Examining Israel's National Security Strategy

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Examining Israels National Security Strategy

December 21, 2011


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INTRODUCTION

Today democratic nations are faced with the complex and nuanced task of formulating

a national security strategy (NSS). Prior to the spread of globalization and technological

advances ushered in during the 1990s, security strategies were rather more simple to

formulate. The realms of domestic and foreign policy were distinct and the respective

response policies tended to follow a well-established framework. For example, military

engagements between foreign nations tended to fit within the long standing framework of

acceptable organized violence or the rules of war (e.g., the Geneva Convention).

Since the end of the Cold War era, traditional definitions that once policy formation

are now unsuitable. With globalization rapidly intertwining nations that are otherwise quite

separate, countries have become vulnerable to an array of non-conventional attacks. The

potency of economic sanctions, for example, has increased dramatically while the clout of

military threat has been undermined. Additionally, with the enhanced speed of information,

civilians now closely monitor the details of military operations and utilize the internet to

instantaneously voice their criticisms. Citizens are now more able than ever to actively

participate in the policy formation process. Power, defined as the ability to affect others to

obtain a desired outcome, is undisputedly diffused across an array of entities.1 The result is

a significant erosion of governments autonomy and coercive powers.

Non-state organizations have also capitalized on the effects of globalization. Groups

that are not commissioned or directed by any government are able to communicate with and

mobilize loyalists all over the world, granting them certain luxuries traditionally reserved for

states. More importantly, well formulated rules of engagement do not exist to define an

appropriate and effective counter toward these threats. Non-state organizations are largely

Examining Israels National Security Strategy 2

1 Joseph Nye, Public Diplomacy and Soft Power, The Annals of the American Academy of Political and SocialScience, 616:94 (2008) 94.


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out of reach of economic or political sanctions, and their members are often not contained

within a limited geographical area (e.g., within one country). 2 Yet, major nations find

themselves engaging directly with non-state players through dialogue and, at times, force.

The distinction between foreign and domestic is now very hard to find.

National leaders once had to primarily concern themselves with protecting their

citizenry, entireness and sovereignty3 (all of which are clearly identifiable and definable).

Governments must now also guarantee the abstract, difficult to define ideas of national values

and interests. They must inform, uphold and defend these values to their own citizens and to

the leaders and citizens of those foreign nations with which a given country is intertwined.4

Doubt of a nations rhetoric and resolve can have very real consequences, as allies as well as

enemies are now more cognizant of one anothers motives and methods.

Clearly nations can no longer focus on security strategies that depend strictly on hard

power, such as sanctions, payments or threats of coercion. Rather, they must also develop a

soft power approach with the aim of [shaping] the preferences of others.5 Soft power can

generally be described as governmental efforts of one nation to influence public or elite

opinion in a second nation for the purpose of turning the foreign policy of the target nation t o

advantage.6 Effective utilization of soft power requires a nation to fully understand,

cultivate and strategically advertise its intangible assets such as an attractive personality,

culture, political values, and institutions, and policies that are seen as legitimate or having


2 In this case, I refer more to non-state organizations with a violent mandate more so than those that seek toresolve global problems.

3 Kobi Michael, Who Really Dictates What an Existential Threat Is? The Israeli Experience, The Journal ofStrategic Studies, 32:5 (October 2009) 688.

4 Given democracies dependence on a judicial system and legal recourse, definitions are a core requirement fora democracy to function.

5 Nye, 95.

6Ibid.


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moral authority.7 Moreover, a countrys projected self must coincide with reality so as to

ensure the nations legitimacy.

The importance of aligning interests among nations and focusing on co-opting allies

rather than coercing them cannot be understated. In an interdependent world, no nation can

afford to be politically or economically ostracized due to perceived belligerency, illegitimacy

or weakness. Particularly given the substantial technological improvements in weaponry

made during recent decades, and the associated increase in effectiveness, it is crucial that

military doctrine remain subordinate to the broader strategic goals of national security. If a

nation allows military thinking to usurp greater NSS considerations, true depredation may

result.8

Civil leadership, with its inherent focus on political objectives, must reign supreme in

identifying and framing threats in order to prevent over application of military doctrine and to

ensure the continued focus on a comprehensive NSS. If this does not occur, countries will

suffer the dual effects of increasing the frequency with which threats are defined as

belligerent while also urging the excessive use of military tactics. Kobi Michael cleverly

provides the metaphor: the surgeons diagnosis will not lead to a homeopathic prognosis.9

That is, elected politicians must provide combined forces with political directives that will


7 Sharon L. Caudle, National Security Strategies: What, for Whom, and by What Means,Journal of HomelandSecurity and Emergency Management, 6:1, 22, (2009) 1.

8 The consensus among nations regarding this principle is clearly illustrated by the prevailing adherence to the1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The treaty was ratified by the five permanent members of theUnited Nations Security Council and known nuclear weapon states: the United States, United Kingdom, Russia,China and France. An additional 185 countries have since endorsed the treaty and in 1995 it was extendedindefinitely. The intent of subverting nuclear war is made clear in the opening clause, Considering thedevastation that would be visited upon all mankind by a nuclear war and the consequent need to make everyeffort to avert the danger of such a war and to take measures to safeguard the security of peoples... Full text of

the NPT is available at http://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2005/npttreaty.html.

9 Michael, 692.
http://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2005/npttreaty.htmlhttp://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2005/npttreaty.html


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inform military strategy. Modern geo-politics demands implementation of soft power

initiatives before resorting to hard power solutions.10

The aim of this paper is to offer a focused discuss of the greatest deficiencies of

Israels NSS in an effort to highlight issues the country must resolve before it can

successfully develop a sophisticated grand strategy. First, the structure and functioning of the

Israeli government favors an inflated role for the IDF, created a militarily-biased NSS.

Moreover, Israel continues to over-rely on deterrence in spite of its declining effectiveness.

Regarding soft power, Israel struggles in co-opting potential allies due to the lack of

consensus regarding the nations underlying values. Finally, the essay concludes with

recommendations for solving (or at least improving) Israels situation.

I. THE REIGN OF MILITARY DOCTRINE

Structural Favoritism of the IDF

A relatively recent, definitive example of the absence of NSS considerations is the

2006 Second Lebanon War. Though war itself is precisely the arena in which combined state

forces can justifiably impose their might, the effort must nevertheless must be the means

toward achieving a political end. When fighting becomes an end in itself, a military loses its

legitimacy to implement organized violence and appears barbaric. Modern warfare is

uniquely challenging due to its lack of definitional framework and continuously shifting

appearance. Before proceeding with a military option, it is crucial for the political echelon to

accurately glean a full assessment of the situation and determine the militarys appropriate

role within the full range of options available (e.g., sanctions, diplomacy, etc.). Naturally,

violence must be reserved as a last resort.


10 See Nye, Public Diplomacy and Soft Power. Nye coins the effective combination of hard and soft power assmart power.


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Civil oversight is precisely what was missing prior to and during the Second Lebanon

War. The conflict began on July 12, 2006 after Hezbollah forces ambushed Israeli Defense

Force (IDF) soldiers patrolling the Israel-Lebanon border, resulting in the abduction of two

soldiers and deaths of another three. Hezbollahs demands for a prisoner exchange were

rejected and the IDF immediately launched a swift, intensive military strike. Combined

forces operations began a full five days before the Prime Minister presented a comprehensive

description of the military campaign and its goals to the Knesset.11 By the time a UN

proffered ceasefire brought an end to fighting, 36 Israeli civilians and 119 IDF soldiers had

been killed.12 A UN official estimated Hezbollah loses at 500.13 The total cost of damage to

Israel was estimated to exceed five billion shekels.14

During the fighting, outcries of dissent were heard from journalists, writers and,

notably, IDF reserve soldiers. As soon as the ceasefire was reached, disapproval of the war

promptly spread, causing thousands to launch scathing criticism of any official connected to

the conflict. Protesters demanded the establishment of a governmental commission of

inquiry, which led to the formation of the Winograd Committee. The Committees initial

findings15 can be summarized as follows:

1. Cabinet leaders decision to approve a high-intensity, coordinated military

strike was not based on a detailed understanding of IDF strategy or the


11 See the official press release summary of the Winograd Commissions Initial Findings, available (in English)at .

12 Raphael Cohen-Almagor and Sharon Haleva-Amir, The Israel-Hezbollah War and the WinogradCommittee,Journal of Parliamentary and Political Law, 2:1 (2008) 28.

13 Patrick Bishop, Peacekeeping force wont disarm Hizbollah, Telegraph (22 August 2006); in Cohen-Almagor, The Israel-Hezbollah War and the Winograd Committee.

14Ibid.

15 Winograd Commissions Initial Findings
http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/winogradreport-04302007.pdfhttp://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/winogradreport-04302007.pdf


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complex characteristics of Lebanon. Such an understanding would

have affirmed: the improbability of meaningful military gains; that a full

scale attack was certain to precipitate missile fire on civilian areas of

northern Israel; in response to missile attacks, the IDF would be forced to

launch a prolonged ground operation to capture the areas from which the

missiles were fired for which the IDF was not adequately prepared.

2. Political leaders failed to consider the full range of options available to

them, illustrating weakness in strategic thinking.

3. Goals and modes of operation for the offensive were not clearly presented

to the cabinet, so as to ensure wide support. Ministers approved the war

that without knowing or understanding its implications or developing

an exit strategy.

4. Certain declared aims of the war were not well-defined, thus were

practically unachievable. Moreover, the approved military tactics were

insufficient for achieving the wars stated aims.

5. The IDF did not diligently propose alternative strategies, did not alert

the political-decision makers to the discrepancy between its own

scenarios and the authorized modes of action, and did not prepare

reserve troops for the imminent ground campaign.

6. Upon discovering the flaws built-in to the military strategy, political

leaders refused to adapt military efforts to the situation. Political leaders

chose instead to continue pursuing clearly unattainable goals and declared

they would not stop fighting until the goals were achieved.



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The findings indisputably show ineptitude on the part of both civilian and military

leaders. Indeed, the report assigns fault specifically to the Chief of General Staff (CGS) Dan

Halutz, Minister of Defense (MOD) Amir Peretz and Prime Minister (PM) Ehud Olmert, the

majority share being placed on the Olmert as head of the State.16 Not only was the war itself

astonishingly ill-conceived, but non-military options were not diligently considered. The IDF

clearly wished to rush to the front lines and the government did little to stop them.

Politicians did not step back to consider the full range of consequences that would result from

such an engagement, nor did they demand further information where the military proposal

was obviously incomplete. Regarding the objective of the war, CGS Halutz told Winograd

investigators, The military dictates the strategic purpose [of the war] which is its political

purpose in a sense and blurs between military and political.17 Tzipi Livni, then Minister of

Foreign Affairs, stated, it was not bon ton [good form] to vote against [the decision to

launch the war] at that stage.18

The example of the Second Lebanon War illustrates several structural issues that

obstruct the proper functioning of the Israeli government. To begin, Minister Linvis

comment speaks directly to the limitations proportional representation imposes on all elected

members of the political echelon. The Israeli parliament, the Knesset, is famously fractured

due to ideological differences, social cleavages and the very low electoral threshold (2

percent). Yet politicians of the ruling party are faced with forming and maintaining a

coalition from among the plethora of parties.19 By definition, the majority party is forced to

pander to and balance the interests of several groups through political maneuvering and


16 Halutz, Peretz and Olmert no longer hold these positions. Halutz was forced to resign following the conflict.

17 Winograd Investigation Committee, Initial Report, April 2007 (Hebrew); quote found in Michael, p. 701. Thelink Michael provides to the report is no longer valid.

18Ibid., p. 706

19 No party has ever gained enough votes to govern without the support of a coalition.


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compromise. Not only does this yield politicians unable to address pressing issues, but it also

causes Knesset members to think no further ahead than the coming election, preventing any

meaningful strategic planning. Governance in Israel is a nearly all consuming exercise in

coalition management.20 Moreover, the Israeli political system almost always guarantees a

cabinet staffed by members of the parliamentary majority.21 Thus, the oversight role of the

Knesset is rendered effectively null. Only during times of significant discord does this cease

to be true.

Additionally, Israels National Security Council (NSC) finds itself in a precarious

position. Though typically a component of the security cabinet, the NSC in Israel reports

directly to the Prime Ministers Office (PMO). Since its establishment in 1999, the NSC has

been unable to overcome the culture of being generally ignored. Knesset members have

historically given little credence to their staff or staff reports.22 Thus, PMO lacks the

organizational capabilities necessary to conduct systematic policy assessment and

formulation, inter-ministerial coordination, and to follow-up on implementation.23 The

Policy Planning Division of the Foreign Ministry is similarly anemic. Charles Freilich notes

that the division lacks personnel and standard operating procedures, resulting in outputs

[that] are almost totally dependent on the individuals composing it.24 Ironically, at a time

when most Israeli citizens feel that the government is isolated in the international arena, an

overwhelming majority of the public nonetheless wants to decrease funding to the Foreign


20 Charles D. Freilich, National Security Decision-Making in Israel: Processes, Pathologies, and Strengths,Middle East Journal, 60:4 (2006) 639.

21Ibid., 640.

22 Tellingly, Moshe Yaalon, the head of the cabinet-level equivalent to the NSC, stated in a meeting that Israeldoes not have an NSC. What he meant is unclear but nonetheless indicative. 15 September 2010.

23 Freilich, 642.

24Ibid.


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Ministry.25 Kobi Michael argues that the civilian authority intentionally eschews the task of

developing suitable knowledge infrastructure. If reliable security assessments were readily

available, Knesset members may be forced to make politically unpalatable decisions.26

The IDF, on the other hand, does have a powerful Planning Branch upon which the

PMO and cabinet are de facto dependent. Freilich reports that the IDF Planning Branch has

become a primary player in the IDF and at the cabinet level.27 Hence, there exists no true

alternative to strategic military assessments. This is consistent with the Winograd

Committees finding of widespread ignorance among Knesset members.

Additionally, Lebanon II highlights the weaknesses of Israels reactive, ad hoc

posture. The phenomenon emerged during Israels first few decades, when the country was

forced to respond to seemingly overwhelming threats with very few available resources.

Indeed, ad hoc decision making frees the IDF from having to jump over bureaucratic hurdles

during times of crisis and allows the military to rapidly adjust to a changing environment. In

the Israeli case, however, provisional decisions have taken the place of strategic planning.

Policies are tried and abandoned as events develop, without forethought, systematic

analysis, and a basic strategic framework.28 Given the increased complexity of modern

international relations, impromptu decision making is especially problematic. Few actions

can be taken without systematic planning, as a single lapse can have significant ramifications.

Evidence of this phenomenon is the current trend of lawfare: the illegitimate use of legal

frameworks to criticize and intentionally hamper military operations. Military leaders can no

longer begin operations without first consulting their on-hand legal staff. The effects of


25 72 percent of respondents stated that funds should be reallocated from the Foreign Ministry to welfareprograms. Yaar, Ephraim and Tamar Herman,Peace Index (June and August 2011) .

26 Michael, 706.

27 Freilich, 643.

28Ibid., 644.
http://www.peaceindex.org/http://www.peaceindex.org/http://www.peaceindex.org/http://www.peaceindex.org/http://www.peaceindex.org/


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lawfare are reinforced by the increased citizen involvement in warfare and governance that is

facilitated by globalization and the information age. Citizens not only wage lawfare

themselves, but they also represent the greatest force behind near instantaneous rapid

dissemination of the deleterious appraisals.

Over-reliance on the Stick of Deterrence

Deterrence is and has always been a central principle of Israels security strategy. The

aim of deterrence is to prevent an enemy from choosing to initiate violent conflict by

projecting an image of overpowering strength.29 Israeli leaders have often been quoted

making statements to the effect of, Although Arab states can choose to start a war, [we] will

determine the scope and intensity of any war.30 The intended effect is to convince Israels

neighbors that they do not want to provoke the docile beast. That is, that the costs of war

would far outweigh any potential benefits.

Following the disastrous outcome of the Second Lebanon War, it is no surprise that

the IDF and Israeli government undertook efforts to address the relevancy gaps31 that had

become glaringly obvious. Not only was the military campaign a tactical failure, but the

entire war effort was an illustration of national security folly for all the world to see. Given

the Winograd Committees finding that the military component of Lebanon II was an

indiscriminate blunder that materialized in the absence of genuine civil oversight, it stands to


29 David Rodman, Israels National Security Doctrine: An Introductory Overview,Middle East Review ofInternational Affairs (MERIA), 5:3, (2001).

30Ibid.

31 Relevancy Gap refers to a discontinuity between mindset and reality.


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reason that government leaders would first and foremost curtail the role of the military and

focus on increasing the accuracy of future attacks.32

Interestingly, this did not transpire. In fact, Israels armed forces determined that they

were over-trained for low-intensity conflict and under-trained for conventional attacks. As

early as August 2007, the IDF held a workshop to discuss their five-year plan which focused

on improving the Armys capacity for coalition war.33 True, the ground forces in Lebanon II

struggled; however, instead of developing and emphasizing non-military options, the

government supported a move in precisely the opposite direction. The foundation for the

plan was developed by none other than former CGS Halutz, the central advocate for the

disastrous strategy of the Second Lebanon War. One concept to emerge from Lebanon II is

the Dehiyah Doctrine. The strategy entails the use of massive firepower and heavy

bombardment, in an attempt to punitively decimate the entire area from which hostile forces

operate. Additionally, the Dehiyah Doctrine does not emphasize decisive victory, but rather

deterrence via considerations of cost effectiveness and hope the threat of massive economic

and physical destruction to infrastructure that will drive a wedge between combatants and

civilians.34 As recently as 2010, Defense Minister Ehud Barak suggested application of this

doctrine in Lebanon if Hezbollah attempts to fire on Tel Aviv.35 Following perhaps the most

stunning illustration of Israels need for a comprehensive NSS, Israel instead chooses to

strengthen its combined forces.


32 Specifically, the IDF was criticized for too heavily relying on air strikes that proved to be only minimallybeneficial.

33 Amir Oren, Wings of a Hawk,Haaretz(23 August 2007) [English, online edition].

34 The Dahiyah Doctrine, Reut Institute (July 2009).

35 Specifically, ...if it happens that Hezbollah will shoot into Tel Aviv, we will not run after each Hezbollahterrorist or launcher of some rocket in all Lebanon. We'll see the government of Lebanon responsible for what

happens, and for what happens within its government, its body politic, and its arsenal of munitions. And we willsee it as a legitimate to hit any target that belongs to the Lebanese state, not just to the Hezbollah. JanineZacharia, Q&A with Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak, The Washington Post(26 July 2010).
http://www.haaretz.com/weekend/week-s-end/wings-of-a-hawk-1.228020http://www.haaretz.com/weekend/week-s-end/wings-of-a-hawk-1.228020http://www.haaretz.com/weekend/week-s-end/wings-of-a-hawk-1.228020http://www.haaretz.com/weekend/week-s-end/wings-of-a-hawk-1.228020http://www.haaretz.com/weekend/week-s-end/wings-of-a-hawk-1.228020


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Arguably the countrys most infamous deterrence strategy is that of nuclear

ambiguity. Development of nuclear capacity began in 1957-58 at the insistence of the

nations first Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion.36 After Israel refused for several years to

sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), President Richard Nixon and PM Golda

Meir reached an understanding: the US would de facto acknowledge Israels nuclear

capabilities and not ask it to join the NPT as long as Israel maintains a low profile and does

not reveal its capabilities via public statements or nuclear testing.37 If a national security

strategy were in place, it is doubtful a continued refusal to sign the NPT would be advised.

The maneuver isolates the nation and calls into question the legitimacy of its nuclear

activities. Indeed, Israel is the only nation in the world to maintain nuclear ambiguity.

Israel cannot afford further isolation, regionally or internationally.

According to a 2010 meeting38 with the Minister of Strategic Affairs, Lieutenant

General Moshe Bogi Yaalon, access to nuclear weapons is a central factor in the current

Israeli governments position toward Iran.39 In Yaalons estimation, Iran is a primary

center of gravity for regional unrest because it supports and equips several non-state

enemies of Israel, including Hezbollah, Hamas and factions in Afghanistan. As a

consequence, Israeli troops find themselves consistently fighting [against] Iranian arms.

Yaalons proposed solution does not involve diplomacy or dialogue with the unstable

Ahmadinejad. Indeed, he explained his strategy quite concisely: Force Iran to choose


36 See Avner Cohen,Israel and the Bomb, Tel Aviv: Shoken Publishing (2000) [Hebrew] 25-29.

37 Israels Nuclear Ambiguity Policy, Reut Institute, (17 June 2009).

38 Yaalon, Moshe. Private between the Minister and Anna Sobol Levy Fellows, Offices of the Prime Minster,Jerusalem, 15 September 2010.

39 The MSA in Israel closely resembles other governments National Security Councils (NSC), in so far as it

provides the Security and Foreign Affairs cabinets with advice and recommendations on national security andforeign policy matters. Israel also has a staff-level National Security Council which reports directly to the PrimeMinister.


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between nuclear warheads or survival. They will choose survival!40 The Minister does

suggest beginning with political isolation, economic sanctions, moral support to internal

opposition, and a credible military option; however, the bottom line is nuclear war.

The effectiveness of deterrence has decreased markedly within the two last decades in

the face of terrorism and guerilla warfare. Non-conventional strikes on Israel, characterized

by sustained, low-intensity conflict, pose a two-fold threat against the states security

strategy. First, such engagement directly undermines Israels deterrent image. Second, it

similarly cripples the countrys ability to successfully achieve a rapid, decisive military

victory. According to the Reut Institute, the Resistance Network of forces against Israel

(primarily Hamas, Hezbollah and Iran) are strategically launching protracted, low-intensity

attacks with the ultimate aim that Israel will implode.41 Israels inability to maintain a

massive, professional army coupled with the nations lack of strategic depth have led the IDF

to depend substantially on deterrence and decisive victory as central tenants of the military

doctrine. Given that Israels enemies are successfully impairing these very principles, it is

time for the nations leaders to open their eyes to the reality that being the local bully is no

longer a tenable position.

II. THE SOFT POWER PREDICAMENT

Feeble Public Diplomacy

Israels over-reliance on hard power is coupled with an under-reliance on soft power

solutions. Though Israel continues to increase its integration into global society, the Israeli


40 To be clear, Yaalon would like the US to issue this ultimatum to Iran.

41 Implosion refers to the idea that Israel will not be overthrown militarity, but rather will be pressured on anumber of fronts that will ultimately lead to its internal implosion. The Logic of Implosion,Reviews, ReutInstitute (2006).


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government has consistently failed to appreciate the extent to which this integration can be

leveraged to achieve foreign policy goals through non-military means.

That being said, Israel is currently attempting to revitalize its public diplomacy (PD)

strategy. Certainly, PD is the most important soft power tactic. Today, it is of crucial

importance that governments actively engage one another through PD so that each nation

may promote a friendly environment for its unique interests. With rapidly increasing access

to the internet and the democratization of information, media have become the primary

medium for PD initiatives. Mediated PD is defined as the intentional efforts of a government

(especially its leader) to exert as much control as possible over the framing of the countrys

policies in foreign media.42 The competition for media attention has two dimensions, agenda

building (i.e., receiving media attention) and media framing (i.e., control of the selected

version of reality presented by the media).43

A nations ability to gain access to agenda building in a target nation is first

determined by the extent to which the acting nation is able to convince the target nation of

shared or similar political-cultural values. These values represent an ideological system that

comprises the symbolic center of the nation: the consensus. The closer issues, events or

political actors are deemed to this consensus, the more important they are considered, and the

better chance they have of receiving media attention.44 Secondly, access to agenda building

is determined by a nations ability to appeal to the medias professional values and needs.


42 R.M. Entman, Theorizing mediated public diplomacy: The US Case,Press/Politics, 13 (2008), 93.

43 Timothy E. Cooke, Governing with the news: The news media as a political institution. Chicago: Universityof Chicago Press, (1998).

44 Sheafer, T. & Gabay, I. Mediated public diplomacy: A strategic contest over international agenda buildingand frame building,Political Communication, 26:4 (2009) 447-467.


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Media tend to seek entertaining stories that will please readers and lead to profits; hence,

nations must present a skilled performance that appeals to these values.45

Entman defines media framing, the second element of media attention, as selecting

and highlighting some facets of events or issues, and making connections among them so as

to promote a particular interpretation, evaluation and/or solution.46 The emphasis here is on

the process that leads journalists to apply a particular frame. Nations must strategically

address frame building and recognize that communication and political acts are nearly

indistinguishable in the process. Like agenda building, the success or failure of a nations

impact on frame building , and thus policy promotion, depends largely upon the perception of

shared political-cultural values and the medias professional values and needs.

Keeping in mind that journalists seek to write about dramatic events that will sell,

Israel has little difficulty staying in the headlines as it is frequently involved in conflict.

According to East-West Communications, Israel ranked in the top-10 for the number of

global press mentions in the years 2008, 2009 and 2010.47 In fact, Yigal Palmer, a spokesman

from the Foreign Ministry, notes that approximately 1000 foreign correspondents are

continually based out of Jerusalem (compared to the approximately 1500 foreign journalists

posted to Washington, D.C.), illustrating the disproportionate coverage that Israel receives at

any given time. Moreover, an additional 1000 foreign journalists flock to Jerusalem during

times of conflict, bringing the number to a whopping 2000 correspondents.48


45Ibid.

46 Entman, 93.

47 East-West Global Index 200: Nation Branding Perception Index,East-West Communications, .

48 Yigal Palmer. Interview with representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), Offices of the MFA,Jerusalem, 3 May 2011.
http://eastwestcoms.com/global_volume.htmhttp://eastwestcoms.com/global_volume.htmhttp://eastwestcoms.com/global_volume.htmhttp://eastwestcoms.com/global_volume.htmhttp://eastwestcoms.com/global_volume.htm


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Obviously, however, remaining in the news due to involvement in conflict is not a

desirable position. Nonetheless, Israel has only recently changed its position from the

reactive stance of Hasbara, or explanation and advocacy, to one of proactive public

diplomacy.49 Until recently, the country seemed to still be following Shimon Peress

seriously flawed opinion that good policies do not require good public relations. The

updated, current strategy involves taking the battle to the enemy, and increasing relations

with the right people.50 A highly relevant example from June 2011 is Prime Minister

Netanyahus rather theatrical speech to the United States Congress. Not only was the speech

attended by a packed house of lawmakers and met with approximately 29 standing ovations

within 45 minutes, but PM Netanyahu displayed the skill and finesse required to proactively

solicit media attention. As head of the Israeli government, Netanyahu made an explicit effort

to establish a direct relationship with elites and decision makers in a target nation, the United

States. The PM was also charismatic and showed a clear understanding of the American

medias professional needs.

Additionally, Donny Sonnshein, Head of Media and Public Affairs at the Foreign

Ministry, emphasizes the Ministrys increased effort to reach out to non-state actors, such as

tourists, universities, journalists who have written on topics related to Israel other than

conflict and the like.51 Unfortunately Israels very slow realization of the importance of

mediated public diplomacy has led to a consistent lack of resources for these efforts.52


49 Eytan Gilboa, Mass communication and diplomacy: A theoretical framework, Communication Theory, 10,(2000) 275.

50 D.J. Schneeweiss. Interview with representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), Offices of theMFA, Jerusalem, 3 May 2011.

51 Donny Sonnshein. Interview with representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), Offices of the

MFA, Jerusalem, 3 May 2011.

52 Gilboa, 289.


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A significant obstacle Israel faces in crafting an effecting PD strategy is the growing

disconnect between nations self-perception and how it is perceived by the world. According

to D.J. Schneeweiss, also of the Foreign Ministry, how Israel knows itself is no longer how

the world knows it. Surely it is very difficult for Israel to successfully convince a target

nation of shared values if it is unaware of the distance between its self-understanding and

how it is perceived by the intended audience. Israel finds itself endeavoring to display

ostensibly shared values in much the same way the proverbial emperor showed-off his new

clothes.

It is important to point out that soft power arises from the attractiveness of a nations

values, culture and policies and causes people to act out of cooperation.53 Thus, soft

power relies on a nations moral authority or legitimacy, not only for the sake of legitimacy

itself but also for the basis legitimacy provides for other espoused values. For example,

Israels claim to be democratic is incoherent and difficult to maintain if the state

simultaneously appears to be illegitimate. A foreign nation that may consider itself to be

democratic may nonetheless fail to claim that this is a shared value between itself and Israel.

Outside of the US, Israel significantly struggles to influence frame building. On one

hand, this relates to the aforementioned discrepancy between Israels self-image and its image

to foreign audiences. If Israel tends to view itself as the moral victim in a conflict (and the

world does not view it this way), it has very little chance of promoting its preferred definition

of a problem. Without a desired definition as a basis for the story, there is no way Israel can

successfully control a foreign medias identification of causes, moral judgement or proposed

remedies. Moreover, no nation can disregard that at best it can hope to achieve command of


53Ibid., 277.


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frame building equal to that of some other foreign nation (or nations) or to the frame

promoted by the target government itself.

To deal with this discrepancy of images, Sonnshein describes Israels focus on re-

branding itself in the national arena. Sonnshein characterizes this as a re-telling of the Israeli

strategy. Zaharna defines nation-branding as the use of multiple modes of communication

to deliver a strategically designed, simple, coherent, and compelling message, with the

goal of differentiating and positioning an entity within a target audiences mind.54 According

to the East-West Nation Brand Perception Index, Israels brand has risen from a low of 192

to the current high of 173 (out of 200) since 2008. For a country consistently in the top-10

for number of mentions in international media, this negative perception leaves much to be

desired. Clearly whichever version of Israel is making it to the media, it is not one which

is received favorably or with which foreign nations claim political or cultural proximity.

Poorly Defined / Upheld Values

Israels greatest obstacle toward developing a grand strategy is the lack of declared

and agreed upon values. The basis for this problem can be attributed to the countrys lack of

a governing constitution. Though Israels Declaration of Independence55 established the

ambitious deadline of October 1, 1948 for the adoption of a formal constitution , the deadline

passed with no such occurrence. Presciently, religious parties refused to accept a written

constitution, fearing the potential that the Israeli government would ultimately favor the

constitution over Jewish religious texts. Since that time, Israel has passed nineBasic Laws,


54 Rhonda S. Zaharna, Mapping out a spectrum of public diplomacy initiatives: Information and relationalcommunication frameworks. In Snow, N. and Taylor, P. M. (Eds.),Routledge Handbook of Public Diplomacy,New York: Routledge, (2009) 87.

55 Full text is available at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs website, .
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace%20Process/Guide%20to%20the%20Peace%20Process/Declaration%20of%20Establishment%20of%20State%20of%20Israelhttp://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace%20Process/Guide%20to%20the%20Peace%20Process/Declaration%20of%20Establishment%20of%20State%20of%20Israelhttp://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace%20Process/Guide%20to%20the%20Peace%20Process/Declaration%20of%20Establishment%20of%20State%20of%20Israelhttp://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace%20Process/Guide%20to%20the%20Peace%20Process/Declaration%20of%20Establishment%20of%20State%20of%20Israelhttp://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace%20Process/Guide%20to%20the%20Peace%20Process/Declaration%20of%20Establishment%20of%20State%20of%20Israelhttp://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace%20Process/Guide%20to%20the%20Peace%20Process/Declaration%20of%20Establishment%20of%20State%20of%20Israelhttp://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace%20Process/Guide%20to%20the%20Peace%20Process/Declaration%20of%20Establishment%20of%20State%20of%20Israel


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which are intended to incrementally build a constitution. Only the two most recently passed

Basic Laws protect human rights: theLaw of Human Dignity and Liberty (1992) and theLaw

of Freedom of Occupation (1994).56 The laws are nonetheless quite narrow by international

standards. Moreover, theLaw of Human Dignity and Liberty is not entrenched. That is, the

Knesset is free to pass legislation that transgresses this law or choose to amend it by simple

majority.

The two values Israel does attempt to maintain are those of being Jewish and

democratic. Firstly, Israel struggles to endorse its legitimacy as a democratic nation. Given

deep social divisions, the nation generally functions as a quasi-consociational democracy.57

Consociational democracies are marked by autonomy granted to social subcultures to handle

internal matters according to each groups specific values and practices; mutual veto

regarding decisions that may affect status quo arrangements; proportional distribution of

resources; and finally a grand coalition in which all of the most powerful social segments are

represented. This system manifests itself largely as informal compromises met by political

elite on behalf of the deeply divided subcultures.58

Israels status as quasi-consociational becomes apparent after comparing the political

efficacy of minority religious and Arab demographics. Although Arabs are granted their own

educational and cultural institutions, they do not have autonomous control over these systems

nor are they granted a commensurate proportion of public resources. No Arab has ever been

elected as a minister of an Israeli government, thus Arab citizens face great difficulty in


56 Full texts of the laws are available at the Knessets website, .

57 Reuven Hazan, Religion and Politics in Israel: The Rise and Fall of the Consociational Model, in ReuvenHazan and Moshe Maor (eds.)Parties, Elections and Cleavages: Israel in Comparative and Theoretical

Perspective. London: Frank Cass (2000) 109.

58 Arend Lijphart. The Politics of Accomodation, Berkeley: University of California Press (1968) 103.
http://www.knesset.gov.il/description/eng/eng_mimshal_yesod1.htmhttp://www.knesset.gov.il/description/eng/eng_mimshal_yesod1.htmhttp://www.knesset.gov.il/description/eng/eng_mimshal_yesod1.htmhttp://www.knesset.gov.il/description/eng/eng_mimshal_yesod1.htmhttp://www.knesset.gov.il/description/eng/eng_mimshal_yesod1.htm


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attempting to veto propositions that affect their community (i.e., no mutual veto).59 Israels

institutionalized Jewish majority has largely precluded Arabs from the possibility of

accommodating agreements. Reuven describes the Jewish-Arab relationship as one of

exclusion and control, on behalf of the Jewish majority, rather than compromise or

symbiosis.60

However, consociational mechanisms exist widely within the religious-secular

cleavage, many of which were established very early in Israels history. Firstly, the religious

subculture has been granted great autonomy in dealing with its internal affairs. The conflict

over control of education was stabilized in the creation of separate educational systems: two

Zionist state systems, one secular one religious, and one state-funded, independent, non-

Zionist religious school system. Autonomy was also granted in the form of a separate

religious court system, and in the exemption of religious women and yeshiva students from

military conscription.61 Mutual veto exists in the form of thestatus quo agreement in which

religious and secular groups maintain the right to veto or shelve any proposed change that

they may be too much in conflict with the already established religious-secular framework.

The most obvious demonstration of this power is Israels lack of a written constitution.

Proportionality exists in Israel both in the electoral system of proportional

representation and in the distribution of public resources. Resources, both strictly monetary

and ministry positions in the government, are divided among the members of the ruling

coalition. Religious parties have historically been included within the coalition generally

because they are willing the join the coalition for a smaller percentage of the budget than


59 Eliezer Don-Yehiya, Conflict Management of Religious Issues: The Israeli Case in a ComparativePerspective, in Reuven Hazan and Moshe Maor (eds.)Parties, Elections and Cleavages: Israel in Comparativeand Theoretical Perspective. London: Frank Cass (2000) 87.

60 Hazan, 111.

61Ibid., 119-120.


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larger parties and due to the fact that, with their membership, the coalition is able to

ostensibly address one of the most acute social cleavages. Grand coalitions have rarely been

present in Israeli government. Often the most influential subcultures are at ideological odds

with one another, thus are reluctant to take part in the same coalition. In the Israeli

experience, such ideological repulsion occurs between the Arab and religious parties. The

religious parties frequent coalition membership grants them the powers associated with

being part of the Knessets ruling majority while also acting as a force to further preclude

Arab parliamentary participation based on ideological grounds.

Increased activism of the High Court has reduced the validity of existing

consociational agreements. That is, consociational agreements tend to be informal (i.e., not

legally enforceable) and flexible, for example the status quo. However, now that the High

Court is adjudicating on issues that were previously considered to be out of its jurisdiction,

the informality, and thus flexibility, of accommodating arrangements is lost, undermining the

agreements altogether. Additionally, the High Court has shown that it frequently decides

against Orthodox groups; therefore, such stabilizing settlements as the status quo are in

danger of being nullified, and the possibility of future agreements of this kind is dubious.

In any case, Israels form of democracy is undoubtedly spurious. A democratic

government which routinely excludes nearly one-fifth of the countrys people is obviously a

perversion of the system. Although Israel may be committed to maintaining a Jewish

majority, it is inconsistent for the country to democratically prefer this majority by

preventing the Arab minority, comprising 17 percent of the population, from being able to

effectively participate in national governance. The quasi-consociational democracys

dependence on informal agreements instead of universally applicable laws further

undermines Israels proposed democratic nature. By declaring democracy as one of two



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foundational values and simultaneously disenfranchising the largest minority voice, Israel is

robbing itself the legitimacy necessary for soft power security strategies.

The second espoused value of Jewishness is also vulnerable to scrutiny. Though

there is little public dissent regarding the priority given to the goal of being universally

recognized as a Jewish state62, answering the follow-on question of what precisely that means

is another story. Initially, Jewishness was utilized as an ethnic identity, uniting Jewish

citizenry while simultaneously subordinating resident, even citizen, non-Jews. To be sure,

the nations Zionist founders had little commitment to Judaism as a religion, with the

associated practices and beliefs.63 For several decades, a majority of establishment leaders

did not consider religious aspects of Judaism to be an important element for consideration

during the policy formation process.

Following the territorial gains of the Six Day War, issues of national security took on

an enhanced religious meaning, as segments of the population saw the opportunity to

establish Greater Israel. Judaism thus regained a central position among Israels greatest

strategic vulnerabilities as it created a new fault line for social division and factionalism

within the Knesset. For example, Israel finds itself in a uniquely challenging position

regarding security policy toward the occupied territories. On the one hand, a mere 10 percent

of the Jewish Israeli population considers achieving Greater Israel to be the ultimate

national priority.64 Yet, religious parties enjoy over-representation in the Knesset, as

previously discussed, whereby they are able to unduly skew the national agenda to support

their idiosyncratic interests. That government authorities have maintained military control


62 Yehuda Ben Meir and Dafna Shaked, The People Speak: Israeli Public Opinion on National Security,2005-2007, Memorandum no. 90, Institute for National Security Studies (2007) .

63 Baruch Kimmerling, The Invention and Decline of Israeliness, (Berkeley: University of California Press,

2001).

64 Ben Meir and Shaked, The People Speak: Isreali Public Opinion on National Security, 2005-2007, 36.
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over the occupied territories for the last four decades proves political reluctance to develop an

acceptable solution for this religiously charged issue.

The enigma of Judaism has been thrust to the top of the agenda without the necessary

clarification as to what this means: should national policies protect Judaism as an the

ethnicity or a religion? If Judaism implies religiosity, what extent of religiosity is appropriate

to incorporate into a grand strategy? This looming issue not only prevents Israel from

developing an NSS based on identified national interests (as the country cannot agree on

what those interests are), but also worsens the strategic vulnerability of Israels inter-Jewish

social cleavages. If it isnt enough for Israel to be famous for its very deep schism between

Jewish and non-Jewish populations, the country now faces a similarly critical divide within

its sacred Jewish majority. In their assessment of public opinion on national security issues,

Yehuda Ben Meir and Dafna Shaked caution that ideological tension within Israels Jewish

population presents a burgeoning and critical threat to Israeli national security. Increasing

divisiveness will surely lead Israel further away from developing a comprehensive strategy

for moving forward.

Constant emphasis on Israels undefined Jewish characteristics indeed contributes

little to national strategy. Israel has not made the necessary efforts to determine an agreed

upon definition of Jewishness. Thus, Judaisms status as a central value undermines the

democratic functioning of the state while also providing no guidance for the development of

an NSS. If a country cannot agree upon its own fundamental values, it will remain unable to

identify its interests. Without a clear understanding of national interests, Israel cannot hope

to effectively employ soft power methods.

III. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS



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If a well-developed national security strategy requires a balanced approach, utilizing

both hard and soft power methods, then Israels NSS is notably biased. The political system

of proportional representation disincentivizes politicians from addressing the most critical

issues or thinking in terms of long-term strategic plans. The IDF has filled this void,

preventing Israels NSS from becoming little more than a military strategy. Unfortunately,

the IDF enjoys wide public support.65 Though the events of the Second Lebanon War caused

public trust in the IDF to wane slightly, such faith still greatly overshadowed the almost non-

existent trust in the political echelon.

Moreover, in a 2007 survey of public opinion, 50 percent of Jewish Israeli

respondents noted that they felt that Lebanon II ended inconclusively and a vast majority

stated that the IDF should have continued fighting until a decisive victory was achieved.66

Such public sentiment reflects the pervasive reality of civil militarism and the associated

legitimacy gap. Israel is plagued by the reinforcing cycle of militarist thought processes

being excessively applied. Kimmerling describes the nature of this mindset as cognitive

civil militarism: the military agenda has become self-evident and is no longer a matter of

debate.67 As a consequence, war has been normalized by the hegemonic elite, leading them

to mold a system of governance that structurally affords the IDF an augmented role in the


65Ibid., 11.

66Ibid., 9.

67 Baruch Kimmerling, The Interrupted System: Israeli Civilians in War and Routine Times, Transaction: NewBrunswick, NJ (1985).


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governance.68 Thereby, the Israeli public is systematically discouraged from supporting the

integration of soft power tactics into the already existing hard power strategies. 69

Israel is not only biased toward identifying belligerent threats, but also largely blind

to vulnerabilities. The globally integrated nation does not appreciate one of its greatest

contemporary weaknesses: an utter lack of self-awareness. This has created significant issues

for the nations legitimacy in the world arena.70 Israel espouses values that eminent portions

of the world find ill-conceived or feel that Israel does not truly honor. In spite of the

necessity for Israel to proactively offer these communities a new, re-branded image, the

country will struggle to do so as it is still defining itself. Israels lack of self-understanding

will make it impossible to co-opt foreign nations on the basis of aligned interests, as the

country is unable to determine what its interests are.

Though limited in scope, this discussion was focused on the most pressing challenges

for Israels foreign policy and national security strategy. In order to improve this situation,

reforms must begin from two fundamental starting points. First, Israel must reform its

political system. Proportional representation accompanied by a very low threshold for

entrance has created a parliament characterized by extreme volatility and low efficacy. The

political echelon must be granted the power to make decisions without fear of being

immediately ousted. This does not necessarily entail throwing out the concept of

proportional representation all together; rather, modifying the arrangement to a better


68 Edna Lomsky-Feder, The Meaning of War Through Veterans Eyes: A Phenomenological Analysis of LifeStories, inMilitary State and Society in Israel, Daniel Maman, Eyal Ben-Ari, Zeev Rosenhek (eds.),Transaction: New Brunswick: NJ (2001), 269-294.

69 Michael Feige asserts that the strengthening of groups such as Peace Now has given a voice to the non-hegemonic populace, enabling them to speak out against civil militarism. While generally agreeing with hisargument, I find the effect to remain limited. Peace Now and the Legitimation Crisis of CivilMilitarism,Israel Studies, 3:1 (2005).

70 Israels legitimacy crisis frequently revolves around human rights issues, which are out of the scope of thispaper. The focus here is on the foundational issues which prevent Israel from developing a viable NSS.


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functioning model. Though this recommendation is by no means original, it remains to be

critically true. From there, Israel can determine its guiding values and enforce a more

realistic democracy whereby boosting its international legitimacy.

Secondly, Israel must embrace its position as one of the most reported-on nations in

the world. Instead of defensively crying out against negative media bias, Israel should

consciously enter the game and learn to influence foreign media reporting. Positive reporting

will pave the way for Israel to begin implementing soft power tactics within its national

security strategy. To date, Israels success in promoting political and/or cultural proximity

between itself and other nations is pitiful, at best. Though it is unfortunate to state that

Israels public diplomacy initiatives continue to display no certain strengths, it is the

persistent reality. Israel must simultaneously embark on resolving underlying structural and

ideological issues, while also rapidly improving its understanding of and ability to utilize soft

power. Together these measures will represent significant improvements to the Israels

national security strategy.



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Examining Israel's National Security Strategy

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