IPPG Programme Office, IDPM, School of Environment & DevelopmentUniversity of Manchester, Arthur Lewis Building, 2.023, Oxford Road

Manchester M13 9PL; Telephone 0161 306 6438; ippg@manchester.ac.uk www.ippg.org.uk

Exploring the Politics of Land Reforms in Malawi: A Case Study of the Community Based Rural Land

Development Programme (CBRLDP)a

Blessings ChinsingaB

Discussion Paper Series Number TwentySeptember 2008

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A ResearchreportedinthispaperwascarriedoutwithfinancialsupportfromtheIPPGprogrammebuttheinterpretationsorconclusionspresentedheredonotnecessarilyreflectIPPGthinkingorpolicy,theauthorisentirelyreponsibleforthem.B ChancellorCollege,UniversityofMalawi,DepartmentofPoliticalandAdministrativeStudies,POBOX280,Zomba,Malawi;tel.(265)8577842;fax.(265)1524043/525900;emailkchinsinga@yahoo.co.uk/bchisinga@chanco.unima.mw

Paper prepared for the DFID-funded Research Programme, Institutions and Pro-Poor Growth(IPPG).TheauthorsaregratefultoDFIDforthefundingthatmadethisresearchpossible.TheviewsexpressedinthispaperareentirelythoseoftheauthorandinnowayrepresenteithertheofficialpolicyofDFIDorthepolicyofanyotherpartoftheUKGovernment.

Material published by the IPPGmay be reproduced free of charge in any format ormediumprovided it is reproduced faithfully, not used in amisleading context andproperly attributedto theauthor(s).Copyright exists in all other originalmaterial publishedbymembersof theProgrammeandmaybelongtotheauthorortotheUniversityofManchesterdependingonthecircumstancesofpublication.Enquiriesshouldbesenttotheeditorattheaboveaddress.

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AbstrActThemainargumentofthispaperisthattheexperiencesoftheCBRLDPareunlikelytoprovidevaluable

lessonstoaidthescaleupofthemodelacrossthecountrybecauseofthecriticaldisjuncturebetweentheneoliberaldriveguidingthereformsandthepopularperceptionofhowlandredistributionshouldactuallyproceedincommunitieswithexcessland.Theyfavourrestitutionasameansofrectifyinglandtenureinequitiesperpetratedbyboththecolonialandpostcolonial regimescontrary to theCBRLDP initiativewhichunequivocallyadvocatesamarket-basedlandredistributiononawilling-buyerand-sellerbasis.Moreover,thegovernment’scommitmenttoaddressthequestionoflandonceandforallremainsatthelevelofrhetoricdespitetheconsensusthatlandisaprimaryproductiveresourceinthecountryandonewhichholdsthekeytopovertyreduction.Theoutcomes,successesandfailuresoftheCBRLDPhavebeenfurtherdriven,influencedandshapedbypoliticalprocessesresultingfromtheinteractionandcontestationofdiversestakeholdersinvolvedwiththeCBRLDPandendowedwithdifferingformsandvaryingdegreesofpower,authorityandinfluence.ThemajorlessonfromtheCBRLDPimplementationexperiencesisthatthedesign,reformandimplementationofpro-poorinstitutionalarrangementsarenotmerelyatechnicalormanagerialmatter,butaprofoundlypoliticalexercise.ThisisunderlinedbythesheerdeterminationofstakeholdersengagedwiththeCBRLDPtoshifttheburdenofthereformselsewhereastheyjostletogetthemostoftheevolvinginstitutionalarrangementsgoverninglandownershipanduse.

contents

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1 SettingtheScene 42 TheoreticalFramework:Institutions,GrowthandChange 63 UnderstandingtheLandQuestioninMalawi 74 TheCommunityBasedRuralLandDevelopmentProject(CBRLDP) 115 ThePoliticsofLandReformundertheCBRLDPinPerspective 1�6 ConcludingRemarks 20 References 22

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1 settingthesceneThequestionoflandreformremainshighontheMalawigovernment’sagendaeventhoughithasbeen

onthetablesincetheattainmentofindependencein1964(Chirwa[2004];Kishindo[2004];Kanyongolo[2005]).TheissueoflandtenurepatternsandownershipinMalawiisclearlyanemotiveonesincelandisthemostcriticalproductiveresourcewhich,forthevastmajority,isthesolebasisfortheirlivelihoods.ThisisunderscoredbythefactthatMalawihaspursuedanagriculturally-drivendevelopmentstrategysince independenceandthis is likely toremainassuchat least for the foreseeable future(Chirwaet al., 2006). However, instead of rectifying the adverse effects of the colonial land policies, the post-independenceagriculturalstrategypursuedfornearlyfourdecadesmerelyexacerbatedthelandtenurepatterns and ownership. The reforms that were implemented to anchor the postcolonial agriculturaldevelopmentstrategydidnotrepresentanybreakwiththepast,butratherreflectedalmostwholesalecontinuitywiththecolonialframeworkgoverninglandtenurepatternsandownership; inessence,thepostcolonialelitessimplysteppedintotheshoesofthedepartingwhitesettlers(N’gong’ola,1982andKanyongolo,2005).Thecombinedeffectsofthepostcolonialagriculturaldevelopmentstrategyandtherapidincreaseinpopulationgrowthhaveledtothedramaticdeclineinpercapitalandholdingsizestoaslowas0.8hectaresinthe2000sfrom1.53hectaresinthelate1960s(Chirwaet al.,2003).Thelandatthedisposalofthemajorityofthesmallholderfarmersisdescribedas‘simplyprovidingacushionorsafetynetthatwillprovidethemwithabasewhiletheirprimaryincomesneedtobegeneratedelsewhere’(Smith,1999:8)yetthequestionoflandamongsmallholderfarmershaseitherbeengivenalukewarmresponseorignoredcompletelyinvariousdevelopmentstrategiessinceindependence.However, the question of land reform received a new lease of life in the lead up to the political

transitionfromanauthoritarianone-partydictatorshiptoamultipartydemocracyinMay1994(PetersandKambewa,2007).Landreformwasflaggedbyadvocatesofdemocratisationasakeystrategyfordealingwiththedeep,widespreadandseverepovertylevelsprevalentinthecountry,theexistenceofwhichwasofficiallydeniedformorethanthreedecades.Duringthisperiod,thequestionofpovertydidnotariseaslongaspeoplehadenoughfoodtoeat,hadapieceofclothontheirbackandlivedinhousesthatdidnotleakwhenitwasraining(Kalemba,1997;Chinsinga,2002).Theadvocatesofdemocracyattributedthecripplinglevelsofpoverty,interalia,totheinequitableandunjustpostcolonialpatternsoflandtenurethatpromotedexcessivealienationoflandfromthesmallholderfarmers.Itwasthereforepromisedthatlandredistributionwouldbeaddressedasanintegralpartofthepovertyreductionagendashouldtheadvocatesofdemocratisationbeushered intopower. Indeed,Malawi reinstatedmultipartydemocracywhichsawtheoustingoftheMalawiCongressParty(MCP)andtheascendancyoftheUnitedDemocraticFront(UDF)in1994.Unlikeitspredecessor,theUDFidentifiedpovertyreductionbothasapolicyandstrategythatwouldguidealldevelopmentactivities intheshort,mediumand longtermperspectivescharacterising it as ‘thegovernment’s first priority and centrepieceof its overall social andeconomicdevelopmentprogramme’(NEC,1998:3).Consequently, the government put together a Presidential Commission of Inquiry on LandReform

in1996whosemandatewas‘topromotescholarlydiscourse,gathertheopinionoftheprivatesector,ordinarycitizensandnon-governmentalorganisationsandtoorganisetheirfindingsinsuchamannerastoaidthelandreformpolicyefforts’(GoM,2001:13).Theideawasthatitsfindingswouldestablish‘themainprinciplesofanewlandpolicywhich[would]fosteramoreeconomicallyefficient,environmentallysustainableandsociallyequitablelandtenuresystem’(Holden et al.,2006:13).Thecommissionproduceditsfinalreportin1999whichformedthebasisfordevelopinganationallandpolicywhichwasapprovedbyCabinetandParliamentin2002.AspecialLawCommissionwasconstitutedin2003taskedtoreviewexistingland-relatedlegislationanddevelopnewlegislationforeffectivelandadministrationbyconsultingaswidely aspossiblewith relevant stakeholdersparticularly the civil society. Theenabling legislativeframeworkforthelandpolicyisyettobepromulgatedintolaweventhoughtheSpecialLawCommissionwoundupitsassignmentmorethanfouryearsago(PetersandKambewa,2007).There ismounting evidence that the delays in implementing the land reforms– championed as a

priority policy issue to galvanise popular support for the democratisation project – is stretching thepatienceofthe‘landhungrypeople’.Theexpectationofthepeoplewasthatthelandreformprogrammewouldbe implemented immediatelyafter the reinstallationofademocraticpoliticaldispensation.Thedelaysappeartohaveencouragedencroachmentandinvasionsintofreeholdlandbyland-scarcefarmers,particularlyinthesoutherndistrictsofThyoloandMulanje(Martin,2004;GoM,2005).Suchinvasionsofprivatelyownedfarmshaveafairlylonghistorybutdramaticallypeakedinthewakeoftheliberalisationofpoliticallifeinthemid1990s.In1999,thegovernment’sestimateswerethatillegallandoccupationsofprivatelyownedfarms‘coveredfrom5%oftheareasoffarmsthatarelessthan20hectaresto52%forlargefarmsof500hectaresormore’(Kanyongolo,2005:129).It is probably the combined effect of the increasing incidents of land invasion and the tragic turn

of events in neighbouringZimbabwe’s land reformprogramme that has prompted the government –workingcloselywithdonors– to implementat leastonapilotbasis,a land reformprogrammeasameansofaddressingthehistoricalinjusticesexposedbythePresidentialCommissionofInquiryonLandReform.KnownastheCommunityBasedRuralLandDevelopmentProgramme(CBRLDP),andtranslatedaskudziguliramalo(literallymeaningbuyingoneselfland)invernacular,thelandreformprogrammeisbeingpilotedinThyoloandMulanjeassendingdistrictsandinMachingaandMangochiaspredominantly

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receivingdistricts.Theprojectinvolvespurchasingandredistributinglandtolandstressedfarmersonwilling-buyerand-sellerbasiswiththeviewofbuildingonitslessonstoscaleuptheinitiativeacrossthecountryasearlyas2009(Chirwaetal.[2003];Chirwa[2004];PetersandKambewa[2007]).Themainpurposeof thispaper is toexplore thepoliticsof landunderlying theCBRLDP initiatives

particularlyintermsofwhoisinvolved,theirinterestsandtheoverallinstitutionalcontextwithinwhichthe initiative isbeingexecuted.The idea is toestablishwhether thispilot isadequatelyconceived toleadtosustainablepovertyreductionoutcomessincelandiswidelyacceptedasthecriticalproductiveresource; orwhether the initiative is beholden to thedictates of pathdependence (North, 1990andChinsinga,2002).Themajorassumptionguidingthisassessmentisthatthepoliticsoflandisverycloselylinkedtotheprocessesofstateformationandnationbuilding.Sincethecolonialdaysstateshave‘soughtto createand transform the institutions that shapeaccess to, and theuseof land just as theyhavesoughttoconstructthemeansbywhichaccessto,anduseoflandisjustifiedandlegitimised’(Alexander,2006:118).Thisisusuallypartofthestates’effortstofashioninstitutionsofgovernanceabletoorder,discipline, develop and at times even represent the people. The politics of land generally entailwhoshouldgainaccesstoit,howshoulditbeutilisedandhowitshouldbesettled.Thisisfurthermanifestedinthearchitectureofinstitutions,inthediscipliningofsocialrelations,inideasaboutwhatconstitutesdevelopmentandinthedefinitionofpropertyrights.ThemainargumentofthispaperisthatthepilotlandreformsundertheauspicesoftheCBRLDPare

unlikelytoprovidevaluablelessonstoaidthescaleupofthemodelacrossthecountry.Themainreasonforthisisthedisjuncturebetweentheneoliberaldriveguidingthereformsandthepopularperceptionof how land redistribution should actually proceed, especially in the receiving communities. In thesecommunities,theidealmodeloflandreformisheavilyskewedinfavouroflandrestitutionasameansofrectifyinglandtenureinequitiesperpetratedbyboththecolonialandpostcolonialregimes,contrarytotheCBRLDPinitiativewhichunequivocallyadvocatesformarketbasedlandredistributioninterventions(Kanyongolo,2005).ThistensionisfurthercompoundedbyseveralanomaliesintheinstitutionaldesignoftheCBRLDPinitiative.Thereis,forinstance,alackofclarityintermsofwhatexactlytheprojectispiloting;itisnotveryclearwhethertheprojectispilotingtheprovisionsofthedraftlandpolicyormerelythewilling-buyerand-sellerphilosophyoflandacquisitionandredistribution.Theaforementionedconstraintsillustrate,inter alia,thatthedesign,reformandimplementationofpro-

poorinstitutionalarrangementsisnotapoliticallyneutralexercise.Theyaredriven,influencedandshapedbypoliticalprocessesresultingfromtheinteractionandcontestationofdiverseinterests(bothinternalandexternal)andfromdifferingformsanddegreesofpower,licitandillicit,formalandinformal(Leftwich,2007;HareandDavis,2006).Thekeypoint,asillustratedinthispaper,isthatdifferentstakeholdersusewhateverpower,authorityorinfluencetheyhavetoshapepro-poorinstitutionalchangestotheirownadvantage.Theultimateobjectiveofstakeholdersistoshifttheburdenofadjustmentresultingfromtheprocessesofinstitutionalchangeelsewhereandasmuchaspossibleavoidchangingpatternsofthestatusquoiftheyareintheirfavour.Thisimpliesthatanyprocessofinstitutionalchangehaswinnersandlosersandthosewhostandtolosearemorelikelytoderailtheimplementationprocessoraffecthowitworks.Itisonthisbasisthatthispaperillustrateshowthemultilevelpoliticalprocesseshaveshaped,influencedanddriventheCBRLDPbothinitsconceptionandimplementationatnationalandlocallevels.ThestudyonwhichthispaperisbasedwascarriedoutintheMachingadistrictamongbothbeneficiaries

oftheCBRLDPandthelocalresidents.Thestudyadoptedanentirelyqualitativeapproachwhichfocusedonthereactionsandcommentsofparticipants,ratherthanquantificationinthecollectionandanalysisofdata.Itisconcernedwithunderstandingthemeaningswhichpeopleattachtoactions,decisions,beliefsandvalueswithintheirsocialworldandunderstandingthementalmappingprocessthatrespondentsusetomakesenseandinterprettheworldaroundthem(Bryman,2001;Campbell,2002).Thisapproach,therefore,providesthemeansofacquiringanin-depthunderstandingofhumanbehavioursinceitprovidestheopportunitytoexploreissues,understandphenomenaandanswerquestions.Themainreasonforthisisthattheapproachusesopen-endedquestionspermittingunexpectedbutrelevantissuestobefollowedupwitheitheradditionalquestionsorsystematicprobing.Wheretheseemerged,theybecameanintegralpartofthefindings.ThemaintoolsfordatacollectionwerekeyinformantinterviewswhichwereheldwiththeCBRLDPstaff,

traditionalleadersandtheleadershipofthenewsettlers;focusgroupdiscussions(FGDs)wereheldwithcommunitiesbothnewandold;andafewindepthindividualinterviewstofollowuponspecificissuesthatemergedintheFGDs.AtotaloftenFGDs,tenkeyinformantinterviewsandtenin-depthinterviewswereheld.TheFGDsandtheinterviewswerefurthercomplementedbyfourindividualcasestudiesespousingtheirdetailedexperienceswiththelandreformprogramme.Thestudywascarriedoutinseventrusts(new settlements) andwithin their neighbourhoods.1 These data collection toolswere complementedbysecondarydatasources,especiallyCBRLDPprogrammedesigndocumentsandevaluationreportstodate.Therestofthepaperisorganisedasfollows:SectionIIarticulatesthetheoreticalframeworkwithin

1 Thebeneficiarygroupsof land from theCBRLDP formTrustswhich constitutea legal entity forpurposesof facilitatingacquisitionandsubsequentownershipofland.Thestudycoveredseventrustsintotal,intheareaofTraditionalAuthorityMlomba.These includedChitimbe, Itendo,Kasauje,Mgatuwanya,Chimbeta,Kalunga,andChimwabvi.Of these, fourareconstitutedbypeoplefromwithinMachingadistrict,namelyNgatuwanya,Chitimbe,ItendoandKausaje.TheremainingthreeareconstitutedbypeoplewhohaveemigratedfromThyolodistrict.

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whichtheCBLRDPexperiencesareunderstood,analysedandrelevantimplicationsaredrawn.SectionIIIprovidesaquickoverviewofthelandquestioninMalawifocusingparticularlyonthereformeffortsthathavebeentakensinceindependencein1964.SectionIVsketchesverybrieflytheinstitutionaldesignoftheCBRLDPpilotprojectinordertoprovidethecontextfortherestofthediscussion.SectionVpresentsthesuccessesandthechallengesoftheCBRLDPprojectinordertoestablishitsprospectsforscalabilityandsustainabilityanditsimplicationsforthepovertyreductionagenda.SectionVIofferssomeconcludingremarks.

2 theoreticAlFrAmework:institutions,growthAndchAnge

Institutions–popularlydefinedastherulesofthegame–aredeemedcriticalforeconomicgrowth(North[1990];DFID[2003];Leftwich[2007]).Theyare,however,deemedparticularly important forpromotingpro-poorgrowthgenerallyconstruedas ‘economicgrowththatenhancesthecapabilitiesofpoorerpeople,whichmaybeachievedboth through theways inwhichgrowth isbroughtaboutandalsothroughmoreequitabledistributionofitsbenefits’(HareandDavis,2006:4).Asrulesofthegame,institutionscanbeunderstoodas‘theessentialstructuralpropertiesofsocietieswhichareconstitutedby the rules andprocedures that constrain some formsof behaviour and interactionbetweenpeopleandgroupsandenableothersinsocial,economicandpoliticaldomains’(Leftwich,2007:11).Scholarsdistinguishbetweenformalandinformalinstitutions(North[1990];HelmkeandLevitsky[2004];Bratton[2007]).AccordingtoHelmkeandLevitsky(2004),formalinstitutionsarerulesandprocedureswhicharecreated,communicatedandenforcedthroughchannelswidelyacceptedasofficialwhereasinformalinstitutions are socially shared rules, usually unwritten, created, communicated and enforcedoutsideofficiallysanctionedchannels.Institutionsarethereforedurablesocialrulesandprocedures,formalorinformal,whichstructurethesocial,economic,andpoliticalrelationsandinteractionsofthoseaffectedbythem.Theythusforbidsomeformsofbehaviourandencourageothersandtheformwhichsuchrulestakemayeitherhinderorpromotegrowth(Leftwich,2006).Hira and Hira (2000) contend that institutions are amajor determinant of economic growth in a

societytotheextentthatdifferencesinthequalityandefficiencyofinstitutionsareprimaryreasonfordifferencesineconomicoutcomesamongsocieties.Thismeansthatinstitutionsinsomecountriesaremoreefficientinachievingsocialoutcomeswhichexplainswhysomecountriesenjoyhigherstandardsoflivingthanothers.Institutionalarrangementscanhindergrowthby,amongotherthings:1)restrictingaccess tomarkets, land, labouropportunities, credit, etc.;2)entrenching systemsofproperty rightsthatdiscriminateagainstsomesegmentsofsocietyandpromotecorruptpracticesbythebureaucracy;3) championing democratic processes that do not promote transparency and accountability; and 4)promotingclassandpatron-clientrelations(DFID,2003).Inthiscontext,pro-poorgrowthcanonlyoccurwheneconomicgrowthisaccompaniedbyshiftsinthedistributionofincomethatfavourthepoor.Thisis,however,criticallydependentontheinteractionsofformalandinformalpolitical,socialandculturalinstitutionswitheconomicinstitutionsinwhichcaseinstitutionalreformsareimperativetobringaboutinstitutionalarrangementsthatwouldpromotepro-poorgrowth(HareandDavis,2007).Itisnonethelesswidelyacknowledgedthatpromotingandfacilitatinginstitutionalchangeisnotaneasy

task(North,1990;Harris,2007);institutionalchangeisadeeplyimbuedpoliticalprocessthatinvolveswinnersandlosers.Inthisregard,politicsisunderstoodasencompassingallactivitiesofco-operation,conflict and negotiation involved in decisions about the use, production and distribution of resourceswhethertheseareformalorinformal,publicorprivate,oramixtureofall(Leftwich,1995;2007).Therearebound tobewinners and losers in the courseof establishingor changing institutions as existinginstitutionalarrangementsarenotneutral:theydistributeadvantagetosomeanddisadvantagetoothersandthusexpressamobilisationofbias insomewayoranother.It isforthisreasonthat institutionalchangeisheavilycontestedbydiverseinterestswithdifferentformsanddegreesofpower,influenceandauthority,creatingintheprocesswinnersandlosers(Leftwich,2007;LeftwichandHogg,2007).Institutionalchangeiswidelyconceivedasafunctionofthechangingbargainingpowerofdifferent

socialgroupstriggeredeitherinternallyorexternally(DFID,2003).Institutionsarethus‘theobjectofanongoingpoliticalcontestation,andchangesinthepoliticalcoalitionsonwhichinstitutionsrestarewhatdrivechangesintheforminstitutionstakeandthefunctionstheyperforminpoliticsandsociety’(Harris,2006).Manyscholarsthereforeconcludethat institutionsareoftencreationsoftherichandpowerfulandassuchthey(institutions)commonlydiscriminateagainst thepoor(HareandDavis,2006). It isthereforenotsurprisingthatelitesalmostalwaysvigorouslycontest institutionalchangesandreformsunlesstheyareadequatelycompensatedthoughlegitimatemechanismsfordoingsoarenon-existent.Elitesresistandcontestchangesbecausewhenchangesoccurtheydonotonlyalterthewaypeopleuseresourcesbutalsotheirrelationswitheachother.Thesechangesdistributeadvantageanddisadvantagetodifferentgroupsand interests indifferentandoftennewwaysandhandling thesechanges ‘isnotsimplyatechnicalormanagerialmatterbutaprofoundlypoliticalone’(LeftwichandHogg,2007:12).Institutional development is therefore construed as ‘a contest among actors to establish ruleswhichstructureoutcomestothoseequilibriumsfavourabletothem’(Leftwich,2007:22).Thelen(2004)challengestheidiosyncraticviewthatinstitutionsaremerelyreflectionsofthecontests

ofthepowerfulsomuchthatthattheyrespondautomaticallytothechangesinthebalanceofpowerorthe

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preferencesofthepowerful(Harris,2006).Thelen’sargumentisthatthereisaneedtotakecognisanceofthefactthatinstitutionsdesignedtoserveonesetofinterestsoftenbecomecarriersofothersaswellandthatinstitutionshaveintendedaswellasunintendedeffects.ThebottomlineofThelen’sargument,asquotedbyHarris(2006:5),isthat‘institutionsarerarelyreflectionsofthepowerful,butmustbeseenas objects of ongoingpolitical negotiation, institutional evolution and change is the outcomeof suchnegotiationbetweencontendingactors’. Inaddition,HelmkeandLevitsky (2004)argue that informalstructuresshapetheperformanceofformalinstitutionsinimportantandoftenunexpectedways,andthetractionandinfluenceofinformalinstitutionstodistortandunderminethespiritofformalinstitutionsisparticularlyhighinthedevelopingworld.Hydencontends‘Africaisthebeststartingpointforexploringthe role of informal institutions and these derive from a social logic [called] economy of affection’.2 Theinteractionbetweenformalandinformalinstitutionsisparticularlyimportantinunderstandingthedynamicsofinstitutionalchange.TheobservationsbyHelmkeandLevitsky(2004:734)areillustrativeinthisregard:

‘Wheninstitutionsfunctioneffectively,weoftenassumethatformalrulesaredrivingactors’behaviour.Yetinsomecases,underlyinginformalnormsdomuchoftheenablingandconstrainingthatweattributetotheformalrules.’

Thereareseveral theoriesof institutions,growthandchangewhich, interalia, include:1) rationalchoiceinstitutionalismwhichisconcernedwithattainmentofcooperationamongstakeholdersaswayofmaximisingreturnsfrominstitutions;2)newinstitutionaleconomicswhichfocusesonthereductionoftransactioncostsasameansofdecidingonefficientandgrowthenhancinginstitutionalarrangements;and3)historicalinstitutionalismwhichispreoccupiedwithunderstandingandanalysingpowerasymmetriesamong stakeholders as the basis for institutional change and development (North [1990]; Hira andHira[2000];Leftwich[2007]).Ofthesethree,historicalinstitutionalismprovidesamuchmoresuitableframeworkforthisstudybecauseitrecognisesthatwhilestructuresdoshapethebehaviourofagents,theyalsocreate,influenceandchangeinstitutionsandthatcriticaljuncturesmayoftenprovokerapidandevenfarreachingchangeininstitutionalpatterns.Inotherwords,historicalinstitutionalismconceivesoutcomesofinstitutionalchangeandreformsasacomplexinteractionofideas,interestsandinstitutions(Leftwich,2007).Criticaljuncturesforchangedonotalwaysculminateinfar-reachinginstitutionalchanges,however.

Thisisthecasebecausechanginginstitutionalarrangementsisdifficultoncetheyhavebeenestablished.Inmostinstances,subsequentinstitutionalchangesarealmostalwaysincrementalinnaturesinceonceaninstitutionhasbeenestablished,powerfulactorswillhaveaninterestinitsreproductiontoservetheirowninterests.Theinstitutionsbecomemoreorlesslockedorfrozenintime(North,1990;Harris,2006).Societiestendthereforetobe lockedinto institutionsthataredysfunctionalfor largesectionsoftheirpopulationsbecausetheseinstitutionssatisfytheinterestsofpowerelites:thisistechnicallyreferredtoaspathdependence.Thepointisthatinmomentsofcriticaljuncturesforchange,pathdependentlegaciesfromapreviouseracansuffocatechangeespeciallywhencriticaljunctureshavecreatedintereststhatwouldresistchange,thoughacaveat is inorderhere:awarenessofhistoricalpathdependencemustbebalancedbytherecognitionofthepossibilitiesforhumanagencytobringaboutfarreachingchangetriggeredeitherendogenouslyorexogenously(Harris,2006).

3 understAndingthelAndQuestioninmAlAwi

TheLandSituationinMalawi

Landremainsthemostsignificantproductiveasset for themajorityofMalawiansyet it is far frombeingequitablydistributed.Itisestimatedthatupto84%Malawianseketheirlivelihoodsdirectlyoutofagriculturewhichcontributesover90%tothecountry’sexportearnings,about39%ofthecountry’sGrossDomesticProduct(GDP)andaccountsfor85%oftotalemployment.Theimportanceofagricultureinthecountry’seconomyisactuallyincreasinginsteadofdiminishingfollowingthedevastatingeffectsstructuraladjustmentprogrammes(SAPs)havehadonthemanufacturingsector.Thecontributionofthemanufacturingsectortothecountry’sGDPhasdeclinedfrom14%in2002to11%in2007inthewakeofeithertotalcollapseofsomeindustriesorreallocationoftheseindustriestoneighbouringcountrieswithintheregion.Themanufacturingsectoraccountsforatleast11%ofGDPofwhichagro-processingconstitutes26%(Chinsinga,2007).ItthereforeneedstobestressedthataccesstolandiskeyforsustainablelivelihoodsinMalawi.Itis

asignificantdeterminantofwhetherahouseholdwillbefoodsecure,lessvulnerabletorisksandshocks,andearnalivelihoodabovethepovertyline.Scholarsactuallypositthattheextenttowhichagriculturaldevelopmentcanhavegreaterimpactonpovertydependsontheavailabilityofland(Woodhouse,2006andPotts,2006).However,thechallengeinMalawiisthattheownershipanddistributionoflandishighlyunequal.Itis,forinstance,estimatedthatonethirdofsmallholderscultivatebetween0.5and1hectares

2 QuotedinBratton,M.(2007)‘FormalversusInformalInstitutionsinAfrica.’Journal of Democracy,18:3,pp.97–110.

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of land;55%ofsmallholdershave less than1hectareof land;andthat70%ofsmallholder farmerscultivatelessthanahectarewiththemedianareabeingcultivatedstandingat0.6hectares,anddevote70%ofthelandtomaize,themainstaple.Theaveragepercapitacultivatedlandareais0.22hectareswiththeultrapoorholding0.16hectarepercapitaandthenon-poorholding0.28hectarespercapita(NSO,2002andChirwa,2004).TherearestrikingregionalvariationsinthepatternsoflanddistributioninMalawiwiththesouthernregionwheretheCBRLDPprojectisbeingpilotedthehardesthit.�Theaveragelandholdingsizespercapitaareestimatedat0.178hectaresinthesouthcomparedto0.257hectaresand0.256hectaresforcentralandnorthernregionsrespectively.The current patterns of land distribution can be attributed to the postcolonial land policies which

insteadofaddressingtheiniquitiesandinjusticesofthecolonialerasimplyreinforcedthem;thiswasinsharpcontrasttotherhetoricintheleaduptotheattainmentofindependencein1964(N’gong’ola,1982;Mkandawire,1993).While some reformswere implemented, theydidnot ‘heralda transformationofMalawi’spoliticaleconomy,butlargelyretainedcoloniallandpoliciesandlaws’(Kanyongolo,2005:127).Thesereformswereanchoredbyanensembleofthreepiecesoflegislation,namely:theCustomaryLandDevelopmentAct,theRegisteredLandActandtheLocalLandBoardsActintroducedin1967.Themaingoaloftheselegislativeinstrumentswastomakeprofoundchangesregardingcustomarylandintendedtorectifysomedefectsthatwouldinturnfacilitatethemodernisationofagricultureinthecountry.Whenintroducingthesebills inparliament,thepresidentarguedthat‘existingcustomsofholdingandtillinglandwereoutdated,wastefulandtotallyunsuitableforthedevelopmentofacountrywithagricultureasthebasisoftheeconomy’(N’gong’ola,1982:115).Thepresidentemphasisedthatthemainproblemwith customary landwas the lackof clarity regardingownership since ‘noone is responsible…for theuneconomicandwastefuluseoflandbecausenooneholdslandasanindividual.Landisheldincommon…andeverybody’sbabyisnobody’sbabyatall’(N’gong’ola,1982:115).Threecategoriesoflandweredistinguishedonthebasisofthesepiecesoflegislation.Theseincluded:1)

privatelanddefinedasalllandthatisowned,heldoroccupiedunderafreehold,leasehold,oracertificateofclaim;2)customarylanddefinedaslandthatisoccupiedundercustomarylaw;and3)publiclanddefinedaslandusedoracquiredbythegovernmentandanyotherlandthatisnotcustomaryorprivate.Itis,however,arguedthatthesecategoriesoflandintroducedbythepostcoloniallandreforms‘didnotrepresentrealchangeintheprevious[colonial]categorisationandthesechangeswerejustchangesinname’(SahnandArulpragasam,1999:1).Thesereformsformedthebasisforthedualagriculturalstrategythatthecountryhaspursuedinthelastfourdecadessinceindependence.Asaresultofthe1967reforms,landwasconstruedasacommoditytobegovernedbymarketforceswhichencouragedentrepreneurstoacquireportionsofcommunallandandconvertthemintotheirownprivatelands(Chirwa,1998andChinsinga,2007).Thus the1967 lawsnotonly institutedmechanisms for converting customary landintoprivatelandbutalsoreinforcedthepostcolonialdualagriculturalstrategythatdistinguishedestatefarmingfromsmallholderagriculture.Thesesectorsdifferedintermsoflandholdingsizesandtypesofcropswhichtheycouldgrow.While

thoseengagedinestatefarmingwereatlibertytocultivateavarietyofcropswithoutlimit,thosewithinthesmallholdersub-sectorwerelegallyprohibitedfromproducingsuchcashcropsasburleytobacco,sugarandteatoavoidprovidingcompetition.Lackofcompetitionwouldenabletheelites(politicians,seniorcivil servants, senior parastatal employeesand chiefs) to reap substantial benefits from internationaltradeforfurtherreinvestmentintheagriculturalsector.Thisfurtherhelpedtoguaranteeestatesareadilyavailablepoolofcheaplaboursincekeepingsmallholderfarmersoutofthelucrativeinternationalmarketsensuredthatthemajorityofthemremainedatsubsistenceleveltherebykeepingtheoptionofworkingastenantsontheestatesattractive(Harrigan,2001andChinsinga,2007).Perhapsmorecriticallyimportantis the fact that the landmarket thatwascreated following the1967 lawsprovidedonly forone-waytransferabilityofland,landcouldonlybetransferredtotheestatesector,andusuallywithonlyamodestcompensation.Itisestimatedthatundertheaegisofthisparticularpolicy,thenumberofestatesincreasedfrom1,200

in1979to14,671in1989coveringonemillionofhectaresoffertilearablelandbutwithconsiderablysub-optimalproductivitylevels(Chirwa,1998;Stambuli,2002).TheresultantskewedlanddistributionpatternisaptlycapturedbytheWorldBank(2003),whichestimatesthatabout1.8to2millionsmallholderfarmerscultivateonaverage1hectarecomparedwith30,000estatescultivating1.1millionhectareswithanaveragelandholdingofbetween10to500hectares;the2002landpolicyestimatesthatabout28%ofthecountry’scultivableland,representingapproximately2.6millionhectares,liesidleintheruralareasandmuchofitfallsunderthefreeholdcategory(GoM,2002).The rapid expansion of the estate sub-sectorwas sponsoredby theAgriculturalDevelopment and

MarketingCorporation(ADMARC).Asastatemarketingboard,ADMARCfinancedtheprogressiveexpansionoftheestatesub-sectorthroughheavyimplicittaxationofsmallholdercashcropproductionbybuyingtheircropsatpricesfarbelowthoseoftheworldmarkets(Mhone,1987).Harrigan(2001),forinstance,estimatesthatbetween1971and1981,ADMARCextractedMK181.9millionfromthesmallholdersector,ofwhichonly14%wasusedtocrosssubsidisesmallholderproductionandconsumption,theremainderbeingusedforinvestmentandloans,only4.3%ofwhichwasrelatedtothedevelopmentofsmallholder

3 Malawiisdividedintothreeadministrativeregions,namelynorth,centreandsouth.

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agriculture.ItisarguedthatDr.Bandainhiscapacityaspresidentacceleratedthedevelopmentofestateagricultureasaformofpatronageencouragingseniorpoliticians,civilservants,traditionalleadersandotherformerlynon-agrarianindigenousbusinesspeopletopurchaseestatesusingpreferentialcreditfromADMARCorbankswithhisbacking.Theprivatisationoflandundertheauspicesofthe1967lawswasjustifiedasameansforfarmingentrepreneurstogainaccesstocommercialcreditforthedevelopmentoftheirlandasthefirstcriticalstepinmodernisingagriculturetoserveasthecountry’sengineofeconomicgrowth.

LandReforminMalawiinaContemporaryPerspective

Theresurgenceofthelandquestiononthegovernment’sagendaiscloselylinkedtothedemocratisationprojectduringthe1990s.Asalreadystatedabove,theadvocatesofthemultipartypoliticaldispensationarguedthatembracingthepoliticaltransitionofferedopportunitiestoaddressawholerangeofinequitiesand injusticesperpetratedby theoneparty regime,primarily inequitable land redistributionpatterns(Kishindo,2004;Kanyongolo,2005).ThequestionoflandreformwasgenerallyflaggedasanimmediatecourseofactionshouldMalawianschoosetoembraceademocraticpoliticaldispensation.Thecountryhastherefore,sincethemid1990s,witnessedaproliferationofpovertyreductioninterventions,thesehaveincludedthePovertyAlleviationProgramme(PAP)launchedin1994underwhichtheMalawiSocialActionFund(MASAF)hasbeenthemainintervention;theVision2020in1998;theMalawiPovertyReductionStrategyPaper(MPRSP)in2001;theOneVillageOneProduct(OVOP)in2003;andtheMalawiGrowthandDevelopmentStrategy(MGDS)(2006).Theproliferationofthepovertyreductioninitiativesnotwithstanding,themomentumleadingtothe

implementationoflandreformshasnotbeenasswiftashadbeenimpliedintheleaduptothepoliticaltransition.YetitiswidelyacknowledgedthatlandinMalawiremainsthemostcriticalproductiveresourceandwithoutanymajorreformsinthelandtenurepatternsandownership,povertyreductioninitiativesarehighlyunlikelytodelivertheirintendedstrategicimpact(Chirwaetal.,2003).Thereisaverycloserelationshipbetweenlandandpovertyreduction,forexampletheredistributionoflandcouldeasethecreditconstraintthusenablingthepoortodiversifyintohighvaluenon-traditionalcashcropproduction.ThemajorrecommendationbythePresidentialCommissionofLandInquiryin1999wasthatsome

formoflandreadjustmentisnecessary,particularlyinthesouthernregionwherelandshortageisquitecritical.Thedraftlandpolicyisquiteelaborateandsomeofthekeyhighlightsinclude:• Itseekstoclarifyandstrengthenlandrightsandtoformalisetheroleoftraditionalauthoritiesin

theadministrationofcustomarylandwhichcoversabout70%ofnationalland.• Itprovidesthatcustomarylandholderswillbeabletoregistertheirlandascustomaryestates

whichwillhaveprivateusufructuaryrightsinperpetuityandonceregistered,thetitleownerwill havefulllegalstatusandcanbeleasedorusedassecurityformortgageloan.• ItseekstorecognisethelongstandingauthorityofTraditionalAuthority(TAs)butalsotoensure

moreaccountabilitybyformalisingthesystemoflandadministration.• Itprovidesforallchildrenirrespectiveofsextoinheritlandandotherpropertyfromparentsto

addresstheconcernofdiscriminationagainstwomeninaccesstoland.• Itrecommendshavingtwotypesoflandcategoriesinsteadofthree,privateandpublic.The

formerlycustomarylandthatbecomestitledwillbeprivate,andanyunallocatedcustomaryor chiefdomland(graveyards,grazingareas,wetlandsetc)willbeaformofpublicland.

Thecommitmentofthegovernmenttoaddressthequestionoflandonceandforallclearlyremainsrhetoricdespiteopportunitiestoact.Thiscouldbeattributedtothefactthatthebeneficiariesofthe1967landreformswerehighrankingpoliticians,seniorcivilservants,chiefsandhighrankingindustrialandparastatalorganisations’employeesunpreparedtogiveupthevasttracksoflandtheyaccumulatedunderaegisofthe1967LandAct.Thisisquitestrikingsincethedebateaboutlandreformwasinitiallyinstigatedinternallybytheelitesthatledthepro-democracymovementagainsttheauthoritarianone-partyrulewhoarguedthattheimplementationoflandreformsportendedthedawnofanewsocio-economicorderforthecountry.Nearlyalltheprominentpro-democracymovementeliteshadbeenanintegralpartoftheonepartyadministrativestructureinsomewayoranotherandtheyhadbenefitedfromthe1997landreforms:theyhadsimplyfallenoutfavourwiththeregime.Itisthereforeunsurprisingthattheirsuccessatthepollsdidnotnecessarilytranslateintotheswiftimplementationoflandreformseventhoughthiswasoneoftheflagshipsofthepro-democracymovement.Itisprobablyfairtosaythatlandreformwasflaggedopportunisticallybyadvocatesfordemocratisation

to gain support for their cause. Once in office, the elites developed cold feet to the idea of a swiftoverhaulof land tenureandownershippatternsreflected the lackofmomentumtopushonwith thereforms.Acoalitionofelitesspanningthepoliticaldividehasstrategicallydeceleratedthepaceoflandreform initiativesand there is nodoubt that to thenewgovernment launched inMay1996 the landreforminitiativewasmerelypayinglip-servicetotheirpre-electionpledge.ThefactthatthePresidentialCommissiononLandEnquirytookthreeyearstowindupspeaksvolumesaboutthecommitmentoftheelitestothequestionoflandreform:bythetimetheCBLRDPwaslaunchedin2005,thedraftlandpolicy–concludedthreeyearsearlier–wasstillyettobeenactedintolaw.TheCBLRDPisthereforethemajor

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landreforminitiativewhichasbeenpushed,andfunded,bytheWorldBankpossiblywaryoftheuglyturnofeventsintheZimbabwe’slandreformprogramme.Inturn,theeliteshaveperhapsacceptedtheinitiativeastheownersofthelandthatisbeingredistributedareeligibleforcompensationatmarketrate.Itisclear,asfurtherexploredbelow,thatthecommitmentofpro-democracyadvocatestothequestionoflandreformwasastrategicploytoattractvotersintousheringthemintopower.Itisquiteapparentthatthereformshavefallenpreytopathdependentlegacies.SincetransitiontodemocracyinMay1994,thecountryhasdevelopedtwostandoutpovertyreduction

initiatives: the MPRSP (2001) and theMGDS (2006). TheMPRSPwas described as the basis for allgovernmentpolicyandplanningactivitiesfordevelopmentwhiletheMGDS,asthesuccessortoMPRSP,isdescribedasanoverarchingpolicydirectionforwealthcreationandeconomicgrowthasameansofreducing poverty on a sustainable basis by transforming the country from predominantly importingandconsumingtoproducingandexporting(GoM,2006;Chinsinga,2008).However,despitebeingtheoverarchingframeworksforguidingthecountry’sstrategicdirectionsfordevelopment,boththeMPRSPandMGDShavestrikinglyshiedawayfromaddressingthelandquestioninadecisivemanner.TheMGDS does not raise the question of land reform apart from acknowledging that land is the

country’smostproductiveresourcewhichimpactsonpovertyinthreemainways:1)inequitableaccesstoproductiveresourcesandprocesses;2)unequallanddistribution;and3)landtenureinsecurity(GoM,2006). It doesnot, as onewouldhavehoped, further the conversationabout land reformstarted intheMPRSPthoughadmittedlyinaverylukewarmfashion.AccordingtoChirwa(2004),intheMPRSPtheproblemoflandwasrankedseventhamongtheissuesthathadtobeaddressedintheagriculturalsectorforpro-poorgrowth;yettheavailabilityofadequatelandtofarmersiswidelyacknowledgedasanecessarycondition foragriculturetoserveasvehicle forpovertyreduction.The landproblemwasapparentlyexcludedfromtheMPRSPconsultativeprocess–apartfromthepresentationofanewdraftlandlawasoneofthetriggerstobemetbythegovernmentinordertoreachacompletionpoint;thepointatwhichdebtreliefbecomeirreversible(JenkinsandTsoka,2003).ThisisdespitethefactthattheMPRSP itselfacknowledgedthecentralityof land in thecountry’spovertyreductionefforts,observingthat‘landconstraintsarisemainlyfromlowproductivityoffragmentedpiecesofsmallholderland,lackofsecurityoftenure,highpopulationdensityandunorganisedlandmarketsystem’(GoM,2001:138).TheMPRSP’s targetwas to distribute at least 14,000 hectares of land to 3, 500 households on a

voluntarybasis(GoM,2001;Chirwa,2004).Themajoractiontakensincethelandquestionreappearedonthegovernment’sagendaasahot-buttonissue,morethanadecadeago,isthelaunchoftheCBRLDPonapilotbasisin2005.Itwouldthereforenotbeexaggeratingthatthegovernment,withsupportfromtheWorldBank,hasbeenpromptedintoactionbyincreasingincidentsoflandinvasionsacrossthecountryandtheunpleasantdevelopmentsinneighbouringZimbabwe.Thegovernment’sofficialexplanationforthedelayinimplementinglandreformsislackoffinancialresourcestoacquirelandtodistributetothelandless(GoM,2005).Thisgranted,itisverystrikingthatthe2002draftlandpolicydoesnotproposeanystrategiestodealwiththelandproblemsitcorrectlyidentifies:theonlyradicalreformdesignedtoredresshistoricalinjusticesistheprovisionthatnon-citizenscannothavefreeholdtitlesunlesstheyarepreparedtobecomeMalawiancitizens.Thiscitizenshipdoesnotinanywaybegintoaddresstheserioushistoricalandstructuralcausesofunequal landredistributionandownership– it issimplymeanttodeflecttheattentionofthepublicawayfromthecorecauseofthesevereimbalancesinthelandownershippatterns(Chinsinga,2002).Theelitesareintentonprotectingtheirowninterestsintheexistinglandtenureandownershippatternsunlesstheyarecompensatedaccordingly.

TheLandReformQuestionintheWiderContext

ThedebatesaboutlandreformarenotnewindevelopmentcirclesingeneralandontheAfricancontinentin particular (Potts, 2006;Toulmin, 2006).Beyond thenational debateson the land reformquestioninstigatedbyexperiencesundercolonialrule,theWorldBankhasapparentlyassumedaleadingroleinpromotinglandreformsindevelopingcountries.Ina1975paper,theWorldBankstronglyrecommended:1)formallandtitlingasapreconditionofmoderndevelopment;2)abandonmentofcommunaltenuresystemsinfavouroffreeholdtitle;and3)widespreadpromotionoflandmarketsforlandredistributiononbothefficiencyandequitygrounds(Quan,2000).Whilelandreformprogrammeshavetakenvariousformssuchaslandnationalisation,agrarianreform,agrariancollectivisation,landdevelopmentandprotectedareas,effortstoreaffirmandrecognisecustomaryrights,tenurereform(landregistrationandtitling)hastendedtodominateandisfavouredbydevelopmentpartners.Toulmin(2006)arguesthattenurereformisfavouredforthefollowingreasons:• Landregistrationstimulatesmoreefficientlandusebyincreasingtenuresecurityandproviding

incentivestoinvestinthelonger-termmanagementandproductivityofland.• Landregistrationreducestransactioncostsandenablesthecreationofalandmarket,allowing

landtransferfromlesstomoredynamicfarmersanditsconsolidationintolargeholdings.• Landregistrationprovidesfarmerswithatitlethatcanbeofferedascollateraltobanks,

improvingfarmers’accesstocredit,andallowingthemtoinvestinlandimprovements.• Landregistrationprovidesgovernmentswithinformationonlandholdersandsizeofplots,thatis,

thefoundationforpropertytaxsystem.

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Tenurereformasakeystrategyfordealingwiththelandquestionwasfurtherreinforcedinthewakeof the structural adjustmentprogrammes (SAPs) (Quan,2000; Toulmin,2006).Themajor thrustofSAPswasthateconomicprosperityanddevelopmentis‘predicatedonacapitalistmodeofproduction,privatepropertyandenterprise, theallocationoffinancialandnaturalresources’(Potts,2006:68).Inotherwords, themarket forceswere believed to lead to an efficient allocation of resources betweennations,regionsandpeople.WithintheframeworkofSAPstherefore,theexistenceofindigenous,non-marketformsoftenurewasconstruedasanimpedimenttoeconomicliberalisation.Tenurereformwasthuslogicallypromotedasthemainframeworkforlandreformssincelandisthemostsignificantnaturalresourceinsub-SaharanAfrica.ThisdriveisperhapsaptlycapturedbyPotts(2006:72).

‘Howcouldthefactorsofproductionbeallocatedaccordingtothelawsofsupplyandmonetarydemandwhenakeyfactorofproductioninsomanycountriesremainedallocatedaccordingtodeeplyentrenchedbirthrightsformostofthemalepopulation?’

Thereis,againstthisbackdrop,onehugechallengeinimplementinglandreformsinthecontemporaryeraarisingoutoftheinherenttensionbetweentenurereformspromotedsimultaneouslywithcommunity-basedmanagementapproachesfornaturalresources.Themainthrustofcommunity-basedmanagementapproachesfornaturalresourceisthatgivingcommunitiestherighttomanageandbenefitfromnaturalresourcesintheirareaswouldinducethemtoadoptaconservationiststance,makingthebenefitsderivedfromthemsustainableoverthelong-term(Alexander,2006;Potts,2006).Thehallmarkofthetensionisthattheprivatisationideologyasadvocatedbytenurereformsdoesnotaugerwellwithdevelopmentparadigms which revolve around community-based development, poverty alleviation and livelihoodsecurity.OnceagainPotts(2006:76)aptlycapturesthemood:‘Onecanenvisagethatwellmeaningresearchprogrammes in[sub-SaharanAfrica]wouldsoonbe

recommendingthatthepoorestruralhouseholdsneedtohavetheirfinancialcapitalstrengthenedinordertogainaccesstothenaturalcapitalofland,andlamentingthelossofcommunitybasedcapitalfornaturalresourcemanagement.’Anexampleofthistensioniswellillustratedbytheexperiencesofthehandoverofthemanagementof

formerlygovernmentoperatedirrigationschemestocommunitiesacrossthecountry(Kambewa,2005;KambewaandPeters,2007).BeneficiariesoftheschemeswereMalawiansfromeverypossiblecornerofthecountry,thejustificationforthehandoverbeingthatcommunitieswouldbeinabetterpositiontoexploittheirsocialcapitalinordertomanagetheschemesonasustainablebasis.Throughthewaterusersassociations,forinstance,communitymanagementoftheschemeswouldresultinthedevelopmentofwidelysharednormsandconventionsgoverningequitabledistributionofwater.Theexperienceshavebeenquite the contrary,however: thehandoverof the irrigation schemes to communitieshas led toaredefinitionoftheeligibilityofthepeopletoparticipateintheschemes.Whilepriortothehandovercitizenshipwasnotanissueatall,itisnowamajordeterminantofaccesstotheplotsontheirrigationschemes (Kambewa, 2005); thus there is conflict between claimantswho are being distinguished asstrangersor latecomersandthoseclaimingstatusas localsandfirstsettlers,with thosethatarenotregardedasbonafidecitizensdiscriminatedagainst.Itisarguedthatthesetendencieshavetakenholdinthewakeoftheprivatisationdiscoursefannedbythedraftlandpolicypurportingtotreatcustomarylandasprivateproperty.Thebitternessresultingfromthepoliticsofaccesstoirrigatedlandhasnegativelyaffectedthedevelopmentofnormsandconventionsgoverningthemanagementanddistributionofwater.The tendencies of individuals to privatise sections of the streamsand rivers bordering their landarereportedlywidespread(Kambewa,2005),makingmanagementoftheschemesasviableeconomicunitsextremelydifficult.

4 thecommunitybAsedrurAllAnddevelopmentproject(cbrldp)

TheoriginsoftheCBRLDPcanbetracedbacktothefindingsofthePresidentialCommissiononLandInquiryconstitutedin1996–windingupitsworkthreeyearslater.Thefindingsofthecommissionwerefurthersupportedbyvariousspecific landutilisationstudiessupportedbydevelopmentpartnerssuchasEU,DFID,USAIDandtheWorldBank(GoM,2005).4Theseunanimouslyestablishedtheavailabilityofunderutilisedcultivablearable land to the tuneof2.6millionhectareswhichcouldbe targeted forredistributionthroughacarefullyconceivedlandreformprogramme.Theconclusionfromthesestudieswasthatmuchoftheestatelandisunderutilisedduetopoormanagementandcompetitionfromsmallholdertobaccoburleyproduction,alsoleadingtodecliningprofitabilityofestatetobacco.ThiseventuallyledtotheconceptionoftheMalawiLandReformProgramme(MLRP)ofwhichtheCBRLDPisapilotinitiative.FundedtothetuneofUS$29millionbytheWorldBankandtheMalawiGovernment,themajorgoal

oftheCBRLDPistoincreasetheincomesofapproximately15,000poorruralfamiliesbyimplementingdecentralised,community-basedandvoluntarylandreforminfourpilotdistricts;themajorchallengeisthatthelandlessdonotgetinformationontheavailabilityoflandanddonothaveresourcesthatwould

4 TheEUsupportedtheCustomaryLandUtilisationStudy;USAIDsupportedthePublicLandUtilisationStudy;andtheWorldBanksupportedtheOptionsforLandResettlementStudy.

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enablethememigratetosuchareas(Chirwa,2004;GoM,2005).5TheCBRLDPisthuspredicatedon,anddrivenby,thewilling-sellerandwilling-buyerphilosophyoflandredistribution,theimplementationmanualclearlystipulatesthat‘landredistributionwilltakeplaceonlyonunencroachedlandsfromwillingsellers,thosealreadyundergovernmentadministration,orprivatedonations’(GoM,2005:4).IntheCBRLDP,twosetsofdistrictshavebeenidentifiedassendingandreceivingdistrictsrespectively:

Thyolo and Mulanje are sending districts while Machinga and Mangochi are receiving districts. Thejustification for designatingThyolo andMulanje as sendingdistricts is that the landproblem is quitesevereinthesedistricts‘[as]vastlandhasbeenturnedintoteaandcoffeeestatesforcingsmallholderfarmersontocongestedmarginal lands’ (GoM,2005:7).By implication,MachingaandMangochihavebeendesignatedasreceivingdistrictsbecauselandpressureisatleastmanageableinthesedistricts.Thebaselinesurveyestablishedthemeanplotsizeperhouseholdasrangingfrom0.34hectaresinMulanjeto1.07hectaresinMachinga.Themeanhouseholdlandsizeswere1.89,0.71,1.57and1.28hectaresinMachinga,Mulanje,ThyoloandMangochirespectively(Chirwaetal.,2003).ThedesignationofMangochias a receiving districtmay therefore not be very accurate because by the baseline indices the landsituationappearsnottobearanysignificancedifferentfromThyolo’s.6TheCBRLDPis inspiredbythecommunitydemand-drivenphilosophyofdevelopmentsupportedby

speciallydesignedstructures inbothsendingandreceivingcommunitiesatdistrictand local levels tofacilitatethelandredistributionexercise(Chirwa,2004;GoM,2005).Theprogrammehasbeenwidelyadvertisedinboththesendingandreceivingcommunities.Thereisalsoaprovisionthatcommunitiesinthereceivingdistrictscanparticipateinthisprogramme.TheproceduresforlandacquisitionundertheCBRLDPareasfollows:• Landconstrainedhouseholdsagedabove18shouldorganisethemselvesintosolidaritygroups

andtheyshoulddemonstratesoundorganisationalability.• Thehouseholdsformingbeneficiarygroupsshouldsatisfythefollowingeligibilitycriteria,namely: beMalawiancitizens,landlessornearlandless,lowlevelsofincomeandfacingtheproblemof endemicfoodsecurity.• Thebeneficiarygroupidentifiesthelandwhichitproposestoacquireanddirectlynegotiatesthe acquisitionofthelandwiththeownerwithinthepricerangesetbytheCBRLDPstaff.Thelistof farmsupforsaleisadvertisedandpotentialsettlerschooseatleasttwoestatesthattheyare interestedin.TheProjectManagementCommittee(PMC)travelstothereceivingdistrictwhere

thefarmsarelocatedtophysicallyinspecttheestatesandnegotiatewithownerthesellingprices oftheestatesthattheyareinterestedin.ThesevisitsarefacilitatedbytheCBRLDPstaff.The

receivingdistrictsareapproximately200kmawayfromthesendingdistricts.• ThebeneficiarygroupthenpresentsitsproposalforfinancingtotheDistrictAssembly(DA)inthe

districtinwhichthelandislocatedfortheDistrictLandsCommittee’s(DLC)approvaltogether withaprovisionalagreementofthesaleofland.• Eachhouseholdisallocatedaminimumof2hectaresundertheprojectandafterthesaleis

concludedthebeneficiarygroupisreadytoemigratetothenewlandandhouseholdsrelocating morethan50kmsfromtheiroriginalhomesareassistedwithtransport.• EachemigratinghouseholdisprovidedwitharesettlementgranttothetuneofUS$1,050for

landadministrationandfarmdevelopment,with30%devotedtolandacquisition,10%tocover settlementand60%forfarmdevelopment.Thegrantalsoincludesprovisionoffarminputsas follows:sixbagsoffertiliser,twohoes,apanga,apeak,andmaizeandtobaccoseedsper household.• Theresettlementgrantisnotpaidouttothebeneficiariesasalumpsum.Itispaidininstalments andincashtotheheadofthehouseholdbytheCBRLDPstaffwiththeexceptionofthefarm

inputsthataredeliveredtothem.

CommunityOversightCommittees(CoCs)andProjectManagementCommittees(PMCs)aretwokeylocalstructuresthatplayacriticalroleinfacilitatingtheformationofbeneficiarygroups,acquisitionoflandandtheresettlementprocess.CoCsareestablishedatGroupVillageHeadmanlevelbothinsendingandreceivingcommunities.TheestablishingoftheCoCsisfacilitatedbytheCBRLDPstaffandtheirmainroleistoensurethatthoseelectedintothesecommitteesfullyunderstandtheirrolessoastoensurethat theprogramme is successfully implemented. The role of theCoC in the sending communities istoscrutiniseandverifytheprofileofthebeneficiariestoensurethathouseholdsincludedindeedmeettheeligibilitycriteriaasspecifiedabove.Inthereceivingcommunities,themajortaskoftheCoCistofacilitateasmoothprocessofresettlementandintegrationofemigratinghouseholdsintotheirrespectivenewcommunities.Thebeneficiarygroupsaretechnicallydesignatedastrusts.Eachtrusthasanameandisrequiredto

developtheirownconstitutiontogoverntheiraffairsoncetheyrelocatetothelandtheyhaveacquired.

5 TheGovernmentofMalawihascontributedUS$2milliontothetotalprojectcosts.6 Inthebaselinesurvey,householdswere,forinstance,askedtoidentifycriticalconstraintstothefarmingenterprise.TheproblemoflimitedaccesstolandwasacuteinMulanjewhereupto72.7%oftherespondentsciteditasacriticalconstraint.ThesituationinThyolocomparedfavourablywithMachingaandMongochias58.5%,50.2%and59.4%respectively.

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EachtrustelectsaPMCwhich,aspreviouslynoted,takesaleadingroleinthesearchforlandaswellasnegotiatingthepriceoflandwithpotentialsellers.ThesePMCscontinuetofunctionevenaftertheylocatetothenewcommunitiesontheunderstandingthattheywouldbesubsidiarytotheexistingjurisdictionofthetraditionalleaderswheretheyhavesettled.Theownershipofthelandisvestedinthetrust,withtheoptionthatindividualhouseholdscantitletheirpiecesoflandaslongastheyareabletomeetthecosts. TheCBDRLD implementationmanual states that ‘beneficiarieiswill decide theproperty regimeunderwhichtheywillholdtheland(leasehold,freeholdorcustomaryestate)’(GoM,2005:4).Itisfurtherstatedthatthelandholderswillnotbeallowedtodisposeofthelandinthefirstfiveyearsandwillnotbeallowedtobesub-divideitbelowtwohectares,butatthetimeofthefieldworkenforcementmechanismswerevirtuallynon-existent(Chirwa,2004;GoM,2005).

5 thepoliticsoFlAndreFormunderthecbrldpinperspective

AchievementsoftheCBRLDPProject

There isnodoubtthattheprojecthasenabledthe landlessornear landlessfrombothThyoloandwithinMachingatoacquirelandatleastadequateforcultivationoffoodtolastthemthroughouttheyearandwithconsiderablesurplusforsale.Thisiswidelyacknowledgedbythebeneficiaries,someofwhoconfessedthat‘theyarenolongersleepingonemptystomachsbecausetheyareabletocultivatemorethanjustenoughforpurposesofsubsistence’.7Fromtrusttotrustthisstorylinewasrepeatedalmostwordforword,underscoringthefactthataccesstolandundertheauspicesoftheCBRLDPhadenhancedtheirproductivitylevels.Reportedmaizeyieldsaveragedbetween30and50bagsperhouseholdacrossallthetrustscoveredinthisstudy;accordingtoChirwa(2008),theaveragemaizeproductionamongbeneficiaryhouseholdsincreasedfrom200kgsbeforeresettlementto1454kgsaftertheprojectin2005/2006andyieldsweresignificantlyhigheraftertheproject(2269kgsperhectare)comparedto962kgsperhectarebeforetheproject.TheCBRLDPhasalsohadapositiveimpactonhouseholdincomes,increasingbyabout40%afteroneyearofrelocation.Forthereceivingcommunities,theCBRLDPstimulatedthecreationofemploymentopportunitiesthrough

casuallabour(ganyu),andthoughwhileganyulabourisgenerallyperceivedasadegradingandexploitativesurvivalstrategy,itwasarguedthattheemigratingcommunitiesinjectedconsiderableresourcesthroughtheirresettlementgrantswhichmadeganyuwagescompetitive.Themassiveexpendituresbythesettlersrevitalisedthelocaleconomiesbenefitingboththehostandsurroundingcommunities.ThepositiveimpactoftheCBRLDPonthelivesofthesettlerswasequallywidelyacknowledged–forinstance,someofthemobservedthat ‘povertyhaddeclinedcomparedtooursituation inThyoloaswearenoweatingnsima(nationalstaplefoodmadefrommaize)onpredictableintervals’.8Themajorconcern,however,iswhethertheexperienceofimprovedlivelihoodswillbesustainedbeyondthefirstyearoftheproject.Themaincauseofconcernforthefarmersislackofmarketstodisposeoftheirproduceataprofit

tohelp thembuy inputs for the subsequent farming seasons. Theexperiences throughout the trustswerestrikinglythesame:thefarmershavehadtodisposeoftheirproduceatextremelylowpriceseveninthoseareasthegovernmentmadeeffortstoprovideaccesstobettermarkets.Theseconcernsareperhapsaptlyillustratedinthefollowing:

Wesolda50kgbagofmaizeatMK500becauseoflackofmarkets.Honestlyspeaking,weletthetradersstealourmaize.9

Wewillnotbeinapositiontosustainourimprovedlives.Weharvestedenoughbutmuchofithasbeenwastedbecauseoflackofmarkets.10

Someofussold70bagsofmaize forMK23,000whenwe investedup toMK23,000onfertiliser.11

Thisclearlyillustratesthatlackofviablemarketsthreatentoplungefarmersintoaviciouspovertytrapgiventhattheinputsupporttothemwasaone-offinitiative.Thefarmersareexpectedtofendforthemselvesinthesubsequentgrowingseasonsontheunderstandingthattheywouldbeinapositiontoreinvest intheir farmingenterprises,takingadvantageofthereturnsfromthe initial inputsupportofferedtothemundertheauspicesoftheCBRLDPinitiative.TheprospectsofthepositivegainsundertheCBRLDPcollapsingafterbarelyayearpointstothefactthatlandreformisamorecomplexexercise.Itisthusmorethanjustaccesstoland–sensethataccesstolandmustbecomplementedbyaccesstonon-landassets,tocreditmarkets,toextensionservicesandtraininginmodernfarmingtechniques(Chirwa,2004;Potts,2006).Thereisneedforfunctioninghealthandeducationalservices,transportationsystem,

7 FocusGroupDiscussionwithmenfromChimbetaTrust.8 FocusGroupDiscussionwithwomenfromChimbetaTrust.9 FocusGroupDiscussionwithwomenfromItendoTrust.10 FocusGroupDiscussionwithmenfromKalungaTrust.11 FocusGroupDiscussionwithmenfromChimwabviTrust.

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accesstoaffordableagriculturalinputsanddecentorevenpredictablepricesforproduce;forinstance,KalunguTrustalmostcollapsedbecause20out35householdsimmigratedbacktoThyoloasthetrustwasallocatedanareawithoutpotablewaterfacilities.AcholeraoutbreakwhichreportedlyclaimedtwolivestriggeredamassiveexodusofhouseholdsbacktoThyolo.ThedubiousprospectsforsustainabilityarefurtheremphasisedbytheeconometricanalysisbyChirwa

(2008)oftheimpactoftheCBRLDPoninvestment,foodproductionandagriculturalproductivity.Theanalysis shows that thepositiveeffectsof theprogrammearemuchmoredue toaccess tofinancialresourcesprovidedunderthepackageofassistanceinthefirstseasonthanchangeinlandtenureperse.Theevidenceisunequivocal:newbeneficiarieswithonlyoneseasonoffarmingundertheprogrammetend to investmore in hybridmaize and aremore productive than those that have been under theprogrammefortwoseasons.

CDRLDPCapturebyElites

There is evidence that local elites (chiefs, traditional leaders and CoC leaders) have captured theprogrammebysteeringitsimplementationinamannerthatlargelybenefitsthemandtheirallies,bothinthesendingandreceivingcommunities.Themainchallengeofimplementingprogrammesofthisnatureisthattheyseldomaddresstheplightoftheintendedbeneficiariesandquiteoftengetcapturedbythegatekeeperswhospeak for,butnotwith, those theyclaim to represent (Cornwall,2002;Chinsinga,2007).Thisisanexampleofinstancesinwhichtheinteractionbetweenformalandinformalinstitutionsproduceunintendedeffectswhichmoreoftenthannotunderminetheattainmentoftheformallystipulatedoutcomes.BothtraditionalleadersandCoCmembershaveintheirowndifferentwaysappropriatedtheCBRLDPasaninstrumentofpatronagetoachieveselfishgoalsattheexpenseoftheprojectasexpressedinthedesigndocuments,asfurtherillustratedbelow.TheCBRLDPhasbecomehighlysusceptibletocapturebytheelitesbecauseoftheprovisionofthe

resettlementgranttothesuccessfulbeneficiarygroups.AtUS$1,050perhousehold,theresettlementallowanceisahugesumofmoneybyMalawianstandards,whereGNPpercapitahasstagnatedatlessthanUS$200forthelastdecade(NSO,2005).Moreover,thereisevidencethatthemannerinwhichCoCmemberswereelectedwasnot transparentenough.Insteadof identifyingtheCoCmembersthroughtransparent and competitive elections,most FGD participants observed that traditional leaders oftenexercised their prerogative to appointwhowas to serve in theCoAs. In two cases, thebeneficiariespointedoutthattraditionalleadersappointedmostlytheirrelationsandalliestoserveinCoCs;inseveralFGDs,participantsdescribedsomeCoCsas‘moreorlessextensionsofchieftaincyasmorethanhalfoftheparticipantsweredrawnfromtheroyalfamilies’.12TheresettlementgranthasrenderedtheCBRLDPpronetoabusebytraditional leadersandCoCmembersparticularly in termsofbeneficiaryselection.WhiletheCBRLDPembracesthecommunitydemand-drivenphilosophyasaprincipalguideforbeneficiaryselection,thereareadditionalcriteriatoassistprogrammefacilitatorsinthescreeningoftheultimatebeneficiariessothattheprogrammeachievesitsintendedgoalsandobjectives.Besidesbeingcitizensofthecountry,thebeneficiariesmustbeeithercompletelylandlessornearlandlessandclearlygrapplingwiththeproblemofendemicfoodinsecurity.Thesecriteriahave,however,notbeenstrictlyadheredtointheimplementationprocessoftheCBRLDP:

theyhavebeenstrategicallycircumventedbytheprogrammefacilitatorsinvariousdifferentways.SeveralcaseswerereportedofCoCmembersprioritisingtheirfamilyandfriendsasbeneficiariesofCBRLDPattheexpenseofhouseholdsthataregenuinelyinneedofland.ItwasfurtherarguedthatthemajorityofthebeneficiarieswhoarenoteitherfamilyrelationsorfriendshavehadtobribetheCoCmembersinordertofindtheirwayintotheprogramme.Insomecases,CoCmemberswereaskingpotentialbeneficiariesto pay up toMK2000 (aboutUS$20) as a qualification fee. The influence of traditional leaderswasparticularlynotableintheintradistrictresettlement,mostofthenon-beneficiariesobservedthattheydidnotknowabouttheprogrammeuntiltheysawpeopleveryclosetotraditionalleadersclearingandsettlingonestatessurroundingtheirvillages,arguingthatmostofthepeoplewereanintegralpartofthewiderloyalfamilynetwork.Thisisaptlycapturedinthefollowingremarks:

Wewerejustsurprisedtoseepeopleclearingsomeestatesanderectingtemporarydwellingshelters.ThemostsurprisingthingwasthatthesepeoplewerecomingfromtheTA’svillageandrelatedtohim.Someofthemareengagedinviablesmall-scalebusinessesat[Mlomba]tradingcentreandalreadyhavehugetractsofland.13

In thisvillage, theydidnoteven tellus that therewill bea land reformprogramme.Wewerejustsurprisedtoseeourfriendsfromthosevillagesoccupyingtheestate.TheTraditionalAuthorityisbiasedtowardshisrelatives.Hewantedtoeatthemoneywithhisrelatives.Hejustwantshisrelativestobenefitandnobodyelse.14

12 FocusGroupDiscussionwithmenandwomenfromChitimbeTrust.13 FocusGroupDiscussionwithnon-beneficiariesfromMlombaVillagesurroundingChitimbeTrust.14 FocusGroupDiscussionwithnon-beneficiariesfromJasiteniIVillagesurroundingKasuajeTrust.

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Thecaptureof theCDRLDPbythe localeliteshasgreatlyaffected its implementation in twomainways. Ithasnotbeeneasy toenforcesomeof theprogrammeguidelinesbecauseof theclientelisticselectionof thebeneficiariesof theprogramme;andsomebeneficiariesareeffectivelyoperating twoareas–particularlyinthecasesofintradistrictresettlement–withoutlosingoneofthepiecesofland.TheCBRLDPstipulatesthatbeneficiariesshouldgiveuptheirlandoncetheyabandontheirsettlementonthetrust.However,itwasobservedthatanincreasingnumberofhouseholdsaremigratingbacktotheirareasoforiginimmediatelyaftertheresettlementgrantrunsout.Whilesomeareforcedtoreturnbacktotheirhomesforgenuinereasons,themajorityofthesehouseholdsarethosewhodidnotdesperatelyneedtheland–basicallythosethatwerepushedintotheprogrammetobenefitfromtheresettlementgrantasreflectedinthefollowingremarks.

Wedonotknowtheaimoftheprojectbutotherssimplywantedtobenefitfromtheresettlementgrant.Thesewerequitedoubtfulrightfromthestartsincetheywerenotasvulnerableaswewere.Someofthemhadaverygoodlifebackhome.TheyfoundtheirwayontotheprogrammebecausetheyareingoodbookswithsomeprominentmembersoftheCoCandthechief.15

Whentheyheardthatthereshallnolongerbegovernmentsupport,theystartedgoingbackimmediatelyafterharvesting.Whatelsecanwesay?Thesepeopledidnothaveseriousproblemsinthefirstplace.16

Thereis,however,onetrustfromThyolothatisparticularlynotableintermsofthememberscommutingbetweenThyoloandMachinga.Thesepeoplehaveessentiallynotrelocatedinearnest–atleastaccordingto the fieldwork findings – and have retained their land on the advice of their traditional leader. Asdemonstrated below, traditional leaders fear that amassive relocation of their subjects toMachingawoulddiminish thestatureof their leadership.Thebeneficiariesareadvised tomove toMachingaasreconnaissancemissionwith theguarantee that their landwillbekept for them;moreover, it isonlyfemalemembersofhouseholdsthathavebeenrelocatingsincethemajorityoftheirhusbandshavesemiskilledjobsintheindustrialtownofLimbe,Blantyrewhichtheyarenotpreparedtogiveup.Beingwithinthevicinityofthemajorcommercialcentre,thebeneficiariesareusingtheirhomeasabaseformarketingtheirproducefromMachinga,sincelucrativemarketshardlyexitinMachinga.ItisalsoquitestrikingthatinsomesendingcommunitiestheCBRLDPisbeingexploitedasameansofgettingridoftroublesomehouseholds.WorkingverycloselywithCoCsasanappointingauthority,villageheadmenenlisthouseholdsdesignatedastroublesomeasbeneficiariesevenwhentheydonotexpressthedesiretodoso.Theyaresimplyforcedtocomplygiventheenormouspower,influenceandauthoritythattraditionalleaderswieldovertheirsubjects.TheapparentelitecaptureoftheCBRLDPmeansthattheprogrammeisfailingtoachieveitsintended

goalsandobjectives.Theincreaseinpiecesoflandbeingabandonedisaresultofdeliberatelyorchestratederrorsofinclusionandexclusionwhichentailenormoustransactioncostsonthepartoftheproject.Theresourcesinvestedwouldhaveyieldedtheintendedoutcomesifandonlyiftheprogrammefacilitatorsweredutifullyadheringtotheprogrammeguidelines.TheelitecaptureistoagreatextentunavoidablebecauseCBRLDPprogrammedesignprefersthatCoCsshouldbeconstitutedbypeoplewhoareatleastfairlyenlightenedinordertosteertheprocess.ThisinvariablymeansthatCoCshavebeendominatedbytheprivilegedsectionsofbothsendingandreceivingcommunitiesattheexpenseofthevulnerablesegmentsmeant tobe theprimarybeneficiaries.CoCshave thereforeabused their enlightenment toexploittheprogrammefortheirownselfishgoals,yetanotherillustrationthatprocessesofinstitutionalchangeareunpredictable;theydonotalwaysgeneratetheintendedeffectsandoutcomes.

Socio-culturalIntegrationExperiences

Theprojectdesignpaidparticular attention to issues related to cultural integration, an imperativebecauseoftheculturalandreligiousdistinctivenessofcommunitiesfromsendingandreceivingdistricts.Whilecommunitiesinbothsendingandreceivingdistrictsarematrilineal,theyhavedistinctculturalandreligiouspractices:communitiesfromThyoloarepredominantlyChristianandpracticerelativelystraightforwardritesofpassageinitiatingtheyouthintoadulthood,themajorityofthepeopleinMachingaareMoslemsandtheypracticequiteelaborateinitiationceremonies.Cognisanceoftheculturalandreligiousdiversity,theprincipalroleoftheCoCsinthereceivingcommunitiesistofacilitatesmoothintegrationofthenewcomers intothesocial fabricofthehostcommunities(GoM,2005).The integrationofthereallocatingcommunitiesintothesocio-culturalfabricofthereceivingcommunitieshasnotbeenverysmooth,however.ThisisquitesurprisingsinceMalawiasacountryhasgenerallyenjoyedarichtraditionofmutualco-existenceofcommunitiesofdifferentculturalorientation,religiousbeliefsandbackgrounds.The major socio-cultural integration challenge has been posed by the patterns of settlement. By

design,theestatesonwhichthenewcommunitiesaresettledoftenlieontheoutskirtsoftheexisting

15 FocusGroupDiscussionwithmenfromChimbetaTrust.16 FocusGroupDiscussionwithnon-beneficiariessurroundingChitimbeTrust.

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settlements.Thenewcomersarethereforequiteconspicuousanddistinctwithtemporaryhousingsheltersandlanguageclearlyarticulatedasdistinguishingmarkers,asthefollowingobservationsillustrate:

Whatdistinguishesusislanguage.WearesomuchusedtoChichewa.TheyknowthatyouareamigrantifwhentheygreetyouinYaoyourespondinChichewa.17

There are nomarkeddifferences betweenus and themexcept that theyhave temporarydwellingstructureswhereasweliveinpermanentstructures.18

Weidentifyindigenouslocalresidentsbytheageofmangotrees.Whereveryouspotyoungmangotrees,theymustbenewcomerstothearea.19

Themajor complaint the new communities is that settling in a Moslem area has greatly affectedthepatternsoftheirlivelihood.Theyobservedthattheycannotfreelyraisepigswhichweretheirkeylivestockback inThyolobecause raisingpigs inaMoslemcommunity is consideredasa taboo; theyfurther indicatedthattheyhavebeenspecificallywarnednottoraisepigsbecauseiftheydosotheirhostswillneversharewiththemanything,particularlyfood;theyarguedthatthefailuretoraisepigshasgreatlylimitedtheirlivestockportfoliosincetheareaisinfectedwithtsetsefliesthatmakeraisingcattleaveryriskyventure.Theirlivelihoodoptionsarefurtherconstrainedbecauseoflimitedaccesstowetlandswhich,asshownbelow,hasforcedsomehouseholdstoimmigratebacktoThyolosincetheystronglyfeelthattheycannotrelyentirelyonrain-fedagricultureforsustainablelivelihoods.Thesocio-culturalintegrationhasbeenfurtheradverselyaffectedbymythsthathavebeengenerated

abouttheCBRLDPindifferentquartersfordifferentreasons:thesettlershavebeenlabelledasgovernmenttenants;bloodsuckers;andvictimsofthegovernmenttobesoldtotheChinesebuildingonalongstandingmythinruralMalawithattheChinesearebloodsuckers–furtherheightenedbythegovernment’sdecisiontoestablishdiplomaticrelationswithmainlandChina.Thisargumentisjustifiedinthatitisstrangeforthegovernmenttogivemoneytopeopleforfree;theyarguethattheresettlementgrantismeanttoenticepeopletoenrolfortheprogrammebutthentheywilleventuallyhavetopaydearlywiththeirlives.ThesearesomeofthesentimentsthatwerereportedintheFGDsabouttheCBRLDPinthisregard:

Wewerelabelledasgovernment’stenants.Theyarguedthatourproducewouldbepassedontogovernment.Theresettlementgrantwasconstruedasourpayment.20

TheyweretreatingusasSatanistssayingwestaytogetherwithpolicemenwhoaremandatedtomakesurethatonceoneofusistakenill,theyrushthemtohospitalandiftheydiewewouldneverseetheirdeadbodies.Theyevenwenttotheextentofsayinggovernmentwouldputusinafenceandtheywouldbekillingusonebyoneastheydowithexoticchickens.21

People back homewere intimidating us that once we emigrate to the new area, we willbecomevictimsofbloodsuckersandthatwewouldbeconfinedtoafencewithoutachanceofgettingoutjustlikestallfeedingchickens.22

Wewerebeingbrandedasagentsofbloodsuckers.Peopleinthesurroundingvillagesarguedthatthereisnowaythegovernmentcangivepeoplelandandinputsforfree.Oursettlementwasdescribedasaquarantinestationwherebloodsuckerswillconvergeanduseitasabasetosucktheirblood.Theyfurtherpointedoutthatthegovernmentwasconstructingaspecialhospitalwheretheirbloodwillbesuckedandwhentheydietheirbodieswillneverbebroughthome.ThebereavedfamilywillbeconsoledwithMK50,000.00.23

Wehadasecretarywhoresignedfollowingthreatsfromhisfriendsthathewouldbekilledbygovernmentagents.HedeclinedtomovetoMachingaeventhoughheclearlyhadaseriouslandproblem.24

Thesemythshave reportedly affected the enthusiasmof the landless or near landlesshouseholdsfor enrolling as potential beneficiaries of programme. In the receiving communities, themyths havecontributedtosomehouseholdsabandoningtheplotsof landtheyhadsecuredundertheauspicesoftheprogrammefearingfortheirlives.Thesituationis,however,changingforthebetterasnothinghas

17 FocusGroupDiscussionwithwomenfromChimbetaTrust.18 FocusGroupDiscussionwithnon-beneficiariesfromNjirimaVillagesurroundingChimwabviTrust.19 FocusGroupDiscussionwithnon-beneficiariesfromMalahabaVillagesurroundingKalungaTrust.20 FocusGroupDiscussionwithwomenfromChimwabviTrust.21 FocusGroupDiscussionwithmenfromItendoTrust.22 FocusGroupDiscussionwithmenfromChitimbeTrust.23 FocusGroupDiscussionwithmenfromNgatuwanyaTrust.24 FocusGroupDiscussionwithwomenfromChimbetaTrust.

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confirmedthesefearsduringfirsttwoyearsoftheprogramme.25Itwasestablishedthatinthesendingcommunitiesthemythsweretoagreatextentperpetratedby

traditionalleaderstodiscouragetheirsubjectsfromenlistingasbeneficiariesoflandredistributionundertheaegisoftheCBRLDP.Itisarguedthattraditionalleadersfearthatmassiveexodusofpeoplefromtheirvillagestosettleindistantlandwouldgreatlydiminishthestatureoftheirleadershipandauthority.Thefeelingsofanxietyamongtraditionalleadersinthesendingcommunitiesareinevitablebecauseoftheoldadage‘villageispeople’.ThefearformosttraditionalleadersisthattheirreignwouldbemeaninglessiftheylosemostoftheirsubjectstothereceivingcommunitiesundertheCBRLDPinitiative.Thedispositionofthetraditionalleadersunderscoresthefactthatinstitutionalchangeprocessesarenotneutral:thereare alwayswinners and losers. In this case, traditional leaders in the sending communities perceivethemselvesaslosersintheCBRLDPscheme;andasloserstheyarecontestingtheCBRLDPbyallowingtheirsubjectstoretainownershipoflandintheirareasofjurisdictionaswellasinthereceivingdistricts.As pointed out above, the CBRLDP beneficiaries remain substantive residents of their places originsandsimplyusethelandacquiredinthereceivingdistrictsforfarming.ThisiscontrarytotherulesofCBRLDP:onceahouseholdbecomesabeneficiary,theyshouldgiveupownershipoflandinthesendingcommunitiesinordertoeaseuplandpressure.Initsownway,thedesignoftheprojecthascontributedtothehitchesthathavebeenexperienced

intherealmofsocio-culturalintegration.Asabove,beneficiariesmovetothenewareasastrustswiththeirownconstitutionandcommitteegoverningtheirdaytodayaffairs.Thisposesthechallengethatthesetrustsareexpectedtobesubsidiarytothetraditionalleadershipstructuresexistinginthereceivingcommunities.Thisarrangementappears,however,nottobeveryeffectiveandhastriggeredunendingtensionsbetweentheincomingandhostcommunities.Byvirtueofhavingtheirowngovernancestructures,thetrustsaremoreorlessviewedasvillageswithinvillagestotheextentthattheaffairsofthetrustsaregivensecondaryattentionbymosttraditionalleaders;theyaregenerallyregardedasindependententitieswithgovernancestructuresoftheirown,capableofhandlingtheirownaffairs.Thisdispositionisfurthersolidifiedbythefactthesetrustsbearnamesimportedfromthesendingcommunitieswhich,sometraditionalleadersadmittedintheinterviews,triggerssentimentsofinvadingforcesinthereceivingcommunities,especiallywhenthenewcomerstrytorenamesomesurroundingphysicalfeatureswithintheirvicinity.26The major flash point of the somewhat uneasy relationship between these groups has been the

administrationofthegovernmentrunsubsidyschemewithintheagriculturalsector.Forthelastthreeyears,thegovernmenthasbeenrunningasubsidyprogrammethatofferscouponstofarmerstoprocurefertilisersandmaizeseedat25%ofthetotalmarketvalueasastrategyforboostingagriculturalproductionandhenceachievingfoodsecurity.Thesmallestunitfortheadministrationofthesubsidyprogrammeis thevillage.Theconcernof thenewcomers is that thetrustsaremarginalised in thedistributionofcouponsmeanttosubsidiseagriculturalinputs.Peoplelivingintrustsarenotprioritisedasbeneficiariesofthecouponsbecausethetrustsaretreatedasseparateentitiesandnotasanintegralpartofthehostvillages’setup.Intheinterviews,sometraditionalleadersopenlyconfessedthattheyhavenothingtodowiththeaffairsofthetrustsas‘thesearegovernment’speopleandgovernmentaloneisbetterplacedtodealwiththeirwelfaredirectlyandnotundertheflagshipofourvillages’.27Insomecases,theperceivedmarginalisation of newcomers in the administration of any kind of external assistance has provokedretaliation,acasewasreportedinwhichthenewcomersaredenyingpeoplefromsurroundingvillagestodrawwaterfromaboreholesunkasanintegralpartoftheresettlementpackage.Toaccessthewater,villagersfromthesurroundingcommunitiesarerequiredtopayMK50perdayjustifiedthechargeasacostrecoverymeasureforthecostsincurredtowardthesinkingoftheborehole.ItisregrettablesincehouseholdswhichcannotaffordtopayMK50areusingunsafewatersourceswhenpotablewaterisjustwithineasyreach.Theattitudeofthehostvillagescanperhapsbeunderstoodbysituatingtheissueinabroadercontext.

Since the turnof the1990s, rural livelihoods inMalawi havebecome characteristically fragile due torecurrent adverse weather and climatic patterns. The government has since intervened with a widerangeofsocialprotectionprogrammestopreventrural livelihoodsfromcollapsingaltogether.Theuseofthevillageasasmallestunitfortheadministrationoftheseschemeshasprecipitatedunprecedentedsub-divisionofvillagesasastrategytoboostthechancesofincreasingthenumberofbeneficiariesof

25 Thesemythsstillpersist,however.TheresearchteamencounteredtheprevalenceofthesemythsduringthefieldworkinMachingadistrict.Theteamwasonmorethantwooccasionschasedfromthevillagesonsuspicionthattheywerebloodsuckersand,inafewcases,thepeople,especiallywomen,didnotturnupforFGDsforfearofbecomingvictimsofbloodsuckers.Inoneofthevillagesvisited,amemberoftheresearchteamwasconfrontedbyanangrymanstating:

Man start your car and leave at once. I do not want to see you again in our village. Women leave, do not say it’s witchcraft when the children die [in this village] when you entertaining blood suckers. Don’t involve me when the children die... Man leave before i can teach you a lesson.

26 Thesesentimentshavebeensomewhatstrongeras theyhavetakenona tomeofnational levelpolitics. Ironically, theincumbantPresidentcomesfromThyolowhichisasendingdistrictwhereasoneoftheprominentleadersoftheopposition,theformerPresident,comesfromMachingawhichisareceivingdistrict.ThesehavebecomebitterarchrivalssincetheydisagreedinFebruary2005followingthedecisionbytheincumbentPresidenttoditchthepartyoftheformerPresidenttoformhisownparty.ThesedynamicsarereflectedsomewhatintheinterfacebetweentheincomingandthehostcommunitiesinMachingadistrict.27 Interviewwithatraditionalleaderwhooptedforanonymity.

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programmesofthisnature(Levy,2005andChinsinga,2007).Traditionalleadersarethereforereluctanttoaccommodatethetrustsasanintegralpartoftheirvillagesbecausedoingsopotentiallyundercutsthenumberofbeneficiariesfromschemesofthisnature.Itisnotthereforesurprisingthatseveraltraditionalleadersarevoicingsupport fortheProjectManagementCommittees(PMCs) inorder forthetruststoevolveintotraditionalleadershipinstitutionsofsomekindandtheyarepreparedtorecognisethesenewvillageswithoutanyhesitation.

ResistancetotheCBRLDPLandReformProgramme

The CBRLDP initiative has suffered from both overt and covert forms of protest in the receivingcommunities. The overt formsof protest havebeenpromotedby ordinarymembers of the receivingcommunities even though the intensity of this form of protest is, in some subtle ways, fanned andsanctionedbytraditionalleadershipstructures.TraditionalleadershaveengagedpredominantlyinsubtleformsofprotestagainsttheCBRLDPinitiativebynottakingtheirquasijudicialroleindealingwithlanddisputesseriously;theovert formsofprotestaremanifested indifferentkindsofunendingandfairlywidespreadlanddisputes.Thisisinevitablebecauseprocessesofinstitutionalchangeandreformprovideaplatformwheredifferentinterestsandideascompetetogetthemostoutoftheinitiatives(Leftwich,2006).Themajorformsofdisputesencounteredduringfieldworkincluded:• Disputesborderingonpropertyor,perhapsmorepreciselysaid,userrights.Severalcaseswere reportedinwhichthesettlershavebeeninconfrontationwithpreviousownersoftheestates wheretheylive.Thedisputeshavecentredontheuseoftreesontheestates.Inthesecases,

mostofthepreviousestateownersarguethatthesettlersdonothaveuserrightsoverthetrees butsimplytheland.Theycontendthatthesaleagreementcoveredonlythelandandnotthe

treesand,insomecases,infrastructureontheestate.• Disputesinvolvingthehostsencroachingontotheestatesoncetheyhaveestablishedthatthe

saleagreementswithprospectivesettlershavebeenconcluded.Thereisevidencefromthe interviewsandfocusgroupdiscussionsthattheseencroachmentsareinstigatedandsanctioned bytraditionalleaders.Whentheencroachersareconfronted,theyarguethatthelandbelongsto themandtheyaccusetheownersoftheestatestohaveliedtothemabouttheexactsizeoftheir land.Veryrarelyhavetheseclaimsbeenauthenticated,theyaremerelyopportunitiesforthemto expandtheiraccesstolandusingtheCDRLDPtocontesttheownershipofthelandthathasbeen lyingidleforverylongperiods.• Disputesborderingonlandinvasionsonestatesthathavelainidleforaverylongperiodoftime. Thesepeoplefeeltheyhavestayedontheestateslongenoughtolegitimatelyclaimownership,

earningtheirlivelihoodsonestatesthatwereabandonedover15yearsago.Theownersofthese estatesdidnottakethesesquattersintoaccountwhentheysoldtheirestatesandthesquatters arecontestingtheirremovalfromlandtheyhavelivedonformorethanadecade.Inmostcases, thesettlershavefailedtoreclaimthelandfromthesesquatterswhoappeartohavenaturalised ownershipoftheland.

LandinvasionhasaverylonghistoryinMalawi,asalreadyindicatedabove.Kanyongolo(2005)arguesthatlandinvasionshaveoccurredonbothpubliclyandprivatelyownedland:peoplehaveencroachedintoforestryreserves,nationalparks,landsurroundingpresidentialpalacesandprivatefarms.Forinstance,upto202peopleoccupiedtheLiwondeForestryReserveinMachinga,adistrictwhichissupposedlytohaveplentifuloflandthatcanbesharedtothelandhungryfromotherpartsofthecountry;inthelandinvasions,farmspreviouslyownedbyDr.Banda,thefirstheadofstate,areparticularlytargeted.Landdisputestakingtheformofencroachmentreflects,interalia,themarkeddivergenceofthelandreformdiscoursebetween theofficial policy and thepopular viewor conceptionat thegrassroots level. Thegrassroots’understandingofafairandjustlandreformprogrammeisthatitshouldchampionrestitutioninsteadofpeoplefromotherdistrictsbeingprioritisedasbeneficiariesoftheinitiative.Thiswouldonlymakesenseifandonlyifthepeopleindistrictsdeemedashavingexcesslandaresatisfiedwiththeirlandholding sizes. The encroachments and land invasions are justified as simply ameans of gettingbacklandthatwasunfairlyexpropriatedfromthemundertheaegisofthe1967legislativeinstrumentswherebyvasttracksofcustomarylandweretransferredintotheestatesub-sectorwithmodestornocompensationatall(Chirwa[1998];Chinsinga[2002];Chirwa[2004]).IntheteaandcoffeegrowingdistrictsofThyoloandMulanjethegrassrootsengaginginlandencroachmentsandinvasionsclaim‘thelandinquestionbelongtothembecauseithadbelongedtothembeforeitwasstolenbycolonialsettlers’(Kanyongolo,2005:129).Traditional leadershavecontributed to theseverityof the landdisputesbyabdicating their role in

finding lastingsolutions to thedisputes.Twocaseswere reported involving thesettlersand thehostcommunities:inonecasethehostcommunitieshaveencroachedintothesettlers’landbyadistanceof75metresandinanotheronetheyhaveencroachedintothesettlers’landupto10ridgesofroughlya100metreslongeachbeyondtheformallyrecognisedboundaries.Insomecases,thereceivingcommunitieshaveevengonetotheextentof takingout thebeaconsthatwereputupto identify theboundaries.TheselanddisputeshavebeentakentotheGroupVillageHeadmenwhohaveinturnreferredthemto

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TraditionalAuthoritiesastheultimateauthority.ThetwocasescitedabovehaveinvolvedthepoliceaswellastheCBRLDPstaff,buttheyarestalledaslongasthetraditionalleadersareunwillingtomove;settlershaveendedupgivinguppartoftheirlandsincethesedisputesremainunresolvedandprospectsofresolutionlookbleak.ThetraditionalleadersarethuspracticingasilentformofprotesttotheCBRLDPinitiative.TheyareclearlylesswillingtogetinvolvedwiththeaffairsoftheCBRLDPbeneficiaries,whoaredescribedasgovernment’speopleand,byimplication,thegovernmenthastodealwiththeirproblems.ItisagainstthisbackdropthatsometraditionalleadershavearguedthatthePMCsfortrustsshouldevolveintotraditionalleadershipstructures,butevenifthisweretohappen,itwouldnotaddresstheproblemsof land disputes – especially since for the host communities a just and fair land reform programmeprimarilyentailsrestitution.Thecombinedeffectoftheovertandcovertformsofprotestisthatithasdiminishedthesenseof

tenuresecurityoftheCBRLDPlandexpereincedbythenewcomers,especiallysincetheydonotasyethavedocumented individual ownershipof their plots of land. There is a senseof feargiven thewaylanddisputeshavebeendealtwithhitherto: the fearofpotentiallybeingdispossessedof the land iswidespread,particularlyasthereisalreadyaforcefuldiscourseofdispossessionthatequatesrightstolandwithcitizenship.Itappearsthatthesettlerswillhavetocontendwiththeconstantthreatthattheirrighttolandisopentocontestationbythosewithcustomaryclaimsbasedonthenotionofautochthony(Woodhouse, 2006; Peters and Kambewa, 2007). This, to a very great extent, illustrates that theimplementationoftheCBRLDPhasbeennegotiatedbyadiverserangeofstakeholders,intentonshiftingtheburdenofadjustmentelsewhere.ThishasinvariablyculminatedinadisjuncturebetweentheintendedandtheactualoutcomesoftheCBRLDPunderpinningthefactthatprocessesofinstitutionalchangeareindeedinherentlypoliticalinnature.Toreiterate,thegoaloftheCBRLDPistorelocatelandstressedfamiliestoplaceswithexcessland

wheretheywouldenjoysecurityoftenureandrobustlivelihoods.ImplementationoftheCBRLDPhasnotbeenanyeasytask,however:thestakeholdersinvolvedhaveinterpreted,appropriatedandengagedwiththeCBRLDPinaccordancewiththeopportunitiesthattheyhavediscernedtopromotetheirowninterests,whichhasinturnshapedandimpactedtheoutcomes,successesandfailuresoftheproject.MostpeopleinthesendingdistrictsseetheCBRLDPasanopportunitytogainaccesstoavaluableproductiveresource;the people in the receiving districts embraced it as a platform for them to assert claims over theirancestralland;andtraditionalleadersandCoCmembersinboththesendingandreceivingdistrictshaveexploiteditasasourceofrent.InadditiontraditionalleadersinthesendingdistrictsfeeltheCBRLDPposesaseriousthreattothestatureoftheirrulershipandtraditionalleadersinthereceivingdistrictshaveseizeditasanopportunitytocontestanyperceivedmodificationintheirauthorityoverlandimpliedbythedraftlandpolicy.Thegoaloflandredistributiontothelandless,withsecuretenure,remainsthereforeanunattainable

idealsincetheimplementationoftheCBRLDPhasalsogivenrisetocompetinginterpretationsabouttheopportunitiesthattheprogrammeprovides.Communities inreceivingdistrictshavetakenrecoursetothehistoricaldevelopmentsinlandtenureandownershippatternstojustifytheiractions;CoCmembersandtraditionalleadersinbothsendingandreceivingdistrictshaveproactivelyengagedwiththeCBRLDPinorder toexploit rentsoutof it; and traditional leaders in the receivingdistrictshaveappropriatedthediscourse triggeredby thedraft landpolicy and the rise of social protectionprogrammeson thegovernment’sagendatoengagewiththeCBRLDPinamannerthatsupportstheirinterests.Inshort,theactsofthestakeholdersinstigatedbytheimplementationoftheCBRLDPareentangledinstrugglesoverthelegitimateauthorityoverland.ItisclearfromtheexperiencesoftheCBRLDPthat‘institutionbuildingisacontestedprocess,drivenforwardandundonebystrugglesbetweenregimes,ruralelitesandfarmingpopulations’(Harris,2006:10).

TheSubjectoftheCBRLDPPilotInitiative

Themajorconcern is thatmajorobjectiveof theCBRLDPpilot initiative isunclear. It isdifficult todiscernwhether CBRLDP is piloting the provisions of the new land policy or thewilling-seller/-buyerphilosophyofthe landdistributionexercise.Itwouldhave,however,beenanexcellentopportunitytofullytesttherobustnessofthevariousprovisionsofthedraftlandpolicyespeciallysincesomeofthemhavegeneratedcontentiousandunendingdebatesduringtheconsultativephaseofthepolicydocument(Chirwa, 2004; Peters andKambewa,2007).Subjecting theprovisions of the landpolicy to rigorousempiricaltestsundertheauspicesoftheCBRLDPwasimperativegiventhepossibilityofscalinguptheinitiativeacrossthecountryasearlyas2009.Twoissuesaresingledouthereforpurposesofillustration:first,thedraftlandpolicyproposestitling

ofcustomarylandasawayofenhancingsecurityoftenureandaskeymeansofencouraginginvestmentintolandbyowners,aswellasameansoftransforminglandintoapotentiallyviableformofcollateral(PetersandKambewa,2007).TodatetheCBRLDPisyettofacilitatetheregistrationofevenasinglecustomaryestateatleastinthetrustsincludedinthisstudy:ownershipofthelandiscollectivelyvestedinthetrusts–individualhouseholdsareyettogettitledeedsfortheirrespectiveplots.ThisiscontrarytothespiritofadvertisementsfortheCBRLDPinwhichitwasstressedthatthesettlerswouldbegivendocuments to serve as proof of ownership of their land. An FGD participant, for instance, observed

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that‘theradioadvertisementsstressedthatourpiecesoflandwouldbeleasedandwewouldbegivendocumentationsupportingourownershipclaimsofpiecesofland’.28ThemainreasonforthedelayisthattheCBRLDPhasnottakentheexerciseseriously,eventhoughtheoverridingobjectiveoftheprojectistopromoteaccesstoadequatelandforsubsistencewithsecurityoftenure.Whilethesettlersenumeratealistofrightsthattheyhaveoverthelandtheyhaveacquiredthroughthe

CBRLDP–suchasgrowingcropsoftheirchoice,saleorsubdivisionofthelandtotheirchildren–theyarenonethelessnotfullyassuredoftheserightsduetotheabsenceofrelevantdocumentation.Nevertheless,whatisstressedisthefactthathouseholdsdonothavethemandatetoeithersellorsubdividetheirplotsbeforefiveyearshaveelapsed.Thetaskoftitlingthelandhasbeenleftwithindividualseventhoughthisisapilotinitiative,howeverexistingempiricalevidenceindicatesthatthisdoesnotalwaysworkoutwithoutsomekindoffacilitationbecausethetaskisnotonlytoobureaucratic,butalsoveryexpensive(Woodhouse,2006;Potts,2006).ThefailuretoaddressthisissueinthepilotphaseraisesthequestionofsustainabilityoftheCBRLDPasasolutiontothelandproblem.Itwasclearfromthefieldworkthatintheabsenceofanyguidance,thesettlerswillusethesameinheritancepracticesthattheyareaccustomedto.Infact,intheFGDs,theyindicatedthatthelandwouldbesubdividedthroughthefemalechildrenoncetheyarereadyformarriage.Bythethirdgenerationtherefore,thepiecesoflandwouldhavebeensubdividedintoportionsthatwouldnolongerbeviableforfarmingasiscurrentlythecaseinthesendingcommunities.Second,theCBRLDPcouldhaveprovidedtheopportunitytotestthecapacityofthedistrictandsub-

districtparticipatorystructuresoutlinedinthedraftlandpolicytomediatelandtransactions.Evidencefrompilotsofasimilarnaturefromelsewhereacrossthecontinentsuggestthatdevelopingthiscapacityisahugechallenge.Oftenthecentrallandregistersquicklybecomeoutofdateasthereisinsufficientfundingforstaffcapacitytoensurethatlandtransfersarenotifiedtothecentralregister(Woodhouse,2006).TheCBRLDPraisesafurtherchallengewithregardtothesettler’saccesstowetlands–dambo–whichare increasinglybecomingavaluableagriculturalresourcefollowingthefrequentoccurrencesofadverseweatherandclimaticpatterns(Chinsinga,2007).Inspiredperhapsbythedraft landpolicywhichcategorisesdambosascommonorpublicland,theCBRLDPinitiativedoesnotaddresstheissuesofdamboaccessbysettlersatall(PetersandKambewa,2007).Theimplicitassumptionisthatdambosremainunallocatedandcanthereforebeaccessedbywhosoeverdesiresthroughtraditionalleadersintheircapacityascustodiansofthisland.Forthisreason,accesstodambobythesettlershasbeenahugeproblem:traditionalleadersaccordpreferenceofaccesstodambostolocalresidentsover‘strangers’.The lackofor limitedaccesstodambohas forcedsomehouseholdswhoweresoweddedtowetlandcultivationinthesendingcommunitiestoabandonCBRLDPland:theyarguethattheycannotsurvivewithoutengaginginwetlandcultivationnotonlyfortheloveofit,butalsoasakeysourceofincomegeneration.

6 concludingremArks

ThereisnodoubtthattheimplementationofalandreformprogrammeisimperativeinMalawigiventhecolonialandpostcolonial injusticesthathaveunderpinnedthelandtenureandownershippatternsinMalawi. It is very clear that the current pattern of land ownership is skewed in favour of a smallminoritywhoaccumulatedvasttractsoflandundertheauspicesofthecolonialandpostcoloniallegislativeinstruments.Thevastmajorityofpeopleweredisenfranchisedofownershipoftheirlandandforaperiodofnearlyfourdecadesnosubstantiveeffortshavebeenundertakentoredressthesehistoricalinequities.Theparadoxisthatmuchofthislandiseitheridleorgrosslyunderutilised.While it iswidelyrecognisedthat land isthekeyproductiveresourceand,therefore,pivotal inthe

poverty reduction initiatives, progress towardanymeaningful land reformhasbeenpainfully slow.Ahot issue in the leadup to thedemocratisationprocess, the subjectof land reformhasnot featuredprominentlyinthemajorpovertyreductionstrategiesthathavebeenimplementedtodate.ItisinfactquitestrikingthattheMalawiGrowthandDevelopmentStrategy(MGDS)addressesthequestionoflandreformonlytangentiallyasitsoverallgoalistotransformthecountryfromapredominantlyconsumingandimportingsocietytoaproducingandexportingcountryinwhichagricultureisgoingtoplayakeyrole.ThemajorinitiativetodatethereforeistheCBRLDPwhichcouldbesaidtobeapredominantlyexternallydriveninitiativetriggeredarguablybytheuglyturnofeventsinZimbabwe’slandreformprogrammeandincreasingcasesoflandencroachmentandinvasionsintheteaandcoffeegrowingdistrictsofThyoloandMulanje.Thiscasestudydemonstratesthatpromotingpro-poorgrowthanddevelopmentisacomplexexercise.

Inparticular,theCBRLDPexperiencesunderscorethefactthatsuccessinpromotingpro-poorgrowthanddevelopmentisnotmerelyamatterofconjuringgoodinstitutionsastheirdesignandimplementationcriticallydependsonagentsandagenciestoimplementthem(Thelen[2004];Leftwich[2006];Harris[2006]).AsdemonstratedbytheCBRLDP,the implementationofschemesofthisnature is inherentlyapoliticalprocess,theactionsofthestakeholdersinvolvedshapeandoftenunderminetheinstitutional

28 FocusGroupDiscussionwithmenfromChitimbeTrust.

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arrangementsintendedbythescheme.ThekeystakeholdersintheimplementationoftheCBRLDPincludedordinarypeopleinboththesendingandreceivingdistricts;CoCmembersandtraditionalleadersinboththesendingandreceivingdistricts;andtheCBRLDPstaff.Theoutcomes,successesandfailureshavebeenshapedbythenegotiatedinteractionamongthesestakeholderswhowereintenttoshifttheburdenofadjustmentresultingfromtheimplementationoftheCBRLDPelsewhere.TheconceptionoftheCBRLDPwasfurthershapedbythegovernment’sdevelopmentpartnerswhohaveparticularinterestsandmotivesforpushingfortheimplementationoflandreforms.TheWorldBank,theDepartmentforInternationalDevelopment(DFID)andtheEuropeanUnion(EU)haveplayedacriticalroleinpushingthegovernmenttoactonthe landquestionparticularlyaftertheevents inZimbabwe.Nonetheless,viable institutionsforpro-poorgrowthcanonlybeestablishedifthereisstrongdomesticdemandforreformtoensuretheestablishmentofappropriateinstitutionsandtoensurecompliancewiththem(Leftwich,2006).Politicsareengrainedinlandreformatboththenationalandlocallevels.Atthenationallevel,progress

towardthe implementationofacomprehensive landreformprogramme implied in the leadupto thetransition to democracy has been quite slow, the government is yet to adopt enabling legislation tofacilitatetheimplementationoflandreforminitiativesdespitetherhetoricduringthestruggleforpoliticalliberalisationattheturnofthe1990s;itisclearthattheCBRLDPhasfallenpreytotheconstraintsofpathdependence(North,1990;Harris,2006).ThescopeoftheCBRLDPhasverymuchbeendictatedbythelackofpoliticalwillthathascharacterisedthelandreforminitiativessincetheadventofindependenceinthe1960s.Thereforminitiativeshaveoftenbeendrivenbyateamofeliteswithvestedinterestsintheexistingtenurepatterns,reflectedinthelackofwillingnesstodepartsubstantiallyfromtheneoliberalslantoflandreformadoptedintheearlyyearsofindependence.Infact,Kanyongolo(2005)arguesthatfromthecolonialeratothepresent,thegovernmenthasimplementedvariouslandacquisitionandreformpolicieswhoseaimhasbeenthecreationandmaintenanceofacapitalisteconomybasedonlarge-scaleexportorientedagricultureattheexpenseofpeasants.WhilethegoaloftheCBRLDPistorelocatelandstressedfamiliestoplaceswithexcesslandwherethey

wouldenjoysecurityoftenure,theintendedoutcomeoftheinitiativeatthelocallevelhangsinbalance.Cognisanceofthefactthatinstitutionalreformsofthisnaturehavewinnersandlosers,stakeholdershaveengagedwiththeCBRLDP intentonminimisingtheir lossesandmaximisingtheirgains.Communitiesinreceivingdistrictshaveexploitedhistoricaldevelopmentstoreassertclaimsovertheirancestrallandalienatedfromthemduringcolonialandpostcolonialeras;traditionalleadersandCoCmembersinbothsendingandreceivingdistrictshaveexploitedtheCBRLDPasasourceofrent,thoughadditiontraditionalleadersinsendingdistrictsperceivetheCBRLDPasasignificantthreattothestatureoftheirrulership;andtraditionalleadersinthereceivingdistrictshaveseizedtheCBRLDPasanopportunitytocontestanyperceivedmodificationintheirauthorityoverlandasimpliedbythedraftlandpolicy.TheengagementoftraditionalleaderswiththeCBRLDPistoalargerextentamanifestationoftheconflictbetweentheneweconomicinstitutionsgoverninglandownershipanduse,andthetraditionalpoliticalinstitutionsofchieflypower,producingunintendedeffectsintheprocess.Theunintendedeffectsareinevitable–inanyinstitutionalreformsthereareboundtobewinnersandlosers,andrarelydostakeholdersacceptdefeatwithoutafight. It is these ‘fights’– foreseenandunforeseen, legitimateand illegitimate, formalandinformal,endogenousandexogenous–thatoftendistorttheimplementationprocessandunderminetheunderlyinggoalsashasbeendemonstratedinthecaseoftheCBRLDP.ThereisnodoubtthattheCBRLDPhasfailedtorunasaneffectivepilot.Thefailureisfurtherreinforced

bytheapparentuncertaintyintermsofwhatexactlyisthesubjectoftheCBRLDPasapilotproject.ItisnotveryclearwhethertheCBRLDPismeanttopilottheprovisionsofthedraftlandpolicyorthewillingseller-buyerphilosophyoflandredistribution.Thisuncertaintyhas,forinstance,culminatedinthefailuretotesttheextenttowhichlandtitlingasprovidedforinthedraftlandpolicywouldindeedguaranteetenuresecurity(Woodhouse,2006;Toulmin,2006).ThefailureoftheCBRLDPtogoallthewayiscreatingafeelingoftenureinsecurityamongthenewlandowners,heightenedbytheirexperiencesregardinghowlanddisputeshavebeenhandledsofar.ThetraditionalleadersinreceivingcommunitieshavebeenveryreluctanttodealwithlanddisputesbetweenthenewlandownersandthelocalresidentsclearlyasaformofcovertprotesttotheCBRLDPinitiative.Nearlyallmajorlanddisputesencounteredduringthefieldworkremainunresolvedand,intheinterim,thenewlandownershavegivenuppartofthelanddesignatedastheirsatthetimeofresettlement.Thishasnegativelyaffectedtheenthusiasmofthenewlandownerstoinvestmassivelyinthelandbecauseofthelackofviableinstitutionstomediateandresolvelanddisputeswithadegreeofcertainty.While the CBRLDP is a laudable initiative given themounting land pressures especially in the tea

andcoffeegrowingdistrictsofThyoloandMulanje, it failstopassasamodelforsustainablepovertyreduction.Liketheearlierinitiatives,itfailstofullyconfrontthestructuresthatgeneratepovertyyetitiswidelyacknowledgedthatthefightagainstpovertyisaboutfightingthesestructures.Itisveryclearfromthiscasestudythatpovertycannotonlybeaddressedbymakingresourcesavailabletothepoorbutalsobyrespondingto,andsupporting,localdemocraticprocesseswhichrecognisetherightsofallcitizenstobasicservices,theruleoflawandaccountableinstitutions;alongwiththehistorical,structuralandinstitutionallegaciesthatconstitutethecontextinwhichbothindividualandgroupagentsoperatetopromoteorhinderinstitutionalprospectsforgrowth.

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