Explaining Compliance with G20 Commitments: The Democratic ...

Compliance and the G20 Ella Kokotsis1

Explaining Compliance with G20 Commitments:The Democratic Institutionalist andConcert Equality Models Compared

Dr. Ella KokotsisDirector of Analytic Studies

G8 Research GroupUniversity of Toronto

[email protected]

Paper prepared for a panel on “Expanding Capacity and Leadership in Global FinancialGovernance: From G7 to G20” at the 46th Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association(ISA), Hawaii, USA, Wednesday, March 5, 2005. I gratefully acknowledge the support of theUniversity of Toronto G8 Research Group, particularly Abby Slinger and Janel Smith for theirresearch assistance. Version dated March 5, 2005.


Abstract

Since its 1975 inception, the now G8 Summit has seen its members comply with their

collective commitments to an increasing and now substantial degree, in a pattern well

explained by the democratic institutionalist model of G8 governance. Does this model

also account for the compliance record of the G20 finance ministers’ forum founded in

1999, where the equality in capability, common democratic principles and constricted

participation – key in G8 compliance – challenge the institutional nature of the G20?

An analysis of compliance with the G20 finance ministers’ commitments from 2003, as

compared with those of the G8, suggests that democratic institutionalism is key in

explaining the G20’s compliance record, but that the concert equality model is equally

important in helping us understand the critical elements in accounting for these cross-

institutional compliance trends.


Introduction

Since their first gathering in 1975, the G7/G8 Summits have increasingly

produced tangible, ambitious and wide-ranging commitments1 in an effort to generate

multilateral consensus across a diverse number of global issues. Annual compliance

assessments conducted since 1996 reveal that the G8 leaders have complied with these

collective commitments to an increasing and now substantial degree, in a pattern well

explained by the democratic institutionalist model of G8 governance.2 But while the G8

has been described as a “full strength global governance institution” that deliberates,

directs, decides and delivers, the G20 has “put in a respectable performance as a

decisional body”, without much known about its ability to delivery with its collective

commitments made.3

This paper thus beings by charting the compliance results of the G8’s 2003 Evian

Summit - the last G8 for which a full compliance data set is available. To put these

results into perspective, part two compares these trends with results found during the

Summit’s most recently completed fourth cycle, the globalization era from 1996-2002.

Part three begins the process of charting compliance with G20 commitments by

assessing the extent to which the G8’s commitments reached at Evian translated into

compliance behaviour by the G20’s South Africa, India and Australia. As the only three

English-speaking non-G8 members of the G20, these countries vary by relative

capability, represent three different continents, are economically situated between the

1 Commitments are defined as discrete, specific, publicly expressed, collectively agreed statements ofintent. In other words, they are promises or undertakings by leaders to take future action to move toward anidentified target or commitment. See Analytical and Compliance Studies - Methodology at:www.g8.utoronto.ca.2 The democratic institutionalist model of G8 governance is explained in: Kokotsis, Ella (1999). KeepingInternational Commitments: Compliance, Credibility and the G7, 1988 – 1995. Garland Publishing, NewYork. Annual compliance studies conducted since 1996 are available on the University of Toronto G8Information Centre web site at: www.g8.utoronto.ca.3 Kirton, John. “Getting the L20 Going: Reaching Out from the G8”. Paper prepared for a workshop on the“G20 to Replace the G8: Why Not Now”. Sponsored by the Brookings Institution, Institute forInternational Economics, and the Centre for Global Governance, Washington, D.C., September 22, 2004.


developed-developing world, and boast varying degrees of association with the G8.

Their unique position within the G20 therefore allows us to select them as logical case

studies in assessing overall G20 compliance behaviour. Part four compares the extent

to which the commitments reached at the G8 since 19994 have carried through as

commitments in the G20 (or visa versa) as a means of understanding the leadership vs.

followship relationship between these two institutions. Do commitments reached at the

annual G8 Summits extend into the communiqués delivered by the G20? Or

alternatively, do the commitments in the G20 communiqués drive the language and

commitments ultimately reached by the G8? Part five explains the G8’s delivery

successes by drawing on the democratic institutionalist model of compliance behaviour.

These causal variables are then extrapolated to explain the G20’s compliance

performance in part six. Finally, part seven concludes by drawing on the concert

equality model to further explain the causal differences in compliance behaviour

between the G8 and G20, and offers some conclusions about what these preliminary

compliance findings might suggest for the G20’s future compliance record.

1. The 2003 G8 Evian Record

The leaders of the G8 met in Evian, France on June 1-3, 2003 in what would

become the highest commitment-producing Summit in its 29-year history.5 Despite the

divisions among the G8 leaders bred by the war in Iraq, the Summit produced a record-

high 206 commitments across 14 separate declarations grouped primarily under

Jacques Chirac’s four Summit themes of solidarity, responsibility, security and

democracy. Following the momentum of Kananaskis the year prior, the leaders made

strong commitments on the African front in areas such as water, famine, infectious

4 1999 corresponds with the inception of the G20.


diseases, agricultural sustainability, peer review and debt relief for the highly indebted

poor countries (HIPC). On the political-security front, the leaders pledged concrete

action in the areas of transport security, radiological terrorism, weapons of mass

destruction and the control of Man-Portable Air Defence Systems (MANPADs). Long-

standing issues of sustainable development and the environment were met with revived

action, while new momentum flowed in areas such as tanker safety, threats from SARS,

corporate governance and the promotion of a responsible market economy. Only in

traditional economic areas, including trade, inflation, exchange rates, fiscal and

monetary policy did the Summit yield disappointingly fewer concrete results. 6

Yet despite the unusually high number of commitments achieved across such a

diverse number of policy areas, the G8 leaders at Evian pledged a total of $3 billion at

the Summit and only for the replenishment of the Global Fund to fight AIDS,

Tuberculosis and Malaria. Relative to the $27 billion pledged at Kananaskis the year

before, the leaders, through their modest financial contributions, offered little to ensure

that the commitments made at Evian would be effectively complied with in the months

and years ahead. Moreover, despite the copious number of documents and

commitments produced, Evian offered only three remit mandates that would bind the

leaders to return to a particular subject at their next Summit meeting in Sea Island, and

one additional remit mandate committing them to review progress on the Africa Action

Plan no later than 2005 (Appendix A).

5 The 2004 Sea Island Summit did supercede Evian with the leaders producing 253 commitments across 15documents.6 The complete set of Evian documents is available on the University of Toronto G8 Information Centreweb site at: www.g8.utoronto.ca.


What do the compliance scores tell us about the G8’s success in reliably

implementing the commitments made at Evian?7 Based on an assessment of the 12

priority issue areas (Appendix B), the Evian numbers revealed an overall compliance

score of 51%, with the highest complying members being Canada and the United

Kingdom, followed by France (Summit host) and the U.S. (next in the hosting rotation)

tied for second place. Germany, Japan and Russia follow, with Italy in last place overall

(Appendix C).

These results also reveal that compliance during this period varied considerably

by issue area, with commitments focused on Terrorism and Weapons of Mass

Destruction (WMD) scoring perfect compliance scores across all G8 countries.

Compliance scores were also high in the area of Development Assistance (ODA) and

Health (AIDS), followed by Transport Security, the Environment (Marine), World

Economy, Debt (HIPC) and Energy. And finally, scores in the negative range are

revealed for commitments relating to Trade (MTN) and Crime (Terrorist Financing)

indicating that the G8 did not act to fulfill their priority commitments in these issue areas

in the post-Evian period.

2. Charting G8 Compliance: 1996 - 2002

Building on previous analytical studies and applying the concepts and

methodology developed by Kirton and Kokotsis, the University of Toronto’s G8 Research

7 Compliance is achieved when national governments alter their own behaviour and that of their societies inorder to fulfil the specified goal or commitment. Leaders legitimize their commitments by including themwithin their national policy agendas, referring to them in State of the Union Address or Throne Speeches,assigning specialized task forces or working groups to negotiate mandates, launching new diplomaticinitiatives or allocating budgetary resources; all designed to fulfill the specified welfare target. Full ornearly full conformance with a commitment here is assigned a score of +1. A score of -1 indicates completeor nearly complete failure to implement a commitment. An "inability to commit", or a "work in progress" isgiven a score of 0. An "inability to commit" refers to factors outside of the executive branch impeding theimplementation of a given commitment and a "work in progress" refers to an initiative that has beenlaunched by a government but is not yet near completion and whose results can therefore not be judged.


Group has assessed the compliance record of the G8 with the Summit’s core

commitments from 1996 to the present. As these analytical studies directly follow and

apply earlier concepts and methods, their results are directly comparable with earlier

compliance assessments. As they cover all core issue areas and the compliance record

of all participating G8 members, they offer a comprehensive portrait of Summit

performance in the years since globalization first became a major Summit

preoccupation.8

Several patterns appear in these findings. First, as Appendix D indicates, the

average level of compliance for this period is 45%. This is considerably higher than the

1975-1988 von Furstenburg and Daniels compliance average of 32%, and very close to

the more limited Kokotsis approach 1988-1995 average of 43%.9 Moreover, the level of

compliance has varied widely by year. It begins at a relatively normal 36% in 1996-97,

drops to 27% in 1997-98, rises sharply to 45% in 1998-99, stays at a relatively robust

39% in 1999-00, surges to 80% in 2000-01, secures an above-average score of 53% in

2001-02, drops below the mean to 33% in 2002-03 and surges above the median to

51% in 2003-04. As all of these scores are well above the 32% identified by von

Furstenberg and Daniels (with the exception of 1997-98), these findings contradict those

who see the G8 in the 1990’s as delivering a lower level of performance than the Summit

in previous years.

As Appendix D also shows, during the 1996-2002 period, compliance continued

to vary widely among countries, even if all members had positive rather than negative

compliance scores. Among the members, Canada continues to lead at 64%, followed by

8 “Compliance here has been assessed against a selected set of priority commitments, rather than allcommitments the last Summit produced. The priority commitments selected were not randomly chosen butidentified to produce a representative subset of the total according to such dimensions as issue areas,ambition, specified time for completion, instruments used and, more generally, the degree of precision,obligation and delegation of each.” See 2003 Evian Interim Compliance Report: www.g8.utoronto.ca


the U.K., a close second at 62%. With these scores, both countries continue to rank

similar to the 1975-89 ranking. Below these falls Germany at 43%, followed by Japan

and Italy at 42% and 41% respectively. The newest member to join the group (and thus

not evaluated during the 1975-89 period), Russia, scores last place with an overall

compliance average of 14%. While the available data for Russia is slender, these

scores appear plausible given the country’s overall lack of national implementation

capacity. Furthermore, they are consistent with the argument that democratic polities

with popularly elected leaders at the time, combined with the socializing effects of the G8

as an international institution over time, generate higher compliance scores.

There is a similarly wide variation in the compliance record of the 1996-2003

Summits by policy sector and issue area. As Appendix E indicates, for the period as a

whole, the compliance level in the core economic sector is 34%. Issues in the

global/transnational sector score 43%. In both cases, these are above the comparable

levels for the 1975-89 period. However, in the area of political security issues (which

includes traditional east-west relations, terrorism, arms control, landmines and human

rights), the level is an unusually high 72%. Unusually low scores are found in the

Regional Security and Governance sectors (focused on UN reform), each at 11% and

17% respectively.

Although the partial nature of this data makes more detailed analysis difficult,

some patterns are clear. First, among the 33 issue areas assessed across the eight

years, there are only eight negative and nine neutral scores. This is consistent with the

argument that these Summits are indeed worth doing for they do generate positive

results over time. At the other end of the spectrum, the presence of fifteen perfect

scores (ranging from macroeconomics to trade, debt of the poorest, the environment,

9 Von Furstenberg, G. and Daniels, J. P. Economic Summit Declarations, 1975-1989: Examining theWritten Record of International Cooperation. Princeton Studies in International Finance. Princeton


global health, terrorism and security) suggests that the G8 can be very effective in

governing globalization.10

Second, as the “globalization era” for the G8 began in 1996, the Summit

compliance score averaged 32%. However the component sector scores of 34% in

economics, 43% in global/transnational issues, 72% in political/security issues, 11% in

Regional Security issues and 17% in governance issues suggests a particularly robust

role for the modern G8 in the political/security field.

An assessment of particular issue areas where sufficient multi-year data exist

suggests several trends. Most striking is the high, indeed, perfect scores for

macroeconomics; a sharp contrast from its low scores in 1975-89. Also noteworthy is the

low score for trade, again a striking contrast with its high scores in 1975-89 and

confirmation by many about the G8’s recent poor performance in this area.11 A third is

the high scores in the areas of the environment (including climate change) terrorism, and

landmines, suggesting that the G8 is indeed a promising forum for advancing an

expanding conflict prevention/human security agenda.

3. Charting G20 Compliance

Meeting on September 25, 1999 in Washington, D.C., the finance ministers of the

G7 announced the creation of the G20 – a new international forum consisting of the

finance ministers and central bankers from 19 countries12 as well as representation by

the EU, IMF and World Bank. The creation of the G20 fulfilled the commitment made by

University Press, New Jersey, 1992. Kokotsis (1999).10 Kirton, John.” Explaining G8 Effectiveness”, in Michael Hodges, John Kirton and Joseph Daniels, eds.The G8’s Role in the New Millennium. Ashgate: Aldershot. 1999.11 Bayne, Nicholas. “The G7 and Multilateral Trade Liberalization: Past Performance, Future Challenges”,in John Kirton and George von Furstenberg, eds. New Directions in Global Economic Governance:Managing Globalization in the Twenty-First Century. Ashgate: Aldershot. 2001.12 G20 members include finance ministers and central bank governors from: Argentina, Australia, Brazil,Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, SouthAfrica, South Korea, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States. The Managing Director of theIMF as well as the President of the World Bank participate fully in the discussions.


the G8 at the 1999 Cologne Summit to “establish an informal mechanism for dialogue

among systematically important countries within the framework of the Bretton Woods

institutional system”.13 Mandated to “promote discussion, study and review policy issues

among industrialized countries and emerging markets with a view to promoting

international financial stability”14, the first meeting of the G20 was held in Berlin in

December 1999 under the chairmanship of Canadian Finance Minister Paul Martin. It

was clear from this first meeting that the reconciliation of interests between the industrial

and emerging markets on issues relating to developments in the international economy

and financial system could play a key role in strengthening the global financial

architecture – particularly since its member countries represented all continents, 80% of

global trade, two-thirds of the world’s population and 90% of the world’s GDP.

Given, however, that the G20’s mandate was premised on “informal dialogue” as

a means of “promoting cooperation to achieve stable and sustainable world growth”15, its

creation was largely seen as “deliberative” rather than “decisional”, designed to

encourage the “formation of consensus” on global financial issues.16 If indeed intended

to encourage consensus rather than drive decisions, what does this mean for the G20’s

ability to not only reach tangible commitments that are timely and robust, but to comply

with these commitments in the weeks and months following the conclusion of these

annual gatherings?

A comparative compliance assessment is offered here which examines the

results of the G20’s compliance with the commitments made at the 2003 Evian

13 G8 Final Communiqué, Cologne, Germany, June 20, 1999. www.g8.utoronto.ca14 “New G20 Forum: Backgrounder”. www.g8.utoronto.ca15 G8 Final Communique, Cologne, Germany, June 20, 1999. www.g8.utoronto.ca16 Kirton, John. “What is the G20?” November 30, 1999. www.g8.utoronto.ca


Summit17. These results are then compared against the compliance outcomes of the

G20 following their 2003 Morelia Summit in Mexico. This analysis focuses specifically

on the compliance trends charted across three predominantly English-speaking (non-

G8) G20 members – Australia, India and South Africa. Not only do these three countries

vary with respect to their relative capability18, geographically, they represent three

different continents and economically, they lie wedged between the developed and the

developing world. Moreover, their personal associations with the G8 varies markedly, as

South Africa has been invited and present at every G8 Summit since Genoa in 2001,

India was in attendance at Evian in 2003, and Australia has yet to attend a G8 Summit.

What do these variations then suggest about each of these countries’ ability to comply

with commitments reached at both the G8 and G20 levels?

Overall compliance by the G20 with the Evian commitments was 41% - or 10%

lower than the G8’s compliance with these same commitments. The results by country

suggest that South Africa ranks the highest across the 12 priority issues with an overall

compliance rate of 67% (see Appendix F. Australia follows with a score of 42% across

the Evian priority commitments, followed by India at 17%.

Comparing results across issue area suggests the strongest compliance results

were in the area of the marine environment and energy, both delivering perfect

compliance scores in the post-Evian period. Crime (terrorist financing), transport

security and WMD follow with compliance scores of 66%. Scores of 33% are revealed

for issues relating to the world economy, ICT, trade and terrorism (CTAG), while

HIV/AIDS and development (ODA) score a “0” overall. The only issue to fall within the

negative range is debt (HIPC), with a compliance score of –33%.

17 The 2003 Evian Summit was selected for this exercise as it represents the last year for which a completedata set of G8 compliance information was available. At the time of this paper, only the interim complianceresults for the 2004 Sea Island Summit had been made publicly available.18 Define relative capability – look at your own book, Ella!


High scores for the protection of the marine environment are not entirely

surprising given the length of coastline and the importance of the fishing industry to the

national economies of each of these three countries. Having already signed the ratified

the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) by the time of the

Evian Summit, some countries, notably Australia, extended beyond the terms of the

convention to launch, for example the following year, a $10 million Regional Heritage

Program that would “work with….neighbours in Asia and the Pacific to protect

threatened areas of high biological diversity”.19 South Africa also extended beyond the

ratification of UNCLOS by launching post Evian (in February 2004), its second

environmental court in Port Elizabeth, designed to “clamp down on organized syndicates

who indiscriminately poach the country’s marine resources”.20

Traditional security issues including WMD, transport security and crime (terrorist

financing) all fall within the middle range, consistent with the G8’s Evian scores across

these three issue areas. Here we find that commitments relating to the reduction in the

proliferation of MANPAD (Man-Portable Air Defence Systems) stockpiles, support for the

IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency), and accession to and ratification of the UN

Convention on Transnational Organized Crime all pull in above-average compliance

scores. Below-average results, however, are revealed on traditional economic issues,

including the world economy and trade. Only South Africa delivers positive compliance

scores for its commitments relating to the strengthening of investor confidence as well as

the delivery of the goals set out in the Doha Development Agenda by the end of 2004.

The area of greatest weakness across all three countries comes in relation to

commitments reached on debt, development and health. On debt, the commitment to

19 “International Good Neighbours”, February 18, 2004. http: www.pm.gov.au/news/media_releases.20 “Ministers Moosa and Maduna to Launch SA’s Second Environmental Court”. Department ofEnvironmental Affairs and Tourism. February 18, 2004. http.www.environment.gov.za


calculate the amount of “topping up” of debt relief available to countries at completion

point is met with an overall score in the negative range. Only Australia showed some

initiative in this regard by agreeing to forgive Nicaragua’s bilateral debt of $5.4 million.21

On development, the commitment for a proposal for a new International Finance Facility

was met with scores of “0” given the absence of explicit discussions surrounding the

establishment of development-related financing instruments across all three countries.

And finally, with regards to health, the commitment to strengthen the Global Fund to fight

AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria is also met with a score of “0”. Compliance results in

this case, however, vary by country. India scores in the negative range given its

complete lack of contributions or pledges to the Global Fund in any form. Australia

scores a “0” given its commitment to contribute $18.9 million, but not in one lump sum

until it is confident that the Global Fund is “working out”.22 In reaction to this

announcement, both Oxfam International and Medecins Sans Frontiers issued a

statement noting that “based on the size of its economy, Australia should be contributing

$25 million for 2004 alone, rather than $19 million over three years”.23 And finally, South

Africa is the only country of the three to demonstrate positive compliance in this issue

area through its contribution of $3.9 million to the Global Fund in the post-Evian period.

Recognizing the burden of HIV / AIDS on the promotion of women’s rights and well-

being, a significant portion of South Africa’s contribution to the Global Fund was directed

towards gender-sensitive development cooperation.24

21 “Australia Forgives Nicaragua’s Debt”. Treasurer of the Commonwealth of Australia. April 15, 2004.www.treasurer.gov.au/tsr/content/pressreleases/2004/

22 “Global Fund says it needs $5 billion during 2004-05”. HIV Treatment Bulletin. April 3, 2004.www.i-base.org.uk/pub/htb/v5/23 Ibid.24 “The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria: Pledges”. The Global Fund. January 1,2005. www.theglobalfund.org/en/files/pledges&contributions.


How do these results then compare with the commitments made by Australia,

India and South Africa following the 2003 Morelia meeting of the G20? The G20

complied less with their own commitments than they did with the G8’s, scoring 31%

across the six commitments made in Morelia (Appendix K). Similar to the Evian results,

South Africa leads in overall compliance with a score of 50%, followed in second place

by India (40%) and then Australia (16%). Once again, compliance varies widely by issue

area, with higher compliance scores for trade and corporate accountability and

transparency standards, mid-range compliance for terrorist financing, and compliance in

the negative range for the monitoring of developments in Offshore Financial Centres

(OFCs).25 Compliance for both financial crisis prevention and the implementation of

financial codes of conduct score a “0” thereby indicating a work in progress in both

cases.

When compared with the Evian results, these scores point to some interesting

observations. Commitments on trade, corporate accountability and transparency

standards, along with terrorist financing, represent extensions of commitments reached

in the Evian Summit just four months prior to the Morelia G20 meeting. On trade,

finance ministers at the G20 affirmed their commitment to “quickly re-energize the

negotiation process towards the fulfillment of the Doha Development Agenda”,

recognizing that “flexibility and political will” from all was “urgently needed”.26 This

commitment represented a direct extension of the one reached at Evian by the G8 just

four months prior to Morelia where the leaders agreed to “…achieve the objectives and

overall timetable set out in the Doha Development Agenda”.27 On the issue of corporate

accountability and transparency standards, the G20 committed itself at Morelia to

25 This compliance result is based on scores for Australian and South Africa only as complianceinformation for India was not available at the time of this paper.26 Communiqué from the fifth G20 Finance Ministers’ and Central Bank Governors’ Meeting, Morelia,Mexico. October 26-27, 2003.


effectively fighting financial abuses, recognizing the existence of “diversified ways for

individuals and companies and other entities to abuse the international financial system”.

Again, this represented an extension of the commitment made by the leaders at Evian to

“fight financial abuses” so that “money laundering, corruption and other relevant crimes

are universally criminalized”. And thirdly, on the issue of terrorist financing, the G20 at

Morelia affirmed their commitment to “ disrupting terrorist financing networks”,

recognizing the need to “concentrate efforts to subject informal financial sectors to

appropriate monitoring and enforcement actions”. This commitment extends directly from

Evian where the G8 noted their direct support for the G20 on this issue by stating they

were “supporting steps by [their] Finance Ministers to coordinate counter-terrorism

financing measures…to address terrorist financing, capacity building and other counter-

terrorism objectives in their assessment and assistance initiatives”.

The G20’s commitment to “monitor developments in Offshore Financial Centres

(OFCs), based on the IMF’s work” reveals the only score in the negative range across

the six commitments reached at Morelia. What is interesting about this commitment is

not its appearance in the Evian communiqué, rather its manifestation in the 2004 Sea

Island communiqué the following year. At Sea Island, the G8 leaders reaffirmed their

commitment to “further enhance transparency and supervisory standards in financial

markets, in particular non-compliant off-shore centers”. More specifically, the leaders

requested their “Finance Ministers to carry this work forward”.28

For the two commitments in which a work in progress – or a compliance score of

“0” is revealed – commitments appearing in the G20 communiqué do not extend from, or

project to, either the Evian or Sea Island communiqués. In the first instance, this

27 The Evian Summit Chair’s Summary, June 3, 2003. Evian, France.28 G8 Final Communiqué on Fighting Corruption and Improving Transparency, Sea Island Summit, June10, 2004.


includes the G20’s mandate “to review and promote crisis prevention and resolution

measures” with the IMF tasked with identifying vulnerabilities. In the second instance,

this includes the G20’s commitment to “promote the development of a workable code of

conduct” with respect to financial crisis. In neither case do these commitments find

resonance in the G8’s documents either prior to, or following from, the G20 Morelia

meeting.

4. Who’s Driving Whom?

This preliminary comparative analysis of the G20’s commitments vis-à-vis

commitments made by the G8 reveals that in those cases where the G8 initiated a

commitment which was then reiterated in the subsequent G20 communiqué, positive

G20 compliance scores followed. Where a commitment was initiated at the G20, but

compliance failed, the commitment re-appeared in the text of the subsequent years’ G8

communiqué. Does this early evidence perhaps suggest that not only is compliance with

G20 commitments more likely in situations where commitments are generated at the G8

level, but that reaffirmation by the leaders with a G20 commitment the subsequent year

is required in cases where G20 compliance fails? A comparative assessment of the G8

and G20 documents from 1999-2003 tells us more about the “push-pull” relationship of

the G8 vs. the G20. 29

Do commitments made in one forum find resonance in the other

(or visa versa)? Or is the G20 simply a means of securing broader consensus for G8-

generated ideas, as some scholars suggest?30

29 Commitments “Pushed” are those commitments initially made at the G20 one year and then repeatedwithin the text of the G8’s final documents at their next meeting. Commitments “Pulled” are thosecommitments made initially at the G8 one year and then repeated within the text of the G20 documents attheir next meeting.30 See, for example, John Kirton. “What is the G20?”. Adapted from “The G7, China and the InternationalFinancial System”,” Paper presented at an International Think Tank Forum on “China in the Twenty-FirstCentury,” China Development Institute, November 10-12, 1999.


A cross-Summit analysis from 1999-2003 shows us that commitments reached at

the G20 were three times more likely to have been generated at the G8 earlier that same

year (Appendix J). In most of these cases, the language supporting the commitments is

almost identical across both forums indicating a firm reiteration of the G8’s commitment

at the G20 level. Moreover, these commitments do not focus on any one particular issue

area, rather, transcend numerous matters, ranging from policies to reduce countries’

vulnerabilities to financial crises, offering technical assistance to emerging market

economies, committing to launch new trade rounds, strengthening efforts to combat

terrorist financing and pledging to achieve the Millennium Development Goals,

particularly in Africa. What perhaps stands out the most from this period, is the outcome

of the 2001 G20 meeting in Ottawa. Falling just two months after the 9/11 terrorist

attacks, this G20 generated the highest number of commitments (24) in its six year

history. A full 20 of the 24 commitments generated focused specifically on terrorist

related promises, including action plans to freeze assets of terrorists, cooperation on the

exchange of intelligence, and technical assistance to countries in need of regulations to

combat terrorist financing. Of these 20 commitments, only two found resonance in the

G8’s Summit the following year at Kananaskis. This points to the real lack of thrust the

G20 has in pushing commitments it generates into the final communiqués of the G8 in

subsequent years.

5. Explaining the G8’s Compliance Success

The past decade has witnessed an overwhelming surge in the volume of scholarly

literature aimed at explaining the G8’s emergence as a global institution worthy of

serious scholarly attention.31 And despite an overall lack of analytic consensus on the

Summit’s performance, John Kirton suggests that “yearly and cyclical variations in G8


performance” show a “secular trend toward increasingly high performance across most

functions…”.32 These core functions include, for example, Summit deliberations (length

of working sessions), direction-setting (number of documents issued), decision-making

(number of commitments agreed to), global governance development (remit mandates

and ministerial institutions created) and finally, delivery (compliance and monies

mobilized). These core Summit functions provide a solid basis against which the overall

performance of the Summits can be assessed.

What do we know about the delivery function of the Summit’s performance?

Based on independent scholarly studies conducted by Von Furstenberg and Daniels,

Kirton and Kokotsis and the University of Toronto G8 Research Group, we find that the

G8 has become more effective in implementing its commitments reached over time, with

compliance scores steadily increasing, particularly during the Summit’s fourth cycle.33

These findings suggest that sustained, positive and increasing compliance patterns over

time are largely attributable to key democratic institutionalist variables which impact the

Summit’s ability to deliver compliance results. These variables include: (i) enhanced

Summit institutionalization at both official and ministerial levels; (ii) strong domestic

bureaucratic units; (iii) effective multilateral organizations controlled by the G8; (iv)

strong commitment by leaders to the G8’s institutions and issues; (v) popular domestic

31 See for example, the G8 bibliography available on www.g8.utoronto.ca32 Here, Kirton looks at nine competing models including: 1) American Leadership; 2) Concert Equality; 3)False New Consensus; 4) Democratic Institutionalism; 5) G8 Nexus; 6) Collective Management; 7) GingerGroup; 8)Group Hegemony; and 9) Meta Institution. John Kirton. “Explaining G8 Effectiveness: A Concertof Vulnerable Equals in a Globalizing World” p. 27.33 See for example, Von Furstenberg, G. and Daniels, J. P. Economic Summit Declarations, 1975-1989:Examining the Written Record of International Cooperation. Princeton Studies in International Finance.Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1992. Kirton, J.J. and Kokotsis, E. “National Compliance withEnvironmental Regimes: The Case of the G7, 1988-1995. Paper presented at the Annual Convention of theInternational Studies Association, Toronto, Ontario, March 18-22, 1997; Kokotsis, E. KeepingInternational Commitments: Compliance, Credibility and the G7, 1988-1995. Garland Publishing, Inc.New York, 1999. Compliance Studies (1996-2004) at www.g8.utoronto.ca


support for leaders and issues they embrace; and (vi) institutional/structural changes from

within.

In the first instance, the development of an institutional architecture within the

Summit process allows for an established framework within which agendas can be

initiated, measures can be approved and commitments can be pursued. Particularly

during the Summit’s fourth cycle, we’ve witnessed a proliferation in both the depth and

breadth of the G8’s inter-Summit ministerial process.34 For example, the 1996-2003

period alone produced 126 inter-Summit ministerials, or 60% of the Summit’s 29-year

total. If follow-up ministerials are important variables in explaining Summit compliance,

some interesting patterns prevail.35 Of the 89 follow-up ministerials since 1975, the first

Summit cycle (1975-1989) produced 19 follow-up ministerials, the second cycle (1989-

1995) produced 24 and the third (1996-2003) produced 50 (or 56% of the total). These

correspond directly with the Summit’s compliance patterns over time, with the highest

compliance coming during the most recent Summit cycle and the lowest compliance

occurring during the Summit’s first cycle.

Similar patterns are obvious when one assess the number of G8 institutions

created, adjusted, approved and continued.36 During the 1996-2003 period, the Summit

34 Inter-Summit ministerials and equivalents are “meetings of the G7/8 ministers or heads or equivalentsfrom these actors (collective statements issued in the name of the G7/8, conference calls) between the endof on year’s annual Summit and the start of the Summit the regularly scheduled annual following year.”John Kirton and Michael Malleson. “Inter-Summit Ministerials and Equivalents, 1975-2003”. July 25,2003. www.g8.utoronto.ca.35 Follow-up ministerials take place prior to the change in host on January 1 of the new year and can beseen primarily as following up or implementing the earlier Summit. Lead-up ministerials, taking place afterJanuary 1, can be seen as primarily preparatory to, or connected with, the subsequent Summit. Follow-upministerials are therefore seen primarily as a cause of compliance with the previous Summit’scommitments and lead-up ministerials are seen as a cause of the subsequent Summit’s success. Kirton andMalleson, 2003.36 “New Institutions Created” includes, in its weakest form, convening officials for a meeting, on thegrounds that this may lead to further meetings and thus the incremental creation of an institution. “Existing


created, adjusted and approved/continued a total of 46 institutions. This compares to 40

during the Summit’s first two cycles (1975- 1988) and 20 during the Summits third cycle

(1989-1995). The surge in the creation, adjustment and approval/continuation of Summit

ministerials during this fourth cycle is commensurate with the overall rise in Summit

compliance during this period. The surge in ministerials and institutional creations

effectively provides a solid mechanism through which more effective and timely

implementation of leaders’ commitments can occur.

Strong domestic bureaucratic institutional units are also key in accounting for the

G8’s increased levels of Summit compliance over time. For example, where strong,

institutionally entrenched Foreign Ministries serve as repositories for implementing G8

agreements, smaller, less institutionally developed departments such as health and the

environment, typically tend to lack the necessary coordinating centres for G8-related

activity and oversight. This is consistent with the findings (between 1996-2003) where

traditional security issues garner a compliance score of 72%, with global transnational

issues securing only 43% (Appendix E).

Higher compliance levels are also assured in cases where the G8 control - either

through monetary/military contributions or political capital - existing broader regimes,

and subsequently extend commitments and issue instructions made at the Summit to these

international institutions. One of the strongest examples of this is with regards to the

Summit’s commitments on the debt of the poorest, for which exceptionally high

compliance scores were recorded for both the 1999 Cologne Summit (86%) and the 2001

Institutions Adjusted” includes having their duration, membership, substantive mandate or relationship withother institutions extended, reduced, or newly specified. “Existing Institutions Approved and Continued”includes an acknowledgement of the institution’s existence, and continuance of its works as currently


Genoa Summit (100%). Here, commitments made by the G8 on the highly indebted poor

countries were subsequently coordinated through existing international institutions that

its members effectively control, including the Paris Club, the IMF and the World Bank.37

The leaders’ commitment to international cooperation, the G8’s institutional

architecture and the issues themselves are evidenced by the number of remit mandates

produced. Remit mandates are “formal instructions contained in the documents the

leaders collectively issue at the annual G8 Summit, specifying that they will deal with an

item at their Summit the following year or in subsequent years”.38 According to Kirton,

remit mandates are important for several reasons. First, they may “indicate the priority or

seriousness that leaders attach to an agenda item, normative direction or decisional

commitment”. Second, they may constitute a form of “self-binding, giving a particular

item a shadow of the future”. And third, they may represent “a way of one year’s host

trying to bind a subsequent year’s host to the priority items preferred by the former”.

Taken together, remit mandates serve as important causes or predictors of compliance

through the delivery of specified discussion items, directions or decisions.

The empirical record of remit mandates illustrates that the overall average from

1975-2003 climbed considerably across the Summit’s three cycles39 – a trend which

mandated, merely noted, reaffirmed or approved. Fact Sheet, “Institutions Created by Summit, 1975-2003”,compiled by Janel Smith, November 12, 2003. www.g8.utoronto.ca.

37 See 1999 and 2001 Compliance Reports by the University of Toronto G8 Research Group at:www.g8.utoronto.ca

38 Kirton, John and Antara Haldar. G7/8 Summit Remit Mandates, 1975-2003. June 24, 2003.www.g8.utoronto.com. Remit mandates take several forms: (i) they may specify that a report be preparedfor the leaders at their next Summit; (ii) they may identify who is to prepare such a report; (iii) they maypledge that the leaders themselves will deal with a particular item or theme, or “review progress” on it; (iv)or they may require that action be taken by the time of their next Summit, implying that they will monitorwhether it has been done or not.39 G8 Remit mandates averaged 1 in the 1975-1988 period, 3.1 in the 1989-1995 period and 4.7 in the1996-2003 period. Kirton and Halder, 2003.


supports the argument that commitments are generally complied with when the leaders

who made them demonstrate a strong personal commitment to both the issues at stake

and the Summit process as whole. By binding themselves to addressing an issue at their

subsequent meeting, leaders are committing themselves to reviewing progress - which

ultimately places increased pressure on them to deliver concrete results.

Deep public support for Summit leaders and the commitments they embrace

grants the leaders an enormous amount of political capital thereby allowing them to more

effectively follow through with their Summit commitments. For example, during the last

cycle of Summitry, leaders were less afflicted by electoral uncertainties and thus enjoyed

longer-lived governments. Given that same group of leaders that met in Evian, had also

met in Kananaskis in 2002 and in Genoa in 2001 meant that the leaders had more

political experience, greater Summit skills, experienced greater socialization at a personal

level and came to the Summit with more balanced expectations. This type of environment

tends to typically be conducive to greater overall levels of Summit compliance,

evidenced by the results of the G8’s most recent cycle.

And finally, the institutional structure and composition of the G8 has also had an

impact on compliance results. Sharp drops in compliance in 1997-98, followed by the

sharp rise in 1999-2001 suggests the impact of changes to the Summit’s compositional

format during these periods. In 1997, the Russians were admitted to the “Denver Summit

of the Eight”, leaving little time for the seven other leaders to meet alone. The new

diversity of membership and hence less focus on substantive issues may have produced

less “psychological buy-in” on the part of the leaders and thus lower compliance with

their commitments the subsequent year. By contrast, the 1998 Birmingham Summit was


the first permanent G8, giving Russia and the other Summit members a level of assurance

with its membership transition. Here we find an overall compliance score of 45%; a sharp

increase from the 27% produced post-Denver the year before.

6. How Does the G20 Measure Up?

When we dissect each of the variables that account for the G8’s delivery successes and

apply them to the G20, we find that the G20 in fact lacks the majority of the institutional

variables that would otherwise enable it to produce compliance successes. With respect to

institutionalization at both official and ministerial levels, the G20, since its inception in

1999, has not initiated any institution-building directives, rather, continues to extend its

mandate through existing international bodies, primarily the UN, World Bank, IMF and

the WTO. This is strongly evidenced in the language of its commitments where pledges

are repeatedly made to “support the activities of International Financial Institutions (IFIs)

and other relevant international fora”.40 Follow-up ministerials or inter-Summit

ministerial processes likewise do not flow from the G20 for the obvious reason that this

body currently exists itself at the ministerial level and commitments expressed by the

finance ministers are more often than not directives imposed through the G8 leaders’

direction-setting and delivery process. This is clearly evidenced by push-pull effect of the

G8, where the leadership of the Summit influences – by a three to one margin - the

direction of the G20’s agenda (Appendix J). On the matter of control over effective

multilateral organizations, again, the G8 process has demonstrated its ability to influence,

direct and promote implementation through those existing international bodies over

40 G20 Finance Ministers’ and Central Bank Governors’ Meeting, Delhi Communiqué, November 23, 2002.


which it exerts the strongest amount of political and financial control. Because the G8

collectively represent the largest shareholders within those institutions responsible for

global policy implementation (IMF, World Bank, OECD, WTO, Paris Club), they are

better able to effectively set the agenda, reach agreements, prompt action, and secure

delivery on commitments reached.

Remit mandates have also proven an effective measurement tool by which to

gauge G8 success as they provide normative direction, create a self-binding mechanism

and also tie future hosts to commitments reached by their predecessors. The G8 vs. G20

record over the 1999-2003 period shows a total of 22 to 4 remit mandates – a five-fold

advantage by the G8 across this function (Appendix H). Given that remit mandates serve

as important predictors of compliance through the delivery of specified discussion items,

directions or decisions, it is clear that the G8 process has the compliance advantage over

the G20 in this area.

And finally, greater political capital, few electoral uncertainties and longer-lived

governments meant that the same group of leaders that met in Evian in 2003 also met in

Kananaskis and Genoa. Through this, the leaders gained more Summit skill and

experience, enhanced their socialization at personal levels and brought with them a more

balanced set of expectations – all of which drove up G8 compliance, as evidenced by the

results of the Summit’s most recent cycle. What is interesting about this phenomenon is

that representation by South Africa at every consecutive G8 Summit since 2001

correlates positively with South Africa’s compliance record with both the 2003 G8 Evian

and the 2003 G20 Morelia commitments. In both cases, South Africa outperformed both

Australia and India, scoring 67% with its G8 commitments (vs. 43% for Australia and


17% with India) and 50% with its Morelia commitments (vs. 16% for Australia and 40%

for India). The advantage, therefore, of having the same group of leaders across an

extended period of time tends to reflect positively on overall compliance outcomes, both

at the G8 and the G20 levels.

7. Conclusion: Drawing Further Explanations from the Concert Equality Model

Democratic institutionalist variables strongly support patterns of compliance by the G8

with their collective Summit agreements and also help us understand how the G20s

record fares by comparison. But does the concert equality model draw on some further

explanatory variables that might help account for the comparatively lower G20

compliance trends? Drawing on concert theory’s variables of direct political control,

concentrated power, constricted participation and shared common values further assists

us understanding and explaining the G20s decisional and delivery record.

On direct political control, the importance of leader-level direct representation at

the G8 cannot be understated for this element ensures that the decisions they embrace and

the commitments they make, carry added weight. Moreover, as Andrew Cooper notes,

“only leaders can see the big picture and have the vision and confidence to take bold

risks”.41 Unlike the G20, the G8 does not need to defer its decisions to higher-level

ministers or bureaucrats. As such, the heads of state and government themselves become

personally attached to the commitments they reach and therefore place a higher degree of

personal importance on seeing these commitments delivered. Moreover, the salience of

leaders-level representation is indicative of the fact that over its thirty-year history, every

41 Cooper, Andrew and John English, “Reforming the International System from the Top: A Leaders’ 20Summit” (2005).


leader from every G7/G8 country has consistently been present at these annual meetings.

According to Kirton, “One can compare this record with the existing G20, and ask if all

its finance ministers have come to every one of its annual meetings in its first five

years”.42

Concentrated power – which refers to the restriction of membership to the great

powers of the day – ensures that although lesser states are occasionally consulted when

their interests are involved, they generally possess fewer rights – and certainly not that of

equality.43 Again, this is indicative of the G20’s influence at the G8 level, where we see

that although South Africa is the only country to have attended since Genoa in 2001, only

Brazil, China, India and Mexico from the G20 were invited to participate on the margins

of the G8 at Evian in 2003.

Third, the G8’s constricted membership or participation ensures that cohesion on

policy coordination and implementation is more likely when fewer states interact. Unlike

the G20 format, the G8’s smaller body of actors lowers overall transaction costs, reduces

potential veto points and increases transparency, thereby facilitating timely joint

decision-making, the verification of compliance and the sanctioning of cheaters.44

Moreover, given the political sensitivities that often flow from the G8’s gatherings, “a

very small, cohesive group is necessary to maintain the trust from which their

effectiveness flows”.45 The ability to have free informal exchanges, meaningful dialogue

and the achievement of consensus – particularly on politically charged or issues of high

42 Kirton, John. “Getting the L20 Going: Reaching Out from the G8”. September 2004.43 Kupchan, Charles and Clifford A. Kupchan, “Concerts, Collective Security and the Future of Europe”.International Security, 16. No. 1, 1991: 120; Elrod, Richard B. “The Concert of Europe: A Fresh Look atan International System”, World Politics, 28, no. 2 (January 1976): 163-64.44 Snidal, Duncan, “The Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory”. International Organization, 39. No. 4(Autumn 1985): 599; Grieco, Jospeh M. “Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of theNewest Liberal Institutionalism”. International Organization, 1988: 506.


sensitivity - is diluted, however, as additional members very often “compromise the

capacity for effective action”.46

And finally, a strong set of common values and shared social purpose amongst the

G8 is reflected in their political solidarity through the sharing of normative orientations,

which makes the compatibility of policy preferences more likely. A much more diffuse

model exists within the G20 where democratic governance is far from secured in either

China or Saudi Arabia.

It is clear that the G8 and the G20 have distinctively separate mandates and roles

within the international system. Whereas the G8 is a “full strength global governance

institution, with deliberative, directional, decisional and delivery” tasks, the G20 remains

a “deliberative rather than decisional body…designed to encourage the formation of

consensus on international issues”.47 This is strongly evidenced by the number of

commitments generated by the G20 from 1999-2003 (44), compared with the 602

generated by the G8 during this same period (Appendix G). Moreover, the G8 and G20

have fundamentally different “constitutional missions”. The G8 was created in 1975 to

“globally protect and promote the value of ‘open democracy, individual liberty and social

advance”, while the G20 was largely created to “ensure financial stability”.48 And if Paul

Martin’s vision of creating a leaders’ level G20 – or “L20” – comes to pass, the G8

leaders within this group, will certainly not want to abolish their democratic stronghold,

45 Kirton, John. “Getting the L20 Going”. September, 2004.46 Kirton, John. “The G20: Representativeness, Effectiveness and Leadership in Global Governance”, inGuiding Global Order: G8 Governance in the Twenty-First Century, John Kirton, Joseph Daniels andAndreas Freytag, eds. (Aldershot: Ashgate). 150.47 Kirton, John, “What is the G20” (1999) and “Getting the L20 Going” (2004).48 “Getting the L20 Going”.


particularly “when democracy is under attack in Russia, and not yet secured in China or

Saudi Arabia”.49

Most importantly, however, global crises often need “timely and responsive

action”. Given that the G8 have “never been able to mount an ad hoc emergency face-to-

face meeting, even in response to crises such as 911” it is hard to imagine how the “more

unwieldy and diverse” G20 - or even L20 – could.50 Even under normal situations, “the

transaction costs of securing such cooperation among 20 rather than eight actors, in a

club with much greater diversity on all dimensions” is extremely difficult to imagine.51

Perhaps the focus needs to remain on the G20 as an international body capable of

fostering dialogue on north-south issues, restarting negotiations on multilateral trade

liberalization and integrating environmental and social issues to “secure a new coherence

in global governance”.52 But with its large and diverse membership, it seems likely that

consensus-building – and by extension delivery on commitments reached – will continue

to remain outside of the G20’s immediate purview. In the mean time, unless Paul

Martin’s concept of an L20 comes to fruition, the G20 will likely find itself continuing to

remain, as John Kirton suggests, “a second-tier body for the legitimization of G7/8

deliberations, direction-setting and decisions…”53

49 Ibid.50 Ibid.51 Ibid.52 Johnson, Pierre Marc, “Creating Sustainable Global Governance” in Guiding Global Order: G8Governance in the Twenty-First Century” (2000). 245-281.53 Kirton, John. “The G20: Representativeness, Effectiveness, and Leadership in Global Governance”(2000). 153.


Appendix A: 2003 Evian G8 Remit Mandates

1. “We will review progress on our [Africa] Action Plan no later than 2005 on the basisof a report”. (Chair’s Summary)

2. “We agree to exchange information on national measures related to theimplementation of these steps [on MANPADs] by December 2003. We will reviewprogress at our next meeting in 2004”. (G8 Action Plan on Enhancing TransportSecurity and Control of MANPADs).

3. “The G8 Presidency will produce a report for the 2004 Summit”. (G8 Action Plan onBuilding International Political Will and Capacity to Combat Terrorism)

4. CTAG will…by…”Seeking to increase counter-terrorism capacity building assistanceand coordination by the 2004 Summit”…Encouraging regional assistanceprogrammes including delivery through regional and donor sponsored trainingcentres by the 2004 Summit….Seeking to address unmet regional assistanceneeds by the 2004 Summit” (G8 Action Plan on Building International Political Willand Capacity to Combat Terrorism”)


Appendix B: Priority Commitments for ComplianceAssessments – 2003 G8 Evian Summit

1. World Economy and Growth:2003-5. We reaffirm our commitment to strengthen investor confidence by improvingcorporate governance, enhancing market discipline and increasing transparency.

2. ICT:2003-69: We will develop an implementation plan to achieve these objectives by nextspring's Tokyo ministerial conference.

♦ We will develop close co-ordination of our respective global observationstrategies for the next ten years; identify new observations to minimize datagaps.

♦ We will build on existing work to produce reliable data products on atmosphere,land, fresh water, oceans and ecosystems.

♦ We will improve the world-wide reporting and archiving of these data and fillobservational gaps of coverage in existing systems.

3. Trade (MTN): 2003-47: We are therefore committed to delivering on schedule, by the end of 2004,the goals set out in the Doha Development Agenda, and to ensuring that theCancun Ministerial Conference in September takes all decisions necessary to helpreach that goal.

4. Development (ODA): 2003-15: We welcomed the report of our Finance Ministers' discussions on ourincreased resources and on financing instruments. We invite them to report back tous in September on the issues raised by the financing instruments, including theproposal for a new International Finance Facility.

5. Debt (HIPC): 2003-16: We reaffirmed the objective of ensuring lasting debt sustainability in HIPCcountries and noted that these countries will remain vulnerable to exogenousshocks, even after reaching completion point. In this context, we have asked ourFinance Ministers to review by September mechanisms to encourage goodgovernance and the methodology for calculating the amount of "topping-up" debtrelief available to countries at completion point based on updated cost estimates.

6. Environment (Marine Environment)2003-121: We commit to the ratification or acceding to and implementation of theUnited Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, which provides the overall legalframework for oceans.

7. Health (AIDS/Infectious Diseases):2003-10: We agreed on measures to strengthen the Global Fund to Fight AIDS,Tuberculosis and Malaria, and other bilateral and multilateral efforts, notably throughour active participation in the donors' and supporters' conference to be hosted inParis this July.


8. Crime and Drugs (Terrorist Financing)2003-36: We reaffirm our commitment to fight financial abuses and to encouragewider accession to and ratification of the U.N. Convention on TransnationalOrganised Crime so that money laundering, corruption and other relevant crimes areuniversally criminalized and that all countries have the power to identify, trace, freezeor seize and ultimately confiscate and dispose of assets from the proceeds of thesecrimes.

9. Terrorism (CTAG):2003-150: The G8 will create a Counter-Terrorism Action Group, to focus on buildingpolitical will, co-ordinating capacity building assistance where necessary. Otherstates, mainly donors, will be invited to join the group. A representative of the CTCwill be invited to CTAG meetings. Representatives from relevant UN bodies, IFIs andother regional and functional organisations will be invited to relevant meetings (firstmeeting to be held by July 15).

10. Transport Security (MANPADS):2003-168: Given the increasing number of Manpads in world-wide circulation, wecommit ourselves to reducing their proliferation and call upon all countries tostrengthen control of their Manpads stockpiles.

11. Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)2003-186: We reaffirm our support for the IAEA, which should be granted thenecessary means to implement its monitoring tasks.

12. Energy2003-75: Participate in the International Conference on Renewable Energies, spring2004 in Bonn.


Appendix C: 2003 Evian Final Compliance Scores*

Canada France Germany Italy Japan Russia UK USA IssueArea

AverageWorldEconomy/Growth

1 0 1 -1 0 0 0 1 0.25

ICT 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0.75

Trade (MTN) 0 0 0 -1 0 -1 0 -1 -0.38

Development(ODA)

1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0.88

Debt (HIPC) 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0.38

Environment(Marine)

1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0.50

Health (AIDS) 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0.88

Crime(TerroristFinancing)

1 1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -0.50

Terrorism (CTAG) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1.00

Transport Security 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0.63

Weapons of MassDestruction (WMD)

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1.00

Energy 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0.75

IndividualCountry Average

0.83 0.75 0.50 0.25 0.42 0.33 0.50 0.50

OverallIssue Average

51%

Overall CountryAverage

51%

OverallComplianceAverage

51%

*The average score by issue area is the average of all countries’ compliance scores for that issue. Theaverage score by country is the average of all issue area compliance scores for a given country. The overallcompliance average is an average of the overall issue average and overall country average.


Appendix D: G8 Compliance Assessments by Country1996 - 2003

Lyon1996-9754

Denver1997-9855

Birmingham1998-9956

Cologne1999-0057

Okinawa2000-0158

Genoa2001-0259

Kananaskis2002-0360

Evian2003-0461

OverallCountryAverage

France 0.26 0 0.25 0.34 0.92 0.69 0.62 0.75 0.48

UnitedStates

0.42 0.34 0.60 0.50 0.67 0.35 0.38 0.50 0.47

UnitedKingdom

0.42 0.50 0.75 0.50 1.0 0.69 0.62 0.50 0.62

Germany 0.58 0.17 0.25 0.17 1.0 0.59 0.15 0.50 0.43

Japan 0.21 0.50 0.20 0.67 0.82 0.44 0.08 0.42 0.42

Italy 0.16 0.50 0.67 0.34 0.89 0.57 -0.09 0.25 0.41

Canada 0.47 0.17 0.50 0.67 0.83 0.82 0.85 0.83 0.64

Russia N/A 0 0.34 0.17 0.14 0.11 -0.09 0.33 0.14

OverallSummitAverage

0.36 0.27 0.45 0.39 0.80 0.53 0.32 0.51 45%

54 Applies to 19 priority issues, embracing the economic, transnational and political security domains.55 Applies to six priority issues, embracing the economic, transnational and political security domains.56 Applies to seven priority issues, embracing the economic, transnational and political security domains(human trafficking).57 Applies to six priority issues, embracing the economic, transnational and political security domains(terrorism).58 Applies to 12 priority issues, embracing economic, transnational, and political security domains (conflictprevention, arms control and terrorism).59 Applies to nine priority issues, embracing economic, transnational, and political security domains(terrorism).60 Applies to the 11 priority issues assessed in the final report, embracing economic, transnational andpolitical security domains (arms control, conflict prevention and terrorism). Excluded in the final report,which were assessed in the interim are debt of the poorest (HIPC) and ODA.61 Applies to the 12 priority issues, embracing economic, transnational and political security domains(WMD, transport security and terrorism).


Appendix E: G8 Compliance by Issue, 1996-2003

Issue Area Lyon1996-97

Denver1997-98

Birmingham1998-99

Cologne1999-00

Okinawa2000-01

Genoa2001-02

Kananaskis2002-03

Evian(interim)2003-04

TOTAL(based on average

of n)

36.2%(22)

12.8%(6)

31.8%(6)

38.2%(6)

81.4%(12)

49.5%(11)

36%(13)

51%(12)

Economic Issues(average 34%)World Economy +0.31 +0.86 +0.25IFI Reform +0.29d -1.0Exchange Rates 0Macroeconomics +1.0 +1.0Microeconomics +0.29e

Employment +0.38f 0g

Aging +0.33h +0.86ICTi +0.57e +1.0 +0.75 +0.75

Trade +0.29e +0.33j -0.57 +1.0+0.88 +0.13 /

-0.13z

-0.38t

Development(General/ODA)

0e 0 0 +0.50 +0.88

Debt of thePoorest/HIPC

0 +0.86 +1.0 +0.25 +0.38

Education +0.58

GlobalTransnationalIssues(average 43%)Transnational Issues(General)

+0.48 +0.63y +0.75w

Environment +0.14 +0.5f +1.0k +0.17 +0.57 /+0.57aa

+0.50u

Biotechnology +0.75Human Genome +0.80Healthl +1.0 +0.75 +0.88Cultural Diversity +0.63Nuclear Safety +0.29Crime & Drugs +0.43e 0f +0.25m 0n +0.25 -0.50

Political/SecurityIssues(average 72%)East/West Relations +0.86e

Terrorism +0.71e +1.0 +0.40 +1.0 +1.0 +1.0Arms Control +0.29e +0.88 +0.25Landmines +0.71 +0.75f

Human Rights +0.71e


Security Issues +0.31+0.63 /+1.0v

Regional Security(average 11%)Asia -0.43e

Europe +0.86o

Middle East -0.43e

Russia -0.86Conflict Prevention +0.63 +0.38

GovernanceIssues(average 17%)UN Reform I($ obligations)

+0.14

UN Reform II(dev’t agenda)

+0.14 +0.25 /0.0x

a Data refer to members' compliance to commitments expressed in the Communiqué, as evaluated immediately prior thenext Summit (i.e., 1996/1997 data refer to commitments made at the Lyon Summit in 1996 and assessed on the eve ofthe 1997 Denver Summit).b Unless otherwise indicated, data refer to all G7 countries.c Includes economic issues.d Excludes Italy and France.e Excludes Italy.f Refers to G8 (includes Russia).g Refers only to Japan, UK, and Russia.h Refers only to Canada, Germany, U.S.i Information and communications technology; includes Digital Divide and Global Information Society.j Excludes Germany.k Refers to G8 countries (includes Russia); is average of data for two commitments referring to the Kyoto Protocol onClimate Change.l Includes infectious disease.m Refers to human trafficking; refers only to France, Germany, Japan.n Refers specifically to the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering.o Excludes Japan.p. Refers to Africa Healthq. Refers to Africa/Good Governance (+0.50) and Africa/Peer Review (0.0)r. Refers to Environment/Sustainable Agriculture (0.0) and Environment/Water (+0.50)s. Refers to Economic Growth/Agricultural Trade (0.0) and Economic Growth/Free Trade (+0.14)t. Refers to Multinational Trade Round (MTN)u. Refers to Marine Environmentv. Refers to Transport Security (+0.63) and Weapons of Mass Destruction (+1.00)w. Refers to Energyx. Refers to Africa/Good Governance (+0.25) and Africa/Peer Review (0.0)y. Refers to Educationz. Refers to Economic Growth/Agricultural Trade (+0.13) and Economic Growth/Free Trade (-0.13)aa. Refers to Environment/Sustainable Agriculture (+0.57) and Environment/Water (+0.57)


Appendix F: G20 Compliance with Evian Priority Commitments

Australia India South Africa Compliance Total(by Issue)

World Economy 0 0 +1 33%ICT 0 0 +1 33%Trade 0 0 +1 33%Development (ODA) 0 0 0 0Development (HIPC) 0 -1 0 -33%Marine Environment +1 +1 +1 100%Crime (TerroristFinancing)

+1 0 +1 66%

Infectious Diseases(HIV/AIDS)

0 -1 +1 0

Terrorism (CTAG) +1 0 0 33%Transport Security +1 +1 0 66%WMD 0 +1 +1 66%Energy +1 +1 +1 100%Compliance Total(by Country)

42% 17% 67% 41%


Appendix G: G8 vs. G20 Commitments: 1999-2003

No. of G8 Commitments No. of G20 Commitments

1999 (Cologne/Berlin) 46 4

2000 (Okinawa/Montreal) 105 8

2001 (Genoa/Ottawa) 58 24

2002 (Kananaskis/Delhi) 187 2

2003 (Evian/Morelia) 206 6

Total 602 44


Appendix H: G8 vs. G20 Remit Mandates62: 1999-2003

No. of G8 Remit Mandates No. of G20 Remit Mandates

1999 (Cologne/Berlin) 3 1

2000 (Okinawa/Montreal) 5 0

2001 (Genoa/Ottawa) 4 1

2002 (Kananaskis/Delhi) 6 1

2003 (Evian/Morelia) 4 1

Total 22 4

62 “Remit mandates” represent an implementation method calling for governments to take up, or others toreport on, a specified subject in subsequent years. An example of a remit mandate, taken from the 2003Morelia, Mexico G20 Summit would be: “We encourage an inclusive group of issuers and marketparticipants to engage in further discussions. We ask G20 deputies to review the progress made by theissuers and market participants at the next G20 Deputies meeting in March.


Appendix I: Priority Commitments for Compliance Assessments– 2003 G20 Morelia Summit63

2003-1: We, Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors, are committed to givingimpetus to the multilateral trade approach as one of the most effective ways to promoteglobal growth, reduce poverty and ensure that the benefits of globalization are broadlyshared by all, particularly the poorest countries. We therefore called on all World TradeOrganization (WTO) members to quickly re-energize the negotiation process toward thefulfillment of the Doha development agenda, recognizing that flexibility and political willfrom all are urgently needed.

2003-2: We reaffirm our mandate to review and promote crisis prevention andresolution measures.

2003-3: With a view to promote the development of a workable code of conduct, weencourage an inclusive group of issuers and market participants to engage in furtherdiscussions, with G-20 members participating on a voluntary basis. We ask G-20Deputies to review the progress made by the issuers and market participants at the nextG-20 Deputies meeting in March.

2003-4: We took note of the diversified ways for individuals and companies and otherentities to abuse the international financial system to undertake illicit activities includingtax evasion. We are committed to cooperate to effectively fight such abuses and make astrong call on all countries especially those OECD countries that have not takennecessary steps- in particular in allowing access to bank information- to join us in thiseffort and look forward to having regular reports on the progress of internationalinitiatives in this area.

2003-5: We also agreed to monitor developments in Offshore Financial Centers (OFCs),based on the IMF’s work.

2003-6: We remain committed to disrupting terrorist financing networks. We recognizedthat this effort requires a focus on both the formal and informal financial sectors.Therefore, while we will continue efforts to improve our formal financial systems, toexpand their scope, and to protect them from this abuse, we will also concentrate effortsto subject informal financial sectors to appropriate monitoring and enforcement actions.

63 Commitments taken from the Fifth G20 Finance Ministers’ and Central Bank Governors’ Meeting,Morelia, Mexico, October 26-27, 2003.


Appendix J: G20 / G8 Commitments “Pushed” vs. “Pulled

G20 CommitmentsPushed to G8

G20 CommitmentsPulled from G8

1999 1 0

2000 0 6

2001 2 1

2002 0 2

2003 1 3

Total 4 12

Notes:

1. Of the four commitments in the 1999 Berlin G20 communiqué, one was pushed to the 2000Okinawa G8 Summit the following year. The other three commitments did not come from, orextend to, the G8.

2. Of the eight commitments in the 2000 Montreal G20 communiqué, six were pulled from theOkinawa G8 Summit that same year. No commitments were pushed to the 2001 Genoa G8Summit.

3. Of the 24 commitments in the 2001 Ottawa G20 communiqué, one was pulled from the 2001Genoa G8 Summit that same year. Two commitments were pushed to the 2002 KananaskisG8.

4. Of the two commitments in the 2002 Delhi G20 communiqué, both were pulled from the 2002Kananaskis G8 Summit that same year.

5. Of the six commitments in the 2003 Morelia G20 communiqué, three were pulled from theEvian G8 Summit that same year. One commitment was pushed to the 2004 G8 Summit inSea Island, Georgia.


Appendix K: G20 Compliance with Morelia Commitments

Australia India South AfricaCompliance

Average(by Issue)

Trade (Doha) +1 +1 +1 100%

Financial CrisisPrevention

0 0 0 0

Financial Codes ofConduct

0 0 0 0

CorporateAccountability and

TransparencyStandards

+1 +1 +1 100%

Monitor OffshoreFinancial Centres

-1 n/a 0 -50%

Terrorist Financing 0 0 +1 33%Compliance

Average(by Country)

16% 40% 50% 31%

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