Externalities and Public Goods From free-riding to the Coase theorem.
Externalities and Public Goods
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Transcript of Externalities and Public Goods
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Externalities and Public
Goods
Chapter 17
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Chapter Seventeen Overview
1. Motivation
2. Inefficiency of Competition with Externalities
3. Allocation Property Rights to Restore Optimality • The Coase Theorem• Problems with the Coase Approach• Other Methods to Restore Optimality – Standards and
Fees
4. Public Goods• A Taxonomy• Demand for Public Goods• Free Riders and the Supply of Public Goods
Chapter Seventeen
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3Chapter Seventeen
Externalities
Definition: If one agent's actions imposes costs on another party, the agent exerts a negative externality, while if the agent's actions have benefits for another party, the agent exerts a positive externality.
• Network externalities, snob effects• Wind chimes
When externalities are present, the competitive market may not attain the Pareto Efficient outcome.
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4Chapter Seventeen
Inefficiency of Competition with Externalities
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5Chapter Seventeen
Inefficiency of Competition with Externalities
Private Social Change Optimum
• Consumers Surplus A+B+G +K A - B - C - K • Private Producers Surplus E+ F+ R+H+N B+E+F+R+H+G B + G - N
• Externality Cost -R-H-N-G-K-M -R-H-G M+N+K
• Net Social Benefits A+B+E+F-M A+B+E+F M(consumer surplus + private producersurplus - cost of externality)
• Deadweight Loss M zero M
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6Chapter Seventeen
Inefficiency of Competition with Externalities
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7Chapter Seventeen
Inefficiency of Competition with Externalities
Private Social Change Optimum
• Private Consumers Surplus B+E +F B+E+F+G+K+L G+K+L •Producers Surplus G+R F+G+R+J+M F+J+M
• Externality Benefit A+H+J A+H+J+M+N+T M+N+T
• Government Cost from Subsidy zero -F-G-J-K-L-M-T -F-G-J-K-L-M-T •Net Social Benefits A+B+E+F A+B+E+F+G+H M+N(consumer surplus + private producer +G+H+J+R +J+M+N+Rsurplus - cost of externality)
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8Chapter Seventeen
Competitive Market & Social Optimum
Competitive market: p = MPC Social optimum: p = MSC
Competitive market creates a dead-weight loss (socially excessive negative externalities)
This is because the polluter does not have to pay for pollution
Socially optimal amount of waste is non-zero.
How can we restore optimality?
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9Chapter Seventeen
Competitive Market & Social Optimum
Emissions Standards – A governmental limit on the amount of pollution that may be emitted.
Emissions Fee – A tax imposed on pollution that is released into the environment.
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Pp ($/ton)
Qp (tons/day)W (units/day)0
MCP
MCS = MCP + MCW
MCW
Demand for Paper
Chapter Seventeen
Methods to Restore Optimality
Emissions Standards (quota)
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Demand for paper
MCW
MCP
•
•
•eS
MCG
MCP
QS= Quota
T
Chapter Seventeen
Pp ($/ton) MCS = MCP + MCW
Other Methods to Restore Optimality
What is the marginal cost of pollution at the social optimum?
Emissions Standards (quota)
Qp (tons/day)W (units/day)
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12Chapter Seventeen
Restoring Optimality
Definition: A property right is a legal rule that describes what economic agents can do with an object or idea.
Deed to parcel of land; patent on a method
Common Property – A resource, such as a public park or a highway that anyone can access.
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13Chapter Seventeen
Suppose that paper mill may reduce its emissions of gunk by installing filters and fishermen can reduce emissions by installing a water treatment plant.
Restoring Optimality – Paper Mill & Fishermen
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14Chapter Seventeen
Restoring Optimality – Paper Mill & Fishermen
Case 1: No explicit rights allocation
• Nash outcome: no filter, treatment plant • Joint payoff = 700 (not Pareto efficient)
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15Chapter Seventeen
Case 2: Fishermen have property right to no Pollution (and so, set a fee of, say, $500 for receiving pollution)
Restoring Optimality – Paper Mill & Fishermen
Nash Outcome: Filter, No treatment
Joint Payoff = 800 (Pareto Efficient)
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16Chapter Seventeen
Restoring Optimality – Paper Mill & Fishermen
Case 3: Mill has right to pollute. Suppose the mill "sells" right to fresh water (i.e. obligation to install filter) for $250:
Nash Outcome: Filter, No
Treatment Joint Payoff = 800 (Pareto Efficient)
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17Chapter Seventeen
The Coase Theorem
• If there are no impediments to bargaining, assigning property rights results in the efficient outcome (at which joint profits are maximized).
• Efficiency is achieved regardless of who receives the property rights.
• Who gets the property rights affects the income distribution: the property rights are valuable. (The party with the property rights is compensated by the other party.)
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18Chapter Seventeen
The Coase Theorem
• Transaction Costs may be high;
• Large numbers of injured parties;
• Incomplete/Asymmetric Information.
e.g. What are the long run effects of genetic engineering?
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19Chapter Seventeen
Public Goods
Definition: Rivalry in consumption means that only one person can consume a good: the good is used up in consumption (it can be depleted).
Definition: Exclusion in consumption means that others can be prevented from consuming a good.
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Exclusion No exclusion
Rivalry Pure Privategoods: Apple
Commons:Fisheries
No Rivalry Club goods:concert
Pure publicgood: cleanair
Chapter Seventeen
Definition: Private goods have properties of rivalry and exclusion. Pure Public goods lack both rivalry and exclusion. Club goods lack rivalry but have property of exclusion. Common property lacks exclusion but does have the property of rivalry.
Public Goods
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21Chapter Seventeen
Demand for Public Goods
Because public goods lack rivalry, the aggregate demand is the aggregate willingness to pay curve: the vertical sum of the individual demand curves.
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Price ($/unit)
Quantity of Public GoodD1
400
300
200
100
10030Chapter Seventeen
Efficient Provision of a Public Good
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D2
Chapter Seventeen
Price ($/unit)
Quantity of Public Good
400
300
200
100
Efficient Provision of a Public Good
0
D1
10030 200
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MC = 240
MC = 50
Chapter Seventeen
D2
Price ($/unit)
Quantity of Public Good
400
300
200
100
Efficient Provision of a Public Good
0
D1
30 200100
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MSB
Chapter Seventeen
MC = 240
MC = 50D2
Price ($/unit)
Quantity of Public Good
400
300
200
100
0
D1
30 200100
Efficient Provision of a Public Good
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MC = 400
Chapter Seventeen
MSB
MC = 240
MC = 50D2
Price ($/unit)
Quantity of Public Good
400
300
200
100
0
D1
30 200100
Efficient Provision of a Public Good
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27Chapter Seventeen
Example
Consumer 1: P1 = 100 - QConsumer 2: P2 = 200 - Q
How would we determine the efficient level of the public god algebraically assuming the marginal cost of the public good is $240?
Summing P1 and P2, we obtain
MSB = P1 + P2 = 100 - Q + 200 - Q =
300 - 2Q
Efficient Provision of a Public Good
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28Chapter Seventeen
Efficient Provision of a Public Good
Setting MSB = MC, we have:
300 - 2Q = 240
Or
Q* = 30
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29Chapter Seventeen
Free Rider
Definition: a free rider benefits from an action of other (s) without paying for that action.
Solutions to the free rider problem
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30Chapter Seventeen
Summary
1. When one agent's actions affect another agent, the agent exerts an externality.
2. When externalities are present the competitive market may not attain the Pareto Efficient outcome.
3. We can restore optimality by assigning property rights to the cause of the externality (The Coase Theorem).
4. If we follow this approach, efficiency is achieved regardless of who receives the property rights; however, the property rights affect the income distribution.
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31Chapter Seventeen
Summary
5. When transaction costs are high or there is asymmetric or incomplete information, allocating property rights may not restore optimality.
6. Other methods of restoring optimality include standards and fees.
7. Private goods have the properties of rivalry and exclusion. Other types of goods exist that do not have these properties.
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32Chapter Seventeen
Summary
8. Goods that lack rivalry and exclusion are called pure public goods.
9. The demand for pure public goods is the vertical sum of the individual willingness to pay for the good.
10. Pure public goods tend to be undersupplied by the market.