Explaining Public Opinion about Conscription: Costs ... · military service. The results suggest...

Explaining Public Opinion about Conscription: Costs, Benefits, and Military Service

Abstract

The military draft imposes a readily understandable cost on a clearly identifiable segment of the public. Support and opposition to the draft thus offers an alternative way to test arguments about the costs of war. The public's response to these costs matters not only for explaining support for the draft but also because the same processes inform many accounts of public support for war. This paper tests several hypotheses about the impact of the costs and benefits of conscription on public opinion in the United States since World War II. It also considers the impact of prior military service. The results suggest that the costs of the draft indeed influence individual opinion about it, as does the perceived value of using military force. At the same time, though, military veterans and, to a lesser extent, their families are also quite supportive of the draft. The decline of veterans as a proportion of the U.S. population helps account for a steady decline in support for the draft since the early 1980s. Overall, the results support claims that the costs of war can influence public opinion, but suggest some important qualifications. War tends to obscure the influence of costs to individuals. Also, some war costs, such as the time draftees spend in military service, may have unexpected effects that do not accord with straightforward claims about the impact of war's costs and benefits.

Paper prepared for presentation to Workshop on Costs and Consequences of War, Cornell University, April 12, 2013

Benjamin O. Fordham Department of Political Science Binghamton University (SUNY)

[email protected]

1

Concerns about the cost of war play a central role in many accounts of public support and

opposition to it. A substantial body of research concludes that military casualties have eroded

American public support for war (e.g., Gartner 2008a; Mueller 1973). Nevertheless, controversy

persists on whether concern about war costs really influences public opinion in this way. Elite

leadership (e.g., Berinsky 2007, 2009), the nature of the conflict (e.g., Liberman 2006), and

expectations about its outcome (e.g., Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler 2005) are among the alternatives

to the casualties hypothesis.

Given the possible importance of military casualties and other costs in shaping public

opinion about war, the way in which the armed forces are recruited is potentially very important.

Institutional choices about whether to rely on volunteers, or to draft some segment of the

population, can determine just who suffers the human costs of war. Recent research has found

that the prospect of a draft reduces support for war, especially among those who might actually

be drafted (Bergan 2009; Horowitz and Levendusky 2011). Expectations about this response to

the costs and risks of being drafted can influence military decisionmaking. Conscription is

associated with more frequent dispute involvement (Choi and James 2003), and may affect the

military decisions by influencing leaders' willingness to endure casualties (Horowitz, Simpson,

and Stam 2011; Vasquez 2005). Indeed, the effects of mass mobilization through conscription

may extend well beyond the realm of foreign and defense policy (e.g., Scheve and Stasavage

2010). Because whether or not there is a draft is an institutional choice, it offers national leaders

a possible way to influence public attitudes toward military operations. They may not be able to

control casualties in war but they can determine who might suffer them.

In spite of its potential importance, there has been relatively little research on one critical

question: do public attitudes toward the draft really reflect concern about its costs? Answering

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this question provides another window onto the broader issue of whether the costs of war shape

public opinion about it. The draft is related to these human costs in a direct and easily

comprehensible way. If the costs of war shape attitudes toward it, these same concerns should

shape attitudes toward the draft.

This paper will examine the sources of public support for the draft in the United States

since World War II, focusing primarily on the impact of the likely costs of the draft on individual

opinion. Recent American history is a useful arena in which to test these arguments. Polling data

are relatively abundant, and both the nature of military recruitment and expectations about the

likely cost of military service have varied substantially. The remainder of this paper has four

parts. The first considers the costs of the draft at the individual level and proposes several

hypotheses about support and opposition to the draft based on these considerations. The second

reviews trends in public opinion about the draft since 1940 and proposes an alternative

explanation for individual attitudes based on socialization rather than costs and benefits. The

third tests hypotheses drawn from these arguments at several points in time. A fourth section

assesses where this evidence leave debates about the role of war costs in shaping public opinion.

Public Opinion and the Draft

The costs and benefits of the draft to the individual and the country as a whole suggest some

obvious reasons for support and opposition to it. These reasons matter because they involve the

same processes widely thought to influence public support for war. A return to the draft may be

unlikely, but patterns in public support and opposition to it are theoretically important because

they offer another way to test the importance of costs and benefits in shaping public opinion

about national security policy matters.

3

Research on public support for military action frequently points to its costs and benefits

as a source of explanation. Some have argued that certain kinds of conflicts provide clearer

benefits than others to the nation as a whole. The public may perceive less benefit from

humanitarian intervention, efforts to remake foreign governments, and other operations that do

not have a clear national security rationale, and thus be less willing to support them (e.g.,

Herrmann, Tetlock, and Visser 1999; Jentleson and Britton 1998; Jentleson 1992). The claim

advanced by Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler (2005) about the importance of public expectations of

victory in shaping support for war rests on a related claim about the benefits of war. Without

victory, even security benefits that would justify military action may not be achieved, and thus

the conflict may not be worthwhile in terms of expected utility.

The benefits of war have to be weighed against its costs. War can be devastatingly

expensive in financial terms, but most research has focused on its human costs. Perhaps the most

important argument about public support for war concerns the corrosive effect of casualties. As

the human cost of war rises, many researchers have argued that more people may conclude that

involvement in the war was a mistake (Mueller 1973). Casualties to which individuals feel a

greater affinity, perhaps because of race or region, appear to weigh more heavily in their

assessments of the costs of war (e.g., Gartner and Segura 2000; Gartner 2008b).

Because the military draft has costs and benefits that are closely related to those of

military conflict, similar mechanisms might well explain public opinion about it. Just as

individual concerns about casualties should affect their support for war, so concern about the

cost of the draft should affect support for conscription. The costs of the draft fall more heavily on

some individuals than others, a fact that offers a way to test whether these costs really matter.

While the state cannot entirely control what individuals become casualties in wartime, it can

4

control who is drafted. In the United States, the conditions of eligibility for the draft have always

been common knowledge, widely publicized by the state to encourage compliance with the law.

For obvious reasons, those who are likely to be drafted--typically young men--should be more

sensitive to the costs of the draft and more likely to oppose it than those who know they will not

have to serve. This relationship should be especially strong in wartime both because more people

are usually drafted under these conditions, and because the risk of death or injury is greater.

Sensitivity to the costs of the draft extends beyond those who might actually be drafted. People

whose children might be drafted should also be more sensitive to its costs.

H1. Individuals who are eligible for the draft should be more likely to oppose conscription. H2. Individuals with children who might be drafted should be more likely to oppose conscription.

The opportunity of cost of being drafted is higher for people with more education and a

higher income. The income well-educated draftees lose while serving in the military is greater

than that lost by their less-educated compatriots. Indeed, draftees from especially deprived

backgrounds might actually have more educational opportunities for having been drafted than

they otherwise would have, and thus face no opportunity cost at all. Similarly, individuals with

high incomes will experience a greater loss while serving in the military than those with lower

incomes. To the extent that opportunity cost of serving in the military influences their assessment

of the draft, support for conscription should decline with education and income. Of course, most

draftees have historically not been old enough to have completed college and are not likely to

have a high income of their own yet. The effects of education and income are likely to work

5

through people's greater sensitivity to the cost of the draft for people like themselves. People

may generalize from their own concerns and experiences when reflecting on the implications of

the draft for the whole country. Alternatively, they may worry about its effect on their children or

future children, who can be expected to have educational opportunities similar to their own.

H3. Support for the draft should decline with education. H4. Support for the draft should decline with income.

Like support for war, support for the draft is about the perceived benefits as well as costs.

Just as people should be more likely to support wars where they perceive a substantial national

security stake, so they might also be willing to support a military draft when they think the use of

force will serve a goal they value. In wartime, this goal is most likely to be the prosecution of the

ongoing war. In peacetime, individuals who perceive a substantial international threat, or who

think the use of military force will advance foreign policy goals they support, should be more

likely to support the draft. These relationships are probabilistic, not necessary: some who

perceive a security threat or prefer an activist foreign policy might nevertheless prefer means

other than the draft. Nevertheless, those who perceive no military threat or oppose an activist

foreign policy have little reason to support the draft.

H5. Beliefs about the value of using military force should be positively associated with support for the draft.

6

Trends in Support for the Draft and an Alternative to Cost-Benefit Explanations

Any account of public opinion about conscription in the United States must confront the fact that

support for the draft has declined substantially over the period for which survey data exist.

Figure 1 summarizes the available evidence about support for the draft since World War II. As

the graph suggests, interest in the issue among survey researchers has waxed and waned over

time, leaving some long periods in which questions about the issue were rare. The fact that

researchers have not asked identical questions about the draft over this entire period further

complicates assessment of changing support for the draft over time. Moreover, there is some

variation in question wording within each category depicted in Figure 1. The Appendix contains

a complete list of the survey questions. With these caveats in mind, the evidence summarized in

the figure points to several generalizations about aggregate support for the draft. These patterns

are worth considering here because they raise questions about explanations stressing the costs

and benefits of the draft. They suggest an alternative explanation that I will discuss here and test

in the next section.

[Figure 1 about here]

As the "support for the draft" questions summarized in Figure 1 suggest, there was broad

public approval of the draft from World War II through the 1960s. Support persisted in both war

and peace. As the list in the Appendix indicates, the survey questions in this set vary widely in

their precise wording, including the type of draft about which respondents were asked.

Nevertheless, support for the draft nearly always fell between 60 and 75 percent. This is true

both for questions about support for particular draft rules and questions about whether the draft

7

should be abolished, shown as a separate category in Figure 1. The costs, inequities, and

inconveniences commonly cited to explain the low level of support for the draft today all applied

during this period, yet they did little to dampen strong public support for conscription.

Support for the draft persisted will into the Vietnam War. Protests against the draft from

this period are widely remembered, yet public opinion does not appear to have differed much

from what it had been during the Korean War and World War II. Researchers asked similar

questions about the postwar abolition of the draft in 1944, 1951, and 1969. These questions

elicited majority support for its continuation. Indeed, the 62 percent support found in the 1969

survey was slightly higher than the 61 percent found in 1944 and 58 percent in 1951. These

numbers make it difficult to explain the subsequent decline in support for the draft in terms of

reaction to the Vietnam War in the general public.

Support for the draft appears to have dropped sharply after its abolition, but it recovered

relatively quickly in the 1970s, reaching high levels again during in the early 1980s. This

recovery can best be seen in responses to an identical question about whether ending the draft

had been a mistake, asked four times between 1974 and 1980. Support for the draft in response

to this question moved steadily upward over this period, as Figure 1 indicates.

After the brief resurgence in support for the draft through the middle of 1981, support

dropped sharply and appears to have remained low ever since. The drop in support in 1981 was

surprisingly sudden. Support for restoring the draft hovered around 60 percent in most surveys

through September of that year. After that date, it never again exceeded 50 percent in the

available data, and often elicited less than 30 percent support.

The changes in aggregate support for the draft raise some important questions about

explanations stressing its costs and benefits. Why was support for the draft relatively high during

8

the early Cold War era, a period when military service was relatively costly to those engaged in

it, especially during the wars in Korea and Vietnam? Why did support for the draft drop so

sharply in the early 1980s, when military service was arguably less dangerous than it had been in

the 1950s and 1960s? After all, the end of the Cold War had not yet eliminated the Soviet threat.

Why is returning to the draft so unpopular now when support was so strong during wars in which

casualties were far greater? These questions do not necessarily suggest that the costs and benefits

of conscription do not influence public support for it. Among other things, conditions that lead

the public to place a higher value on the benefits of a draft must considered alongside its costs.

However, these patterns do suggest that other processes may also be at work.

One possible influence on public attitudes toward the draft that might help explain the

decline in public support over time is the effect of military service itself. Military service could

potentially have important and lasting effects on the attitudes those inducted into it, something

that both advocates and opponents of national service commonly note. Even skeptical accounts

of the impact of military service (e.g., Schreiber 1979) find that it has lasting and positive effects

on individual attitudes toward the military. If veterans retrospectively view their military service

in a positive light, they should be more likely to support the draft for later groups of young

people. This is arguably less true of those who served in the all-volunteer force because they

might view volunteers like themselves as preferable to draftees. If they indeed support the draft

more than those who did not serve, military veterans might pass these attitudes along to their

family and others with whom they interact on a regular basis.

H6: Veterans, especially those who served under the draft, should be more likely to support conscription. H7: The families of veterans should be more likely to support conscription.

9

This line of argument is potentially useful because it suggests an explanation for the

decline in support for the draft. The proportion of veterans in the population has been steadily

declining since the end of the Vietnam War. The all-volunteer force has consisted of a smaller

number of personnel serving for longer periods of time than did their drafted predecessors. After

the Cold War ended, the personnel size of the armed forces was further reduced, and did not

increase during the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. To the extent that veterans are indeed more

supportive of conscription than are non-veterans, and they pass these views along to others, their

decline as a proportion of the population might help explain why returning to the draft is now so

much less popular than it was in the early 1980s. [GET DATA ON THE PROPORTION OF

VETERANS IN THE POPULATION, 1945-PRESENT.]

Empirical Analysis

The fact that both draft laws and the likely consequences of conscription have varied greatly over

the period encompassed in Figure 1 makes it possible to test the hypotheses enumerated above

under several different conditions. I have selected nine polls available from the Roper Center's

Public Opinion Archive. These are only of fraction of those depicted in Figure 1, and were

selected because they contained questions that permitted the testing of many of the hypotheses

proposed earlier while covering a range of different historical periods. A more exhaustive

analysis would include all the polls listed in the Appendix, but this sample should provide a

reasonable starting point. The data rarely permit a test of all seven of the hypotheses set out

earlier in a single survey. However, in some cases, they included additional questions tapping

respondents' views about the costs and benefits of conscription in other ways.

10

For the sake of simplicity, I will treat "don't know" responses as missing in the analysis,

and use a binary dependent variable in which the higher value indicates support for

conscription.1 In order to permit a valid test of the hypotheses about eligibility for the draft and

veteran status, each of the models tested here will include variables indicating the age and sex of

the respondent. Both veterans and those eligible for the draft were predominantly male during

the period considered here. Because previous research has found that men tend to support

military action more than women (e.g., Conover and Sapiro 1993), it is necessary to control for

gender in order to estimate the effect of being a draft-eligible or a veteran. Similarly, those

eligible for the draft were younger than most respondents, and veterans were typically older.

Including age in the model should avoid confounding the possible effects of age with those I

wish to estimate.

Wartime Support for a Postwar Draft: 1945, 1952, and 1969. Surveys rarely asked

about support for the draft for an ongoing war. In fact, none of the wartime surveys listed in the

appendix contained any such questions. However, they did ask the public whether or not they

favored a peacetime draft once the war ended. Even during the Vietnam era, support for

continuing conscription in peacetime was fairly high. Indeed, 69 percent of the respondents

expressed support for a peacetime draft in both 1969 and 1945. Support in 1952 was a somewhat

lower 60 percent.

1 Although treating the "don't know" responses as missing simplifies the analysis, the reasons that respondents would decline to give an opinion about the draft, especially during wartime, are well worth considering. Multinomial logit models that include the "don't know" response category found no evidence that the theoretically important variables in this analysis served mainly to make these responses more or less likely.

11

Table 1 presents the results of a model of support for a postwar draft in a Gallup survey

administered January 19-24, 1945.2 Respondents were asked one of two somewhat different

questions about a peacetime draft after the war:

Form K. After this war is over, do you think every able-bodied young man should be required to serve one year in the army or navy? Form T. After this war is over, do you think every able-bodied young man should be required to take military or naval training for one year?

These questions anticipated the postwar debate on whether the United States should have a

system of Universal Military Training (UMT) for all young men. Congress ultimately rejected

this proposal in favor of "Selective Service," in which the military drafted only those needed to

fill the ranks at any given time (Friedberg 2000, 154–78; Hogan 1998, 119–58). In spite of the

important differences between these conscription schemes, they elicited essentially the same

level of support among respondents, with 66 percent and 69 percent, respectively. Given the low

level of knowledge most survey respondents have, it is likely that the broad principle that young

men could be required to serve in the military boded larger in their minds than the details of the

actual policy.

The regression results in Table 1 find no support for the hypotheses that could be tested

in either formulation of the draft question. Draft eligibility, education, and social class were all

statistically insignificant.3 The survey also gave respondents the opportunity to say that their

sacrifices for the ongoing war had included military service by a member of their immediate

family. Even this cost had no effect on their evaluation of the postwar draft. Unfortunately, the

2 The analysis of this survey employed the weights provided by Adam Berinsky and Eric Schickler to compensate for the shortcomings of the sampling technique it employed (Berinsky and Schickler 2011; Berinsky 2006; Berinsky et al. 2011). 3 The survey did not ask respondents about their family income, but interviewers rated their social class in six categories that were discreetly abbreviated on the instrument: wealthy (W), above average (AV+), average (A), poor (P), "OAA," and "OR". The last two appear to refer to types of public assistance.

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survey did not include a question about support for the war. It is possible that the high level of

mobilization prevailing at the time obscured considerations that might otherwise have influenced

assessments of the draft by pulling some respondents away from their positions they might have

taken on the issue in calmer times. The sample also excluded the considerable number of men of

were actually serving in the military at the time. I will return to the issue of wartime conditions

and their effect on survey responses at the end of this section.

[Table 1 about here]

While none of the hypothesized relationships was apparent in the 1945 survey, similar

polls taken during the wars in Korea and Vietnam provide somewhat more support. Table 2

reports models of two survey questions asked in 1952 and 1969:

Gallup, February 28-March 5, 1952: Would you favor or oppose requiring every able-bodied young man in this country, when he reaches age 18, to serve 6 months in military training and then join the reserves? Gallup, January 1-6, 1969: Turning to a new topic...After the Vietnam War is over, do you think the U.S. should do away with the draft and depend upon a professional military force made up of volunteers, or do you think the draft should be continued?

Some caution in comparing these results is in order because these questions are quite different,

with the 1952 item focusing on UMT, and the 1969 item on a postwar draft. Nevertheless, the

results of the World War II survey suggest that the details of the conscription program under

consideration do not influence responses very much. Theoretically, the patterns that the cost and

benefit argument suggests should be apparent in both cases.


13

In the case of the Korean War, the 1952 survey once again found no support for the

hypotheses concerning the cost of the draft to the survey respondents. Draft eligibility, education,

and income were all statistically insignificant, just as they were in the 1945 survey. By contrast,

there is strong support for the hypothesized effect of military service. Veterans of both world

wars were more likely to support continued conscription in peacetime. Compared to an otherwise

identical 27-year old man who had not served, being a World War II veteran increased the

probability of support for conscription from 0.66 to 0.74. Compared to an otherwise identical 55-

year old man, being a World War I veteran increased this probability from 0.58 to 0.73. In

accounting for high aggregate support for the war, the presence of these veterans of mass

mobilization made a difference. Overall, 16 percent of the sample reported serving in World War

II, and six percent in World War I.

The 1969 survey provides only slightly more support for the hypotheses about the costs

of the draft to individuals. The first model of this survey, shown in the third column of Table 2,

indicates that those eligible for the draft were slightly more likely to oppose it. A 20-year old

man eligible for the draft had a 0.79 probability of expressing support for the draft. This

increased to 0.82 for a 26-year old man who was no longer eligible. Similarly, respondents with

children were slightly less supportive of a continuing draft than those without them. Having

children decreased the probability that an otherwise identical, typical respondent would support

conscription after the war from 0.76 to 0.73.4 While draft eligibility and having children were

statistically significant, their effects were substantively unimportant. Education also had the

predicted effect, but only at its highest value. Being a college graduate rather than not having

4 Here and elsewhere in the paper, a "typical" respondent is one of mean age for the sample, and modal value on other variables. In most cases, this means the respondent is female, has a high school education, and is in the middle category on the wealth or social class variable.

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completed high school--the modal education category in this survey--decreased the probability of

support for continued conscription from 0.76 to 0.58. This substantial effect could be due to the

increased opportunity cost of the draft to college graduates, but the fact that the differences

associated with education appear only between college graduates and those with less than a high

school education suggest that other processes may be at work. For instance, highly educated

respondents might have been more responsive to the antiwar movement, something that was far

less visible during the Korean War.

While the cost hypotheses found little support in these wartime surveys, the hypothesis

that the perceived value of the war's objectives would increase support for the draft fares better.

The second model of each survey in Table 2 includes a variable indicating support for the

ongoing war or, in the case of Vietnam, others like it in the future. The 1952 survey asked

respondents "do you think the United States made a mistake in going into the war in Korea, or

not?" The 1969 survey asked "if a situation like Vietnam were to develop in another part of the

world, so you think the U.S. should or should not send troops?" The results offer some support

for the hypothesis that belief in the benefits of military action produces greater support for the

draft. In the 1952 survey, roughly 37 percent thought intervention in Korea was not a mistake. A

typical respondent who took this position had a 0.78 probability of supporting the draft,

compared to a 0.61 probability among otherwise identical respondent who disagreed. The 25

percent of respondents who said the U.S. should send troops to future situations like the one that

prompted intervention in Vietnam were also significantly more likely to support a peacetime

draft. Agreement with this statement increased the probability of supporting the draft from 0.72

to 0.84 among otherwise identical, typical respondents.

15

These relationships are quite strong, but interpreting the results of regressions that use

one attitude to predict another in this way require some caution (Fordham and Kleinberg 2012,

316–20). The direction of causation among these opinions cannot be known from the regression

result. Respondents might support the war, or further intervention, partly out of a commitment to

the draft rather than the other way around. More likely, both attitudes might arise from part of a

broader set of opinions caused by other, exogenous factors. Demographic variables are almost

always causally prior to attitudes. Any reduction in the effect of the demographic variables when

other attitudes are added to the model must be caused by the effect of demographic

characteristics on attitudes. For example in this case, opinions about the Korean or Vietnam

Wars cannot explain a respondent's age, gender, education, or income, though the reverse might

well be the case. This is why the table reports results both with and without independent

variables indicating these other attitudes. The remainder of this analysis will follow the same

practice.

Support for Restoring the Peacetime Draft in the 1980s. As Figure 1 indicates, public

opinion about the draft went through substantial changes during the last decade of the Cold War.

From a high of around 60 percent in 1980 and 1981, support for restoring the draft fell to as low

as 23 percent by the middle of the decade. The reasons for this collapse in support matter

because they suggest what might have to happen in order for the public to support a return to

conscription. In order to address this issue and to test the performance of the cost-benefit model

during a period of peace without a draft, I will examine four polls: two taken in 1980 and 1981

when support for returning to the draft was strong, and two taken later in the decade, in 1985 and

1987, when support was much weaker.

16

Table 3 presents an analysis of the two survey items from the early 1980s. The questions

were as follows:

Roper, February 9-23, 1980: In late 1978 for the first time since the draft ended, all four armed services failed to meet their recruiting targets. Furthermore, the Pentagon reports there is a critical shortage of people in the Army Reserves. Some people say the only way to meet the needs of the nation's armed forces is to restore the peacetime draft. Others say the problem can be solved by offering more incentives for people to volunteer for military service. How do you feel--are you in favor of or opposed to restoring the draft? NBC News/Associated Press, January 21-23, 1981: Do you favor or oppose the reinstatement of the draft for the armed forces?

Although the NBC/AP question was far less leading than the one that the Roper Organization

had posed a year earlier, the NBC/AP question actually elicited somewhat stronger support for

the draft. Of respondents to the 1981 question, 65 percent supported a return to the draft,

compared to 60 percent in response to the 1980 question.

[Table 3 about here.]

In contrast to the wartime surveys just considered, analyses of both polls from the early

1980s finds strong support for some of the hypotheses about the individual cost of the draft.

Draft eligibility appears to have been especially important. The first model in Table 3 finds that a

22-24-year old man, who was eligible for the draft, had a predicted probability of 0.55 of

supporting conscription. By contrast, an otherwise identical 25-29-year old had a 0.74

probability of taking this position. The 1981 NBC/AP poll modeled in the third column suggests

a nearly identical relationship, with a draft-eligible man having a 0.55 probability of supporting

the draft, while a slightly older man not eligible for the draft had a 0.76 probability of taking this

position. The fact that these effects are so strong, and show up in more than one poll with a very

17

different question, suggests that draft eligibility was genuinely important for shaping attitudes in

the early 1980s. The Carter administration's decision to resume draft registration does not appear

to be responsible for this large effect. Though registration must have made young men aware that

they were eligible for conscription, the 1980 Roper poll was taken several months before this

new policy was announced and still found that eligibility has a substantial effect. It may be more

significant that memories of the draft during the Vietnam War were still relatively fresh in 1980.

The opportunity cost hypothesis about education also finds some support in both polls,

though its effects were far smaller than those associated with draft eligibility. Compared to a

typical high school graduate, college graduates were 0.05 less likely to support the draft in the

1980 poll, and 0.11 less likely to do so in the 1981 poll. These marginal effects were roughly one

third to one half of those associated with draft eligibility. Most college graduates were ineligible

for the draft. As I noted earlier, this effect is likely to work through the respondent's

generalization of the opportunity cost of the draft to other people, such as his or her children.

Costs that fall directly on the respondent appear to have had larger effects. Neither of the polls

from the early 1980s finds evidence that respondents with children were more likely to oppose

the draft.

The 1980 poll included questions that tap the effect of beliefs about the value of potential

military action. The first asked respondents to characterize "Russia's primary objective in world

affairs." I coded a variable indicating those who agreed with the most extreme statement

respondents were offered: "Russia seeks global domination and will risk a major war to achieve

that domination if it can't be achieved by other mean." In 1980, this was the modal response.

18

None of the other responses suggested that military conflict might be likely.5 The second

question presented respondents with a seven scenarios in which U.S. troops might be used, and

asked them if they approved of doing so in each case. I counted the number of the scenarios in

which respondents approved of the use of force, taking it as an indicator of the potential value of

using military force.6

The caveats noted earlier about explaining one attitude with another apply in this case, so

this evidence must be treated with caution. Nevertheless two implications follow from the results

in the second column of Table 3. First, the perception of a fairly serious Soviet threat was not

associated with support for the draft. This result holds even if the foreign policy activism

variable is excluded from the model. Respondents might have believed that a large nuclear

arsenal was sufficient to deter the Soviets from launching a major war. Second, respondents who

envisioned many scenarios in which troops might be used tended to favor the draft. This

relationship was quite strong. Typical respondents who did not approve of any of the seven

scenarios had a 0.64 probability of supporting the draft. This probability rose to 0.78 among

those who approved of three scenarios, and 0.89 among those who approved of all seven. Beliefs

about the usefulness of military force and support for the draft went together in 1980, though a

dire view of the Soviet threat did not.

Table 4 presents the analyses of two surveys take later in the 1980s, when support for

restoring the draft had declined. The questions are as follows:

ABC News/Washington Post, March 21-15, 1985: Do you think we should return to the military draft at this time, or not?

5 From mildest to most sever, the other responses were: (1) Russia seeks only to protect itself against the possibility of attack by other countries; (2) Russia seeks to compete with the U.S. for more influence in other parts of the world; and (3) Russia seeks global domination, but not at the expense of starting a major war. 6 The seven scenarios were worded as follows: (1) if the Soviet Union invaded West Berlin; (2) if Arab forces invaded Israel; (3) if Soviet troops invaded Western Europe; (4) if Soviet troops invaded Yugoslavia; (5) if the Arabs cut off oils shipments to the US. And we could obtain oil only by taking over Arab oil fields; (6) if Soviet troops invaded Iran; (7) if Soviet troops invaded Pakistan.

19

Times-Mirror/Gallup, April 25-May 10, 1987: The following is a list of some programs and proposals that are being discussed in this country today. For each one, please tell me whether you strongly favor, favor, oppose, or strongly oppose...Resuming the military draft.

Support for restoring the draft was weaker than it had usually been in the early 1980s. The 1985

poll found 24 percent support; the 1987 poll 43 percent.


As with the surveys taken in the early 1980s, patterns in both these polls support the cost

hypotheses about draft eligibility and education. Compared to a 26-year old no longer eligible for

the draft, an otherwise identical 20-year old male was roughly half as likely to support

restoration of the draft in the 1985 poll (0.12, compared to 0.23). Analysis of the 1987 poll finds

a very similar marginal effect. The draft-eligible respondent was 0.08 less likely to support

resumption of the draft (0.39, compared to 0.47). Education produced a small but significant

effect in the 1985 survey, with college graduates being 0.02 less likely to support the draft than

those who had completed only high school. This effect was somewhat larger in the 1987 study

(0.08).

The 1985 poll is especially informative. Prompted by the tenth anniversary of the fall of

Saigon, researchers asked a variety of questions about military service and respondents'

experiences during the Vietnam War. These permit another test of the hypothesis that military

service generated lasting support for the draft, as well as a chance to compare its effects with

those of other experiences related to the war. The results reported in the first column of Table 4

suggest that a 35-year-old veteran, who would have been 19 in 1969, had a 0.37 probability of

20

supporting the draft. An otherwise identical non-veteran had a 0.24 probability of taking this

position. Individuals who served only in the all-volunteer force do not appear to have differed

from other veterans, but the sample included only a small number of these people.7 The results

suggest that veterans' opinions were sometimes transmitted to their immediate families. Non-

veterans living in a household with a veteran were 0.03 more likely to support restoration of the

draft than an identical respondent not living with a veteran.

The 1987 survey did not include a question about military service, but it did ask

respondents to select two historical events from a list of 13 that "most affected your political

views." The results in the third column of Table 4 include a variable indicating whether

respondents selected World War II, the Korean War, or the Vietnam War. Those who did--a

group likely to include many veterans--were somewhat more likely to support the draft. The

marginal effect of such a formative experience on a typical respondent, an increase of 0.04 in the

probability of support for the draft, was small but statistically significant.

The second column of Table 4 adds four additional variables to the analysis of the 1985

survey. Three of these test whether other experiences during the Vietnam War influenced

opinion about the draft. These include having actually served in Vietnam, having attended an

antiwar protest, and knowing someone who evaded the draft during that time. Perhaps

surprisingly, none of these experiences had any effect on attitudes toward the draft in 1985.

(These variables were also statistically insignificant when introduced into the model singly rather

than alongside the others.) Because the model already included a variable indicating veteran

status, the variable indicating service in Vietnam essentially tests the hypothesis that individuals

with this particular military experience differed from other veterans. These results point to the

7 Overall, 18 percent of respondents (273 of 1506) reported that they were veterans. Roughly 2 percent (32 of 1506) were 18 years old or younger in 1973 when the draft was abolished.

21

importance of military service as a formative experience. It shaped respondents' attitudes in

lasting ways that other experiences related to war, including actual service in the combat zone,

did not.

By contrast, retrospective support for the Vietnam War was associated with greater

support for the draft. This supports the hypothesis concerning respondents' beliefs about the

value of using military force. Respondents were asked the following question:

As you may know, the United States' military involvement in the Vietnam War ended ten years ago, in 1975. Some people think we should not have become militarily involved in Vietnam, while others think we should have. What is your opinion?

The 30 percent of respondents who said the United States should have been involved in Vietnam

were significantly more likely to support the draft. A typical respondent who took this position

had a 0.30 probability of supporting a return to the draft. An otherwise identical respondent who

took the opposite position had a 0.21 probability of supporting the draft. This effect is

substantial, but not nearly as large as that associated with either veteran status or eligibility for

the draft.

The 1987 survey included an item on foreign policy activism similar to those used in the

National Election Study and surveys by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs.8 It asked

respondents whether they agreed that "it's best for the future of our country to be active in world

affairs." Responses were coded on a 5-point Likert scale, recoded here so that higher values

indicate greater internationalism. For reasons of space, regression results including this variable

are not included in Table 4. The variable was not significant, suggesting that, at least in 1987, not

all American internationalists viewed the draft as an important foundation of American foreign

policy.

8 For discussions of these questions, see Fordham 2008 and Page 2006, 70–2.

22

Two other questions are related to opinions about the draft, and provide additional insight

into the specific foreign policy views associated with support for the draft during the 1980s. One

asked respondents whether they agreed with this statement: "I often worry about the chances of

nuclear war." Greater agreement with this statement on the 5-point scale was associated with a

slight reduction in support for the draft. Among typical respondents, the marginal effect of

moving from a 2 to a 4 on the scale was -0.03 in the probability of support for returning to the

draft. On the other hand, agreement with the statement that "[t]here is an international

communist conspiracy to rule the world" was positively associated with support for the draft.

Movement from a 2 to a 4 on this scale was associated with a 0.07 increase in the probability of

support for the draft. Worrying about the threat of war, especially nuclear war, was not

necessarily linked to support for conscription. This position makes sense in view of the limited

role a conventional army of conscripted soldiers would play in a nuclear war. At the same time,

worry about international communism was associated with support for the draft. Because this

concern was associated with conventional military interventions in less developed countries,

drafted soldiers might play a larger role in addressing it.

Support for Returning to the Draft in the Last Decade. It is not surprising that survey

researchers asked few questions about returning to the draft during the 1990s. After the end of

the Cold War and two decades of a relatively successful all-volunteer force, there was little

reason to consider this option. The strains that the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan placed on the

armed forces after 9/11 changed things, leading a few observers to call for resumption of the

draft in recent years, though without much hope of serious consideration. As Figure 1 indicates,

polls taken since 2003 have rarely found more than 30 percent of the public willing to endorse

23

this course of action, a pattern that contrasts with more supportive public attitudes during the

Cold War.

Table 5 presents the analyses of two questions about returning to the draft asked in the

past ten years. The questions are as follows:

Gallup, October 24-6, 2003: Do you think the United States should return to the military draft at this time, or not? Pew Research Center, September 1-15, 2011: Do you think the United States should return to the military draft at this time, or not?

The 2003 poll found 19 percent support for returning to the draft; the 2011 poll found 20 percent.

Both included a range of questions that make it possible to test several hypotheses about the

sources of public opinion on the draft.

Analyses of both surveys support some but not all the hypotheses about the costs and

benefits of the draft. First, unlike the surveys from the 1980s reviewed here, neither of these

contains evidence that respondents who were eligible for the draft were more likely to oppose it.

Similarly, respondents with children under the age of 18 were no more or less likely to support

conscription in the 2011 study than anyone else. It is possible that after 30 or more years without

conscription, respondents do not take the possibility of a new draft seriously enough to have it

influence their opinions, even with the reminder that draft registration still provides to young

men.

Second, the 2011 survey supports the hypotheses concerning income and education,

though the 2003 survey does not. In the 2011 study, an otherwise identical respondent with a

high school education was 0.04 more likely to favor resuming the draft than was a respondent

with a college degree. A respondent from the middle quintile in household income was 0.06

more likely to support a renewed draft than was a respondent from the highest quintile.

24

Like all the surveys reviewed here in which the hypothesis could be tested, having served

in the military increases an individual's support for the draft. Both these surveys included

questions on veteran status. In the 2003 study, a 57 year old veteran--the average age for veterans

in the sample--had a 0.30 probability of supporting the draft. An otherwise identical non-veteran

had a 0.22 probability of taking this position. The marginal effect was identical in the 2011

study. In that case, a 59-year old veteran--again, the average age for veterans in the sample--had

a 0.40 probability of supporting the draft. An otherwise identical non-veteran had a 0.32

probability of taking this position.

The second column of Table 5 takes advantage of the fact that the 2003 survey asked

about the ongoing war in Iraq. Respondents were asked "do you favor or oppose the war with

Iraq?" Those who favored the war in response to this question were much more likely to support

the draft as well. The results are quite similar to those concerning the wars in Korea and

Vietnam, reported in Table 2 above. A typical respondent who supported the war had a 0.21

probability of supporting a return to the draft. An otherwise identical respondent who opposed

the war had a 0.12 probability of taking this position.

While views about the Vietnam War influenced support for resuming the draft in the

1980s, attitudes toward Iraq and Afghanistan had no comparable effect in 2011. The second

model of the 2011 survey offers no evidence that support for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan

had any effect on opinion about the draft. The survey asked respondents "all in all, considering

the costs to the United States versus the benefits to the United States, do you think the war in

Iraq has been worth fighting, or not?" The survey followed up with an identical question about

Afghanistan. Responses to both these questions were uncorrelated with support for the draft. An

alternative independent variable adding the two together produced the same null result. Because

25

retrospective support for the Vietnam War had a continuing effect on attitudes toward a

restoration of the draft in the 1980s, this result is somewhat surprising. After all, both wars were

still going on when the 2011 survey was administered, and support for the Iraq War had made a

difference in support for a return to the draft in 2003. On the other hand, conscription was not

used to fight the wars in Iraq or Afghanistan, both of which had been going on for a number of

years by 2011, unlike 2003. It is possible that survey respondents simply no longer see any

linkage between the draft and these wars.

Patterns across Time. The nine surveys examined here point to three broad patterns in

support for the hypotheses proposed in the opening section under different historical conditions.

This review of the evidence is far from exhaustive, so these patterns are best taken as provisional

directions for further research than firm conclusions. First, hypotheses about the cost of the draft

found support mainly in surveys that were administered in times of relative peace. The wartime

surveys conducted in 1945, 1952, 1969, and 2003 produced little evidence that draft eligibility,

having children, education, or income influenced support for the draft. (Propositions about these

considerations were H1-H4 in the opening section of the paper.) On the other hand, draft

eligibility mattered in the four surveys taken in the 1980s, when there was no major military

conflict taking place. Education mattered in all of these same surveys, as well as the one

administered in 2011. Income mattered only in the 2011 survey. Having children was also related

to support for the draft in only one survey, though the data needed to test this hypothesis were

not always available.

It is possible that ongoing wars obscure the effect of costs on individual attitudes. For

young men of draft age, expressing opposition to the draft might have been socially unacceptable

26

during wartime. This effect was relatively large in all four surveys administered during the

1980s, so this particular cost clearly makes a difference in at least some settings. The other cost

considerations--education, income, and having children--all produced much smaller effects when

they were evident at all. Indeed, the evidence reviewed here offers little reason to think income

or having children had much effect at all. Given the small magnitude of the education effect in

peacetime surveys, it would not be surprising if the reticence of some people to express their

opinions in wartime entirely obscured its effects.

Second, concerns about the value of using military force--H5 in the opening section--

appear to have made a significant difference, especially during wars. Support for military action

during the wars in Korea, Vietnam, and Iraq was strongly associated with support for the draft.

During the 1980s, concerns about the communist threat and belief in the need to use force under

a variety of conditions went along with support for the draft. These results accord with the logic

of the logic of the cost-benefit argument about public opinion, but they provide only weak

evidence of a causal connection. It is at least as likely that support for the draft and beliefs about

the necessity of using military force are elements of a broader ideological perspective as it is that

the beliefs about military force produce support for the draft. If the former is a better

characterization of their connection than the causal claim, then the relationship between them

begs the question of what exogenous influences produce the broader ideology. In sum, attitudes

toward war and the use of force offer only a thin theoretical basis for understanding support for

the draft.

Third, veteran status had a very strong effect on support for the draft in every survey in

which it could be tested, regardless of whether it was conducted during peace or war. Moreover,

there is some evidence that veterans passed these attitudes along to members of their family, who

27

were somewhat more likely to support conscription as well. This socialization process appears to

have been a larger and more consistent influence on attitudes toward the draft than were

considerations of individual cost. This effect was not statistically significantly weaker for

veterans of the all-volunteer force, even in the 2011 survey where a substantial proportion of the

veterans in the sample (36 percent) had served in the all-volunteer force. The declining

proportion of veterans in the population might well play a role in explaining the broader decline

in support for conscription.

Conclusion

What if anything does this evidence about public support for the draft tell us about the broader

question of public support for war? Conscription imposes obvious costs on some segments of the

population. These costs are relatively simple and should be understandable even to segments of

the general public who find the intricacies of military spending and war finance difficult to grasp.

The mechanisms through which the public reacts to these costs are closely related to the

mechanisms through which they respond to war and perhaps to other national security policy

questions such as military spending and taxation to support it. There is evidence here that these

costs matter for public opinion, especially in the results indicating that individuals who are

eligible for the draft are more likely to oppose it. However, the evidence also suggests at least

two important qualifications to this generalization that are relevant to other arguments about

public opinion resting on similar claims about public response to costs.

First, the effects of costs on individual opinion appear to be muted in wartime. Draft

eligibility made a big difference in individual attitudes during the 1980s, but had no discernible

effect at the times when the draft imposed (or would have imposed) the largest cost on draftees.

28

This pattern is not really surprising since it is widely observed that war frees national leaders to

take many actions that would have produced a public outcry in times of peace. This does not

imply that response to casualties cannot drive public support for war. The fact that the public

tolerates higher costs during wartime does not mean that its tolerance is limitless. However, to

the extent that public opinion is influential, this pattern does suggest that it might have it largest

effects during periods of mobilization before war begins, or periods of demobilization when the

pressures abate that lead individuals to overlook (or at least to set aside) the costs of war. In U.S.

history, the extensive controversy about possible intervention in World War II, which ended

abruptly after Pearl Harbor, and the Democratic Party's loss of both the House and Senate in the

1946 elections may provide examples.

Second, individual reactions to the costs of war may not be simple. On its face, being

drafted into the military imposes considerable costs on the draftee, especially in wartime.

Beyond the obvious risk to life and limb, conscription separates draftees from their families for

long periods of time, delays their education, and usually pays far less than they would have

earned if they had spent the time pursuing a civilian career. (The food and accommodations also

receive generally poor reviews.) Paradoxically, though, the survey evidence suggests that many

of those who actually pay these costs take a different view, and are more likely to favor future

conscription than those who never served. A cynic might suspect that this opinion stems from the

spiteful wish that everyone else be forced to suffer what the veteran did. This line of argument

rest uneasily with evidence that veterans are also more pro-military than the rest of the

population, however (e.g., Schreiber 1979). They do not usually recall their experience as a bad

one. A more likely interpretation is that military service mobilizes draftees ideologically as well

as physically, in addition to imposing costs on them. It shapes their preferences in lasting ways,

29

including increasing their support for the draft. The mobilization effect of phenomena like

military service might be more important than the costs these aspects of warfare impose on those

who experience them.

Military service may not be unique in shaping individual preferences in ways that run

against the costs it imposes on them. Other aspects of war might well do the same thing. For

example, while the bombing of cities imposes large costs on the target population, it may also

mobilize them to hate their enemy more intensely, or identify more strongly with their fellow

citizens who have also been targeted. The German bombing of British cities is widely supposed

to have had this effect. As some research on the American response to 9/11 suggests, this is not a

simple phenomenon. Depending on their circumstances and individual psychology, people react

differently to international threats and hardships (e.g., Huddy et al. 2005). However, it would be

a mistake to assume that people simply always try to minimize the costs war imposes on them.

Obviously, the evidence considered here is far from conclusive. The patterns in public

support for conscription reviewed here require further tests on a much wider range of evidence.

This caution applies with even greater force to the broader conclusions I have just presented.

Whether these results hold up or not, it is clear that public support for conscription provides a

useful and under-researched window onto the public response to the costs of war. Even if there is

little or no chance that the United States will return to the draft this phenomenon deserves more

attention than it has received.

30

References

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Jentleson, Bruce W. 1992. "The Pretty Prudent Public: Post Post-Vietnam American Opinion on the Use of Military Force." International Studies Quarterly 36(1): 49–73.

Jentleson, Bruce W., and Rebecca L. Britton. 1998. "Still Pretty Prudent: Post-Cold War American Public Opinion on the Use of Military Force." The Journal of Conflict Resolution 42(4): 395–417.

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Figure 1.Support for the Military Draft on Various Survey Questions, 1940-2011

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%Ja

n-40

Jan-

44

Jan-

48

Jan-

52

Jan-

56

Jan-

60

Jan-

64

Jan-

68

Jan-

72

Jan-

76

Jan-

80

Jan-

84

Jan-

88

Jan-

92

Jan-

96

Jan-

00

Jan-

04

Jan-

08

Jan-

12

Per

cent

Exp

ress

ing

Som

e Fo

rm o

f Sup

port

for t

he D

raft

Should we resume the draft?Should we have ended the draft?Do you support the draft?Should we abolish the draft?

32

Table 1. Logit Models of Support for a Postwar Draft in January, 1945

Form K. Military service

Form T. Military training

Eligible for the draft 0.23 (0.16)

0.29 (0.27)

Education: High school 0.07

(0.21) 0.10

(0.22) Some college -0.23

(0.21) -0.15 (0.39)

College graduate 0.02 (0.27)

-0.55* (0.30)

Wald test for joint significance

0.84 1.45

Social class: Below average 0.37

(0.42) 0.52

(0.38) Average 0.31

(0.40) 0.29

(0.38) Above average 0.17

(0.43) 0.38

(0.32) Wealthy 0.32

(0.63) 2.21

(1.14) Wald test for joint significance

0.26 1.44

Member of family currently serving in military

-0.09 (0.14)

0.09 (0.18)

Male -0.29* (0.14)

-0.37* (0.19)

Age 0.01 (0.01)

0.01 (0.01)

Constant 0.42 (0.56)

0.60 (0.58)

n 1,303 1,209 Note: Asterisk indicates significance at p<0.05 level in a one-tailed test. Standard errors in parentheses. Question wording in text. The omitted category for education is "less than high school." For social class, it is "poor."

33

Table 2. Logit Models of Support for the Draft during the Korean and Vietnam Wars

1952 Survey 1969 Survey Eligible for the draft -0.24

(0.20) -0.01

(0.005) -0.32* (0.14)

-0.28* (0.13)

Respondent has children -0.14* (0.04)

-0.13* (0.05)


(0.13) 0.08

(0.14) -0.12 (0.14)

-0.09 (0.13)

Some college 0.30 (0.19)

0.26 (0.20)

-0.28 (0.15)

-0.26 (0.14)


-0.09 (0.21)

-0.79* (0.23)

0.71* (0.21)


2.57 2.68 11.57 11.87

Social class\Income quintile: Below average\4th -0.43

(0.44) -0.40 (0.45)

0.16 (0.27)

0.17 (0.25)

Average\3rd -0.64 (0.45)

-0.60 (0.46)

0.32 (0.26)

0.32 (0.26)

Above average\2nd -0.76 (0.48)

-0.72 (0.48)

0.34 (0.23)

0.34 (0.21)

Wealthy\1st -1.03* (0.62)

-0.96 (0.63)

0.06 (0.19)

-0.01 (0.17)


6.03 5.24 0.25 0.30

Served in World War I 0.64* (0.24)

0.67* (0.25)

Served in World War II 0.41* (0.18)

0.40* (0.18)

Korean War not a mistake 0.80* (0.12)

U.S. should intervene in future situations like Vietnam

0.73* (0.11)

Male -0.15 (0.13)

-0.26* (0.13)

-0.06 (0.09)

-0.09 (0.10)

Age -0.01* (0.004)

-0.01 (0.005)

-0.02* (0.01)

-0.02* (0.01)

Constant 1.53* (0.53)

1.17* (0.54)

1.77* (0.38)

1.45* (0.33)

n 1,651 1,651 1,335 1,335 Note: Asterisk indicates significance at p<0.05 level in a one-tailed test. Standard errors in parentheses. Question wording in text. The 1952 survey employs Gallup's coding for social class. The 1969 survey uses quintiles of family income. The omitted category for education is "less than high school." For social class, it is "poor." For income, it is the lowest quintile.

34

Table 3. Logit Models of Support for Resumption of the Draft in the Early 1980s

1980 Survey 1981 Survey Eligible for the draft -0.77*

(0.05) -0.73* (0.07)

-0.70* (0.21)

Respondent has children 0.04 (0.02)

-0.02 (0.01)

0.20 (0.11)


(0.01) 0.15

(0.05) -0.09 (0.16)


-0.03 (0.05)

-0.21 (0.18)


0.002 (0.09)

-0.61* (0.18)

Wald test for joint significance 0.73 0.00 17.67* Income quintile: 4th 0.11

(0.05) 0.06

(0.05) 0.18

(0.19) 3rd 0.10

(0.05) 0.11

(0.03) 0.46

(0.18) 2nd 0.24

(0.08) 0.13

(0.07) 0.50

(0.20) 1st -0.01

(0.01) -0.12* (0.01)

0.56 (0.21)

Wald test for joint significance 9.14 3.35 11.68 Russia will risk war for world domination

0.18 (0.12)

Scenarios in which troops should be used (0-7)

0.22* (0.002)

Male 0.67* (0.02)

0.54* (0.05)

0.63* (0.11)

Age 0.08* (0.01)

0.09* (0.005)

0.25* (0.05)

Constant -0.21* (0.06)

-0.74* (0.05)

-0.36 (0.26)

n 1,715 1,694 2,063 Note: Asterisk indicates significance at p<0.05 level in a one-tailed test. Standard errors in parentheses. Question wording in text. The omitted category for education is "less than high school." For income, it is the lowest quintile.

35

Table 4. Logit Models of Support for Resumption of the Draft during mid-1980s

1985 Survey 1987 Survey Eligible for the draft -0.78*

(0.42) -0.86* (0.38)

-0.28* (0.14)

-0.27* (0.14)

Respondent has children 0.03 (0.08)

0.04 (0.08)

Education: High school -0.28

(0.19) 0.26

(0.18) 0.07

(0.10) 0.06

(0.10) Some college -0.52*

(0.21) -0.50* (0.19)

-0.18* (0.09)

-0.19* (0.09)

College graduate -0.40* (0.15)

-0.44* (0.14)

-0.51* (0.10)

-0.52* (0.10)

Wald test for joint significance 2.14 3.41 14.68* 15.07* Income: $8-12K 0.10

(0.36) 0.11

(0.35)

$12-20K 0.06 (0.26)

0.10 (0.25)

$20-30K 0.12 (0.22)

0.18 (0.22)

$30-50K 0.05 (0.20)

0.05 (0.21)

More than $50K 0.05 (0.38)

0.10 (0.38)

Wald test for joint significance 0.08 0.25 Military veteran 0.60*

(0.20) 0.54* (0.21)

Veteran of all-volunteer force 0.31 (0.53)

0.39 (0.52)

Non-veteran with veteran living in household

0.25* (0.11)

0.23* (0.11)

Served in Vietnam 0.07 (0.28)

Participated in antiwar activities during Vietnam War

-0.06 (0.25)

Knows someone who evaded the draft during the Vietnam War

0.07 (0.19)

Intervention in Vietnam was the right decision

0.48* (0.09)

War was a formative experience 0.11* (0.06)

Male 0.16 (0.17)

0.13 (0.17)

0.38* (0.06)

0.37* (0.06)

Age 0.006 (0.004)

0.007 (0.005)

0.01* (0.002)

0.01* (0.002)

Constant -1.34* (0.41)

-1.56* (0.42)

-0.80* (0.16)

-0.86* (0.17)

n 1,371 1,367 3,884 3,884 Note: Asterisk indicates significance at p<0.05 level in a one-tailed test. Standard errors in parentheses. Question wording in text. The 1985 survey coded 6 income categories that resisted recoding as quintiles. The omitted category for education is "less than high school." For social class, it is "poor." For income, it is the lowest category (less than $8K).

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Table 5. Logit Models of Support for Resumption of the Draft after 2000

2003 Survey 2011 Survey Eligible for the draft 0.39

(0.44) 0.50

(0.45) -0.09 (0.31)

-0.09 (0.31)

Respondent has children under 18 -0.08 (0.19)

-0.08 (0.19)


(0.40) 0.29

(0.39) -0.52* (0.23)

-0.53* (0.23)


0.23 (0.35)

-0.74* (0.24)

-0.76* (0.24)

College graduate -0.13 (0.40)

-0.14 (0.41)

-0.76* (0.27)

-0.78* (0.27)

Wald test for joint significance 1.91 1.38 3.32* 3.30* Income quintile: 4th 0.28

(0.31) 0.28

(0.32) -0.27 (0.19)

-0.27 (0.19)

3rd 0.02 (0.29)

-0.07 (0.31)

-0.13 (0.17)

-0.13 (0.17)

2nd 0.19 (0.35)

0.14 (0.37)

-0.40 (0.26)

-0.41 (0.26)

1st 0.27 (0.31)

0.15 (0.34)

-0.56* (0.21)

-0.56* (0.21)

Wald test for joint significance 0.44 0.46 2.55* 2.56* Military veteran 0.42*

(0.24) 0.35*

(0.20) 0.36* (0.19)

Veteran of all-volunteer force -0.04 (0.56)

-0.29 (0.30)

-0.29 (0.30)

Parent served in military -0.02 (0.14)

-0.02 (0.14)

Favors Iraq War 0.65* (0.17)

War in Iraq was worth fighting -0.03 (0.04)

War in Afghanistan was worth fighting

0.01 (0.03)

Male 0.07 (0.23)

0.03 (0.23)

0.50* (0.15)

0.50* (0.15)

Age 0.03* (0.01)

0.03* (0.01)

0.02* (0.01)

0.02* (0.01)

Constant -3.31* (0.53)

-3.67* (0.55)

-1.67* (0.37)

-1.65* (0.37)

n 915 915 1,654 1,654 Note: Asterisk indicates significance at p<0.05 level in a one-tailed test. Standard errors in parentheses. Question wording in text. The omitted category for education is "less than high school." For income, it is the lowest quintile.

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Appendix. Polls and Questions on the Draft from the Roper Center Database

Roper Reference # Question Year of Poll

1. Questions on Resuming the Draft USCBS2011-11B Do you favor or oppose reinstating the military draft in the United

States? 2011

USPEW2011-SDT09 Do you think the United States should return to the military draft at this time, or not?

2011

USCBS2009-12B Do you think we should return to the military draft at this time, or not?

2009

USNORCGSS1972-2006 Do you think we should return to a military draft at this time, or should we continue to rely on volunteers?

1982, 1983, 1984, 2006

USCBS2006-03A Do you favor or oppose reinstating the military draft in the United States?

2006

USAP2005-06US2 Do you favor or oppose the reinstatement of the military draft in the United States?

2005

USAIPOCNUS2003-47 Do you think the United States should return to the military draft at this time, or not?

2003

USAIPOCNUS2003-01 Do you think the United States should return to the military draft at this time, or not?

2003

USTM1987-PS0487 The following is a list of some programs and proposals that are being discussed in this country today. For each one, please tell me whether you strongly favor, favor, oppose, or strongly oppose...Resuming the military draft

1987

USYANK1985-5731 Do you favor or oppose...Reinstituting the military draft 1985 USABCWASH1985-8890 Do you think we should return to the military draft at this time, or

not? 1985

USABCWASH1984-8540 I am going to read a few statements. After each, please tell me if you agree with the statement or disagree with it, or if, perhaps, you have no opinion about that statement....The military draft should be reinstituted.

1984

GSS Do you think we should return to a military draft at this time, or should we continue to rely on volunteers?

1984


1983


1982

USABCWASH1981-8999 Turning to another subject, do you think we should return to the military draft at this time or not?

1981

USYANK1981-8608 Now I'd like to know how you feel about a number of important issues that face the country. Do you favor or oppose: Reinstituting the military draft

1981

USAIPO1981-1180G Do you think we should return to the military draft at this time or not?

1981

USNBCAP1981-JUL Do you favor or oppose reinstatement of the draft for the armed forces?

1981

USYANK1981-8607 Now I'd like to know how you feel about a number of important issues that face the country. Do you favor or oppose: Reinstituting the military draft

1981

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USRPRR1981-04 In late 1978 for the first time since the draft ended, all four armed services failed to meet their recruiting targets. Furthermore, the Pentagon reports there is a critical shortage of people in the Army Reserves. Some people say the only way to meet the needs of the nation's armed forces is to restore the peacetime draft. Others say the problem can be solved by offering more incentives for people to volunteer for military service. How do you feel--are you in favor of or opposed to restoring the draft?

1981

USNBCAP1981-JAN Do you favor or oppose the reinstatement of the draft for the armed forces?

1981


1980

USCBSNYT1980-FEB Do you think the U.S. should or should not actually resume drafting men into the armed forces?

1980


1980


1980


1979

USAIPO1979-1122G As you may know, there is no longer a military draft and those who serve in the armed forces are volunteers. Recently, however, the armed forces have had trouble in getting enough volunteers to meet manpower needs. Do you think we should return to the draft at this time, or not?

1979

USAIPO1977-0967 As you may know, there is no longer a military draft and those who serve in the armed forces are volunteers. Recently, however, the armed forces have had trouble in getting enough volunteers to meet manpower needs. Do you think we should return to the draft at this time, or not?

1977

2. Questions on whether the draft should have been ended

USRPRR1980-03 In 1972 the draft was ended, and we now man the armed services by volunteers. How do you feel about this--that this has been a good thing, or that it would be better if we had kept the draft?

1980


1979


1977

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1974

3. Questions on Support for the Draft

Gallup #734-K Do you think every able-bodied male 18 years old should be required to serve in the armed forces one year?

1966

USAIPO1955-0542 Would you be in favor of requiring every able-bodied young man in this country when he reaches the age 18, to spend on year in military training and then join the reserves?

1955

USAIPO1952-0487 Would you favor or oppose requiring every able-bodied young man in this country, when he reaches age 18, to serve 6 months in military training and then join the reserves?

1952

USAIPO1950-0459 Q8BK. In the future, do you think every able-bodied young man (who has not already been in the armed forces) should be required to take military of naval training for one year?

1950

USAIPO1950-0451 The Selective Service Draft law ends in June. Do you think Congress should or should not continue the draft law for another 3 years?

1950

USAIPO1949-0436 The U.S. now has the Draft Act to keep our armed forces at the strength needed at present. It has been suggested that we have, in addition, Universal Military Training to build up a large reserve force. Do you think every able-bodied young man (who has not already been in the Armed Forces) should be required to take military or naval training for one year?

1949

USAIPO1948-0423 On August 30, all men between 18 and 25 years of age will start registering under the new federal draft law. In general, do you approve or disapprove of the draft?

1948

USAIPO1948-0415 Q4A. Do you think Congress should or should not pass a law to require every able-bodied young man (who has not already been in the armed force) to take military or naval training for one year?

1948

USAIPO1948-0415 Q10B. Do you think Congress should pass a law which would permit the government to draft young me to serve in the armed forces?

1948

USAIPO1947-0388 In the future, do you think every able-bodied young man should be required to take military or naval training for one year?

1947

USRFOR1946-053 Do you think the United States should or should not draft all young men for a certain amount of military training during peacetime?

1946

USAIPO1946-0367 The Selective Service Draft Law expires in May. Do you think Congress should or should not vote to continue the Draft Law for another year?

1946

USNORC1945-0239 Would you be in favor of or would you be against a law that would require boys to take a year's military training in peacetime when they become 18 years old?

1945

USAIPO1945-0354 Q1K. In the future, do you think every able-bodied young man should be required to take military or naval training for one year?

1945

USAIPO1945-0354 Q1T. In the future, do you think every able-bodied young man should be required to serve on year in the army or navy?

1945

USAIPO1945-0348 Q14K. Do you think Congress should pass a law requiring every able-bodied young man to take military or naval training for one year?

1945

USAIPO1945-0339 Q2AK. After this war is over, do you think every able-bodied young man should be required to serve one year in the army or navy?

1945

USAIPO1945-0339 Q2AT. After this war is over, do you think every able-bodied young man should be required to take military or naval training for one year?

1945

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USRFOR1944-038 3. After the war, do you think the United States should draft all young men for a certain amount of Army training during peacetime or should be go back to the regular Army system of taking volunteers only?

1944

USRFOR1944-037 2. After the war, do you think the United States should draft all young men for a certain amount of Army training during peacetime?

1944

USAIPO1940-0226 Is the draft a good thing? 1940

4. Questions on the Abolition of the Draft USAIPO1969-0773 After the Vietnam War is over, do you think the U.S. should do

away with the draft and depend upon a professional military force made up of volunteers, or do you think the draft should be continued?

1969

Gallup #699KB Do you think the time has come when this country should do away with the draft and depend upon professional military forces made up of volunteers, or do you think the draft should be continued?

1964

USAIPO1956-0571 Do you think the time has come when this country should do away with the draft or not?

1956

USAIPO1951-0473 After the present emergency is over, do you think EVERY young man (who has not already been in the Armed Forces) should or should not spend two years in the Armed Forces or in work connected with national defense?

1951

USRFOR1944-038 3. After the war, do you think the United States should draft all young men for a certain amount of Army training during peacetime or should be go back to the regular Army system of taking volunteers only?

1944

Explaining Public Opinion about Conscription: Costs ... · military service. The results suggest...

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