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Exploring deliberative behavior in a non-deliberative setting1

Julia Jennstål, (julia.jennstal@statsvet.uu.se),

Uppsala University

Prepared for delivery at the ECPR, Reykjavik, August 25-27, 2011.

(Work in progress!)

In this paper I explore deliberative behavior as it occurs in non-deliberative settings. A “deliberative

behavioral repertoire”, extracted from the deliberative literature, is used to determine to what extent

the chief negotiators (Nelson Mandela and F.W de Klerk) during the South African peace negotiations,

1989-94, displayed deliberative conduct. The hypothesis is that deliberative conduct was the micro

mechanism at work during the negotiations, partly accounting for the successful outcome of the

negotiations.

The paper rests on two assumptions. First, deliberative behavior can appear anywhere, anytime,

hence, is not reliant upon certain institutional, social or cultural settings. Second, there are

“deliberative personality structures” that bring about deliberative behavior. The latter assumption is

dealt with in another paper, while the first will be explored here.

Deliberation is a very particular type of social behavior, measured by the participants’ adherence to

the principles of reasoned discussion (Bohman & Rehg, 1999; Chambers, 1996; Cooke, 2009;

Dietelhoff & Müller, 2005; Elster, 1998; Risse, 2000). Four key deliberative behavioral expectations

(that will be further elaborated below) can be extracted from the deliberative literature: reason giving,

inner moral reasoning, open-mindedness, and respect of others. Reason-giving encompass an

individuals logical and rhetorical skills. Inner moral reasoning means that our standpoints must be

grounded in personal, moral, convictions. Open-mindedness means to be open to persuasion and ready

to change opinion if convincing arguments are put forth. Respect of others is, finally, an attitudinal

disposition towards others that they are worthy of respect. Thus, reasoned discussion prescribes a

complex and rigid, behavioral repertoire, which all participants, ideally, should adhere to.

Concerning the second assumption noted above, the deliberative behavioral repertoire is in this

context hypothesized to be tightly intertwined with personality variables, primarily the Big Five

taxonomy. Given the, nowadays, well established existence of stable and validated personality traits

individuals are no longer considered “blank slates” open to fill with a desired content (e.g. Goldberg,

1990; McCrae & Terracciano, 2005; Mondak, 2010). Individuals possess a unique combination of 1 This paper is part of my dissertation project. In an earlier article I have explored deliberative behavior from a personality approach (using the Big Five model) arguing for the existence of a “deliberative personality”. This paper can be seen as a pilot study based on the findings in the prior study. In this paper I assess to what extent Nelson Mandela and de Klerk deliberated. The next step will be to explore if deliberative behavior used by Mandela and de Klerk during the negotiations can be related to and explained by personality variables.

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personality traits which distinguish them from each other. For example, this means that individuals are

likely to respond differently to learning situations and also behave differently (from each other) in

social situations. Viewed from a personality trait approach, the highly complex deliberative behavioral

repertoire can hardly be deemed a “universal competence” nor can individuals be expected to behave

according to it solely as the result of a deliberatively structured situation. From this perspective, it

becomes more relevant to make in-depth explorations of individual conduct to capture the interplay of

different deliberative behavior within single individuals, in order to determine the quality of

deliberation.

Deliberative behavior, as such, has been explored by, among others, Thomas Risse and Simone

Chambers in non-deliberative, political settings. Using two empirical illustrations, the socialization of

human rights norms into domestic practices and negotiations between east and west to end the cold

war, Risse demonstrates the effects of deliberative behavior (“arguing”) in a seemingly anarchic and

power ridden international setting (Risse, 1999, 2001). Even though certain institutional provisions

might be more conducive to deliberative practices it still comes down to the single individual to

actually behave in accordance with the principles of deliberation.

Chambers explores the idea of “deliberative rhetoric” which “allows us to think about promoting

deliberation in a context where face-to-face dialogue is the exception rather than rule and where a

small number of elites dominate political communication” (Chambers 2009:324). Chambers wants to

challenge the dominant perception that mass public is out of reach for deliberation by distinguishing

between deliberative and plebiscitary rhetoric. Politicians can create deliberative relationship with the

audience by the use of deliberative rhetoric even if the audience lacks instruments to immediately

respond to the speaker: “deliberative rhetoric makes people think, it makes people see things in new

ways, it conveys information and knowledge, and it makes people more reflective” (Chambers

2009:335). Chambers contribution is to show that deliberative rhetoric is not restricted to particular

settings and can occur anywhere, anytime in the public sphere. Chambers refines our understanding of

rhetoric by stating that it can be dialogical, even in asymmetric relationships. What is needed is a

politician willing to deliberate.

Instead of endorsing an institutional perspective, Chambers and Risse search the system after

deliberative behavior. They both reach the conclusion that there can be more or less deliberativeness in

the system depending on politicians conduct. From this standpoint deliberation originates within

individuals. However, neither pose the questions of who “choose” to deliberate and why.

This paper examines Nelson Mandela’s and F.W. de Klerk’s behavior during the South African

peace negotiations, 1989-94 in an effort to explain if it was deliberative behavior that was the “micro

mechanism” at play during the successful negotiation process.

Explanations of the South African success story when it comes to the non-violent transformation

from apartheid to a transition government have mostly concerned institutional choice analysis and

other strategic and rational actor perspectives (Sisk 1995; Strand 2000). The extraordinary leadership

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and foremost Mandela’s exceptional style and conduct have been noted by many yet these individual

level variables have seldom been treated as explanatory of the outcome.

South Africa is a tough case for the hypothesis of a deliberative behavior. The situation in South

Africa in the beginning of the 1990’s did not encourage openness and the seeking of understanding.

The protracted conflict had been fought along racial lines and strong group identification was

persistent. When the political leaders sat down to negotiate it was in a climate of political suspicion

and deep mistrust for the contender.

A DELIBERATIVE BEHAVIORAL REPERTOIRE Reasoned discussion can be viewed as a mean or an end, and can be measured in a multitude of

ways, but at the essence of it there is a belief in the merits of a deliberative mode of conduct

(Chambers, 1996; Bohman & Rehg, 1999; Elster, 1998; Cooke, 2009; Thomas Risse, 2000; Müller,

2004; Deitelhoff & Müller, 2005). Reasoned discussion prescribes a particular way of behaving and

this behavioral repertoire, sometimes referred to as a “deliberative character”, ultimately rely on the

existence of a universal competence, something which every individual can be fostered in to or taught

through social and cultural learning processes.

All humans are believed to have an innate general, pre-theoretical disposition, on which to draw on

in reasoned discussion, implying the following four behavioral expectations. Reason giving (1)

requires of a person to clearly state her preferences and be ready to explicate the reasons for why she is

holding them, thereby contributing to a critical discussion on the pros and cons of different

standpoints. Dryzek stresses that all actors involved must be “communicatively competent” meaning

that “all actors should be equally and fully capable of making and questioning arguments” (Dryzek,

1990). Reason-giving denote an activity in dialogue with opponents. Reply to or ask questions, deliver

critique or a declaration of intent prove, at least a minimal, acceptance of the contender and the

process. Justifications, apologizes, self-serving rhetoric and shaming strategies can all be argued to be

reason-giving activities, hence in line with deliberate conduct (e.g. Risse, 1999; 2000). What is critical

is the underlying belief that what I say matters. Shaming refer to efforts to prove dissonance between

the contender’s actions and principles. It is used both do degrade the contender’s reputation and

simultaneously get one self a better position. Individuals with high moral ambitions more easily get

caught in “argumentative self-entrapments”. They make references to principles and values in

speeches and thereby place obligations on themselves to comply with the same values. The more they

discuss the more entangled they get, which means that they become forced to adapt to the proclaimed

values in order not to loose leverage (Risse 1999:536-550). “Argumentative self-entrapments” is an

unintended consequence of reason-giving.

If reason giving means to publicly express and defend opinions in a clear and understandable

manner, inner moral reasoning (2) accounts for the substance and quality of the given reasons. Inner

reasoning means that participants must have reflected on the impartial as well as partial aspects of

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their ideas, wishes, and preferences, and whether their preferences are reasonable (Cohen, 1996). They

need a profound understanding that equality and fairness among participants is something inherently

good and to be governed by principles stating that all have the right to speak, all must be listened to,

and everyone’s statements should be given equal consideration.

Abstract principles such as “the force of the better argument” and tolerance of ambiguity (Dryzek,

1990, p. 15; Risse, 2000, p. 12) necessitates an inner process of moral reasoning to make sense to

individuals. Deliberative scholars stress tolerance of ambiguity meaning that no one of the participants

knows who will learn from whom, which, in practice, means that everyone should stick to the premise

that the better argument always prevail. All participants must comprehend that no matter how

exhaustive the debate has been, and no matter how justifiable the decision seems to be, the positions

and arguments can be challenged again at any time (Gutmann & Thompson, 1990; Risse, 2000). Both

these principles necessitate an abstract and rule-guided way of thinking to manage to see things from a

distance, in order to acknowledge and show respect to the multitude of attitudes and opinions in

discussions. Chambers (1996) mentions thought experiments as one type of inner reasoning when

individuals reflects on questions such as; would I have agreed to this norm in free and equal

discussion? What kinds of arguments could be brought for and against a certain norm? Thought

experiments undertaken in privacy are believed to assist the individual in later deliberative encounters

(see also Rawls, 1973).

Linklater has summarized Habermas’ “basic procedures” for deliberation which can be described as

an individual’s free choice derived from a process of inner moral reasoning: “First, they should enter

dialogue convinced that no-one can know who will learn from whom. Second, they should strive to

reach agreements which rely on the force of the better argument and which try to reduce overt and

subtle forms of power. Third, they should think from the standpoint of others and aim to agree on

universal principles which bind all together as moral equals” (Linklater, 2005). The process of inner

moral reasoning captures the individual’s conviction of and devotion to the foundational principles on

which the other behavioral requirements rest.

Open-mindedness (3) indicates a readiness to modify or abandon one´s preferences upon (relevant)

criticism. Those who stress the formation and transformation of preferences as vital to deliberation

require of participants to be open-minded (e.g. Karlsson, 2008). Open-mindedness means to be ready

to change one’s preferences if contradictory evidence is received that on reflection cannot be answered

(Eriksen 1997:228; Gutmann 1990:80). A person with an open mind deals with uncertainty in a

constructive way and manage to keep both good and bad aspects of a situation/person in mind without

getting anxious.

Finally, respect for others (4) is a foundational attitudinal disposition towards people in general, a

genuine belief in the authenticity and sincerity of other participants (Chambers, 1996; Elster, 1998;

Risse, 2000). This attitude also means to acknowledge an opponent’s demands and interests as morally

justifiable, “rather than a purely political, economic or other kind of non-moral view” (Gutmann

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1990:79). What other people say is considered to be important and relevant, and it is considered

meaningful to search for an understanding of them and their situation. In practice, respect implies a

readiness to engage in a discussion with the opponent, even though one may not accept their

standpoints as relevant or even valid.

A deliberator should embrace what Gutmann and Thompson describe as “the mutual justification as

implied by the principle of reciprocity” (Gutmann et al, 2002, p. 156). In this state of mind people

distances themselves from egocentric preferences, they truly listen and reflect on others preferences

and are affected by what they hear and learn. Risse stresses the nearby concept of empathy as a critical

feature of arguing (Risse 1999). Empathy means the ability to really listen to what other people say,

and thereby gain a profound, emotional or intellectual, understanding of the opponent’s situation,

behavior, and demands.

These four behaviors are implicitly required of participants. In this article, they are assumed and

treated as underlying, psychological stipulations of deliberation and all four of equal importance for

successful deliberation.

Some methodological points The empirical examination goes through critical events between 1989 and 1994 in order to capture

patterns of interaction between the two leaders, hence it follows the logic of “pattern tracing” (Kaarbo

& Beasley, 1999, pp. 386. If these patterns prove congruent with the deliberative repertoire (i.e. that

all four deliberative behaviors are evident within, as well as characteristic of, the process) the

hypothesis is strengthened.

The single, greatest impediment to peace during the transition was violence. Therefore the analysis

of de Klerk’s and Mandela’s interactions will primarily concentrate on how they dealt with and

responded to acts of violence and the security issue, and the related question of interim government.

This is two highly significant matters both from a theoretical and an empirical vantage point.

Prevailing theories often fall back on acts of violence to explain critical policy shifts and/or changes in

the balance of power between the negotiating actors. Therefore, questions of violence and security are

least likely to be dealt with in a deliberative manner. Thus, if a deliberative mode of conduct proves

dominant when dealing with violence and security issues, it is reasonable to assume that it also exerts

considerable influence in other types of discussions between the leaders.

The four behaviors will first be scrutinized as separated constructs and then related to each other in

order to see how they relate to each other and if they tend to appear simultaneously.

When it comes to the requirement of reason-giving, respect for others and open-mindedness these

behaviors can be directly inferred from the behavior while inner moral reasoning, however, requires

other sorts of sources that reach into the internal thought processes and reflections of the leaders. This

means that inner moral reasoning is dependent on the leaders’ ability and willingness (and reason) to

verbalize their thinking. The guiding assumption is that if an individual has a sophisticated and

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morally conscious thinking they will be motivated to express their thoughts to make clear that their

standpoint is justifiable and well-founded. An important source that hint at the leaders inner moral

thinking during the process are to be dated long afterwards, in memoirs etceteras.

The analysis will be structured along the following questions:

1. Reason-giving

Do they state their opinions in a straightforward way?

Do they give reasons for why they hold certain opinions?

Do they explain their behavior?

Do they respond to questions?

Overall: do they actively engage in a dialogue with the contender (or do they hide information

about their true preferences in a manipulative and strategic game in order to get advantages)?

2. Inner moral reasoning

Do they express/show concern about the principle of “tolerance of ambiguity”?

Do they express/show concern about the principle of “the never ending process of revisions”?

Do they express/show concern about the principle of “the force of the better argument”?

Do they seek points of convergence with the opponent?

Overall: do foundational moral convictions influence their thinking and saying, in public or

bilaterally, during the interactions (or do they act spontaneous and affectionate in relation to the

unfolding of the negotiations)?

3. Open-minded

Do they change/modify/abandon opinions in response to new information or if the situation

change?

Do they deal with complexities in a nuanced manner?

Do they incorporate other’s preferences into their own thinking?

Overall: Can they cope with being in a state of uncertainty without falling back on stereotypic and

simplified explanations or clinging on to long-held beliefs?

4. Respect of others

Do they acknowledge the legitimacy of the opponent?

Do they acknowledge the sincerity of the opponent’s demands, beliefs, and values?

Do they really attempt to understand the logic of the opponent’s statements and demands?

Do they reply to questions from the opponent?

Do they empathize with the other’s situations?

Overall: do they consider the opponent as an equal and, as such, an inevitable feature of the

negotiation process (or do they attempt to undermine or circumscribe the opponent by any means)?

Emphasis will be on instances when any of the four behaviors are evident. The absence of or

contradictory behavior will be commented on in a concluding discussion. Attention will be given to

the opponent’s description of the other as living up to any of these four behavioral requirements. For

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instance, if Mandela describes de Klerk as having an open-mind this will strengthen the hypothesis of

de Klerk as a deliberative person.

The material used originates from during the negotiation process. Daily news papers, transcripts of

journalistic interviews, press releases made by the ANC and the NP, as well as secondary sources, are

the primary sources of information.

SOUTH AFRICAN PEACE NEGOTIATIONS, 1989-94

Table 1. Chronology of key events during the negotiation process, 1989-94

Date Events

1989 September De Klerk’s inauguration speech as NP leader

1990 February Parliamentary speech by de Klerk

May ANC and NP sign the Groote schuur accord

June State of emergency lifted

July Violent outbreak in Sebokeng township

August ANC suspend armed activities

September Mandela accuses the Government of “a state-sponsored, hidden, third

force”

1991 February ANC and NP sign the D.F. Malan minute.

April ANC ultimatum: no talks if the violence does not decrease

May ANC withdrawal from talks

September National Peace Accord

December Codesa convenes and Mandela publicly attacks de Klerk

1992

Mars

May

White only referendum

Codesa deadlocks

June ANC and NP negotiations break down

June Mass action campaign announced by the ANC

June Inkatha affiliates kill ANC member in Boipatong

September Police shooting at demonstrators in Bisho

1993

1994

September

April

April

June

October

April

ANC and NP signs the Record of Understanding

Multi party talks – MPN

Chris Hani is assassinated

Breakthrough in ANC and NP talks

Nobel Peace Price to Mandela and de Klerk

National election

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Reason-giving Activity in dialogue could be seen as a baseline in deliberative encounters. To be characterized as a

deliberative style of reason-giving discussants are intended to have a dialogue with each other and not

only try to score political points by capturing the audience attention. The fundamental request is that

discussants confront each other with questions, clarifications, justifications, apologizes, threats,

accusations, blame or explorations of the reasons behind different standpoints. Participants’ main

concern should be to provide reasons in order persuade or influence the opponent. Reason-giving

requires a continuous dialogue, because situations change, requiring new positions and provision of

new reasons, hence the important part is the continuation of reason-giving during the whole process.

Turning to the initial phase of the negotiation process, there is ample evidence of both leaders’

willingness to outline the logic behind their positions.

In December 1989 when Mandela was still imprisoned he sent a letter to de Klerk with the title “To

create a climate of understanding”, in which he explained why he considered the Government’s

approach to the question of negotiations with the ANC, totally unacceptable (Mandela 1989). While

acknowledging the positive contributions undertaken by the Government to prepare the way for

negotiations, Mandela also underscored that more needed to be done.

Also de Klerk demonstrated, at an early stage, his readiness to participate in an exchange of reason-

giving. In September 1989, de Klerk held his inauguration speech in which he responded to Mandela’s

accusations that the Government violated certain norms of appropriate behavior. By stating that the

accusations in themselves were violations of norms for peaceful behavior de Klerk dismissed them as

unjustifiable. This is not an advanced argumentation but it is an indication of de Klerk’s incentive to

engage in a debate on righteous behavior. A few months later, de Klerk made his annual address at the

opening of Parliament where he announced the normalization of politics. In addition to declaring the

Government’s intentions he also delineated the most important facets that lead the Government to take

this decision (De Klerk 1990).i

Reason-giving in terms of accusations starts appear already in connection to their first signed

accord, the Groote Schuur Accord. Mandela accuses de Klerk of not complying with the Groote

Schuur accord when it came to the release of political prisoners, the lifting of the state of emergency

and the management of violence. De Klerk on his part accused Mandela of not fulfilling his part of the

D.F. Malan Minute in abandoning the armed struggle. This last accusation was to become a

reoccurring subject of discussion during the negotiations. Mandela often spelled out the reasons why

he could not carry out the Government’s demand on disbanding the armed struggle under the present

conditions [Mandela , 1990 #110](Mandela* 1990; Mandela* 1991).

At this stage of the process both contenders seem inclined to outline

the motives for their actions and to argue for their demands to be reasonable.

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When the Inkathagate scandal was revealed in 1991, Mandela blamed de Klerk for advancing his

administrations cause “over the corpses” of ANC affiliates (Laurence 1991).2

Following the attacks on ANC members by Inkatha affiliates in Sebokeng and Zonkiziziwe

Mandela requested a private meeting with de Klerk. In his memoirs, Mandela recalls,

And in 1993 de Klerk

was accused of not “even take the simplest precautions to curb violence, in his view their [black] lives

are cheap. When it comes to blacks, he is absolutely insensitive” (Mandela 1994).

When I saw him, I angrily asked for an explanation. ‘You were warned in advance’, I told him ‘and

yet did nothing. Why is that? Why is that there have been no arrests? Why have the police sat on their

hands? […] He had no reply to what I said. I asked de Klerk to furnish me with an explanation, and he

never did (Mandela 1994:579).

Mandela asks questions but is not content with de Klerk’s response. According to Mandela, every time

he confronted de Klerk with these sorts of questions the reply was that he should investigate and

respond on the matter something that never happened on the word of Mandela (Mandela 1994:579).3

Another frequent accusation by Mandela was that de Klerk was inconsistent in his words and deeds,

while paying lip service to a negotiated solution he was conducting a violent struggle (Johnson 1991).

In 1992 the Goldstone Commission, appointed by de Klerk’s government, proved one of the instigator

of violence to be a state sponsored, hidden third force (Sisk 1995:213). De Klerk stated his lack of

knowledge, while confronting the police and the National Intelligence Service to find out the truth

behind the charges of a third force but they all denied involvement. De Klerk had to decide whether or

not to trust his closest allies (Waldmeir 1997:183).

However, in a speech to parliament in January 1992, de Klerk defends the security forces from

Mandela’s indictments that they are to be blamed for the violence (Africa Contemporary Record*

1998).

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As long as de Klerk maintains that he did not knew about the third force it is difficult to accuse him

of inconsistent behavior. At least partly, Mandela’s belief could be explained by his limited

understanding of the resources available to State Presidents. A parallel could be made to the revelation

of the Operation Vula, which was a secret structure within the ANC prepared for armed struggle. The

revelation of its existence proved the ANC, despite their proclamations of the suspended armed

struggle, to still have a “double agenda” (or, what some have called an “insurance policy”), hence

2 Interesting to note is that despite Mandela’s harsh reaction to the revelation of the Inkathagate scandal he did not call for the resignation of de Klerk (Ebrahim 1998:80, Laurence 1991). This strengthen the argument that shaming is used to pressure the other into undertaking certain actions, while it is not intended to completely disrupt or undermine the process as a whole. 3De Klerk recalls Mandela’s questions and allegations and also that he promised to investigate and respond. However, in contrast to Mandela, de Klerk’s opinion seems to be that he did what he could to answer the questions and provide Mandela with information but that Mandela was never satisfied (De Klerk 1998:200) 4 Afterwards de Klerk has said that;”somebody must have been lying to us – or at the very least had not provided us with vital information” (De Klerk 1998:122). Shortly before the election 1994 additional information from the Goldstone Commission leaked to the press asserting that top police officers in the South African Police force had provided Inkatha with weapons and ammunition and furthermore been taking part in severe criminal behavior (Waldmeir 1997:183). In the memoirs he wrote that he “still do not know the full truth about all these charges, or who within the security forces authorized these gross violations of human rights” (De Klerk 1998).

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being guilty of the same conduct as the Government was accused of (Strand 2000:123). When

operation Vula was revealed Mandela denied that he should have known about its existence.

Apparently, Mandela seems to reason that as State President it must be easier to keep an eye on

colleagues due to the resources available. In his memoirs, de Klerk makes the following remark, It is ironic that Mandela originally knew nothing of this. He would later frequently accuse me of

having known about everything that happened in the security forces and of having a double agenda (De

Klerk 1998:199:201).

Regardless of de Klerk’s knowledge of the third force it is telling that they both continued arguing

during the whole crisis. In this context, the relevant question is not whether de Klerk really was

innocent or not but to what extent he attempted to explain and defend his actions in response to

Mandelas accusations. Waldmeir suggests de Klerk’s truthfulness by making clear that he was only

losing out from the violence. It undermined both his international reputation as a great politician and

his power position in the domestic negotiations.

At numerous occasions de Klerk publicly committed himself to democratic principles, which was a

theme Mandela utilized to put pressure on him. For example, on several occasions Mandela accused

de Klerk of being insensitive to the sufferings of the Blacks. In a press briefing from 1992 Mandela

made the comparison of how Jews were treated in Nazi Germany with the situation for the Blacks in

South Africa (Waugh 1992).

At Codesa, Mandela said in response to a speech by de Klerk in which he criticized Mandela, that, Although [de Klerk] wants these democratic changes, he has sometimes very little idea what

democracy means […] he is forgetting that he cannot speak like a representative of a Government which

has got legitimacy and which represents the majority of the population (Mandela* 1991).

When Mandela addressed the OAU in April 1992 he said that de Klerk was ”determined to cling on to

power by any means necessary” and that de Klerk believes he “does not need to respect democratic

elections” (Africa Contemporary Record 1998). On a joint trip with de Klerk to the US in 1993,

Mandela made a public statement in which he said that de Klerk was “the leader of an illegitimate

government lacking credibility”. He also added that, “we don’t regard him as the president of South

Africa, but as a leader put there by only 15 percent of the population” (Fabricius 1993). De Klerk is

both accused of applying undemocratic means and that he, and his Government, is acting outside the

democratic realm.

Mandela used the Inkathatgate scandal to stress the relevance of the ANC’s longstanding demand

on an interim government (Ebrahim 1998:81). An interim government, he argued, was the only

mechanism that could bring back confidence in the process and revitalize negotiations. The pros and

cons with an interim government were discussed countless times and equal number of times Mandela

explained why he viewed an interim government as the only viable option for South Africa

(Laurence* 1991; Sparks* 1992).

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Both contenders highlight inconsistencies in each other’s argumentation. In response to the

Government refusal to initiate talks with the ANC before they make an; “honest commitment to

peace”, Mandela initiates a moral debate. On a normative level Mandela stated his acceptance of the

precondition. What he did not accept was the definition of the ANC’s armed struggle. Mandela’s

perception of it was as “a purely defensive measure”. ANC was not the aggressor and thus the

Government’s demand on the ANC to suspend the armed struggle was illegitimate. Mandela applied

the same kind of reasoning when criticizing the Government for its preconditions for talks. While

calling on other parties to participate in talks with open mind the Government had set up certain

criteria to determine who had the right to participate in talks (Mandela 1989). By this line of reason-

giving, Mandela could reject the Government’s demands as unjustifiable.

A similar reflection by de Klerk is made a few months later. Anticipating the Groote Schuur

meeting, police forces killed demonstrators in Sebokeng, which made Mandela immediately cancel all

the planned meetings with the Government. De Klerk interpreted this withdrawal from talks as a sign

of contradiction in the ANC’s policy. Why;”an organization, which claimed to be interested in peace,

refused to talk about that very issue”, could only be interpreted as contradicting behavior. De Klerk

stated that;”a continuing commitment to violence and peaceful negotiations were mutually exclusive”

(De Klerk 1998).

In the available material it seems as if Mandela more often started moral discussions but also that

de Klerk did respond to Mandela’s questions and demands. De Klerk did not merely dismiss the

questions but at least attempted to answer them. Searching for an explanation as to how Mandela and

de Klerk managed to retain a working relationship in the face of all the ruthless confrontations,

Waldmeir asserts that it was “because both knew the norms for appropriate behaviour” (Waldmeir

1997).

Given these, sometimes rampant, accusations between the leaders, it is especially interesting to

consider the exchange of memorandum that took place between them during the all time low in the

summer of 1992. Due to the escalating levels of violence, Mandela declared the “rolling mass action”

campaign in order to pressure the Government to take resolute action to tackle the violence. Shortly

afterwards a massacre took place in the township of Boipatong. In response the ANC decided to break

off all bilateral talks as well as the Codesa negotiations with the government (ANC, 1992). In an

interview with The Star Mandela justified the use of mass action as a continued struggle but with non-

violent, democratic means (Steyn 1992). Nevertheless, even if the formal meetings stalled it did not

stop Mandela and de Klerk from justifying and explaining what they perceived to be the main

obstacles to the negotiation process by exchanging written memorandums (Mandela 1992; Mandela*

1992; Mandela** 1992).5

5 The letters have been published in Ebrahim (1998)De Klerk’s reply is found in part two in Ebrahim (1998:545).

In these letters they sketched how they perceived the present situation, the

opponent’s demands and behavior as well as the logic of their own demands. Minister Roelf Meyer

said in response to the exchange of memoranda that it had had a positive influence on future

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discussions because it had outlined the relevant points of differences between the parties (Johnson*

1992). And this important development took shape during the “all-time-low” of the negotiations.

In sum

Reason-giving is evident from both leaders even though Mandela to a larger extent than de Klerk

relied on accusations and shaming strategies, in order to make de Klerk get caught in argumentative

self-entrapments, while de Klerk had to spend more time on defending and explaining his opinions and

actions. Some have interpreted these constant accusations as an evidence of lack of trust between the

leaders, hence that it had a destabilizing impact, threatening to derail the negotiations. Even though the

accusations posed huge obstacles to the process, my interpretation of it is that it did not affect the

leaders’ commitment to reach a settlement. The accusations were honestly experienced, sincerely

responded to, and even though they sometimes had a repetitive tendency they never disrupted the

process of reason-giving.

Reason-giving took place both in public and in bilateral meetings. When official talks stalled, they

switched over to provide reasons to each other in more informal channels. Not the least these written

memorandums from the mid-1992 proved their willingness to continuously explain, defend, and

challenge each other’s perceptions.6 If this had not been the case, one letter would have been

sufficient.7

Inner moral reasoning

To become a deliberator certain principles must be incorporated into one’s thinking, principles that

give moral guidance in everyday life. As a participant in a decision-making process, you should follow

the premise that no one of the participants know who will learn from whom, which means to accept

“the power of the better argument”. A question is never settled once and for all but can always be

challenged again if new arguments/evidences are put forth. The acceptance of this principle also

requires of the individual to have a “tolerance of ambiguity”. In a deliberative mind-set, individuals’

should also search “for significant points of convergence” between seemingly incompatible principles

and “in promoting these policies on which principles converge” (Gutmann 1990:80). This last point

signifies a firm commitment to reach an agreement, a commitment that necessitates a continuous

dialogue.

A relevant point of departure for the analysis seems to be the leaders’ own words to describe the

meaning of negotiations. De Klerk describes it not as a competition but an interaction in which,

“everybody’s political points of view will be tested against their realism, their workability and their

6 See for example Friedman (1993:158-) and Ebrahim (1998:135) 7 This reading is the opposite of Strand’s interpretation of the event “more than anything these letters between the two leaders tell of the mutual distrust between the two major parties at this stage” (Strand 2000).

13

fairness” (Dugard 1992). Mandela uses similar words to describe it as a “robust and honest exchange

of opinions and criticism are necessary for any society to be truly democratic” (Nyatsumba 1994).

At the first real breakthrough in official talks between the Government and the ANC, Mandela and

de Klerk stressed the importance of establishing both informal and formal channels of communication.

The communication channels would work as a security guarantee if either one of them “feel the other

side is breaching the agreement” (Breier 1990).

As mentioned above, during the all time low in the summer of 1992 when violence and allegations

marred the process, the leaders’ started to exchange memos’. Within a week after the massacre in

Boipatong, Mandela sent the first memorandum to de Klerk. The memorandums proved the leaders’

reason giving ability but the incident is also significant for it represent the both leaders’ principled

stance and commitment to reach a negotiated solution. The letters symbolizes the leaders’ shared

conviction that communication was inevitable to a successful resolution of conflicts.

The role of communication channels is once again underscored in Mandela’s closing address to the

ANC national conference in December 1990. As a reply to the criticism voiced by ANC delegates

against the confidential negotiations conducted between members of the ANC and the Government,

Mandela stated that this kind of criticism, …could only be made by those who do not understand the nature of negotiations and the practical

problems that face us on the ground. There would have been no talks about talks today, no future prospect

for negotiations, if there were no confidential negotiations between members of the ANC and the

government (Mandela*** 1990).

Not even the disclosure of the Inkathagate scandal changed the commitment to a constitution of talks

and open channels of communication, albeit, in Mandela’s view, it complicated matters further

(Laurence 1991; Star 1991). In an interview in December 1994, de Klerk said about his and Mandela’s

relationship that, There was always free access, where he took the initiative to phone me on a specific situation, about

an eruption of violence in place A or B, and where I would take the initiative to contact him on a specific

issue. On such matters, we never broke off talking to each other (CSIS 1994).

Scholar William Zartman has noted that it was the “unconditional dialogue” that led to the successful

ending of the South African peace process [Zartman, 1995 #28]. But in addition to a mutual

commitment to continuous negotiations, there are indications of converging principles that both

Mandela and de Klerk seem to draw on in discussions and public statements.

Two common themes they kept returning to were the portrayal of them as “partners in peace”, and

the shared understanding that politics is all about morality. They stood united in their quest for a non-

violent solution that could be morally defended. These two converging principles could they revert

back to when events unfolded that threatened the process and these principles were frequently used as

reference points in discussions.

14

After the signing of the Groote Schuur Minute in May 1990, in which both sides made a

commitment to negotiations and to work for a resolution of the widespread violence, Mandela said

that, “both sides had gone into the discussions in the spirit that there should be no victors or losers,

‘South Africa is the victor’” (Breier 1990). Not even the harshest verbal confrontations made them less

inclined to be seen as partners in peace. The severe confrontation that took place between Mandela and

de Klerk at the first day of Codesa 1 can be seen as a critical test of their commitment to uphold the

idea of them as “partners in peace”. Directly after insensitive and callous statements made by both

leaders (even though Mandela’s speech was more, personal and ruthless compared to de Klerk’s) the

leaders made sure that the TV cameras captured them shaking hand (Waldmeir 1997). Both of them,

according to Mandela “took pains to show that no irreparable harm had been done. At the beginning of

the session, he and I publicly shook hands and said we would work together” (Mandela 1994).

The similar sentiment was present a year later when the leaders addressed the World Economic

Forum, and de Klerk said “we have the desire and the will to face the future together, and together we

will build a new South Africa” (Fabricius 1992).

Mandela has explicitly said that he did not like to co-operate with the NP or de Klerk but he had too

in order to bring about a political change in South Africa (Carlin 1993), which is a sign of the

principled stance of Mandela.

In the run up to election in 1994 de Klerk and Mandela met in a television debate, which initially

was dominated by attacks but ended with them holding hands and Mandela saying; I think we are a shining example to the entire world of people drawn from different racial groups who

have a common loyalty, a common love, to their common country […]. We are going to face the

problems of this country together (Waugh 1992).

When de Klerk resigned as State President he described the relationship between himself and Mandela

as “a symbol of the ability of South Africans from widely different backgrounds to co-operate in the

national interest” (Johnson* 1994).

As partners in peace, neither of them seemed interested in lingering in the past but committed to

resolving the present situation. De Klerk and Mandela stood united in search for a “negotiated

solution” (Ebrahim 1998:14; Friedman 1993:9; Spitz 2000:44). Remembering their second meeting de

Klerk asserts that he and Mandela, …realised that we both bore the ultimate responsibility for ensuring that there would be a negotiated

settlement and we were both committed to carrying out this responsibility (De Klerk 1998).

De Klerk underscored the imperative of conducting peaceful negotiations at various occasions (Africa

Contemporary Record** 1998; Dugard 1992). Even during the most strenuous times the leaders were

able to keep the value of a negotiated settlement in mind. At many occasions crisis were followed by

conciliatory statements; after Codesa I and II, the Chris Hani assassination and at the end of the TV-

debate in 1994. In each case the leaders were eager to prove that the basis of their commitment

15

remained unchanged regardless of the harsh words uttered during debates.8

Though we did not find a way out of the impasse, we agreed that the negotiations must not founder.

We decided that we would each speak the following day in a spirit of constructive compromise (Mandela

1994:594).

In relation to the murder of

Chris Hani the leaders publicly re-committed themselves to negotiations in order to avoid a national

crisis (Ebrahim 1998:153; Waugh 1993). In 1991 the Convention for a democratic South Africa

(Codesa I), which was the first multiparty negotiation forum, met for the first time. However it did not

take long until the process was faltering. Mandela has described his and de Klerk’s response as,

De Klerk shares this understanding of the Codesa process and writes in his memoirs that, Both he [Mandela] and I were determined to keep the negotiating process on course and to accentuate

the many positive achievements of the Codesa working groups. […] The next morning, both he and I,

made conciliatory closing statements to the conference and to the press. I said that although we had

started off on the wrong foot, we had managed, jointly, thanks to the wisdom and the commitment of the

leaders of all the delegations (De Klerk 1998:238).

Maybe it was a “vain attempt to trick the general populace”, as Waldmeir (1997:203) calls it, but

nevertheless it shows that Mandela and De Klerk could work together, that they were mutually

determined to accomplish a negotiated agreement. In light of the above, a reasonable conclusion is that

the leaders had a joint preference for a negotiated solution around which they could stand united when

facing obstacles.

Irrespective of each other the leaders stressed the importance of ”consolidation” of antagonists, in

contrast to “traditional party politics”, “victories”, and “competition” (De Klerk 1993.05.25; De Klerk

1995.04.24.; Johnson 1993; Seery 1991). Mandela and de Klerk took strong action in order to bring

negotiations back on track after crisis situations (Ebrahim 1998:40). The process in total has been

described as a “stop-start nature of negotiations” (Ebrahim 1998:40). For instance, when the Codesa

process broke down the parties believed “that damage was temporary, that engagement would resume

soon” (Friedman 1994:9). In hindsight, de Klerk has said that, “even the Codesa break up was not

necessarily bad because it proved that only negotiation could bring a solution” (De Klerk 1994.11.23).

The massacres in Boipatong and Bisho spurred the parties to reach an agreement (i.e. the Record of

Understanding). Besides the stalling of the Codesa process and the Bisho and Boipatong massacres,

the murder of Chris Hani and the revelation of the Inkathagate scandal also led the parties to speed up

the negotiation process.9

8 Needless to say, references to shared values do not necessarily reflect the reality. It can simply be rhetoric to strengthen the own cause but, still, they do work as argumentative self-entrapments.

Ups and downs were expected by the leaders and viewed as a natural part of

9 Guelke (1999:62) argues that the Chris Hani assassination accelerated the negotiations and made the parties sooner rather than later agree on a date for the holding of elections. The ANC kept a low-profile during the Inkathagate scandal, which some observers have interpreted as a strategy to get the move on negotiations to the ANC’s advantage (Johnson* 1991).

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negotiations and did not derail or threaten the peace process as a whole.10

If “partners in peace” was there joint venture, partly a result of their commitment to a negotiated

solution, their personal agendas also converged in critical aspects. Both aspired to a moral identity and

were well aware of the other’s aspirations. Mandela’s years in prison coupled with his forgiving

mentality and de Klerk as the one who released Mandela and dismantled the apartheid system both

entered negotiations with a reputation of being guided by high moral standards. Experiences of racial

politics and its institutionalization through the Apartheid system surely contributed to making politics

a question of morality.

In hindsight, de Klerk has

said about the negotiations between himself and Mandela that, “we would both frequently have to rise

above our personal antipathy to resolve deadlocks and keep the negotiations on course” (De Klerk

1998:222).

Initially this “moral high ground” was used as a common platform, from where de Klerk and

Mandela could stand united proclaiming their visions of a new South Africa. Although over time, this

moral platform turned into a bitter moral struggle.

A statement by de Klerk in mid 1990, referring to the ANC’s unilateral suspension of the armed

struggle, is a good illustration of the moral struggle. De Klerk understood this move by Mandela as an

attempt to seize “the moral high ground”. The reason de Klerk could understand the move was because

the NP “had done much the same thing when, two months earlier, we had unilaterally decided to lift

the state of emergency” (De Klerk 1998:186). From de Klerk’s perspective both the ANC and the NP

activities were motivated by seizing the moral high ground. Another example is Mandela’s frequent

accusations that de Klerk did not do enough to stop the violence and de Klerk’s response. De Klerk

stressed the activities he had undertaken to curb the violence and furthermore he tried to draw

attention to Mandela’s real intentions behind his attacks. In the memoirs, de Klerk writes that he ones

told Mandela that, I had not attacked him publicly for his blatant disregard of his undertakings in terms of the D.F. Malan

Accord. Unlike him, I had refrained from scoring political points by publicly accusing him personally of

being a killer. […] I told him that his public attacks on me had become more outrageous by the day (De

Klerk 1998:216).

“Scoring political points” by accusations is obviously not something reputable. Evidently, in this case

de Klerk tries to bring light on, what he deemed to be, Mandela’s real (immoral) tactics. When de

Klerk recalls the television debate in 1994, his impression is that Mandela initially was quite

aggressive and that he “did not hesitate to launch personal attacks on me” while de Klerk himself

”preferred to stick to the issue”. Towards the end of the debate, de Klerk felt that he had scored most

points, but then, he was taken by surprise when Mandela was leaning across and grabbing him by the

hand. De Klerk interpreted Mandela’s initiative to grab him by the hand at the end of the debate as a 10 Previous research about the South African negotiations has even shown that certain crisis have led too real progress in the negotiations (Ebrahim 1998:28, Spitz 2000:79).

17

clear sign of Mandela’s strategic thinking and not as other observers explained it as a gesture of

reconciliation. De Klerk writes that “this single gesture of apparent goodwill probably counted for as

much as all my reasoned replies”. De Klerk refers to it as “apparent goodwill” in an attempt to unravel

the hidden agenda. De Klerk goes on, “it was a masterful stroke and I mentally tipped my hat to the

strategic planning ability of Mandela and his advisers” (De Klerk 1998:331). What appears to be a

conciliatory move from Mandela’s part is from de Klerk’s perspective interpreted as nothing else than

a smart trick.

In sum

Partly, they both understood the rules of the game and that they were competitors when it came to

winning the public. Hence, the game could be ugly, which was ok, as long as both of them played it

fair. Simultaneously they shared the understanding of them as “partners in peace”, they were

dependent on each other and there were no alternative than to uphold a continuous dialogue,

attempting to reach a shared standpoint.

A principled commitment that both leaders, irrespective of each other, brought with them into the

negotiations was to find a negotiated solution no matter what. The only route to do this was by a

dedication to continuous dialogue until the objective was completed. By this dedication they could

firmly meet the challenges that lay ahead.

Partners in peace, negotiated solution, and the understanding of the importance of morality in

politics were points of convergence between the leaders, which they themselves stressed throughout

the negotiation process.

Open-mindedness

Uncertainty and complexity are instinctive features of decision making processes. Deliberation

requires of participants not to fall back on simplistic and rigid standpoints but to confront complex

issues with an open frame of mind. Open-mindedness refers to deliberators’ ability to reach beyond a

black-and-white thinking and to consider nuances. Every situation/person/incident can be approached

and understood in a myriad of ways, and it requires of a deliberator to consider more than one frame.

Political leaders walk a tightrope between satisfying the expectations from the own constituency,

while at the same time trying to build a reliable working relationship with his opponent.

Something both leaders’ did was to pay close attention to if public speeches was intended as an

input to the negotiation process or if they were attempts to communicate with the own constituency.

There are many examples of this context sensitivity. De Klerk’s call for an all-white referendum in

March 1992 is one example of when Mandela was opposed to the action per se but reluctantly

accepted it because he understood that de Klerk’s needed to confirm his position as a leader (Ebrahim

1998; Meyer 1994.11.15). Apparently, Mandela understood the white-only poll not as a statement

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against the non-white population but as an attempt by de Klerk to get his constituency on the

negotiation track (Waldmeir 1997). In 1992 de Klerk made a similar concession when he accepted the

rolling mass action campaign even though he was totally against it. De Klerk could have condemned

Mandela for the actions, which he deemed to be counter-productive to negotiations, but he made very

clear that he accepted them as legitimate democratic means (Grange 1992). According to Richard

Spitz, many believed mass action to have the same unifying effect on the ANC leadership with its

constituency as the all-white referendum had legitimised the Government’s negotiation policy (Spitz

2000:28).

Mandela did express understanding for why de Klerk did not take strong action against the

violence. According to Waldmeir, in 1991 Mandela ”was still willing to grant that de Klerk’s inability

to stop the violence stemmed from his ‘problems with his own constituency” (Waldmeir 1997:187).

Moreover, in an interview in 1993, Mandela says that there are strong hawks in the Government and

de Klerk has problems getting full support for the reforms. From Mandela’s vantage point, de Klerk

was trapped between the demands by the ANC and the wish to keep his party (and constituency)

together (Carlin 1993).

Mandela’s strong personal conviction of the need of a speedy settlement of the conflict was verified

in his reaction to the murder of the ANC leader Chris Hani in April 1993. Hani was assassinated by a

right-wing extremist, assisted by a member of the Conservative Party, but instead of translating the

murder into racial terms – whites on blacks – Mandela went on air pleading, “to all South Africans to

stand together against those who, from any quarter, wish to destroy what Chris Hani gave his life for –

the freedom of all of us” (Star 1993). If Mandela had not urged blacks and whites alike to keep calm

and if he had been unable to separate the White population, including de Klerk, from the actions

undertaken by a single, white extremist, the attack could have disrupted the peace process. Researcher

Richard Spitz has concluded that even though the murder threatened to derail the whole peace process,

the ANC’s and NP’s instead used the incidence constructively to speed up the negotiation process

(Spitz 2000:37).

They were equally concerned about white fears of black domination. Throughout the negotiation

process, Mandela made frequent references to the situation of the White population. In his memoirs he

wrote that the Whites were “in need of liberation just as surely as the oppressed” (Mandela 1994:617).

In interviews, public speeches, and ANC conferences he touches upon the fears of the White

population, which he accept as real – even though he believes them to be groundless and irrational

(Johnson 1994; Johnson** 1991; MacLennan 1991; Mandela 1994.07.01; Sparks* 1992; van der

Merwe 1990). De Klerk (together with other NP members) has made similar utterances of the need to

address White fears and liberate the White population from the moral dilemma caused by the

Apartheid legislation (Africa Contemporary Record*** 1998; De Klerk 1994.11.23; Meyer*

1994.11.16). Instances were de Klerk has expressed understanding for the historic and present

19

situations of the Black people are rarer. Only indirectly by admitting the shortcomings of the

Apartheid policies he acknowledges the sufferings of the Black population.

By making statements talking on behalf of the whole nation, black or white, Mandela managed to

differentiate between the people and the problem. In 1992 Mandela stated that the people in the

townships no longer considered the Government their enemy but “you and me, people who drive a car

and have a house” (Steyn 1992)

In the South African negotiations the question on what caused the apartheid system and who was to

be blamed for it were basically non-issues (even though de Klerk spends a great part of his memoirs to

explain the ideology behind the apartheid system). Mandela does not refer to de Klerk, or the whites,

as the perpetrators or those responsible for past injustices. Mandela’s unwillingness to hold the white

people accountable for the suffering of the blacks sees no limits. At the core of it is Mandela’s

perception is that it is not the people but the system which should be blamed. Mandela did not feel

anger against whites as a group but was committed to judge each person individually (Sparks 1990).

Responding to Waldmeir’s question on why he had undertaken the reform process, de Klerk said,

“Well, I think as we went along, all of us realised that we’d have to take greater risks than we had

originally planned” (Waldmeir 1997:233).

A question vital to de Klerk was the inclusion of group rights into the final agreement. South

Africa’s new institution must recognize rights knitted to group belonging and not solely individual

rights. Group rights was vital in de Klerk’s vision for the future still, already in 1989 de Klerk

expressed that he was not inflexible but willing to negotiate the issue (MacLennan 1989).

It seems that there was no major plan guiding de Klerk’s actions. Rather, a step-by-step process in

which each step brought him to a completely new and unforeseen situation from which he had to

reconsider earlier standpoints. Certain statements by de Klerk indicate that he viewed

negotiations/interaction processes as part of a “learning curve” and as an “evolutionary process” (De

Klerk 1994.11.23; De Klerk 1994.06.23). This indicates that he did not see negotiations as a simple

cost-benefit calculation but a process in which participants change as an effect of the interaction.

Mandela has made a similar remark regarding the work in the Government of National Unity, “we

may start from different angels, […] but at the end of that debate, we speak with one voice. That is

what is happening in the Government of National Unity” (Mandela 1994.07.01).

In 1993 Mandela got the frequently asked question how he could accept the Nobel peace prize

together with de Klerk, against whom he had delivered such devastating critique, Mandela answered

that; “although I would not take back my criticism, I could say that he had made a genuine and

indispensable contribution to the peace process” (Mandela 1994).

A continuing discussion, that put a lot of strain on the leaders’ relationship, was the strength and

leverage vested in the Presidential position. When it came to the appalling levels of violence – which

more than once threatened to derail the whole peace process – from Mandela’s vantage point it was

impossible to understand; “how a head of state, who had all the apparatus of governance, could not do

20

something openly and meaningfully to stop the violence” (Ramaphosa 1995.01.19). Mandela knew

that “men at the highest level of the police and the security forces were aiding the third forces”

therefore the only reasonable conclusion was that de Klerk was insensitive to the sufferings of the

black population (Mandela 1994; Mandela* 1991). This might indicate that Mandela had a flawed

understanding of the position as State President. His exasperation over the blacks’ situation perhaps

distorted his normally realistic understanding of what expectations and demands are reasonable to

place on political leaders. The South African researcher Steven Friedman has said that the ANC’s

judgement of the strength of the Government was unrealistic and it was only towards the end of 1992

when they started to realise that they could not force the Government to a quick settlement (Friedman

1993:175). Perhaps did Mandela reach a similar insight when it came to de Klerk’s capacity to

function as State President. After all, Mandela was a political leader but he had never acted State

President. In 1994, during an interview with Waldmeir, De Klerk explained his understanding of

Mandela’s accusations, I felt at times that he was not sufficiently understanding of the complexity of the situation, that he did

not give significant recognition of the numerous steps I have taken to ensure that the security forces

should not be involved in any way whatsoever, that he was unreasonable in requiring action on the basis

of unsubstantiated evidence (Waldmeir 1997).

In sum

They displayed different kinds of open-mindedness. Primarily, Mandela displayed complexity in

thinking, while de Klerk proved ready to change opinion when confronted with persuading (shaming)

arguments.

Respect for others

Respect for the opponent during negotiations, as is at stake here, can be inferred by scrutinizing how

the leaders’ allude to the other side – as a terrorist, partner, or simply competitor. Do they accept the

legitimacy of the opponent? It can also be inferred by examining to what extent participants’ listen to

and show empathy with the opponent. Do they make a real attempt to understand the position of the

opponent? Do they think the opponent’s motives and objectives are sincere (i.e. they do think the other

has moral concerns and not simply guided by political, economical, or self-interest)? Do they respond

to questions? In addition to observable measures, respect has a subjective component only to be

properly assessed by the opponent.

When de Klerk gave his historic speech to Parliament in February 1990, Richard Maponya, a Black

businessman, who visited Mandela in prison, told the media,

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[Mandela] was very impressed by de Klerk; he thought he was honest because, even though he had

just recently been elected, he had already made positive and meaningful moves. He did say, though, that

de Klerk should press on and continue to make positive moves because if he stopped, like his

predecessors did, we would be back at square one (Africa Contemporary Record 1992)

At their first face-to-face encounter, both leaders irrespective of each other reached the conclusion that

it would be possible for them to do business with each other (De Klerk 1998:158; Mandela 1994:545).

Remembering their first face-to-face meeting, Mandela stated; “from the first, I noticed that Mr. De

Klerk listened to what I had to say. This was a novel experience […] Mr de Klerk seemed to be

making a real attempt to listen and understand” (Mandela 1994). After the meeting Mandela informed

his colleagues in Lusaka that de Klerk was “a man we could do business with” (Waldmeir 1997:148).

De Klerk has made similar remarks about their initial meetings. In relation to their second meeting, de

Klerk recalls how he and Mandela; “established a reasonable rapport with one another. We accepted

one another’s integrity – but in the full knowledge that we were opponents with divergent goals” (De

Klerk 1998:169).

In public de Klerk granted Mandela formal legitimacy already at the time of his 2nd February speech

in Parliament by saying that Mandela could make a constructive contribution to finding a peaceful

solution to the problems South Africa was facing (Dugard 1992:139). When Mandela gave his first

public address in 27 years, he praised de Klerk as “a man of integrity” (Fabricius 1990).

A few months after their initial encounters the two contenders met at Groote Schuur to hold talk

about talks. The Groote Schuur Minute included provisions of the lifting of the state of emergency and

a reconsideration of the ANC’s armed struggle. At the end of the talks, Mandela and de Klerk made a

joint public appearance in television, in which Mandela stressed the government’s integrity and that he

did not have “the slightest doubt that the State President means what he says” (Waldmeir 1997:162).

Even though both of them were well aware of the many disagreements between them, by making a

joint appearance they accepted each other as valid partners.

In an interview when asked about why continue negotiate with, what Mandela himself has referred

to as “a discredited and illegitimate” Government, he replied, “whether I like him or not, the reality of

our situation is that I have to work with him. And of course, when you negotiate you have to accept

the integrity of another man” (Carlin 1993). Respect for the opponent was crucial to Mandela, and he

managed to uphold the same spirit during the whole negotiation process, in his first public address

after the release; in response to de Klerk’s speech at the opening of parliament in 1991; in response to

de Klerk’s attack on the ANC at the first session of Codesa; in response to de Klerk’s management of

the Inkathagate scandal; and in the TV debate in 1994, Mandela accentuated de Klerk’s positive

contribution to the process (Ebrahim 1998:81; Fabricius 1990; Johnson** 1994; Mandela* 1991;

Seery 1991).

The rather well known verbal exchange that took place between Mandela and de Klerk at the first

day of the Codesa 1 can be seen as a critical test of the level of respect between the leaders. Codesa,

22

the first multiparty negotiation forum, met for the first time in December 1991. De Klerk had asked

the ANC to accept him to be the last speaker of the day. In his concluding speech he delivered severe

critique against the ANC (Ebrahim 1998) 93-106. He accused them of violating the Pretoria Minute

and the D.F. Malan Accord by maintaining a private army, thereby they had not abandoned the armed

struggle and he also questioned the ANC’s right to participate in the future constitution-making organ

(Ebrahim 1998).

The attack came as a complete surprise to Mandela who lost his temper and did not let the session

conclude until he had launched a ferocious counterattack on de Klerk. By saying that De Klerk was;

“the head of an illegitimate, discredited, minority regime” and therefore he was “not fit to be a head of

government”, tremendous harm was done to the personal rapport between them (Mandela* 1991).

Mandela withdrew his initial acceptance of de Klerk as a legitimate contender, which indicates a lack

of respect.

However, from de Klerk’s perspective, this counterattack was an unwarranted outburst by Mandela

directed at him as a person (De Klerk 1998:222). Afterwards, in an interview with Waldmeir, de Klerk

has explained/excused the attack by referring to a note sent to Mandela in advance but which

apparently never reached him, It was a damaging episode, and it was based on, at the least a grave misunderstanding […] because he

was not properly informed. Because I sent him a message […] that unless we agreed on certain aspects, I

would have to take a very strong stance, and it is clear to me that he was not expecting this. Apparently,

therefore, he did not get the message (De Klerk 1994.11.23).

De Klerk suggests that Mandela would have accepted the attack if he only had been warned in

advance. A possible interpretation is that de Klerk assumed a leadership understanding to be present

between them. Thus, de Klerk’s concluding speech was foremost an attempt to show his own people

that he was not being intimidated by the ANC and Mandela. If Mandela only had been forewarned, as

planned, he would have understood and respected de Klerk’s statement and hence not reacted as

strongly.

At the end of the negotiation process, both leaders expressed deep appreciation of the other’s

contribution to the negotiation process; de Klerk it in his concession speech and Mandela in his

inauguration speech as President (Johnson 1994; Mandela 1994).11

In de Klerk’s biography he describes the fundamental nature of his and Mandela’s relationship, We

were – and are – political opponents. Although we respected each other, three was little warmth in our

relationship. I could not forget his bitter and unfounded attacks on me, and he could not shake off his

deep suspicions concerning my role and intentions. (de Klerk, 1998)

11 The NP negotitors’ Roelf Meyer, Gerrit Viljoen and the ANC negotiator Cyril Ramaphosa have all expressed similar remarks of the integrity, reasonableness and respect of their negotiating partners, which indicate that this atmosphere of acceptance stretched beyond the relationship of Mandela and de Klerk (Meyer 1995.02.10; Ramaphosa 1995.01.19; Viljoen 1994.10.20).

23

According to de Klerk the leaders were convinced about the opponent’s sincerity regarding the

negotiations (De Klerk 1994.11.23; De Klerk 1993.05.25). De Klerk has also explicitly stated that he

believes Mandela to be committed to “peaceful solution” (Fabricius 1989; Fabricius 1990).

In sum

The leaders’ did accept each other as valid negotiation partners. Public statements are plentiful in

which the leaders’ reiterate the importance of the other. However, during the process their personal

relationship deteriorated. They lost confidence in the others personal intentions and motives. The

respect continued throughout the process but only on a political, official level.

WAS IT DELIBERATION? Treating deliberation as an individual level phenomenon, unrelated to institutional and social

variables, perhaps some would argue is not deliberation at all. From this perspective, the analysis

above misses the point. A procedural definition of deliberation, for instance, does not necessarily

include any provisions of participants’ conduct but rely on procedure to guarantee fairness and

equality.

A tricky question with the behavioral perspective is to determine how much of each behavior is

needed in order to qualify as deliberation. In the above analysis every action, in line with any of the

four behavioral categories, has been recorded. However, there is no established threshold for each

category, that is, the required frequency (in place) and continuity (over time) for it to qualify as

deliberation. Neither if some behaviors are more valuable than others. In regard to the latter, it is

possible that the lack of reason-giving might be a greater obstacle than if there is a lack of inner moral

reasoning. When it comes to the question of thresholds it is possible that, for example, reason-giving

necessitate both a high frequency in each encounter, while the continuation is not as decisive (there

might be a decrease of reason-giving towards the end of discussions).

Leaving these limitations aside, the analysis proves the existence and influence of all four

behaviors. The peace process could be thought of as an extended debate on the validity of different

arguments. Both sides were equally eager to respond to demands and statements made by the

contender and to rationally and morally defend their own positions. They were both deeply engaged in

the dialogue. Even though they had different roles – Mandela asked questions and de Klerk responded

– they were both committed to remain within the process which meant that there were no other way

than to uphold the dialogue. The continuous dialogue rested on the leaders’ moral understanding of the

nature of negotiations. Also the fact that they early on in the process had gained a profound mutual

understanding of their commonalities; they were partners in peace and hence united in a struggle for a

negotiated settlement with moral connotations.

24

Mandela excelled in reason-giving and seemed to be guided by moral considerations. There are also

reoccurring feature of respectfulness from Mandela’s side. Especially during or after crisis situations

he made public statements stressing his belief in de Klerk’s sincerity, legitimacy, and vital

contribution to the process. Yet, it is well-known that Mandela lost confidence in de Klerk during the

process, especially Mandela for de Klerk due to his “ignorance” concerning violence directed at

blacks. The fact that Mandela managed to uphold a public, official respect for de Klerk despite his

feelings of antipathy towards him, proves Mandela’s principled stance in politics. He was committed

to the long-term goals. Short-term interest and personal feelings were not to gain influence over the

negotiations.

De Klerk’s deliberative strengths seem a bit different from Mandela’s. Open-mindedness was a

critical feature of his but not primarily in terms of cognitive complexity. De Klerk proved willing to

change opinion during the process. The sheer fact that de Klerk withstood all ruthless accusations from

Mandela indicates his moral stance towards the negotiations. He did not let these personal attacks

divert him from the longer goal of reaching a negotiated solution. He accepted them and also

responded to them which proved his readiness to provide reasons for his behavior. A possible

conclusion is that these accusations actually impacted on de Klerk, he became entangled in

argumentative self-entrapments, and as a result he changed his mind in certain vital issues.

The interactions to a large extent circled around questions of identity and morality. Even if Mandela

showed a great amount of empathetic understanding for de Klerk and the White population at large,

the principal strategies at both sides were shaming. The reason for this seems to have been that both of

them aspired for a ‘moral’ identity, which gave rise to controversies about who was the most righteous

leader. De Klerk’s attempts to shame Mandela are rather harmless in light of how Mandela used the

shared moral understanding to put pressure on de Klerk. Basically all Mandela’s accusations directed

at de Klerk either of being the instigator of violence or of not doing enough to end it can be viewed as

strategies of shaming. Mandela understood the vital importance morality and righteousness played to

de Klerk’s self-image and he cleverly used it to influence de Klerk’s actions. Mandela’s very

categorical stance on de Klerk’s responsibility for the violence could be interpreted as a lack of

openness. However due to the many evidences on Mandela’s ability to have a balanced thinking a

more appropriate interpretation is that it was Mandela’s true conviction. It was not a smart rhetorical

trick to blame de Klerk but a sincere attempt to get the topic on the agenda.

De Klerk’s talk about “search for justice” made him vulnerable to moral criticism. A plausible

explanation for why he kept returning to the question of justice could be that it was so closely knitted

to de Klerk’s self-image. De Klerk considered himself to be a moral person,12

12 This self-image is congruent with Roelf Meyer’s understanding of de Klerk as a person “who stood up for his convictions in the direction of justice, blind justice, and I think his inner belief in that also told him that we have to put things right on the basis of justice” (Meyer).

guided by a search for

justice, which made it vitally important for him to come up with moral explanations in defence of the

25

apartheid system. Apartheid was not an evil conspiracy but an attempt by the white leadership to

establish a fair system. Perhaps he could not stand the thought that some might condemn him because

of the apartheid system, which he had been born into and profited from for the major part of his life.

From Mandela’s position, as a black leader outside the system, it was far easier to make persuading

moral judgements, thus he had the opportunity to exert a considerable influence over de Klerk’s

actions. At least partly it is possible to explain de Klerk’s acceptance of majority rule, individually

based rights, and interim government as an effect of argumentative self-entrapments due to his

commitment to justice and equal treatment.

In many ways de Klerk initiated a moral struggle, while Mandela exploited it. In the moral struggle,

de Klerk was bound to lose much moral leverage and once initiated he could not escape its

consequences. If he had not continued the struggle he would have been bereaved of his whole identity.

De Klerk made personal sacrifices for the accomplishment of a “deliberatively” negotiated peace.

To secure a negotiated settlement in an atmosphere of trust and respect across racial lines he raised

above personal feelings and antipathy towards Mandela. He felt indignant and bitter years afterwards

and eager to unravel the myth of Mandel (Waldmeir 1997:196). De Klerk’s eagerness to disclose

Mandela’s true motives follows logically on their internal fight about the moral supremacy.13

CONCLUSIONS

I

interpret it as de Klerk, by conviction, followed through with the peace process in a mode of respect

and openness but this principled way of behaving had considerable personal costs. Perhaps is this

indicative of a potential problem with deliberative proceedings. Over time, people might rethink their

experiences of the deliberative encounter and reinterpret it as they were forced into agreement.

The underlying assumption has been that even an entirely procedural understanding of deliberation

implicitly relies on a firm “behavioral repertoire”. What is more this repertoire encompasses a wide

range of behavior, all necessary to display, in a delicate mixture, in order to qualify as a true

“deliberator”. The analysis of Mandela and de Klerk indicate that their excellence in negotiations

might stem from their deliberative style of conduct and thereby be an example of “true deliberators” in

a non-deliberative setting. It indicates the relevance to go further in the suggested direction and give

more attention to personality variables at work in deliberation.

13 However it is interesting to note Mandela’s explanation of his behaviour in the TV-studio. Mandela writes in his memoirs, “as the debate was nearing an end, I felt I had been to harsh with the man who would be my partner in a government of national unity” (Mandela 1994). According to Mandela he put himself in de Klerk’s shoes and realised that if someone had spoken to him in the same way, he would have difficulties maintaining a working relationship with that person. Therefore, he was more or less forced to make a conciliatory move.

26

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