Experiment ResultsDating Game

Presented by Doug Chung

Introduction

► Question addressed How fast How strategic Rational expectation / Nash Absolute / Relative Risk aversion

Introduction

► Motivation Group dating cases in Korea during the nineties Analysis of strategic behavior Signaling

► Matching problem Full information case Different payoffs Asymmetric Information case

Previous Literature

► Gale & Shapley (1962) Assigning applicants to colleges

► Mertens & Zamir (1971) Two-person zero sum games and asymmetric information

► Kelso & Crawford (1982) Labor market matching

► Ackerberg & Botticini (2002) Endogenous matching – principal & agent

► Sorensen (2003) Venture capital / firm matching

► Choo & Siow (2006) Marriage matches

Experimental Design

► Cohort 4 person group that played each other

► Participants Undergraduate / Graduate students at Yale University – Ex2 Yale Korean Graduate Student Association – Ex1, Ex2, Ex3 Korean Military Acadamy Alumni Association at Texas A&M

Univeristy – Ex1, Ex2, Ex3 Total number of participants: 32

Experimental Design

► Experiment 1 (Perfect Information) Payoff matrix

　 Girl-High Girl-Low

Boy-High (4, 4) (2, 4)

Boy-Low (4, 2) (2, 2)

Experimental Design

► Experiment 1 (Perfect Information)

Experimental Design

► Experiment 1 (Perfect Information) cont’

Experimental Design

► Experiment 2 (Uncertainty) Payoff matrix

　 Girl-High Girl-Low

Boy-High (4, 4) (0, 4)

Boy-Low (4, 0) (0, 0)

► Experiment 2 (Uncertainty)

Experimental Design

► Experiment 2 (Uncertainty) cont’

Experimental Design

Experimental Design

► Experiment 3 (United we stand) Payoff matrix

Boy1 Girl-High 4

Boy2 Girl-Low 2

Boy1 Girl-High 0

Boy2 Girl-High 0

Boy1 Girl-Low 0

Boy2 Girl-Low 0

► Experiment 3 (United we stand)

Experimental Design

► Experiment 3 (United we stand) cont’

Experimental Design

Thank You