Executive legislative relation in ghana
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Transcript of Executive legislative relation in ghana
CHAPTER ONE
This chapter gives the background to the study. It is followed by the
statement of the problem, purpose of the study, conceptual
framework, hypothesis, the scope of the study, significance of the
study, methodology, and limitations of the study.
1.0 BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY.
Ghana has experienced different models of democracy since the
attainment of political independence in 1957. Each model had its
peculiar institutional design by which power was distributed among
the three organs of state. By the same institutional logic the
framework of governance was different. While Ghana’s democracy is
often cited as one of the most functional in Africa, its institutional
arrangements continue to be a constraint to democratic
consolidation. (Regina 2007:1). In this regard, this research is aimed
at getting fuller understanding of the Ghanaian Legislature and its
relationship with the Executive and presents the existing institutional
deficits and how this has hindered the efficient and effective
performance of Ghana’s parliament.
The 1992 Constitution of Ghana creates a hybrid political system that
combines elements of presidential and parliamentary systems. This
1
political structure has constrained parliament’s potential policy
influence by creating an expectation of parliamentary oversight while
simultaneously undermining its independence. In particular, the
constitution requires that the majority of government ministers also
be parliamentarians, and has thus partially fused the executive and
legislative branches.
It is generally recognized that as a consequence of the fusion,
majority of the Parliamentarians often aspire to ministerial and other
government appointments. This expectation constrains them from
presenting substantial challenges to presidential policies for fear of
damaging their appointment prospects. Further, it is difficult if not
impossible for a parliamentarian who doubles as a minister of state to
perform independent and unbiased oversight of government.
This partial fusion of the Executive and the Legislature is a key
problem in the 1992 Constitution. It undermines official separation of
powers and reinforces the negative pattern of executive dominance
in Ghanaian politics. The power and the opportunity granted to the
President under the constitution to appoint Members of Parliament
(MPs) to ministerial positions keeps the MPs beholding to the
President.
The requirement that majority of ministers of states be selected from
among members of parliament also has the potential to decimate the
institution of parliament and undermine its bipartisan cohesion as
2
MPs now serving as ministers of state will be distracted from their
legislative duties. This weakens the ability of parliament to
countervail executive powers and further pose a threat to Ghana’s
democratic consolidation process agenda.
(Prempeh 2003:8)
The combination of constitutional constraints and Ghanaian political
culture and practice has also made the laying of Private Member Bill
(PMBs) extremely difficult, a situation exacerbated by the divided
loyalty of many MPs between their legislative and executive duties. In
practice, sector minister have laid bills before parliament during the
entirety of the fourth Republic (1992-present), meaning that no
legislation has originated in Parliament.
As a result of the structural impediments and the incentive structure
that have been created, the executive essentially controls both the
legislative and public policy agenda.
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE LEGISLATURE IN GHANA.
Legislative power was first exercised in the Gold Coast during the
reign of Queen Victoria (1837-1901). During the period of 1850-1865,
the Gold Coast had a distinct Legislative Council consisted of the
Governor and at least two other persons designated by Royal
Instructions. Apart from the legislative body, the Gold Coast also had
3
an Executive Council. The Legislative and Executive Councils were
responsible for policy making and implementation. (Ayensu and
Darkwa 1999:16)
Since independence in 1957, Ghana has experimented with various
types of governments: “Westminster” model of parliamentary
government (1957-1960 and 1969-1972); one-party dictatorship
(1960-1966); military dictatorship (1966-1969; 1972-1979 and 1981-
1993); United States’ model of separation of powers (1979-1981) and
Fourth Republican Constitution (1992 to date),which is a combination
of Westminster type and the American Presidential model.
In all these duly elected constitutional governments (1957-1960;
1969-1972; 1979-1981 and 1991-Date) the authority of the state has
resided in the National Assembly elected on a competitive basis. A
Prime Minister or President for the Westminster and American
models either headed the government. In the case of the Westminster
model both the Prime Minister and other Ministers were members of
parliament whereas in the presidential system there was a strict
separation of powers (at least in terms of personnel) between the
executive and legislature – the President and the ministers are not
members of the legislative body and do not take part in its
proceedings. In contrast, the model adopted in 1992 requires that a
specific proportion of ministers were to be appointed from among the
4
members of the legislative body. The objective was probably to avoid
deadlocks that sometimes develop between the legislature and the
executive in the presidential system.
Ghana followed the Westminster type of democracy at independence
in 1957 with a liberal democratic Constitution and all its trappings
such as opposition parties, guarantees of civil liberties and an
independent Judiciary. In 1960 the country became a Republic and
four years (1964) later the Constitution of the First Republic was
amended and replaced with a one party state with substantial
legislative powers to the President. Although the traditional
legislative and oversight role of the then Parliament was not taken
away, it was virtually ineffective in checking the activities of the
executive. While few members of the House were able to express the
concerns of the electorate and made attempts to check the activities
of the executive, the majority of them tended to agree to whatever
policies and programs the executive initiated.
The 1969 Constitution of the Second Republic of Ghana re-introduced
multi-party democracy in Ghana with a more vibrant Parliament.
Unfortunately, the Constitution was overthrown in over two years of
its existence. The next constitutional attempt was made in 1979 with
late Dr. Hilla Liman as the President. Again, within two and half
years of its existence the Constitution was suspended and parliament
5
dissolved. Thus between 1972 and 1979, Ghana was ruled by a
succession of military officers (National Redemption Council (NRC),
Supreme Military Council (SMC) I and II) and in June 1979, by the
Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), headed by Flight
Lieutenant J.J Rawlings.
Between December 1981 and January 6, 1991 the country was again
ruled by a military dictatorship under the Provisional National
Defence Council (PNDC).
The current Parliament of Ghana was established by Article 93 of the
1992 Constitution. The body is vested with legislative powers of the
state, which is exercised in accordance with the Constitution. The
legislative power is exercised by passing of Bills which is later
assented by the President to become laws. The tenure of each
Parliament is four years and there is no restriction on the number of
times an individual can seek re-election.
At the apex of the Parliament established by the 1992 Constitution
are the Speaker and two Deputies (first and second Deputy Speaker).
The next on the ladder is the Majority Leader also known as the
Minister for Parliamentary Affairs followed by the Minority Leader,
the Whips of the various parties and backbenchers. There are specific
rules and procedures governing the activities of the House. For
instance, no debate can take place in the floor of the house unless a
member moves it. The Parliament is a unicameral legislature with at
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least 140 elected members as stipulated in the Constitution. The first
three Parliament of the Fourth Republic consisted of 200 members
elected once every four years, from 200 single-member
constituencies throughout the country. By the Representation of the
People Parliamentary Constituencies Instrument2004, CI 41, the
membership of parliament increased to230 from January 2005.
THE 1992 CONSTITUTION
The architecture of the 1992 constitution is complex. It is based on
the principle of separation of powers, as well as a system of
overlapping personnel, functions and powers resulting in a hybrid
of the presidential and parliamentary systems of government.
In the first instance, state power is shared among its three organs:
Article 58 (1) vests executive power in the president; Article 93
vests legislative power in parliament; and Article 125(3) vests
judicial power in the judiciary. Second, Article 78 (1) provides that
the President shall appoint ministers of state with the prior
approval of parliament, and that the majority of such appointees
should be “from among members of parliament.” The Vice
President, Ministers and Deputy Ministers who are not Members of
Parliament can participate in the proceedings of parliament, except
that they are not entitled to vote (Article 111). Third, though the
President exercises executive power, including the enforcement of
7
all the laws of Ghana under Article 58 (2) he or she cannot spend
public moneys without authorization by parliament. Nor can the
president make laws. The power to make laws as well as authorize
the use of public funds is vested in parliament; but it is only the
President who can introduce a bill or motion to impose a tax or
spend public money. (Article 108)
The president could refuse to assent a bill passed by parliament
even though parliament could override the President’s veto by a
vote of not less than two-thirds of its members (Article 106 (9-10).
Fourth, Article 81 (1) empowers parliament to initiate proceedings
to impeach or remove from office either a minister or deputy
minister, however, clause 5 of article 82 leaves it to the discretion
of the President to revoke the appointment of the minister or
deputy minister concerned.
The strong bond between the president and his party in
parliament creates a virtual monopoly over the decision making
apparatus of the state. That is, the president (together with his
cabinet) and the legislature are able to control these two critical
decision-making structures within the state system.
Though members of parliament could propose an independent
members’ bill, Article 108 of the Constitution vests in the president
the sole authority to propose bills that have financial implications.
8
Essentially the president and his cabinet, all of whom have so far
come from the same political party, exercise exclusive
responsibility for development policy. When a development policy
issue gets to parliament for approval the president uses his party,
which is in the majority, to get it approved. The majority party in
parliament tends to be less democratic when major national issues
come before parliament for consideration. It has turned
parliamentary deliberation on such issues into partisan contests for
hegemony in the legislature. Such partisanship has often forced
the opposition party or parties to bring the issues outside the
domain of parliament in order to mobilize a wider public to express
their viewpoint. But the majority party in parliament has always
had its way on such highly contested policy issues.
This hybrid system has lead to what has become known as
executive dominance over parliament in the Fourth Republic
1.1 PROBLEM STATEMENT
The 1992 Constitution shares power among the various arms of
government, however, the legislature in a way has failed to overcome
executive dominance and to undertake its functions effectively within
the framework of the 1992 constitution.
What this research therefore seeks to unravel is the ineffectiveness of
parliament serving as a check on the executive.
9
The fusion of executive and legislative powers in certain respects,
and the hybridization of the parliamentary and presidential system
have given the executive a huge and unequivocal presence in
parliament. First, executive power is exercise in parliament through
the President’s majority party of which he becomes leader by virtue of
his position as President. On the one hand, this gives the President’s
party in parliament a strong stake in the President’s +++policies and
programmes that are brought before parliament. Because the success
or failure of the President’s policies and programmes affect the
electoral fortune of his party, the President’s parliamentary party
collectively and individually becomes a strong advocate of the
President’s policies and programmes. On the other hand, the
President also sees his party in parliament as an indispensable
resource for getting his policies and programmes through parliament.
He accordingly maintains keen interest in the decisions made by his
parliamentary party and closely monitors trends.
The executive again, has a more direct presence in parliament
through the ministers appoint from among members of parliament.
The executive is further represented in parliament through ministers
and deputy ministers who are not members of parliament but can
participate in the business of parliament except voting.
The majority party in parliament also ensures that the person
appointed as speaker is favorably disposed to the president.
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Theoretically the speaker is an independent officer of the state who
has sworn The Speaker’s Oath to defend the constitution and do right
to all manner of persons in accordance with the constitution of Ghana
and the laws and conventions of parliament. The reality is that the
speaker is elected on the strength of the president’s party in
parliament, which makes the speaker indirectly part of the ensemble
of powers that represent the president in parliament.
It is therefore argue that, the framers of the constitution have
subordinated the Legislature to the Executive (the President) which
weakens the strength of parliament.
As a result, parliament has not been able to effectively perform its
oversight functions as required by the constitution.
Others further argue that, for the constitution to allow majority of
ministers to be appointed from within members of parliament, it
weakens the credibility of parliament in performance of its oversight
responsibility.
This means the executive arm is highly influential over parliament.
This undermines the effective constitutional checks and balances and
in effect, hinders accountability of the executive arm of government
under the fourth republic. This has therefore come to be known as
the Executive dominance of the Legislature.
1.2 OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY
11
The research is aimed at critically assessing parliament under the
Fourth Republic and established why the Legislature had failed to
perform its oversight responsibilities on the Executive effectively.
Specifically, the study would look into the major factors that
militate against the work of the legislature.
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
The concepts of separation of powers and checks and balances
would be examined in relation to this work. According to Strong
C.F. (1963; 58) cited in Gilbert Keith Bluwey (2002: 63) “these
concepts first appeared in a work by Baron de Montesquieu
entitled Esprit des Lois, published in 1748. Montesquieu held that
when the legislative and executive powers are united in the same
person or, body of persons there can be no liberty because of the
danger that the same monarch or senate may enact tyrannical laws
and execute them in a tyrannical manner.”
He therefore advocated that in order to prevent abuse of power
and tyrannical rule, no two of the three functions of government
should be vested in the same hands. These functions are: law-
making, law-executing and the interpretation of the law in the
settlement of disputes.
Another classical interpretation of this concept is given by M.J.C.
Vile (1967: 13) cited in J.C. Johari (1982: 524) “it is essential for
12
the establishment and maintenance of political liberty that the
government be divided into three branches or departments, the
legislature, the executive and judiciary. To each of these branches
there is a corresponding identifiable function of government,
legislative, executive or judicial. Each of these branches must be
confined to the exercise of its own functions and not allowed to
encroach upon the functions of other branches. Also, the persons
who compose of these agencies of government must be kept
separate and distinct, no individual being allowed to be at the same
time a member of more than one branch. In this way, each of the
branches will be able to control the machinery of the state.”
Separation of powers therefore implies that, there should be three
separate organs of government with their separate set of powers. It
also implies that the various arms should be kept separate in the
interest of the individual. This in essence is the division of powers
of government among the various organs in terms of functions and
personnel’s. Each organ must be confined to the exercise of its own
functions and not allowed to encroach upon the functions of other
organs. Also, persons who compose these three organs must be
kept separate and distinct; no individual must be allowed to be a
member of more than one organ.
Under the concept of separation of powers a member of parliament
who is appointed a minister of state is require to resign as Member
13
of Parliament before the person can assume the office as a minister
of state.
In order to ensure efficiency and accountability of each of the
organs in performance of their constitutional functions,
Montesquieu did not only propose a clear and permanent
separation of legislative, executive, and judicial functions. He also
advocated that each of the organs should be made to check one
another in order to avoid the abuse of powers by any of the organs
through the concept of checks and balances. Here, each of the
organs is vested with powers to serve as a watchdog on each other.
Montesquieu thus gave to the world the twin concepts of separation of
powers and checks and balances.
Separation of powers would increase the competence of each of the
branches while the checks and balances would prevent abuse of
power.
This would promote the autonomy of each of the branches and enable
them constitute themselves and function effectively without undue
interference from each other.
1.4. HYPOTHESIS
The entire study is based on the assumptions that:
The President has being vested with excessive powers over
parliament.
14
Parliament and parliamentary committees lack office
accommodation, which inhibits their oversight role.
1.5 SCOPE OF THE STUDY.
The research study was carried out within Accra and Kumasi.
However, the offices of parliament, CDD and IDEG were specifically
selected within Accra.
For the purpose of our study, we limited our scope in Kumasi to
KNUST campus and Adum. This has enabled us to minimize cost and
elicited the relevant information for the study.
1.6. JUSTIFICATION
It is the conviction of the researchers that the findings of this study
will go a long way to assist policy makers to be well informed of the
extent to which parliament had failed to effectively perform its
oversight function over the executive. The researchers also believe
that, the findings of this research will inform Ghanaians on how the
constitution possesses certain limitations on the work of parliament.
Finally, the study will also be of immense benefit to students and
researchers who will carry out further research in this area.
The constitution reflects a hybrid of the parliamentary and
presidential systems which promotes executive dominance at the
expense of parliamentary accountability. The framers of the
constitution have handed us an executive-legislature arrangement
that reinforce one of the negative aspects of our political culture
15
which is excessive presidential powers over parliament. This affects
horizontal accountability between the legislature and the executive.
This means the executive will always dominate parliament so far as
the ruling party maintain majority in parliament and continue to draw
majority of ministers from parliament. This can be a root cause of bad
government.
1.6.0 METHODOLOGY
This section deals with the systematic way employed by the
researchers to arrive at the organized data in chapter three in relation
to the research objectives. Under this, the researchers outlined the
population under study and the sample size for the study as well as
the techniques adopted in getting the sample size. The methods
adopted in collections of data, presentation and analyzing of the data
are also included under this section.
1.6.1 Population
The population of this study is made up of Ghanaian adults who are
between the ages of eighteen and above. The target population was
however categorized into three. They were made up of the educated
elite, civil societies and the mass public. The educated elites
constituted parliamentarians, staffs of parliament and students. CDD
and IDEG were the main civil societies consulted.
1.6.2 Sample size
16
In order to obtain objective and accurate information on the problem,
a sample size of two hundred respondents was targeted. The targeted
population was sampled from each of the categorized of the
population. However, one hundred and twenty respondents were
consulted at the end of the research.
1.6.3 Sample technique
The non-probability sampling technique was used to obtain the sample
size. Specifically, the purposive sampling was used to obtain
respondents. This was due to the nature of the study which requires
some level of knowledge about the legislative and executive arms of
government.
1.6.4 Method of data collection
Both primary and secondary data were used. The primary source of
data includes administered questionnaires and discussions. Journals,
articles, reports, thesis from researchers, both published and
unpublished and the use of the internet were our secondary source of
information.
1.6.5 Types of data
Both quantitative and qualitative types of data were collected. The
qualitative data included the comments and suggestions from the
respondents. The quantitative date on the other hand, includes
statistical data and values collected from the respondents.
1.6.6 Method of Data Analysis
17
In analyzing the data obtained, both qualitative and quantitative
methods have been used. Analysis of the research work was in three
main processes, which is preparation of coding scheme, coding data
entry, and analysis. Analysis was done by the use of statistical
packages for Social Sciences (SPSS). Furthermore, the data was
analyzed by examining the features in relation to the objectives of the
study. Descriptive statistics were employed by the use of pie chart,
and bar graphs.
1.7 Organization of the study
The study has been organized into four chapters. Chapter one
constitutes the general background of the study, problem statement,
conceptual framework, hypothesis, scope of study, objectives,
methodology, and relevance of the study. The limitation, delimitations
and budget are also under this chapter. Chapter two consists of
literature review where relevant works relating to this study had been
reviewed. The review was captured under the following sub-headings;
Studies on the legislature, Historical overview of the legislature in
Ghana, Parliament of the fourth Republic, Factors that militate
against parliament and Review summary and evaluation. Chapter
three contains the demography of the respondent as well as data
presentation and analysis. The final chapter provides a summary of
the findings, conclusion, recommendation and bibliography.
18
1.8 Limitation
In the course of the research, the challenges encountered include;
getting access to information from the office of parliament and even
members of parliament (MPs). There were also time constraints and
financial set-backs. However, to overcome these challenges letters
were sent to the office of parliament and MP’s to give them prior
notice. Financial support was also sought from our parents and
guidance.
19
REFERENCES
1. The 1992 Constitution of Ghana. Accra, Ghana.
2. H. Kwasi Prempeh (2003), Executive Legislature
Relationship Under the 1992 Constitution: A Critical
Review.CDD Publication Accra, Ghana, September 2003.
Critical Perspective Number 15 (P:8).
3. Ninsin A. Kwame (2005). Executive- Parliament Interface in
the Legislative Process (1993-2006). A Synergy of Power,
Institute for Democratic Governance Publication Accra; Ghana
(P:2)
4. Center for Democratic Development Newsletter (2001),
Democracy Watch Volume 2 Number 1. CDD Publication,
Accra, Ghana March, 2001.
5. Regina Oforiwa Amanfo (2007), A paper presented on African
Legislatures Project Conference on African Legislature;
Integrating Research and Policy (The Case of Ghanaian
Parliament)
6. Center for Democratic Development Publication (2000),
Parliament and Democratic Governance in Ghana’s Fourth
Republic. CDD Publication, Accra, Ghana.
20
7. K.B. Ayensu and S.N. Darkwa (1999), The Evolution of
Parliament in Ghana, Institute of Economic Affairs
Publication, Accra, Ghana.
8. Thomas E. Patterson (2002), the American Democracy (16
Edition), McGraw Hill Publication. United States of America.
9. Kumekpor Tom K.B (2002), Research Methods, Sonlife Press
and Service, Accra, Ghana.
10. Gilbert Keith Bluwey (2002) Political Science: An
Introduction. Legon Center for International Affairs (LECIA)
Publication. Accra, Ghana. (P:63)
11. J.C Johari (1982) Comparative Politics. Sterling Publishes
Limited, New Delhi, India. (P:524)
12. Shana Warren (2005) Legislative Performance in Ghana:
Assessment of the Third Parliament of the Fourth
Republic, 2001-2005. CDD Publication Accra, Ghana. (P:9)
21
CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW
This chapter deals with the review of some published works relating
to the research topic. A number of studies have gone into the
legislatures and parliament in Ghana, however, no single published
work emphasizes on the ineffectiveness of parliament in serving as a
check on the executive. Some of the works however, establish several
factors that militate against the effective performance of parliament.
For the purpose of the study, a brief review of literature is attempted.
The review is centered on the following sub-related topics:
1. Studies on the Legislature.
2. Historical Overview of Legislature in Ghana.
22
3. Parliament of the Fourth Republic.
4. Factors that militate against Parliament of the Fourth Republic.
5. Review Summary and Evaluations.
2.1 INTRODUCTION
In general, a bewildering variety of terms are used to describe the
law making organ of government. It is often referred to as congress
in the USA, national assembly in France, and the House of
Representatives or diet in Japan, parliament in Singapore and Ghana,
congress of duties in Spain and so on. Parliament or legislature is
derived from the French word “parler” which meant to speak’ the
Latin origin of parliament is ‘parliamentum’.
Legislatures are perceived as “building where representatives meet
and discuss the main affairs of the nation, they pass legislation and
they exercise control, or try to exercise it over government”.
(Chapman et al. 1999:99).
Others contend that legislatures are deliberating bodies of states.
Legislature is also perceived as “Law making assembly of elected
members in formally equal relationship to one another”. (Mclean,
1996:280)
Legislatures occupy a unique position in the machinery of
government in every state. Today every state has a legislative body of
23
some kind. In some states legislatures are powerful decisions making
bodies, while in others they are merely advisory bodies, performing
only as rubber stamp institutions.
The constitutional arrangement of states however, established a
relationship between the executive and legislative arms of
government. This mostly depends on the system of government
practiced in that particular country. The most fundamental
differences between the various systems of government therefore lie
in the relationship between the executive and the legislature.
According to Andrew Heywood (2002:313), the executive-legislative a
relations in every state more commonly conform to one of three
institutional arrangements: Parliamentary Presidential, and Hybrid
system of government. In an attempt to explain these systems of
government, Heywood explain the parliamentary system as “one in
which the government governs in and through the Assembly or
Parliament, thereby fusing the legislative and executive branches.” He
emphasized that the central feature of this system is a fusion of
legislative and executive powers.
J/C. Johari (2009:494) also shared the same view with Haywood but
added that under the parliamentary system, “parliament has the
24
upper hand because it has the ultimate power: the ability to remove
the government”
The principal alternative to the parliamentary system according to
Haywood (ibid, 315) is the presidential system of government. The
presidential system to him is based on the strict application of the
doctrine of separation of powers between the executive and the
legislature. This ensures that the two are formally independent from
one another and separately elected.
J.C. Johari also emphasized that the essential feature of this system is
a separation of the legislature from the executive. To him, this system
does not allow the president and his ministers to become members of
the legislature. He maintained that in case the president appoints
someone as a minister who is also a member of the legislature, he
will have to resign his legislative membership before accepting the
ministerial assignment.
According to Haywood and Johari, states either adopts the
presidential system as practiced in the United States or the
parliamentary system as practiced in Britain. However, others also
practice a mixture of both the presidential and parliamentary systems
as it is in France and Ghana. Here there is an elected president who
can appoint some of his ministers from the legislature without them
resigning their legislative membership. This system is mostly known
as the hybrid system.
25
2.2 STUDIES ON THE LEGISLATURE
A lot of studies have been undertaken on the legislature. A
contemporary comparative politics series edited by Joseph
LaPalombara, offer a comparative perspective of legislature across
the globe, the work is fundamentally devoted to what legislatures can
do and cannot do what they can do best and under what conditions
these achievements can occur.
Andrew Heywood explores legislatures from a theoretical point of
view. He is of the considered view that legislators are often treated
with special respect and status as the public and even democratic
face of government. He continues with the definitions of the
legislature and identifies some of the functions of the legislature
which include; legislation representation, scrutiny, political
recruitment and legitimacy (Heywood 2002: 216-219). He further
discusses the structure of parliament and the committee system. He
concluded that, legislatures seem to be on decline largely because of
the emergence of disciplined political parties, the growth of big
government, organizational weaknesses of legislature and the rise of
interest groups and the media power. This study is very instructive as
the theoretical grounding of our study relies extensively on it.
The work of Jackson and Jackson on the legislature was brief but very
authoritative. They affirm the importance of legislature and assert
26
that in democracies, these bodies consist of representatives who
govern on behalf of the people (Jackson and Jackson 1997:243).
Jackson and Jackson identify some functions of legislatures such as
law making, the power to raise taxes, helping to elect a government
and teaching and informing the public (Jackson and Jackson 1997:
244-246).
The study also touched on the organization of legislatures by
explaining the two fundamental houses of legislature and reasons for
their adoption. Their study also indicates that the internal rules for
deliberations in legislatures are important in the determination of
member’s activities and their effectiveness. The study mentions the
committee system, the speaker and other bodies of the house which
help the institution to function effectively (Jackson and Jackson
1997:248-250).
They conclude, by discussing the relationship between the executive
and the legislature which they believe is very crucial to the way a
political system works. They consider two main opposing schools of
thought on this topic. One school of thought has it that legislatures
have declined over time and thus allowed executives to become more
powerful in the policy process. This position is countered by the
position that there never was a period when the legislature
dominated executives; legislative institutions have always been
relatively weak.
27
The relationship between the executive and the legislature is of
paramount importance to our study. The conclusion we draw on this
is that this asymmetrical relationship has undermined the
performance of the legislature.
The work of J. Blondel describes the legislature as one institution of
governments that poses the most fascinating problem. Legislatures
continue to be the most revered, the most hoped for and often the
least successful institution in contemporary governments. (Blondel
1973: 2). He maintains that legislatures are considered as mere
puppets, exercising little influence over policy-making. He also
opines that even though legislatures are expected to promote
liberalism and democracy, they have not been successful in that
endeavour.
(Blondel 1973: 3).
Among the other issues dealt with by the study are the constraints of
legislature, constitutional framework of powers and the role of
legislature on policies of immediate importance which relate to the
generation of new ideas and the control of output of administration
and government (Blondel 1973:104)
On the functions of the legislature, Blondel is of the views that,
legislatures serve as intermediaries for demands made by others or
28
may themselves serve as originators of suggestions. In relation to
output of the political system, it will ran from very detailed to
general, they often result from initiatives of members or triggered by
constituent and interests. (Blondel 1973: 16-17).
He concludes that even though there is an exaggerated view of the
importance of the legislature, they still remain very influential in
countries where they were originally created and elsewhere than is
usually claimed (Blondel, 1973: 133)
The study offers a general overview of legislature in a comparative
basis. It also provides some useful insights into the functions of
legislatures.
The work of Godwin and Wahlke was on forms of government. They
specifically discuss parliamentary and presidential system and also
focus on the responsibility and dissolution of parliament. They dilate
on the institutional framework of legislatures like legislative
competence, the number of chambers, rule of procedure, and the
authority and leadership structure. The committee system is also
discussed (Godwin and Wahlke 1997: 218-224).
Legislative processes such as initiative, deliberation and enactment
are elaborated. One legislative performance, the study identifies
representation as a very crucial function of the legislature.
29
They maintain that many people believe that a representative’s first
obligation is to protect the interests of the home district and to base
actions on the opinion of constituents (Godwin and Wahlke
1997:229). They further mention oversight and control over the
executive, community service, recruitment of political elites some
symbolic functions such as the oath of office and promising to uphold
the constitution and preserve the welfare of the entire country.
(Godwin and Wahlke 1997: 252).
Although the oversight responsibility of the legislature over the
executive was not elaborated much in their work, it is however,
crucial to our study.
2.3 HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE LEGISLATURE IN
GHANA
Legislative power was fist exercised in the Gold Coast during the
reign of Queen Victoria (1837-1901). (Boafo-Arthur 2005:121).
During the period of 1850-1865, the Gold Coast had a district
legislative council consisted of the Governor and at least two other
persons designed by royal Instructions. Apart from the legislature
body, the Gold Coast also had an Executive Council. The legislative
and Executive council were responsible for policy making and
implementation. (Ayensu and Darkwa 1999:16). To them the
legislative council was specifically required to make all laws,
30
institutions and ordinances as may from time to time be necessary for
the peace, order and good governance in the Gold Coast which was
subjected to rules and regulations made by Order in Council. They
maintained that Ghanaians were under-represented in both the
legislative and executive councils. What was even worse according to
Ayensu and Darkwa was that both councils were mere advisory ones
and therefore their decisions were not binding on the Governor of the
Gold Coast.
According to Alabi (1998:9), under the British rule the first elections
into the legislative council took place under the 1925 Guggisberg
Constitution. Nine out of the thirty members who constituted the
legislative council were Ghanaians. This gave room to the people to
impact on policies and programmes that affected their lives.
According to Ayensu and Darkwa “legislative authority of Ghana has
been vested in parliament which has exercised it in varying degree
since independence in 1957”. (Ayensu and Darkwa 1999:122)
Aye is of the View that “Ghana has experimented with various types
of governments: “Westminster” model of parliamentary government
(1957-1960 and 1969-1972); one-party dictatorship (1960-1966);
military dictatorship (1966-1969; 1972-1979 and 1981-1993); United
States’ model of separation of powers (1979-1981) and Fourth
Republic constitution (1992 to date) which is a combination of
31
Westminster type and the American Presidential model” (Aye
2005:91)
In all these duly elected constitutional governments (1957-1960;
1969-1972; 1979-1981 and 1991-date), Aye maintained that legislative
authority of the state has resided in the National Assembly elected on
the competitive basis. A prime minister or President for the
Westminster and American models either headed the government. In
the case of the Westminster model both the Prime Minister and other
Ministers were members of parliament whereas in the presidential
system there was a strict separation of powers (at least in terms of
personnel) between the executive and legislature- the president and
the ministers are not members of the legislative body and do not take
part in its proceedings.
Ghana followed the Westminster type of democracy at independence
in 1957 with a liberal democratic constitution and all its trappings
such as opposition parties, guarantees of civil liberties and an
independent judiciary. In 1960 the country became a Republic and
four years (1964) later the constitution of the First Republic was
amended and replaced with a one party state with substantial
legislative powers to the president. Although the traditional legislative
and oversight role of the then parliament was not taken away, it was
virtually ineffective in checking the activities of the executive.
32
While few members of the House were able to express the concerns of
the electorate and made attempts to check the activities of the
executive, the majority of them tended to agree to whatever policies
and programs the executive initiated.
The 1969 constitution of the Second Republic of Ghana re-introduced
multi-party democracy in Ghana with a more vibrant Parliament.
Unfortunately, the constitution was overthrown in over two years of
its existence. The next constitutional attempt was made in 1979 with
late Dr. Hilla Lima as the president. Again, within two and half years
of its existence the constitution was suspended and parliament
dissolved. Thus between 1972 and 1979, Ghana was ruled by a
succession of military officers National Redemption Council (NRC),
Supreme Military Council (SMC) I and II) and June 1979 by the Arm
Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), headed by Flight Lieutenant J.J
Rawlings. Between December, 1981 and January 6, 1991 the country
was again ruled by military dictatorship under the Provisional
National Defence council (PNDC)
2.4 PARLIAMENT OF THE FOURTH REPUBLIC
The work of Ayensu and Darkwa offer a panoramic view of the
evolution and development of parliamentary practice in Ghana. They
started with the Bond of 1844 and the beginning of the exercise of
legislative authority in the Gold Coast up to the second parliament of
the fourth Republic. Their work was motivated by the fact that the
33
decisions of parliament affect the lives of everybody in Ghana. It is
therefore very important for people and MPs to appreciate the
history and the workings of the institution. While offering the
overview of parliaments in Ghana, they also explained that most of
them could not live their constitutional mandated term, largely
because of military adventurism.
There is also a discussion of the activities of the big six and the
various phases of constitutional development in the country. Their
work highlights the various parliaments from 1957 through to the
fourth republic.
They maintained that the First Parliament of the First Republic
(1960-1965) and the first parliament of the fourth republic (1993-
1997) completed their statutory terms of office (Ayensu and Darkwa
1999: 148). The life of the Independence Parliament of 1957 was cut
short by the nations overwhelming desire to become a republic. The
second Parliament of the first republic and the parliament of the
second and third republics had their terms terminated by military
interventions.
In concluding their work Ayensu and Darkwa (1999) shed light on the
development of the committee system, which they maintained has
being a common feature of most our republican parliaments. They
explained that the committee system enables parliament to scrutinize
bills brought before them. Their work is very authoritative in that it
34
provides elaborate information on parliaments in Ghana. This would
enable us examine the fourth republican parliament very effectively.
A Guide to Parliament of Ghana is a handbook prepared by the
Parliament of Ghana. The book has given a brief outlook of the
Parliaments of Ghana. It tries to compare the various parliaments and
bring out some peculiar features of each. The work however
concentrate on the fourth republic, pointing out the basic features of
these parliaments include, multi-party system, hybrid system, role in
governance, representation, and oversight (Parliament of Ghana
2004 :14). The book also gives an overview of the evolution of the
legislature in Ghana.
The structure of the fourth republican parliament, areas like
composition, qualification of MPs, declaration of vacancy and seating
arrangement of parliament had all been examined in the guide. The
Parliamentary Guide also identifies the functions of parliament as
legislative, financial, oversight of the executive, representational and
deliberative. It concludes with a discussion on functionaries and
parliamentary service and their role in effectively managing the
affairs of parliament. The oversight role of parliament discussed in the
work would be very helpful because it is very keen in this research.
35
Boafo-Arthur (2005) takes a view of Ghana’s parliamentary practices
for the past 150 years. He tackles the struggle of local elites for
greater representation and how they are governed. He also covers the
period between 1957 and 1992, where the legislature went through
several mutations. He gave the structure of the fourth republican
parliament focusing on the officers of the house and the composition
of parliament from 1993 to 2005.
On the functions of parliament, Boafo-Arthur (2005) states that
parliament embodies the will of the people because parliamentarians
who represent 230 constituencies of the country try to highlight the
developmental needs of their constituents. He also identified law
making, control of the public fund, the exercise of oversight over the
executive and the vetting of nominees to fill ministerial and other
important positions as other functions of parliament. He concludes
that “a strengthened parliament with functional committee system, to
a large extent, holds the key to national efforts to ensure
governmental accountability, transparency and democratic
consolidation”. Boafo-Arthur, 2005:140)
In a presentation by Regina Oforiwaa Amanfo (Program Officer of the
Ghana Center for Democratic Development), on African Legislatures
specifically the case of Ghana, she was of the view that, the current
Parliament of Ghana was established by Article 93 of the 1992
36
constitution. The body is vested with legislative powers of the state,
which is exercised in accordance with the constitution. The
legislative power is exercised by passing of bills which is later
assented by the president to become laws. The tenure of each
parliament is four years and there is no restriction on the number of
times an individual can seek re-election.
In terms of the structure of parliament, Regina identified that, at the
apex of the parliament established by the 1992 constitution are the
speaker and two Deputies (first and second deputy Speaker). The
next on the ladder is the Majority Leader, the Whip of the various
parties and backbenchers. There are specific rules and procedures
governing the activities of the House. For instance, no debate can
take place in the floor of the house unless a member moves it. She
added also that, the parliament is a unicameral legislature with at
least 140 elected member as stipulated in the constitution. The first
three Parliament of the fourth republic consisted of 200 members
elected once every four years, from 200 single-member
constituencies instrument 2004, CI 41, the membership of parliament
increased to230 from January 2005.
To her, the parliament of Ghana like any other parliament of the
world over, performs three important functions namely
representation, legislation and oversight. She maintained that
parliament’s representative mandate involves identifying the needs of
37
its constituent, the citizens of Ghana, and reflecting them their needs
in its deliberation, legislative and oversight roles. She added that
parliament is responsible for the oversight of the executive, its
actions and spending. She maintains that, parliament needs constant
access to information on the activities of the executive branch. She is
also of the view that parliament fulfills its legislative functions
through the creation and passage of bills, and scrutinizing existing
statutory instruments and evaluating when and how they should be
applied.
To effectively exercise these functions, the institution of parliament is
composed of 230 elected members and is headed by a speaker on the
first day of the life of each parliament according to Regina. She
added that the speaker is assisted by two deputy speakers who by
practice and convention are expected to come from a different
political parties for the sake of preserving a balance of power within
parliament.
The work by Aye is a reflection on government, politics and
development of Ghana in fifty years of independence. He generally
examined the atmosphere of governance after independence and
the development that have taken place in Ghana as an independent
state. Looking at government specifically on the role of the
legislature, Aye maintained that, generally the legislature performs
38
a number of functions and this may include; representative role. He
is of the view that the legislatures represent the interest of at least
some or all social class in the state. Aye believe that, although the
legislature performs other functions such as law making, vetting
and approving government nominees and so on, crucial to these is
to keep the bridle on king, which is to limit abuse of power by the
executive. He added that the “legislature both in parliamentary
and presidential systems have power to keep tabs on the executive
branch and its agencies” (Aye 2007:89) this to him is normally
done through the use of ‘question time’, the power to impeach the
president for gross misconduct and other act which have the
tendency of bringing the office of the president into disrepute and
the power of the purse.
2.4 FACTORS THAT MILITATE AGAINST PARLIAMENT OF
THE FOURTH REPUBLIC
A number of studies have being conducted on parliament of Ghana
especially under the Fourth Republic. However, three major works
would be reviewed. One of such works is by H. Kwasi Prempeh. His
work is a review of the relationship that exists between parliament
and the executive under the 1992 Constitution. He maintained that
“the legislature has failed to overcome executive dominance and to
39
undertake its functions effectively within the framework of the 1992
Constitution” (Prempeh 2003:4). According to him, of the three arms
of government, parliament has had the most discontinuous and
punctuated existence in Ghana’s history. Unlike the judiciary and the
administrative machinery of the state that have always survived the
forced overthrow of constituted authority in Ghana, there was no
parliament to speak of 1966 to 1969, 1972 and 1979, and 1982 to
1993. To him, this institutional discontinuity has retarded the smooth
and consistent development of a parliamentary tradition in Ghana.
Consequently, the parliament of the fourth Republic started the
ongoing transition to constitutional democracy with the most
institutional deficit of all the three branches of government.
He added that, the parliament of the fourth republic started its life
facing a crisis of legitimacy. The fist parliament was a de facto one
party parliament since the opposition party boycotted the
parliamentary election. All the candidates put forth by the National
Democratic Congress (NDC) won by default.
Prempeh focus specifically on Articles 78 and 108 of the 1992
Constitution which require the President to appoint majority of
ministers from among MPs and where parliament is forbidden from
proceeding on bills or motions regarding taxation, payment or
withdrawal from the consolidated fund that does not come from the
President respectively.
40
To him, “given the superior attractiveness of ministerial positions,
Article 78 helps to divert the interest and ambitions of MPs away from
their role as legislators and towards the Executive. Election as a
Member of Parliament has become for many MPs, merely a way of
enhancing their chances of making into the President pool of
ministers. And once their ministerial ambitions have been satisfied,
MPs generally pay little attention to their role as legislators” (ibid: 9).
He added that what make article 78 more problematic is the absence
of ceiling on the president’s ministerial appointment. To him this does
not promote effective checks and balances and horizontal
accountability to ensure good governance. He also believes that
Article 108 essentially reduces parliament to a law passing instead of
law making. Second, it denies parliament institutional autonomy in
determining the level of funding that it needs to carry on with its
work. Parliament budget is subject to item by item control by the
ministry of Finance.
He added that, it is not surprising that parliament has persistently
lacked the resources and capacity to perform its work. Partisanship is
also another factor indicated by Prempeh as contributing to
parliamentary ineffectiveness. He thinks parliament of the fourth
republic has failed to speak with a collective voice and to take
resolute action to stem abuse, corruption, inefficiency and waste in
the public half of the national economy. Prempeh however, hold the
41
view that parliament’s ineffectiveness cannot all be blamed on the
constitution or partisanship. In certain instances, legislative lethargy
appears to be more appropriate culprit. He thinks although
parliamentarians have the constitutional mandate to introduce a
“private member bill”, yet for the past years parliament has not
enacted such legislations require by the constitution.
The standing orders of parliament according to Prempeh also hamper
its institutional effectiveness. Parliament’s standing orders give little
initiative or scope to parliamentary committee, caucuses, or
individuals members to trigger investigations or inquire into matters
of public concern. Only the full house can initiate committee
investigations, this means that the party with majority in parliament
can always veto any attempt to initiate investigation into allegation
into of scandal and other cases of executive malfeasances.
Parliamentary committee system was also examined in his work and
maintained that effective parliamentary committees promote good
governance in many respects. He added that, if parliament appears to
be weak vis-á-vis the executive it because it was designed
constitutionally to be so. He therefore concluded that, indeed
requiring, the president to use his patronage power to co-opt MPs to
the executive side of government only serve to emasculate parliament
thereby entrenches the culture of executive hegemony in Ghana. The
42
relationship between the executive and parliament to him is however
crucial to enhance good governance and consolidate democracy.
Another important work on the Fourth Republic parliament is
“Refection on the effectiveness of the parliament of the fourth
republic of Ghana by Peter Ala-Adjettey. He began his work by
examining the legislative council under colonial rule through to
independence. He continued with parliament from the independent
constitution to the fourth republic. To him “legislative competence of
the Parliament of Ghana since 1969 has been subject to limitation
imposed by the constitution themselves” (Ala-Adjettey 2006: 16).
Focusing his work on the Fourth Republic parliament, as a former
speaker of parliament he shared the same view with Kwasi Prempeh.
He however added that article 108 of the constitution “by one stroke
of pen has taken away from parliament one of its most important
weapon or tool for securing control over or compliance by the
executive, namely what has been described as ‘the power of the
purse’. (Ala-Adjettey 2006:17). By prohibiting parliament from
debating matters involving the raising of taxation or increases in the
rate of taxation or increase in the level of expenditure, parliament has
been denied the use of weapon which can bring a recalcitrant
executive to heel.” To him the people’s representatives are effectively
prevented from having their way in matters that vitality affects the
people. He however concluded his work that, looking at the
43
constitutional history of this country parliamentary supremacy can be
dangerous tool in the hands of supine parliament and a determined
president. However, parliament should be clothed with sufficient
independence to enable it exercise oversight control of the executive.
The work Staffan I. Lindberg examines the rise and decline of
Parliament of Ghana. He agreed with Prempeh that parliament of the
fourth republic started its life facing the crisis of legitimacy. The
opposition NPP boycotted the parliamentary election nationwide after
their complaints of voting rigging in the 1992 presidential ballot. As a
result, the first parliament of the fourth republic was a defacto one
party parliament, as nearly all the candidate put forth by the NDC
won the seats by default. Out of the 200 seats contested the NDC won
189 representing 94.5% National Convention Party had 8
representing 4.0%, Eagle Party pulled 1 representing 0.5% and 2
seats representing 1.0% going to independent and candidates shared
the 11 remaining seats representing 5.5%. The NPP which was the
strongest opposition party had no seat in parliament. This outcome
weakened the representativeness and the credibility of parliament
during the first four years of the fourth republic.
To him the second parliament of the fourth Republic presented amore
balance situation as the opposition parties contested the elections and
posed some impressive results.
44
For Staffan, although the first parliament (1993-1997) was often seen
as a “rubber stamp parliament”, MPs made significant impact on
many of the bills introduced by President Rawlings government.
Despite being essentially one-party parliament, the first parliament
nevertheless managed to have four out of 88 bills (4.5 percent)
withdrawn by the executive. (Staffan 2003:8). Staffan also maintains
that, in the second parliament, influence over legislation was further
pronounced with 14bills out of a total of 78 (18 percent) withdrawn.
Notwithstanding the impressive performance put forth by the Fourth
Republic Parliament in the area of legislation, parliaments under the
fourth republic are still coupled with a lot of challenges. Staffan
agreed with both Prempeh and Ala-Adjettey on the constitutional
provision that allows MPs to double as ministers as one of the major
challenges of parliament. To him, the effect of this is felt directly in
parliament as those MPs who double as ministers spend less time in
the legislature.
He also believed that parliament power to obstruct-cum-control the
president’s political agenda is circumvented by Article 108 preventing
parliament from proceeding on any legislative initiative that would
incur budget or tax increase unless such initiative comes from the
executive.
2.5. REVIEW SUMMARY AND EVALUATIONS.
45
From the above literature review it is very clear that, of all the formal
institutions of government, the legislature plays a very important role
in promoting checks and balances in any political system. In Ghana
for instance, unlike the judiciary that must wait for aggrieved
plaintiffs to bring justifiable cases before it, parliament can act on its
own initiative to investigate any issue of public interest imaginable
issues like corruption, mismanagement of state enterprises,
ministerial abuse of power, and government profligacy.
The review above has looked at the various views hold by different
authorities on the legislature in Ghana and legislatures in general.
They content that, legislature are of vital importance in democracies
because it is through the legislature that citizens are represented.
Many of the authors were of the view that, legislatures are sometimes
faced with some challenges in the performance of their constitutional
duties. In the case of Ghana, the authors were of the view that, there
are certain constitutional provisions that militate against the work of
the legislature. Others believe that instead of parliament to use its
institutional powers to check the executive, parliament has stood by
like a spectator while report upon report has carried stories and
anecdotal evidence of waste, corruption, self-dealing and ultra vires
transaction at a number of taxpayer-funded entities. Some authors
contend that parliament of Ghana has failed to show bold and timely
46
initiatives in its quest to serve as a check on the executive under this
fourth republic.
Based on this theoretical analysis about the Ghanaian Legislature,
what is left now is actually to examine the situation on the ground.
This is the purpose of the research work.
REFERENCES
1. Andrew Haywood (2002) Politics, Second Edition. Macmillan
Publication: London (Pp:216-219,313,315)
2. Alabi Niyi (1998) Parliamentary Democracy in West Africa.
Friedrich Ebert Foundation: Accra. Ghana.(p:9)
47
3. J.C Johari (1982) Comparative Politics. Sterling Publishes
Limited, New Delhi India.(P:494)
4. Jackson Robert and Doreen Jackson (1997) A comparative
Introduced to Political Science. Prentice Hall Publication:
New Jersey. (244-246,248-250)
5. Blondel J. (1973) Comparative Legislature. Prentice Hall
Publication: New Jersey. (Pp:2,3,16-17,133)
6. Godwin Kenneth and Walhlke (1997) Introduction to Political
Science. Harcourt Brace: New York. (Pp 218,224,29)
7. K.B. Ayensu and S.N Darkwa (199), Evolution of Parliament
in Ghana. Institute of Economic Affairs Publication. Accra:
Ghana. (Pp.160, 148)
8. Ghana Parliament (2004) A Guide to the Parliament of
Ghana. Parliament of Ghana Publication. Accra. (P;14)
9. Boafa-Arthur K. (2005) “ Longitudinal View on Ghana’s
Parliamentary Practices” in Salih Mohammed M.A (Ed),
African Parliaments between Governance and
48
Government. Palgrave Macmillan Publication. New York.
(P:140)
10. H. Kwasi Prempeh (2003), Executive Legislature
Relationship Under the 1992 Constitution: A Critical
Review. CDD Publication Accra, Ghana, September 2003.
Critical Perspective number 15. (Pp:4,5)
11. Peter Ala-Adjettey (2006). Reflection on the
Effectiveness of the Parliament of the Fourth Republic of
Ghana. CDD Publication, Accra: Ghana. (Pp.16,17)
12. Staffan I. Linberg (2003). The Rise and Decline of
Parliament of Ghana. Center for Africa Studies. University of
Florida. (P:8)
13. Ayee R.A.Joseph (2007), Ghana at 50: Government,
Politics and Development. University of Ghana Publication,
(Legon), Accra, Ghana (77,88)
14. Regina Oforiwa Amanfo (2007) A paper presented on
Africa Legislatures Project conference o Africa
Legislature; Integrating Research and Policy (the case of
Ghanaian Parliament) CDD Publication, Accra: Ghana (P:2)
15. Bealey F. Chapman and R.A. Sheehan (1999), Element in
Political Science. Edinburgh University Press; Edinburgh
(P:99)
49
16. Mclean Latin (1996), Oxford Concise Dictionary of
Politics. Oxford University Press;(P; 280)
CHAPTER THREE
DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS
3.1 INTRODUCTION.
This chapter deals with the presentation and analysis of data collected
on the study. Questionnaire was the main technique employed in
collecting data. The questionnaires were personally administered to
the respondents by researchers.
As mentioned in the chapter one, bar charts and pie charts have been
used in presenting and analyzing the data, through the use of the
Statistical Package for Social Science.
3.2 .0 SOCIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF RESPONDENTS.
3.2.1 Respondents’ Gender
In order to ensure a fair gender representation, both males and
females were consciously selected as respondents. Out of the one
hundred and twenty respondents selected, 75 were males
50
representing 62.5% and the remaining 45 were females representing
37.5%.
This is illustrated in the figure below.
3.2.2 Category of Age Groups of Respondents.
51
37.5%62.5%
For purposes of effective data collection, the research defined three
ranges of age groups. Respondents ageing from 18-30years
constituted 46.7%. Those from 31- 45years also constituted 34.2%
the respondents. The remaining 19.1% was composed of those ageing
from 46years and above.
The above statistics indicates clearly that majority of the
respondents fall within the ages of 18-30years.
3.2.3 Educational level of Respondents.
52
46.7%
19.1%
34.2%
All the one hundred and twenty respondents selected had attained
formal education. Out of that 7.5% had basic education and 29.2%
also had secondary education. The remaining 63.3% were those who
had either completed their tertiary education or were still at tertiary
institutions.
3.2.4 Respondents Occupation
The occupation of respondents is categorized into four sectors after
coding. 34.2 percent were made up of public servants who composed
of Members of Parliament and Staffs of Parliament who were
purposively selected. 22.5 percent made up of civil servants, Students
53
63.3%
29.2%
7.5%
were made up of 20.8 percent and 15.0percent were also self
employed. 7.5 percent were unemployed.
ANALYSIS OF FIELD INFORMATION
3.3 General Performance of Parliament.
This section of the research sought to assess the general performance
of Parliament. The overall performance is perceived to have improved
steadily. Responding to the general performance of Parliament, the
elite respondents rated Parliament very high. However, they were of
the view that there is more room for improvement. 69.2 percent of
the respondents perceived the general performance of Parliament to
be good. 18.3 percent of this segment of respondents felt satisfied
with Parliament general performance and rated parliament very good.
54
7.5%
15.0%
22.5%
20.8%
34.2%
The general performance of Parliament was rated poor by 12.5
percent of the respondents who were mostly composed of the mass
respondents.
3.4 Parliament Serving as a Check on the Executive.
In assessing Parliament on its role of serving as a check on the
executive, many of respondent believed parliament had not perform to
their satisfaction. 60.8 percent of the respondent were of the view
that parliament is ineffective in the area of its oversight role on the
executive. However, 39.2 percent of the respondents were also of a
different view that parliament is effective in that regard.
55
18.3%12.5%
69.2%
3.5 Ensuring Financial Accountability of the Executive by
Parliament.
Of prime importance in democratic governance is promotion of
executive accountability. Parliament serves a vital link in the chain of
accontability between government and the citizens. On effecctiveness
of Parliament in this area, majority respondents of 50.0 percent rated
parliament poor. Majority of the elite respondents were diassastisfied
in this regard. On the contrary, 25.8 percent of the respondents were
satified with the work of parliament. 20.0 percent of this segment of
respondent rated parliament good whilst the remaining 5.8 percent
also rated the work of parliament in this regard very good. A good
number of 24.2% of the respondents rated the work of parliament in
ensuring financial accountability of the executive very poor. To them
56
39.2%
60.8%
the high incidence of corruption allegations against former ministers
is an indication of parliament’s ineffectiveness of ensuring financial
accountability. They added that parliament had allow the Excutive to
spend state funds for their own private gains without any proper
checks by parliament. A study by CDD also revealed that, the overall
performance of parliament in this area is less than satisfactory. Many
Ghanaians believe parliament is not doing any good job in the area of
ensuring financial accountability of the executive.
3.6 Facilities at Office of Parliament.
57
5.8%
20.0%
24.2%
50.0%
For parliament to function effectively as an institution there is the
need for adequate facilities for both MPs and Parliamentary Staffs’ In
responds to indicate a simple Yes ∕No whether the office of parliament
had been well equipped for effective performance, 43.3 % of the
respondents indicated Yes whilst the remaining 56.7% were for No.
Many of the respondents at the office of parliament responded no to
this question. A chart with some of the staff at parliament revealed
that, most of them are accommodated in small shells which are mostly
overcrowded due to their number. This to them, affect effective
discharge of their duties
58
43.3%56.7%
3.6 Assessment of Office Facilities for MPs and Select
Committees of Parliament.
In assessing office facilities for MPs and Select Committees of
Parliament, 28.3 percent of the respondents indicated adequate whilst
the remaining 71.7 percent also indicated inadequate. A visit to
parliament by researchers attested to the fact that only the leadership
of both the majority and the minority has offices to operate. Reactions
from some MPs to this question also revealed that most of the
Parliamentary Select Committees attend their meetings in the
conference rooms of some ministries outside parliament. This results
to the lateness of some MPs to parliamentary proceedings. Others
may even stay out of parliament for committee work. Other committee
meetings which are organized within parliament are mostly done in
the open. As a result certain issues are not objectively discussed by
committee members due to the presence of the press. Others also
shared the view that, parliament’s power is mainly derived from the
formal provisions of the constitution without the political and material
means for actualizing it.
59
3.7 Opinion on whether lack of Offices for MPs Affect the work
of Parliament.
Having identified lack of offices for MPs as one of the major
challenges of Parliament, a different stage was then set to find out if
60
71.7%
28.3%
that contribute to the inefficiency of Parliament. Responding to a Yes
and No question, 60.8 percent of the one hundred and twenty
respondents admitted that lack of offices for MPS also contribute to
the administrative inefficiency of Parliament, as against 13.3 percent
who said No. However, 5.9 percent of the respondents left the
question unanswered. A further probing into this question from the
MPs themselves revealed that most of them operate from their car
boots where all relevant documents are kept. To them this does not
ensure effective performance as parliamentarians. Although, they
have research assistance to assist them in their work, they lack the
facilities to enable them do their work effectively.
61
60.8%
33.3%
5.9%
3.8 Assessment of Presidential Powers over Parliament.
Another key area that has raised concerns on the ineffective of the
Ghanaian Parliament is the excessive powers of the President over
Parliament. When respondents were asked whether the office of the
President has being vested with excessive powers over Parliament.
An overwhelming majority of 79.2 percent responded yes to the
question as against 20.8 percent who indicated no. This result validate
the notion that the 1992 Constitution grants more powers to the
President then to Parliament which constitute the representatives of
Ghanaians.
3.9 Opinion on whether the Excessive Powers of the President
weakens Parliament.
A follow up question was asked as to whether parliament is affected
by the excessive powers of the President. Although responses were
62
79.2%
20.8%
different among respondents, those who responded yes maintained an
overwhelming majority of 79.2 percent as against 13.3 percent of
those who answered no. However, 7.5 percent recorded was
unanswered. This result authenticates the notion of executive control
of parliament.
3.10 How the Excessive Powers of the President weakens
Parliament.
Respondents were asked to identify ways by which parliament is
affected by the Powers of the President. With this, responses of
respondents were centered on four key areas after their answers have
63
79.2%
7.5%13.3%
been coded. 25.8 percent of the respondents indicated that parliament
has been reduced to a rubber stamp with the kind of majoritarian
parliamentary system practice in Ghana. To them because majority
takes all when it comes to voting on the floor of parliament, whenever
the ruling party controls majority in parliament the President is able
to push certain policies through parliament without any proper
scrutiny by Parliament. 12.5 percent of the respondents also indicated
that parliamentary independence is affected by the powers of the
President.
fvcvmAmong the elite respondents some quoted Article 78 of the
Constitution that allows the President to appoint majority of MPs as
ministers as militating against parliamentary independence. To them
this provision of the constitution is one of the means the executive
uses to dominate parliament. Some of them cited the case of the
recent appointment of the entire leadership of the majority NDC Party
in Parliament as ministers as a clear indication of parliament being
weaken by presidential powers. 39.2 percent were also of the view
that the excessive powers of the president weaken parliament
oversight powers on the executive. To them majority party in
parliament for the past have always toe the line of the president
because most of the MPs within the majority always aspire to be
appointed by the President as ministers. They therefore find it
extremely difficult to come out objectively to criticize the actions and
64
policies of the President. Some MPs attested to this and added that
parliament is mandated to approve ministerial appointments through
the activities of the Appointment Committee of Parliament, however,
when it comes to firing or reshuffling ministers’ parliament is not
consulted. Some further added that, although, the Public Accounts
Committee of Parliament has the powers of a high court to prosecute
public officials who are found guilty of corruption, the committee in
practice had failed to exercise such powers over the years. The
remaining 22.5 percent of the respondents were of the view that the
excessive powers of the president limit parliament’s legislative
powers. Although several reasons were given to support their view,
majority of them especially the elite respondent were of the view that
because the President can refuse to assent to bills passed by
Parliament to become laws, parliament had in a way been limited in
its legislative powers. To them whether a bill would become law or
not, it lies in the hands of the President not Parliament. These
responses affirm how parliament had been weakened by executive
powers over the years.
65
3.11. Why Parliament is Unable to perform its Oversight Role
on the Executive Effectively.
One of the key responsibilities of parliament in every state is to serve
as a watchdog on the actions and policies of the President and the
entire executive arm of government. However, this seems to be
ineffective in the case of the Ghanaian Parliament. This question
therefore sought to know the views of respondents as to why
parliament is unable to perform such a task effectively over the years.
66
25.8%
12.5%
22.5%
39.2%
52.5 percent of the respondents endorsed the fact that the executive
specifically the President wields too much power over parliament and
has therefore cripple parliament in that regard. However, most of
them explained with the same reasons as provided in figure 3.12. 24.2
percent were of the view that parliament is ineffective in this regard
because MPs double as ministers. They buttressed their view with the
fact that the moment someone is appointed as a ministers such a
person is accountable to the President. Therefore, the moment an MP
is appointed a minister automatically the person become accountable
to the president. It now becomes extremely difficult if not impossible
for an MP who doubles as a minister to check someone he or she is
accountable to. MPs that double as ministers always toe the line of the
President when an issue comes to the floor of parliament. A staff of
Parliament affirmed that the situation is even worse if an MP is
appointed as a cabinet minister. Another important issue raised by
19.2 percent of the respondent is lack of office accommodation for
MPs and Select Committees. This segment of respondents were of the
view that much of the oversight role of parliament is done at the
committee level but sadly enough these committees are not well
resourced in terms of facilities and finance.
Victimization of MPs by the Executive was also recorded by 4.2
percent of the respondents. Among the mass public many were of the
view that MPs are given certain packages to toe the line of the
67
executive. However, if a Member of Parliament comes out public to
reveal such an act he or she is victimized. This has keep some of the
MPs mute even when they know clearly that a decision being taken is
not in the interest of the country. Some of them cited the case of the
Member of Parliament for Odobeng Brakwa; Hon. P.C Appiah Ofori.
These are clear indications that Parliament as one of the key
institutions of the country exist with challenges which need greater
attention of Ghanaians in order to consolidate our democracy
effectively.
3.12 How Parliament can be Strengthen to perform its
oversight role.
68
24.2%
52.5%
19.2%
4.2%
Having established these challenges and how disastrous they could be
to our democracy in terms of horizontal accountability between
parliament and the executive, it was prudent to solicit for the views of
respondents on how best parliament can be made to perform its
oversight responsibilities effectively. Among the several options
provided by respondents, Parliamentary independence recorded
51.7%. The mass publics were of the view that the hybrid system
being practiced does not ensure horizontal accountability. Ministers
of State must therefore be selected from outside parliament. Secret
balloting doing parliamentary proceedings was also identified by 12.5
percent of respondents. To them voting by head count as done during
parliamentary proceedings does not allow for objectivity on the part of
MPs. Some are influenced by the actions of their chief whips.
18.3 percent were of the opinion that parliament should be well
resourced in order to ensure effectiveness. They believed parliament
should be financially autonomous for it to be able to carry out their
oversight responsibility effectively. Some Members of Parliament
were of the view that, financial autonomy of the legislature is
guarantee by Article 179(2) of the constitution and Act 460 of 1993
providing that the administrative and operational expenses of the
Parliamentary Service are neither subject to budgetary review or
control by the Ministry of Finance, but this autonomy has been
compromised and parliamentary budgets have being subjected to
69
scrutiny by the Finance Ministry. 12.5 percent also believed the
partisan attitude of parliamentarians must also be avoided in order to
ensure objective and effective oversight. A study also by CDD
suggested that one crucial means to enable parliament to effectively
serve as a check on the executive is to get enough information about
the activities of the executive. To them information is an important
lubricant for every institution, and more important for an institution
charged with the responsibility of lawmaking and policy deliberation.
70
17.5%
51.7%
18.3%
12.5%
CHAPTER FOUR
SUMMARY OF RESEARCH FINDINGS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND
CONCLUTION
4.0 RESEARCHERS MAIN FINDINGS.
After we have been to the field to carry out the research, the following
are our main findings.
There is poor public awareness of what parliament does as an
institution of the state. Some people do not even know the
kind of relationship that exists between parliament and the
executive.
The overall performance of parliament had improved. Many
Ghanaians think parliament is performing better today in its
legislative functions then some year back. However, many are
of the view that, the performance of parliament in terms of
71
the effectiveness with which it carries out its oversight role on
the executive has been low.
The rationale for the provision that majority of ministers be
picked from parliament was intended for them to inform
parliament on its deliberation. However, the reality on the
ground is different because those ministers see themselves
more as members of the executive than as MPs and therefore
compromising their independence.
Both qualitative and quantitative data suggest that parliament
had failed to overcome executive dominance and to undertake
its oversight responsibilities on the executive effectively.
Many of our respondents were of the view that because MPs
double as ministers they are unable to be independent in
order to exercise a check on the executive as
parliamentarians.
The current Ghanaians political dispensation creates the
attitude of partisanship in MPs who hope to be offered
ministerial appointment.
The excessive power of the President over Parliament is seen
as one of the main source of parliamentary weakness
Lack of offices for MPs also affects the performance of
parliamentarians.
72
There are constitutional constraints that also militate against
parliament in its oversight role on the executive.
4.1 RECOMMENDATIONS.
The research findings reveal clearly that there are still more to be
done for parliament to be able to exercise its constitutional checks
effectively on the executive in order to achieve horizontal
accountability between the legislature and the executive arms of
government. A number of recommendations result from the study
conducted. The implementation of these recommendations would help
strengthen the capacity of parliament to perform its oversight role
effectively on the executive.
There should be effective public education on the work of
parliament so that people can understand how parliament works
and what they should expect from it. Ghanaians should be
educated to understand how they are governed.
Good governance practices that promote complementary rather
than partisan and conflicting relationship between the three
main institutions of government in the performance of their
functions should be adopted
Institutional network that promote greater interaction,
collaboration, communication and consensus building between
the organs of government on: setting national priorities,
73
determining resource allocation and regular appraisal based on
agree indicators should be established
Infrastructural and resources capacity of parliament must be
improved
Voting by head count in parliament must be replaced by secret
balloting in order to enhance independence of voting and
thereby reduce partisan approach to the business of parliament
The need to strengthen the committee system. In order to
reduce the executive dominance of parliament and to
strengthen the oversight functions of the legislature, members
other than from the ruling party should chair committees of
parliament.
In order to make parliament more relevant and eradicate the
perception of parliament as a mere approving body, a
mechanism should be put in place to involve parliament in the
process of policy initiation at very early stages to enable it
prioritize and influence allocation of resources and not just wait
to be given completed policies that require ordinary approval.
Parliament should be strengthened to have necessary
independence to do its work. This will require the development
of a national vision and strategic plan for parliament as an
institution; identification and adoption of best practice norms to
foster the insulation of key national issue from excessive
74
partisanship and the development of consensus based decision
making in parliament.
In order for parliament to effectively carry out its oversight
functions effectively it is important for parliament to keep the
executive at arm length so that it can more effectively perform
the oversight function.
4.2 CONCLUSION
It is a little disappointing that one of Africa’s most successful cases of
democratization has a parliament that does not seem as potent as a
democratic institution as the country deserves looking at the overall
situation for democracy. It is not unique, however, that a young
democracy experience a period of executive dominance. Executive
branches of government after all generally seek to extend their
influence beyond their bounds not only in emerging democracies but
also in established ones. Known in Latin American politics as the lack
of strong horizontal accountability (O’ Donnell 1998), this
phenomenon is expressing itself in various ways in Africa.
The Parliament of Ghana since its inception in has not been able to
enjoy all the necessary organizational resources that will enable it
perform it oversight, representation and legislative functions. The
75
history of Parliament in Ghana has been tumultuous; but, the overall
performance of the Ghanaian Parliament has been better than before.
However, quantitative data suggest that parliament has failed to
overcome executive dominance and to undertake its functions
effectively within the framework of the 1992 Constitution.
The major challenges that weaken Parliament in the Fourth Republic
include; domination of parliament by the executive in the current
political environment, the constitutionally mandated selection of
Ministers of State from among MPs, frequent voting by head count
rather than by secret balloting, weak infrastructural and resource
base and the excessive powers of the president over parliament. The
organizational resources are necessary for the effective performance
of parliament, and therefore Parliament must exert itself to ensure it
is guaranteed financial autonomy and the resource to carry out all its
activities. MPs should have well equipped offices both in Parliament
and their various constituencies, capable, competent and professional
staff to assist MPs and Parliament in their assigned roles. The
Parliamentary Committees should also have well equipped meeting
rooms to facilitate their investigative and oversight roles.
However, improved infrastructural and resource base of parliament is
not enough to alter the situation. There would still be significant
obstacles to the ideal operation of the Ghanaian Parliament even if
76
these constraints are removed. For parliament to fulfill its duties, a
very fundamental issue must be resolved, namely the constitutional
right of the President to appoint a large number of appointees of the
executive wing of government from parliament so as to achieve an
effective separation of power between Parliament and the Executive.
More so the present state of affairs where parliament has to depend
almost entirely on the executive for funds to provide its functioning
and the constitutional right of the president to determine the salaries
and other allowances of Members of Parliament. All these constraints
tend to derogate substantially from the effectiveness of Parliament.
For the Parliament of Ghana to be truly independent and function well
as an autonomous arm of government, Ghana must re-evaluate the
1992 Constitution which shapes Parliament as an institution.
77
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Alibi Niyi (1998) Parliamentary Democracy in West Africa.
Friedrich Ebert Foundation: Accra. Ghana
Andrew Heywood (200) Politics, second Edition. Macmillan
Publication: London.
Ayee R.A. Joseph (2007). Ghana at 50: Government, Politics
and Development. University of Ghana Publication, (Legon),
Accra, Ghana.
Bealey F. Chapman and R.A. Sheenhan (1999), Elements in
Political Science. Edinburgh University Press; Edinburgh.
78
Boafo-Arthur K.(2005) “Longitudinal View on Ghana’s
Parliament Practices” in Salih Mohammed M.A. (Ed), Africa
Parliaments Between Governance and Government.
Palgrave Macmillan Publication. New York.
Blondel J. (1973) Comparative Legislature. Prentice Hall
Publication: New Jersey.
Center for Democratic Development Newsletter (2001)
Democracy Watch Volume 2 Number 1. CDD Publication,
Accra, Ghana March, 2001.
Center for Democratic Development Publication (2002),
Parliament and Democratic Governance in Ghana’s Fourth
Republic. CDD Publication, Accra, Ghana Publication. Accra.
Gilbert Keith Bluwey (2002) Political Science: An
Introduction. Legon Center for International Affairs (LECIA)
Publication. Accra, Ghana.
Godwin Kenneth and Wahlke (1997) Introduction to Political
Science. Harcourt Brace: New York.
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H. Kwasi Prempeh (2003)|, Executive Legislature
Relationship under the 1992 Constitution: A Critical
Review. CDD Publication Accra, Ghana, September 2003
Critical Perspective Number 15.
Jackson Robert and Doreen Jackson (1997) A Comparative
Introduction to Political Science. Prentice Hall Publication:
New Jersey.
J.C Johari (1982) Comparative Politics. Sterling Publishes
Limited, New Delhi, India.
K.B. Ayensu and S.N Darkwa (1999), The Evolution of
Parliament in Ghana, Institution of Economic Affairs
Publication, Accra, Ghana
Kumekpor Tom K.B (2002), Research Methods, Sonlife Press
and Services, Accra, Ghana.
Mclean Lain (1996). Oxford Concise Dictionary of Politics.
Oxford University Press; Oxford.
80
Ninsin A. Kwame (2005). Executive-Parliament Interface in
the Legislative Process (1993-2006). A Synergy of Power,
Institute for Democratic Governance Publication Accra; Ghana.
Peter Ala-Adjettey (2006). Reflection on the Effectiveness of
the Parliament of the Fourth Republic of Ghana CDD
Publication, Accra: Ghana.
Regina Oforiwa Amanfo (2007), A paper presented on Africa
Legislatures Project Conference on Africa Legislature:
Integrating Research and Policy (the case of Ghanaian
Parliament) CDD Publication, Accra: Ghana.
Shana Warren (2005) Legislative Performance in Ghana: An
Assessment of the Third Parliament of the Fourth
Republic, 2001-2005. CDD Publication Accra. Ghana
Staffan I. Lindberg (2003). The Rise and Decline of
Parliament of Ghana. Center for Africa Studies. Unversity of
Florida
The 1992 Constitution of Ghana. Accra, Ghana.
81
Thomas E. Patterson (2002), the American Democracy (16
Edition), McGraw Hill Publication. United States of America.
APPENDIX A
STATISTICAL SUMMARY OF FINDINGS.
82
Figure 3.1: Respondents' Gender
Frequen
cy
Percen
t
Valid
Percent
Cumulativ
e Percent
Valid Male 75 62.5 62.5 62.5
Femal
e45 37.5 37.5 100.0
Total 120 100.0 100.0
Figure 3.2: Respondents' Age
Frequen
cy
Percen
t
Valid
Percent
Cumulativ
e Percent
Valid 18-30 years 56 46.7 46.7 46.7
31-45 years 41 34.2 34.2 80.8
46 years and
above23 19.2 19.2 100.0
Total 120 100.0 100.0
83
Figure 3.3 Respondents' educational level
Frequen
cy
Percen
t
Valid
Percent
Cumulativ
e Percent
Valid Basic 9 7.5 7.5 7.5
Seconda
ry35 29.2 29.2 36.7
Tertiary 76 63.3 63.3 100.0
Total 120 100.0 100.0
84
Figure 3.4 Respondents' occupation
Frequen
cy
Percen
t
Valid
Percent
Cumulativ
e Percent
Valid Public
Servant41 34.2 34.2 34.2
Civil
servant27 22.5 22.5 56.7
Self-
employed18 15.0 15.0 71.7
Unemploye
d9 7.5 7.5 79.2
Students 25 20.8 20.8 100.0
Total 120 100.0 100.0
85
Figure 3.5 Assessment of parliament's general
performance
Frequen
cy Percent
Valid
Percent
Cumulative
Percent
Valid Very
good22 18.3 18.3 18.3
Good 83 69.2 69.2 87.5
Poor 15 12.5 12.5 100.0
Total 120 100.0 100.0
86
Figure 3.6: Parliamentary role of serving as a
check on the executive
Frequen
cy
Percen
t
Valid
Percent
Cumulativ
e Percent
Valid Effectiv
e47 39.2 39.2 39.2
Ineffecti
ve73 60.8 60.8 100.0
Total 120 100.0 100.0
87
Figure 3.7 Parliament oversight role of
ensuring financial accountability of the
executive.
Frequen
cy
Percen
t
Valid
Percent
Cumulativ
e Percent
Valid Very
good7 5.8 5.8 5.8
Good 24 20.0 20.0 25.8
Poor 60 50.0 50.0 75.8
Very
poor29 24.2 24.2 100.0
Total 120 100.0 100.0
Figure 3.8 Views on whether Parliament has adequate facilities
Frequency
Percent
Valid Percent
Cumulative Percent
Valid Yes 52 43.3 43.3 43.3
NO 68 56.7 56.7 100.0
Total 120 100.0 100.0
88
Figure 3.9 Assessment of Parliament in terms of
office space for MPs and Parliamentary Select
Committees
Frequen
cy
Percen
t
Valid
Percent
Cumulativ
e Percent
Valid Adequat
e34 28.3 28.3 28.3
Inadequa
te86 71.7 71.7 100.0
Total 120 100.0 100.0
Figure 3.10 View on whether the office of Presidents has been invested with excessive powers over parliament
Frequency
Percent
Valid Percent
Cumulative Percent
Valid Yes 95 79.2 79.2 79.2
No 25 20.8 20.8 100.0
Total 120 100.0 100.0
89
Figure 3.11 Opinion on whether the excessive powers of the president weakens parliament.
Frequency
Percent
Valid Percent
Cumulative Percent
Valid Yes 95 79.2 79.2 79.2
No 16 13.3 13.3 92.5
Unanswered
9 7.5 7.5 100.0
Total 120 100.0 100.0
90
Figure 3.12 Views on how the powers of the president
weakens parliament
Frequen
cy
Percen
t
Valid
Percent
Cumulativ
e Percent
Valid Reduces
parliament to a
rubber stamp
31 25.8 25.8 25.8
Affects
parliamentary
independence
15 12.5 12.5 38.3
Limits
parliament's
legislative powers
24 20.0 20.0 58.3
Weakens
parliament
oversight powers.
50 41.7 41.7 100.0
Total 120 100.0 100.0
91
Figure 3.13 Views on the causes of parliamentary failure in its watchdog role
Frequency
Percent
Valid Percent
Cumulative Percent
Valid Because MPs double as ministers
29 24.2 24.2 24.2
Excessive powers of the president
63 52.5 52.5 76.7
lack of offices for MPs and select committees
23 19.2 19.2 95.8
Victimization of MPs by the executive
5 4.2 4.2 100.0
Total 120 100.0 100.0
92
Figure 3.14 How Parliament can be strengthen to
effectively serve as a check on the executive
Frequen
cy
Percen
t
Valid
Percent
Cumulativ
e Percent
Valid Parliament should
be made
independent from
the executive
62 51.7 51.7 51.7
Parliamentarians
should avoid
partisan politics
21 17.5 17.5 69.2
Parliament must
be financially
autonomous
22 18.3 18.3 87.5
Parliamentary
voting should be
done secretly to
avoid victimization
15 12.5 12.5 100.0
Total 120 100.0 100.0
93
APPENDIX B
94
QUESTIONNAIRE
We are final year students at Kwame Nkrumah University of Science
and Technology undertaking a research on the topic: Executive
dominance of Parliament in the Fourth Republic). We would be
grateful if you could answer the following questions on the topic in
order to help us gather the necessary data. The research is for
academic purpose only. We wish to assure you that any information
given will be treated in strict confidence and used only for the stated
purpose and subject to any other condition that you may impose.
INSTRUCTIONS
1. Where the alternatives have been provided tick the required one
in the box.
2. For other questions write your answer in the space provided.
SECTION A
BIOGRAPHIC DATA OF RESPONDENTS.
Please tick [ ] or answer where appropriate.
1. Gender of respondent.
Male [ ] Female [ ]
2. Age of respondent.
18 – 30 [ ] 31 – 45 [ ] 46 and above [ ]
3. Level of education.
95
Basic [ ] Secondary [ ] Tertiary [ ] others,
please
specify……………………………………………………………………
4. Respondent’s occupation.
………………………………………………………………
SECTION B
PERFORMANCE OF PARLIAMENT
1. How would you assess the general performance of parliament?
Very good [ ] Good [ ] Poor [ ]
2. In terms of serving as a check on the executive, how would
assess parliament?
Effective [ ] Ineffective [ ]
3. How would you assess parliament in the area of ensuring
financial accountability of the executive?
Very good [ ] Good [ ] Poor [ ] Very poor [ ]
4. Has parliament been well equipped in terms facilities to perform
its oversight role?
Yes [ ] No [ ]
5. In terms of office accommodation for MPs and Parliamentary
Select Committees, how do you assess Parliament?
Adequate [ ] Inadequate [ ]
96
6. Is the work of MPs affected by lack of office accommodations?
Yes [ ] No [ ]
7. Do you see the office of the President being vested with
excessive powers over parliament?
Yes [ ] No [ ]
8. Do the excessive powers of the president weaken parliament?
Yes [ ] No [ ]
9. Would you please indicate how parliament is weakened by the
powers of the president?
………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………
10. What in your view had account for the failure of
parliament in serving as a check on the executive effectively?
………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………
11. How can parliament be strengthened to effectively serve
as a check on the executive?
………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………
97
98