Extended Essay - Mohamed Amine Belarbi

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Red Cross Nordic United world College

Western Sahara: The

Best Political Model

for a resolution

Mohamed Amine Belarbi

Candidate Number:

000858 - 013

May 2012

Word Count : 3998



2

Table of content:

1. Introduction: The necessity for a solution --------------------------------P.2

2. International extension of the conflict--------------------------------------P.2

3. Proposed Solutions-------------------------------------------------------------P.3

ReferendumThe Autonomy Plan

4. My Plan --------------------------------------------------------------------------P.6

General Framework

Economic Partnership benefits

Geopolitical and strategic cooperation gains

Social Advantage of the framework

5. Limitations of the model-------------------------------------------------------P.9

6. Conclusion-----------------------------------------------------------------------P.9

7. BIBLIOGRAPHY ------------------------------------------------------------P.XI

8. APPENDIX -------------------------------------------------------------------P.XII



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1. Introduction: The necessity to find a solution

The necessity to find a solution for the Western Sahara Conflict is now becoming more pressing than

ever. Many countries are entrenched in the conflict and do not allow for solutions to surface. My

research of the past solutions led me to analyze the flows and weaknesses which led to the failure of

every model; hence my resolution template advocates a win-win situation that I intend to advancethrough a model which I will develop in this assessment. This outcome I maintain would serve the

nationalist interests of the Sahrawi struggle and the economic needs necessary for the Moroccan

stability.

2. International extension of the conflict:

The conflict of Western Sahara is far from being a regional conflict where only Morocco and the

Polisario front are involved in. The issue is a complex geostrategic game where not only the known

parties are present, but where the international community and precisely the western super powers

are actively involved in securing interests and benefits.

As Toby Shelley mentioned in his book, “Exploration, evaluation and exploitation of resources run

through the plot of the modern history of the Western Sahara. From the late 1940s the spotlight was

on phosphates; from the mid-1970s fishing rights grew in importance; now oil – always in the wings –

has taken center stage. In future, it could be vanadium.” 1

The United States in one part, has an important tactical approach in dealing with the case of WS,

since while complying with international laws in not recognizing Moroccan sovereignty over Western

Sahara, the U.S nonetheless backs the Moroccan position by closing its eyes over the illegal aspects

of the Moroccan presence in the territory and protecting their ally in the Security Council by

opposing any actions able to condemn Morocco by the international community. This can be easily

understood in the framework of the American foreign policy philosophy, clearly pictured by the

famous proverb: “The USA doesn’t have friends, the USA has only interests”. These interests, mainly

in the domain of counter terrorism and Islamism control, have led the USA to stay careful in not

allowing any disturbance of the Moroccan regime who proved over the years to be a fervent server

of the US interests in the region.

Another major player in the Sahara dossier is France, Morocco’s primary ally. After Moroccan

independence in 1956, France didn’t leave the country totally, since the interests of the country in

Morocco had to be preserved, and so the French administration made sure to leave a complying

regime with the French wishes in keeping a tight grip over the many political and economic interests

abounding in the region, especially in Western Sahara.

The phosphate exploitation, the fisheries resources and the hypothetical presence of oil has led

major countries to approve the situation in Western Sahara and to back Morocco up, and this

support has been countered with generous concessions from the Moroccan authorities, be it through

the advantageous fisheries agreements with the EU, passing by the military and intelligence

cooperation in counter terrorism with the US, without forgetting the phosphate provisioning for the

world industries at appealing rates.

1Toby Shelley, End Game in the Western Sahara, p. 61.



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This being said, the Polisario finds support as well from international players who try to overcome

the western influence in the dossier, and among these states Algeria and Libya, followed by several

Latin American and African countries.

Algeria, considered as the Big brother who dictates Polisario behavior, has more than once expressed

its intent to bring Morocco’s quest for regional hegemony to an end, hence supporting the majormilitary resistance to the kingdom through logistical and financial backing of the Polisario. But the

strategic plan of Algiers doesn’t stop at a simple North African supremacy, but extends to economic

benefits in seeing the emergence of an independent state in Western Sahara, and that is explained

by the need of Algiers administration to find a corridor leading to the Atlantic Ocean instead of

keeping one maritime door on the Mediterranean.

This international interest in the regions’ resources led to a stagnating situation were resolution

attempts were doomed to fail, and one of these failures is the referendum which never took place.

A revision of the previously proposed solutions imposes itself in order to examine and thus concludewhat led to the failure of these attempts, and to furthermore understand what makes my model

stands out in comparison with notably the Referendum and the Autonomy Plan.

3. Proposed solutions: Referendum

The referendum, as prescribed in UN resolutions and as emphasized by the UN fourth Committee on

Special Political and Decolonization, is the only recourse the international community can have to

deal with cases of non-self-governing territories. The application of the process is an act the UN’s

member nations abide by when integrating the UN and adopting the charters, treaties and covenants

which the organization’s work has been built upon.

The implementation of the referendum would not only be a victory for international law respect, but

would also provide the Saharawi population with their right to determine their faith and choose

between either integrate Morocco, get their independence or adopt the autonomy plan.

Yet, the referendum has failed, and one of the major hindrances which stopped the UN Settlement

Plan from being implemented is the difficulty of identification of the voters eligible to participate in

the self-determination process. While the Polisario holds on the census made by the Spanish colonial

administration and which listed the inhabitants of Western Sahara in 1974, Morocco claims the right

for Sahrawis living in the Moroccan territories who fled the Spanish occupation and later the

Moroccan settlers who’ve been transported onto the territories to participate in the referendum, aclaim Polisario front rejects strongly and categorically.

As Yahia H. Zoubir 2

puts it, although the provisional list of voters was finalized by MINURSO in

December 1999 and made public by the UN in January 2000, Morocco blocked the countdown to the

referendum again. It lodged some 130.000 appeals, 95% of which were devoid of any legal or

practical basis.3

2

Professor of International Relations and Management at the Euro med Marseille School of Management,France3 IPJET , Yahia H. Zoubir , International Law and the Question of Western Sahara, 284



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The Polisario, who refers to the demographic manipulation which the Sahrawi society has been

subject to, sees in the obstruction made by Morocco on the 1974 census a way to stop the efforts for

a potential realization of the referendum, and accuses the Kingdom’s authorities of allegedly

transporting Moroccan settlers onto the Western Sahara while deporting Sahrawis into Moroccan

territories in a clear attempt to make use of the settlers as a safe card to display if a referendum is

ever to be hold.

The Moroccan authorities have more than once made objections on the holding of a referendum by

obstructing UN efforts in the identification process of eligible voters, and that has been displayed by

the submission of Morocco of an additional list of 130.000 voters after the end of the UN census in

2000.

As the current situation of the status quo is favorable for the Moroccan regime, both economic and

politically, the potential enrollment of the Kingdom in serious efforts to find an adequate solution

remains improbable, especially that the major superpowers encourage such a stagnation which

serves their interest in the area.

Yet, an agreement in the fields of politics, economy and security could be reached if efforts are

deployed in order to adopt a win-win situation where both parties benefit while making few

sacrifices. This agreement framework is further detailed in previous sections where I discussed the

mechanisms of overcoming the winner-takes-all deadlock.

Although the referendum short term consequence will be the fulfillment of a long wished outcome,

the long term impact on the Moroccan internal situation will be as disastrous as the continuity of the

conflict itself.

The Moroccan society is a complex and diverse entity which counts in its ranks several ethnical

groups, among which appears the Arabs, the Berber native population and the Rif population as well

as the Sahrawis living in the southern part of the country. This social mixture is more of an explosive

cocktail which has, throughout the years been living together in a nervous peaceful situation, subject

to destabilization by minor disputes or social differences.

A potential establishment of a referendum in the Western Sahara would ultimately sparkle claims all

over Morocco for such a process, and the requests from different regions to be granted similar

privilege will tear apart the centralized power of the regime in Rabat, leading it to losing control over

the political, judicial and economic privileges it was given throughout the 1200 years of royalty in

Morocco.

If the economic and socio-political benefits of the Western Sahara exploitation are to remain, this

would ultimately pose no threat to the internal stability of the kingdom, regardless of the party who

controls the region.

An advanced collaboration and mutual exploitation of the WS resources in the cadre of a common

economic system where both the Moroccan administration and the Polisario cooperate in investing

in and supporting each other’s financial structure would serve as a potential solution to the fear of

social disturbance Morocco is trying to prevent. This framework solution will be discussed later on in

the economic and socio-political benefits section of my personal model.



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Unachievable, the referendum has been discarded in favor of other solutions, among which the

Autonomy plan supported by Morocco.

The Autonomy plan:

The constant deadlock the negotiations have been through imposed a new reality over the conflictresolution, a reality not abiding necessarily by UN resolutions. The status of the Western Sahara,

according to international law is without opposition a non-self-governing territory which requires the

implementation of a referendum in order to allow the native population to determine their faith, yet

we notice the constant stagnation of the dossier in the UN corridor. The Realpolitik as we know it

today imposed a whole new approach to international conflict, and the Western Sahara dossier is

part of this global chess game where the interests are served regardless of the international law.

Morocco, by maintaining the status quo in Western Sahara, serves its political and social stability

while ensuring the economic interests of the EU and the USA, in a everyone-is-winning situation. The

proposal of the autonomy is a breakthrough and a premiere in Morocco’s concessions in the issue,and enabling the Polisario to become a political power able to operate from the inside of the

Western Sahara through governmental organs is a chance the front ought to consider.

In his report to the Security Council, Annan stated that, in addition to the fact that the referendum

could not take place until at least 2002, in view of the differences between Morocco and Polisario:

“[…] it would be essential that the parties now offer specific and concrete solutions to the multiple

problems relating to the implementation of the plan that can be agreed to or, alternatively, be

prepared to consider other ways of achieving an early, durable and agreed resolution of their dispute

over Western Sahara” 4

The autonomy proposal, first presented by the Secretary Generals’ special envoy James Baker

annexed to his report to the Security Council on 20 June 20015, was developed as an alternative

framework agreement to the deadlock the conflict was in, and the draft framework agreement

conferred on the “population” of Western Sahara the right to elect their own executive and legislative

bodies and to have exclusive competence over local government administration, territorial budget

and taxation, law enforcement, internal security, social welfare, […]. Morocco would have exclusive

competence over foreign relations, national security (including anti-secession measures), and external

defense, and the flag, currency, customs, and postal and communication systems of the Moroccan

Kingdom should be the same for Western Sahara.6

Yet looking as an appealing option, many are those who suspect the political willingness of Morocco

to implement effectively such a solution, and these fears have been reported in Franks’ Rudy work in

a simple yet expressive sentence : “The Moroccan limited autonomy plan for Western Sahara […]

might sound like a step forward, at least until one reads the not-so-fine print ”7

Though an appealing prospect for the conflict resolution, the Polisario front repeatedly rejects the

autonomy plan on several bases, some emanating from a legal aspect and others relating to a more

4UN Doc. S/2000/461, 22 May 2000

5

Erik Jensen, Western Sahara: Anatomy of a stalemate, 1066 Erik Jensen, Western Sahara: Anatomy of a stalemate, 106

7 IPJET , Frank Ruddy , International Law and the Question of Western Sahara, 12



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deep mistrust between the Sahrawis and the Moroccan authorities. From a legal perspective, the

autonomy plan and its enforcement over the Sahrawis is a breach of the internationally recognized

rights of the non-self-governing territories and populations to determine their faith through a fair

and just referendum, and that any attempt to impose a certain solution on these people is an

unlawful act and a violation of their sovereign right over their future.

Besides the legal contradiction of the proposed autonomy with international law, the Sahrawis have

deeper motives to reject such a proposal, mainly because of the lack of trusteeship between the

parties of the conflict. The autonomy, as a political framework which grants a certain region more

independence from the central power and which enable its people to govern themselves by

themselves through governmental organs under their supervision and control, needs first to be

allocated mechanisms of Human rights protection in order to ensure the fair and real

implementation of such framework without the intervention of the authorities with the aim of

limiting or taking hold of the powers conferred to the people in order to dictate freely the laws they

want to be subject to.

Finally, the Saharawi people have more than once expressed their will for independence, as reported

by the UN Visiting Mission to Western Sahara8. According to the report of the Mission, there was an

overwhelming majority consensus among the population in favor of national independence and

against integration with any neighboring State. 9 Imposing a certain political solution over the

population will bring more animosity and refusal from the Sahrawis, and even in case the solution is

enforced, it will only make from Western Sahara an instable region where the armed struggle will be

the first option the Sahrawis will go for, bringing the conflict to the starting point again.

4. My plan:

General framework

My plan stands upon several pillars, those being economic, political and social attributes to be

observed in any future settlement solution.

The main feature of my framework is the inclusion of the UN or the OAU as a primary collaborator in

the implementation of the framework, and that through including the Western Sahara under the

supervision of the UN/OAU administration, this administration being a collaborative structure

involving representatives from Polisario and Morocco. The first assignment of the new administration

would be to ensure the return of the refugees to the WS. This administration would have as well the

exclusivity of making a study on the prospects of holding a future referendum and the establishmentof voting lists based on 1974 census, and also the administrative body would have the privilege of

modeling the cooperation mechanisms between the two future distinct political bodies, this being

done along with trust building measures between both the Moroccan and Saharawi population and

also between the political entities of Morocco and the Polisario front.

The study led by the transitional administration would focus on the establishment of resources

division, sharing and exploitation plans, and the drafting of a special UN status for Western Sahara in

case of non-feasibility of referendum, this special status having the following aspects as a starting

point for the finalization of the entire plan:

8See UN Doc. A/10023/Add.5,Annex, pp. 48-56

9 Erik Jensen, Western Sahara: Anatomy of a stalemate, 66



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No border drawing with virtual delimitation of areas

Collaboration and partnership in resources sharing

Mutual investment and exchange of expertise between political bodies

Different and distinct political administrations with advanced collaboration escalating to

potential overlapping and merging of functions

Non-militarized zone in previously high tension regions with ability to be crossed in case of

mutual agreement for military or police assistance

Withdrawal of UN/OAU administrative and military personnel after specific period unless

otherwise requested by both parties

Economic partnership benefits (Resources)

Talking about the Western Sahara without discussing its economic importance for Morocco, the

Saharawi people and the international community is simply scratching the surface of a deep rooted

conflict in the free market economy game.

Any framework should ultimately preserve the economic benefits which Morocco enjoyed during its

excessive exploitation of the Western Sahara wealth, especially that these benefits are securing the

stability and royalty insurance inside Morocco, making from the Kingdom’s prosperity a closely

bonded subject the framework should insure.

The Military expenditures in the Western Sahara have been and are, throughout the conflict, a major

issue for the national budget which sees a big share of it allocated to the maintenance of military

facilities and ground troops in a part of the continent which, because of its harsh environmental

conditions, dooms the maintenance fees to an exponential increase.

In 1983, US Congress heard estimates that Morocco was spending 1.9 billion $ a year on prosecuting

the war.10

These expenses tend to decrease, but the major financial input in the conflict came after

the war, with the wall of sands’ construction. The project, partly funded by the Saudi Arabian regime,

yet still a painful financial weigh which cut on a budget supposedly meat for Morocco’s development.

Given that the Moroccan Royal Armed Forces comprise approximately 250,000 men, it can be

roughly estimated that around half the kingdom’s military budget is devoted to the Western

Sahara.11

With these military costs being redirected to investments inside Morocco, financing efficient projects

to create employment opportunities and attract foreign investments through more modernized

infrastructures and public services, Morocco’s mediocre performance in development indexes and

world rankings can be brought back to more positive advance, especially that 15% of the national

budget, previously spent into military presence in Western Sahara, could be spared and incorporated

in other institutions funds and financial prospects.

10Cited by Leo Kamil, Fueling the fire: US policy and the Western Sahara conflict , Red Sea Press, New Jersey,

1987 p. 8011 Morocco’s military budget rose to $1.7 billion in 2004. See “L’Année Stratégique 2004”, Institute of

International and Strategic Relations, 2004.



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Besides the benefits from such a withdrawal of Moroccan military presence in the area, my

framework focuses on the potential economic collaboration between Morocco and an independent

state, and how such cooperation would allow a bilateral benefit in the cadre of a win-win situation.

Military expertise exchange

Free trade agreements Fishing/Mining licenses

Moroccan investment in W.S

Employment opportunities growth

Geopolitical and strategic cooperation gains

If the Western Saharan conflict is a regional issue, its implications are far greater, and the frozen

Moroccan Algerian relations as well as the stagnation of the Maghreb Union plus the internal

divergences inside the Organization of the African Unity are only one of the many repercussions of

the conflict on the international scene, as advanced by I. William Zartman:

‘The result of the non-solution of the Saharan conflict was the temporary destruction of the African

regional organization, of its activities, and of its progress toward conflict resolution.’12

The resolution of the issue will not only boost the regional cooperation between the Maghreb

countries, but would also enhance the economic and political cooperation between the North African

countries which enjoy complementary economic systems.

Social advantage of the framework

One of the major points which Moroccan partisans advance is the necessity of maintaining theMoroccan presence in Western Sahara as a mean to secure the social and political stability of the

Kingdom by not allowing the different ethnic groups of following the path of the Sahrawis in their

struggle for independence or advanced autonomy.

But what we must not overlook is the deep connection between the social stability and the socio-

economic conditions of the country.

Lebanon, for example, though being a far more diverse and conflicting case, has been able to

stabilize the country through the major economic investments and the importance given to the

socio-economic situation in ensuring the peaceful cohabitation of the Sunnis, Shia and Christians tomention only those, during the period of Rafiq Hariri.

If Morocco is to invest strongly in the sectors of social welfare, the threat of ethnical chaos would

become an unnecessary worry for the regime. As explained in the section above about the economic

benefits of the possible withdrawal of Morocco from Western Sahara, the internal economy would

be revived thank to the spared investments in the military and in the territory plus the economic

partnership with a Western Saharan government.

12 I. William Zartman, Ripe for Resolution conflict and Intervention in Africa, Updated Edition, New York Oxford,

Oxford University press, 1989, p.47



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5. Limitations of the model:

The model argued for in this essay redresses most of the issues normal templates solutions have

failed to address, and the mechanisms with which to implement a lasting win-win solution are talked

about whereas conventional frameworks advanced by both antagonists and the UN are lacking

practical devices able to bring ideal resolutions into the field.

Yet, my model has its own set of disadvantages which limit its efficacy and realization. One of the

disadvantages is the lack of an enforcement mechanism which will push the conflicting parties to

adopt it regardless of their willingness and consent. Enforcement, if one is to be planned and led by

the UN or the AU will have a negative impact on the conflict, leading to an expenditure of the armed

struggle into neighboring countries due to alliances and security pacts.

Furthermore, my research lacks statistics which are fundamental to any solution template since it

gives a preview of the general tendency several fields will adopt, ranging from economic impact of

the implementation of the plan till the social response of the country’s citizens, as well as theinfluence that would have on international relations and world politics.

This model faces not only challenges in its implementation due to the interests’ conflict between

Morocco and the Polisario, but also its efficiency is subject to questioning especially in a

geostrategic cadre where international parties are actively involved.

6. Conclusion:

The richness of the Western Sahara region with fisheries, Phosphate mines and potential oil deposits

can sustain both the Moroccan and Sahrawi economic system if spent efficiently. By Giving the

Western Sahara its independence, Morocco wouldn’t gain spare the financial resources spent on

military presence in the region, resources which can be redirected towards empowering the

industrial sector in the country and boost production capacities Morocco lacks, but also the kingdom

can have still access to the wealth of the Western Sahara through special licenses of exploitation

given exclusively to Morocco. The establishment of a privileged status for Morocco, in the same way

the EU granted the country an advanced cooperation status with the European Union, assigned by

the Western Sahara’s government, would allow the young country to benefit from the logistical and

political support of Morocco, in exchange of low rates of financial costs on exportation to the

kingdom and additional exploitation rights. Securing financial benefits from the Western Sahara will

ultimately lead to the stabilization of the internal situation in the country, where the investmentsdue to the spared money on military and the income from the Western Sahara’s privileges will

increase in a way the political security of the regime who won’t be threatened by a socio-economic

catastrophe. The cooperation between an independent state in the Sahara and the Moroccan

government would be far more fruitful and rewarding than the prolonging of the conflict, a conflict

which has been withdrawing considerable resources out of the national budget for more than 36

years.

Word Count: 3998



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Appendix:

Follows an article I wrote succeeding my visit to the Saharawi refugee camps in Tindouf, South West

Algeria. The visit was meant to be a complementary material to support my EE and to test the

political model on the ground through negotiating and presenting the resolution framework to the

Governmental and Non-Governmental officials. The feedback collected was directed towards

improving my model and redressing some of the flaws pointed out during my visit to the camps by

civilians and state officials.

I am a Moroccan student going to Tindouf! Yet being the one going, I spent much more time in

digesting this idea than the time of my whole trip. Was I a fool or a suicidal to do so, a traitor

conspiring with the enemy maybe? No, I was a freeman with a free conscience and free will, looking

for something beyond conventional ideas and opinions channeled to me through different mediums.

With only a backpack full of clothes, a laptop without battery and a newly acquired camcorder, I

sailed toward an unseen destination, a place lying somewhere in the desert which has witnessed so

many events that it ultimately shaped the history of my country as I see it today.

Chapter ONE When I went into the aircraft and finally found my seat, something strange and interesting

happened, pushing me to start a long period thinking and wondering about the essence and nature

of my trip to the refugee camps.

Once seated, the first thing I thought was: ‘Awesome, I got the seat next to the window, I’ll have the

chance to contemplate the wonders of the view from above!’, and indeed I saw an interesting thing,

but the only difference was that we didn’t need to fly over the skies to gaze at the terrific landscapes.

The thing I saw was simply a sentence written on the wing of the plane “Do not walk outside this

area”.

Astonishingly, I made a direct connection between the sentence and what I was up to, overlooking

the literal meaning of the notice. I was indeed walking outside a specific area; I was getting out of

that delimited box which has been shaped for me for so many years. Whether calling it a leap of

intellectual freedom or a reality prison-break, it was at the end something beyond the conventionalstandards almost every Moroccan was abiding by.

A ‘normal’ Moroccan, being generally defined as a nationalistic and patriotist citizen, would have

never dare explore the idea of challenging the official story about the Western Sahara, to critically

think about the information we are asked to ingurgitate every day, without wondering about its

nature, source and level of veracity.

Whether to refute or to strengthen the pre manufactured opinion every citizen jealous over his

national integrity has, my trip was far beyond the simple detective work aimed at modeling a certain

political stance over the Sahara issue.



14

My main purpose was to adopt a new perspective in dealing with issues I had an opinion about, yet

never experienced. Hearing about international crisis and throwing shiny statements and speeches in

the air, with the only justification of working toward the resolution of the conflict is totally pointless

if we have never worked toward analyzing first hand data and direct interaction with the parties

involved in the problem.

Media has so long been discredited, and the biased coverage of international events is widely

recognized as a political tool to serve specific agendas and parties.

Independence and objectiveness are in nowadays lifestyle myths frozen in the past centuries, or even

in the past millenniums since no historical transcripts or documents can testify of a fair and

transparent information processing in ancient civilizations where no outside force has intervened to

deviate the truth for a certain purpose.

Once I set foot in the college, I knew that a new period of my life has begun, a period characterized

by dynamism and action, thing which would push my interaction with the outside world to becomefull of tension and highly instable.

This tension clearly appeared in the behavior my family had toward my trip and the project I was

involved in. As a Moroccan son of a Moroccan family, the fact of intruding the world of officials and

political figures, of disturbing the area of the grown-ups who deal with international affairs and

sensitive dossiers with my little stubbornness to prove something no-body cared about, was a serious

challenge for me and a lifetime battle to definitively trace my path: A conventional obedient citizen

or a stubborn troubles seeker rebel.

My choice was clear and not subject to any change or remodeling.

For the simple purpose of gaining self-satisfaction and fulfilling the personal defiance I set to myself, I

would have chosen to be the rebel, but my choice was motivated by factors which are far more pure

and intellectually high-standardized than to fall into the childish decisions or rushes of revolutionary

anti-social needs, typical of all teens who are fed up with social and parental control.

Now that I am writing these lines, I already started feeling the righteousness of my decision. The life

of tension and electrical situations, the seeking for adrenaline and spy-agents-like rush of emotions

was emerging from the imaginary scenes I used to appreciate during my free-time day-dreaming slot,

to the real life situation I was bored of living few days ago.

The flight from Paris to Algiers was quite fast, and before ending up my small play inside my head

where I was arrested for spying in the camps and other weird stuff, I found myself in the passport

check area, with armed police forces and serious Algerian officers behind the desk, all in uniforms.

The moment I got to talk to the officer charged of the passport inspection, things turned like the

endless scenes spinning restlessly in my mind. The officer took a more serious position, hardened his

features and asked me what I was attempting to do in Tindouf, as specified in my traveling form.

Quite hesitantly I started formulating words about the purpose of my travel, and my shaking hands

put several documents on the desk, papers testifying of the cause of my trip, ranging from

recommendation letters to written invitations from Saharawi organizations.



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The guy seemed oblivious to me for a while, not paying attention to the papers or to my confused

speech. Before ending my talk, the officer turned and asked some other people to call a certain

‘Mohamed’. Meanwhile, I was asked to step aside, and the officer sank again in his mechanical work,

dealing with the rest of the passengers who seemed to flow constantly.

After few minutes, the supposedly named Mohamed showed up, and from the bits of conversation Igot, they were talking about ‘that Marroqui who is screwing something in Tindouf’, a conversation

cut short after Mohamed mentioned something about certain ‘people who came in the morning and

the Marroqui was with them’. They both looked back at me, smiled and asked me to take my

passport and go ahead.

Quite surprisingly, I managed to focus on what was happening after a period of total confusion, since

I had no idea about who were those people who came in the morning and with whom I was

apparently with, and why I was suddenly freed to leave with no questions or further administrative

procedures.

That was how ended a long journey of expectations, fears and excitement about an unknown future

where only a blind could find his way, while a normal individual would ultimately end up trapped in

the many holes his minds creates, hole not meant to exist, but by the constant effort to speculate

and forecast unpredictable events, one’s ends up bringing them to life, regularly feeding them by

wondering, fearing and doubting about what’s coming next.

Chapter two:

Finally, after hours of waiting and flying, I found myself in Tindouf, which appeared at first sight like a

modern and normal city, far away from the ghost place described constantly by the national media

back home.

At the borders checkpoint, the officials followed the normal procedure, taking care of the paperwork

and asking for few information, among which one would have caused me troubles if my Saharawi

host didn’t show up to finalize the details of my stay and accommodation:

When I was asked to state the location where I’ll spend my week, I simply answered ‘in the refugee

camps’, not knowing that these camps were a set of six separated blocs, each one with a specific

name and with a notable population.

I walked outside the small airport, my head still spinning from the realization that I was here, in

Tindouf, the stronghold of the Polisario. My bewilderment soon vanished when I knew that this was

in no case a Polisario HQ, but rather was an Algerian city, which the close distance from the refugee

camps gave the reputation of a Sahrawi city.

After few steps out, a huge and dark Land Rover, with a nice embedded logo in the car door saying

‘PROTOCOLES’, appeared in the street, overshadowing the rest of the vehicles present in the

surrounding.

The driver’s appearance was more surprising than anything else: He was small, dark skinned, his head

was covered in a black scarf typically folded in the Sahrawi way and he was curved behind the huge

wheel, almost his size. Everything contrasted, from the setting to the driver’s appearance, giving theimpression that we were in terrorists training camps in Afghanistan.



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It sounded unreal when we climbed up the back of the Land Rover, called by the Sahrawis the tank or

in Arabic ‘Dabbaba’ for obvious reasons, and started driving along the sandy track at a crazy speed,

throwing us in the air from side to side painfully each time the truck bumped on a rock.

Driving in the dark, with dunes everywhere and sand coming out like flames from the ground, I

realized that this is the life I was hoping for, the action I wanted to live. A huge smile was on my facethe whole trip, but a strong fear was building inside me, a fear from the so called mercenaries the

media warned us against, an anxiety from ending up in an unknown place with masked people

torturing me and pointing AK-47s at my head.

It was definitely my imagination working full-speed, and the any movies I used to watch apparently

substituted craziness to reason in my overwhelmed brain.

The travel from Tindouf to the school of 27th of February camp was quick, yet the distance <e crossed

was a considerable 19 Km.

I couldn’t remember how I ended up sleeping in a modest house, but the flash of images recorded

during that night gave me the conviction that the most amazing part was yet to come.

Chapter three

After a deep and relaxing sleep, crucial after the 12 hours of travel, I woke up, aware that this time, it

wasn’t the fjord I would see when looking outside, but an endless horizon filled with dunes and clay

houses, it wasn’t the fresh and cool air of Flekke I would enjoy but a hot and dry wind biting the skin.

I opened my eyes on a bright room I couldn’t recognize, and when I ate eagerly the breakfast, still

excited to gaze at the camps, I set off to the door, opening it quickly, only to see at a first glance aginormous Land Rover again rotting under the sun.

‘Those Land Rovers are everywhere’ I thought!

But when I moved my eyes around, it was barracks everywhere, pieces of metal, barrels and Land

Rovers, and above all, red shiny sand and dunes.

It was like the way the Moroccan media depicted them, but as I noticed afterwards, the Saharawi

society wasn’t limited to the camps’ superficial appearance, but it was a whole set of customs,

traditions, institutions and more.

‘Get in the Land Rover Mohamed’ shouted Hamdi.

We got in and he started to turn on the engine, but the car refused to growl and to give a sign of life.

So basically, the first thing I did, as a guest in the camps, was to push a decades old Land Rover on

the track until it turned on.

As I spent two or three days in the camps, that Land Rover became part of my daily life, pushing it

around two time a day until it accepted to go on its own. The ironic thing was that, once independent

from human assistance, the truck turned totally into a war vehicle, or as Hamdi like to repeat a

‘Dabbaba’.



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Hamdi never kept on track whenever driving: always moving over rocks and bumps, and driving

crazily over the dunes.

I always wondered how it could keep on rolling on its wheels, especially that the dashboard was a set

of wires rolled on sticks and rocks. There were no keys; the only thing you needed was connecting

two wires to turn the truck on, like in movies.

I was a bit disappointed nonetheless to not see armed forces around, AK-47s or military vehicles.

Where were those checkpoints and those walls imprisoning the people here? Nothing!

People were driving around, walking behind their goats or chatting around a cup of tea under the

tents.

The myth of the Polisario started falling apart in my mind.

People I met and talked to, stayed with and drank tea among were the most natural and friendly

people I ever met.

This posed a new challenge to my beliefs and ideas, since after what I saw and lived, I had to make a

huge cleanup in my messy mind, changing a whole story I took for granted into a totally different set

of facts and events, but the challenge didn’t stop here. This experience, still freshly started, pushed

me to question the dogma of absolute truth, its component and the way to defend myself against the

deliberately implemented ideas I was asked and convinced to follow.

Chapter four

A museum in the camps! That was my exclamation when Hamdi told me that we are spending the

morning visiting the national museum. The first image to jump into my mind was the conventional

setting of a museum with ancient reliques and huge skeletons belonging to unknown creatures, but

as usual, the Sahrawis surprised me with a place I could best describe as a History teacher frozen into

walls and pieces of papers and metal.

When I got into the truck, Hamdi, with a shiny smile in his face, said “There are no brakes, they were

screwed up yesterday!”

WTF! Did I sign up for some sort of survival competition or what?! Every day, it’s a new story with

that Land Rover! I still can’t imagine how it is able to be driven anymore.

“Anyway, just make sure to get us alive to that museum!” I replied quietly, almost used to the fact

that the truck was falling in pieces, and it was only a matter of days before it dies completely

somewhere in the desert.

And so we set off, with NO BRAKES, thing which made our trip to the neighboring camp quite funny,

especially when I was hearing Hamdi begging the truck to stop, and praying God that it stood still at

the right moment and in the right place.

At some point, we managed to get to the Museum alive; a Museum which I thought at first was a

military plant because of the tanks, jeeps and mortars I perceived from the entrance.



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We went into the building, accompanied with two military guide, and the modest place, dull and

poorly furnished, disappointed my wild expectations. The whole thing was about documents,

pictures and lot of readings -which I am not fond of-, reminding me painfully of the History classes

back home. But, at some point, paying attention to the guy explaining the issue of colonization and

talking fervently about the military confrontations between the Polisario fighters and Moroccan

troops, I thought he was talking about a different country than mine. Too many facts, too many

memories, too many contradictions with my version of the conflict… That was a lot to make you think

about. As if it seemed not enough, the last area of the museum, and which I was looking forward to

visiting, gave the achieving shot to the excitement which motivated me few hours ago.

The planes, military trucks and missiles didn’t make me clap hands, because I realized these weapons

didn’t serve in a movie nor in a parade, but instead it blew people up in bits, made children orphans,

women widows and men lifetime haters and revenge seekers of the Moroccan Kingdom. Surprisingly,

Morocco had a lot of friends as it appeared from the huge range of arms coming from all over the

world, ranging from Israel to Germany and passing by the apartheid period South Africa.

How could a nation of few tens of thousands of people endure all this, yet never give up? How come

hundreds of Sahrawi fighters kept up with a well-equipped military machine counting 40 thousand

individual at that time? If it’s not the conviction and the faith in a just cause that motivated the

Saharawi struggle, then I’ll seriously consider joining the UFO and ET believers clubs.

But even still confused, I said to myself: This is the great nation you are so proud of belonging to!

Look at the exploits your country made; look at the paragraph of history written in blood which will

soon remind the world of us, not as heroes or a country of peace, but the oppressing power and

oblivious people who gave themselves the right to steal the memory of a nation, the lands and

wealth of those who became homeless and deprived from a life of dignity in camps harsher than anyprison, yet their will and faith pierced every standing obstacle to reach the conscience of the ones

still alive, those who refuse to claim something they don’t own and who cannot accept building their

happiness and comfort with the misfortune of others.

Chapter five

Maybe people would tend to suspect and criticize this sudden change in convictions, although I

wouldn’t describe the fact that I was supporting the Moroccan position as a conviction I believed in.

It was a natural process for me to be pro Moroccan while discussing the Western Sahara issue,

because at that time the only set of information I was exposed to and the ultimate version of history

I was taught in school and through the media has never been challenged by alternative sources,

within Moroccan borders at least.

But as I was brought into a new setting, where I was claiming something everybody refuted, things

started clinging inside my head, and the obvious for me became suspect to change. Is it enough to

walk out with a rigid and unshakable opinion just for the sake of preventing my mind from

brainwashing and misleading facts other tierce parties might seek to implement? Was I holding the

truth only because I believed in it, or is the truth a common good everybody had access t, a common

property we are all doomed to partition in the best way possible, not ultimately the more just and

fair, but at least what would lay foundations for a consensus on what is true and what is not?



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That’s why by challenging my own perception of the conflict, I tried to prove to myself that there is

only one way to be comfortable mentally when unveiling your convictions, and that’s through

building strong bases for your position, bases which are to be brought to life by direct witnessing and

searching in the source place of the issue, criticizing ourselves before others do and never take things

for granted.

Life is an endless show full of ‘coups de théâtre’ where things turn out totally wrong, wrong according

to our previsions and speculations which might be rooted in fake yet convincing lands, and thus the

events which we don’t envisage or don’t want to happen bring us back to new tracks -not necessarily

the right ones-, like an enlightenment or a revelation we are the only ones to appreciate and to fully

understand, like a precious secret we hold on tightly and confide to ourselves for pleasure and unique

satisfaction.13

Mohamed Amine Belarbi

13 Belarbi, Mohamed Amine. ‘Refugee Camps Diary’. Mohamed Amine @ RCNUWC. 15 January 2012. Web.

<http://aminebelarbi.blogspot.com/p/camps-diary.html>

http://aminebelarbi.blogspot.com/p/camps-diary.html




Extended Essay - Mohamed Amine Belarbi

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