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Ethan Lazuk

Elective Essay #3

AS.470.602.81.SP16

2 April 2016

Executive Duties in America's Republican Government:

As Conceived by George Washington & Alexander Hamilton

Much is learnable from George Washington's Farewell Address and Alexander

Hamilton's Federalist #70 and #71 essays about the duties of the executive in a

republican government. In their writings, Washington and Hamilton seldom speak

directly to duties of the executive—Washington speaks largely to the dangers of

international alliances while Hamilton divulges the merits of a unitary over a plural

executive and advocates for a four-year executive tenure in office—but the two founding

fathers do provide clues regarding such duties. Among the executive duties that are

discernible from Hamilton's writings are the energy to stand up to anticipated dominance

from the national legislature and the will to follow one's opinions over public opinion in

matters of public welfare. Hamilton like a strong executive, but only when his or her

powers stay within the bounds of enumerated constitutional limitations. Washington has

a conception of executive duties that includes executive disinterestedness toward

factionalism and ability to transcend or mend divisions between political parties, as well

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as the foresight to construct lasting commercial alliances with international allies while

precluding all forms of political association with them.

In a republican form of government, Washington and Hamilton believe wise men,

like themselves, have a duty to be representatives who promote the public welfare over

other considerations, including at the expense of public opinion, as Hamilton explains in

Federalist #71.1 In other words, the president should disregard public opinion and

instead follow the best path toward public happiness and security that he or she knows.

It is convenient if the public desires a course of action that aligns with the executive's

course, but the reverse is by no means a deal-breaker. It is not hubris that makes a

president value his or her opinion over public opinion, however. Instead, there are two

reasons for such executive autonomy in decision-making. The first reason concerns the

qualifications of the executive. As an enlightened representative with a liberal education

(presumably), the president embodies the republican values of objectivity and

disinterestedness that make his or her judgment on governmental matters sound.

Contrast the executive's analytical credentials with those of the mass public. Although

the public rightfully desires to promote the common good, it ultimately lacks the

intellectual "means of promoting it."2

The second reason executive opinion supersedes that of the public relates to

Hamilton's ideas about presidential reelection. Hamilton advocates for a four-year

executive tenure in office because he believes that is a sufficient length of time for the

president to become comfortable pursuing his or her desired courses of action without 1 Federalist #71, Page 2 2 Ibid

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overwhelming concerns over public criticism.3 If the tenure of the president is too brief,

argues Hamilton, he or she will be fixated on the upcoming reelection bid instead of on

good governance. Even though Hamilton is writing before the era of popular presidential

elections, public opinion of the executive still carries significant influence on the

outcome, namely by influencing the popularly elected state legislators who compose, and

occasionally comprise part of, the Electoral College. An executive concerned with

reelection will instinctively ascribe undeserved weight to public opinion, even going so

far as to knowingly follow it despite better but less popular alternatives. Four-year terms

in office are meant to incentivize presidents to favor their erudite instincts over the

capricious and amateurish opinions of the public. But it is ultimately a president's duty to

have more consideration for public welfare (even if it means following an unpopular

course of action) than for his or her reelection prospects. In other words, an executive

never panders to public opinion at the expense of the public good.

That a president is duty-bound to ignore public opinion when it conflicts with his

or her own inclinations is a trait consistent with Hamilton's preference for a strong

executive capable of making autonomous decisions and taking unilateral actions. In his

assessments of historical and contemporary leaders in Federalist #70, Hamilton speaks

appreciatively of the British monarchy and the balance of power between the king and

his council of advisors. Since the king is beyond reproach of public opinion, having a

close council of advisors means there is a source of responsibility for executive actions. In

a republican form of government, however, all individuals bear responsibility for their

3 Federalist #71, Page 3

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actions, including the president. A council of advisors is, therefore, superfluous, argues

Hamilton, because the executive is held responsible for his or her actions.4 The nature of

that responsibility is in the form of public opinion, and it thus forms the other half of the

president's circular relationship with the public. For the sake of good governance, the

president must ignore public opinion when it conflicts with his or her intended course of

action to promote the public welfare. Given his or her four-year tenure, the president has

enough time in office not to worry about the public's preliminary response to an

executive decision that contradicts its wishes. Should the long-term effects of the

president's decision prove beneficial to the public good, the public can hold him or her

responsible in the next election. If the executive decision fails to improve public welfare,

on the other hand, the president bears the same personal responsibility through a likely

challenge in the upcoming election. What is important here is neither the executive nor

the public has an inordinate level of power that would permit one side to interfere

unjustly with the actions of the other. Both parties have the power to commit actions

with full intent. The president can act to promote the public welfare without fearing an

immediate backlash from public opinion, and the public can hold the executive

personally responsible for his or her actions within a reasonable timeframe between

elections, thus precluding the extreme levels of executive autonomy that allow for

despotic tendencies.

Public opinion has so far played a central role in this discussion of executive

duties, but Washington and Hamilton both intimate other prerequisite criteria

4 Federalist #70, Page 5

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concerning executive leadership that must be met, otherwise the role of public opinion is

altogether moot. The heart of Hamilton's argument in Federalist #70 is that only a

unitary executive is viable in a republican government, as history has shown.5 The

Federalist Papers by Hamilton and others appeared concurrently with the Constitutional

Convention, which was a time when fervent debates over the proper structure of a

republican government were taking place, and the ideal form of executive leadership was

one significant topic of discussion. Hamilton advocated for a unitary executive, an

autonomous presidential leader who possesses enough energy to counterbalance the

dominant inertia that the national legislature (whatever its final formulation) was bound

to have. A separation of powers between the executive, legislative, and judicial branches

of the incipient national government was a central theme of the impending Constitution.

With this and other considerations in mind, certain debaters believed a plural executive

was the best way forward. After all, the ostensible purpose of America's not-so-distant

revolution for independence from the British Monarchy was to escape the arbitrary

commands of an omnipotent unitary executive in the King. It stands to reason that

promoters of a plural executive viewed the equitable distribution of executive authority

as its own balance of power, thus lowering the probability that a despotic individual

could arise. But Hamilton had already anticipated that a strong legislature would cast a

shadow on executive authority, and his concern was not in limiting executive powers but

consolidating them in the hands of one energetic president.

5 Federalist #70, Page 2

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Even though Hamilton favored an energetic unitary executive with consolidated

powers, he also believed that more limitations against despotism were placed on a

unitary than a plural executive because the former can be more easily face responsibility

by public opinion for his or her actions.6 Executive decision-making is not inherently

transparent given the sensitivity of much of the information considered. The decision-

making process for a unitary executive is nonetheless straightforward because ultimate

responsibility rests with one person: the president. With a plural executive, however, the

nuances behind decisions, regarding individual roles played, are lost in the endless

number of exchanges that take place between men and women who possess equal

amounts of executive authority.7 The circular relationship between executive actions and

public opinion relies on the public having the ability to hold the executive accountable in

an election (although in the late-18th century, this did not mean voting but lobbying

state legislatures). The fact that responsibility (like blame or praise) is not readily

assignable to specific members of a plural executive compromises the public's ability to

hold certain executives accountable in elections. It is already a republican assumption

that the public lacks the intellectual prowess for consequential decision-making, but with

no grounds to evaluate executive leadership available, all public opinion becomes

conjectural and assumptive. Essentially, a faction of republican leaders emerges, and the

public, having little recourse on the actions of their representatives, loses interest.

Furthermore, according to Washington, the loss of public interest and the diminution of

influence afforded to public opinion have implications beyond the executive sphere and 6 Federalist #70, Page 6 7 Ibid, Page 5

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threaten the entire bedrock of republican government in America, its separation of

powers. "The habits of thinking in a free Country should inspire caution in those

entrusted with its administration, to confine themselves within their respective

Constitutional spheres."8 Without public accountability for executive actions, Washington

is saying, the possibility for the executive to encroach on the national legislature's

enumerated constitutional powers is real. Conversely, the legislature, which Hamilton

anticipates will be dominant, could likewise usurp executive authorities, especially if the

executive lacks the energy to fight back.

There is another area of government that Washington and Hamilton both regard

as consequential for the executive, and that is factions and parties. In his Farewell

Address, Washington describes the work of factions as, "to put in the place of the

delegated will of the Nation, the will of party."9 In Washington's view, factions lead to

(political) parties, which bring about the diminution of individuals' autonomous political

thoughts. There, in turn, comes a rise of collective swathes of the public and their

government representatives, who are joined by their shared views on choice issues,

except for the fact that a cabal of ideologues at the top of the party hierarchy imposes

those views on its membership. These ideologues are commonly powerful men

competing with one another for influence, reputation, and power. Parties "become

potent engines," Washington explains, "by which cunning, ambitious and unprincipled

men will be enabled to subvert the Power of the People, and to usurp for themselves the

reigns of Government; destroying afterwards the very engines which have lifted them to 8 Farewell Address, Page 7 9 Ibid, Page 5

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unjust dominion."10 The passionate tone of Washington's words come across as though

the departing president is speaking not just theoretically or conceptually but based on his

own personal experience while in office. Washington's cabinet had at one time included

both Thomas Jefferson and Alexander Hamilton. These two men were founding

ideologues of divergent political parties, and Washington knew the difficulties of finding

compromises in policy recommendations between party adversaries. As a subscriber to

republican values, Washington undoubtedly agreed with his colleagues and peers that

the public was inept at self-governance and, therefore, required representation from

republican leaders. In this context, it is most probable that Washington viewed factions

and political parties as reprehensible not because they precluded members of the public

from thinking independently about government, but rather because parties corrupted the

qualified republican leaders themselves. It is, hence, an executive duty, in Washington's

mind, that the president should maintain a perennial state of disinterestedness and not

succumb to the subjectivity, combativeness, or inclinations toward despotism that

political party membership (and especially leadership) can inspire.

An ideologue himself, Hamilton nonetheless shares Washington's disapproval of

factions. In his introduction to Federalist #70, Hamilton outlines several reasons why

having energy is essential for a unitary executive, and among them is to protect "the

security of liberty against the enterprises and assaults of ambition, of faction, and of

anarchy."11 In fact, an additional facet of Hamilton's advocacy against a plural executive

is his belief that, in the event of disagreements between two or more executives, factions 10 Farewell Address, Page 5-6 11 Federalist #70, Page 1

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will arise to support the different executive leaders' governing philosophies. 12

Anticipating that a slew of competing interests will comprise the national legislature,

Hamilton approves of deliberate policymaking over a "promptitude of decisions."13 The

legislature's slow pace, however, presents another facet of Hamilton's call for an

energetic and unitary executive. Sometimes, in the course governing, crises will arise

that require immediate responses. In the event of national crises, or if legislative

deliberations get stalled, an energetic president can remedy these situations with quick

responses. A plural executive, on the other hand, needs lengthy deliberations, similar to

the national legislature, therein stopping the executive branch from responding promptly

to crises.

While Hamilton cares about protecting the autonomy of executive actions and

decisions (so long as they fall within enumerated constitutional limits) from the

immediate influences of the national legislature and public opinion, Washington cares

about maintaining the autonomy of the entire government from the meddling of

international (or "foreign") powers, and he regards political parties as helping to invite

such unwelcome external presences. Factionalism in domestic politics "opens the door to

foreign influence and corruption," warns Washington, "which find a facilitated access to

the government itself through the channels of party passions."14 Washington's fear of

international powers is driven not by xenophobia or domestic cultural fervor but by a

practical concern for the viability of the national government. "Foreign influence is one

12 Federalist #70, Page 3 13 Ibid 14 Farewell Address, Page 7

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of the most baneful foes of Republican Government [because] its tools and dupes usurp

the applause and confidence of the people, to surrender their interests."15 With these

words, Washington is expressing his belief that when certain factions of the public show

enthusiasm and allegiances toward different countries, the competing interests between

those countries finds a proxy in the American public, driving wedges between them and

distracting them from domestic matters.

A strong economy often relies on international trade, however, and Washington

knows this. Therefore, he believes that a pivotal executive duty is to promote

international commercial alliances that promote the public welfare while at the same

time making sure to avoid any political connections with these same trading partners.

Hamilton invokes an economic argument, as well, to support his argument for a unitary

over a plural executive. Speaking about executive salaries, Hamilton expresses how the

costs of a single executive salary will be lower than the multiple salaries needed to

support a plural executive.16 That such a matter as executive salaries should enter into

constitutional deliberations speaks to the fledgling nature of the national economy and

the national government's revenue collection powers in the period of Washington and

Hamilton's writings. With this backdrop in mind, the consequentiality of the debates over

executive duties is made clearer. In constructing an incipient republican government for

a new American nation, men like Hamilton and Washington were in unchartered

territory.

15 Farewell Address, Page 9 16 Federalist #70, Page 6

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Hamilton's ideas about how an executive should be a unitary entity with energy to

fulfill the burdens of his or her office and ward off legislative dominance, all while

ignoring public opinion when it conflicted with the public welfare, yet still being

beholden to public opinion come election time, these are altogether revolutionary new

principles concerning executive duties in late-18th century America's incipient

government. Meanwhile, Washington's calls for executive duties that include warding off

international influences, reconciling or transcending domestic political factionalism, and

adhering to the enumerated separation of powers in the Constitution are thoughtful

ideas made formidable with retrospection and wisdom from his firsthand experience

being an executive in America's incipient republican government.

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Sources

Alexander Hamilton. Federalist #70: The Executive Department Further Considered.

Published: March 15, 1788. Accessed by:

http://teachingamericanhistory.org/library/document/federalist-no-70/

Alexander Hamilton. Federalist #71: The Duration In Office Of The Executive. Published:

March 18, 1788. Accessed by:

http://teachingamericanhistory.org/library/document/federalist-no-71/

George Washington. Farewell Address. Published: September 19, 1796. Accessed by:

http://teachingamericanhistory.org/library/document/farewell-address/