Executive Summary - World Resources Institutepdf.wri.org/wcd_executive_summary.pdf · 2018. 9....

E x e c u t i v e S u m m a r y

Independent Assessment of the World Commission on Dams i

A Watershed in Global Governance?AN INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENT OF THE WORLD COMMISSION ON DAMS

Executive Summary

Navroz K. Dubash

Mairi Dupar

Smitu Kothari

Tundu Lissu


i i A Watershed in Global Governance?

Copyright © 2001 World Resources Institute, Lokayan, andLawyers’ Environmental Action Team. All rights reserved.

ISBN: 1-56973-485-2

Printed in the United States of America on chlorine-free paper withrecycled content of 50%, 20% of which is post consumer.

Cover Photo Credits:

Commissioners: World Commission on DamsProtest: SamfotoConsultation: World Commission on Dams

CAROL ROSENPUBLICATIONS DIRECTOR

HYACINTH BILLINGSPRODUCTION MANAGER

MAGGIE POWELLDESIGN AND LAYOUT

CAROLLYNE HUTTEREDITOR

About the Independent Assessment

This independent assessment of the World Commission on Dams (WCD) is the collaborative effort of threeresearch and advocacy organisations: World Resources Institute (WRI), Washington, DC; Lokayan, Delhi;and Lawyers’ Environmental Action Team (LEAT), Dar es Salaam. (A full description of the contributingorganisations is given on the back inside cover.)

WRI, Lokayan, and LEAT secured the explicit co-operation of the World Commission on Dams and itsSecretariat to undertake this assessment; we are grateful to the WCD for granting interviews and sharinginformation. However, this assessment was not commissioned by the WCD and it maintains completeeditorial independence from the WCD. The WCD provided funds for translation and dissemination of theassessment’s findings, separate from research and preparation of the report. WRI was a member of the WCDForum, where it was classified as a “research institute.” WRI’s participation in the WCD as a Forum member,in terms of personnel and substantive engagement, was separate from this assessment.

WRI, Lokayan, and LEAT would like to thank the New York and New Delhi offices of the Ford Foundationfor providing major funding for the research.** Youth for Unity & Voluntary Action (YUVA), Mumbai co-ordinated support for work in South Asia. WRI is also grateful for funds it received from the Royal DutchMinistry of Foreign Affairs, the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, the U.S. Agencyfor International Development, and the MacArthur Foundation that were used in the start-up phase of thisassessment.

Established in May 1998, the WCD released its final report in November 2000. WRI, Lokayan, and LEAT’sassessment was timed to coincide with the WCD’s process and the initial period of public reception to itsfinal report. To assess in depth the innovative features and stakeholder dynamics of the WCD’s process, theresearch team undertook a comprehensive program of interviews, observation, and document review duringthe 18 months between December 1999 and May 2001.

The research team attended numerous regional and country meetings of the WCD, convened focus groups,and reviewed portrayals of the WCD in the media and literature of relevant organisations. The teaminterviewed key participants in the WCD process: 10 Commissioners, all senior advisors at the Secretariat,representatives of almost all 68 member organisations of the Forum, and various consultants and donors ofthe WCD, as well as dam-related stakeholders who were not formally involved in the WCD process. Theresearch included comprehensive analysis of portions of the WCD archive in Cape Town.

This report went through two rounds of peer review—“internal” with colleagues in our organisations, and“external.” The 10 external reviewers included five persons with central roles in the WCD process, andanother five with experience in global governance processes, or who were working in the issue areas at theintersection of environment, development, and justice. In addition, we submitted the draft informally tofive reviewers drawn from the Commission and Secretariat. Based upon these comments, we revised thereport again before final publication. Review comments, biographies of the authors, and links referenced inour text are available on the website: www.wcdassessment.org.

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** Erratum The preceding text should read: "The authors would like to thank Lokayan for its voluntary institutional partnership. We would also like to thank the New York and the New Dehli offices of the Ford Foundation for providing major funding for the research."

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Independent Assessment of the World Commission on Dams iii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

action researcher spending a year at Lokayan,and Gopal Siwakoti “Chintan,” director ofINHURED International, Kathmandu, joinedthe Lokayan team at the inception of the assess-ment. Anil withdrew six months later to pursueadvanced studies. He was replaced byRamananda Wangkheirakpam, JawaharlalNehru University, whose diligence and consis-tency contributed significantly to our report.Lakshmi Rao, Jawaharlal Nehru University,joined the team for three months, primarily toassess the entire process of a WCD thematicstudy and help organise the India workshop onthe WCD report. Biplove Chaudhary alsocontributed to the organising of this workshop.A special word of gratitude to Minar Pimple andDilip Bhadarge of YUVA, Mumbai for their trustand support. Finally, without the sustainedadministrative and logistical support providedby P.T. George, the India process and the pub-lishing of the final report would have definitelysuffered. We are immensely grateful to all ofthem as well as to the other colleagues, SteeringCommittee members, and staff of Lokayan whopatiently endured the onslaught in their midst.

LEAT acknowledges the invaluable contributionsfrom the following: Melchisedeck Lutema, a LEATstaff attorney who was part of the original studyteam until July 2000 when he moved to the US forhis graduate studies. Lutema rejoined the team asan intern from American University in Washington,DC between January and April 2001. SusanMlangwa-Nangwala, a sociologist from Uganda,prepared a Ugandan case study; JosephatAyamunda, a Kenyan lawyer, did a Kenyan study,and John Langas Mughwai and Marcel Sawa Muroundertook a Tanzanian case study. Various LEATcolleagues gave ideas and comments at variousstages of the study and to them all we are grateful.

All the authors would like to acknowledge andthank their families and loved ones who now,involuntarily, know more about the WCD thananyone could reasonably choose to. Mairi Duparand Smitu Kothari would particularly like to thanktheir daughters, Heather and Emma. By acceptinglong workdays, enduring long absences, and tolerat-ing distracted parents, our families supported uswith great, and sometimes less, amounts of patience.It is now time to pay back the debt, a task we allcommit ourselves to in the coming months.

The authors are extremely grateful to the Commis-sioners, Secretariat staff, and Forum members for thetime and assistance they generously provided in thecourse of this assessment. We also wish to thank ourreviewers for their time and efforts. While they bearno responsibility for the final product, their com-ments have led to substantial improvements in thedocument. We are also grateful to several others whocontributed knowledge and insights at key moments.Manuel Pulgar-Vidal of the Peruvian Society forEnvironmental Law attended and provided feedbackon the WCD regional consultation in São Paolo inAugust 1999. Flávia Braga Vieira of the FederalUniversity of Rio de Janeiro prepared a paper on theinteraction of Brazil’s Movement of Dam-AffectedPeople (MAB) with the WCD, during a two-monthresearch fellowship at WRI.

WRI thanks several colleagues, within WRI andacross the world, whose contributions have enrichedthis report. This report would not have beencompleted without Fritz Kahrl, who co-ordinatedresearch and production, provided editing andresearch support, and maintained enthusiasm forthe process throughout. Frances Seymour, WRI’srepresentative on the WCD Forum, encouraged usthroughout this process, and was instrumental inhelping us clear bureaucratic, financial, and otherobstacles. Elena Petkova contributed ongoing advice,detailed review, and attended key WCD meetings onbehalf of the assessment team. Thanks also toNathan Badenoch, Don Doering, and JanetRanganathan, who took time out of their busyschedules at short notice to provide helpful com-ments as part of WRI’s internal review. Tony Janetosand Grace Bermudez steered the document throughthe review process. Danilo Pelletiere of GeorgeMason University and George Faraday contributedgreatly to the assessment by reviewing the globalgovernance literature. Two interns performed wellabove and beyond the call of duty. Ray Wan of theYale School of Forestry undertook extensive researchon the WCD’s media strategy and coverage of theWCD in the popular media, and Luna Ranjit, arecent graduate of Grinnell College, providedresearch assistance on the WCD’s thematic reviews.To all these, and other colleagues who helpedthrough encouragement, support, and filling in thegaps in our workload, we are most grateful.

Lokayan wishes to acknowledge several contribu-tors and colleagues. Anil Bhattarai, a Nepalese


An Independent Assessment of the World Commission on Dams 1

Executive Summary

Because of its efforts at representing a range ofviews, its emphasis on broad consultation, and itscommitment to transparency in its work, the WCDdescribed itself as, and was proclaimed by others tobe, a unique experiment in global publicpolicymaking.1 Interest in the WCD model grewwhen, after 30 months of data gathering andnegotiation and significant scepticism overwhether consensus was possible, the Commission-ers completed a consensus report, Dams andDevelopment.2 In their report, the Commissionersovercame political divisions to provide a jointassessment of the development effectiveness ofdams in the past and map out priorities andrecommendations for water and energy develop-ment in the future. (See Box 2 and 3.) Since then,discussions about the WCD’s replicability havecascaded into areas as diverse as extractive indus-tries, trade and environment, food security andgenetically modified organisms, and debt relief.

An Experiment in Global PublicPolicymaking

Box 1

Key objectives of the WCD

� A global review of the development effective-ness of large dams, and assessments of alterna-tives.

� A framework for options assessment anddecision-making processes for water resourceand energy services and development.

� Internationally acceptable criteria and guidelinesfor planning, designing, construction, operation,monitoring, and decommissioning of dams.

Source: World Commission on Dams, Interim Report, July1999.

In mid-2000, Medha Patkar, a leader of one of thebest-known social movements in India, and GöranLindahl, the Chief Executive Officer of one of theworld’s largest engineering firms, participated in ameeting together in Cape Town. The two camefrom different worlds. Patkar was weak fromundertaking a hunger strike to protest a dam onthe Narmada River in western India. Lindahlarrived at the last minute on his private jet. Beforetheir meeting, Patkar animatedly described therecent protests, showed Lindahl pictures of thevillagers, and narrated their experiences.

So began a typical meeting of the World Commis-sion on Dams (WCD). Ms. Patkar, Mr. Lindahl,and their 10 colleagues from government minis-tries, the private sector, and civil society were allCommissioners on the WCD. Their common taskwas to address the conflicting viewpoints that havemade large dams a flash point in the arena ofenvironment, development, and justice.

The WCD was formed following a meeting ofdiverse dam-related stakeholders in early 1997 todiscuss the past and future of large dams. TheWorld Bank and the World Conservation Union(IUCN) initiated the process in response togrowing protests at dam sites around the world.Although originally focusing on a study of theWorld Bank’s dam-building record, the processgrew into an independent review that consumedthe time of 12 Commissioners, a full-time profes-sional Secretariat, a 68-member advisory Forum,and thousands of contributors. The WCD’s goalswere to build a comprehensive knowledge base oflarge dams’ development effectiveness and todevelop criteria and guidelines to advise futuredecision-making on dams. (See Box 1.)


2 A Watershed in Global Governance?

Box 2

The Dams and Development report

The Commission’s final report, Dams and Development, isa consensus report of 380 pages. All 12 Commissioners*signed the report.** Dams and Development wrapstogether the Commission’s global review of dams’development effectiveness, a framework for waterresources planning, and guidelines for options assess-ment and dam building, maintenance, and decommis-sioning.

The report was much more than a finding on dams.Rather, it was a judgement on the very governance andsocietal relations that underpin any major developmentproject. It broke new ground in international develop-ment discourse and in the history of commissions bysquarely locating infrastructure development in ahuman rights framework endorsed by most countries inthe world.

In assessing past performance, the Commissionconcluded that large dams vary greatly in deliveringpredicted water and electricity benefits, with somenotable over- and under-performance among hydrodams. Large dams often incur substantial capital costoverruns. Large dams have displaced from 40 to 80million people worldwide, but official statistics do not

This report tells the story of the WCD experimentand assesses its implications for future globalpublic policymaking. It is intended to informstakeholders in the dams debate and also govern-ments, NGOs, social movements, and private firmslooking to advance international understanding inother contentious development arenas.

The WCD in Historical Context

The WCD emerged from several strands in therecent history of global policymaking. First, theWCD built upon a history of global commissionsthat have sought either to reconcile economicgrowth and environmental sustainability (such asthe Brundtland Commission and the Stockholmand Rio Conferences) or to address North-Southinequalities and questions of justice (such as theBrandt and South Commissions). Indeed, theWCD marked a step forward by incorporating atonce the themes of social justice, human rights,ecological sustainability, and development in itswork.

Second, the dams arena illustrates the growingability of transnational civil society networks tocontribute to global public policy agendas. The

capture the full picture. Governments and developershave systematically failed to assess the range ofpotential negative impacts and to put adequatemitigation and compensation measures in place.Therefore, the development benefits of dams havebeen “marred in many cases by significant environ-mental and social impacts which when viewed fromtoday’s values, are unacceptable.” The report arguesthat inequitable power relations within and acrossnations and closed decision-making processes areamong the root causes of these failures.

To locate dams practice, past and future, theCommission used three United Nations instruments:the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948;Declaration on the Right to Development, 1986; andthe Rio Principles, 1992. The Commission argued that“governments, in constructing dams, have often foundthemselves in conflict with basic principles of goodgovernance that have been articulated in the threeinternational instruments.” Future water and energyplanning should place those rights at the centre.

The report laid out a “Rights and Risks” framework toidentify which stakeholders should be involved or

WCD was formed as a result of national andinternational civil society protest against largedams, which was often directed at such multilateralagencies as the World Bank.3 The high transac-tions costs created by civil society dissent per-suaded the World Bank and selected allies ininternational finance and industry that a newapproach was required to move the dams debateforward.

Third, the WCD stood out from previous commis-sions in its diversity by including pro-dam lobby-ists and anti-dam protesters, rather than limitingitself to participants from a broad middle ground.By the standards of global commissions generally,it also marked a notable departure from the“eminent persons” model of distinguished publicservants. It comprised, instead, active practitionerswhose personal legitimacy derived from theirprominence in international networks of stake-holders.

Fourth, the WCD was one of many government,private sector, and civil society dialogues ondevelopment policy that have proliferated sincethe landmark UN Conference on Environmentand Development in Rio de Janeiro in 1992. By



represented in decision-making. Stakeholders wouldbe identified based on whether they had a legitimateclaim and entitlement (under law, constitution, orcustom) that might be affected by a developmentproject. In what is perhaps the most far-reachingconcept in the report, the Commission argued that therisks (or “loss of rights”) of project-affected peoplesshould be recognised and addressed in an explicit,open, and transparent fashion. Historically, the notion ofrisks had been applied to investors who risked financialcapital on a project. The Commission highlighted thenumber of “involuntary risk takers” in both displacedand downstream communities as the result of dambuilding. The Commission explicitly rejected the old-fashioned “balance sheet” approach that sought to tradeoff one person’s loss against another’s gain. When rightsof various stakeholders might overlap or conflict, theCommission stated that good faith negotiations orrecourse to independent courts would be required toreconcile stakeholder interests. The Commission alsobroke new ground by accepting the principle of “priorand informed consent” of indigenous and tribalpeoples for options assessment and all stages of

planning for water and energy developments thatwould affect them.

The Commission supplemented this frameworkwith a set of strategic priorities and policy principlesfor water and energy resource development and 26specific guidelines for dam planning, building andmaintenance, and options assessment.

* There were originally 12 members on the WorldCommission on Dams, plus one non-voting member, theSecretary-General Achim Steiner. Halfway through theprocess Commissioner Shen Guoyi of China resigned, andher employer, the Chinese Ministry of Water Resources,declined to provide a replacement. Achim Steinersubsequently signed the final report with the status of fullCommissioner.

** Medha Patkar added a “comment” reiterating herappreciation for and endorsement of the Commission’s workbut expressing reservations about the report’s failure toaddress the development model underlying large dams.

Source: World Commission on Dams, Dams and Development:A New Framework for Decision-Making (London: Earthscan,2000).

including a broad range of stakeholders, the WCDwas a leading example of a “multi-stakeholderprocess.” By including multiple perspectives,integrating diverse viewpoints early in a policyprocess, and building constituencies for imple-mentation, multi-stakeholder processes areintended to provide a more inclusive and prag-matic form of policy formulation.4 Some consulta-tive processes involving civil society, business, andgovernmental actors have a direct input intopolicymaking.5 However, many multi-stakeholderprocesses lack formal authority for decision-making and result in declarations, policy recom-mendations, and codes of conduct that are notlegally binding. The WCD’s report joined a recentprofusion of normative instruments and processesin international development that have no legalstature in themselves but are intended to beconsidered by legislators and to influence develop-ment practice.6

Finally, the WCD’s structure and functioningresponded to a broader call by civil society fortransparency and inclusiveness in global gover-nance. Before and since the WCD’s formation,numerous protests and advocacy efforts by NGOsand social movements have sought to open up

global decision-making about trade and invest-ment rules, and associated labour, human rights,and environmental standards—decisions that aremade behind closed doors and in the hands of thefew, but affect the lives of millions. As a multi-stakeholder process whose objective was to addressthe source of past conflicts, the WCD committedexplicitly to being transparent and open in itswork.

Box 3

The WCD’s values and priorities

The WCD’s Five Core Values:equity, sustainability, efficiency, participatorydecision-making, and accountability.

The WCD’s Seven Strategic Priorities:gaining public acceptance; comprehensive optionsassessment; addressing existing dams; sustainingrivers and livelihoods; recognising entitlements andsharing benefits; ensuring compliance; sharing riversfor peace, development, and security.

Source: World Commission on Dams, Dams and Develop-ment: A New Framework for Decision-Making (London:Earthscan, 2000).

Box 2, continued



The debate over large dams was ripe for theWCD’s approach. Dams issues provide a micro-cosm of the changing political roles of the state,civil society, and the private sector in the rushtoward a globalised world. Private financing isplaying an increasing role, expanding the numberof actors who hold leverage in dam planning anddecision-making. Dams decisions often involvegovernments, private firms, and international financiers—including bilateral aid agencies, multilateraldevelopment banks, export credit agencies, andcommercial banks. Social movements and NGOshave criticised these actors for lack of transpar-ency and have vocally resisted their decisions. Theincrease in number and scope of physical protestshas brought added urgency to the dams debate. Atthe same time, the number of dams under plan-ning and construction has rapidly fallen as cost-effective alternatives to large dams have becomeincreasingly available, especially in providingenergy services. The controversy generated by largedams and the changing face of the dams industryprovided compelling reason for the supporters andopponents of large dams, although wary, to cometo the table. This is the context in which discussionbegan over the formation of an independentcommission to address the dams debate.

Framework for Assessing the WCD

The ability to convene diverse actors and keep themconstructively engaged is a core principle of multi-stakeholder processes, such as the WCD. For suchprocesses to be successful, stakeholders must feelthat they have access to the process, that their voicesare fully heard, and that their participation in thedeliberations is meaningful. The potential benefitsof these conditions are two fold: first, such processesare better informed, integrate diverse subjectiveviewpoints, and result in better outcomes. Second,inclusion builds constituencies for implementation.

We look at the efforts of the WCD and its initiatorsto create political space for broad access to theprocess and build constituencies for implementa-tion through

� full representation of relevant stakeholdergroups on the Commission,

� independence from external influence,� transparency to ensure the Commission’s

accountability to stakeholders’ concerns, and� inclusiveness of a range of views in compiling

the knowledge base.

We assess how the WCD put these principles intopractice, and the effect on stakeholder perceptionsof the WCD’s legitimacy as the process unfolded.Based on interviews and observation of theprocess, we ask if the WCD’s structures andpractices were sufficiently robust for stakeholdersto feel that they were meaningfully involved. Thisapproach was made possible by the timeframe ofour assessment, which was concurrent with theWCD.

We pay close attention to the political and practi-cal trade-offs that the WCD faced in its efforts tocreate a representative, independent, transparent,and inclusive process. Since the WCD broughttogether opponents in the dams debate as well as abroad political middle, inclusion of one group orperspective risked alienating another. In addition,the work of a commission is inevitably shaped bypractical trade-offs. Funds, time, and the patienceand perseverance of commissioners, staff, andstakeholders are real constraints on any suchprocess, no matter how high the aspirations togood governance. The real measure of the WCD’ssuccess is whether it managed these trade-offs wellenough to allow engagement by a range of stake-holders that was sufficiently broad to promote itsresults.

Representation and good process are ultimatelyonly means to influence policy and practice.Impact can be difficult to measure, because multi-stakeholder processes often do not have formalauthority as decision-making bodies, but seek toshape outcomes through their influence as anadvisory voice. In this study, we deploy multiplecriteria for assessment of the Commission’s likelyimpact. First, we examine whether and how theCommission achieved consensus. Without consen-sus, a commission will be seen to have reproduceddivisions among stakeholders, rather than tran-scending them. Second, we ask whether and how

The WCD stood out fromprevious commissions in itsdiversity, including pro-dam

lobbyists and anti-damprotesters, rather than limiting

itself to a broad middle.

ments, private firms, and international financiers—



the narrow consensus among commissioners caneventually be translated into a broader consensusamong stakeholders. In particular, we explorewhether a sufficiently broad range of stakeholderswas satisfied enough with the process to constitutea constituency for implementation.

Finally, this assessment is informed by historicalprecedent. We undertook a detailed survey of pastcommissions, civil society advocacy efforts, globalconferences, and multi-stakeholder processes. Allof these arenas represent important influences inthe formation of the WCD. This rich recordprovides a useful context for the assessment, as itreflects the many strands that shaped the WCD. Itprovides a lens on the practical feasibility ofdifferent forms of stakeholder consultation andrepresentation by demonstrating what has beenaccomplished before.

The Formation of the WCD

The World Commission on Dams was initiatedfollowing a meeting of diverse dam-related stake-holders convened by the World Bank and IUCN atGland, Switzerland, in 1997. The purpose of themeeting was to discuss the second phase of a studyby the World Bank’s Operations EvaluationDepartment (OED) on World Bank-sponsoreddams.7 In the run-up to the meeting, civil societygroups called for an independent global body toreview large dams’ performance and criticised theOED review sharply for failing to reveal the trueextent of dams’ environmental and social disrup-tion and economic and technical under-perfor-mance.8

The convenors of the process were important increating the political space for dialogue. Neitherthe World Bank nor the IUCN were regarded asneutral convenors, for stakeholders identified theformer with dam building and the latter withenvironmental conservation interests. Together,however, they persuaded stakeholders fromgovernment, industry, NGOs, and social move-ments to attend the Gland workshop.

The World Bank and IUCN debated how broadparticipation in the dialogue should be anddecided to cast the net wide to capture diversityacross and within stakeholder groups. Inviteesincluded civil engineers with lifelong careers indam building, such as members of the Interna-tional Commission on Large Dams (ICOLD), a

dam-builders’ association, as well as groups thatwere formed specifically to oppose large dams,such as the International Rivers Network (IRN)and Narmada Bachao Andolan (Struggle to Savethe Narmada River). With the aid of painstakingpreparation and facilitation by the organisers, theparticipants agreed, during a tense two-day meet-ing, on the need for an independent global review ofdams’ development effectiveness and a new interna-tional framework for water and energy planning.9

The World Bank and IUCN oversaw a contentiousprocess of Commissioner selection in late 1997.Together with a core group of participants fromthe Gland meeting, they chose a 12-memberCommission with Professor Kader Asmal, SouthAfrica’s Minister for Water Affairs and Forestry, atthe helm. Lakshmi Jain, the Indian High Commis-sioner to South Africa, was appointed as Vice-Chairperson. The other Commissioners hailedfrom government, industry, academia, non-governmental organisations, and social move-ments. (See Box 4.) The process of Commissionerselection was so tense that major interest groupsinvolved threatened on many occasions to with-draw and scuttle the effort in a barrage of negativepublicity.

From its first meeting in May 1998, the Commis-sion embarked upon a two-year fact-findingmission.10 (See Box 1.) The ambitious workprogramme included public hearings, case studies,cross-cutting “thematic” papers, and an overviewsurvey of 150 large dams.11 (See Box 5.) Theprogramme’s objective was to build a knowledgebase on the development effectiveness of largedams and options for providing water and energyservices—a knowledge base from which theCommissioners would extrapolate their findingsand recommendations. The knowledge formationprocess was also to provide a platform for dialogueamong diverse stakeholders.

The WCD’s structure andfunctioning responded to a

broader call by civil society fortransparency and inclusiveness

in global governance.



The WCD recognised that technical informationabout dams already resided with professionaldams associations, such as ICOLD and theInternational Hydropower Association (IHA).Therefore, its members decided to focus on “those

key issues around which there is greatest disagree-ment”12 —the benefits and costs of dams, and thenature of the decision-making processes behindthem.

A professional Secretariat of 10 senior membersand numerous support staff managed the workprogramme from Cape Town, South Africa. Anadvisory Forum comprising the original partici-pants of the Gland meeting, plus an additional 30representatives of relevant organisations (see Box6), met twice during the WCD’s process and onceafter the report’s release to act as a sounding boardfor the Commission’s work.

Because the Commission attempted to capture thepolitical extremes of the debate in its compositionand work programme, many observers consideredthe experiment ambitious. Even with the threecomponent bodies of the WCD in place—theCommission, Secretariat, and Forum—it was notclear that they would endure the political frictionof the process.

Establishing a Credible Process

Representation

The WCD departed from the eminent persons modelof past global commissions, which were composed ofelder statesmen and women with distinguishedrecords of public service. The Commissioners of theWCD were indeed prominent individuals, but theywere prominent as active practitioners in NGO, socialmovement, and business networks, as well as ingovernment agencies. In many cases they wereselected because they were perceived as being affiliatedwith distinct constituencies. The combination ofstature and affiliation with interests provided abridge between previous commission models and theemerging concept of multi-stakeholder processes. TheWCD’s initiators had no obvious benchmark to usewhen departing from an eminent persons’ model tocompose a diverse multi-stakeholder commission.Rather, the selection of Commissioners was the resultof a political negotiation. Helpfully, the WCD’s ownprocess later generated a robust framework foridentifying stakeholders based on rights and volun-tary and involuntary risks. (See Box 2.) This frame-work will be relevant to the formation of futuremulti-stakeholder processes.

Although representativeness was a key selectioncriterion for Commissioners, they were chosen to

Box 4

The Commissioners

Kader AsmalWCD ChairpersonMinistry of Water Affairs and Forestry, South Africa

Lakshmi Chand JainWCD Vice-ChairpersonHigh Commissioner to South Africa, India

Judy HendersonOxfam International, Australia

Göran LindahlAsea Brown Boveri Ltd., Sweden

Thayer ScudderCalifornia Institute of Technology, United States

Joji CariñoTebtebba Foundation, Philippines

Donald BlackmoreMurray-Darling Basin Commission, Australia

Medha PatkarStruggle to Save the Narmada River, India

José GoldembergUniversity of São Paolo, Brazil

Deborah MooreEnvironmental Defense, United States

Shen Guoyi*Ministry of Water Resources, China

Jan Veltrop**Honorary President, ICOLD, United States

Achim Steiner***WCD Secretary-GeneralGermany

* Resigned, early 2000

** Joined Commission in September 1998, to replaceWolfgang Pircher the original nominee

*** Initially an ex-officio Commissioner

Note: Affiliations as of 1998.

Source: World Commission on Dams, Interim Report, July1999.



serve in their individual capacities rather than asformal institutional representatives. This arrange-ment placed the burden of legitimacy heavily on thepersonal and professional reputation of the Com-missioners, and on the continued strength of theirties to their networks. This notion of loose represen-tation was critical to the overall success of theprocess. Commissioners’ freedom from institutionalties allowed them the flexibility to evolve new formsof understanding amongst themselves. It alsorequired them to move skilfully between theirprofessional networks and their shared responsibil-ity as Commissioners.

The Commissioner selection process provedinstrumental to stakeholders’ willingness to engagein the WCD process. After pressuring the WorldBank and IUCN for a role, a small group repre-senting industry, NGOs, and dam-affected peoplewas allowed to participate in vetting candidatesand drawing up a final list. The participation ofthese stakeholders in the selection process turnedout to be vital to the Commission’s legitimacy withthose interest groups. It would have been impracti-cal for all concerned stakeholders to learn aboutand participate in the selection process. Theparticipation of this ad hoc group, from diversenetworks and backgrounds, was a practical, goodfaith effort to gauge the general political accept-ability of the Commission. Future processes wouldbenefit from involving a range of stakeholdergroups in the selection of commissioners.

The different levels of organisation and interestacross stakeholder groups at this time influencedCommissioners and groups’ subsequent engage-ment in the process. When the WCD was formed,the anti-dam movement was relatively wellorganised, which translated into coherent demandsfor representation. Before and after the Glandmeeting, civil society groups refused to be sub-

sumed in a single stakeholder category. They arguedthat “civil society” was sufficiently diverse that itmerited several stakeholder categories: indigenouspeoples, non-indigenous project-affected people,public interest advocacy groups, and environmentalgroups. In particular, civil society groups pressed foraffected peoples’ representatives and indigenouspeoples’ representatives to have their own seats atthe table. This demand—which formed the basis forthe Commission’s political acceptability to the anti-dam movement—marked a departure fromprevious consultative and multi-stakeholderprocesses in which civil society slots were typicallytaken by NGOs close to the corridors of power inWashington, Nairobi, and Delhi.

Box 6

Categories of stakeholder groups on theWCD advisory Forum

Category Number of Groups

Bilateral Agencies /Export Credit Guarantee Agencies 6

Government Agencies 6

International Associations 4

Multilateral Agencies 7

Affected Peoples’ Groups 7

NGOs 13

Private Sector Firms 6

Research Institutes 10

River Basin Authorities 4

Utilities 5

Source: WCD website, www.dams.org/about/forum_list.htm(28 August 2001).

Box 5

The WCD Work Programme

Knowledge Base

Focal Dam/Basin 125 Large Dams Thematic Reviews Submissions Case Studies Cross-Check Survey & Consultations

Source: World Commission on Dams, Dams and Development: A New Framework for Decision-Making (London: Earthscan, 2000).



By contrast, dam-building companies andutilities did not take an active interest in thenascent WCD process in its early days, largelybecause they disregarded its significance. Inaddition, some business people noted that thecompetitive nature of the dams industry, orsimply companies’ varying portfolios, posed aninitial challenge to their building group solidarityaround common interests. As a result, whenprivate companies and utilities recognised thegrowing reputation of the WCD and becamemore active in the process later on, some feltunder-represented on the Commission. Thisdiscontent was exacerbated by circumstances, asthe Commissioner best positioned to representcorporate interests (Mr. Lindahl) slowly lost theconfidence of industry groups as his companyprogressively withdrew from the large hydro-power business. This gradual loss of representa-tion led industry groups to feel that they werelosing ground in the debate and led to the estab-lishment of a more formal industry networktoward the end of the process. The contrastingexperience of stakeholder groups suggests thatstakeholders bear a considerable burden of defin-ing constituencies and mobilising accordingly, ifthey are to feel adequately represented.

National governments were represented onlymodestly at the Gland meeting and in theCommission’s formation, an outcome with consid-erable significance for the subsequent process. TheWorld Bank and IUCN invited only one ministryrepresentative to the Gland meeting: an officialfrom China, which was undertaking possibly thelargest engineering feat known to humankind in theThree Gorges Dam.13 Government viewpoints wereotherwise represented by various proxies and quasi-governmental appointees, from two state-ownedutilities,14 and two river basin authorities.15 TheIndian government would later point out that in itsview, it and other major dam-building governmentshad been excluded from the formative process.Despite the presence of a strong Chairperson andVice-Chairperson from Southern governments, theability of the WCD to attract the political support ofgovernments would become a serious issue later on,and would inhibit their more enthusiastic engage-ment with the process and final report.

The issue of government representation highlightsone of the trade-offs that the WCD could not avoid.The muted participation of governments during theCommission’s formation helped create the space for

groups believed that to involve governmentsintegrally from the start would have delayed, if notstalled, the formation process.16 Based on state-ments made by governments later in the process,government involvement at the formation stagewould likely have led to a less broadly consultativeprocess and a less aspirational outcome.17 Hence,greater “inclusion” of governments would likelyhave led to the loss of civil society voices.18 Forexample, the response of the Chinese government tothe unfolding process certainly suggests that somegovernments were unwilling to sustain engagementwith a broad spectrum of stakeholders. The Chinesegovernment permitted an official of the Ministry ofWater Resources, Shen Guoyi, to serve on theCommission in her personal capacity. However, Ms.Guoyi resigned halfway through the process,ostensibly for health reasons. The governmentdeclined to provide a replacement and later statedthat “China retreated from WCD 1998 due to [our]very different position with the majority of Com-mission members.”19 China’s discomfort with theprocess led to its rejection of the final report, whichwas significant given that almost half of the globalpopulation of 45,000 large dams resides in China.

The option of a Commissioner from the WorldBank was never explicitly considered given thehistory of the dams debate and the genesis of theWCD in civil society calls for an independentreview. It was important to affirm the principle ofdiverse stakeholder representation rather thanspecific representatives from particular institutionsor agencies. Indeed, World Bank representation onthe Commission may have alienated social move-ments and NGOs. Such a development would havechanged the entire character of the process andlikely its results. In future processes, if the WorldBank is more centrally engaged, even representedon a Commission, it may place greater pressure onthe institution to acknowledge ownership of thefindings and recommendations. The price, how-ever, would be diminished independence. Suchpotential trade-offs between representation and

The Commissioner selectionprocess proved instrumental to

stakeholders’ willingness toengage in the WCD process.

NGOs and social movements to participate. These



adoption of findings, on the one hand, and charac-ter of the process and results, on the other, arehighly relevant to future processes.

The emphasis on representing positions withinthe dams debate resulted in limited attention torepresentation viewed through a regional lens.Although Commissioners came from sevencountries in all, they included three Americans,two Western Europeans, two Indians, and twoAustralians. This apparent regional imbalanceperplexed stakeholders in other major dam-building regions, such as Latin America, Africa,and the Middle East.20 This said, the Commission’smembership was well balanced between North andSouth, and in a matter of great importance toSouthern countries—where the majority of futuredams will be built—both the Chairperson and theVice-Chairperson were from Southern nations.

From the perspective of stakeholders within acountry, the viewpoint of Commissioners wasequally, if not more important, than the number ofCommissioners. To the Government of India, thechoice of Commissioners proved a red flag. Thegovernment regarded both Indian nationals,Lakshmi Jain and particularly Medha Patkar, asanti-dam. This perception, compounded byunfortunate events surrounding the cancellation ofa South Asia regional meeting in Bhopal, India,contributed to the distancing of this key govern-ment from the WCD process.

Finally, the WCD experience suggests that ad-equate representation of stakeholders shouldextend beyond the Commission to all the otherorgans of the process. As a sounding board, theadvisory Forum was intended to capture diverseperspectives from the dams debate, and did sosuccessfully. Secretariat diversity was importantbecause Secretariat staff were the filters betweenthe broad community of stakeholders and theCommissioners, and deployed their networks indeveloping the work programme. NGOs faultedthe Secretariat for having no staff who had workeddirectly with displaced people. Industry groupscriticised the Secretariat for lacking technicaldams expertise. According to the Secretariat, it wasdifficult to recruit senior staff with diverse sectoraland regional backgrounds because of relocationissues and the temporary nature of the assignment.Criticisms by Forum members suggest that quiteaside from the performance of the Secretariat, in apartisan arena each interest group hopes to see

someone “like themselves” on the Secretariat, andjudges the legitimacy of the Secretariat accord-ingly.

Women were well represented on the Commissionitself, comprising five of the twelve originalmembers. However, both the Secretariat andForum had disproportionately small numbers ofwomen or, perhaps more pertinent to issues ofrepresentation, they included few women or menwho were sensitive to the gender-differentiatedimpacts of water and energy development, and tobest practice in gender and development work. Thediscrepancy in numbers and the poor representa-tion of gender advocates led women to feelmarginalised in discussion forums. The WCD’sfinal report might have had a stronger genderperspective running through it had there beenmore women and gender advocates in its Secre-tariat and Forum.21 By failing to include moresuch voices, the WCD failed to meet its ownstandard for inclusiveness and neglected animportant constituency.

In summary, representation of the full range ofstakeholders, across government, business, and civilsociety as well as regions and disciplines, canconsiderably enhance the legitimacy of a multi-stakeholder process. In the case of the WCD, thispotential was somewhat diminished by the lack offull industry confidence, largely because of theirfailure to mobilise early in the process, and by thewariness of some governments. Yet, the alternative

SSSSSTRTRTRTRTRAAAAATEGIESTEGIESTEGIESTEGIESTEGIES FORFORFORFORFOR AAAAACHIECHIECHIECHIECHIEVINGVINGVINGVINGVING ADEQADEQADEQADEQADEQUUUUUAAAAATETETETETE

REPRESENTREPRESENTREPRESENTREPRESENTREPRESENTAAAAATIONTIONTIONTIONTION

� Base representation on broad constituencies andskills-based categories, rather than on eminencealone, to create the political space for a largerange of stakeholders to get involved.

� Undertake an assessment to determine majorcategories of stakeholders who must be broughtto the table.

� Engage a range of stakeholders early in theprocess of commissioner selection to gauge thepolitical acceptability of commission composi-tion, particularly if the commission is based on therepresentation of interest groups.

� Ensure that the composition of the secretariatembraces disciplinary breadth and is seen toreflect broader stakeholder interests.

� Ensure that a gender perspective is representedin all of a commission’s bodies.


1 0 A Watershed in Global Governance?

of relying exclusively on a middle ground, how-ever eminent the representatives, would not havecarried the same credibility with the range ofpeople involved and particularly not with civilsociety whose calls for an independent review ledto the formation of the WCD. Hence, despite thetrade-offs involved that make it impossible tosatisfy all sides, and despite the challenges ofbalancing various forms of representation, thepotential legitimacy gains make the representativemulti-stakeholder model worth emulating.

Independence

The WCD was born out of calls by civil society foran independent review of the global experiencewith large dams, with a particular focus on the roleof international aid and credit agencies. Hence itsindependence, not only from funding agencies, butalso from influence by various stakeholder groupswas a critical element of its legitimacy. At the sametime, the success of the WCD relied on vigorousengagement by all stakeholders, so as to promotebuy-in to the process and the final outcome. Thesimultaneous pursuit of independence and en-gagement certainly posed a challenge. Rather thanseeking neutrality, the Commission sought balancein its engagement with stakeholders.

The Commission was independent from theconvening institutions—the World Bank andIUCN—insofar as it was not answerable to them,these institutions were not represented on theCommission, and they did not control its opera-tions or decision-making process. The WCD madea clear choice for independence over ownershipby convening institutions, a choice that was critical tothe Commission’s legitimacy.

Considerations of independence should extendbeyond a commission to selection of secretariatmembers. A secretariat invariably influences acommission’s work and perceptions of indepen-dence. Secretariat members draw on their pastexperience and professional networks in perform-ing tasks, which include framing debates,

synthesising materials, and managing research andreview processes. In the WCD process, for example,some stakeholders were concerned that theSecretary-General and three of ten senior advisershad strong prior ties with IUCN and that ecologi-cal concerns would be given undue weight ascompared to social or economic issues.

Maintaining independence by diversifying fundingsources was a major accomplishment of the WCDthat enhanced its broader legitimacy. The WCDexplicitly sought financial support from govern-ment and multilateral agencies, the private sector,and civil society groups. This fundraising effort wastime-consuming and overshadowed much of thework programme. However, the pay-off was worththe effort, for diverse funding sources demon-strated that the WCD was not beholden to any oneset of interests. Indeed, it is a notable measure ofsuccess that Forum members and the generalmedia did not criticise the WCD’s funding strategy.

Also in the interests of independence, the WCDadopted a policy of only seeking money that camewith no strings attached. This was more difficult toaccomplish. In order to raise sufficient funds, theWCD did compromise this principle. For instance,the Commission accepted major donations(principally from bilateral and multilateralagencies) that were tied to specific events orstudies. However, there is no evidence that theseconditions forced the WCD to do what it otherwisewould not have done, nor did they undermine theconfidence of Forum members or other concernedstakeholders in the integrity of the process. Futureprocesses will, similarly, have to handle suchrelationships cautiously to avoid donor influence.

Transparency

A body of international analysis is emerging onnorms for transparency in development decision-

The WCD’s independencefrom convening institutionswas critical to its legitimacy.

SSSSSTRTRTRTRTRAAAAATEGIESTEGIESTEGIESTEGIESTEGIES FORFORFORFORFOR ENSURINGENSURINGENSURINGENSURINGENSURING INDEPENDENCEINDEPENDENCEINDEPENDENCEINDEPENDENCEINDEPENDENCE

� Weigh the benefits of independence against thepotential for buy-in that comes with institutionalownership of a process.

� Ensure that the composition of the Secretariatsupports, rather than undermines, perceptionsand reality of independence.

� Seek a diverse funding base based on untiedfunds.


An Independent Assessment of the World Commission on Dams 1 1

making, which provides a benchmark againstwhich to evaluate the WCD experience and othermulti-stakeholder processes. A relevant standardfor transparency is that the objective of the policyprocess is communicated in a timely manner torelevant stakeholders, stakeholders are told howthey can participate and how their inputs will beused, stakeholders’ inputs are acknowledged, anddecisions are communicated in full.22

Transparency was central to the WCD’s legitimacyfor several reasons. Non-transparent decision-making processes in multilateral institutions, andin large-scale development generally, have beenmajor causes of friction in the history of largedams. To mobilise broad input for its workprogramme, and therefore build credibility as aplatform for dialogue, the WCD had to respond tostakeholder demands for transparency. Transpar-ency was especially important, because there wereno formal accountability mechanisms betweenCommissioners and various constituencies. Hence,disclosing information about objectives, methods,and progress helped keep Commissioners honestto broader tides of opinion. Perhaps most impor-tant, the WCD had limited ability to facilitatebroad consensus among contending interestgroups during its lifetime. Given a two-year timeline and limited resources, it was at first uncertainwhether even the Commissioners themselveswould reach consensus. In order to leverage theWCD’s influence in the dams debate, the commit-ment to transparency was necessary to disseminatenew ways of thinking among these constituen-cies.23

The WCD did strive to, and substantially achieved,such high standards of transparency. It communi-cated widely to stakeholders the opportunities forparticipation in the work programme throughpostings on the Internet. It disseminated the termsof reference for studies and the thematic papersand case studies to all interested parties andposted them on its award-winning website. Inaddition, stakeholder groups were engaged in theprocess by reviewing the terms of reference andstudies and by occasionally participating inmeetings organised around the various studies.

The Commission’s track record for transparencywas tarnished toward the end of the process,however, when the Commission did not communi-cate clearly whether the Forum would have anopportunity to review a synthesis of work

programme results. The synthesis was to becompiled by the Secretariat from the myriadbackground studies midway through the process.It was intended to provide a succinct summary ofthe knowledge base that the Commission woulduse to prepare its findings and recommendations.Because of time pressures, the interim step ofsharing a synthesis with the Forum was abandoned.The lack of a focused consultation with Forummembers about the tone, emphasis, and approachto recommendations based on interim findingsfailed to make full use of the Forum.

Although discussion of interim findings compiledby the Secretariat based on the knowledge basemay well have been constructive, disclosure of theCommissioners’ draft final report, as some Forumgroups desired, would have been counterproduc-tive. A premature effort to build a broad consensusamong stakeholders, via the Forum, might haverisked undermining progress toward the Commis-sioners’ consensus. Over two years, the Commis-sioners had developed a delicate internal dynamicbased upon mutual respect and shared learningthat did not exist among Forum members or thewider stakeholder community. Circulation of aCommissioners’ draft for comment risked ignitingpolitically charged debates among interest groups,which could have undermined Commissionersolidarity. The lesson is that the demand fortransparency must be balanced with the often-delicate dynamics of consensus among commis-sioners.

Another set of practical challenges to full trans-parency pertain to consultation in a global settingwhere stakeholders’ use of information is limitedby language and their access to information islimited by access to the Internet. The transparencyof the WCD’s process was diluted for those non-English speaking stakeholders who could notunderstand the information. The WCD’s recordin translating information about the workprogramme from English into other languages wasmixed. Although the final report itself wastranslated in full into Spanish and the summaryinto numerous languages,24 working documentswere not translated. Because it is not practical totranslate multiple drafts of working papers forstakeholder dissemination, a reasonable standardmay be to translate essential framing documentsand interim products into major world languages.Although translation and interpretation requiressignificant amounts of time and money, it should



be an integral part of the time lines and budgets offuture processes.

The WCD’s efforts to reach out in person tostakeholders and go beyond reliance on theInternet were important to those with limitedInternet access. This included the majority ofSouthern stakeholders, even in elite institutions.Personal contact—through seminars, workshops,and official consultations—helped engage themand solicit their input more effectively.

The Commission’s efforts to disseminate informa-tion about opportunities for participation werenot matched by its management capability toacknowledge stakeholder inputs once they werereceived. This is a problem that can easily becorrected in future processes. For almost the firsttwo years of the Commission’s life, stakeholderswere invited to send written submissions on thedevelopment effectiveness of large dams. Theprocess yielded a total of 970 submissions frominstitutions and individuals around the world andhelped the Commission achieve an image ofopenness. Managerial problems somewhat under-mined the mechanism’s legitimacy. Consultantsfailed to integrate submissions and only in the latestages did the Secretariat have the resources to doso. They were included on a CD-ROM of theknowledge base that was mailed to stakeholdersafter the report’s launch. However, the lack of earlyacknowledgement undermined the confidence ofcontributors that their submissions would be takeninto account.

Inclusiveness

“Let no one say that the World Commission onDams has not been all-inclusive,” said ProfessorKader Asmal on launching the WCD’s report inNovember 2000. Indeed, by the standard of globalcommissions, the WCD was extraordinary in itsinclusiveness. Not only were affected peoples’

perspectives directly represented on the Commis-sion, but community groups were empowered toparticipate directly in case study consultations andregional hearings, and members of the generalpublic were encouraged to submit their viewsdirectly to the Commission for consideration. TheCommission’s insistence on welcoming all forms ofevidence—the grassroots as well as the “official”—as a valid contribution to the knowledge baseensured that it was more democratic than techno-cratic. The effort to reach previously unheardvoices also displeased some technical experts whowere accustomed to being the dominant partici-pants in such processes. The practical obstacles todemocratising the dialogue were many, and thecommitment to inclusiveness raised people’sexpectations, perhaps beyond a level that the WCDcould deliver, as we shall detail below. The WCD’smajor achievement was that it developed sufficientauthority as a convenor that it could create andstrengthen the political space over two years ofconsultations to engage most concerned parties inthe knowledge gathering process.

The WCD’s advisory Forum best demonstratedthe inclusiveness of the process, for it includedorganisations that had engaged in bitter wars ofwords and even physical clashes in the past overthe legitimacy of dam projects. Export creditagencies that were backing controversial damprojects in the South joined the Forum alongsideindigenous peoples’ groups defending theirancestral lands from large dams. Large engineeringfirms that supplied dam equipment joined along-side civil society organisations that had arrangedprotests outside their corporate offices. Forummeetings provided the chance for such diverse

To build credibility as aplatform for dialogue, theWCD had to respond tostakeholder demands for

transparency.

SSSSSTRTRTRTRTRAAAAATEGIESTEGIESTEGIESTEGIESTEGIES FORFORFORFORFOR CREACREACREACREACREATINGTINGTINGTINGTING TRTRTRTRTRANSPANSPANSPANSPANSPARENTARENTARENTARENTARENT

PRPRPRPRPROOOOO CESSCESSCESSCESSCESS

� Respect stakeholder expectations to comment oninterim products, given current norms oftransparency. Weigh stakeholder expectations forcomment, particularly on final products, againstthe risks of disrupting a fragile consensus.

� Translate framing and synthesis documents tobroaden participation in the process.

� Disseminate documents on the Internet anddevote significant resources to outreach by non-electronic means.

� Establish adequate mechanisms for acknowledg-ing and processing public contributions.



actors to talk for the first time, as when the JapanBank for International Cooperation met with theCordillera People’s Alliance from the Philippines.Some Forum members refused to engage in directdialogue with others, but many agency officials,community representatives, and NGOs camewith—or developed—a listening ear. Although theeffects are hard to measure, gathering such actorsin the same room for three substantive Forummeetings was clearly an achievement.

While the act of convening such diverse partieswas worthwhile and quite unusual, the ongoingengagement of Forum members in the WCD’swork programme was sporadic and uneven. Forummembers’ satisfaction with their roles had partly todo with how effectively they organised themselvesto provide input. Some seized the initiative.Indeed, the Chairperson and Secretariat spentcountless hours responding to concerns, mostlyfrom NGOs and industry groups, about how theWCD framed its work programme and the contentof specific papers and events. The time anddiplomacy required for this task should not beunderestimated. Staff ’s personal qualities wereimportant to keeping these diverse groups engagedin the process.

Structured opportunities for Forum members toprovide guidance on the work programme were farfewer. Commission and Secretariat members saythey were informed and empowered by their twoformal meetings with Forum members. However,the consultations fell far short of using the Forumas a “sounding board” for the direction of theWCD’s final report as Forum members gainedlittle sense of the Commission’s internal delibera-tions. As a result, Forum members’ ownership inthe process and forthcoming product was quitetenuous. Between the second Forum meeting andthe launch of the report, an intense aura of secrecysurrounded the final report’s content, and thereport surprised many Forum members upon itsrelease. Many members were ill-prepared toreceive and respond to the report.

The WCD experience suggests that advisory bodieshave considerable value in providing a platformfor exchange among conflicting interest groups.Such bodies further a commission’s shared learningand advance its members’ thinking. For partici-pants to reap tangible benefits from the experi-ence, they not only need to be organised andmotivated to participate themselves, but they also

require regular updates about the progress of thework programme and the direction of acommission’s thinking. The WCD excelled inproviding Forum members with informationalupdates, but as our discussion about transparencyindicated, they fell short of their own high stan-dards in fully engaging the Forum.

The WCD’s ability to create and maintain politicalspace for diverse engagement rested in large parton its open-ended approach to knowledge gather-ing. Rather than defining criteria up front for thedevelopment effectiveness of large dams, theCommission invited stakeholders to present theirown analytic and normative views of whetherdam projects had advanced their society’s development.The multicriteria, multidisciplinary case studieswere in theory set up to elicit such converging anddiverging views.25 This approach assured stake-holders that the process did not prejudge out-comes, and thus encouraged broad participation.

Alternative methodologies for the workprogramme could have focused on more compre-hensive comparisons of dams with water andenergy alternatives, or on situating dams withinglobal water and energy forecasts. Many industryand government participants remain displeasedthat such a comparison was not undertaken.Stakeholders from scientific backgrounds criticisedheavily the perceived lack of technical merit in theWCD’s final report. However, it remains the casethat a more technocratic process would haveexcluded the broad range of views encouraged bythe WCD—grassroots, as well as official.

The WCD’s open-ended and inclusive approach toknowledge gathering held significant implicationsfor its structure and operations. The multifacetedstudies and consultations required a large manage-ment effort and a substantial budget. The totalexpenses of the Commission over two and a halfyears were almost US$10 million, of which the

Advisory bodies have con-siderable value in providing

a platform for exchangeamong conflicting interest

groups.



majority went toward knowledge gathering andsynthesis.26 The scope of the effort created a greatfundraising burden. It also fostered new stake-holder relationships, enabled a profound processof shared learning to occur among Commissioners,and led to the production of a report that signifi-cantly reframed the global dams debate. Becauseone of the main breaking points in the damsdebate had been civil society opposition, thelegitimacy of the WCD process and its potential toaccomplish real progress depended upon inclusionof a range of civil society voices.

The WCD’s regional consultations were importantvehicles for the Commission to demonstrate itsinclusive approach. These hearings, which tookplace in South Asia, South America, Africa andthe Middle East, and East and Southeast Asia, broughtalmost the entire Commission and Secretariat toSouthern regions to reach out and listen to stake-holders. The Secretariat went to considerablelengths to include social, economic, and environ-mental topics, along with pro- and anti-damperspectives on the panels, by selecting presentersbeforehand, based on a general submissionsprocess. The Commission paid for presenters’travel to the venue when they lacked their ownfunds, which ensured that a range of presenters

could attend, from community representatives, toenvironmental experts, to dam engineers, toagency planners. Not only did these events raiseawareness of the Commission’s work during itsprocess, but they were also a means of legitimisingthe process’ outcome—the Commission could restits report upon consultations with thousands ofpeople.

The first attempt to stage a consultation failedmiserably because the Commission planned a fieldtrip to the hugely controversial Narmada Valleyproject in India. This decision outraged the stategovernment of Gujarat, a major beneficiary of thedam project. Responding to this, the Governmentof India withdrew its permission for the meetingand the Commission retreated under a hail ofnegative press. However, the Commission suc-ceeded in arranging events with diverse representa-tion subsequently, in Sri Lanka (for South Asia),Brazil (for Latin America), Egypt (for Africa andthe Middle East), and Vietnam (for East andSoutheast Asia).

Two important lessons from the regional consulta-tions are relevant for future commissions andmulti-stakeholder processes. First, even whenmeetings are carefully designed for balance andinclusiveness, the failed India meeting serves as areminder that the location and timing of publicmeetings is a political decision that can alienatestakeholders. When such decisions appear heavilybiased toward one side or another, the commissionrisks destroying its ability to act as a convenor forbroad stakeholder dialogue. In this case, themeeting preparation appeared to bear upon a localcontroversy.

Second, the WCD succeeded in mobilisinggrassroots input for its hearings, which wasnotable for a global commission. WCD eventsoften marked the first time that governmentofficials had heard directly the voices of affectedpeople and the alternative viewpoints of NGOs.This mobilisation owed something to the effortsof diverse Commissioners, Secretariat staff, andForum members. But in particular, grassrootsmobilisation resulted from the efforts of a fewhighly co-ordinated, dedicated civil society groupswho reached out to contacts at the communitylevel with their own resources. Future processeswill also rely heavily upon networks of staff,commissioners, and advisors to mobilise participa-tion. Where such networks are limited in their

SSSSSTRTRTRTRTRAAAAATEGIESTEGIESTEGIESTEGIESTEGIES FORFORFORFORFOR CREACREACREACREACREATINGTINGTINGTINGTING INCLINCLINCLINCLINCLUSIVEUSIVEUSIVEUSIVEUSIVE PRPRPRPRPROOOOOCESSCESSCESSCESSCESS

� Use advisory forums to create structured opportu-nities for multi-stakeholder input to the process. Ifforum members are to be used as ambassadorsfor the final product, they must be briefedregularly on the substance of the developingproduct to gain their support.

� Adopt a work programme that allows stakehold-ers to propose diverse approaches and measuresin order to foster inclusion.

� Hold public hearings and establish processes foraccepting general submissions from the public tofoster inclusion of diverse viewpoints.

� Use international networks to disseminateinformation about events, but also exploit countryand regional networks and the mass media, wherepossible, to reach broad audiences.

� Provide financial support to community represen-tatives and other less-resourced groups to allowthem to travel to meetings, so that the scope oftheir participation is equivalent to that ofgovernment, business, and better-resourcedgroups.



reach, as they inevitably will be, it may be practicalto assign additional resources to civil societygroups and local actors to increase appropriateoutreach. Vigorous outreach to local media tomobilise input to consultations would also be acost-effective strategy in the future.

A Successful Model?

Was the WCD a successful model? Whatoverarching lessons does the WCD experience holdfor multi-stakeholder commissions? The WCD’simplicit strategy was to achieve consensus among asmall, but legitimate and broadly representativegroup of Commissioners, and subsequently toexpand this consensus to the broader group ofstakeholders. The WCD passed one necessarycondition for success—it produced a consensusreport. That it achieved this tangible goal suggeststhat the Commission did transcend, rather thanreproduce, fractures among interest groups in thedams debate. Achieving a consensus was by nomeans a foregone conclusion at any stage of theprocess. It owed much to careful design. A centralelement in this design was the principle of “suffi-cient consensus” on which the Chairperson basedthe deliberations. This formulation allowedincremental progress toward agreement on anever-expanding set of issues, even while preservingspace for disagreement. For example, one Commis-sioner chose to issue a comment stating agreementwith the report, but also concern that the WCD didnot go far enough in challenging the basic premiseof the development enterprise.

Consensus among Commissioners was alwaysintended to be a means to a greater end—progresstoward a consensus among stakeholders at large. Alegitimate process was a precondition for thisoutcome. An important assumption of the Com-mission was that if stakeholders felt adequatelyrepresented on the Commission, and if theyacknowledged that their voices were adequatelyheard, then they would have few grounds on whichto reject the outcome. In this assessment, we havedocumented and discussed various strengths andflaws in the WCD process and stakeholders’opinions about the implications of these flaws. Dostakeholder views about shortcomings underminethe outcome? As a brief summary of reactions tothe report suggests, the answer to this questiondepends on one’s stance.

From Commissioner to StakeholderConsensus? Reactions to the WCD Report

The reactions to the WCD report signalled thatexpanding consensus from the Commissioners tothe broad set of stakeholders would neither beautomatic nor easy. Stakeholder reactions in the sixmonths following the report’s release largelyfollowed the lines of various interest groups.However, the detail and breadth of reaction didshow that different groups were reading the reportclosely.27 Below we briefly describe these reactionsand their significance, but with two caveats. First,since this assessment was concluded only monthsafter the report release, what follows captures onlythe immediate reaction to the report, and not theslow unfolding of reactions as the implications ofthe WCD are weighed against existing knowledgeand practice. Second, the short snapshots below donot completely capture the variation in responseswithin each stakeholder group.

A majority of NGOs, and particularly interna-tional NGOs, welcomed the final report, andsought concrete commitments to its guidelines byinternational financing institutions.28 They notedthat not only the credibility of the WCD, but theparticipation of NGOs in future multi-stakeholderprocesses would rest on such commitments. Aminority of NGO actors came out strongly againstthe report. They said the WCD’s failure to rejectlarge dams technology altogether, and its focus onunderlying decision-making processes, was anunacceptable compromise for the global anti-dammovement.29

Peoples’ movements and community-basedorganisations found much in the report to heartenthem and expressed a desire to work with thereport, but also conveyed disappointment that theWCD did not root its analysis in a more funda-mental critique of contemporary thinking andpractice of development.30 They criticised the WCDdecision to restrict the principle of “free, prior, andinformed consent” regarding the impacts of waterand energy developments to indigenous peoples.31

The WCD favoured the less precise notion of“public acceptability” of dams, rather than free,prior, and informed consent for the population atlarge. Both NGOs and peoples’ movements foundfault with the process, suggesting undue relianceon “mainstream” consultants and inadequatefeedback to stakeholders during and after theconsultation process.



International financial institutions, both multilat-eral and bilateral, had a varied response. TheWorld Bank, a key actor and convenor of the WCDprocess, was arguably the most cautious. TheWorld Bank used client government reservationsas a rationale for its unenthusiastic response.Based on this feedback, it promised that therewould be no new loan conditionalities stemmingfrom the WCD report. It also proposed a modestsuite of follow-up activities such as gatheringinformation on good practice and further explora-tion of how the WCD guidelines might inform theWorld Bank’s own guiding strategies.32 The Asianand African Development Banks stated that theywould begin the process of integrating the guide-lines into their own procedures. A communiquéfrom the Asian Development Bank’s (ADB)management to the WCD Forum was particularlycomprehensive in stating how the ADB wouldadopt WCD recommendations,33 although an ADBconsultation with its client governments indicatedthat there was a long way to go before they wouldaccept the spirit of the recommendations.34

Bilateral aid agencies, such as the German, British,and Dutch agencies, many of which providedfunds to the WCD, were forthright in their supportfor the report. At the same time, they emphasisedthe need to adapt the guidelines to national policyprocesses and encouraged discussion and debatetoward this end.

United Nations (UN) agencies, many of which hadhad partnerships of some kind with the WCDduring its process, provided a warm response tothe WCD report. The common approach betweenthe UN and the WCD report is under-scored bythe UN norms that the WCD chose to place at theheart of its analysis and forward-looking frame-work. UN agencies expressed appreciation for theusefulness of the WCD’s framework to all types ofdevelopment, not just dams. Overall their ap-proach was constructive and indicated a willing-ness to try out the recommendations. The head ofthe United Nations Environment Programme(UNEP) welcomed the report’s contribution todevelopment debates35 and offered to host theWCD’s follow-up body, the Dams and Develop-ment Unit, in UNEP offices, to facilitate dissemi-nation to government stakeholders. The WorldHealth Organization praised the WCD report foracknowledging the myriad and often complexeffects of dam building on public health andrecognised the rights-and-risk framework as a“leap forward in development planning” overall.36

The Food and Agriculture Organization of theUnited Nations (FAO) faulted the WCD for under-stating food security concerns but promised tocarry forward the recommendations in a forth-coming international multi-stakeholder dialogueon Water, Food, and the Environment.37

Private and public corporations and dams-relatedtrade groups and associations criticised the WCD’srecommendations for the future, itscharacterisation of the past, and its knowledgegathering process. Industry’s objective was a set ofclear guidelines on when and how to build dams,which would reduce the transaction costs of dambuilding and allow them to continue buildingdams, albeit within a more restrictive framework.In their view, some of the WCD guidelines, such asa call for stakeholder dialogue on options andnegotiations between developers and project-affected peoples, would introduce unbearableuncertainties and risks into project development.With regard to the past, the dams industry accusedthe WCD of underplaying the contributions ofdams to development and overstating the costs. Onprocess, they were bitterly critical of the finalstages of the WCD and argued that the WCD’sfailure to share interim findings and draft conclu-sions with stakeholders was a failure of transpar-ency.38

Finally, several Southern governments, such asBrazil and Nepal, produced a formal response tothe report that agreed with the core values andmany strategic priorities promoted by the WCD,but suggested that these were already incorporatedinto their national policies and measures.39 Theoverall tone was defensive. This defensivenessextended to their interpretation of the follow-upprocess. Although the WCD called upon govern-ments to begin national dialogues and establish aframework to internalise WCD guidelines, manygovernments incorrectly interpreted the report asa call to import the guidelines wholesale and ob-jected to this on grounds of national sovereignty.40

With regard to the process, some governments,such as India, China, Nepal, and Ethiopia, cri-tiqued the WCD’s methodology as insufficientlyrepresentative of the range of dams in existenceand insufficiently attentive to government viewsand data.41 By contrast, in South Africa, theDepartment of Water Affairs and Forestry, SouthAfrican National Committee on Large Dams, theEnvironmental Monitoring Group (an NGO), andIUCN held a joint Congress that put in place



concrete measures for bringing forward the WCDrecommendations in the South African context.42

In the only response from a Northern governmentto date (other than Northern aid agencies), theNorwegian government praised the WCD’s reportbut cautioned that it may have “gone too far in thedirection of consensus-based decision-makingsystems” as compared to its own preferred optionof allowing legislatures to decide on behalf of thecommunity as a whole.43

In sum, in the short term the Commissionerconsensus did not translate into a broader stake-holder consensus. Initial reactions suggest ahardening of the positions that existed before theexistence of the WCD. However, a closer look atinitial reactions suggest stakeholder willingness tograpple with the report, compare recommenda-tions to existing policies and situations on theground, and potentially put in place some ideasembedded in the report. If broad consensus lies inthe future of the dams debate, it will be forgedthrough a longer term process initiated by, ratherthan concluded by, the WCD. In the words of theWCD report, “… all concerned parties must staytogether if we are to resolve the issues surroundingwater and energy resources development. It is aprocess with multiple heirs and no clear arbiter.”44

Could an immediate consensus among all stake-holder groups feasibly have been forged? Thereactions to the report provide a basis for extrapo-lating what each group might have looked for insuch a consensus. Based on their reactions, NGOsand social movements would likely have sought amore direct indictment of broader developmentprocesses. Industry groups would likely haverejected any articulation of a rights and risksframework that empowered affected communitiesto negotiate with industry on a time-consumingcase-by-case basis. Various governments mightwell have focused on issues of specific relevance totheir national circumstance. Had the governmentand industry views prevailed, NGOs and socialmovements might not have continued theirengagement with the process at all.

Hence, it is likely that an immediate, broadconsensus among all stakeholders would not havebeen a viable goal. If anything, a process of stake-holder negotiation over the content of the WCD’sreport might have produced a report that onlymoved incrementally beyond the status quo.Arguably, such a report would have had a greater

chance of being adopted wholesale by multilateralinstitutions, governments, and industry in theshort term. However, such a report would almostdefinitely have lacked the support of NGOs andthe social movements and might have inspiredeven greater citizen protest. By focussing onforging a consensus among a smaller number ofCommissioners, the WCD has produced a moreaspirational text, but one which dam-buildingnations and industries have greetedunenthusiastically. In the longer term, the promisefor implementation depends largely upon anongoing constructive engagement by civil societygroups with governments, international agencies,and the private sector, and the expectation ofresults in the medium to long term.

The Legacy of the WCD

The Promise of a Representative Commission

The WCD reveals both the promise and thepitfalls of an advisory multi-stakeholder process.The promise is that selection of active practitio-ners can provide legitimacy with the full range ofstakeholders engaged in a debate. The pitfalls arethat determining representation within amor-phous constituencies and expanding consensusamong representative commissioners to a broadconsensus remains a challenge.

The WCD also provides lessons on how to supportand promote the legitimacy of advisory commis-sions. The WCD experience suggests that if amulti-stakeholder process is to truly move beyondthe divisive politics of an issue, representativesfrom the full spectrum of the debate must be atthe table. The WCD provides a model where voicesthat have long protested decisions made abouttheir lives in their absence can represent theirviews directly and share in developing a frameworkfor future decision-making. Who is a stakeholder?Who should be at the table? Helpfully, the WCD’sown report identifies a framework for deliberationbased upon “rights and risks.” This framework callsfor full identification of the overlapping andintersecting rights followed by a negotiatedsolution, combined with attention to both volun-tary and involuntary risks latent in a project. Thisprovides one point of departure for identifyinglegitimate stakeholders for dialogues in manydevelopment arenas—from the global to thenational to the local. Based on legitimacy with awide range of stakeholders, such bodies are well



poised to act as “norm entrepreneurs,” whoarticulate genuinely new formulations that, overtime, diffuse and are accepted as new norms ofconduct in the international arena.45

What Does Good Process Contribute?

In this assessment, we have examined the WCDprocess against the benchmarks of independence,transparency, and inclusiveness. Although theprocess did have flaws, we have concluded that itwas essentially robust. As the stakeholder reactionsabove suggest, however, good process cannot byitself transcend divisive politics. Indeed, it wouldbe naïve to suggest that it could. What, then, didattention to process bring to the WCD, and whatdoes it promise for future processes?

The most significant contribution of good process isto support the legitimacy of a multi-stakeholderprocess. This is important because in contentiousarenas, such as dams, not all differences can bereconciled through new information and cognitiveadvances. Ultimately, some differences are irreconcil-able and will require a framework to decide whichinterests prevail. A legitimate process is an importantdefence against criticisms of this approach.

A good process can expand the range and varietyof information and perspectives that feed intodecision-making. The WCD’s efforts at inclusionbrought to the fore voices that have often beenmarginalised in the dams debate. The WCD cast awide net, capturing the views of the displaced,along with the reports of consultants and the databanks of governments. This process enriched theknowledge base on which the WCD deliberated.

An important promise of a multi-stakeholderprocess is its ability to create a broader space fordialogue among stakeholders. The WCD provedonly partially successful at this task. In theirfrequent face to face meetings, the Commissionerswere able to transcend pre-conceivedcharacterisations of other constituencies. Thebroader group of stakeholders had far feweropportunities for interaction. Moreover, the

regional consultations and, in large part, Forummeetings were structured to inform the Commis-sion, rather than as a two-way dialogue. Finally, theabsence of an interim report that could stimulate adirected discussion among Forum membersproved an obstacle to furthering stakeholderdialogue. Despite these design flaws, the WCD,nonetheless, did encourage far more communica-tion across stakeholder groups than had occurredin the past years of the dams debate and addition-ally stimulated the formation of networks withinstakeholder groups.

The Challenge of Implementation

Multi-stakeholder processes typically have littleformal decision-making authority, and the WCDwas no exception. Instead, multi-stakeholderprocesses are designed to win consent for imple-mentation through a process of inclusion, with aparticular focus on civil society and the privatesector. A process structured around representativestakeholders holds the potential for genuinely newand transformative formulations that can breakpolicy deadlocks, a contribution that is less likely tobe achieved through governmental processes alone.

Yet, as the tentative and defensive reactions ofSouthern governments to the WCD suggest, amulti-stakeholder approach coexists only uneasilywith the existing framework of international lawbased on the sovereignty of nation states. As theIndian government’s negative reaction to theappointment of an activist as a Commissionerillustrates, governments question the legitimacy ofnon-elected individuals as representatives of a broadview. Moreover, as governments’ call for no newconditionalities arising from the WCD suggests,they are wary of non-governmental actors’ ability tocircumscribe states’ role through internationalagencies and such processes as the WCD.

What then, is the pathway to implementation,one that captures the potential for creativity ofmulti-stakeholder processes, while recognising thelegitimate role of governments? The full answer tothis question must await the unfolding of reactionsto the WCD report over time. However, the initialsteps taken by various actors provide indications ofa way forward.

The WCD Forum established a Dams and Devel-opment Unit (DDU) to carry forward its work. Arange of Forum members —the World Bank,IUCN, and NGO, a river basin authority, a social

Representatives of the fullspectrum of the debate must

be at the table.



movement, and a private sector actor—agreed toserve as the steering committee of this unit. It is anindication of the ongoing relevance of theCommission’s report that a range of stakeholdersagreed to take on this role.

The WCD couched its recommendations withinthe context of the United Nations covenants anddeclarations on human rights, development, andenvironment. By so doing, it firmly located itself aswithin, rather than external to, the frameworks ofintergovernmental deliberations. It, thus, provideda way for governments to engage with its findingsin a manner that recognised the legitimacy ofintergovernmental deliberations. Moreover, thesteering committee’s choice of an establishedintergovernmental body, the United NationsEnvironment Programme, as the host of the DDU,provides a further bridge to governments.

At the same time, rather than being backed byformal sanction mechanisms, the WCD depends

on acceptance of norms of practice, supported bycivil society scrutiny of the private sector, nationalgovernments, and international agencies. Ifsuccessful, a critical role for the WCD will havebeen to crystallise and provide an impetus tonorms of practice for infrastructure projects. Overthe longer term, the bridge back to formal govern-mental and intergovernmental processes will likelybe built incrementally, by incorporating practiceinto formal laws, in part through continuedpressure by non-state actors.

This discussion reinforces the message that al-though democratisation of decision-making at theglobal level can bring significant advantages,ultimately advances in principles and practicesmust be translated to and implemented at thenational level and below. However, as the experi-ence of the WCD suggests, efforts at global andnational democratisation are mutually reinforcing.In the WCD process, civil society organising at thenational level served as the catalyst for creating theWCD and the seedbed for a transnational civilsociety alliance on dams. Conversely, the WCDprocess provided an avenue for greater expressionat the national level and stimulated furtherdialogue across sectors at that level. It is in thispromise of democratisation, at both the nationaland global levels, that the WCD’s full potential lies.

If successful, the WCD willprovide impetus to norms of

good practice.



ENDNOTES

9. The proceedings of the meeting and the immediatefollow-up process were captured in an IUCN-WorldBank publication entitled Large Dams: Learning from thePast, Looking to the Future (Gland: IUCN, 1997). Onlineat: www.dams.org/publications/publication1.htm (23August 2001).

10. The Commission derived this specific set of objectivesbased upon its interpretation of the six-point Terms ofReference developed by the stakeholders at Gland.

11. Later reduced to 125 because of incomplete survey forms.

12. World Commission on Dams, “Strategy and Objectives:June 1998 – June 2000,” Cape Town.

13. The Three Gorges Project is planned to have a 18,200MW installed capacity and 39.3 109 m3 reservoir capacity.It is forecast to produce 84.7 109 kWh in annual energy.R. Fuggle; W.T. Smith; Hydrosult Canada Inc.; andAgrodev Canada Inc. 2000. Large Dams in Water andEnergy Resource Development in The People’s Republicof China (PRC), country review paper prepared as aninput to the World Commission on Dams, Cape Town,www.dams.org/studies/cn (23 August 2001).

14. Electricité de France and ISAGEN-Colombia.

15. Volta River Authority and Lesotho Highlands Develop-ment Project.

16. Interviews with Forum members, September 2000 andNovember 2000. Email correspondence with Forummember, January 2001.

17. In interviews and public settings during the Forummeetings, government representatives expressedreservation about the extent of NGO and social move-ment participation in the WCD process. Also interviewwith government representative, April 2000.

18. Patrick McCully, “How to Use a Trilateral Network: AnActivist’s Perspective on the World Commission onDams.” Paper presented at Agrarian Studies ProgramColloquium, Yale University, 19 January 2001. Online at:http://www.rivernet.org/general/wcd/other_ngo.htm#how (23 August 2001).

19. World Bank internal document, “Talking points fromGovernment of China discussion with World Bank,” 15January 2001.

20. Based upon interviews with government and agencyofficials at the WCD consultation in Egypt, December1999, and focus groups and interviews in Tanzania,Kenya, and Uganda in November 2000.

21. For example, the Dublin Principles agreed upon bygovernmental representatives in 1992 in the run-up tothe United Nations Conference on Environment andDevelopment recognised that “[the] pivotal role ofwomen as providers and users of water and guardians ofthe living environment has seldom been reflected ininstitutional arrangements for the development andmanagement of water” as one of four overarchingprinciples. Principle Three of The Dublin Statement,International Conference on Water and the Environ-ment: Development issues for the 21st century, 26-31January 1992, Dublin, Ireland. The WCD’s final reportdocuments some of the effects of dam-related develop-

1. See, for example, WCD Newsletter No. 3, June 1999.Online at: www.dams.org/newsletters/newsletter3.htm(23 August 2001). External audiences have echoed thisframing of the WCD (See Jörg Baur and Jochen Rudolph,“A Breakthrough in the Evolution of Large Dams? Back tothe Negotiating Table,” D+C Development Cooperation,No. 2, March/April 2001, p. 9-12. Online at:www.dse.de/zeitschr/de201-3.htm (23 August 2001);David Seckler and Achim Steiner, “More Crop per Dropand Dams on Demand? Implications for the 21stCentury.” Report given at the ODI-SOAS Meeting Series,9 February 2000. Online at: www.oneworld.org/odi/speeches/water3.html (23 August 2001).

2. World Commission on Dams, Dams and Development: ANew Framework for Decision-Making (London: Earthscan,2000).

3. See Jonathan Fox and L. David Brown, eds. The Strugglefor Accountability: The World Bank, NGOs and GrassrootsMovements (Boston: MIT Press, 1998); Robert Wade,“Greening the Bank: The Struggle over the Environment,1970-1995,” in The World Bank: Its First Half-Century.Devesh Kapur, John P. Lewis, and Richard Webb, eds.(Washington: Brookings Institution, 1997).

4. Minu Hemmati et. al. “Multi-stakeholder Processes: AMethodological Framework,” 2nd Draft Project Report,UNED Forum, April 2001. Online at:www.earthsummit2002.org/msp/report/draft_framework.htm (23 August 2001).

5. For instance, at the meetings of the United NationsCommission on Sustainable Development (CSD) theresults of the multi-stakeholder dialogues at the begin-ning of the sessions are summarised by the CSDChairperson. These summaries are presented tonegotiators the following week and assume the status ofan official document. The delegates choose paragraphsfrom the summaries in formulating the formal decision.Personal communication with UNED Forum staff, 30July 2001.

6. See A. Florini, ed. The Third Force: The Rise ofTransnational Civil Society (Washington, DC: CarnegieEndowment for International Peace, 2000); DinahShelton, ed. Commitment and Compliance: The Role ofNon-binding Norms in the International Legal System(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).

7. World Bank Operations Evaluation Department, WorldBank Lending for Large Dams: A Preliminary Review ofImpacts, OED Précis, September 1996.

8. On March 14 1997, a coalition of civil society groupsissued the “Declaration of Curitiba: Affirming the Rightto Life and Livelihood of People Affected by Dams”(www.irn.org/programs/curitiba.html, 23 August 2001)which called for an independent review of large dams.This call echoed an earlier statement by civil societyopponents of dams issued in India, the “ManibeliDeclaration Calling for a Moratorium on World Bank

Funding of Large Dams,” September, 1994 (www.irn.org/programs/finance/manibeli.shtml, 23 August 2001).



ment and displacement on women, but its guidelines andrecommendations incorporate only a passing mention ofgender issues.

22. Derived from Corporación Participa, EnvironmentalManagement and Law Association, Thailand Environ-ment Institute, and World Resources Institute, “Frame-work for Assessing Public Access to EnvironmentalDecision-Making,” 2001.

23. This recommendation is contained in a paper by an earlyadvisor to the Commission, Anthony Dorcey, “Institu-tional Design and Operational Modalities for theProposed Large Dams Commission,” Stockholm Draft 6,August 1997 (mimeo).

24. Including French, Russian, Hindi, Polish, German,Chinese, Japanese, and Portuguese.

25. Brazil—Tucurui Dam and Amazon/Tocantins River;Norway—Glomma and Lågen River Basin; Pakistan—Tarbela Dam and Indus River Basin; Thailand—Pak MunDam and Mekong/Mun River Basins; Turkey—AslantasDam and Ceyhan River Basin; United States—GrandCoulee Dam and Columbia Basin; Zambia and Zimba-bwe—Kariba Dam and Zambezi River Basin. CountryReviews: China, India, Russia. Pilot Study: South AfricaGariep and Van der Kloof Dams and Orange River Basin.

26. World Commission on Dams, “World Commission onDams Project & Financial Report,” May 1998 – April2001.

27. For detailed reactions to the final report, seewww.dams.org/report/followups.htm (6 September2001). This site is updated on an ongoing basis, andincludes new material that has been posted since theauthors completed the WCD assessment in May 2001.All of the responses described here are posted onwww.dams.org/report/reaction.htm except as noted.

31.

32.

34. Ramaswamy R. Iyer, public letter to Professor Asmal onthe proceedings of the ADB consultation with clientgovernments in Manila, 22 February 2001.

36. World Health Organization response to the WCD’s finalreport, “Risks, Rights and Negotiated Agreements,” WorldHealth Organization, 30 November 2000.

39. These views were captured in official letters from theNational Water Agency of Brazil and the Government ofNepal to the World Bank, February 2001.

40. As in the formal response of the Ministry of Finance,Government of China to the World Bank, February 2001.

41. Response of the Government of India to the WCDReport and initial response of the Government of Nepal,as distributed to the WCD Forum, 25-27 February 2001.Response of the Government of Ethiopia. Memo by theChinese Ministry of Finance to the World Bank on theWCD Report, February 2001.

42. WCD press release, “South African Symposium endorsesWCD recommendations,” 24 July 2001. Online at:www.dams.org/press/default.php?article=1324 (24 August2001).

43. Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Norway’sComments on the Report of the World Commission onDams,” June 2001.

44. World Commission on Dams, 2000, p. 319.

45. Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink. Autumn 1998.“International Norm Dynamics and Political Change.”International Organization 52(4): 887-917.

For example, International Rivers Network and the BerneDeclaration, with 109 additional signatories from NGOsaround the world, “From Commission to Action: AnNGO Call to Public Financial Institutions,” 16 November2000; Rivers Watch East and Southeast Asia, “Call toDam-building agencies in East and SE Asia upon therelease of the World Commission on Dams final report,”29 November 2000. See also World Wide Fund for Natureposition statement, February 2001. Online at:www.panda.org/livingwaters/pubs.html (14 September 2001).

28.

29. See Philip Williams, “Lies, Dam Lies,” The Guardian (22November 2000). Online at: http://society.guardian.co.uk/societyguardian/story/0,7843,400894,00.html (23 August 2001). PhilipWilliams is the founder and former President of IRN.

For example, Southern African communities and non-governmental organisations, “Southern African Call toAction,” 23 November 2000; James Bay Cree Nation andthe Pimicikamak Cree Nation, “Statement on theoccasion of the release of the World Commission onDams final report,” Undated; Narmada Bachao Andolan(Struggle to Save the Narmada River), “World Commis-sion on Dams Report vindicates unjustifiability of largedams,” 20 November 2000. See also Brazilian Movementof Dam-Affected People, “The Brazilian Movement of

30.

Personal communication with Brazilian activist, January2001.

John Briscoe, “Responding to the WCD Report: A ProgressReport from the World Bank.” Presentation at the WCD’sThird Forum Meeting, Cape Town, February 2001. JohnBriscoe is a Senior Water Resources Advisor at the World Bank.

Asian Development Bank, “ADB’s ongoing and plannedresponses to the WCD’s strategic priorities, best practices,and institutional responses.” Internal ADB draft,February 2001.

33.

United Nations Environment Programme, “UNEP chiefwelcomes new report on impacts of dams as majorcontribution to future energy and water resource policy-making,” News Release No. 00/129, 17 November 2000.

35.

Food and Agriculture Organization of the UnitedNations. Statement at the WCD’s Third Forum Meeting,25-27 February 2000.

37.

Interviews with industry representatives on the WCDForum, 28 February 2001.

38.

Dam-affected People (MAB) and the World Commisionon Dams (WCD),” 9 February 2001. Online at:www.rivernet.org/general/wcd/other_ngo.htm#bra (23 August 2000).

Who We Are

World Resources Institute provides—and helps other institutions provide—informationand practical proposals for policy and institutional change that will foster environ-mentally sound, socially equitable development. WRI researches and publicises policyoptions, encourages adoption of innovative approaches, and provides strong technicalsupport to governments, corporations, international institutions, and environmentalnon-governmental organisations (NGOs). WRI’s Institutions and GovernanceProgram, a program that focuses on the social and political dimensions of environ-mental policymaking, houses the WCD assessment team.World Resources Institute, 10 G Street, NE; Suite 800Washington, DC 20002, USA

Lokayan, a 20-year-old action-research centre in India, works with social movements,research institutes, policy-makers and citizens at large to foster the widening of justice,democracy, and ecological sustainability. It does this through participatory research,campaigns, advocacy, political mobilisation, dialogues, and publications. Lokayan wonthe Right Livelihood Award (“Alternative Nobel Prize”) in 1986.Lokayan, 13 Alipur Road, Exchange Building, Civil Lines,Delhi 110 054, India

The Lawyers’ Environmental Action Team (LEAT) is a public interest lawyers’organisation based in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. Founded in 1994, LEAT specialises inpublic policy research and advocacy in the field of environment and natural resourcemanagement. It has undertaken applied policy research work on institutional andgovernance issues for government departments and donor agencies. It also carries outpublic interest litigation on selected cases on behalf of rural communities.LEAT, Kings Palace Hotel Building, First Floor, Sikukuu Street,Kariakoo Area, P.O. Box 12605, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania

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