Expressive Collective Action Phillip Jones

The Logic of Expressive CollectiveAction: When will IndividualsNail their Colours to the Mast?

Philip Jones

Individuals do not act collectively simply because they recognise common interests; collective interestscan be defined as collective goods and collective goods are non-excludable. In large groupsinstrumental individuals have no incentive to act because individual action is imperceptible. Butare individuals always this instrumental? If it is a mistake to assume that collective action occursnaturally when common interests are recognised, it is a mistake to ignore awareness of commoninterests. Individuals derive satisfaction from expressing identity with common interests but whenwill individuals choose to nail their colours to the mast?

Keywords: expressive; instrumental; collective action

Mancur Olson (1965) rejected the supposition that awareness of common interestsis sufficient to explain collective action. He predicted that a member of a largegroup would not voluntarily support an association even if the association had thepotential to advance a groups common interests (e.g. by lobbying for legislativechange). Each member of the group would recognise that a common goal is freelyavailable; benefits derived from collective action are not contingent on providingsupport. Contribution to an association is tantamount to revealing demand for acollective good. A collective good is non-rival in consumption and non-excludable;consumption by one individual does not reduce availability to others. If it isirrational to reveal demand for a non-excludable good, why incur costs to supportan association? The dominant strategy is to free-ride but if all behave rationallynothing is achieved (there is no free ride).

Olsons analysis does not rely on the assumption that individuals are self-interested.Even if the member of a large group were to neglect his own interests entirely, hestill would not rationally contribute toward the provision of any collective or publicgood since his own contribution would not be perceptible (Olson 1965, 64). Thecritical assumption is that behaviour is instrumental (to change outcome). Why actif action would not be perceptible? Olsons distinction between small and largegroups is premised on this consideration. In large groups individual action isimperceptible; in small groups individual action can exert an impact on outcome(Buchanan 1968). Members of a small group might act collectively but large groupsremain latent (Olson 1965).

While Olson distinguished between market groups and non-market groups (e.g.between firms acting as cartels and groups pressing for legislative change to advan-

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tage the community as a whole), the focus was on instrumental motivation. PatrickDunleavy (1991, 77) suggests that associations can be structured to increase per-ceptions that individual action might be significant. Size manipulation is possibleif influence exerted in a small subset of the association would imply influence in theassociation as a whole. Again the emphasis is on action to change outcome. Butsurely motivation depends on more than ability to influence outcome? The archi-tects of utility theory identified many sources of utility but the evolution of theutility concept during our century has been characterised by a progressive strippingaway of psychology (Lowenstein 1999, 315). Bentham (1948 [1789]) argued thatutility is derived from action, quite apart from outcome contingent on action. Is itreally sufficient to assume that the only motivation to act is to change outcome?

There is already more than a hint of another dimension. Collective action is farmore prevalent than predicted (Johansen 1977; Ledyard 1995); empirical studiesinsist that perceptions of the intrinsic value of action are relevant (e.g. Andreoni1988 and 2001; Frey 1997). An individual is intrinsically motivated to perform anactivity when one receives no apparent reward except the activity itself (Deci 1971,105). Olson focused on action as an investment (to change outcome). What ifindividuals also derive consumption from action (Lee 1988)?

Intrinsic value is derived in different ways. Individuals may feel better aboutthemselves if they act with dignity. Self-esteem might depend on the signal emitted(to oneself and to others). In behavioural experiments, individuals derive a warmglow from philanthropic action (Andreoni 1988 and 2001). Action can also yieldintrinsic interest; the difference between liking and disliking work may well bemore important than remuneration (Scitovsky 1976, 103). While all sources ofintrinsic value are relevant the focus in this article falls on action to express identity.

The term identity is used to describe a persons social category (Akerlof andKranton 2005, 12, emphasis original). Individuals choose action that creates iden-tity; John Wallis (2003, 227) notes that people define who they are in terms of thepeople they interact with and how they interact. Even when identity is preor-dained (e.g. by race, nationality, etc.) individuals still choose whether to emphasiseidentity. George Akerlof and Rachel Kranton (2005, 12) argue that [i]n a model ofutility ... a persons identity describes gains and losses in utility from behaviour thatconforms or departs from the norms for particular social categories in particularsituations.

To explain collective action as a predilection to act collectively explains everythingmerely by re-describing it (Barry 1970, 33). Olsons lesson is well taken; hiscritique of existing explanations (e.g. by Bentley 1908; Truman 1951) reveals thatindividuals do not act collectively just because they [have] similar feelings andideals (Dougherty 2003, 29). There is a distinction between common interests andindividual interests. Individuals might be aware of common interests but have noincentive to act to express identity with common interests. Individuals might deriveutility from action that signals identity with common interests but remain unwillingto incur the costs. But, does this imply that awareness of common interests shouldsimply be ignored? If it is a mistake to explain action as recognition of commoninterests, it is a mistake to ignore awareness of common interests. Individuals deriveintrinsic value from expressing identity with common interests. The challenge is to

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predict when the perceived intrinsic value of this action exceeds the costs that mustbe incurred. Recent empirical studies offer insight; behaviour can be explained withreference to systematic changes in the perceived intrinsic value of action (e.g. Frey1997; Gneezy and Rustichini 2000).

The following section revisits the by-product theory of action by large groups.Analysis premised only on instrumental motivation leaves many questions unan-swered, so much so that, in later sections of the article, the question is not whetherto embrace analysis of willingness to express identity but how to embrace analysisof willingness to express identity.

1. The Logic of Expressive Collective ActionOlson (1965) analysed collective action as a by-product. In the absence of coercion(closed shop arrangements) associations mobilise large groups by offering selec-tive incentives (e.g. cheap insurance, a journal, an invitation to a social or galaoccasion, etc.all contingent on membership). When individuals are instrumental,the larger the group the farther it will fall short of providing an optimal supply ofa collective good and very large groups normally will not, in the absence of coercionor separate outside incentives, provide themselves with even minimal amounts ofa collective good (Olson 1965, 48).

The by-product theory is now common currency.1 The following examples illus-trate the inducement of a private good. An instrumental individual is asked tocontribute 5 to finance pursuit of a collective goal. Achievement of the commonobjective is worth the equivalent of 10 to the individual. In Table 1 net payoff is 5if the individual contributes and others contribute. If others do not contribute, asingle contribution will not matter; there is a loss of 5. If the individual makes nocontribution and others contribute, the individual gains the equivalent of 10 (byfree-riding on provision by others); if others also refuse to contribute the payoff iszero. Payoffs from not contributing dominate those from contributing.

The association might induce action by offering each contributor a private goodworth the equivalent of 6. The cost of contribution is now 5.5 (the additional0.5 is required to cover the cost of the private good). Payoffs in Table 2 reveal thatthe individuals dominant strategy is now to contribute.

It appears a simple matter to demonstrate that a private-good inducement will alterthe balance of payoffs and create an incentive to act. However, this refinement begs

Table 1: Collective Action: The Free-Rider Problem

Others contributeOthers do notcontribute

Contribution 10 - 5 = 5 -5No contribution 10 0

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so many questions. If the selective incentive is to prove successful, private benefitsmust be cheap enough to produce for the surplus generated from contributions tobe large enough to provide both the collective consumption good and the privatebenefits (Laver 1997, 40). The inducement must generate sufficient financialsurplus (in this case a minimum of 5 per member for the collective consumptiongood). But:

(1) If a financial surplus must be generated there is a profit. If there is a profitthere is an incentive to private firms to produce this private good (Stigler1974). Surely, private goods (selective incentives) will be supplied by privatefirms in the market?

(2) If private firms have an incentive to produce the private good, private firmsare at a competitive advantage. Private firms are able to offer private goods andservices at a lower price (because private firms are not committed to incurcosts to provide a collective good). How are associations to survive?

(3) Even if the association survives, where is the motivation to invest any part ofthe financial surplus to provide a common goal? If members are not motivatedby pursuit of the collective goal, political entrepreneurs have no incentive todevote funds to provide the collective good (this will have no effect onsubscription to associations). Why do associations supply collective goods(Stigler 1974; Fireman and Gamson 1979; Udehn 1996)? Even if somemembers did join the union as a result of the selective benefits on offer,yielding a surplus for the union that could be deployed in the production ofcollective benefits, why would union officials deploy their surplus in thisway? (Laver 1997, 41).Laver emphasises that political entrepreneurs must be secular saints for thetheory to hold (they must forgo pecuniary gain to devote profit to a commoncause). Of course philanthropy is possible (Glaeser and Schleifer 1998) but theby-product theory is far from robust (if it appears to rely on a contrivedasymmetry between entrepreneurial aspirations in market and non-marketstructures).

(4) Although so many key theoretical questions remain unanswered, criticsusually focus on empirical investigation. If private-good inducements reallyprovide the motivation, why do empirical studies insist that private goods andservices (selective incentives) are of little concern to members? Questionnairestudies report that members have little interest in selective incentives. Respon-dents insist that their motivation is pursuit of common interests (Jordan andMaloney (1996 and 1998) review this literature).Some argue that respondents may have misunderstood questions or answereddishonestly. But such concern is endemic to questionnaire analysis. With

Table 2: Collective Action and Selective Incentives

Others contributeOthers do notcontribute

Contribution 10 - 5.5 + 6 = 10.5 -5.5 + 6 = 0.5No contribution 10 0



consensus across questionnaire studies (and the absence of competition fromprivate firms), perhaps individuals are answering honestly?

Surely something is missing? The analytical importance of selective incentives isthat they explain how a group might be mobilised. They do not explain why agroup exists (the presumption is that individuals are already aware of groupinterests). Consider the difference if analysis also embraces individuals choice toexpress identity with group interests. In this case selective incentives play a morecomplex role. Acquisition of selective incentives also signals identity with commoninterests. Selective incentives are invariably distinguishable by design. They takethe form of flags, badges, bumper stickers, sweatshirts with associated logos andattendance at symbolic events. Selective incentives offer an intrinsic, expressivegain (SE) as well as a gain derived from the enjoyment of a private good in its ownright (SP).

In Table 3 the expressive gain from acquisition of a selective incentive (as a signal)is 5.8; the value of a private good (in its own right) is only 0.2. In each cell ofTable 3 there are the same net payoffs as in Table 2. Once again the individual willcontribute but now the analysis is quite different.

Even though net payoffs are identical in Tables 2 and 3, the configuration of gainsin Table 3 matters:

(1) It is no longer necessary that the value of the private goodin its ownrightexceeds the cost of producing the private good. In Table 3 the cost ofthe private good is 0.5 and the value of the good, in its own right, is 0.2. Ifthe value of the private good (as a private good) is less than the cost ofproduction, there is no incentive for private firms to supply these goods.

(2) The expressive value of signalling identity with common interests depends onperceptions of the esteem in which common interests are held. Private goodssupplied by private firms yield SP but not SE. Purchase of a symbolic selectiveincentive from a private firm lacks credibility as a symbol of identity. Receiptof a symbolic selective incentive from an association yields SP + SE because theassociation also commits resources in pursuit of a common goal. Associationsnow have an advantage.

(3) As selective incentives signal identity with common interests there is a ratio-nale to devote resources to a common cause. The expressive gain from acqui-sition of symbolic selective incentives (SE) depends on pursuit of a collectivegoal.

(4) If private goods also signal identity with common interests, questionnaireresponses resonate with theoretical predictions. Even if the value of the

Table 3: Collective Action: Signalling Identity

Others contribute Others do not contribute

Contribution 10 - 5.5 + 5.8 + 0.2 = 10.5 -5.5 + 5.8 + 0.2 = 0.5No contribution 10 0

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private good, in and of itself, is negligible (as in Table 3), selective incentivesinduce action (to express identity). There is no inconsistency if respondentsinsist their main concern is the common goal.

There is evidence that selective incentives play a dual role. Charles Cell (1980)analysed associations in the USA and reported that private-good inducements (asprivate goodsdelivering SP) increased when associations concern with ideologicalobjectives decreased (and the capacity to deliver SE diminished). One more directtest is possible. If Olsons analysis (premised only on instrumental rationality) isapposite, selective incentives furnish revenue to pursue the collective goal (aone-way relationship). If willingness to pay to express identity is also relevant,selective incentives finance pursuit of a collective goal but now they are moreattractive (as signals of identity) the more the association spends on pursuit ofcommon interests (a two-way relationship). Statistical analysis of associationsfinances reveals a two-way relationship: Revenues generated on selective incen-tives ... are contingent on the level of spending on public goods (Lowry 1997,308).2

2. Willingness to Express IdentityA plethora of criticisms of the by-product theory suggest that behaviour dependson more than instrumental rationality. A consistent response to criticisms expressedindependently emerges when analysis embraces willingness to express identity.There is scope for analysis of willingness to express identity, but can predictions beformed?3

(a) Determinants of the Intrinsic Value of Identity

For Akerlof and Kranton (2005, 12) the term identity is used to describe a personssocial category. It captures how people feel about themselves as well as how thosefeelings depend upon their actions. In the military sector and the civilian sector,output is higher when individuals bond with common goals; effort is not simply afunction of remuneration. The question is what determines perceptions of theintrinsic value of expressive action. Analysts report that intrinsic value depends onmoral considerations and also on extrinsic signals (e.g. Deci and Ryan 1980 and1985; Frey 1997); signals that acknowledge action enhance perceptions of intrinsicvalue.

A first signal is political rhetoric. Like Hamlet without the Prince, the script fails todo justice to the role played by political leadership when it is premised only oninstrumental rationality (McLean 2001). If, in Table 1, political rhetoric were tomagnify perceptions of the value of achieving a common goal (say from 10 to100or to 10,000), the decision is still to attempt to free-ride. If rhetoric mini-mises perceptions of the value of costs (from 5 to say 0.05), free-riding remainsthe dominant strategy. The contrast is stark when comparing the impact of rhetoricon perceptions of the intrinsic value of action. Returning to Table 3, rhetoric hasonly to raise perceptions of the intrinsic value of signalling identity from 5.2 to5.8 for the decision to change from apathy to participation. Political rhetoric extols



the virtues of doing the right thing. Producers of mass participation (Schuessler2000, 91) are often successful when relying on a symbol-intensive, expressive-attachment-inviting approach (ibid., 87). Empiricists estimate the impact thatleaders ethical posture exerts on followers (Vitell and Davis 1990).

A second signal capable of informing perceptions of intrinsic value is the status ofthe association. Henry Hansmann (1980) argues that charitable status helps toreassure instrumental donors that donations are unlikely to be misappropriated(because administrators have no legal entitlement to any financial surplus). But thisstatus also acknowledges the importance of action.

Turning to empirical studies of private giving, consider the importance of signalsemitted by government. If only instrumental rationality were relevant, privategiving to charities would decrease on a one-for-one basis when government assistsbeneficiaries of private charities (Warr 1982). Altruism is a public good (e.g. Collard1978) and altruists would free-ride. But, in practice crowd-out parameters are farless than one (usually 0.1 and very rarely as high as 0.6Schiff 1989 and Jones andPosnett 1993 survey empirical work). There is also evidence of crowd-in (for asurvey see Jones 2005). Crowd-in is possible because the actions of others seem toserve as cues to guide behaviour rather than ... as strategies to be counteracted(Roy 1998, 417). Jones et al. (1998) report this demonstration effect when anal-ysing private giving in the UK. Signals that acknowledge the status of action informperceptions of the value of action.

A third determinant of perceptions of intrinsic value is the nature of commoninterests. If common interests are collective goods, collective goods have two char-acteristics. Collective goods are non-excludable and non-rival in consumption.Non-rivalness in consumption means that consumption by one individual does notreduce availability to others (McLean 1987). Goods can be classified with referenceto the rate at which availability atrophies when access broadens (e.g. Head 1962;Buchanan 1968; Musgrave 1969; Craig 1987).4 There is a considerable difference(for example) between collective action that provides a swimming pool (rival inconsumption above capacity limits) and collective action that provides medicalresearch (to produce information capable of reducing everyones probability ofcontracting a disease).5

Olson focused almost exclusively on the first characteristic, non-excludability(Olstrom 2003). Implicitly, many of his examples considered the incentive tocontribute to goals that are more rival in consumption.6 Instrumental willingness totake action is greater the more rival the good. Action matters because it is importantto secure a share of the (rival) output that will be produced. The greater theincentive to secure a share of output the greater the instrumental incentive to act.In Figure 1 willingness to pay is reported on the vertical axis and degree of non-rivalness (between 0 and 1) on the horizontal axis. Instrumental motivation (I)decreases as the degree of non-rivalness increases.

By contrast, the more that common interest is non-rival in consumption, thegreater the intrinsic value of action from expressing identity because it is moreobvious that such action is not simply self-serving. Share of output is no longerpertinent if one individuals consumption does not reduce availability to others

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(Jones 2004). Expressive motivation (E) increases with the degree to whichcommon interests are non-rival in consumption. Robert Putnam (1993, 89) refersto the relevance of the degree to which common goals are encompassing. Hudsonand Jones (2005) present empirical evidence that individuals are more willing to actcollectively (as altruists) when consumption by others does not reduce availabilityof a collective good. E is not a mirror image of I in Figure 1; the position and slopeof E also depend on political rhetoric, charitable status, etc.

Predictions resonate in empirical studies:

(1) Motivation to act collectively depends on the degree to which common inter-ests are non-rival in consumption. David Knoke (1990) analysed 35 associa-tions in the National Association Survey in the USA. Of 35 associations, 15were classified as political. Classification was based on responses by leaders ofassociations. Leaders of the 15 more frequently asserted that lobbying was animportant task (a far greater percentage of the 15 reported that they madefrequent representation to federal government). The motivation of memberswas assessed with reference to members questionnaire responses. For the 15,political activity was cited as the main reason to join by 35 per cent ofmembers (compared to only 6 per cent of the 4,347 sample members of the 20non-political organisations). By contrast, 53 per cent of the membership ofnon-political organisations gave job-related concerns as the motive for mem-bership (compared to 35 per cent of the membership of 15 political organisa-tions). Members motivations for joining were not distributed randomlyacross types of collective action organisations. An associations purpose mayshape its members motivations for involvement (Knoke 1990, 125).

(2) As suggested by the dashed U-shaped function (I + E) in Figure 1, there is avery clear distinction between groups motivated primarily by instrumentalconcerns and groups motivated primarily by willingness to express identity.Kenneth Shepsle and Mark Bonchek (1997) review empirical studies. Theyhighlight the distinction between economic associations (trade associations,

Figure 1: Instrumental and Expressive Motivation

0

I E

1

Instrumental motivation

Expressive motivation

I+E

Degree of non-rivalness



trade unions) focused on more rival goals (higher profits, higher wages) andexpressive associations in pursuit of goals that are less rival. Members ofeconomic groups join primarily for the selective benefits ... while members ofnon-economic groups join primarily for the collective benefits (Shepsle andBonchek 1997, 249).

The nature of common interests matters when analysing willingness to act toexpress identity. It also matters when considering the way that organisations areclassified. Private firms supply excludable and rival goods (they operate in anenvironment in which individuals acquire property rights). Clubs supply excludableand (below capacity levels) non-rival services (Buchanan 1965). Common pool pro-vision supplies non-excludable but rival services (Olstrom 2003); cartels providenon-excludable but rival goals when they strive to maximise profit that is rivalbetween member firms. Representative associations pursue non-excludable and non-rival goals.

(b) The Price of Expressive Action

Perceptions of intrinsic value change systematically but individuals are only willingto act if perceived intrinsic value exceeds the price that must be paid. Constraintsplay a more prominent role than when analysis is premised only on instrumentalmotivation. If analysis is premised only on instrumental motivation (as in Table 1),free-riding remains the individuals optimal strategy whether income is high orlow. But, in practice income matters; income is a strong predictor of giving topolitical campaigns (e.g. Ansolabehere et al. 2003) and donations to charities (e.g.Schiff 1989). What about price?

One way to test the relevance of price is to compare behaviour in different fora. Inthe following examples all of the variables remain the same, i.e. the instrumentalgain from achieving a common goal (B), the probability that action might affectoutcome (p), costs of action (C) and the consumption gain from expressive action(E) are the same. Net expected utility of action is:

pB E C+ > 0 (1)

and expressive action is worthwhile if:

E C pB> (2)

It follows that the price of expressive action is C-pB (price is equal to the cost ofcontribution net of any prospective instrumental gain). The price of expressiveaction may vary in different fora because price depends on the way costs andbenefits are framed (Tversky and Kahneman 1981; McDermott 2001).

In the first forum an altruist is asked to donate 5 to finance a home for the elderly.The altruist feels the equivalent of 10 better off if the home is provided and derivesintrinsic value equivalent to 4 by expressing identity with this cause. Table 4illustrates payoffs. While the individual is aware of common interests there is nowillingness to express identity by contributing (payoffs from not contributingdominate).

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In the second example the same individual decides whether to vote for public-sector provision of the home for the elderly. The tax cost is 5 per person. Thegain from identity at the ballot box (self-signalling) by voting for is equivalent to4. In this forum the price of expressive action is systematically lower. The indi-vidual is aware that their vote has virtually no impact on electoral outcome andthe tax-cost is only relevant if a majority votes in favour. The individual can votefor (and identify with the goal) knowing that this will have a negligible impacton the electoral outcome (and on incurring a tax-cost). The price of expressiveaction is lower even though p, B, C and E are identical (in this forum priceis equal to p(C-B) because the cost to the individual of expressing identity withcommon interests is only relevant if there is a probability, p, that a single vote willlead to a tax-cost). In Table 5 payoffs from action to express identity are nowdominant.

Evidence again proves consistent with predictions premised on analysis of expres-sive collective action; individuals vote charitably and act selfishly (Tullock 1973,27). For reviews of empirical studies, see Brennan and Lomasky (1993); Hudsonand Jones (1994); Udehn (1996); and Mueller (2003). Even if expressive gain weregreater by donating than voting, the principle remains robust. Price of expressiveaction varies in different fora and willingness to act collectively is greater whenprice is lower.

3. Willingness to Express Identity: Implications whenAnalysing Political ParticipationRecent empirical studies shed insight on the determinants of perceptions of will-ingness to express identity and on the importance of the price of expressive action.Empirical studies highlight the significance of expressive action (e.g. Akerlof and

Table 4: Collective Action: Identity by Donation

Otherscontribute

Others do notcontribute

Contribution 10 - 5 + 4 = 9 -5 + 4 = -1No contribution 10 0

Table 5: Collective Action: At the Ballot Box

Others vote forOthers voteagainst

Vote for 10 - 5 + 4 = 9 0 + 4 = +4Vote against 10 - 5 = 5 0



Kranton 2005); individuals behave as if they derive a consumption gain fromaction to signal self-image (to themselves and to others). Individuals derive utilityfrom outcomes contingent on action and from action to express identity. Theindividual may be conceived as having a perfectly standard utility function whichincludes reference to both the value of various consequential outcomes, and thevalue of various expressions or acts (Brennan and Hamlin 2002, 302). While theinstrumental account ... is sometimes taken to be a defining feature of the rationalactor approach to politics (Brennan and Hamlin 1998, 149), the authors emphasisethe importance of expressive action in large number situations. Collective actioncan be predicted with reference to systematic response to determinants of percep-tions of the intrinsic value of expressive action and with reference to changes in theprice of expressive action.7

In this section the focus falls on the implications when analysing interest groupactivity and when analysing other forms of political participation. The first insightis with respect to alternative assessments of interest group competition. The secondis with respect to apparently anomalous alignments of interest groups. In both casesanalysis that encompasses expressive action provides value added. In the thirdexample the value added is in terms of new issues that would otherwise be ignored;the approach raises questions that would not be asked if behaviour were motivatedonly by action to change outcome.

(1) Different assessments of interest group activity. Some analysts (Olson 1965 and1982; Tullock 1965) emphasise the waste (e.g. lower economic growth) thatoccurs when instrumental groups compete for rents (e.g. for legislation thatwill deliver remuneration above payment received in competitive environ-ments). Others applaud collective action, arguing that it can instil ... habits ofco-operation, solidarity and public spiritness and a sense of shared respon-sibility (Putnam 1993, 8990; Knack 2003). Different assessments can beexplained with reference to Figure 1. More instrumental groups (e.g. eco-nomic associations) frequently waste resources (competing for transfers fromone section of the community to anothergoals that are rival in consump-tion). Expressive groups are more likely to inculcate a sense of shared respon-sibility, by focusing on goals that are non-rival in consumption (and have thepotential to benefit one and all).

(2) Anomalous alignments of interest groups. With reference to wastes incurred com-peting for transfers, Gordon Tullock (1997 and 1998) asks repeatedly whythey are so much lower than anticipated (e.g. the empirical analysis of Ansola-behere et al. 2003 reports lower than anticipated costs). At the same time,another set of studies expresses surprise that apparently disparate groups alignto press for legislative change. Bruce Yandle (1989, 34) is surprised thatregulation of the Sunday sale of booze ties together bootleggers, Baptists andthe legal operators of liquor stores. Achim Krber (1998) notes the curiousalignment between environmentalists and producers of canned tuna lobbyingfor legislation in the USA to protect dolphins (in the 1980s US producers weresupplied with tuna from dolphin friendly waters).If wastes are lower and harmony greater than anticipated it is because politi-cians more easily accommodate pressures when individuals, motivated prima-

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rily by the immediacy of a consumption gain derived from expressive action,have little incentive to monitor outcomes (Jones 2006). When civil andreligious groups press for international aid (Kaul and Conceio 2006), gov-ernments offer tied aid that proves inefficient because it also delivershigher profits to domestic producers (Jones 2006). When there is pressure fortrade sanctions against oppressive regimes, governments design sanctions toserve the interests of import-competing domestic producers (Kaempfer andLowenbourg 1988), even though the design means that trade sanctionsseldom achieve their goals (van Bergeijk 1994) in terms of the goals set byexpressive groups.

(3) New issues when individuals act to express identity. If the contest between differentgroups is less fierce than anticipated (because those motivated by an expres-sive gain have little incentive to monitor outcome) there are new concerns.Analysis of group activity premised only on instrumental motivation indicatesthat small groups might exploit large groups if small groups are able tofree-ride on the contribution made by large groups (Olson 1965; Olson andZeckhauser 1966). But, when contributions to groups are also motivated byexpressive identity there are new concerns, that those who contribute toexpress identity (contributors who have no incentive to monitor outcomes)might be exploited by those who contribute more instrumentally. Exploita-tion occurs if expressive groups can be manipulated.8

While these examples focus on interest group activity, there are implications whenanalysing political participation more generally. If individuals only motivationwere instrumental (to change outcome) there would be no incentive to turn out tovote because the probability that an individual vote will change an electoraloutcome is minuscule. But, in practice, turnout rates are high even in nationalelections (Aldrich 1993); Grofman (1993) refers to the paradox that ate publicchoice.

Electoral turnout might be explained with reference to the importance of actionthat expresses identity with the community, i.e. with reference to action that fulfilscivic duty. Jones and Hudson (2000) report evidence that turnout in the 1997 UKgeneral election fell because the election had been preceded by a plethora ofallegations of political sleaze, allegations that demeaned the intrinsic value ofexpressions of civic duty. Some argue that more than one motivation is alsorelevant when explaining other forms of participation. Paul Whiteley and PatrickSeyd (1996) analyse the motives of party activists. They examine the motivation ofactivists in the UK Labour Party and conclude that activists are more expressivelyattached to the party than inactive members, despite the fact that the incentives tofree ride are the same for strongly attached individuals as they are for weaklyattached individuals (ibid., 227). Justin Fisher and Paul Webb (2003) analyse themotivation of those employed by political parties. While employees are instrumen-tally responsive to the terms of their contract, motivation is not purely instrumen-tal. After interview analysis, the authors report the following comment by anemployee of the Labour Party: the first reason, nine times out of ten, is the feelingthat you work for something that you believe in (ibid., 179).

If expressive motivation is important when explaining why individuals participate,expressive motivation is also relevant when explaining how individuals participate.



Jones and Dawson (forthcoming) consider the relevance of instrumental evaluationof policies presented by political parties and the intrinsic value of expressing identitywith a preferred political party. The intrinsic value of expressing party identityproved significant when explaining choice at the 2002 UK general election. Geof-frey Brennan and Alan Hamlin (1998) argue that this motivation is relevant whenexplaining why political parties divert from anticipated policy manifestos and adoptpreferred symbolic policy options. Alexander Schuessler (2000) emphasises thismotivation when explaining how politicians set out to win support; they rely oninclusive statements rather than instrumental discussion of policy options.

The issue of how individuals express choice is also important when analysingpreference for constitutional rules. If analysis is premised only on instrumentalmotivation, the value of ... institutions is to be assessed in terms of the outcomesproducedin a manner analogous to that in which market institutions are judgedby reference to the allocation of resources that they induce (Brennan and Hamlin2002, 310). But, if expressive motivation is important, democratic institutions areassessed in terms of what those institutions stand for. If these democratic valuesmight be among expressive concerns of individuals, then in many settings ... theseexpressive preferences for particular aspects of democratic institutions per se will besystematically over-emphasised to the detriment of more instrumental concerns(Brennan and Hamlin 2002, 310).

The impact of expressive action on well-being is the remit for another paper. Thereare instances in which willingness to express identity mobilises collective action toproduce outcomes that would be under-supplied. In Table 3 it is the private con-sumption gain from expressive action [5.8 - 5.5] that explains willingness to actcollectively and it is the same private consumption gain that explains why thecommon goal is achieved. In Table 3 the individual is ultimately better off by[10 + 5.8 - 5.5 + 0.2] because, if the individual is representative, all act collec-tively and the common goal is achieved. However, there are also instances in whichwillingness to express identity can reduce well-being.9 In this article the propositionis simply that willingness to express identity cannot be dismissed when explainingcollective action. Signals that inform perceptions of the intrinsic value of action canprove more potent than instrumental evaluation of outcome (Jones 2003).

ConclusionsAs Olson (1965) argued, provision of a private good by an association will changepayoffs and induce instrumental individuals to act collectively. But, as an explana-tion of collective action this analytical refinement brings in its wake many ques-tions. If the private good were the individuals only concern, the individual wouldpurchase the good from a private firm. If an association managed to survivecompetition from private firms there would be no rationale to devote a financialsurplus to a collective goal. Questionnaire analysis insists that the private good is aminor concern. When analysis embraces willingness to express identity individualsalso derive satisfaction from expressing self-image. Selective incentives now play adual role. They serve as private goods and they also serve to signal identity. If theirrelevance as a symbol is greater when they signal identity with an association that

576 PHILIP JONES


pursues a common goal, private firms are unable to compete. There is a rationale todevote a financial surplus to a common goal. Questionnaire responses prove con-sistent with theoretical predictions.

Collective action can be analysed with reference to the determinants of perceptionsof the intrinsic value of expressing identity with an association. Empirical studiesreport systematic behavioural responses. Perceptions of the intrinsic value of actiondepend on: ethical posture by political leaders; the status afforded to associations;and the degree to which common interests are non-rival in consumption. Thedegree to which common goals are non-rival in consumption can prove as impor-tant as the extent to which common goals are non-excludable.

It has not been argued that collective action is simply a reflection of awareness ofcommon interests. A distinction must be drawn between the intrinsic value ofexpressing identity and the price that must be paid. Individuals might recognisecommon interests but have no inclination to express identity with common inter-ests. Willingness to act depends on both perceptions of the intrinsic value of actionand on the price that must be paid. Willingness to act collectively increases if theperceived intrinsic value of expressive action increases and if the price of expressiveaction falls.

Analysis of a private consumption gain derived by expression of identity explainsexisting anomalies when analysing interest group competition and raises newquestions (questions that would not be asked if analysis were narrowly premised oninstrumental motivation). It offers insight on the different alignments that existbetween different groups but, in so doing, it also calls in question the possibility thataction by expressive groups might be exploited by those who act more instrumen-tally. The question of why and how individuals choose to signal self-image (tothemselves and to others) is important when analysing political participation. Thesmaller the likelihood that individual action will affect outcome, the greater therelevance of analysis of willingness to pay to express identity.

Olsons lesson has been well taken, but perhaps too well taken? Awareness ofcommon interests will not lead naturally to collective action but awareness ofcommon interests should not be ignored. Too many pieces of the jigsaw are missingwhen analysis studiously ignores individuals willingness to nail their colours tothe mast.

About the Author

Philip Jones, Professor of Economics, Department of Economics and International Development,University of Bath, Bath, BA2 7AY, UK, email: [email protected]

Notes1. It is applied generally. For example, political revolution has been analysed as a career-enhancing

opportunity to secure a better position in a post-revolution government (Tullock 1971; Silver 1974;Jennings 1998).

2. Hansen (1985) argues that expenditure on a collective good advertises an associations selectiveincentives. This explanation implies that private goods are more attractive the more is spent onpursuit of a common goal.



3. It is not necessary here to consider why utility is derived from identity; this is the remit for anotherpaper. Some suggest that signalling identity with a common goal enhances reputation for trustwor-thiness. Frank (1988) analyses the role played by conscience. He suggests that this generates an aurathat others can detect and that expression of identity is relevant for the instrumental pursuit of longrun objectives. All of this is freely acknowledged. Here the focus is narrower; the proposition is thatanalysis of collective action is incomplete if willingness to pay to express identity is ignored.

4. If output of an association is defined as X and the number in the group is N, the extent to which agoal is non-rival is gauged by the exponent h when the amount available for any individual (i) isqi = X/Nh. When h = 0 the good is non-rival in consumption; when h = 1 the good is rival inconsumption.

5. McLean (1987, 11) notes that Non-rival means that it is not subject to crowding. If G is non-rivalthe relationship of the total provision to consumption by individuals A, B and C is G = GA = GB = GC;if X were rival the relationship is X = XA + XB + XC.

6. Chamberlin (1974) illustrates how the theoretical force of Olsons examples is heightened by choos-ing collective goods more rival in consumption; Esteban and Ray (2001) offer further analysis of therelevance of this characteristic.

7. In this journal Dowding (2005 and 2006) and Parsons (2006) have explored the implications thatarise if individuals are motivated to take action because they perceive that they have a duty to act.Analysis in this article assumes that individuals act because they derive utility from action and, asBrennan and Hamlin note, in making choices of all sorts, the individuals will behave in a manner thatis consistent with the standard axioms of rationality given such a utility function. Individualswillingness to give greater emphasis to expressive action depends on (i) perceptions of the intrinsicvalue of such action; (ii) institutional structures [that] change the terms of trade between instru-mental and expressive elements (Brennan and Hamlin 2002, 302). Both instrumental and expressiveaction might prove commensurate but if (in large group situations) there is no motivation to act tochange outcome, the individual might still be motivated to act to express identity.

8. Ethical investing (in the UK and USA) can be explained in terms of willingness to identify with a causedeemed worthy but there are increasing calls for codes of conduct to restrain instrumental fundmanagement and ensure that outcomes better match aspirations expressed (see e.g. Cullis et al.2006).

9. Table 6 reports payoffs when an individual acts to acquire a good simply to signal status. The cost is4. If others are unable to acquire the good, the payoff is (5 - 4). If others purchase the good, thestatus gain of 5 is cancelled. If the individual does not acquire the good, the individual is 5 worseoff when others purchase the good. But if no one purchases the good there is no effect on welfare.Each individual is motivated to acquire the good to express identity, but if all behave this way, eachperson is worse off (by -5 + 5 - 4 in Table 6). There is collective action, albeit informal, butexpression of identity by conspicuous consumption can reduce well-being.

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Table 6: Collective Action and Frames of Reference

Others acquire a symbolOthers do not acquire a

symbol

Acquire a symbol -5 + 5 - 4 = -4 +5 - 4 = 1Not acquire a symbol -5 0

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