Ex post evaluation of bedouin settlement projects in Jordan: A case study of wadi arja

Agricultural Administration 15 (1984) l-23

Ex Post Evaluation of Bedouin Settlement Projects in Jordan: A Case Study of Wadi Arja

Eberhard H. H. Pfuhl*

German Agency for Technical Cooperation (GTZ), PO Box 5180, D-6236 Eschborn 1, West Germany

(Received: 14 February, 1983)

SUMMARY

This paper describes the attitudes and expectations of the Bedouin towards sedentarisation, with a brief summary of the Jordanian Government’s reasoning for its Bedouin settlement policy. The author explores an integrated modelfor assessing quantifiable economic as well as non-quant$able social and distributional effects of settlement project investments. This model is based on the use of conventional cost-benefit analysis techniques for quantitative and/or purely economic results of project investment only, while applying a ‘Project Impact Matrix’ for measuring the degree of target achievement in the political and socio- economic field. The issues are demonstrated by ex post evaluation experiences of the Irrigation and Bedouin Settlement Project at Wadi Arja in Jordan. It is hoped that the methodological tools for project evaluation developed in this paper might be a basis to work from and a step forward in social impact assessment research.

ATTITUDES AND EXPECTATIONS OF THE BEDOUIN TOWARDS SEDENTARISATION

Generally speaking, the Bedouin are not happy with the state of affairs concerning their socio-cultural and economic activities as herdsmen. They often moan that they are weak, that their situation is very

* Present address: 711 Quirino Avenue (Suite 102), Malate/Metro Manila, The Philippines.

Agricuhral Administration 0309-586X/84/$03.00 0 Elsevier Applied Science Publishers Ltd, England, 1984. Printed in Great Britain

2 Eberhard H. H. fftihl

precarious, and that their survival depends on events over which they have no control, such as drought and disease. On the other hand, they do not wish to be too dependent on government bureaucracies which they find difficult to deal with. Interviews and discussions with Bedouin on the rangelands of Wadi Arja and Qa’disi in Southern Jordan have revealed that most of them are in favour of permanent settlement. However, even if this opinion is valid, it still remains a question how do the Bedouin see their pastoral way of life? What are the present expectations of the Bedouin?

The main expectations that they associate with a settled life are of better living conditions (see Table 1). The primary reason for the Bedouin’s interest in leading a settled life centres on the opportunity for their children to attend school regularly. This statement has been confirmed by Cole who, as a result of a survey in Saudi Arabia, found that (ref. 2, p. 11):

‘ * . . about 96 per cent of the semi-settled and short-range nomads said they would definitely settle for the sake of their children’s education while only 74.6 per cent of the long-range nomads said they would settle. Over 90 per cent of all of them said that nomadism itselfwas a major impediment to schooling’.

In this connection it is of interest to note that all Bedouin at Wadi Arja, a settlement project which is discussed below in detail, decided spontaneously to help actively in the building of the new school and to do so free of charge. This leads to the fact that it is not only quantitative expectations which are raised among the future settlers but also that qualitative, socio-cultural criteria are receiving increased importance. Consequently, future settlement programmes and activities accompany- ing the sedentarisation process should assume as their starting point (unlike what has occurred in the past) a much higher level of interest and motivation among the ‘could-be’ settlers. But, this interest which has been aroused among the Bedouin towards living full-time in a fixed settlement is also reflected in a high level of expectations among them. These include an expectation of assistance from the national government to help the Bedouin to develop their agricultural plots. However, they are very reserved in giving their opinions of, and in their relationship with the government bureaucracy, and even the smallest disappointment (that is, unfulfilled expectations) can lead to distrust of an entire settlement project and its administration, and consequently a disastrous outcome in the long-run for the economic investment involved.

Bedouin settlement policy in Jordan

TABLE 1 Reasons for Application for a Settlement Plot (percentages)

Reasons/explanations Settlement Settlement Settlers Non-scheduled candidates candidates at settlers at

at at El Jafr El Jafr Wadi Arja Qatrana

Expectation of better standards of living and in particular availability of schooling facilities

Rejection of nomadism. Preference for irrigated agriculture. Desire for permanent job. Inadequate rangeland resources

Desire to own a farm Legal claim to Miri land.”

Born in project area Expectation of a higher income Proposal by the Government

or Sheikh Search for a job Long-term employment by

project. Experience in irrigated agriculture

Desire to own and live in a house Others

Total

Number of people interviewed

38 10 19 30

12 22 17 21

15 13 4 3

19 16 0 0 0 13 0 0

0 10 12 0

0 10 0 0 0 3 0 0

100 100 100 100

26 31 24 67

Source: INSTRUPA, October, 1976.6

0 4

0 0

22 27

0 0

a Miri land: State-owned land, to which the State allocates the rights for private use, but which the Bedouin claim under an Ottoman law of 1858.

With this in mind, and recognising the advantages of a settled life for the Bedouin as well as for the local or national administration it was a surprise for the author to come across certain official government attitudes which did not always show much sympathy for the pastoralists and their socio-cultural independence.

Most African and Near-East national governments are more or less hostile to pure or traditional pastoralism. They claim that pastoralism is too primitive a way of life for this modern, changing world, or that traditional pastoralists are not maximising the true natural potential of their areas.

4 Eberhard H. H. Pfuhl

But is this reproach of real value? What are the reasons underlying the Jordanian Government’s intervention in the socio-cultural structure of the Bedouin?

RATIONALE OF THE JORDANIAN GOVERNMENT FOR ITS BEDOUIN SETTLEMENT POLICY

First, there is the argument that pastoral nomadism leads to dangerous ecological problems. However, it could be maintained that, above a certain level of aridity, pasturage is the only possible way of land use. Bearing this in mind, and without denying the harmful effect of some human activities to the natural environment, it can be stated that in the southern region of the Kingdom of Jordan generally a kind of balance between the vegetation and grazing intensity of the herds has been established. Consequently, one disputes the arguments of, and cannot sympathise with radical reformers like Ebrahim Konate who stated (ref. 4, p. 9):

‘We have to discipline these people, and control their grazing and their movements. Their liberty is too expensive for us.’

Another argument of the Jordanian Government in favour of its Bedouin settlement policy centres on the excuse that unfortunate natural conditions, that the imposition of national boundaries which cross the traditional migration routes of the Bedouin, and moreover, that tribal and Bedouin societies are inimical to social and economic progress.

Gathering the threads of the arguments, a case can be made for a participative approach towards Bedouin development. This means no development of range lands, but rather a development based upon mutual co-operation between the national authorities and the Bedouin which aims to create a better future for the nomads. On the basis of such a strategy, and under the condition that planning and implementation decisions be undertaken as part of a process of mutual understanding with the Bedouin, a real challenge faces the Bedouin for appropriate development according to their abilities and interests.

With this in mind, we can now turn our attention to an integrated model of assessing quantifiable economic as well as non-quantifiable

Bedouin settlement policy in Jordan 5

social and distributional effects of a project investment. This will be illustrated with reference to the Wadi Arja Project.

EX POST EVALUATION: CASE STUDY WAD1 ARJA

Due to the low precipitation over most of Jordan, its agricultural potential is limited. The government’s agricultural policy has focused largely on increasing productivity and favouring early season fruit and vegetables for export grown under irrigation mainly in the Jordan Valley in the north west of the country. This locational concentration of agricultural development offers little benefit to the Bedouin in the southern part of the Kingdom. However, between 1964 and 1974, eleven groundwater development and Bedouin settlement schemes were begun, all but one of which are in the south. These have been funded bilaterally through the development and technical assistance programmes of various European and the US governments or multilaterally by UN agencies. By this means the Jordanian Government has endeavoured to establish nuclei of agricultural and regional development through the settlement of the Bedouin.

The Wadi Arja Project is situated on the desert plateau of southern Jordan, to the north of Ma’an. It is near the main highway from Amman to Aqaba, some 200 km south of the capital, in an area where the average annual precipitation is under 100 mm. The project, which covers 120 ha, was sponsored between 1967 and 1976 by the Technical Co-operation Programme of the Federal Republic of Germany. Its aims have been to provide the technical infrastructure for irrigated farming, and the training and guidance of a selected number of Bedouin settlers in agricultural and farm management practices (see layout of the Wadi Arja Project, Fig. 1).

The organisational structure of the project corresponded to the hierarchical conditions in Jordan. Despite the problems involved, the responsibility for the project initially lay with the Natural Resources Authority (NRA), but during the implementation phase it was transferred to the Ministry of Agriculture. Subsequently, and after the allocation of irrigation units to the Bedouin settlers in 1979, the central management of the project was transferred to the Jordan Co-operative Organisation (JCO).

All the institutions responsible for the project’s implementation and project management, assisted by a team of German consultants, con-

PILO

T FA

RM

0

\ 01

I Fi

g.

1.

Layo

ut

of t

he W

adi

Arja

Proj

ect.

Sour

ce:

AHT-

Cons

ulta

nt.8

!


-+- WORKSHOP

+ WATER SUPPLY

ENGINEERING AGRIC. SUPPORT p---

i BEDOUIN

Farm Holdings

Ah

I

I

/

MARKETING and SUPPLY

__t_ out-going instructlons and recommendations

- back-flow of information and reports

Fig. 2. Organisation of the Wadi Arja Project. Source: AHT-Consultant’ with modifications by the author.

sidered the adequate management and co-ordination of all activities as crucial for the successful operation of the project. Accordingly, within the project organisation, all central tasks and activities were entrusted to the following sections (see organisational chart, Fig. 2):

(i) Administration section (ii) Economic and monitoring section (iii) Engineering and agricultural support section (iv) Research and extension section


(v) Marketing and supply section (vi) Water supply section (vii) Workshop section

Data and information from the different sections of the central service helped the management in identifying constraints and assessing the economic performance of the project, which were necessary in order to achieve an improved standard of living and adequate family income for the Bedouin settlers.

After describing some organisational aspects of the Wadi Arja Project, attention will be directed to an analysis of the economic aspects of agricultural production and the long-term viability of the project. This will be done by an expost evaluation of the project’s costs and benefits using actual market prices in Jordan in summer 1976. In Jordan, market prices for inputs and outputs reflect their opportunity costs to a very high degree; public intervention which aims to regulate market forces is extremely limited.

Although Chambers1 advocates that more work is needed to develop methods of evaluation, the author here intends to apply a conventional cost-benefit analysis (CBA) for all quantitative and/or purely economic effects and considerations of the project. All non-quantifiable social, political and economic effects of the investment will be discussed in the subsequent section; the author does not align himself with those who believe that all costs and benefits must be measured in terms of a single comparative commodity, namely money. Therefore, no attempt will be made to measure all development benefits in monetary terms. Although current CBA methods offer a high level of mathematical precision, they do not possess the subtlety of the arts or social sciences. The same applies to various methods and procedures used in development planning. Because of these shortcomings the author concentrates on the CBA method to measure economic costs and economic benefits only.

The summary economic analysis of the Wadi Arja Project from 1969 onwards is presented in Table 2. On the basis of project costs and benefits, thefinancial internal rate of return is calculated. Even when the calculation is presented under conditions of the highest level of yields (III), the Net Present Value (NPV) remains negative over the lifespan of the project.

The economic internal rate of return is slightly higher than the financial rate of return, because the opportunity costs for labour can be assumed to

Year

Ca

pita

l Op

erat

ion

and

cost

m

ainte

nanc

e co

sts

Train

ing

Repl

acem

ent

Tota

l To

tal

bene

fitsb

Ne

t ca

sh. f

lo w

co

sts

cost

s co

sts

I II

III

I II

- -

III

1969

72

.1

11.5

0.

6 0

84.2

0

0 0

- 84

.2

- 84

.2

- 84

.2

1970

23

.1

6.5

0.5

0 30

.1

0 0

0 -

30.1

-3

0.1

-30.

1 19

71

46.5

8.

6 0.

4 0

55.5

0

0 0

- 55

.5

- 55

.5

- 55

.5

1972

69

.4

23.5

0.

8 0

93.7

1.

3 0

0 -

92.4

-9

3.7

-93.

7 19

73

65.3

25

.5

1.0

0 91

.8

1.5

2.2

0 -

90.3

-

89.6

-9

1.8

1974

32

.9

28.8

2.

1 0

63.8

12

.4

2.2

2.9

-51.

4 -6

1.6

- 60

.9

1975

7.

6 30

.2

3.2

0 41

.0

13.8

18

.8

2.9

- 27

.2

- 22

.2

-38.

1 19

76

2.8

32.5

2.

3 0

37.6

30

.6

41.7

55

.5

-7.0

+4

.1

+ 17

.9

1977

39

.0

43.3

82

.3

30.6

41

.7

55.5

-5

1.7

- 40

.6

-26.

8 19

78

39.0

0

39.0

30

.6

41.7

55

.5

-8.4

+2

.7

+ 16

.5

1979

56

.0

0 56

.0

46.0

64

.7

85.3

-

10.0

+8

.7

+ 29

.3

1980

59

.4

24.7

84

.1

46.0

64

.7

85.3

-3

8.1

- 19

.4

+ 1.

2 19

81

59.4

0

59.4

46

.0

64.7

85

.3

- 13

.4

+53

+ 25

.9

1982

59

.4

76.5

13

5.9

46.0

64

.7

85.3

-

89.9

-7

1.2

- 50

.6

1983

-86

59.4

0

59.4

46

.0

64.7

85

.3

-13.

4 +5

.3

+ 25

.9

1987

59

.4

64.4

12

3.8

46.0

64

.7

85.3

-

77.8

-5

9.1

+ 38

.5

1988

59

.4

24.7

84

.1

46.0

64

.7

85.3

-3

8.1

- 19

.4

+1.2

19

89-9

1

59.4

0

59.4

46

.0

64.7

85

.3

- 13

.4

+5.3

+

25.9

19

92

59.4

76

.5

135.

9 46

.0

64.7

85

.3

- 89

.9

-71.

2 -

50.6

19

93-9

5 59

.4

0 59

.4

46.0

64

.7

85.3

-

13.4

+5

.3

+ 25

.9

1996

59

.4

24.7

84

.1

46.0

64

.7

85.3

-3

8.1

- 19

.4

+1.2

19

97

59.4

43

.3

102.

7 46

.0

64.7

85

.3

- 56

.7

+5.3

+

25.9

19

98

59.4

0

59.4

46

.0

64.7

85

.3

- 13

.4

+5.3

+

25.9

19

99

59.4

0

59.4

46

.0

64.7

85

.3

- 13

.4

+5.3

+

25.9

TABL

E 2

Cost

an

d Be

nefit

Fl

ows

for

Inte

rnal

Rate

of

Ret

urn

Calcu

latio

ns

(In

thou

sand

s of

Jor

dania

n Di

nars

(J

D)“)

(196

9-79

ac

tual

; 19

80-9

9 ca

lculat

ed)

NPVa

t 5%

III

- 84

.2

-28.

7 -5

0.3

-81.

0 -

75.6

-4

7.7

-28.

4 f

12.7

-1

8.1

+ 10

.6

+ 18

.0

+0.7

+

14.4

-2

6.8

-l-48

.1

+ 16

.0

$0.5

+2

8.0

- 16

.5

+ 22

.9

f0.3

-4

.4

+6.3

i-

6.0

Tota

l NP

V 19

69-1

999

= -

276

600

JD.

a 1 J

D =

Ster

ling

El.8

52

(midd

le ra

te,

30 S

ept.,

19

76).

b To

tal

bene

fits

are

equiv

alent

to

Gro

ss

Value

of

Pro

ducti

on.

Gros

s Va

lue

of P

rodu

ction

(I,

II,

III)

= 3

diffe

rent

yie

ld-lev

els

as a

chiev

ed

at

I W

adi

Arja,

II

Qatra

na,

III

Top

yield

s at

El

Jafr.

10 Eberhard H. H. Pfihl

be lower, and about 10 % to 20 % customs duties could be subtracted from the replacement costs for equipment and farm machinery.

The total costs of the project are divided into investment costs for productive installations and equipment (all made between 1969 and 1976), operation and maintenance costs, training costs, and replacement costs for equipment and farm machinery. It can be assumed that the inflationary effects on costs and benefits will be at a similar level, Because of this underlying CBA principle, and accepting the true situation in Jordan, all costs and benefits have been calculated on the basis of actual market prices in Jordan, summer 1976. This is to follow Gittinger (ref. 3, p. 37) who advises the analyst:

‘To assume that all prices on both the cost side and the benefit side will rise uniformly by the same proportion and that therefore they will not change their relative value. Then your analytical procedure can be simply to value all future prices at today’s levels, knowing full well that future money prices will rise.’

It has to be remembered that the investment costs do not include the costs of water exploration, drilling and geophysical well logging, because they have no direct productive effects. They are much more important for the national and regional water masterplan. In addition to this, it must also be noted that the expenses for German experts and consultant personnel have not been included in the total cost calculation. One can argue that the costs of expensive foreign advisers should be seen more in the light of an educational process for the junior staff and of the higher aim for mutual co-operation between governments and nations. Therefore, these personnel costs should not be allocated to a single project.

All operation and maintenance costs up to 1979 are the actual annual costs that emerged in each particular year. The first distinction is between the construction phase (1969 to 1973) with virtually no agricultural production output, and the pre-testing and first operation phase. During the pre-testing and first operation phase, which lasted from 1974 to 1978, a research and experimental station of 60 dunurns? was established and produced valuable information (see ‘Pilot Farm’ on Fig. 1). Besides that, the whole project area also came under irrigation and was managed as a large-scale government farm under the responsibility of the Ministry of Agriculture. Finally, in March 1979, the distribution of 1060 dunums of a 1 dunum = 0.1 ha or 0.24 acre.

TABL

E 3

Proj

ect

Cash

Fl

ow

for

Inte

rnal

Rate

of

Ret

urn

Calcu

lation

(J

orda

nian

Dina

rs)

Actu

al

Cost

s In

curre

d an

d Be

nefit

s,

1969

to

1979

Item

s 19

69

1970

19

71

1972

19

73

1974

19

75

1976

19

77

1978

19

79

Capi

tal

inve

stm

ent

costs

Tr

aini

ng

Oper

atio

n an

d m

aint

enan

ce

costs

Re

plac

emen

t co

sts

1214

3 23

094

625

500

1150

0 65

00

Tota

l co

sts

8426

8 30

094

Bene

fits

Gros

s Va

lue

of

Prod

uctio

n I

Gros

s Va

lue

of

Prod

uctio

n II

Gros

s Va

lue

of

Prod

uctio

n III

Cash

-flow

I

-842

68

-300

94

Cash

-flow

II

-842

68

-300

94

Cash

-Row

III

-8

4268

-3

0094

Aggr

egat

ed

cash

-flow

I

-842

68

-114

362

Aggr

egat

ed

cash

-flow

II

-842

68

-114

362

Aggr

egat

ed

cash

-flow

III

-8

4268

-1

1436

2

4645

5 69

482

6534

7 32

925

315

750

1000

21

25

8625

23

500

2550

0 28

800

5545

5 93

732

9184

7 63

850

1283

-554

55

-924

49

-554

55

-937

32

-554

55

-931

32

-169

817

-262

266

-169

817

- 26

3 54

9 -1

6981

7 -2

6354

9

1546

12

421

2 17

0 21

70

2943

-903

01

-514

29

-896

17

-616

80

-918

47

-609

07

-352

567

-403

996

-353

226

-414

906

-355

396

-416

303

7553

27

85

3250

22

50

3020

0 32

544

3896

9 38

969

5601

9 43

323

4100

3 37

579

8229

2 38

969

5601

9

1378

4 30

556

3055

6 30

556

4603

2

1882

0 41

714

4171

4 41

714

6473

6

2943

55

516

5551

6 55

516

8534

4

-272

19

-702

3 -5

1736

-8

413

-998

7 -2

2 18

3 41

35

-405

78

274s

87

17

- 38

060

17

937

-261

16

1654

7 29

325

-431

215

-438

238

-489

974

-489

387

-508

374

-437

089

-432

954

-473

532

-470

787

-462

070

-454

363

-436

426

-463

202

-446

655

-417

330


TABLE 4 Project Cash Flow for Internal Rate of Return Calculation (Jordanian Dinars): Future

Costs and Benefits, 1980 to 1999

k?ms 1980 1981 1982 1983-86 1987

Capital investment costs Training Operation and maintenancecosts Replacement costs

Total costs

59 429 59429 24701 - 84 130 59429

59 429 76481

135910

59429

59429

59 429 64 392

123821

Benefits Gross Value of Production I 46032 46032 46032 46032 46032 Gross Value of Production II 64136 64 736 64736 64736 64 736 Gross Value of Production III 85 344 85 344 85 344 85344 85 344

Cash-flow I Cash-flow II Cash-flow III

-38098 -13397 - 89 878 -13397 -19394 5 307 -71174 5 307

1214 25915 - 50 566 25915

- 77 789 -59085 - 38 471

Aggregated cash-flow I Aggregated cash-flow II Aggregated cash-flow III

-546412 - 559 869 -481464 -476 157 -416 116 -390201

- 649 747 - 547 331 -440 767

- 703 335 - 526 103 -337 107

-781 124 -585 188 - 375 584

irrigated land to Bedouin settlers took place, with the distribution of 32 individual holdings for Bedouin farmers. The central project management was, at the same time, removed from the Ministry of Agriculture to the Jordan Co-operative Organisation (JCO). From 1980 onwards, the costs are calculated according to the project objectives and the experiences gained in the different sections. The last item is concerned with the replacement costs for equipment and farm machinery. The years in which these costs appear over the life-span of the project are shown in Table 2. Only buildings, the water reservoirs and fuel tanks are considered to have a life of more than 30 years.

The total benefits in the project accrue from the agricultural production. Alfalfa, barley and wheat, as well as winter and summer vegetables (onions and tomatoes) are the major crops in the cropping pattern which are considered in the benefit calculations. The calculations of the ‘Gross Value of Production’ have been based on three different yield-levels and a crop ratio which varies according to the type of project organisation.

To complete the explanation, it should be noted that the ‘Gross Value of Production’ is identical to the production capacity of the project under given natural conditions. At the same time, it indicates the level of contribution of the project towards the GNP of the whole national economy.


TABLE kcontd.

1988 1989-91 I992 1993-95 1996 1997 1998 1999

59429 59429 59429 59429 59429 59429 59429 59429 24701 - 76481 24701 43323 - 84 130 59429 135910 59429 84130 102752 59429 59429

46032 46032 46032 46032 46032 46032 46032 46032 64736 64736 64736 64736 64736 64736 64736 64736 85344 85344 85344 85344 85344 85344 85344 85344

-38098 -13397 -89878 -13397 -38098 -56720 -13397 -13397 -19394 5307 -71174 5307 - 19 394 -38016 5307 5307

1214 25915 -50566 25915 1214 - 17408 2591.5 25915

-819222 -859413 -949291 -989482 - 1027 580 - 1084 300 - 1097 697 -1111094 -604 582 - 588 661 -659 835 -643914 - 663 308 -701324 -696017 -690710 - 374 370 -296 625 -347 191 - 269 446 - 268 232 - 285 640 - 259 725 -233 810

The economic judgement of the project and the analysis of the lines of the cash-flow lead to remarkable results (see Tables 3 and 4). First, the line of cash-flow given yield-level I clearly shows negative profits throughout the life-span of the project. On the other hand, at yield-level II the project produces marginal profits in 16 out of 30 years, while the profits are of medium value at yield-level III in 16 out of 30 years. It is evident, therefore, that the Wadi Arja Bedouin settlement scheme remains a project which will be in need of a permanent subsidy because the aggregated cash-flow, even with the highest yield-levels, shows no consistently positive picture. Consequently, we have an accumulated negative Net Present Value (NPV) of JD 276600, and the payment of interest on the invested capital cannot occur.

POLITICAL, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC SIGNIFICANCE OF THE PROJECT

It is significant that over the past 5 years or so even economists and planners have felt uncomfortable using the sophisticated methods of CBA for evaluating the social and distributional effects of investments. But why do they persist with an instrument which has obvious methodological as


well as operational shortcomings? Are economists and the planners of development programmes possibly afraid of losing their influence in the decision-making process?

In this author’s opinion, CBA is not a useful instrument for making a comprehensive judgement of all the important developmental effects of a project. Indeed, development is not solely a matter of economic growth, nor is it even economic growth with equitable distribution. Economics as a discipline, despite the existence of studies in welfare economics, is incapable of adequately understanding the problems of human welfare and well-being, and because of this, it is unable to grasp the full meaning of development.

In this section, therefore, the objective is to investigate the political, social and economic results of the Wadi Arja Bedouin settlement project which have not been incorporated into the CBA. These developmental effects will be judged by means of a ‘Project Impact Matrix’.

First, the aim of any Project Impact Matrix is to determine development benefits in a standardised form. Furthermore, the Project Impact Matrix aims to present all individual non-quantifiable project results in an open manner, comparing envisaged project aims with the actual degree of target achievement. This can be done by applying a points rationing scheme. Secondly, the weighting of all sections to be analysed (as there are political, social and economic effects), as well as the ranking and relative weighting of the criteria between each other within a section has to be decided. This weighting of criteria can be in no way objective. It will be always a matter of subjective judgement which rests with the evaluator responsible for it, and it will be open to contention. Because of this, a different argument for or against a certain weighting will consequently lead to a different degree of target achievement. But, this is no real problem in itself since each step in the decision-making process can be examined and if necessary revised.

What are the important preconditions for the practical use of such a multi-dimensional system? The usefulness and the value of a Project Impact Matrix depends entirely on the completeness and quality of the project aim which is formulated. This central project aim, in turn, has to be broken down into sub-targets. Having done this, a catalogue of objectives or criteria has to be drawn up which have to be organised in a hierarchical order and weighted according to their importance for the fulfilment of the final project aim. Obviously, it is most important to examine these criteria several times for their consistency and their independent nature. Any overlapping of criteria has to be removed,


otherwise irregularities will occur. In other words, it is essential to guarantee the independent nature of each of the different criteria in the Project Impact Matrix. 5

These main features and methodology of the Project Impact Matrix were first applied in the assessment of the Wadi Arja Bedouin settlement scheme by the German Consultant INSTRUPA,6 in 1976. At that time, the whole project was organised and managed as a government state farm, and future Bedouin settlers were being employed as farm labourers. The second assessment of the project was undertaken by the author in the summer of 1980.

Looking now at the Project Impact Matrix, Table 5, the first distinction being drawn is between political, social and economic effects of the project, which are considered to represent 20 %, 45 % and 3.5 % respectively of the whole result. This distribution was used by the consultant in 1976, and it represents quite accurately the developmental interests of the Bedouin farmers. For the purpose of a more detailed allocation of points to the individual criteria, the weighting factors have been multiplied by ten. The changes between 1976 and 1980 in the points allocated is partly the result of a further positive development effect of the project and also of the consequence of the project being altered from a state farm to individual Bedouin settlement holdings which took place in 1979. Other positive effects arose as a result of schooling facilities becoming available (see criterion B(1) of the matrix) and the participation of settlers in the central management of the irrigation scheme (see criterion A(8) of the matrix). A relatively low degree of target achievement, at only 61 %, can be seen under ‘Economic effects’. This seems to support the contention that high economic objectives can only be achieved in the long-run. In other words, the whole complex of knowledge transfer and the use of a relatively high technology involved in irrigated agriculture, combined with the necessary change of roles and attitudes, demands a time-consuming educational process.

This indicates a wide range and a vital need for active extension work, which has to be intensified for the benefit of the newly settled Bedouin farmers. Despite the problems involved in organising intensive extension work in such a remote project, it should be kept in mind that this group of the community cannot any longer be kept in the ‘waiting room of poverty’; as von Blanckenburg warns (ref. 7, p. 36):

‘rural people tend to no longer accept negligence in development assistance compared with the urban-industrial sector’.


TABLE 5 Political, Social and Economic Effects of the Wadi Arja Project as Compared with

Targeted Results: a Project Impact Matrix

Complete target achievement Degree of target achiewment (maximum number of

points to be allocated) Index points/ multiplied Results-a post Results-ex post

weighting by 10 evaluation 1976 awluation 1980 jhctor

A. Political effects (1) Promotion of rural areas in order

to reduce regional differences (5year plan)

(2) Integration of Bedouin into nation (3) Promotion of Bedouin’s national

awareness and loyalty to Government (4) Improvement of administrative

recording of Bedouin (5) Standardisation of legal practice (6) Reduction of traditional tribal disputes (7) Utilisation of local resources/

settlement of unused desert area (8) Democratisation of decision process

Sub-total A

B. Social effects (1) Improvement of Bedouin’s level

of education (2) Improvement of Bedouin’s health status (3) Improvement of nutrition by

diversification of foods (4) Improvement of Bedouin’s living

conditions (5) Creation of jobs for Bedouin (6) Improvement of income distribution (7) Increase in material security (8) Curtailment of rural exodus (9) Stimulation of community initiatives

(10) Enlargement of individual freedom (11) Increase of personal initiative (12) Increase of willingness to work (13) Reflection on non-settling Bedouin

Sub-total B

C. Economic effects (1) Contribution to total increase in

economic growth (5year plan) (2) Increase in food self-sufficiency as

contribution to reduction in balance of trade deficit (5-year plan)

(3) Easing of burden on government budget (4) Increase in tax revenue

5

4 3

2

2 1 2

1

20

5

5 5

5

4 4 3 3 3 2 2 2 2

45

5

4

4 3

50

40 30

20

20 IO 20

10

200

50

50 50

50

40 40 30 30 30 20 20 20 20

450

50

40

40 30

50 50

24 30 18 15

16 20

16 10 8 5

12 15

0

144 (72%)

5

150 (75%)

0 20

37 31 25

32 45

20 40 32 40 27 30 27 30 10 6 20 10

8 12 10 15 18 18

241 (54%) 328 (73 ‘;/) 0

30

25

30 15

Bedouin settlement policy in Jordan

TABLE 5-contd.

17

Complete target achiewment Degree oj target achievement (maximum number of

points to be allocated) Index points/ multiplied Results-ex post Results-ex post

weighting by IO evaluation 1976 ewluation 1980 factor

(5) Creation of additional income (6) increase in capital formation and

readiness to invest (7) Development of regional market (8) Increase in specialist agricultural

knowledge (9) Increase in management capacities

(10) Growth in transferable experience

Sub-total C

Sub-total A Sub-total B Sub-totaJ C

Total number of points/final points value

3 3

3 30 6 23 4 40 20 26

3 30 25 15 2 20 20 12

35 350 161 (46%) 213 (61%)

20 200 144 150 45 450 241 328 35 350 161 213

100 1000 546 (55 %) 69 I (69 %)

30 30

15 5

22 15

Source: INSTRUPA, October, 1976,6 with modifications, and personal research by the author.

INTERPRETATION OF FINDINGS

Pastoral nomadism in Jordan today has lost its former importance. Technology and other influences have made the nomads an anachronism, and they have become prominently involved in the process of sedentarisation. As a result of this sedentarisation process, there are nowadays few nomadic tribes in Jordan who follow their traditional patterns of life.

In the two preceding sections we concentrated mainly on the profit- ability of the Bedouin settlement project at Wadi Arja within and on behalf of the national economy. This was in the context of the social and economic expectations inherent in the settlement policy of the Jordanian government. Despite the fact that the Wadi Arja project produces in the wider view of the national economy a considerable negative ‘Net Present Value’, the analysis has indicated that the project is, at least at the farm level, attractive enough economically to encourage the Bedouin to participate in the settlement scheme.

It should be noted, however, that there are obvious limitations to introducing a more intensive cropping regime or ratio. Nevertheless, settlers are always advised to increase the vegetable ratio in their

18 Eberhard H. H. Pjkhl

individual cropping pattern according to the availability of manpower. Another limiting factor is the availability of irrigation water. Apart from this, it will be difficult to obtain a higher level of efficiency, which is about 65 %, due to the relatively shallow soil in the project area.

Given these limitations and constraints it is impossible to change the cropping pattern in favour of a high proportion of alfalfa because of its high water requirement. It becomes clear, therefore, that the cropping pattern used for the CBA and gross margin calculation (alfalfa = 40 %, wheat = 40 ‘A, vegetables = 20 ‘A) are quite realistic; but, limited oppor- tunities still remain for improvement towards a higher cropping intensity which could lead to a higher farm income.

These facts and limitations are of considerable importance in relation to the following farm income calculations. The moderate yield-level II, which has been achieved in Wadi Arja since 1980/81, already produces a gross output which is sufficient to cover the running costs of production and which guarantees a small annual family income of JD 315. This confirms that the project is, from an economic point of view at the farm level, an attractive enterprise.

Gross Value of Production II = JD 61268 Operation and maintenance costs = JD 51 186 ___-

JD 10082: 32 settlers JD 315: for each holding

The profit margin of the settlers will be considerably higher after having achieved yield-level III. This situation, which will probably be achieved in 1984/85, will guarantee the secure development of the co- operative organisation and a good annual family income of JD 925.

Gross Value of Production III = JD 80 772 Operation and maintenance costs = JD 51 186

JD 29 586: 32 settlers JD 925: for each holding

These farm income calculations, moreover, do not take account of the fact that the Bedouin settlers in Wadi Arja, as well as in most of the other irrigation projects in Jordan, pay no water rates or at least not the full water rates normally charged. It can be assumed that this ‘water gift’, which can be estimated as 50 ‘A of the water rates normally charged, produces an additional farm profit/family income of JD 121 per annum.


Proceeding from the present situation with a modest individual farm income of around JD 13 per dunum per annum, and in the light of the negative NPV, it can be concluded that a substantial proportion of the initial investment costs and the replacement costs for long-lasting investments will have to be financed from the public budget. Realistically, the co-operative organisation, as the central management and service institution of the settlement scheme, cannot bear the responsibility for all the financial expenditures. Is this, therefore, the price which the government will have to pay for accomplishing its Bedouin settlement policy? The answer is an unqualified yes, if these types of projects are being centrally planned and and implemented. However, there is a known ‘low-cost’ alternative, which will be proposed in the next section. It should be the aim of policy makers to use the most appropriate and cost-effective measures for accomplishing development strategies.

EVALUATION OF RESULTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A NEW BEDOUIN SETTLEMENT POLICY

Arising from the application of cost-benefit analysis and the Project Impact Matrix techniques in the ex post evaluation of the Wadi Arja settlement project, it has to be admitted that such project assessment methods are less than fully satisfactory. Further research into method- ologies and their operational usefulness is necessary in this field. Despite the use in this paper of the two different techniques for assessing the economic, political and social effects of an investment, their relative merits and the conclusions to be drawn from them remain matters of debate. Almost all who attempt ex post evaluations of agricultural projects sooner or later arrive at the point where they admit they have insufficient data or resources to enable them to produce work which satisfies the goals they set themselves. In this analysis of the Wadi Arja project it is thus difficult to draw firm conclusions, and recommendations can only be of a tentative nature.

Without, therefore, laying claim to the completeness or general applicability of the arguments and information used so far, some of the key problems involved in the sedentarisation process of Bedouin in Jordan may be highlighted. Sufficient evidence has been given for the high interest of the Bedouin in leading a settled life. But it has also been pointed out that the Bedouin’s attitudes towards sedentarisation are connected


with high expectations. These expectations include, particularly, substantial assistance from the national government to implement and develop their agricultural holdings. However, the process of sedentarisation needs to take into account the cultural identity and the desires of the Bedouin ifwe wish to avoid its failure. This requires, in turn, an essentially participatory approach, which was lacking in the first stage of the Wadi Arja project. Despite these major shortcomings, it is surprising to see the results presented by the Project Impact Matrix with regard to the political and social effects of the settlement scheme which appeared especially after the distribution of the land to the individual Bedouin farmers.

If the methodology of the Project Impact Matrix is accepted, it can be concluded that with this type of project it is quite possible to attain a high degree of target achievement. This, of course, refers in the first instance to the political and social effects of investment in a project.

To sum up the results from Wadi Arja as a study, it can be concluded that this type of Bedouin settlement project is in no sense feasible or viable in economic terms. A tremendous amount of money from the public budget, together with foreign loans or grants, has to be invested, and even the projected long-term economic results remain bleak.

In other words, such ground water development and Bedouin settlement projects using a relatively high technological standard show neither a financial nor an economic internal rate of return for the invested capital. In addition, a good deal of similarity exists between the negative results derived by a cost-benefit analysis and the less promising result of the economic effects as represented in the Project Impact Matrix. The achievement of an acceptable economic result through a Bedouin settlement project seems to be more difficult to attain than a high degree of target achievement in the political and social sectors.

If we take into consideration the full range of consequences which the Jordanian Government would be facing in the long-run, not only from the economic point of view but also from the difficult viewpoint of actually managing these projects, it is easy to have sympathy with the Jordanian Government’s decision not to create any further new Bedouin settlement projects.

Although the conclusion could be drawn from the financial analysis in favour of abolishing all public expenditure on Bedouin settlement schemes, attention has to be paid, however, to the whole development process of the Bedouin. This development process is not simply a matter of growth and productivity, but it is broader, encompassing social change


which takes place in all spheres of human life. At least, equal importance must be given to the cultural identity of the Bedouin, and this must be a consideration which is built into each process of development.

Gathering up all the threads of the arguments which have been advanced, the author is not advocating a ‘funeral’ for the Bedouin. On the contrary, an appropriate approach is required towards their social and economic development. This target, however, can only be achieved if future development strategies for the Bedouin are not planned in isolation, but rather in co-operation with them. Furthermore, the evaluation presented in this analysis seems to show that projects, though spectacular at times in an agricultural sense as well as in their technical design and equipment, are unsuitable for the purposes of Bedouin settlement. Here again the statement ‘small is beautiful’ has a special value for Bedouin development.

The Jordanian Government is advised to turn its attention in the future to small Bedouin settlement schemes, which could be created, in the first instance, by the Bedouin themselves. It is right that settlement activities in the southern region of the Kingdom which are generated among the Bedouin-like the Husseiniya Settlement Scheme-should be sponsored and co-financed by the government. The first step for any settlement idea should always come from the Bedouin, otherwise it begins a whole artificial process, which will neither satisfy the settlers nor the politicians in the government.

One final note might be added. Despite all the methodological and operational problems involved in any comprehensive ex post evaluation of agricultural projects, the author recommends that economists and planners should apply sophisticated cost-benefit analysis techniques more critically in assessing the non-quantifiable social and distributional effects of project investment. Project evaluation should not be an end in itself or a purely academic exercise. Rather, it should serve all parties involved in the developing process and offer clear indications to the decision makers in developing countries.

REFERENCES

I. Chambers, Robert, Rural poverty-oriented monitoring & evaluation, simple is optimal? University of Sussex, Institute of Development Studies, October, 1978.


2. Cole, Donald P., Pastoral nomads in a rapidly changing economy: The case of Saudi Arabia, Pastoral Network Paper of ODI, No. 7e, 1979, pp. l-22.

3. Gittinger, Price J., Economic analysis of agricultural projects, A World Bank Publication, The Johns Hopkins University Press, London-Baltimore, 1972.

4. Marnham, P., Nomads of the Sahel, Minority Rights Group Report No. 33, 1979.

5. Neubauer, Herbert, Die Nutzwertanalyse als Methode zur operationalen Liisung von komplexen Entscheidungensproblemen in Entwicklungslandern. (The utility value analysis as operative methodology to solve complex decision problems in developing countries.) GS Institut fur Projektplanung (unpublished report), Stuttgart, 1981.

6. The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Vergleichende Studie iiber Projekte der Grundwassererschlie&ng zur Landbewasserung und Beduineansiedlung in Jordanien: Unter besonderer Beriicksichtigung von Wadi Arja. (Comparative study on projects of exploitation and use of groundwater resources for Bedouin settlement in Jordan with special reference to the Wadi Arja Project.) INSTRUPA for GTZ, Bad Homburg, Oct., 1976.

7. von Blanckenburg, P., Basic concepts of agricultural extension in developing countries. Agricultural Administration, 10(l), 1982, 3543.

8. Wadi Arja Project, Irrigation and Bedouin Settlement Project Wadi Arja, Jordan, Project Publication of AHT-Consultant Commissioned by GTZ, Eschborn, Essen, 1974.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Awad, M., Nomadism in the Arab Lands of the Middle East, The problems of the arid zone. UNESCO-Symposium Arid Zone Research, No. 18, Paris, 1962, 325-39.

Carruthers, Ian and Clayton, Eric S., Expost evaluation of agricultural projects: its implication for planning. Journal of Agricultural Economics, XXVIII(3), 1977, 305-16.

Carruthers, Ian and Chambers, Robert, Rapid appraisal for rural development. Agricultural Administration, S(6), 1981, 407-21.

Clayton, Eric S., Wadi Dhuleil-Jordan: an ex post evaluation, University of London, Agricultural Development Unit, Wye College, for ODA, 1974.

Johnson, Douglas L., The nature of nomadism, Dept. of Geography, Research Paper No. 118, University of Chicago, Chicago, 1969.

Knigge, R., Von der Cost-Benefit Analyse zur Nutzwert Analyse. (From the cost-benefit analysis towards the utility value analysis.) Das Wirtschafts- studium, 4(3), 1975, 126.

Sa Sa, Abdulrahman, Die sozialkulturellen Probleme der Sesshaftmachung von


Kamel-Nomaden in Stid-Jordanien (El-Jafr-Region). (Socio-cultural problems involved in the sedentarisation process of camel-nomads in southern Jordan.) PhD Dissertation, Giessen University, Giessen, 1973.

Spooner, Brian, The status of nomadism as a cultural phenomenon in the Middle East. In: Perspectives on nomadism, Irons, W. and Dyson-Hudson, N. (Eds), Leiden and Brill, London, 1972.

Tapper, Richard L., The organization of nomadic communities in pastoral societies of the Middle East. In: Pastoralproduction and society, Lefebure, C. (Ed.), Cambridge University Press, 1979.

Weissleder, Wolfgang, (Ed.), The nomadic alternative, The Hague-Mouton Publishers, Paris, 1978.

Ex post evaluation of bedouin settlement projects in Jordan: A case study of wadi arja

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