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8. The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration,when this was denied; he filed the instant petition to thecourt.

9. Respondents claims that the petitioners‘s chargescontained in the letter of Cong. Roces were not directedagainst him but against the offce in general for the truthis that he was specifically charged withmismanagement, gross inefficiency and negligence inthe performance of his duties as a Chief of the MVO andas a result he was required to answer it for 72hours.

10. Respondents also denied that the petitioner wasinvestigated without being accorded to due process.

11. Respondents also averred that the Pres. Of the Philhas jurisdiction to investigate and remove him since heis a presidential appointee who belongs to the non-competitive or unclassified service under Sec. 5 of Rep.Act No. 2260.

12. They also averred that the letter of Cong. Roces is ineffect a valid administrative complaint because it wascontained specific charges w/c constituting just causesfor his suspension and removal.

ISSUE: Whether or not Villaluz is under the jurisdictionof the President to be removed considering that he isan appointee of the president. HELD: The President of the Philippines has jurisdiction

to investigate and remove him since he is apresidential appointee who belongs to the non-competitive or unclassified service under Sec 5 of RA2260; being a presidential appointee, Villaluz belongsto the non-competitive or unclassified service of thegovernment and as such he can only be investigatedand removed from office after due hearing by thePresident of the Philippines under the principle that"the power to remove is inherent in the power toappoint" . There is some point in the argument thatthe power of control of the President may extend tothe power to investigate, suspend or remove officersand employees who belong to the executivedepartment if they are presidential appointees or do

not belong to the classified service for such can be justified under the principle that the power to removeis inherent in the power to appoint but not with regardto those officers or employees who belong to theclassified service for as to them that inherent powercannot be exercised. This is in line with the provisionof our Constitution which says that ̀ the Congress may

by law vest the appointment of the inferior officers, inthe President alone, in the courts, or in heads of department.

CIVIL LIBERTIES UNIONv s. THE EXECUTIVESECRETARY

FACTS:



The two petitions in this case sought to

declare unconstitutional Executive Order No. 284 issued

by President CorazonC. Aquino. The assailed law

provides that:

Sec. 1. Even if allowed by law or by the ordinary

functions of his position, a member of the Cabinet,

undersecretary or assistant secretary or other

appointive officials of the Executive Department may, in

addition to his primary position, hold not more than

two positions in the government and government

corporations and receive the corresponding

compensation there for; Provided, that this

Limitation shall not apply to ad hoc bodies or

committees, or to boards, councils or bodies of which

the President is the Chairman. The petitioners alleged that the cited provision of EO284contravenes the provision of Sec. 13, Article VII whichdeclares:

The President,Vice-President,theMembers of theCabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not,

unless otherwise provided in this Constitution,hold any other office or employment during theirtenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly orindirectly practice any other profession, participate inany business, or be financially interested in anycontract with, or in any franchise, or special privilegegranted by the Government or any subdivision, agency,or instrumentality thereof, including government-ownedor controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They

shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office.

The petitioners maintained that the phrase

"unless otherwiseprovided in this Constitution" used in

Section 13 of Article VII meant that the exception mustbe expressly provided in the Constitution.

Public respondents, on the other hand,

maintain that the phrase "unless otherwise provided in

the Constitution" in Section 13,Article VII makes

reference to Section 7, par. (2), Article I-XB insofar as

the appointive officials mentioned therein are

concerned. The provision relied upon by the

respondents provides:Sec. 7. . . . . .Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the

Primary functions of his position, no appointive official

shall hold any other office or employment in the

government or any subdivision, agency or

instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or

controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.

ISSUE No. 1 : Does the prohibition in Section 13,

Article VII of the1987 Constitution insofar asCabinet members, their deputies or assistants

are concerned admit of the broad exceptions

made for appointive officials in general under

Section 7, par. (2), Article I-XB?

No.



The intent of the framers of the Constitution was toimpose a

Stricter prohibition on the President and his official

family in so far as holding other offices or employment

in the government or elsewhere is concerned.Although Section 7, Article I-XB already

contains a blanket prohibition against the holding of

multiple offices or employment in the government

subsuming both elective and appointive public officials,

the Constitutional Commission should see it fit to

formulate another provision, Sec. 13, Article VII,

specifically prohibiting the President, Vice-President,

members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistantsfrom holding any other office or employment during

their tenure, unless otherwise provided in the

Constitution itself. While all other appointive officials in

the civil service are allowed to hold other office or

employment in the government during their tenure

when such is allowed by law or by the primary functions

of their positions, members of the Cabinet, their

deputies and assistants may do so only when expressly

authorized by the Constitution itself. In other words,

Section 7, Article I-XB is meant to lay down the general

rule applicable to all elective and appointive public

officials and employees, while Section 13, Article VII is

meant to be the exception applicable only to the

President, the Vice- President, Members of the

Cabinet, their Deputies and assistants.

The phrase "unless otherwise provided in this

Constitution “must be given a literal interpretation to

refer only to those particular instances cited in the

Constitution itself, to wit: the Vice-President being

appointed as a member of the Cabinet under Section 3,

par. (2),Article VII; or acting as President in those

instances provided under Section 7, pars. (2) and (3),

Article VII; and, the Secretary of Justice being ex-

officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue

of Section 8 (1), Article VIII.

ISSUE No. 2: Does the prohibition apply to

positions held in ex officio capacity? The prohibition against holding dual or

multiple offices or employment under Section 13,

Article VII of the Constitution must not, however, be

construed as applying to posts occupied by the

Executive officials specified therein without additional

compensation in anex-Officio capacity as provided by

law and as required by the primary functions of said

officials' office. The reason is that these posts do no

comprise "any other office" within the contemplation of

the constitutional prohibition but are properly an

imposition of additional duties and functions on said

officials. The term ex-officio means "from office; by

virtue of office."Ex-officio likewise denotes an "act done

in an official character, or as a consequence of office,

and without any other appointment or authority than



that conferred by the office."The additional duties must

not only be closely related to, but must be required by

the official's primary functions. If the functions required

to be performed are merely incidental, remotely

related, inconsistent, incompatible, or otherwise alien to

the primary function of a cabinet official, such

additional functions would fall under the purview of

"any other office" prohibited by the Constitution.

ISSUE No. 3: Can the respondents be obliged to

reimburse the perquisites they have received

from the offices they have held pursuant to EO

284?

During their tenure in the questioned positions,respondents may be considered de facto officers and as

such entitled to emoluments for actual services

rendered. It has been held that "in cases where there is

no de jure officer, a de facto officer, who, in good faith

has had possession of the office and has discharged the

duties pertaining thereto, is legally entitled to the

emoluments of the office, and may in an appropriate

action recover the salary, fees and othercompensations attached to the office. Any per diem,

allowances or other emoluments received by the

respondents by virtue of actual services rendered in the

questioned positions may therefore be retained by

them.

Overall, Executive Order No. 284 is

unconstitutional as it actually allows a member of the

cabinet, undersecretary or assistant secretary or other

appointive officials of the Executive Department to hold

multiple offices or employment in direct contravention

of the express mandate of Section 13, Article VII of the

1987 Constitution prohibiting them from doing so, unless

otherwise provided in the 1987Constitution itself.

Guevara vs. Inocentes

FACTS: The petitioner, Onofre Guevara was extendedan ad interim appointment as Undersecretary of Laborby the former Executive on November 18, 1965. Took

his oath of office on November 25

th

same year. Theincumbent Executive issued Memorandum Circular No.8 dated January 23, 1966 declaring that all ad interimappointments made by the former Executive lapsed

with the adjournment of the special session of Congress at about midnight of January 22, 1966. Therespondent, Raoul Inocentes was extended an adinterim appointment for the same position by theincumbent Executive on January 23, 1966. Guevarafiled before the court an instant petition for QuoWarranto seeking to be declared person legally

entitled to the said Officer of the Undersecretary of Labor under Art. VII Sec. 10 (4) of the 1935Constitution. which states that:

The president shall have the power to makeappointments during the recess of the Congress, but such appointments shall be effective only untildisapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of Congress.



Since there was no Commission onAppointments organized during the special sessionwhich commenced on January 17, 1966, therespondent contended that the petitioner’s ad interimappointment as well as other made under similar

conditions must have lapsed when the Congressadjourned its last special session. But the petitionerstated that (1) the specific provision in the Constitutionwhich states that: “until the next adjournment of Congress” means adjournment of a regular session of Congress and not by a special session and (2) only theSenate adjourned sine die at midnight of January 22,1966 and the House of the Representative merely‘suspended’ its session and to be resumed on January24, 1966 at 10:00 AM. The petitioner thereforeconcludes that Congress has been in continuoussession without interruption since January 17.

ISSUE/S:

1. Whether or not, the petitioner’s contentionregarding “the next adjournment of Congressspecifically provides for regular session only.

2. Whether or not, the petitioner’s contentionthat Congress is still in continuous session?

HELD:1. NO. The phrase “until the next adjournment of Congress” does not make any reference to specific

session of Congress, whether regular or special. But awell-know Latin maxim is statutory construction statedthat ‘when the law does not distinguish we should notdistinguish. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distingueredebemus. It is safe to conclude that the authors of the1935 Constitution used the word “adjournment” had in

mind either regular or special and not simply theregular one as the petitioner contended.

2. NO. The mere fact that the Senate adjourned sinedie at midnight of January 22, 1966, the House of the

Representative is only a part of the Congress and notthe Congress itself. So logically, the adjournment of one of its Houses is considered adjournment of theCongress as a whole. And the petitioner’s ad interimappointment must have been lapsed on January 22,1966 upon adjournment of the Senate

JOSEPH ESTRADA petitioner v GLORIA MACAPAGAL

ARROYO respondent

G.R. No. 146710-15 March

2, 2001

(on Term of Office)

FACTS:

This involves petitions of Joseph Ejercito Estrada

challenging the respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as

the de jure 14th President of the Republic. A short

outline of events that precipitated the case at bar thus

follows:

1. Petitioner won in the May 1998 national

elections as president, the respondent as vice-

president.

2. On October 4, 2000, Ilocos Sur Governor Chavit

Singson accused the petitioner and his family of

receiving



millions of pesos from jueteng lords. Such

expose ignited several reactions of rage.

3. There became a built up of a call for petitioner

to resign from office and his officials one by one

resignedwithdrawing their support.

4. In November 20 Impeachment Trial of the

petitioner was opened, in December 7

Impeachment Trial began.

5. January 19 people lined up in EDSA showing a

greater call for the resignation of the president.

6. January 20 was the day of petitioner's

surrender. At 12:00 noon Chief Justice Hilario

Davide administered

oath to respondent Arroyo as President of the

Philippines. At 2:30 pm petitioner left Malacanang

and issued

a press statement and a letter transmitting

the executive power upon him, the president to

the vice

president becoming the acting president

7. The Monday after the oath, Arroyo discharged

powers of the President.

8. Criminal cases have been filed against thepetitioner after he stepped down into presidency.

ISSUES:

There are several important issues sprouting in this

case.

1. W/N the cases at bar present a justiciable

controversy / political question specifically

regarding the

legitimacy of the Arroyo administration.

2. W/N Estrada resigned as President.3. W/N Estrada is only temporarily unable to act as

President.

4. W/N Estrada enjoys immunity from suit.

5. WON/N the prosecution of petitioner Estrada

should be enjoined due to prejudicial publicity.

HELD:

The petitions of Joseph Ejercito Estrada challenging the respondent

Macapagal-Arroyo as the de jure 14th President of the Republic are

DISMISSED.

1. The question on the legitimacy of the

Arroyo administration is subject to judicial

review. It is a legal question, which is

justiciable.

At first, it can be said that acquisition of the

presidential seat of respondent Arroyo would be

similar to that of former President Corazon Aquinoas they were placed into position by means of the

call of the people in a revolutionary mass

demonstration known as EDSA I for Aquino, and

EDSA II for Arroyo.

It has been stressed by private respondents that

Arroyo ascended the presidency through people

power; that she has already taken her oath as the



14th President of the Republic; that she has

exercised the powers of the presidency and that

she has been recognized by foreign governments.

Consequently, the grounds of the case show that

such is a political question.

SC read the case Lawyers League vs Pres. Aquino,

which decided that the legitimacy of Aquino

administration in question was a political question.

The Freedom Constitution declared that Aquino's

government was a result a successful peaceful

revolution by the sovereign Filipino people, hence

a political question. In contrast, Arroyo's

government was not revolutionary in character.

Arroyo swore under the 1987 Constitution.

There is a legal distinction between EDSA People

Power I and EDSA People Power II. EDSA I involves

the exercise of the people power of revolution

which overthrew the whole government; it

presented then a political question. EDSA II is an

exercise of people power of freedom of speech and

freedom of assembly to petition the government

for redress of grievances which only affected theoffice of the President, presenting a legal and

justiciable question.

2. It was held that Estrada has resigned as

President.

The issue was whether the petitioner resigned as

President or should he be considered resigned as

of January 20, 2001 when respondent took her

oath as the 14th President of the Public in view of

Art. VII Sec. 8 of 1987 Constitution.

It was said that there must be intent to resign

and the intent must be coupled by acts of

relinquishment . There is no formal requirement

as to form of a valid resignation. It can be oral. It

can be written. It can be express. It can be implied.

As long as the resignation is clear, it must be given

legal effect. Consequently, whether or not

petitioner resigned has to be determined from his

act and omissions before, during and after January

20, 2001 or by the totality of prior,

contemporaneous and posterior facts and

circumstantial evidence bearing a material

relevance on the issue.

Using the TOTALITY TEST, Estrada was held to

have resigned as President.

Intent to Resign. There was public pressure forpetitioner to resign. In the diary of Executive

Secretary Eduardo Angara called "Final Days of

Joseph Ejercito Estrada," an authoritative window

to the state of mind of the petitioner was provided.

On January 20, 2:30 pm he proposed for a snap

election for president in May, emphasizing that he

would not be a candidate. This is an indication that



he intended to give up the presidency even at that

time.

As his support from his officials were withdrawn,

he was even advised to have a "dignified exit orresignation." Estrada did not object to this

suggestion but stated that he would never leave

the country. At 10:00 p.m. he said to Angara "Ed,

Angie (Reyes) guaranteed that I would have five

days to a week in the palace." This was proof

petitioner had reconciled himself to the reality that

he had to resign. His mind was already concerned

with the five-day grace period he could stay in the

palace. Estrada became concerned with peaceful

and orderly transfer of power when he told Angara

""Ed, magtulungan tayo para magkaroon tayo ng

(let's cooperate to ensure a) peaceful and orderly

transfer of power." The resignation of the

petitioner was implied.

Acts of Relinquishment. In the press release

containing his final statement before he and his

family left Malacanang, (1) he acknowledged the

oath-taking of the respondent as President of theRepublic albeit with reservation about its legality;

(2) he emphasized he was leaving the Palace, the

seat of the presidency, for the sake of peace and

in order to begin the healing process of our nation.

He did not say he was leaving the Palace due to

any kind inability and that he was going to re-

assume the presidency as soon as the disability

disappears: (3) he expressed his gratitude to the

people for the opportunity to serve them. Without

doubt, he was referring to the past opportunity

given him to serve the people as President (4) he

assured that he will not shirk from any futurechallenge that may come ahead in the same

service of our country. Petitioner's reference is to a

future challenge after occupying the office of the

president which he has given up; and (5) he called

on his supporters to join him in the promotion of a

constructive national spirit of reconciliation and

solidarity. Certainly, the national spirit of

reconciliation and solidarity could not be attained

if he did not give up the presidency. The press

release was petitioner's valedictory, his final act of

farewell. His presidency is now in the past tense.

3. The law which concerned this issue was Article

VII Sec.11 which provides in part:

"Whenever the President transmits to the

President of the Senate and the Speaker of the

House of Representatives his written declaration

that he is unable to discharge the powers andduties of his office, and until he transmits to them

a written declaration to the contrary, such powers

and duties shall be discharged by the Vice-

President as Acting President.

Whenever a majority of all the Members of the

Cabinet transmit to the President of the Senate

and to the Speaker of the House of



Representatives their written declaration that the

President is unable to discharge the powers and

duties of his office, the Vice-President shall

immediately assume the powers and duties of the

office as Acting President."

"If the Congress, within ten days after receipt of

the last written declaration, or, if not in session,

within twelve days after it is required to assemble,

determines by a two-thirds vote of both Houses,

voting separately, that the President is unable to

discharge the powers and duties of his office, the

Vice-President shall act as President; otherwise,

the President shall continue exercising the powers

and duties of his office"

The operative facts concerning this issue are:

*Petitioner, on January 20, 2001, sent letter

claiming inability to the Senate President and

Speaker of the House;

*Unaware of the letter, respondent Arroyo took her

oath of office as President on January 20, 2001 at

about 12:30 p.m.;

*Despite receipt of the letter, the House of Representatives passed on January 24, 2001

House Resolution No. 175; followed by House

Resolution No. 176 a resolution expressing the

support of the house of representatives to the

assumption into office by Vice President Gloria

Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Republic of

the Philippines, adopted January 24, 2001.

Clearly, from the given facts, both houses of

Congress have recognized respondent Arroyo

as the President. Implicitly clear in that

recognition is the premise that the inabilityof petitioner Estrada is no longer temporary.

Congress has clearly rejected petitioner's

claim of temporary inability. The Court has

no jurisdiction to review the temporary

inability and to revise thereafter the decision

of both houses of Congress recognizing

Arroyo as President because this question

involves the Legislature's discretionary

authority.

4. It was held the Estrada is not immune for

liability. His claim that he must the impeachment

proceeding must first be decided before civil or

criminal prosecution begin is untenable for he has

been considered resigned from office. Hence the

impeachment tribunal and proceeding has ceased.

Hence, as a non-sitting President, he can be tried

for civil and criminal charges filed against him.

5. Petitioner contended that the respondent

Ombudsman should be stopped from conducting

the investigation of the cases filed against him due

to the barrage of prejudicial publicity on his guilt.

He stated that the respondent Ombudsman has

developed bias and is all set file the criminal cases

violation of his right to due process. It was held



that there was not enough evidence to

warrant the Court to enjoin the preliminary

investigation of the petitioner by the

respondent Ombudsman. The evidence given

by petitioner that Ombudsman has been biased bythe pervasive prejudicial publicity against him was

insubstantial.

Isidro Ang-Angco petitioner v Hon. Natalio Castillo,

et al. respondents

G.R. no. L-17169 November 30, 1963

(on Executive power of control and supervision)

Facts: Isidro Ang-Angco is the Collector of Customs.

The Commissioner of Customs filed an administrative

complaint against him for releasing 1,188 units of Pepsi-

cola concentrate without authorization. President

Ramon Magsaysay, on the strength of this complaint,

created an investigating committee to investigate Ang-

Angco. As a result, Ang-Angco was suspended from his

office on December 1956. On April 1, 1957, Collector

Ang-Angco was reinstated by Finance Secretary

Hernandez, but the investigation decision was still

pending. President Magsaysay died and it was afterthree years, that Executive Secretary Natalio Castillo

rendered a decision on the pending administrative case.

He found Ang-Angco guilty and considered him resigned

from the date of notice. Ang-Angco filed a motion for

reconsideration, which was denied. After exhausting all

administrative remedies, he filed this petition.

Issues: W/N the President has the power to take direct

action against petitioner in spite of the provisions in the

Civil Service Act of 1959.

Held:

No. The action taken by Respondent Executive

Secretary, even with the authority of the President, in

taking direct action on the administrative case of

petitioner , without submitting the same to the

Commissioner of Civil Service, is contrary to law and

should be set aside.

1. Under sec. 16(i) of the Civil Service Act of 1959, it isthe Commissioner of Civil Service who has the original

and exclusive jurisdiction to decide administrative cases

of all officers and employees in the classified service.

The decision may be appealed to the Civil Service Board

(Sec. 18 RA 2260), and not the President as was allowed

before under Commonwealth Act 598. The said act was

expressly repealed by the Civil Service Act of 1959,

therefore the petitioner was deprived of the procedure

laid down in the law and has lost his right to due

process.

2. However, under sec. 16(i), the power to remove,

separate and suspend officers and employees is

qualified by the saving clause “Except as otherwise

provided by law”. Is there any other law that allows the



President to remove officers and employees in the

classified civil service?

No. The only other law that gives the President the rightto remove officials is Sec. 64(b) of the Revised

Administrative Code. The president has the power to

remove officials from office “conformably to law”. This

means that the President does not have blanket

authority to remove any officer, but is still subject to

laws that may be enacted by the legislature.

3. Respondents cite President’s power to control allofficials and employees in the executive department to

override the provisions in the Civil Service Act. (Sec.

10(1) Art. VII, Constitution)

The power of the President to “control” all officers and

employees in the Executive Department only means

that he has the power to “alter, or modify, or nullify, or

set aside what a subordinate officer has done in the

performance of his duties, and to substitute the

President’s judgment over his.” This merely applies tothe acts of the employee or official, and not to the agent

of the act. President only has power to set aside action

of the official, not remove him from office.

4. The purpose of the Civil Service System is to give

stability of tenure to those who belong in the classified

service. In Sec. 4 Art. XII of the Constitution, it states

that “No officer of employee in the civil service shall be

removed or suspended except, for cause as provided by

law”. This section must be harmonized with Sec.10(1)

Art. VII, which gives the President the power to controlall officials and employees of the Executive Department.

The Court held that the President may remove,

investigate or suspend employees, if they are

presidential appointees, or they do not belong to the

classified service. This is because with the power to

appoint comes the power to remove.

Bayan v. Zamora

November 10, 2010

G.R. No. 138570 (Oct. 10, 2000)

FACTS: Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) was enteredinto by the Philippines and United States to regulateconditions of presence of US military personnels in thePhilippines. The Senate concurred with the VFA.Petitioners who are taxpayers and members of Congress questioned its validity.

HELD: Petitioners failed to show that they havesustained or are in danger of sustaining any direct



injury as a result of the enforcement of VFA. Astaxpayers, they failed to show how the VFA will involvethe exercise of Congress of its taxing or spendingpowers. Members of Congress’ standing cannot beupheld absent a clear showing of any direct injury to

their person or to the institution to which they belong.Further, IBP has no standing.

The Visiting Forces Agreement, for which Senateconcurrence was sought and received on May 27,1999, is the subject of a number of Constitutionalchallenges.

Issue 1: Do the Petitioners have legal standingas concerned citizens, taxpayers, or legislatorsto question the constitutionality of the VFA?

Petitioners Bayan Muna, etc. have no standing. Aparty bringing a suit challenging the Constitutionalityof a law must show not only that the law is invalid, butthat he has sustained or is in immediate danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of itsenforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby insome indefinite way. Petitioners have failed to show

that they are in any danger of direct injury as a resultof the VFA.

As taxpayers, they have failed to establish that theVFA involves the exercise by Congress of its taxing orspending powers. A taxpayer’s suit refers to a casewhere the act complained of directly involves theillegal disbursement of public funds derived fromtaxation. Before he can invoke the power of judicial

review, he must specifically prove that he hassufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditureof money raised by taxation and that he will sustain adirect injury as a result of the enforcement of thequestioned statute or contract. It is not sufficient that

he has merely a general interest common to allmembers of the public. Clearly, inasmuch as no publicfunds raised by taxation are involved in this case, andin the absence of any allegation by petitioners thatpublic funds are being misspent or illegally expended,petitioners, as taxpayers, have no legal standing toassail the legality of the VFA.

Similarly, the petitioner-legislators (Tanada, Arroyo,etc.) do not possess the requisite locus standi to sue.In the absence of a clear showing of any direct injuryto their person or to the institution to which theybelong, they cannot sue. The Integrated Bar of thePhilippines (IBP) is also stripped of standing in thesecases. The IBP lacks the legal capacity to bring thissuit in the absence of a board resolution from its Boardof Governors authorizing its National President tocommence the present action.

Notwithstanding, in view of the paramount importanceand the constitutional significance of the issues raised,

the Court may brush aside the procedural barrier andtakes cognizance of the petitions.

Issue 2: Is the VFA governed by section 21, Art.VII, or section 25, Art. XVIII of the Constitution?

Section 25, Art XVIII, not section 21, Art. VII, applies, asthe VFA involves the presence of foreign militarytroops in the Philippines.



The Constitution contains two provisions requiring theconcurrence of the Senate on treaties or internationalagreements. Section 21, Article VII reads: “[n]o treatyor international agreement shall be valid and effectiveunless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the

Members of the Senate.” Section 25, Article XVIII,provides:”[a]fter the expiration in 1991 of theAgreement between the Republic of the Philippinesand the United States of America concerning MilitaryBases, foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shallnot be allowed in the Philippines except under a treatyduly concurred in by the Senate and, when theCongress so requires, ratified by a majority of thevotes cast by the people in a national referendum heldfor that purpose, and recognized as a treaty by theother contracting State.”

Section 21, Article VII deals with treaties orinternational agreements in general, in which case, theconcurrence of at least two-thirds (2/3) of all theMembers of the Senate is required to make the treatyvalid and binding to the Philippines. This provision laysdown the general rule on treaties. All treaties,regardless of subject matter, coverage, or particulardesignation or appellation, requires the concurrence of the Senate to be valid and effective.

In contrast, Section 25, Article XVIII is a specialprovision that applies to treaties which involve thepresence of foreign military bases, troops or facilitiesin the Philippines. Under this provision, theconcurrence of the Senate is only one of the requisitesto render compliance with the constitutionalrequirements and to consider the agreement bindingon the Philippines. Sec 25 further requires that“foreign military bases, troops, or facilities” may be

allowed in the Philippines only by virtue of a treatyduly concurred in by the Senate, ratified by a majorityof the votes cast in a national referendum held for thatpurpose if so required by Congress, and recognized assuch by the other contracting state.

On the whole, the VFA is an agreement which definesthe treatment of US troops visiting the Philippines. Itprovides for the guidelines to govern such visits of military personnel, and further defines the rights of theUS and RP government in the matter of criminal jurisdiction, movement of vessel and aircraft, importand export of equipment, materials and supplies.

Undoubtedly, Section 25, Article XVIII, whichspecifically deals with treaties involving foreignmilitary bases, troops, or facilities, should apply in theinstant case. To a certain extent, however, theprovisions of Section 21, Article VII will findapplicability with regard to determining the number of votes required to obtain the valid concurrence of theSenate.

It is specious to argue that Section 25, Article XVIII isinapplicable to mere transient agreements for thereason that there is no permanent placing of structure

for the establishment of a military base. TheConstitution makes no distinction between “transient”and “permanent”. We find nothing in Section 25,Article XVIII that requires foreign troops or facilities tobe stationed or placed permanently in the Philippines.When no distinction is made by law; the Court shouldnot distinguish. We do not subscribe to the argumentthat Section 25, Article XVIII is not controlling since noforeign military bases, but merely foreign troops andfacilities, are involved in the VFA. The proscription



covers “foreign military bases, troops, or facilities.”Stated differently, this prohibition is not limited to theentry of troops and facilities without any foreign basesbeing established. The clause does not refer to“foreign military bases, troops, or facilities”

collectively but treats them as separate andindependent subjects, such that three differentsituations are contemplated — a military treaty thesubject of which could be either (a) foreign bases, (b)foreign troops, or (c) foreign facilities — any of thethree standing alone places it under the coverage of Section 25, Article XVIII.

Issue 3: Was Sec 25 Art XVIII’s requisitessatisfied to make the VFA effective?

Section 25, Article XVIII disallows foreign militarybases, troops, or facilities in the country, unless thefollowing conditions are sufficiently met: (a) it must beunder a treaty; (b) the treaty must be duly concurredin by the Senate and, when so required by Congress,ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people ina national referendum; and (c) recognized as a treatyby the other contracting state. There is no dispute asto the presence of the first two requisites in the caseof the VFA. The concurrence handed by the Senate

through Resolution No. 18 is in accordance with theConstitution, as there were at least 16 Senators thatconcurred.

As to condition (c), the Court held that the phrase“recognized as a treaty” means that the othercontracting party accepts or acknowledges theagreement as a treaty. To require the US to submit theVFA to the US Senate for concurrence pursuant to itsConstitution, is to accord strict meaning to the phrase.

Well-entrenched is the principle that the words used inthe Constitution are to be given their ordinary meaningexcept where technical terms are employed, in whichcase the significance thus attached to them prevails.Its language should be understood in the sense they

have in common use.

The records reveal that the US Government, throughAmbassador Hubbard, has stated that the US has fullycommitted to living up to the terms of the VFA. For aslong as the US accepts or acknowledges the VFA as atreaty, and binds itself further to comply with its treatyobligations, there is indeed compliance with themandate of the Constitution.

Worth stressing too, is that the ratification by thePresident of the VFA, and the concurrence of theSenate, should be taken as a clear and unequivocalexpression of our nation’s consent to be bound by saidtreaty, with the concomitant duty to uphold theobligations and responsibilities embodied thereunder.Ratification is generally held to be an executive act,undertaken by the head of the state, through whichthe formal acceptance of the treaty is proclaimed. AState may provide in its domestic legislation theprocess of ratification of a treaty. In our jurisdiction,

the power to ratify is vested in the President and not,as commonly believed, in the legislature. The role of the Senate is limited only to giving or withholding itsconsent, or concurrence, to the ratification.

With the ratification of the VFA it now becomesobligatory and incumbent on our part, under principlesof international law (pacta sunt servanda), to be boundby the terms of the agreement. Thus, no less thanSection 2, Article II declares that the Philippines adopts



the generally accepted principles of international lawas part of the law of the land and adheres to the policyof peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation andamity with all nations.

Mondano v. SilvosaL-7708, 30 May 1955

FACTS: The petitioner, Jose Mondano, is the duly elected andqualified Mayor of the Municipality of Mainit, Surigao.On 27 February 1954, Consolacion Vda. De Mosendefiled a sworn complaint with the Presidential Complaintsand Action Committee accusing him of rape andconcubinage which was subsequently indorsed by theAssistant Executive Secretary to the respondent,Fernando Silvosa, Governor of Surigao for immediateinvestigation, appropriate action and report. On April10,1954, petitioner appeared, upon summon, before therespondent with the Provincial Board. On the same day,the respondent issued Administrative Order No.8suspending the petitioner from office, and thereafter,the Provincial Board proceeded to hear the chargesagainst him.

ISSUE:Whether or not the suspension of the petitioner and theinvestigation by the provincial board is illegal andwithout legal effect

HELD:Section 10, paragraph 1, Article VII, of the Constitutionprovides: "The President shall have control of all theexecutive departments, bureaus, or offices, exercise

general supervision over all local governments as maybe provided by law, and take care that the laws befaithfully executed." Under this constitutional provisionthe President has been invested with the power of control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or

offices, but not of all local governments over which hehas been granted only the power of general supervisionas may be provided by law. The Department head asagent of the President has direct control andsupervision over all bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction as provided for in section 79 (c) of theRevised Administrative Code, but he does not have thesame control of local governments as that exercised byhim over bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction.Likewise, his authority to order the investigation of anyact or conduct of any person in the service of any

bureau or office under his department is confined tobureaus or offices under his jurisdiction and does notextend to local governments over which, as alreadystated, the President exercises only general supervisionas may be provided by law.

The Congress has expressly and specifically lodged theprovincial supervision over municipal officials in theprovincial governor who is authorized to "receive andinvestigate complaints made under oath againstmunicipal officers for neglect of duty, oppression,corruption or other form of maladministration of office,and conviction by final judgment of any crime involvingmoral turpitude."2 And if the charges are serious, "heshall submit written charges touching the matter to theprovincial board, furnishing a copy of such charges tothe accused either personally or by registered mail, andhe may in such case suspend the officer (not being themunicipal treasurer) pending action by the board, if inhis opinion the charge be one affecting the official



integrity of the officer in question. In this case, themunicipal officer was charged with rape andconcubinage which have nothing to do with theperformance of his duties as mayor of the municipalitynor do they constitute or involve neglect of duty,

oppression, corruption or any other form of maladministration of office. The investigation of suchcharges by the provincial board is unauthorized andillegal. Hence, his suspension as mayor of themunicipality is unlawful and without authority of law.Before the provincial governor and board may act andproceed against the municipal official, a conviction byfinal judgment must precede the filing by the provincialgovernor of the charges and trial by the provincialboard.

SOLIVEN, petitioner VS. JUDGE MAKASIAR,

respondent

167 SCRA 393

FACTS:

This case is a PETITION for certiorari and prohibition to

review the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the petitioners were denied dueprocess when information for libel were filedagainst them although the finding of theexistence of a prima facie case was still under

review by the Secretary of Justice and,subsequently by the President

2. Whether or not the constitutional rights of Beltran (petitioner) were violated whenrespondent RTC judge issued a warrant for his

arrest without personally examining thecomplainant and the witnesses, if any, todetermine probable clause

3. Whether or not the President of the Philippines,under the Constitution, may initiate criminalproceedings against the petitioners throughfiling of a complaint-affidavit

DECISION:

Finding no grave abuse of discretion amounting toexcess or lack of jurisdiction on the part of the publicrespondents, the Court Resolved to DISMISS thepetitions.

The Order to maintain the status quo contained in theResolution of the Court en banc is LIFTED.

RATIO:

Background of the first issue

• MARCH 30, 1988: Secretary of Justice deniedpetitioner’s motion for reconsideration

• APRIL 7, 1988: A second motion forreconsideration filed by petitioner Beltran wasdenied by the Secretary of Justice

• MAY 2, 1988: On appeal, the President, throughExecutive Secretary, affirmed the resolution of the Secretary of Justice



• MAY 16, 1988: Motion for reconsideration wasdenied by the Executive Secretary

Petitioner Beltran alleges that he has been denied dueprocess of law.

-This is negated by the fact that instead of submittinghis counter-affidavits, he filed a “Motion to DeclareProceedings Closed”, in effect, waiving his right torefute the complaint by filing counter-affidavits.

Due process of law does not require that therespondent in a criminal case actually file hiscounter-affidavits before the preliminaryinvestigation is deemed completed. All that isrequired is that the respondent be given theopportunity to submit counter-affidavits if he isso minded.

Second issue

This calls for an interpretation of the constitutionalprovision on the issuance of warrants of arrest:

Art. III, Sec.2. The right of the people to be secure intheir persons, houses, papers and effects against

unreasonable searches and seizures of whatevernature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and nosearch warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue exceptupon probable cause to be determined personally bythe judge after examination under oath or affirmationof the complainant and the witnesses he may produce,and particularly describing the place to be searchedand the persons or things to be seized.

Petitioner Beltran is convinced that the Constitutionrequires the judge to personally examine thecomplainant and his witness in his determination of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrests.

-However, what the Constitution underscores is theexclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probablecause. In doing so, the judge is not required topersonally examine the complainant and his witness.

Following the established doctrine of procedure,the judge shall: (1) Personally evaluate thereport and supporting documents submitted bythe fiscal regarding the existence of probablecause (and on the basis, thereof, issue a warrantof arrest); or (2) If on the basis thereof he findsno probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal’sreport and require the submission of supportingaffidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at aconclusion as to the evidence of probable cause.

Third issue

Petitioner Beltran contends that proceedings ensue byvirtue of the President’s filing of her complaint-affidavit, she may subsequently have to be a witnessfor the prosecution, bringing her under the trial court’s jurisdiction. àThis would in an indirect way defeat her privilege of immunity from suit , as by testifying on thewitness stand, she would be exposing herself topossible contempt of court or perjury.



-This privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to thePresident by virtue of the office and may be invokedonly by the holder of the office; not by any otherperson in the President’s behalf.

-The choice of whether to exercise the privilege or towaive is solely the President’s prerogative. It is adecision that cannot be assumed and imposed by anyother person (And there is nothing in our laws thatwould prevent the President from waiving theprivilege).

Additional Issue:

Beltran contends that he could not be held liable forlibel because of the privileged character of thepublication. He also says that to the libel case toproceed would produce a “chilling effect” on pressfreedom.

-Court reiterates that it is not a trier of facts And Courtfinds no basis at this stage to rule on the “chillingeffect” point.

SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION Guitierrez, Jr., J.

Concurs with the majority opinion insofar as it revolvesaround the three principal issues. With regard towhether or not the libel case would produce a “chillingeffect” on press freedom, Gutierrez believes that thisparticular issue is the most important and should beresolved now rather than later.

Quotable quotes: “Men in public life may suffer under a hostile and unjust accusation; the wound can be

assuaged with the balm of a clear conscience.” –United States v. Bustos

“No longer is there a Minister of the Crown or a personin authority of such exalted position that the citizen

must speak of him only with bated breath.” –People v.Perfecto

DOROMAL VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, G. R.

No. 85468, 07 September 1989Topic: Prohibitions [Article VII: Section 13]Ponente: GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.

FACTS:

• Quintin S. Doromal, a public officer and being aCommissioner of the Presidential Commission onGood Government, participated in a business throughthe Doromal International Trading Corporation (DITC),a family corporation of which he is the President, andwhich company participated in the biddings conductedby the Department of Education, Culture and Sports(DECS) and the National Manpower & Youth Council

(NMYC) .

• In connection with his shareholdings and position aspresident and director of the Doromal InternationalTrading Corporation which submitted bids to supplyP61 million worth of electronic, electrical, automotive,mechanical and airconditioning equipment to theN THEDepartment of Education, Culture and Sports and theNational Manpower and Youth Council.



• An information was then filed by the “Tanodbayan”against Doromal for the said violation and a preliminaryinvestigation was conducted. The petitioner then filed apetition for certiorari and prohibition questioning the jurisdiction of the “Tanodbayan” to file the information

without the approval of the Ombudsman.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the act of Doromal would constitute a violation of the Constitution.

RULING:

Yes, the act of Doromal would constitute a violation of theConstitution specifically of Section 13 of Article VII.

RATIO DECIDENDI:

• Article VII, Section 13 (1) of the Constitutionprovides:

“The President, Vice-President, theMembers of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unlessotherwise provided in this Constitution, hold

any other office or employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure,directly or indirectly, practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in any contract with,or in any franchise, or special privilegegranted by the Government or anysubdivision, agency, or instrumentalitythereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.

They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest inthe conduct of their office. “

• This Constitutional ban of Section 13 is similar to theprohibition in the Civil Service Law (PD No. 807, Sec. 36,

subpar. 24) that "Pursuit of private business ... without thepermission required by Civil Service Rules andRegulations" shall be a ground for disciplinary actionagainst any officer or employee in the civil service.

• The presence of a signed document bearing thesignature of Doromal as part of the application to bidshows that he can rightfully be charged with havingparticipated in a business which act is absolutelyprohibited by Section 13 of Article VII of the Constitution"because "the DITC remained a family corporation in which

Doromal has at least an indirect interest."

SANLAKAS VS. EXECUTIVESECRETARY, G.R. No. 159085; 3 Feb 2004

Topic: Military Powers [Article VII: Section 18]Ponente: TINGA, J.

FACTS:

• During the wee hours of July 27, 2003, some three-hundred junior officers and enlisted men of the AFP,acting upon instigation, command and direction of known and unknown leaders have seized the OakwoodBuilding in Makati.

• Publicly, they complained of the corruption in the AFPand declared their withdrawal of support for thegovernment, demanding the resignation of thePresident, Secretary of Defense and the PNP Chief.



• These acts constitute a violation of Article 134 of theRevised Penal Code, and by virtue of Proclamation No.427 and General Order No. 4, the Philippines wasdeclared under the State of Rebellion.

• Negotiations took place and the officers went back totheir barracks in the evening of the same day. OnAugust 1, 2003, both the Proclamation and GeneralOrders were lifted, and Proclamation No. 435,declaring the Cessation of the State of Rebellion wasissued.

• In the interim, however, the following petitions werefiled:(1) SANLAKAS AND PARTIDO NGMANGGAGAWA VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY,petitioners contending that Sec. 18 Article VII of theConstitution does not require the declaration of astate of rebellion to call out the AFP, and that thereis no factual basis for such proclamation.(2)SJS Officers/Members v. Hon. ExecutiveSecretary, et al, petitioners contending that theproclamation is a circumvention of the reportrequirement under the same Section 18, Article VII,commanding the President to submit a report toCongress within 48 hours from the proclamation of martial law. Finally, they contend that thepresidential issuances cannot be construed as anexercise of emergency powers as Congress has notdelegated any such power to the President.(3) Rep. Suplico et al. v. President Macapagal-Arroyo and Executive Secretary Romulo, petitionerscontending that there was usurpation of the power of Congress granted by Section 23 (2), Article VI of the Constitution.

(4) Pimentel v. Romulo, et al, petitioner fears thatthe declaration of a state of rebellion "opens thedoor to the unconstitutional implementation of warrantless arrests" for the crime of rebellion.

ISSUE:

Whether or Not Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No.4 are Constitutional?

RULING:

The Court rendered that both the Proclamation No. 427 andGeneral Order No. 4 are Constitutional (Section 18, ArticleVII).

RATIO DECIDENDI:

• Section 18 (1), Article VII OF THE 1987 Constitutionprovides:

“The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of allarmed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomesnecessary, he may call out such armed forces to preventor suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In

case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it,he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend theprivilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippinesor any part thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight hoursfrom the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of theprivilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shallsubmit a report in person or in writing to the Congress. TheCongress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of allits Members in regular or special session, may revoke such



proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be setaside by the President. Upon the initiative of the President, theCongress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamationor suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress,if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety

requires it.”

• Section 18, Article VII does not expressly prohibit declaring state or rebellion. The President in addition toits Commander-in-Chief Powers is conferred by theConstitution executive powers. It is not disputed thatthe President has full discretionary power to call out thearmed forces and to determine the necessity for theexercise of such power.

• While the Court may examine whether the power wasexercised within constitutional limits or in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion, none of thepetitioners have, by way of proof, supported their assertion that the President acted without factual basis.

• The issue of usurpation of the legislative power of theCongress is of no moment since the President, indeclaring a state of rebellion and in calling out thearmed forces, was merely exercising a wedding of her Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief powers.These are purely executive powers, vested on thePresident by Sections 1 and 18, Article VII, as opposedto the delegated legislative powers contemplated bySection 23 (2), Article VI.

• Declaration of a state of rebellion is within thecalling-out power of the President. When the

president declares a state of emergency or a state of rebellion her action is merely a description of thesituation as she sees it but it does not give her newpowers. The declaration cannot diminish or violateconstitutionally protected rights.

RONALD ALLAN POE vs. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-

ARROYO

P.E.T. Case no. 002 March 29, 2005

CONCEPT: QUALIFICATIONS AND DISQUALIFICATIONS

Quisumbing, J.:

May the widow substitute or intervene for the

protestant who died during the course of the latter’s

protest case?

Before the Electoral Tribunal, composed of all the fifteen

(15) members of the Supreme Court, is a matter of first

impression. The Tribunal is tasked not only to determine

the true winner of the May 10, 2004 Presidential

election; but also to decide on whether the Protestant’s



widow can validly intervene or substitute for the

deceased party.

MATERIAL FACTS:

Past midnight in the early hours of June 24,

2004; the Congress acting as the National Board of

Canvassers, in a near unanimous roll-call vote,

proclaimed Mrs. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo (GMA) as the

duly elected president of the Republic of the Philippines;

by a difference of 1,123,576 over her closest opponent

for the Presidential seat, Ronal Allan Poe (FPJ). She then

took her Oath of Office before Chief Justice of the

Supreme Court on June 30, 2004.

Mr. Fernando Poe Jr., refusing to concede

defeat, filed an election protest before the Electoral

Tribunal on July 23, 2004. Mrs. Arroyo, through her

counsel, filed her Answer with Counter Protest on

August 5, 2004. However, while the counsels of bothparties were engaged in a lively exchange of motions

regarding the controversy; Mr. Fernando Poe Jr. suffered

a cardio pulmonary arrest (heart attack) which

eventually led to his death on December 14, 2004.

Subsequently, together with the formal Notice of

Death of the Protestant; his counsel submitted to the

Tribunal a “Manifestation with Urgent Petition/Motion to

Intervene as a Substitute for the deceased Protestant

FPJ”, by the widow Mrs. Jesusa Sonora Poe, on January

10, 2005.

In her comment, the protestee averred that the

widow of a deceased candidate is not the proper party

to replace the protestant; since a public office is

personal and hence moved to dismiss the petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the widow can validly substitute or

intervene for the Protestant who died during the

pendency of a protest case.

RULES:

Pursuant to Rule 14 of the Presidential Electoral

Tribunal; it provides that on cases of Electoral Protests,

only the registered candidates for the elections of the

President and Vice- President, who garnered the second

and third highest number of votes, can validly contest

and file a verified petition within thirty (30) days from

the proclamation of the winner.

Rule 3, Section 16 and Rule 19, Section 1 of the

Rules of Court were cited by the Protestant’s widow to

help support her claim to able to validly substitute and

intervene in lieu of her deceased husband.



HELD:

The Supreme Court, acting as the Presidential

Electoral Tribunal, held that the motion of, the

movant/intervener, Mrs. Jesusa Sonora Poe (Susan

Roces) to intervene and substitute for her deceased

husband was hereby denied for lack of merit. In

addition, the Tribunal also dismissed Case no 002,

entitled Ronald Allan Poe v. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo

(2005) on the ground that no real party in interest came

forward within the allowable period prescribed by the

law to validly intervene or to substitute for thedeceased Prostant

RATIO DECIDENDI:

Rule 14 of the Presidential Electoral TribunalRules provide only for two persons who can validly

contest an election. According to this rule, only

registered candidates for the Presidential and Vice-

Presidential elections who received the second and the

third highest number of votes can validly file. By this

expressed enumeration, we can infer that these are the

only parties considered as real parties in interest. Thus,

in the event that the proclaimed candidate had not

been the one truly voted for by the electorate; the

second or the third candidate with the highest number

of votes would then be the legitimate beneficiary of the

electoral protest.

It can be gleaned from the citation of Rule 3,

Section 16 of the Rules of Court, that the

movant/intervenor (Mrs. Poe) seeks to appear as the

legal representative of her deceased husband. However,

it was stated that in the application of this rule in

election contests; the Supreme Court has consistently

ruled that “the public office is a public trust.” This

means that the public office is considered to be

personal to the public officer and not a mere propertywhich can be easily transferred to the heirs. Even in

various cases decided by the Supreme Court, involving

the substitution by the widow of a deceased protestant,

in cases where the widow is not the real party in

interest, the substitution of the wife and the heirs were

all decided in the negative.

Rule 19, Section 1 of the Rules of Court,

specifically, provides for the parties who may intervene

in election protests. The interest that would suffice and justify the intervention must be in the matter of

litigation and of such direct and immediate character

that the intervener will either gain or lose by the effect

of the decision. In this protest, it has been held that Mrs.

Poe will not immediately and directly benefit from the

outcome of this protest, particularly, in the



determination of whether the declared President did not

truly get the highest number of votes.

G.R. Nos. 146710-15, March 2, 2001

JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, petitioner VS. ANIANO

DESIERTO, in his capacity as

Ombudsman, RAMON

GONZALES et.al,respondents

G.R. No. 146738, March 2, 2001

JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, petitioner VS. GLORIA

MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, respondent

Concept: Presidential Immunity & Qualifications and

Disqualifications

FACTS:

The case basically revolves around the series of eventsthat happened prior and subsequent to the event we know as

EDSA II. During the 1998 elections, Joseph E. Estrada and

Gloria Macapagal Arroyo were elected as president and vicepresident respectively. The downfall of the Estrada

administration began when For. Gov. Luis Chavit Singsonwent to the media and released his exposé that petitioner was

part of the Jueteng scandal as having received large sums of money. After this expose, a lot of different groups and many

personalities had asked for the resignation of the petitioner.

Some of which are the Catholic Bishops Conference of thePhilippines (CBCP), Sen. Nene Pimentel, Archbishop of

Manila, Jaime Cardinal Sin, For. Pres. Fidel Ramos, and For.Pres. Corazon Aquino who asked petitioner to make the

“supreme self-sacrifice”. Respondent also resigned as

Secretary of the Department of Social Welfare and Servicesand also asked petitioner for his resignation. 4 senior economic

advisers of the petitioner resigned and then Speaker MannyVillar, together with 47 representatives, defected from Lapian

ng Masang Pilipino.

By November, an impeachment case was to be held as Speaker

Manny Villar had transmitted the Articles of Impeachment tothe senate. On November 20, the 21 senators took oath as

judges to the impeachment trial with SC CJ Hilario Davide, Jr.,

presiding. The impeachment trial was one for the ages. It was a battle royal of well known lawyers. But then came the fateful

day, when by the vote of 11-10, the judges came to a decisionto not open the second envelop allegedly containing evidence

showing that the petitioner had a secret bank account under thename “Jose Velarde” containing P3.3 billion. The not opening

of the 2ndenvelop resulted to the people going to the streets andthe public prosecutors withdrawing from the trial. On January



19, AFP Chief of Staff Angelo Reyes marched to EDSA shrineand declared “on behalf of your Armed Forces, the 130,000

strong members of the Armed Forces, we wish to announce

that we are withdrawing our support to this government.” PNPChief, Director General Panfilo Lacson together with some

Cabinet members made the same announcement.June 20 was the day of surrender. At around 12:20 AM,

negotiations started for the peaceful transition of power. But ataround 12 noon, respondent took oath as the 14th president of

the Philippines. At 2:30 PM, petitioner and his family left

Malacanang. He issued the following Press Statement:“20January 2001”

STATEMENT FROMPRESIDENT JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA

At twelve o’clock noon today, Vice President Gloria

Macapagal-Arroyo took her oath as President of the Republicof the Philippines. While along with many other legal minds of our country, I have strong and serious doubts about the

legality and constitutionality of her proclamation as President,

I do not wish to be a factor that will prevent the restoration of unity and order in our civil society.

It is for this reason that I now leave Malacañang Palace, the seat of the presidency of this country, for the sake of peace and

in order to begin the healing process of our nation. I leave the Palace of our people with gratitude for the opportunities given

to me for service to our people. I will not shirk from any futurechallenges that may come ahead in the same service of our country.

I call on all my supporters and followers to join me in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation

and solidarity.

May the Almighty bless our country and beloved people.MABUHAY!

(Sgd.) JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA”

It also appears that on the same day, January 20, 2001, he

signed the following letter:“Sir: By virtue of the provisions of Section 11, Article VII of the

Constitution, I am hereby transmitting this declaration that I

am unable to exercise the powers and duties of my office. Byoperation of law and the Constitution, the Vice-President shall

be the Acting President.(Sgd.) JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA”

On January 22, this Court issued the following Resolution inAdministrative Matter No. 01-1-05-SC. The said resolution

confirmed the authority given by the 12 SC justices to the CJ

during the oath taking that happened on January 20. Soon,other countries accepted the respondent as the new president of

the Philippines. The House then passed Resolution No. 175“expressing the full support of the House of Representatives to

the administration of Her Excellency Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Philippines.” It also approved

Resolution No. 176 “expressing the support of the House of

Representatives to the assumption into office by Vice PresidentGloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Republic of the

Philippines, extending its congratulations and expressing its

support for her administration as a partner in the attainment of the nation’s goals under the Constitution.”

On February 6, respondent recommended Teofisto Guingona to

be the vice president. On February 7, the Senate adoptedResolution 82 which confirmed the nomination of Senator

Guingona. On the same day, the Senate passed Resolution No.83 declaring that the impeachment court is functus officio and



has been terminated. Several cases were filed against the petitioner which are as follows: (1) OMB Case No. 0-00-1629,

filed by Ramon A. Gonzales on October 23, 2000 for bribery

and graft and corruption; (2) OMB Case No. 0-00-1754 filed by the Volunteers Against Crime and Corruption on November

17, 2000 for plunder, forfeiture, graft and corruption, bribery, perjury, serious misconduct, violation of the Code of Conduct

for government Employees, etc; (3) OMB Case No. 0-00-1755filed by the Graft Free Philippines Foundation, Inc. on

November 24, 2000 for plunder, forfeiture, graft and

corruption, bribery, perjury, serious misconduct; (4) OMBCase No. 0-00-1756 filed by Romeo Capulong, et al., on

November 28, 2000 for malversation of public funds, illegaluse of public funds and property, plunder, etc., (5) OMB Case

No. 0-00-1757 filed by Leonard de Vera, et al., on November

28, 2000 for bribery, plunder, indirect bribery, violation of PD1602, PD 1829, PD 46, and RA 7080; and (6) OMB Case No.

0-00-1758 filed by Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr. on December 4,2000 for plunder, graft and corruption.

A special panel of investigators was forthwith created by therespondent Ombudsman to investigate the charges against the

petitioner. It is chaired by Overall Deputy Ombudsman

Margarito P. Gervasio with the following as members, viz :Director Andrew Amuyutan, Prosecutor Pelayo Apostol, Atty.

Jose de Jesus and Atty. Emmanuel Laureso. On January 22,

the panel issued an Order directing the petitioner to file hiscounter-affidavit and the affidavits of his witnesses as well as

other supporting documents in answer to the aforementionedcomplaints against him.

Thus, the stage for the cases at bar was set. On February 5, petitioner filed with this Court GR No. 146710-15, a petition

for prohibition with a prayer for a writ of preliminaryinjunction. It sought to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman

from “conducting any further proceedings in Case Nos. OMB0-00-1629, 1754, 1755, 1756, 1757 and 1758 or in any other

criminal complaint that may be filed in his office, until after the

term of petitioner as President is over and only if legallywarranted.” Thru another counsel, petitioner, on February 6,

filed GR No. 146738 for Quo Warranto. He prayed for judgment “confirming petitioner to be the lawful and

incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippinestemporarily unable to discharge the duties of his office, and

declaring respondent to have taken her oath as and to be

holding the Office of the President, only in an acting capacity pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution.” Acting on GR

Nos. 146710-15, the Court, on the same day, February 6,required the respondents “to comment thereon within a non-

extendible period expiring on 12 February 2001.” On February

13, the Court ordered the consolidation of GR Nos. 146710-15and GR No. 146738 and the filing of the respondents’

comments “on or before 8:00 a.m. of February 15.”In a resolution dated February 20, acting on the urgent motion

for copies of resolution and press statement for “Gag Order” onrespondent Ombudsman filed by counsel for petitioner in G.R.

No. 146738, the Court resolved:

“(1) to inform the parties that the Court did not issue aresolution on January 20, 2001 declaring the office of the

President vacant and that neither did the Chief Justice issue a

press statement justifying the alleged resolution;(2) to order the parties and especially their counsel who are

officers of the Court under pain of being cited for contempt torefrain from making any comment or discussing in public the

merits of the cases at bar while they are still pending decision by the Court, and

(3) to issue a 30-day status quo order effective immediatelyenjoining the respondent Ombudsman from resolving or



deciding the criminal cases pending investigation in his officeagainst petitioner Joseph E. Estrada and subject of the cases at

bar, it appearing from news reports that the respondent

Ombudsman may immediately resolve the cases against petitioner Joseph E. Estrada seven (7) days after the hearing

held on February 15, 2001, which action will make the cases at bar moot and academic.”

ISSUES:

1. Whether the petitions present a justiciable controversy.2. Assuming that the petitions present a justiciable controversy,

whether petitioner Estrada is President on leave whilerespondent Arroyo is an Acting President.

3. Whether conviction in the impeachment proceedings is a

condition precedent for the criminal prosecution of petitioner Estrada. In the negative and on the assumption that petitioner

is still President, whether he is immune from criminal prosecution.

4. Whether the prosecution of petitioner Estrada should beenjoined on the ground of prejudicial publicity.

HELD:

1. No. The case is legal not political.

2. No. He is not a president on leave.

3. No. The impeachment proceedings were already aborted. Asa non-sitting president, he is not entitled to immunity from

criminal prosecution4. There is not enough evidence to warrant this Court to enjoin

the preliminary investigation of the petitioner by therespondent Ombudsman.

RATIO DECIDENDI:

1. Whether or not the case involves a political

question

Respondents contend that the cases at bar pose a political

question. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo became a President

through the People power revolution. Her legitimacy as president was also accepted by other nations. Thus, they

conclude that the following shall serve as political thicketwhich the Court cannot enter.

The Court rules otherwise. A political question has beendefined by our Court as “those questions which, under the

Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereigncapacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has

been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of thegovernment. It is concerned with issues dependent upon

the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure.”

Respondents allege that the legality of the Arroyoadministration should be treated similarly with the Aquino

administration. Respondents propose that the situation of theArroyo and Aquino administrations are similar. However, the

Court finds otherwise. The Court has made substantial

distinctions which are the following:Aquino Arroyo

Government was a result of a

successful revolution

Government was a result of a

peaceful revolution

In the Freedom constitution, it

was stated that the Aquinogovernment was instilled

directly by the people in

Arroyo took the oath of the

1987 Constitution. She isdischarging the authority of the

president under the 1987



defiance of the 1973Constitution as amended.

constitution.

It is a well settled rule that the legitimacy of a government

sired by a successful revolution by people power is beyond judicial scrutiny for that government automatically orbits out of

the constitutional loop. But this would not apply as the Court

finds substantial difference between the 2 EDSA Revolutions.It would show that there are differences between the 2

governments set up by EDSA I and II. This was further explained by the Court by comparing the 2 EDSA Revolutions.

EDSA I EDSA II

Extra-constitutional. Hence,

“Xxx IN DEFIANCE OF THE1973 CONSTITUTION, ASAMENDED”—cannot be subject

of judicial review

Intra-Constitutional. Hence,

the oath of the respondent asPresident includes the protection and upholding of

the 1987 Constitution.—

resignation of the Presidentmakes it subject to judicial

review

exercise of the people power of

revolution whichoverthrew thewhole government

exercise of people power of

freedom of speech andfreedom of assembly to

petition the government for redress of

grievances which only

affected the office of thePresident

Political question Legal Question

In this issue, the Court holds that the issue is legal and not political.

2. Whether or not petitioner resigned as

President

Resignation is a factual question and its elements are beyondquibble: there must be an intent to resign and the intent must

be coupled by acts of relinquishment. There is no requiredform of resignation. It can be expressed, implied, oral or

written. It is true that respondent never wrote a letter of

resignation before he left Malacanang on June 20, 2001. In thisissue, the Court would use the totality test or the totality of

prior, contemporaneous and posterior facts and circumstantialevidence bearing a material relevance on the issue.

Using this test, the Court rules that the petitioner had resigned.The Court knows the amount of stress that the petitioner had

suffered. With just a blink of an eye, he lost the support of the

legislative when then Manny Villar and other Representativeshad defected. AFP Chief of Staff General Angelo Reyes had

already gone to EDSA. PNP Chief Director General PanfiloLacson and other cabinet secretaries had withdrawn as well. By

looking into the Angara diaries, it was pointed out that the

petitioner had suggested a snap election at May on which hewould not be a candidate. Proposing a snap election in which

he is not a candidate means that he had intent to resign. Whenthe proposal for a dignified exit or resignation was proposed,

petitioner did not disagree but listened closely. This is proof that petitioner had reconciled himself to the reality that he had

to resign. His mind was already concerned with the five-day

grace period he could stay in the palace. It was a matter of time.



The negotiations that had happened were about a peacefultransfer of power. It was already implied that petitioner would

resign. The negotiations concentrated on the following: (1) the

transition period of five days after the petitioner’s resignation;(2) the guarantee of the safety of the petitioner and his family,

and (3) the agreement to open the second envelope to vindicatethe name of the petitioner. Also taken from the Angara diaries,

The President says. “Pagod na pagod na ako. Ayoko namasyado nang masakit. Pagod na ako sa red tape, bureaucracy,

intriga. (I am very tired. I don’t want any more of this – it’s

too painful. I’m tired of the red tape, the bureaucracy, theintrigue.) I just want to clear my name, then I will go.” The

quoted statement of the petitioner was a clear evidence that hehas resigned.

The second round of negotiations were about the consolidating

of the clauses which were proposed by both sides. The secondround of negotiation cements the reading that the petitioner has

resigned. It will be noted that during this second round of negotiation, the resignation of the petitioner was again treated

as a given fact. The only unsettled points at that time were themeasures to be undertaken by the parties during and after the

transition period.

When everything was already signed by the side of the petitioner and ready to be faxed by Angara, the negotiator for

the respondent, Angelo Reyes, called to Angara saying that the

SC would allow respondent to have her oath taking. Before petitioner left Malacanang, he made a last statement.

The statement reads: ‘At twelve o’clock noon today, VicePresident Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took her oath as President

of the Republic of the Philippines. While along with manyother legal minds of our country, I have strong and serious

doubts about the legality and constitutionality of her

proclamation as president, I do not wish to be a factor that will prevent the restoration of unity and order in our civil society.

It is for this reason that I now leave Malacañang Palace, the

seat of the presidency of this country, for the sake of peace andin order to begin the healing process of our nation. I leave the

Palace of our people with gratitude for the opportunities givento me for service to our people. I will not shrik from any future

challenges that may come ahead in the same service of our country.

I call on all my supporters and followers to join me in the

promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation andsolidarity.

May the Almighty bless our country and our beloved people.MABUHAY!’”

By making such statement, petitioner impliedly affirms thefollowing: (1) he acknowledged the oath-taking of the

respondent as President of the Republic albeit with thereservation about its legality; (2) he emphasized he was leaving

the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the sake of peace andin order to begin the healing process of our nation. He did not

say he was leaving the Palace due to any kind of inability

and that he was going to re-assume the presidency as soon

as the disability disappears; (3) he expressed his gratitude to

the people for the opportunity to serve them. Without doubt,

he was referring to the past opportunity given him to servethe people as President; (4) he assured that he will not shirk

from any future challenge that may come ahead in the sameservice of our country. Petitioner’s reference is to a future

challenge after occupying the office of the president that hehas given up; and (5) he called on his supporters to join him in

the promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliationand solidarity. Certainly, the national spirit of



reconciliation and solidarity could not be attained if he did

not give up the presidency.

Petitioner however argues that he only took a temporary leave

of absence. This is evidenced by a letter which reads asfollows:

“Sir

By virtue of the provisions of Section II, Article VII of theConstitution, I am hereby transmitting this declaration that I

am unable to exercise the powers and duties of my office. Byoperation of law and the Constitution, the Vice President shall

be the Acting President.(Sgd.) Joseph Ejercito Estrada”

The Court was surprised that the petitioner did not use this

letter during the week long crisis. It would be very easy for himto say before he left Malacanang that he was temporarily

unable to govern, thus, he is leaving Malacanang. Under anycircumstance, however, the mysterious letter cannot negate the

resignation of the petitioner. If it was prepared before the pressrelease of the petitioner clearly showing his resignation from

the presidency, then the resignation must prevail as a later act.

If, however, it was prepared after the press release, still, itcommands scant legal significance.

Petitioner also argues that he could not resign. His legal basis is

RA 3019 which states:“Sec. 12. No public officer shall be allowed to resign or retire

pending an investigation, criminal or administrative, or pending a prosecution against him, for any offense under this

Act or under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on bribery.”

During the amendments, another section was inserted whichstates that:

During the period of amendments, the following provision wasinserted as section 15:

“Sec. 15. Termination of office — No public official shall be

allowed to resign or retire pending an investigation, criminal or administrative, or pending a prosecution against him, for any

offense under the Act or under the provisions of the RevisedPenal Code on bribery.

The separation or cessation of a public official from office shallnot be a bar to his prosecution under this Act for an offense

committed during his incumbency.”

The original senate bill was rejected because of the2nd paragraph of section 15. Nonetheless, another similar bill

was passed. Section 15 then became section 13. There isanother reason why petitioner’s contention should be rejected.

In the cases at bar, the records show that when petitioner

resigned on January 20, 2001, the cases filed against him before the Ombudsman were OMB Case Nos. 0-00-1629, 0-00-

1755, 0-00-1756, 0-00-1757 and 0-00-1758. While these caseshave been filed, the respondent Ombudsman refrained from

conducting the preliminary investigation of the petitioner for the reason that as the sitting President then, petitioner was

immune from suit. Technically, the said cases cannot be

considered as pending for the Ombudsman lacked jurisdictionto act on them. Section 12 of RA No. 3019 cannot therefore be

invoked by the petitioner for it contemplates of cases whose

investigation or prosecution do not suffer from any insuperablelegal obstacle like the immunity from suit of a sitting President.

Petitioner contends that the impeachment proceeding is anadministrative investigation that, under section 12 of RA 3019,

bars him from resigning. The Court holds otherwise. Theimpeachment proceeding may be arguable. However, even if

the impeachment proceeding is administrative, it cannot beconsidered pending because the process had already broke



down. There was also a withdrawal by the prosecutors to partake in the impeachment case. In fact, the proceeding was

postponed indefinitely. In fact, there was no impeachment case

pending when he resigned.

3. Whether or not the petitioner is only

temporarily unable to act as President

This issue arose from the January 20 letter which wasaddressed to then Speaker Fuentebella and then Senate

President Pimentel. Petitioner’s contention is that he is a

president on leave and that the respondent is an acting

president. This contention is the centerpiece of petitioner’sstance that he is aPresident on leave and respondent Arroyo isonly an Acting President.

An examination of section 11, Article VII is in order. It provides:

“SEC. 11. Whenever the President transmit to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his

written declaration that he is unable to discharge the powersand duties of his office, and until he transmits to them a written

declaration to the contrary, such powers and duties shall bedischarged by the Vice-President as Acting President.Whenever a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet

transmit to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of theHouse of Representatives their written declaration that the

President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of hisoffice, the Vice-President shall immediately assume the powers

and duties of the office as Acting President.

Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President of theSenate and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives his

written declaration that no inability exists, he shall reassume

the powers and duties of his office. Meanwhile, should amajority of all the Members of the Cabinet transmit within five

days to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of theHouse of Representatives their written declaration that the

President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of hisoffice, the Congress shall decide the issue. For that purpose,

the Congress shall convene, if it is not in session, within forty-

eight hours, in accordance with its rules and without need of call.

If the Congress, within ten days after receipt of the last writtendeclaration, or, if not in session within twelve days after it is

required to assemble, determines by a two-thirds vote of both

Houses, voting separately, that the President is unable todischarge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice-

President shall act as President; otherwise, the President shallcontinue exercising the powers and duties of his office."

After studying in-depth the series of events that happened after petitioner left Malacanang, it is very clear that the inability of

the petitioner as president is not temporary. The question is

whether this Court has jurisdiction to review the claim

of temporary inability of petitioner Estrada and

thereafter revise the decision of both Houses

of Congress recognizing respondent Arroyo as President of thePhilippines. The Court says that they cannot, for such is an

example of a political question, in which the matter has solely been left to the legislative,

4. Whether or not the petitioner enjoys

immunity from suit. If yes, what is the extent of

the immunity?



Petitioner Estrada makes two submissions: first, the cases filed

against him before the respondent Ombudsman should be

prohibited because he has not been convicted in the

impeachment proceedings against him; and second, heenjoys immunity from all kinds of suit, whether criminal or civil. The “immunity” the petitioner points to is the principle of

non-liability.

The principle of non-liability simply states that a chief executive may not be personally mulcted in civil damages for

the consequences of an act executed in the performance of hisofficial duties. He is liable when he acts in a case so plainly

outside of his power and authority that he cannot be said tohave exercise discretion in determining whether or not he had

the right to act. What is held here is that he will be protectedfrom personal liability for damages not only when he actswithin his authority, but also when he is without authority,

provided he actually used discretion and judgment, that is, the judicial faculty, in determining whether he had authority to act

or not. In other words, he is entitled to protection indetermining the question of his authority. If he decidewrongly, he is still protected provided the question of his

authority was one over which two men, reasonably qualifiedfor that position, might honestly differ; but he is not protected

if the lack of authority to act is so plain that two such mencould not honestly differ over its determination.

The Court rejects the petitioner’s argument that before he could

be prosecuted, he should be first convicted of impeachment proceedings. The impeachment proceeding was already aborted

because of the walking out of the prosecutors. This was thenformalized by a Senate resolution (Resolution #83) which

declared the proceeding functus officio. According to the

debates in the Constitutional Convention, when an

impeachment proceeding have become moot due to theresignation of the President, proper civil and criminal cases

may be filed against him.

We now come to the scope of immunity that can be claimed by petitioner as a non-sitting President. The cases filed against

petitioner Estrada arecriminal in character. They involveplunder, bribery and graft and corruption. By no stretch of

the imagination can these crimes, especially plunder whichcarries the death penalty, be covered by the allege mantle of

immunity of a non-sitting president. Petitioner cannot cite any

decision of this Court licensing the President to commitcriminal acts and wrapping him with post-tenure immunity

from liability. It will be anomalous to hold that immunity is

an inoculation from liability for unlawful acts and

omissions. As for civil immunity, it means immunity from

civil damages only covers “official acts”.

MARCOS v. MANGLAPUS

177 SCRA 668 (1989)

Concept: Residual Powers

FACTS:

Former President Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from the presidency via the non-violent “people power” revolution and

was forced into exile. Marcos, in his deathbed, has signified hiswish to return to the Philippines to die. But President Corazon

Aquino, considering the dire consequences to the nation of hisreturn at a time when the stability of government is threatened



from various directions and the economy is just beginning torise and move forward, has stood firmly on the decision to bar

the return of Marcos and his family.

Aquino barred Marcos from returning due to possible threats &following supervening events:

1. failed Manila Hotel coup in 1986 led byMarcos leaders2. channel 7 taken over by rebels & loyalists

3. plan of Marcoses to return w/ mercenariesaboard a chartered plane of a Lebanese arms dealer. This is to prove that they can stir trouble from afar

4. Honasan’s failed coup5. Communist insurgency movements6. secessionist movements in Mindanao7. devastated economy because of

- accumulated foreign debt

- plunder of nation by Marcos & cronies

Marcos filed for a petition of mandamus and prohibition toorder the respondents to issue them their travel documents and

prevent the implementation of President Aquino’s decision to bar Marcos from returning in the Philippines. Petitioner

questions Aquino’s power to bar his return in the country. He

also questioned the claim of the President that the decision wasmade in the interest of national security, public safety and

health. Petitioner also claimed that the President acted outsideher jurisdiction.

According to the Marcoses, such act deprives them of their right to life, liberty, property without due process and equal

protection of the laws. They also said that it deprives them of

their right to travel which according to Section 6, Article 3 of the constitution, may only be impaired by a court order.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers

granted by the Constitution, the President may

prohibit the Marcoses from returning to thePhilippines.

2. Whether or not the President acted arbitrarily or

with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or

excess of jurisdiction when she determined that the

return of the Marcoses to the Philippines poses a

serious threat to national interest and welfare and

decided to bar their return.

HELD: No to both issues. Petition dismissed.RATIO DECIDENDI:

Separation of power dictates that each department hasexclusive powers. According to Section 1, Article VII of the

1987 Philippine Constitution, “the executive power shall be

vested in the President of the Philippines.” However, it doesnot define what is meant by “executive power” although in the

same article it touches on exercise of certain powers by thePresident, i.e., the power of control over all executive

departments, bureaus and offices, the power to execute thelaws, the appointing power to grant reprieves, commutations

and pardons… (art VII secfs. 14-23). Although the constitution

outlines tasks of the president, this list is not defined &exclusive. She has residual & discretionary powers not

stated in the Constitution which include the power to

protect the general welfare of the people. She is obliged to

protect the people, promote their welfare & advance national

interest. (Art. II, Sec. 4-5 of the Constitution). Residual



powers, according to Theodore Roosevelt, dictate that thePresident can do anything which is not forbidden in the

Constitution (Corwin, supra at 153), inevitable to vest

discretionary powers on the President (Hyman, AmericanPresident) and that the president has to maintain peace during

times of emergency but also on the day-to-day operation of theState.

The rights Marcoses are invoking are not absolute. They’reflexible depending on the circumstances. The request of the

Marcoses to be allowed to return to the Philippines cannot be

considered in the light solely of the constitutional provisionsguaranteeing liberty of abode and the right to travel, subject to

certain exceptions, or of case law which clearly never contemplated situations even remotely similar to the present

one. It must be treated as a matter that is appropriately

addressed to those residual unstated powers of the Presidentwhich are implicit in and correlative to the paramount duty

residing in that office to safeguard and protect general welfare.In that context, such request or demand should submit to the

exercise of a broader discretion on the part of the President todetermine whether it must be granted or denied.

For issue number 2, the question for the court to determine is

whether or not there exist factual basis for the President toconclude that it was in the national interest to bar the return of

the Marcoses in the Philippines. It is proven that there are

factual bases in her decision. The supervening events thathappened before her decision are factual. The President must

take preemptive measures for the self-preservation of thecountry & protection of the people. She has to uphold the

Constitution.

Fernan, Concurring

1. The president’s power is not fixed. Limitswould depend on the imperatives of events andnot on abstract theories of law. We areundergoing a critical time and the currentproblem can only be answerable by the President.2. Threat is real. Return of the Marcoses wouldpose a clear & present danger. Thus, it’s theexecutive’s responsibility & obligation to preventa grave & serious threat to its safety from arising.3. We can’t sacrifice public peace, order, safety& our political & economic gains to give in toMarcos’ wish to die in the country. Compassionmust give way to the other state interests.

Cruz, Dissenting1. As a citizen of this country, it is Marcos’ rightto return, live & die in his own country. It is a rightguaranteed by the Constitution to all individuals,whether patriot, homesick, prodigal, tyrant, etc.2. Military representatives failed to show thatMarcos’ return would pose a threat to nationalsecurity. Fears were mere conjectures.3. Residual powers – but the executive’spowers were outlined to limit her powers & notexpand.

Paras, Dissenting1. AFP has failed to prove danger which wouldallow State to impair Marcos’ right to return to thePhilippines. .2. Family can be put under house arrest & in theevent that one dies, he/she should be buried w/in10 days.3. Untenable that without a legislation, right totravel is absolute & state is powerless to restrict



it. It’s w/in police power of the state to restrict thisright if national security, public safety/healthdemands that such be restricted. It can’t beabsolute & unlimited all the time. It can’t bearbitrary & irrational.

4. No proof that Marcos’ return would endangernational security or public safety. Fears arespeculative & military admits that it’s undercontrol. Filipinos would know how to handleMarcos’ return.

Padilla, Dissenting

Sarmiento, Dissenting1. President’s determination that Marcos’ returnwould threaten national security should be agreedupon by the court. Such threat must be clear &present.

Executive Power Cases

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