Export Controls Case Work - Northwestern 2015

7/25/2019 Export Controls Case Work - Northwestern 2015

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Exports Advantage


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Competitiveness Answers


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Defense---1NC

Export controls dont hurt competitiveness---no economic benefits from reformO!" 1#, Open Society Policy Center, non-partisan and non-profit organization that engages inadvocacy aimed at influencing U.S. government policy on domestic and international issues,

Eport Control !eform" Economic #llogic and Overloo$ed Conse%uences,& Open Society PolicyCenter #ssue 'rief, (uly )*+, http"opensocietypolicycenter.orgp-contentuploads/rms-Eport-Control-!eform-#ncreases-Outsourcing.pdf

#n )*++ the United States cornered $%&$' of the global arms mar(et , ith the closest peer

competitor 0eing !ussia, ith 1.23.4 5his overwhelming dominance of the glo0al arms mar$et calls

into %uestions 0oth the need for, and the a0ility of, arms eport reform to significantly increaseU.S.sales of military-related technology.67oreover, only an etremely small portion of total U.S. trade

re%uires an eport license today" a0out #' of )&& trade is su08ect to licensingfrom the 9epartment ofState. #f roughly :;3 of U.S. trade is not licensed in the first place, ho 0ig of an economic impact could 0e achieved 0y ma$ingad8ustment in ho the remaining 3 is handled < particularly given the pre-eisting U.S. dominance of that sector= One 0usiness

trade analyst has suggested that given this reality, any increases in U.S. eports due to arms licensing

issues ould 0e infinitesimal .&165he /dministration has underta$en a massive0ureaucraticeffort to reform eport controls 0ased, apparently, on a surveyof U.S. industry that claims a loss of more than >)0illion in sales annually due to eport controls.25his survey is not pu0licly availa0le.6?hen @ouse Aoreign /ffairsCommittee chairman !ep. Ed !oyce B!-C/ as$ed hether the O0ama /dministration had %uantified the economic 0enefits of

eport control reform, the /ssistant Secretary of Commerce for Eport /dministration responded that we dont have an

estimate for that particular economic 0enefit.&6?hat is availa0le is a )*+* analysis 0y the 7il$en

#nstitute, financed 0y the Dational /ssociation of 7anufactures.; 5his study concluded that the EC!# couldsu0stantially increase U.S. mar$et sharein $ey countries < such as China, #ndia, Pa$istan, !ussia, and #srael < andgenerate 4*,*** ne 8o0s 0y )*+:. Dot surprisingly, this impressive conclusion has 0een fre%uently touted 0y supporters of the

initiative, 0ut the reports methodology is seriousl* m*sterious .65he study assumes that the EC!# ill resultin a 1*3 increase in U.S. mar$et share in crucial countries here it is currently underperforming relative to its glo0al mar$etshare.Aor eample, assume that the U.S. share of the orld mar$et in a given item is 1*3, 0ut its share of the mar$et for that same item inChina is only +*3. Under the 7il$en reports logic, the U.S. share of the Chinese mar$et ould 8ump to *3 < triple its current

levels < if U.S. eport controls are modernized.& 'ut the report offers no 8ustification for its assumption thatthe U.S. share of any product ould increase so dramatically merely due to an easing of eport

controls. 5here are man* other factors at pla*Bprice, %uality, relationships and many other

government policies that may play a much greater role in 0oosting U.S. eports, such as eportfinancing and therole of U.S. government in promotingsales of U.S. technology.


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+ olves,Exports igh---.NC

No internal lin(---exports are high now---onl* a ris( the plan decreasescompetitivenessO!" 1#, Open Society Policy Center, non-partisan and non-profit organization that engages in

advocacy aimed at influencing U.S. government policy on domestic and international issues,Eport Control !eform" Economic #llogic and Overloo$ed Conse%uences,& Open Society PolicyCenter #ssue 'rief, (uly )*+, http"opensocietypolicycenter.orgp-contentuploads/rms-Eport-Control-!eform-#ncreases-Outsourcing.pdfSupporters ofthe O0ama /dministrations arms eport control reforminitiative fre%uently cite economic

0enefits< namely an increase in eports of U.S. defense products and resulting 8o0 creation < as a rationale for shiftingthousands of items from the State 9epartments U.S. 7unitions Fist to the Commerce 9epartments Control Fist, here they ill 0emore easily eported.+ Aormer /ssistant Secretary of State for Political 7ilitary /ffairs /ndre Shapiro defended the initiative ashaving a real impact on our economy at a time hen competition is even fiercer and at a time hen our manufacturing 0ase could

really use a 0oost.&)6/ close loo$, hoever, raises /uestions a0out the purported economic 0enefits,

finding that they are far from guaranteed and that the reform could, 8ust as easily, undermine

domestic manufacturing and lead to a net 0ob loss .6Proponents of the reform effort descri0e the

negative effects of the 0ureaucratic nightmare& of eporting items that are tightly controlled, 0ut U.S. eports ofmanufactured goods have 0een increasing at record rates in the past fe years, even ithout a

massive reorganization of eport controls. #ndustries eporting itemson the U.S. 7unitions Fist are flourishingGthe dollar value of eport licenses approved for items on the US7F has more than dou0led in recent

years, from >+:.H 0illion in )**2 to a staggering >44.) 0illion in )*++. Dot all items licensed translate into actualsales, 0ut the value of licenses granted indicates that in general producers of e%uipment and components are

not suffering from an inabilit* to ac/uire export licenses under the current eport control systemgoverning items on the US7F.

S%uo solves competitiveness?illiam 9. artung 1#, director of the /rms and Security #nitiative at the De /merica

Aoundation, /ugust )+, )*+, !is$ and !eturns" 5he Economic #llogic of the O0ama/dministrationIs /rms Eport !eforms&, https".ciponline.orgresearchhtmlris$-and-returns-the-economic-illogic-of-the-o0ama-administrations-arms-ep5he administrations claims of ma8or economic 0enefits from eport control reform have not

0een su0stantiated. #n fact, there is strong evidence to suggest that eport reform is unli$ely tosignificantly increase U. S. sales of military-related technology. 5he United States alreadyaccounts for nearly H* percent of the glo0al mar$et for items currently covered 0y the US7F.Even a radical reform of arms eport controls is unli$ely to push that figure much higher. #n anycase, 8ust three percent of U.S. eports are su08ect to eport licensing controls. #t is unreasona0leto epect that changes in eport procedures governing that small a fraction of U.S. eports areli$ely to have a ma8or economic impact. /s one 0usiness analyst has noted, the economic 0enefits of arms eportreform, if they eist at all, are li$ely to 0e infinitesimal.& 5his may 0e hy, hen as$ed 0y @ouse Aoreign /ffairs CommitteeChairman Ed !oyce hether the administration could %uantify the epected economic impacts of eport control reform, Jevin ?olf,

the /ssistant Secretary of Commerce for Eport /dministration, replied that e dont have an estimate for that particular economic0enefit.& #t is even possi0le that arms eport reform could reduce U.S. employment. 5he reformill ma$e it easier to produce components of U.S. eapons systems overseas and to sell U.S.production technology to potential competitors. 5homas 'uffen0arger, the president of the#nternational /ssociation of 7achinists, the union that represents the 0ul$ of the or$ers in the arms and aerospaceindustries, hasarned that K5Lhe less stringent controls provided under the CCF could lead tofurther transfers of technology or production from the U.S. to another country. 5he transfer oftechnology and production can have long-term conse%uences as other countries utilize that
https://www.ciponline.org/research/html/risk-and-returns-the-economic-illogic-of-the-obama-administrations-arms-exphttps://www.ciponline.org/research/html/risk-and-returns-the-economic-illogic-of-the-obama-administrations-arms-exphttps://www.ciponline.org/research/html/risk-and-returns-the-economic-illogic-of-the-obama-administrations-arms-exphttps://www.ciponline.org/research/html/risk-and-returns-the-economic-illogic-of-the-obama-administrations-arms-exp


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transferred technologyand production to develop their on commercial and defense industries atour epense.


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!lan Not e*,No 2enefit---.NC

No competitiveness advantage---re0ect their ev---the plan has an infinitesimall*small impact on the overall econom*9avid !. 3it4gerald 15, (.9. Candidate, University of Dorth Carolina School of Fa, )*+4,

/!5#CFE" FE/M#DN 5@E '/CJ 9OO! OPED" @O? EPO!5 COD5!OF !EAO!7IS9E!ENUF/5#OD 7/ @/!7 /7E!#C/IS SECU!#5,& Dorth Carolina (ournal of Fa Q5echnology, Online Edition, +1 D.C. (.F. Q 5ech. On. 215his version of the EC!Is stated goals more closely echoes the concerns of the commercialentities driving reform efforts than the language of national security statutes. n+H 7orerevealingly, it hints at the ultimate economic motivations 0ehind the EC! that are typicallyRcloa$KedLR 0ehind the veil of national security. n+: 5he effort to reform eport controls 0eganin earnest in 7arch )**; Runder the aegis of the Coalition for Security and Competitiveness.Rn+4* 5he to main o08ectives of this organization of defense manufacturers as to reduce thenum0er of items KHHL controlled 0y the US7F and to increase the use of eemptions alloingeports ithout a license. n+4+ Nen. (im (ones B!et, President O0amaIs first Dational Security

/dvisor, reiterated the CoalitionIs argument that eport controls ere actually harming national

security 0y undermining the Rhealth of the countryIs defense industrial 0ase.R n+4) 5hePresidentIs Eport Council n+4 li$eise endorsed the proposals and urged immediate action.n+44 Niven that Nen. (ones B!et served on 'oeingIs 'oard of 9irectors immediately prior toassuming the role of Dational Security /dvisor n+41 and 'oeingIs CEO, ?. (ames 7cDerney (r.,n+42 is the chairman of the PresidentIs Eport Council, it is unsurprising that the /erospaceindustry as announced as the first to 0egin product migration from the US7F. n+4; ?hileleading private-sector companies should undou0tedly 0e consulted in this process, the EC!Iscurrent KH:L process reflects a one-sided approach ith a %uestiona0le economic premise to acomple national security issue. n+4HOne mem0er n+4: of the Coalition for Security and Competitiveness commissioned a reportdetailing economic imperatives to support its claim that the EC! is desperately needed to avoidfurther harm to /mericaIs defense industrial 0ase. n+1* 5his analysis, conducted 0y the 7il$en

#nstitute, asserts that reforming arm-eport controls Rcould su0stantially increase U.S. mar$etshare in $ey countries and generate 4*,*** ne 8o0s in the United StatesR 0y the end of thedecade. n+1+ @oever, this report assumes--ithout evidentiary 8ustification--that easingeport controls on certain high-tech, commercially availa0le products ould triple mar$et sharein countries such as China, #ndia, Pa$istan, !ussia, and #srael. n+1)#n )*++, the latest year for hich full statistics are availa0le, U.S. arms eporters en8oyed a

;H.;3 mar$et share. n+1 !ussia--the nearest foreign competitor--had only a 1.23 share. n+14#n the four preceding years, U.S. manufacturers similarly supplied 123 of the glo0al armsmar$et hile !ussia accounted for 8ust +).H3. n+11 7oreover, CCF and US7F controlled itemscom0ined to represent K:*L 8ust .)3 of total U.S. eports in )*++. n+12 5his fact has led

some analysts to %uestion ho 0eneficial the EC!Is impact ould 0e on the economy as a hole ,

n+1; ith one concluding it ould 0e Rinfinitesimal.R n+1H

Eport controls have a miniscule effect on the economy < flei0ility in mar$ets has maintainedtrade hile still $eeping dangerous technologies from threatening countries(. 9avid "ichardsonand/sha undaram 1#, (. 9avid !ichardson is a Senior AelloEmeritus at the Peterson #nstitute for #nternational Economics, Professor of Economics and#nternational !elations Emeritus at Syracuse University, and a !esearch /ssociate of theDational 'ureau of Economic !esearch. /sha Sundaram is Senior Fecturer of Economics at theUniversity of Cape 5on, South /frica, 7ay )*+, Sizing Up US Eport 9isincentives for a De


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Neneration of Dational Security Eport Controls&, Peterson #nstitute for #nternationalEconomics, http"iie.compu0licationsp0p0+-+.pdf#n the early +::*s, as the Cold ?ar ended, US eport controls that aimed to $eep high-tech goods and technologies outof the hands of enemies deterred from >+1 0illion to >)1 0illion of such eports , according to Peterson #nstituteresearch at the time. !ecent US eport controls, aimed at a different setof potential security threats, and onlymodestly streamlined in administrative structure until )*+* reform initiatives, seem to deter US high-tech eports

considera0ly less./s percentages of seven 0road industrial categories of high-tech eports,estimated /merican eport shortfallsfrom national security controls have fallen from roughly 1 percentin the early +::*s to slightly over + percent in the mid-)***s . 5hese estimates are reasona0lyro0ust across alternative estimation techni%ues andalso for a data update through )*++. !eformof /merican national-security eport controls ould seemtherefore, somehat surprisingly, to have onlymodest effects on the level of US high-tech eports . BSuch reform ould, of course, shift the identities of importcustomers for /merican high-tech eports more significantly. Our eplanationfor these modest overall eport-suppressioneffects, even in high-profile importer mar$ets li$e Chinas, is to-fold./merican eportersseem to have developeda distinctive competitive a0ility to shift their sales efforts flei0ly among customers and productsthat are su08ect totight, loose, and fe controls. BCustomers include their on overseas affiliates, and products includeinputs traded ithin glo0al supply chains. #mportant importing countries seem to have developed adistinctive a0ility to shift their sourcing flei0ly among alternative suppliers, including a groing set of

emerging eporters of high-tech goods. 5hough importing countries that are glo0al security threats are stilldeprived of up to >)1* 0illion orth of high-technology goods annually, according to our estimates, it isEuropean, (apanese, and leading emerging eporters, rather than the United States, hichcurrently seem to suffer the largest eport shortfalls, unli$e the early +::*s


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tats,+uantification---.NC

Costs are small---/uantification is impossible so disregard their internal lin(!ichard6an Atta $, Pro8ect Feader, #nstitute for 9efense /nalysis, (anuary )**;, EportControls and the U.S. 9efense #ndustrial 'ase,& .dtic.milcgi-0inNet5!9oc=

/9T/9/4211:)uantitative assessment of eport control impacts is inherentl* difficult . Eport controls are

only one of a number of factors impacting the competitive position of companies, and typically

they are not the most prominent factor . Competitiveness is more directly impacted 0yfirm-

specific issues such as !Q9 investment, manufacturing efficiency, and mar$et strategies, as ell asmacroeconomic issues such as s$illed la0or availa0ility and cost, echange rate policy, tariffs and legal 0arriers. #ndustrycyclicality can alsomas$Vor mimicVeport control effects. @ence, even in those industries here eport controlsappear to play an important role, it is difficult to prove that they actually cause lost mar$et share. 5he 0est economic studies satisfy

themselves ith sizing up& the pro0lem as opposed to ma$ing definitive %uantitative estimates.4 'y the same to$en, it is

typically impossible for individual firms to prove a negative&Vi.e., that particular sales ere lost due toeport controls.6#n those areas here the study team as a0le to collect and analyze %uantitative data on an entire industryV

satellites and machine toolsVa compelling case could not be made thatdifferential application of US eportcontrols account for loss of US mar$et share. !ather, rising foreign competency and naturalcyclicality seem to 0etter account for the drop. Similarly, ith the eception of a fe specific and important cases,

companiescontacted 0y this study and pu0lished reports cite onl* a handful of instances here sales

ere lost to a foreign competitordue todelays or conditions in US eport licensing. Unilateral costs to

US-0ased firmsassociated ith eport control complianceare relativel* small in direct, %uantitativeterms.


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Offense---1NC

7urn---(ills industrial base---causes outsourcing and (ills competitivenessO!" 1#, Open Society Policy Center, non-partisan and non-profit organization that engages inadvocacy aimed at influencing U.S. government policy on domestic and international issues,

Eport Control !eform" Economic #llogic and Overloo$ed Conse%uences,& Open Society PolicyCenter #ssue 'rief, (uly )*+, http"opensocietypolicycenter.orgp-contentuploads/rms-Eport-Control-!eform-#ncreases-Outsourcing.pdfCritics of the reform effort 0elieve that several implications of loosening controls on US7F itemscould, in the ords

of a former head of the State 9epartments Office of 9efense 5rade Controls, constitute a recipe for

outsourcing & production. Under this scenario, the EC!# ould, in fact, harm domestic industry and

result in the eport of 8o0s.6Calculating the economic costs or 0enefits of looser restrictions on eports of certain items iscomplicated 0y the fact that that not all eports are created e%ual. #f a U.S.-0ased firm uses foreign components in an eported item,the Commerce 9epartment treats the entire item as if it as produced in the United States. 5his may not matter much in gauging theimpact of the eport on the revenues and profits of the eporting firm, 0ut it ma$es a huge difference in terms of the potential impact

on U.S. 8o0s. 7ore foreign components mean feer U.S. 8o0s. Changes made through the reform initiative ill

ma$e it more li$ely that su0components of U.S. eapons systems ill 0e produced abroad .

/lthough the largest la0or union representing or$ers in this industry have repeatedly raised the issue ith the Commerce

9epartment, the /dministration has apparently underta(en no stud* to determine the impact

of outsourcing of component production on the num0er of 8o0s generated 0y U.S. eports .6#n thecomple orld of international trade, most countries demand economic offsets& < arrangements that reduce theeconomic cost of an imported item 12 0illion.H O0viously, this phenomenon convolutes the benefits to

domestic industry and or$ers 0y moving production of $ey components overseas.:6Even 0y anarro definition of the offset phenomenon that focuses only on defense trade, a num0er of ma8or industrial sectors

sho a net loss


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Offshoring---.NC

Export control reform 0ust causes outsourcing---bad for competitiveness9avid !. 3it4gerald 15, (.9. Candidate, University of Dorth Carolina School of Fa, )*+4,/!5#CFE" FE/M#DN 5@E '/CJ 9OO! OPED" @O? EPO!5 COD5!OF !EAO!7IS

9E!ENUF/5#OD 7/ @/!7 /7E!#C/IS SECU!#5,& Dorth Carolina (ournal of Fa Q5echnology, Online Edition, +1 D.C. (.F. Q 5ech. On. 215he potential for the EC! to create hundreds of thousands of domestic 8o0s has li$eise 0een

%uestioned. n+1: 5he nationIs largest union representing employees of the U.S. arms industry,the #nternational /ssociation of 7achinists and /erospace ?or$ers, has epressed alarm overthe lac$ of studies analyzing the effect that looser controls ould have on outsourcing

technology production. n+2* 5he rise of RoffsetsR n+2+ in the defense industry and theCommerce 9epartmentIs treatment of any U.S. end-product containing foreign manufacturersu0components as entirely /merican-made incentivizes manufacturers to maimize K:+Lprofita0ility 0y shifting production of all or part of a given item to regions ith loer la0or

costs. n+2) 5his ould stifle rather than 0olster /merican 8o0 groth. 5he 'ureau of #ndustryand Security, a Commerce 9epartment su0sidiary, noted Roffset agreements and associatedoffset transactions can negate some of the potential economic and industrial 0ase 0enefitsaccrued through defense eports if the offset activity displaces or$ that ould otherise have

0een conducted in the United States.R n+2 5he 9epartment of Commerce has not yetunderta$en a study of the EC!Is potential impact on 8o0 outsourcing. n+24

S%uo solves competitiveness and reform decreases it?illiam 9. artung 1#, director of the /rms and Security #nitiative at the De /mericaAoundation, /ugust )+, )*+, !is$ and !eturns" 5he Economic #llogic of the O0ama

/dministrationIs /rms Eport !eforms&, https".ciponline.orgresearchhtmlris$-and-returns-the-economic-illogic-of-the-o0ama-administrations-arms-ep5he administrations claims of ma8or economic 0enefits from eport control reform have not

0een su0stantiated. #n fact, there is strong evidence to suggest that eport reform is unli$ely to

significantly increase U. S. sales of military-related technology. 5he United States alreadyaccounts for nearly H* percent of the glo0al mar$et for items currently covered 0y the US7F.Even a radical reform of arms eport controls is unli$ely to push that figure much higher. #n anycase, 8ust three percent of U.S. eports are su08ect to eport licensing controls. #t is unreasona0leto epect that changes in eport procedures governing that small a fraction of U.S. eports areli$ely to have a ma8or economic impact. /s one 0usiness analyst has noted, the economic 0enefits of arms eportreform, if they eist at all, are li$ely to 0e infinitesimal.& 5his may 0e hy, hen as$ed 0y @ouse Aoreign /ffairs CommitteeChairman Ed !oyce hether the administration could %uantify the epected economic impacts of eport control reform, Jevin ?olf,the /ssistant Secretary of Commerce for Eport /dministration, replied that e dont have an estimate for that particular economic

0enefit.& #t is even possi0le that arms eport reform could reduce U.S. employment. 5he reformill ma$e it easier to produce components of U.S. eapons systems overseas and to sell U.S.production technology to potential competitors. 5homas 'uffen0arger, the president of the#nternational /ssociation of 7achinists, the union that represents the 0ul$ of the or$ers in the arms and aerospace

industries, hasarned that K5Lhe less stringent controls provided under the CCF could lead tofurther transfers of technology or production from the U.S. to another country. 5he transfer oftechnology and production can have long-term conse%uences as other countries utilize thattransferred technologyand production to develop their on commercial and defense industries atour epense.
https://www.ciponline.org/research/html/risk-and-returns-the-economic-illogic-of-the-obama-administrations-arms-exphttps://www.ciponline.org/research/html/risk-and-returns-the-economic-illogic-of-the-obama-administrations-arms-exphttps://www.ciponline.org/research/html/risk-and-returns-the-economic-illogic-of-the-obama-administrations-arms-exphttps://www.ciponline.org/research/html/risk-and-returns-the-economic-illogic-of-the-obama-administrations-arms-exp


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ormu4 Answers


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No Closure---1NC

Despite threats8 9ran has no intention of closing the trait of ormu4 - conflictswont escalate!ic$ :ladstone8 ;,18reporter for the De or$ 5imes, 1+)*+1, Strait of @ormuz Once

/gain at Center of U.S.-#ran Strife&http".nytimes.com)*+1*1*)orldmiddleeaststrait-of-hormuz-once-again-at-center-of-us-iran-strife.html5he strait, )+ miles ide at its narroest point, is the conduit for a0out 4* percent of the orlds oil tan$er traffic. #t falls ithin

territory claimed not only 0y #ran 0ut 0y Oman and the United /ra0 Emirates.6 Despite 9rans threats in the

past to completel* close the strait during times of acute tensions8 it has never

done so , although military analysts have said the #ranians could lay mines across the ateray ithin a matter of days,

paralyzing traffic.6#ranian officials, including Aoreign 7inister 7ohammad (avad Warif, have said inrecent days that #ran has no intention of o0structing or stopping traffic in the strait .6Donetheless,#ran is epected to respond to the Davys increased presence in the area.6Under international maritime la, ships of all nations maytraverse the strait. 5hey are o0liged to follo special navigation rules $non as the5raffic Separation Scheme. /n in0ound lane andout0ound lane, each one mile ide, is separated 0y a to-mile 0uffer zone on either side.65he lanes leave little room for

maneuvering enormous oil tan$ers and other large vessels, and the additional deployment of military ships could ma$e the lanesmore croded V creating more potential for accidents.65he strait has 0een the 0ac$drop of military 0lusterand confrontation 0eteen #ran and other nations since the +:;: #slamic !evolution. #n +:H4#ran threatened to close the strait after #ra% attac$ed #ranian shipping during the #ran-#ra%

?ar.6/merican and #ranian forces clashed there repeatedly in +:HH after a Davy frigate asdamaged 0y an #ranian mine. On /pril +H of that year, /merican forces san$ three #ranian arships and destroyed tosurveillance platforms in hat as $non asOperation Praying 7antis.6People dont remem0er e fought a miniar ith #ran inan afternoon,& saidEugene Nholz, a professor of pu0lic affairs at the University of 5eas ho directed a)**H research study of theStrait of @ormuzand its strategic significance.6On (uly , +:HH, an /merican arship patrolling the strait, the U.S.S. Mincennes,shot don an #ranian commercial airliner, $illing ):* people. 5he ships cre apparently mistoo$ the plane for an #ranian A-+4fighter.6#ran altered its naval strategy in the strait regarding the /mericans after the confrontations in +:HH, shifting to the use ofsmaller nim0le speed0oats that could outrun the more poerful arships of the United States Aifth Aleet, hich is 0ased in

'ahrain.65here is a idespread vie that #ran has no desire to let the latest tensions ith the

United States in the strait get out of control. /t the same time, analysts said, #ranants to sho V at least to a

domestic audience V that its forces ill not 0e 0ullied.65hey loo$ largely for razzle-dazzle that doesnt have a

big militar* effect ,& 7r. Nholz said. #t ould 0e an accidental escalation. 5he #ranians dont ant to fight

ith us. 5heyve shon restraintith respect to the U.S. military.&
https://strausscenter.org/hormuz/about-the-strait.htmlhttp://www.history.navy.mil/browse-by-topic/wars-conflicts-and-operations/operation-praying-mantis.htmlhttp://www.history.navy.mil/browse-by-topic/wars-conflicts-and-operations/operation-praying-mantis.htmlhttp://www.history.navy.mil/browse-by-topic/wars-conflicts-and-operations/operation-praying-mantis.htmlhttps://www.utexas.edu/lbj/directory/faculty/eugene-gholzhttps://www.utexas.edu/lbj/directory/faculty/eugene-gholzhttps://strausscenter.org/hormuz/about-the-project.htmlhttps://strausscenter.org/hormuz/about-the-project.htmlhttps://strausscenter.org/hormuz/about-the-project.htmlhttps://strausscenter.org/hormuz/about-the-project.htmlhttp://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/july/3/newsid_4678000/4678707.stmhttp://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/july/3/newsid_4678000/4678707.stmhttps://strausscenter.org/hormuz/about-the-strait.htmlhttp://www.history.navy.mil/browse-by-topic/wars-conflicts-and-operations/operation-praying-mantis.htmlhttps://www.utexas.edu/lbj/directory/faculty/eugene-gholzhttps://strausscenter.org/hormuz/about-the-project.htmlhttps://strausscenter.org/hormuz/about-the-project.htmlhttp://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/july/3/newsid_4678000/4678707.stmhttp://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/july/3/newsid_4678000/4678707.stm


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the strait, it ould do great damage to the orld economy. 'ut it ould also damage its on already sha$yeconomy 0ecause #ran relies on the strait to deliver oil eports to China and other customers.#n any case, closing the strait is not nearly as easyas /dm. @a0i0ollah Sayari, commander of the #ranian Davy, ouldhave it. @e said that closing the strait is Ras easy as drin$ing a glass of ater.R /ctually it ould 0e a0out as easy as drin$ing an entire0uc$et of ater in one gulp.

#ran tried this tric$ 0efore and failed misera0ly.#n +:H4, during the #ran-#ra% ?ar, Saddam @ussein attac$ed#ranian oil tan$ers and the #ranian oil-processing facility at Jhar% #sland. #ran struc$ 0ac$ 0y attac$ing Juaiti tan$ers carrying

#ra%i crude and then other tan$ers in the Persian Nulf. #n +:H;, after years of groing disruptions in this vital ateray, President!onald !eagan responded 0y offering to reflag Juaiti tan$ers ith the U.S. flag and provide U.S. naval escort. #ran shied aayfrom direct attac$s on U.S. arships 0ut continued soing mines, staging attac$s ith small patrol 0oats, and firing a variety ofmissiles at tan$ers.On /pril +4, +:HH, the guided-missile frigate USS Samuel '. !o0erts struc$ an #ranian mineG no sailors ere $illed 0ut several erein8ured and the ship nearly san$. 5he U.S. Davy responded 0y launching Operation Praying 7antis, its 0iggest surface com0at actionsince ?orld ?ar ##.@alf a dozen U.S. arships in to separate Surface /ction Nroups moved in to destroy to #ranian oil platforms. 5he #raniansresponded 0y sending armed speed0oats, frigates and A-4 aircraft to fire at the U.S. arships.#n defending themselves, the /merican vessels san$ at least three #ranian speed0oats, one gun0oat and one frigateG other #ranianships and aircraft ere damaged. 5he only ma8or U.S. loss occurred hen a 7arine Corps Sea Co0ra helicopter crashed, apparently0y accident, $illing to cremen.5he ar all 0ut ended less than three months later hen the guided missile cruiser USS Mincennes mista$enly fired a surface-to-airmissile at an #ranian passenger airliner that it had mista$en for a fighter 8et. 5he plane as destroyed and ):* people $illed./lthough this as an accident, the #ranian regime as convinced that ?ashington as escalating the conflict and decided to reach atruce ith #ra%.5he greatest loss suffered 0y U.S. forces during this hole conflict occurred in +:H; hen an #ra%i aircraft fired an Eocet missilethat hit the frigate USS Star$, $illing ; sailors and in8uring )+. BSaddam @ussein claimed this as an accident.

5he #ranians had little to sho for their efforts" FloydIs of Fondon estimated that the 5an$er ?ar resulted indamage to 142 commercial vessels and the deaths of 4* civilian mariners 0ut many of those losses ere caused 0y #ra%, not #ran.

?hile these attac$s temporarily disrupted the free passage of oil, they did not come close to closingthe strait.9espite the unveiling of a ne antiship cruise missile called the ader, #ranIs conventional naval and air forcesVon display duringthe Meleyat :* naval eercises in the Persian Nulf hich ended 7ondayV are still no match for the U.S. and its allies in the region.5he U.S. alone has in the area to carrier stri$e groups, an epeditionary stri$e force Bcentered around an amphi0ious assault shipthat is in essence a small aircraft carrier, and numerous land-0ased aircraft at 0ases such as /l Udied in atar, /l 9afra in theUnited /ra0 Emirates, and #sa /ir 'ase in 'ahrain. 5he U.S. and our /ra0 allies Bhich are e%uipped ith a groing array ofmodern /merican-made e%uipment such as A-+1s and A-+2s could use overhelming force to destroy #ranIs conventional navalforces in very short order.#ranIs real a0ility to disrupt the flo of oil lies in its asymmetric ar-fighting capacity. #ran has thousands of minesBand any ship thatcan carry a mine is 0y definition a mine-layer, a small num0er of midget su0marines, thousands of small atercraft that could 0eused in sarm attac$s, and antiship cruise missiles. #f the #ranians lay mines, it ill ta$e a significant amount of time to clear them.

#t too$ several months to clear all mines after the 5an$er ?ar, 0ut a much shorter period to clear safe passages through the PersianNulf to and from oil shipping terminals./ntiship cruise missiles are mo0ile, yet those can also 0e found and destroyed. ono su0marines are short-duration threatsVthey

eventually have to come to port for resupply, and hen they do they ill 0e sitting duc$s. U.S. forces may ta$e losses, asthey did ith the hits on the USS Star$ and Samuel '. !o0erts, 0ut they ill prevail and in fairlyshort order.5he #ranians must realize that the 0alance of forces does not lie in their favor. 'y initiatinghostilities they ris$ /merican retaliation against their most prized assetsVtheir covert nuclear-

eapons program. 5he odds are good, then, that the #ranians ill not follo through on theirsa0er-rattling threats.


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Airpower No olve---.NC

7urns ormu4--- 9ran will retaliate to ) air stri(es b* bombing ormu4Wac$ 2eauchamp 1;, !eporter'logger at 5hin$Progress and './ in Political Science andPhilosophy from 'ron University, /pril +4, )*+1, @ereIs hat ould really happen if the US

0om0ed #ran,& http".vo.com)*+14+4HH:1+1iran-arEven limited stri$es against #ran ould have the potential to spar( a broader conflict .5he

conse%uences of that, especially in todayIs 7iddle East, ould 0e disastrous. #ran has the poer to ma$e an unsta0le7iddle East even orse" it could directly target and $ill /mericans in the region, eacer0ate anum0er of the regionIs festering conflicts, and potentially threaten the glo0al oil supply V and

thus the global econom*.US military leadership has orried, PoliticoIs 7ichael Croley reports, that if tal$s fell apart then #ranian proy militias could decide

to attac$ /merican troops in #ra%. #tIs difficult to imagine #ran staying its hand in the event of an outright US attac$.?hile theUS is particularly eposed in #ra%, it has people and assets across much of the region G #ran, too, hasproies across the 7iddle East.

#ran could also attac$ oil infrastructure or 0loc$ade the traits of ormu4 , a critical oil-

shipping route, hich ould have tremendous effects.R#ran can use a mi of mines, su0marines, su0mersi0les, drones, anti ship missiles, small craft,

and assault forces anyhere in the Nulf region to threaten the flow of oil exports ,R Cordesmanand 5ou$an rite. R/ny ma8or disruption affects the entire economy of /sia and all orld oil prices V regardless of here oil is

produced. #t can lead to panic and hoarding on a global basis .R


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?ilitar* "eadiness Answers


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"eform Not e*,2ad---1NC

!lan decreases national securit*---increases dangerous arms exports and doesnthelp readiness

?illiam 9. artung 1#, director of the /rms and Security Pro8ect at the Center for

#nternational Policy, !is$s and !eturns" 5he Economic #llogic of the O0ama /dministrations/rms Eport !eforms,& H)++, https".ciponline.orgresearchhtmlris$-and-returns-the-economic-illogic-of-the-o0ama-administrations-arms-ep#n the near future, smugglers ill li$ely havean easiertime of it due tothe O0amaadministrations plans todramatically loosen U.S. arms eport controls. 5he stated purpose of the reform effort is to simplify arms eport procedures

hile 0oosting the sales and profits of the arms and aerospace industries. 'ut the O0ama administrations proposed reforms threaten

to undermine a carefull* crafted s*stem of arms export controls and increase the

ris$s of eapons technology falling into the rong hands. 5his is far too high a price to pay for any marginal economic0enefits that may result from an easing of controls.6Early in its first term, the O0ama administration announced the outlines of a ne approach toarms eport controls designed to reform hat e control, ho e control it, ho e enforce those controls and ho e manage our controls.& 5hestated goal of the reform effort as to focus on controlling the most critical products and technologies& hile enhancing the competitiveness of $eyUnited States manufacturing and technology sectors.&6/ central element of the administrations approach has 0een to move items from the UnitedStates 7unitions Fist BUS7F < a compendium of arms and arms-related technologies monitored 0y the State 9epartment < to the Commerce ControlFist BCCF, hich su08ects e%uipment destined for eport to less rigorous scrutiny.665he O0ama administrations loosening of controls goes far 0eyond

anything contemplated 0y the Clinton or 'ush administrations. 5he ?hite @ouse has asserted that, /t the end of this process, e anticipate that asignificant percentage of the items that are transferred off of the US7F ould 0e permitted to

0e eported ithout a license.& 5his means that oversight would be lifted from these items.6#t is

generally agreed that eisting eport control las and regulations need to 0e simplified and updated, 0ut human rights groups and theNovernment /ccounta0ility Office BN/O have raised serious concerns over the potential forthe O0amaadministrations reforms to undercut current las designed to $eep U.S. defense articles out of the

hands of terrorists , human rights abusers , or countriesor groups see$ing to develop

nuclear weapons .65he arms and aerospace corporations perspectives overwhelmingl*

drove the eport reform initiative, and the administration has touted its economic 0enefits as an important factor driving theentire reform effort. Aor eample, a former /ssistant Secretary of State for Political-7ilitary /ffairs, /ndre Shapiro, has argued that theadministrations eport control reform ould have a real impact on our economy at a time hen competition is even more fierce and at a time henour manufacturing 0ase could really use a 0oost.&


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"eform 2ad---.NC

7urn--"eform undermines weapons controlA2A8 1#, /merican 'ar /ssociation Center Aor @uman !ights, (anuary +4, )*+, Proposals to!ela Eport Controls for Significant 7ilitary E%uipment&,

http".american0ar.orgcontentdama0aadministrativeindividualYrights8de0Ya0aYchrYhiteYpaperYonYproposalsYtoYrelaYeportYcontrolsYforYsignificantYmilitaryYe%uipmentYfinal.authchec$dam.pdf5he United States eports, at least, tens of millions of dollars of small arms every year, includingto nations in hich there are dangerous terrorist groups and to governments ith consistentlypoor human rights records.1 5hese eapons are etremely hard to trac$.2?hile the United States hasprograms to monitor the end-use& of U.S. eaponry, according to the Novernment /ccounta0ility OfficeBN/O, a significant percentage of post-eport inspections revealed that such items are nolonger in the possession of the intended recipient.; 5herefore, e cannot ensure that U.S. originmaterials are not ending upon the hands of those ho present a ris$ to U.S. interests . 5here is adanger that transferring defense articles to the CCF ill eacer0ate eisting pro0lems ith our enforcement system. N/O has notedthat the State 9epartment has not evaluated the potential impact of control list reform on its enforcement system.H /s discussed in

the legal analysis 0elo, the US7FVunli$e the CCFVis part of a sophisticated statutory regime designed toprotect sensitive eaponry. #t re%uires the registration of manufacturers, detailed licensingapplications and significant penalties for violations. 5hese provisions ena0le the United States tomonitor a significant volume of eports. 5hey also esta0lish an evidentiary trail that is essentialto detecting diversions and prosecuting violators . 'y transferring these items from the statutorily mandatedUS7F, the reforms could seriously undermine the sophisticated system of controls created 0y theCongress in the /EC/. Aurther, it ould create am0iguity concerning the application ofimportant counterterrorism and human rights provisions of the Aoreign /ssistance /ct BA//& thatcontrol the provision of security assistance, including the eport of defense articles& as definedunder the /EC/.: Aor eample, the A// prohi0its the provision of assistance, including the eport of defense articles,& tostate sponsors of terrorism+* and to foreign military units that engage in human rights a0uses.++ 'y transferring these items fromthe US7F to the CCF, the proposed reforms ould create am0iguity as to hich items are considered defense articles& for thepurpose of these important provisions of the A//.

Export controls necessar* to retain re/uired militar* products/. N. O@andC. @& !E7E"ON $, /ttorneys ith the Neneral Electric Company, EportControl Fas and 7ultinational Enterprises&, The International LawyerMol. ++, Do. + B?inter+:;;, pp. ):-44 P

5he second reason for eport control is to prevent the eport of scarce materials for economicand military reasons. Controls of scarce materials for military reasons ere imposed during theJorean ?ar. 5he focus of eport controls has, in recent years, shifted somehat from nationalsecurity to scarce materials. 5his shift is found in the Eport /dministration /mendments of+:;4. 5he Eecutive 'ranch had sought to limit eports such as soy0eans, 0ut the then eistinglegislation governing such controls as limited to situations here the shortages ere the resultof a0normally high foreign demand. 5he +:;4 legislation eliminated the a0normally high

re%uirement and authorized the S ecretary o f C ommerce to monitor eportshich couldadversely affect the domestic economy , / related provision in the +:;4 /mendments, prompted

0y OPEC, authorizes the President to utilize e port c ontrols to conduct foreign restrictions oneports to the United Stateshere such restrictions have a serious inflationary impact, cause aserious domestic shortage , or have 0een imposed to influence United States policy.


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Allies---.NC

Effective militar* tech transfer now---export controls reform not (e*Sean @*ngaas 15, AC? staff riter covering defense, cy0ersecurity and intelligence issues,9O9 prioritizes tech transfer to trusted /sian allies,& +)+;+4,

http"fc.comarticles)*+4+)+;dod-tech-transfer.aspPentagon officials long orried a0out Chinese theft of intellectual property are prioriti4ing

the secure transfer of )&& defense technolog* to /sian allies ary of ChinaIs military

rise.6#n the last fe months, according to 9efense 5echnology Security /dministration 9irector 'eth 7cCormic$, 9O9 has0egun a security initiative that or$s to strengthen the eport control regime of U.S. allies. #n anera of tight 0udgets, the Pentagon has had to concentrate its effort somehere. 5hat somehere is /sia, here the O0ama

administration has declared a RpivotR or Rre0alanceR of U.S. strategic attention from other parts of the orld.6Southeast /sia,ith Singapore as a Rfocal point,R is a Rcritical gateayR for trade that Rre%uires significant aarenessthrough the domains of air, sea, space and cy0er,here intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance technologiesare vital force multipliers,R 7cCormic$ said in a 9ec. +; speech at the @udson #nstitute in ?ashington, 9.C. /s head of 95S/, she isthe senior Pentagon official ho or$s ith the State 9epartment and other agencies to shape U.S. eport control policy.6

7cCormic$ made scant, if any, direct reference to Chinain her speech. et 'ei8ing has 0een front-and-center in

pu0lic discussions a0out protecting U.S. military intellectual property.6#n an annual report to Congressreleased in (une, the Pentagon accused China of using its Rintelligence services and other illicit approaches to collect sensitive U.S.information and eport-controlled technology in violation of U.S. las and eport controls.R 5hat report came out ithin ee$s ofthe (ustice 9epartment issuing its first indictment of state-sponsored cy0er espionage, against five mem0ers of the Chinese

military.67cCormic$ did, hoever, say that the U.S. government is focused on ma$ing its allies $eenlyaare that other countries could 0e trying to steal U.S. technology they ac%uire.6R?e ant them

to protect the technolog*and to ma$e sure that theyre not alloing it to go to some place that e ouldnt actuallyauthorize it to go. 'ut really its in their interest as ell,R she said.6ChinaIs cy0er spies have targeted countries such as South Joreaand (apan 0ecause of their close technological trade relationship ith the United States, according to 5ony Cole, vice president and

glo0al government C5O at AireEye, a netor$ security firm.65he United States is encouraging allies to do

threat anal*ses hen they trade in sensitive technology ith other countries, 7cCormic$ said.

5hat means trading in the appropriate %uantity and type of technology, and thoroughly vetting all

recipients.67cCormic$ held out (apan as a model trading partner in technolog* , calling the

0ilateral relationship a true measure of information technology security& and pointing favora0ly to(apanIs revision of a prohi0ition on defense technology eports.6(apan, /ustralia, De Wealand and South Joreaare hat she du00ed Rmature practitionersR of security eport controls . 5hose countries also all

happen to 0e close )&& allies G(apan and South Jorea each host tens of thousands of U.S. troops.6R5hese

nations represent the measure 0y hich emerging partners in /sia should aspire in terms ofepanding greater technology sharingthat is commensurate ith their technology security practices,R 7cCormic$added.6Aor a 9efense 9epartment acutely concerned ith its dindling technological edge < in part 0ecause of cy0er espionage 4tn annually, according to US officials, and the #5/ ill affect >+tn of that trade hen it comes intoforce.5uesdays deal 0eteen the US and China must still 0e approved 0y the more than 1* other countries involved in the #5/negotiations, 0ut that is epected to happen ithin ee$s.6#n an intervie ith the Ainancial 5imes, 7r Aroman said that theO0ama administration had mounted a concerted campaign to convince the Chinese of the 0enefits from a deal, ith officials fromthe president on don ma$ing the case for the #5/ in recent months.65here as a lot of engagement on this,& he said

igh-tech exports to China high now9ean Cheng 1, Senior !esearch Aello, /sian Studies Center, @eritage Aoundation, EportControls and the @ard Case of China,& +)++*,http".heritage.orgresearchreports)*+*+)eport-controls-and-the-hard-case-of-china

Aurthermore, China is most certainly not an autar$ic nation. 5he United States and China have significant economic

interrelationships . #n )**:, U.S. eports to China totaled >2:.1 0illion, and imports from China totaled >):2.4 0illion. 9ata for

the first half of )*+* indicate that 0ilateral trade ill 0e even greater than in )**: .KL 5his trade involvesa variety of goods. 7a8or U.S. eports to China includenot only agricultural products, especially soy0eans, 0ut also

electrical machiner*8 plastics8 and aircraft .K4L 7eanhile, the U.S. imports various types of machinery andelectrical e%uipment from China and a ide range of consumer goods. 9isparate elements in 0oth countries therefore have an interest in sustainingeconomic ties.65hese economic ties, coupled ith the security antagonisms that are muted compared ith past antagonisms ith the USS!, havecreated a dynamic in hich national security re%uirements and economic 0enefits are not necessarily aligned, unli$e in the prior U.S. relationship ith

the Soviet Union. #ndeed, su0stantial segments of the /merican population, including many consumers, ould stand to lose if overall trade ererestricted. Ending U.S. trade ith the P!C is simply impossi0le ithout inflicting su0stantial economic costs on 0oth sides.6Aurther complicating thesituation are Chinas relationships ith /merican allies. China has etensive economic ties ith the U.J., Nermany, Arance, and many other ?esternnations and poses less of a security challenge to them. Dot surprisingly, China is not one of the countries of interest& in the ?assenaar /rrangement.#ndeed, fe states are li$ely to press for applying the agreement to the P!C in a0sence of a pressing threat from 'ei8ing.K1L Done of the participants inthe K?assenaarL process appears to favor the types of strong controlsVand U.S. dominanceVthat eisted under CoCO7.&K2L65his suggests that, unlesscarefully thought out, any U.S. attempt to impose unilateral eport controls on the P!C ould li$ely fail to prevent 'ei8ing from o0taining compara0letechnologies from U.S. competitors, hile costing /merican manufacturers 8o0s and sales. On the other hand, a clear set of controlled eports mightallo the U.S. to present European and (apanese eporters ith an opportunity to epand their participation in the U.S. defense mar$et in echange fortighter controls over the listed technologies and processes.6!egretta0ly, the structure of U.S.1.); 0illion in )**:G


26/29

aircraft , including engines, e%uipment, and partsB>1. 0illionG and 0roadcasting e%uipment and

instruments for electronic and electrical testingB>+.+H 0illion.K;L 7uch of this e%uipment, especiallysemiconductors and aircraft parts, is shipped to China for assem0ly into finished goods. 5hey therefore hold distinct dual-use potential. Conse%uently, even as the U.S. is trading ith the P!C, it is also potentially 0enefiting the PF/ and therefore may 0e ea$ening U.S.national security.

)-China technolog* relationship high despite export controls99! Digital #, U.S. 9epartment of State, (une *:, )**, REport Controls Dot #mpeding U.S.-#ndia @igh-tech 5rade,Rhttp"iipdigital.usem0assy.govstenglishtettrans)***2)***2*:+H)Haa8u$a*.:1;:4+.htmlXazzgN#N:)H7y point that U.S. eport controls are not inhi0iting high-technology groth in #ndia is furthersupported 0y eamining the U.S.-China trade and high-technology relationship. 5he UnitedStates maintains a more restrictive dual-use eport control policy toard China than it does#ndia. Donetheless, U.S.-China trade - including trade in high-technology - has thrived. U.S.

eports to China in )**) ere over five times greater than )&& exports to 9ndia , and

China as the fourth largest trading partner of the )nited tates . Clearly, the more

restrictive eport controls on China have not impeded or prevented the emergence of a

vi0rant U.S.-China high-technology relationship.


27/29

China "egs A,C---.NC

Chinese state regulation on trade along with poor enforcement of internationalobligations negativel* effect trade&

?ayne 7. ?orrison #-1$-+1, Specialist in /sian 5rade and Ainance for the Congressional

!esearch Service, 7arch +;, )*+1, China-U.S. 5rade #ssues &, Pu0lished 0y the congressionalresearch service, https"fas.orgsgpcrsro!F12.pdf9espite groing commercial ties, the 0ilateral economic relationship has 0ecome increasingly comple and often

fraught ith tension. Arom the U.S. perspective, many trade tensions stem from Chinas incomplete

transition to a free mar(et econom*. ?hile Chinahas significantly li0eralized its economic and trade

regimes over the past three decades, it continues to maintainBor has recently imposed a num0er of state-directed

policies that appear to distort trade and investment flows .7a8or areas of concern

epressed 0y U.S. policyma$ersand sta$eholders include Chinasrelatively poor record of intellectualproperty rightsB#P! enforcementandallegedidespread cy0er economic espionageagainst U.S. firms 0yChinese government entitiesG its mied record on implementing its?orld 5rade Organization B?5Oo0ligationsG its etensive use of industrial policiesBsuch as financial support of state-oned firms, trade and

investment 0arriers, and pressure on foreign-invested firms in China to transfer technology in echange for mar$et access inorder to promote the development of industries favored 0y the government and protect them fromforeign competitionG and its policies to hold don the value of its currency.7any U.S. policyma$ers argue thatsuch policies negatively impact U.S. economic interestsand have contri0uted to U.S. 8o0 losses. 5here are anum0er of vies in the United States over ho to more effectively address commercial disputes ith China"


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pace Coop 9mpossible---.NC

Cooperation with China over space is impossible9ean Cheng/pril :th, )*15, Senior !esearch Aello, /sian Studies Center, Prospects for US-China Space Cooperation&, http".heritage.orgresearchtestimony)*+4*4prospects-

for-us-china--space-cooperation?ithin this contet, then, the prospects for meaningful cooperation ith the P!C in the area of spaceould seem to 0e etremely limited. Chinas past eperience of ma8or high-technology cooperative ventures BSino

Export Controls Case Work - Northwestern 2015

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