Evolving the Assessment of the Effectiveness of IAEA Safeguards Implementation INMM

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IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency Evolving the Assessment of the Effectiveness of IAEA Safeguards Implementation INMM Bruce W. Moran, Head Section for Effectiveness Evaluation Department of Safeguards

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Evolving the Assessment of the Effectiveness of IAEA Safeguards Implementation INMM . Bruce W. Moran, Head Section for Effectiveness Evaluation Department of Safeguards. Starting with the State-Level Concept. A holistic approach to safeguards implementation - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Page 1: Evolving the Assessment of the Effectiveness of  IAEA Safeguards Implementation INMM

IAEAInternational Atomic Energy Agency

Evolving the Assessment of the Effectiveness of

IAEA Safeguards Implementation

INMM

Bruce W. Moran, HeadSection for Effectiveness Evaluation

Department of Safeguards

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Starting with the State-Level Concept

• A holistic approach to safeguards implementation − Applicable to all States with SG agreements− Based on a comprehensive and continual State

evaluation and a State-level approach, including a specific combination of safeguards measures for an individual State

− Executed through an annual implementation plan• Considering the State as a whole provides the opportunity

to take State-specific factors into consideration during all stages of safeguards implementation

• Implementation of the State-level concept is responsive to changes in the analysis, ensuring that safeguards conclusions remain soundly based and up-to-date

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Implementing the State-level Concept

Enhancement of the implementation of the Agency’s State-level concept requires:• An expanded use of State-specific factors and a

structured acquisition path analysis to define and prioritize State-specific technical objectives

• State-level approaches that specify and provide options for Headquarters and in-field activities required to meet the technical objectives

• Identification and selection of activities in the annual implementation plan

• Linkage of the State evaluation process with conduct of safeguards verification activities

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Implementing the State-level Concept

Evolving the safeguards system to be more:• Objectives As opposed to criteria driven; allows for

based: customized State-level approaches to meetState-specific objectives

• Information Use of all information, including State driven:factors, to determine objectives and conduct

safeguards activities• Focused: At the State level and on issues of concern;

putting resources where the risks are• Adaptable: Responsive to changes in information and

analysis for conducting safeguards

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Assuring Continued Effectiveness

• Each DIR-SGO is responsible and accountable for• the implementation of safeguards for each State assigned to the

Division and • the conclusions arising therefrom

• Each DIR-SGO must ensure that• the implementation of the activities is consistent with procedures or

guidelines established for such purpose• any changes to the activities achieve the objectives

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Assuring Continued Effectiveness

• State Evaluation Reports• Prepared by the relevant State Evaluation Group• Reviewed by a Departmental Committee

• State-Level Approaches• Prepared by the relevant State Evaluation Group• Reviewed by Departmental Sub-Committee

• Annual Implementation Plan• Prepared by the relevant State Evaluation Group• Reviewed by the relevant Operations Division Director (DIR-SGO)

• Quality Management System• Evaluate departmental processes and procedures and their

implementation• Oversee the corrective action programme

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Assuring Continued Effectiveness

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State Evaluation

State-Level Safeguards Approach

Safeguards Processes andSafeguards Approaches

Annual Implementation Plan and Safeguards Implementation

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SEE Responsibilities

are cross-cutting

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State Evaluation

State-Level Safeguards Approach

Safeguards Processes and Safeguards Approaches )

Annual Implementation Plan and Safeguards Implementation

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Section for Effectiveness Evaluation (SEE)

• SEE will operate as the central quality control tool of the Department for implementation and evaluation issues

• SEE will perform the quality control activities on statements, surveillance, and seals, among others

• SEE will perform an independent and in-depth assessment for each State of • safeguards verification activities• goal or objective attainment• safeguards conclusions and recommendations

• SEE will lead assessments of selected State evaluation reports to ensure that the conclusions drawn are sound

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SEE Responsibilities

• SEE will • Conduct selective evaluations of the effectiveness of the State

evaluation process• Conduct selective evaluations of specific safeguards verification

activities across a selection of States, such as • inspections, complementary access, design information verification and

other safeguards activities, such as information analysis• Conduct selective evaluations of the effectiveness of safeguards

measures, such as• monitoring activities (e.g., seals and surveillance), measurement

activities, and information collection activities• Conduct selective evaluations of annual implementation plans• Conduct technical reviews of anomalies• Prepare the Safeguards Implementation Report and Data

Evaluation Report

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SEE Evaluation Activities

• Selection process will be random and information-driven

• Evaluations will be performed through• Document and information reviews• Quality control tests• Observations and interviews

• Periodic reports to DDG and Management Committee on findings

• SEE findings identify where process audits and corrective actions may need to be initiated

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Evolving the Safeguards Implementation Report

• Purpose of the SIR is to provide safeguards conclusions and information to enhance confidence in those conclusions• SIR should provide more analysis and explanation of the

data• SIR is to be aligned with the State-level concept for

safeguards implementation. • The report should demonstrate how the Agency is using

all relevant information to draw safeguards conclusions• SIR is to be focused on safeguards implementation

• Activities formerly presented as “safeguards strengthening” are now routine safeguards tools

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Summary

• Safeguards effectiveness evaluation is independently performed by Departmental entities for all aspects of safeguards implementation

• SEE quality control activities will assure that• Verification activities were correctly performed• Data was correctly generated and analysed• All information was considered in the State evaluation

• Assurance is provided to States that safeguards activities met their objectives and support the safeguards conclusions