Experimental and Theoretical basis of QD standards · • Distance functions SQ1 through SQ17 •...

Supporting Munitions Safety

Munitions Safety Information Analysis Center Supporting Member Nations in the Enhancement of their Munitions Life Cycle Safety

Martijn van der Voort

TSO Safety of Munition Storage and Transport +32.(0)2.707.54.26

[email protected]

Experimental and Theoretical basis of QD standards

KG Spring, 12-14 April 2016

NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to PfP, MD, ICI, Australia, Colombia, Iraq, Japan, the Republic of Korea,

Mongolia, New Zealand, Singapore and South Africa

mailto:[email protected]

Supporting Munitions Safety Supporting Munitions Safety

AASTP-1 “NATO guidelines for the storage of military ammunition and explosives”, Ed B, Version 1 (December 2015)

AASTP-1 Quantity Distance (QD) tables for • HD1.1, HD1.2.1, HD1.2.2, HD1.2.3, HD1.3.1, HD1.3.2, HD1.6

Dependent on

• Potential Explosion Site (PES) type (10) • Exposed Site (ES) type (26) • Net Explosive Quantity (NEQ) • Protection level

“virtually complete”, “high”, “limited” not available for all three

• Traffic density “low”, “medium”, “high”

2

Introduction


Additional restrictions • No primary explosives • No items vulnerable to spall

HD1.1 QD tables

• Distance functions D1 through D17 • From 500 to 250,000 kg HD1.1

Recent work on small quantities of HD1.1 • Distance functions SQ1 through SQ17 • From 1 to 500 kg HD1.1

Similar tables and distance functions for other HD and SsD Furthermore: Airfield Distances (ADs), Ship Distances (SDs)

3

Introduction


Interior QDs

Exterior QDs

Inter Magazine Distance (IMD)

Potential Explosion Site (PES)

Explosive Workshop Distance (EWD) Intra Line Distance (ILD)

Public Traffic Route Distance (PTRD)

Inhabited Building Distance (IBD)

Site border

Exposed Sites (ES)

Net Explosive Quantity (NEQ, Q)

Maximum Credible Event (MCE)

Compatibility Group (CG) A-N

Sensitivity Group (SG)

SG1-SG5

Hazard (sub) division HD1.1

HD1.2 (SsD1.2.1, SsD1.2.2, SsD1.2.3) HD1.3 (SsD1.3.1, SsD1.3.2)

HD1.4 HD1.5 HD1.6

Earth Covered Magazine (ECM)

Heavy Structure

Light Structure

Introduction


AASTP-5 “NATO guidelines for the storage, maintenance and transport of ammunition on deployed missions or operations”, Ed 1, Version 3 (December 2015)

AASTP-5 Field Distance (FD) tables • HD1.1/1.2/1.3 to be regarded as HD1.1 • From 25 to 4,000 kg HD1.1 • Choice was made for high protection level • Distance functions FD1 through FD10

5

Introduction


Global comparison • Many QD related to scaled distance • Many similarities (red)

6

Introduction Scaled

distance AASTP-1 AASTP-1 AASTP-5

Z (m/kg1/3) QD SQ FD Main physical effect 0.35 D1 Combined explosion effects versus PES 0.4 FD1 part Combined explosion effects versus PES

0.44 D2 Combined explosion effects versus PES 0.5 D3 SQ1 Combined explosion effects versus PES 0.6 FD1 part Combined explosion effects versus PES 0.8 D4 SQ2 Combined explosion effects versus PES 1.1 D5 SQ3 Combined explosion effects versus PES 1.8 D6 SQ4 Combined explosion effects versus PES 2.4 D7 SQ5 FD2 Combined explosion effects versus PES 3.6 D8 Combined explosion effects versus PES

4 FD4 Blast versus human (lung injury) 4.8 D9 SQ6 FD3 Combined explosion effects versus PES

6 FD5 Blast versus human (lung injury)

8 D10 SQ7 FD6 Blast versus ES (building damage)

11.1 SQ8 Blast versus ES (building damage)

13 FD7 part Blast versus ES (light structure damage)

14.8 D11 part Blast versus ES (building damage)

22.2 D12/13 part SQ9 FD10 part Blast versus ES (building damage)

44.4 2*D12/D13

part SQ10 Blast versus ES (building damage)

14 D14 Blast (from ECM rear) versus ES (building damage)

18 D15 Blast (from ECM side) versus ES (building damage)

9.3 D16 Blast (from ECM rear) versus ES (building damage)

12 D17 Blast (from ECM side) versus ES (building damage)

28 2*D14 Blast (from ECM rear) versus ES (building damage)

36 2*D15 Blast (from ECM side) versus ES (building damage)

AASTP-1 AASTP-5

SQ FD Main physical effect

SQ11 Debris (from ECM rear or side) versus human

SQ12 Debris (from unbarricaded front of undefined ECM) versus human

SQ13 Debris (from barricaded front of any ECM or front of 3 or 7 bar ECM) versus human

SQ14 Debris (from RC or brick < 20 m3) versus human

SQ15 Debris (from RC or brick > 20 m3) versus human

SQ16 Debris (from barricaded light/open structure) versus human

FD10 part Debris (from heavy armoured vehicle) versus human

SQ17 FD9 Fragments (from unbarricaded light/open structure) versus human

FD8 Fragments (from barricaded light/open structure) versus human


QD standards • Developed by AC/326 experts over many decades • Based on many tests and analysis

Issues

• Not easy to understand for new people in the field • Not clear which explosion effects determine QDs • Comprehensive and transparent overview is missing

7

?

Problem description


MSIAC work element started in 2016 “Experimental and Theoretical basis of QD standards” Focus on HD1.1 and HD1.2

• “All QDs related to blast, fragments and structural debris”

Steps: • Collect all relevant references with experimental work and analysis,

including the latest WPs • Explain the science of explosion effects and consequences at the

right level of detail • Compile a comprehensive report that gives the experimental and

theoretical basis of current QD standards • Identify knowledge gaps and advice on areas for further

development

8

Approach


All QD tables follow from a limited set of “rules and assumptions’’ Changes in “rules and assumptions’’ have direct impact on tables

9

Rules and assumptions

Approach


QDs have contributions from various explosion effects

QD is maximum of: • QD for blast • QD for low angle debris (e.g. walls, including doors) • QD for high angle debris (e.g. roof) • QD for low angle fragments • QD for high angle fragments • QD for thermal effects

Determination of QD requires:

• Knowledge of the above explosion effects from each PES type • A criterion for each of these effects and for each ES type

Note:

• For IMDs combined explosion effects have to be considered • Including crater formation and barricade impact

10

Approach


HD1.1 = mass detonation of all NEQ • Timeline:


t < 0 t = 0 t > 0

Mass detonation of all NEQ: -Blast -Fragments -Debris


HD1.2 open stack = “Popcorn effect” HD1.2 in structure = “HD1.1-like effect” + “Popcorn effect”

• Timeline:

12


t < 0 t = 0 t = minutes, hours

Small “HD1.1-like effect’’: -Blast -Fragments -Debris

“Popcorn effect’’: -Fragments -Lobbed ammunition

What is worse?


MCE to be used for QD determination:

For HD1.1: • Mass detonation of all NEQ in magazine

For SsD1.2.1 (HE content ≥ 0.136 kg/round)

• For items similar to certain 81mm and 105mm (NEQ = 50 kg HD1.1) • Established by testing, analogy, or available data (NEQ up to 500 kg HD1.1) • HE content of three outer shipping packages (NEQ up to 500 kg HD1.1)

For SsD1.2.2 (HE content < 0.136 kg/round)

No MCE defined

For SsD1.2.3 (“insensitive” HD1.2) NEQ of one item or package as determined through testing

13



P

i

Range

Time

PES ES

Ps

Pr

Blast

Side-on blast load Reflected blast load

Hemispherical surface burst


QD based on blast peak overpressure • Side-on peak overpressure: Ps = f(Z) • Scaled distance: Z = R/Q1/3 • QD ~ Q1/3

Blast QD scaling

Hemispherical Surface Burst (HSB), US TP17

1

10

100

1000

10000

0.1 1 10 100

Side

-on

peak

ove

rpre

ssur

e (k

Pa)

Scaled Distance (m/kg1/3)


QD based on blast impulse • Scaled impulse: i/Q1/3 = g(Z) • Scaled distance: Z = R/Q1/3 • QD ~ Q2/3 (valid between 1 < Z < 100 m/kg1/3)

Blast QD scaling

1

10

100

1000

0.1 1 10 100

Scal

ed si

de-o

n im

puls

e (P

a.s/

kg1/

3 )


Hemispherical Surface Burst (HSB), US TP17


Blast damage levels based on WWII London bombing (Jarret)

17

Blast & building damage

damage level

RB ratio description

A 0.675 Houses completely demolished, i.e. with over 75% of the external brickwork demolished

B 1.00 Houses so badly damaged that they are beyond repair and must be demolished when opportunity arises. Property is included in this category if 50% to 75% of the external brickwork is destroyed, or in the case of less severe destruction, the remaining walls have gaping cracks rendering them unsafe.

Cb 1.74 Houses which are rendered uninhabitable by serious damage, and need repairs so extensive that they must be postponed until after the war. Examples of damage resulting in such conditions include partial or total collapse of roof structures, partial demolition of one or two external walls up to 25% of the whole, and severe damage to load-bearing partitions necessitating demolition and replacement.

Ca 3.0 Houses that are rendered uninhabitable, but can be repaired reasonably quickly under wartime conditions, the damage sustained not exceeding minor structural damage, and partitions and joinery wrenched from fixings

D 6.0 Houses requiring repairs to remedy serious inconveniences, but remaining habitable. Houses in this category may have sustained damage to ceilings and tilings, battens and roof coverings, and minor fragmentation effects on walls and window glazing. Cases in which the only damage amounts to broken glass in less than 10% of the windows are not included.

61

2

31

1

+

⋅⋅=

MM

MkRBACR

ACR

ACR

kACR = 7.1 m/kg1/3 MACR = 3175 kg.


Damage level A

18


Stone, P.D., Henderson, J., World War II bomb damage, accidental explosions and the basis of our current quantity distances, 32nd Explosives Safety Seminar, 2006.

Channel 4, Blitz Street. Documentary series hosted by Tony Robinson, http://www.channel4.com/programmes/blitz-street


Damage level B

19



Damage level Cb

Damage level Ca

20

Blast & building damage Damage level D

Damage level Ca

Grønsten, Langberg, Øiom, Woomera 5-tonne trial: The Norwegian participation, DDESB seminar 2006


P-i curves for damage level A through D


1

10

100

1000

10000

10 100 1000 10000

Side

-on

peak

ove

rpre

ssur

e (k

Pa)

Side-on positive phase impulse (Pa.s)

Dam

age

leve

l

MCE (kg)

A

B

Cb

Ca

D

Impulsive load

Qua

sist

atic

load

Far Field


Range vs. NEQ for damage level A through D


10

100

1000

10 100 1000 10000 100000

Rang

e (m

)

NEQ (kg)

Impu

lsive

Qua

si-st

atic

Dyna

mic

2500 4500

Far Field

Dam

age

leve

l

A

B

Cb

Ca

D

Solid lines:Jarret curves

Power law

2/3 1/31/2


Range vs. NEQ for damage level Ca (comparison D12 & D13)


10

100

1000

10 100 1000 10000 100000

Rang

e (m

)

NEQ (kg)

Impu

lsive

Qua

si-st

atic

Dyna

mic

2500 4500

Far Field

Solid line:Jarret curve for damage level Ca

Power law

2/3 1/31/2

D12

D13


P-i curve for damage level Ca (comparison D12 & D13)


1

10

100

1000

10000

10 100 1000 10000

Side

-on

Peak

Ove

rpre

ssur

e (k

Pa)

Side-on positive phase impulse (Pa.s)

MCE (kg)

Impu

lsive

load

Quasi static load

Far Field

D13

D12 D13

D12 PI curve for damage level Ca


Range vs. NEQ for damage A through D (comparison D9 to D13)


10

100

1000

10 100 1000 10000 100000

Rang

e (m

)

NEQ (kg)

D9D10D10 (US)D11D12D132*D122*D13

Impu

lsive

Qua

si-st

atic

Dyna

mic

2500 4500

Far Field

Dam

age

leve

l

A

B

Cb

Ca

D

Solid lines:Jarret curves

Power law

2/3 1/31/2


AASTP-1 D9 to D13 and WWII blast damage data


Distance Application Damage level Overpressure criterion used in AASTP-1

Impulse criterion used in AASTP-1

D9 IMD A Yes (47 kPa) No

D10 EWD B Yes (21 kPa) No

D11 PTRD Cb-Ca Yes (9 kPa) Yes

D12 IBD Ca Yes (5 kPa) No

D13 IBD Ca Yes (5 kPa) Yes

2*D12 Vulnerable B D Yes (2 kPa) No

2*D13 Vulnerable B D Yes (2 kPa) Yes


Conclusions: • AASTP-1 D9 to D13 are clearly related to WWII blast damage

• AASTP-1 D9 to D13 are approximations to Jarret curves

• Striking features:

IBD is based on damage level Ca EWD is based on “severe’’ damage level B

• AASTP-1 does not consistently exploit impulse criterion

Using only an overpressure criterion leads to conservatism



US TP-17 • Well validated blast models • Latest update (v7) made available

Blast models in US TP17


Calculation results TP17:

Baseline is the HSB (black)

Blast is comparable to HSB for • ECM front (red): close-in

Significant blast attenuation (relative to HSB) for:

• ECM rear (green) • ECM side (blue) • ECM front (red): far field • Above Ground Structures (AGS): RC, brick, ISO

29

Blast models in US TP17


Blast (HSB & ECM)

1

10

100

1000

10000

0.1 1 10 100

Side

-on

peak

ove

rpre

ssur

e (k

Pa)



ECM Front

ECM Side

ECM Rear

PES


Blast (HSB & AGS / ISO)

1

10

100

1000

10000

0.1 1 10 100

Side

-on

peak

ove

rpre

ssur

e (k

Pa)



AGS Masonry

AGS Concrete

ISO Container

PES


According to AASTP-1:

Blast attenuation only taken into account for: • ECM side (blue) • ECM rear (green) (attenuation applies for < 45.000 kg and > 500m3)

Blast is not (significantly) attenuated

• For AGS • For ECM front far field • Due to PES barricades • Due to ES barricades

32

AASTP-1 assumptions


Comparison criteria vs. TP17

1

10

100

1000

10000

0.1 1 10 100

Side

-on

peak

ove

rpre

ssur

e (k

Pa)


Hemispherical surfaceburstECM Front

ECM Side

ECM Rear

Vulnerablebuilding

PES ES

2 kPa

5 kPa

9 kPa

21 kPa

70 kPa

180 kPa

300 kPa

700 kPa

47 kPa


1

10

0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50

Side

-on

peak

ove

rpre

ssur

e (k

Pa)



ECM Front

ECM Side

ECM Rear

Vulnerablebuilding

PES

ES

2*D12/D13

D16 D17 D11

D10

D14 D15 D12/D13

2*D152*D14

2 kPa

5 kPa

9 kPa

21 kPa

In the far field blast from ECM front is

similar to the ECM side.

Good match between QDs and TP17 blast curves



Conclusions: • AASTP-1 agrees well with TP17

For hemispherical surface burst (D9 – D13) For rear and side of ECM (D14 - D17)

• AASTP-1 is conservative For front of ECM (D9 – D13)

Ongoing work:

• Comparison between AASTP-1 and TP17 for IMD • Not easy due to limited validity of TP17 for small Z • Other sources of information are available



Debris IBD • 1 hazardous (>79J) debris/fragment per 56 m2 • Equivalent to 1% hit probability • Consequences for 79J blunt impact:

Major injury likely Lethality small %

36

Debris IBD

0

0.1

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5

0.6

0.7

0.8

0.9

1

1 10 100 1000

Prob

abili

ty (-

)

Kinetic energy (J)

Lethality

Major injury

Minor injury

20J

79J

Based on Bienz, Kummer & Partners, and ACTA, AASTP-4


Debris launch velocity (DLV) • Areal mass m (kg/m2) • Volume V (m3)

Impact distance

Combination of DLV and impact distance • For a fixed magazine type (m, V), and for “large’’ Q:

37

Debris IBD scaling

DLV = 525 ∙ Q𝑉𝑉2/3∙𝑚𝑚

R = 𝐶𝐶1 ∙ 𝑚𝑚 ∙ ln (1 + 𝐶𝐶2 ∙𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑉𝑉2

𝑚𝑚)

IBD~ln (𝑄𝑄)


Determination of Debris IBD • Described in US TP21 • Pseudo Trajectory Normal Method (PTN) • Count all debris/fragments behind exposed object

Experimental data used for IBD

• Only in main directions • This is conservative!

Data analysis to determine IBD

• Average value over multiple test • This seems reasonable!

38

Debris IBD

PES

Blast

Debris

Thermal


Debris IBD: the 400 m minimum

39

Debris IBD

10

100

1000

1 10 100 1000 10000 100000

IBD

(m)

NEQ (kg)

AASTP-1 blast IBD (D13)

Historical AASTP-1 debris IBD


UK trials with brick storehouses

40

Debris IBD

10

100

1000

1 10 100 1000 10000 100000

IBD

(m)

NEQ (kg)



UK trials (20-30 m3)

UK trials (100 m3)

UK trials (2250 m3)


Large RC and brick structures (>20 m3): SQ15 • Based on Swisdak average curve ~ln(NEQ)

41

Debris IBD

10

100

1000

1 10 100 1000 10000 100000

IBD

(m)

NEQ (kg)




UK trials (100 m3)

UK trials (2250 m3)

Swisdak average

Swisdak maximum

SQ15 (concrete/brick > 20 m3)


Small RC structures: the Kasun test series

42

Debris IBD

Langberg, 2004


Small RC and brick structures (<20 m3): SQ14 • Based on Swisdak max curve (*1 and *1.5, max 450m)

43

Debris IBD

10

100

1000

1 10 100 1000 10000 100000

IBD

(m)

NEQ (kg)




UK trials (100 m3)

UK trials (2250 m3)

Swisdak average

Swisdak maximum


Kasun (8 m3)

SQ14 (concrete/brick < 20 m3)


Sci Pan test data: what about NEQ > 500kg ?

44

Debris IBD

10

100

1000

1 10 100 1000 10000 100000

IBD

(m)

NEQ (kg)




UK trials (100 m3)

UK trials (2250 m3)

Swisdak average

Swisdak maximum


Kasun (8 m3)

SQ14 (concrete/brick < 20 m3)

Sci Pan (250 m3)

Sci Pan (1000 m3)


Barricaded light/open structures: SQ16 • Low angle fragments defeated by barricade • Debris from (light) container or from barricade itself remains

• In the absence of experimental data:

SQ16 was set equal to SQ15, or “Swisdak average curve”

45

Debris IBD


Earth Covered Magazines (ECMs) • Hastings test series (1984)

Excess navy 1940’s concrete arch magazines 18 kg HE and less: headwall was damaged, but no debris Relatively light doors (100 kg/m2) were launched with 10s of m/s

• Dahn-Fischbach tests (1997-1998) Stradley type (3/7 bar) ECM 4-8 kg HE: door throw 5 – 20m

46

Debris IBD

Reeves, 1984 Ross, 2010


10

100

1000

1 10 100

IBD

(m)

NEQ (kg)

SQ11 (Side/rear ECM)

SQ12 (Unbarricaded front of undefined ECM)

SQ13 (Barricaded front of undefined ECM,and 3 or 7 bar ECM)

Earth Covered Magazines (ECMs) • Side / Rear ECM: SQ11 • Unbarricaded front of undefined ECM: SQ12 • Barricaded front of undefined ECM, and 3 or 7 bar ECM: SQ13

47

Debris IBD

Door throw distance

Blast: 22.2 Q1/3

Swisdak maximum curve

DoD 6055.9

Head wall rupture


Earth Covered Magazines (ECMs) • Suggested update: SQ11 (side/rear) always ≤ front

48

Debris IBD

10

100

1000

1 10 100

IBD

(m)

NEQ (kg)

SQ11 (Side/rear ECM corrected)

SQ12 (Unbarricaded front of undefined ECM)

SQ13 (Barricaded front of undefined ECM,and 3 or 7 bar ECM)


49

Debris IBD

More advanced debris IBD models • Take into account more variables:

Swisdak: loading density = NEQ/Volume

20

30

40

50

1 10 100

Curve FitOther DataISO-1ISO-2SciPan 1SciPan 3SciPan 4

SCA

LE

D A

VE

RA

GE

PT

N IB

D, D

(m/k

g1/3 )

LOADING DENSITY, W/V (kg/m3)

153000.3

D = 22.031 + 18.021/[1+0.05045*(W/V) 140.81]

SciPan 5


50

Debris IBD

More advanced debris IBD models • Take into account more variables:

Van der Voort: NEQ, Volume, wall thickness

1

10

100

1000

10000

100000

1 10 100 1000 10000 100000

Inve

rse

calc

ulat

ed c

harg

e w

eigh

t (kg

)

Real Charge Weight (kg)

Concrete Kasun I

Concrete Kasun II

Concrete Kasun III

Concrete US Sci Pan

Masonry UK

Multiplex FOI

Steel VB-IED

Steel US ISO

perfect match


51

Debris IBD

More advanced debris IBD models • Take into account directional dependency • IBD for main directions (e.g. +/- 10º wall normal) • IBD for diagonal directions (other)


Eskimo I trial (Weals, 1973) • PES: 200.000 lb (≈ 90.000 kg) of HE (155 mm projectiles) • ES front facing rear of PES at 2 W1/3 (0.8 Q1/3 = D4) • ES front facing side of PES at 2.75 W1/3 (1.1 Q1/3 = D5) • ES front facing side of PES at 1.25 W1/3 (0.5 Q1/3 = D3)

52

IMDs

Weals, F.H., Eskimo I Magazine Separation Test, Naval Weapons Center, April 1973


Defence Trial 845/03: Acceptor magazine test (2004) • 5,000 kg Hexolite (≈ 6,000 kg TNT) • MAM (Modular Ammunition Magazine), 19 cm RC walls • Distance = D4 = 0.8 Q1/3 =17 m • “Spall” means collapse of wall + impact: don’t store SG 5 at D4!

IMDs

Van Wees, et al. , Test of a Modular Ammunition Magazine as acceptor in a 5 tonne mass explosion, DDESB 2006


IMDs

Sensitivity group definition • Described in AASTP-3 • Based on flyer plate impact test (Hager, 2000)


5 tonnes trial (2002) • 299 M106C1 shells • 5011 kg HE

IMDs

1

2

3

4

Barricade Fill IMD (m) Factor Thickness (m) B1 local soil 14 ≈0.8 (D4) 2

B2 local soil 8 ≈0.5 (D3) 3.05

B3 local soil 14 ≈0.8 (D4) 7

B4 water 14 ≈0.8 (D4) 3.2

Van Wees, van Dongen, Bouma, The participation of the Netherlands in the UK/AUS Defense Trial 840. Study of Barricades to prevent Sympathetic detonation in field storage. DDESB seminar 2006.


5 tonnes trial (2002), acceptors: • Live munitions

SG1: 155 mm SG5: detonators, plastic explosive

• Inert munitions (155 mm)

• Crusher gauges

IMDs


5 tonnes trial (2002), results: • Heavily damaged containers • No reaction of live munitions • Some of the blocks of plastic explosive flattened or broken in pieces • Steel detonator box heavily deformed, carton with detonators intact • None of the 155 mm shells showed deformation • Some crusher gauges >25% deformation (burning reaction possible)

IMDs


AASTP-1 is conservative

58

Recommendations to AC/326 SGC

AASTP-1 assumption

Observation Recommendation

Blast QDs mostly based on overpressure

Dependency on impulse not consistently addressed

Address impulse consistently

Blast from ECM front not attenuated

Blast from ECM front is significantly attenuated in far field, similar to ECM side

Address blast attenuation for ECM front in far field

Blast from RC and brick structures not attenuated

Blast from RC and brick AGS is significantly attenuated

Address blast attenuation for RC and brick AGS

Debris QDs based on wall normal direction

Debris QDs are significantly smaller in other directions, e.g. diagonal

Address smaller QDs in off-normal directions


AASTP-1 is not conservative

Experimental basis of debris IBD from ECM • What can we learn from scaled ECM tests Singapore/Norway?

Harmonization issues

• Many similarities between AASTP-1 QDs/SQs and AASTP-5 FDs Reduction number of tables might be possible • QDs not available for all protection levels

Harmonization of AASTP-1 protection levels is desirable

59


AASTP-1 assumption

Observation Recommendation

Explosive Workshops Distance Corresponds to severe damage (level B)

Address question whether this is desirable

Debris IBD (>500 kg) is fixed minimum value: 400 m

Debris IBD observed in tests (> 500kg) may be much larger

Address applicability of 400 m minimum value


For the long term: • Making changes in “rules and assumptions” rather than in tables

• Consider each explosion effect separately

• QDs not in table format but in calculation tools

Prevents human error Avoids issues about rounding and interpolation

• More advanced debris IBD models

Building dimensions, wall thickness, door properties Take into account crucifix pattern, not only main directions

60



Further study on • Complete overview of basis all QD, FD, and SQ • Inter Magazine Distances (IMD) • Other Hazard Divisions (in 2016 limited to HD1.1&1.2) • Harmonization of AASTP-1 QD and AASTP-5 FD

Presentation at various meetings/symposia • MABS symposium (18-23 sept) • OME symposium (1-2 nov) • Klotz Group, AASTP-4 CWG, AC/326 SG C • Webinar, MSIAC country visits, 1 day training

Report (end of 2016)

Basis of QD standards Knowledge gaps Advice for further development

61

Way forward


Feedback, input, & cooperation are welcome!!!!

62

Way forward

Experimental and Theoretical basis of QD standards · • Distance functions SQ1 through SQ17 •...

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