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CHAPTER – III

EVOLUTION OF PANCHAYATI RAJ INSTITUTIONS

IN INDIA AND KARNATAKA

There is sufficient evidence to establish the fact that the institution of

local self-government is almost pre-historic, and the conception of local self-

government is indigenous to the Indian soil. Municipal governments have

flourished in India since times immemorial. While empires rose and fell, village

panchayats which formed an integral part of the national life, helped to

preserve democratic traditions in social, cultural, economic and political life,

survived the onslaughts of centuries of political upheavals and saved Indian

society from disintegration. The existence of local bodies in ancient India is a

positive proof of the inherent genius of our people to manage local affairs

efficiently and on a decentralized basis. Likewise, devolution of authority to

local government institutions shows considerable variation across states in

India. This is inspite of the 73rd Amendment to the Constitution of India, which

mandates a more of less uniform structure of Panchayat Raj Institutions

throughout the country. The persistence of variation in regard to the

performance of PRIs needs to be explained with reference to factors, which

appear to be specific to the context of a State. A historical narrative tracing the

evolution of devolution in a state throws light on that set of factors which has

impacted, positively or otherwise, on the growth and performance of local

government institutions. The present chapter attempts to discuss the origin,

development and growth of local self-government in India in general and

Karanataka State in particular.

57

Significance of Local Self Government:

The emergence of local government as a distinct governmental unit is a

result of the interplay of several factors-historical, ideological and

administrative. Historically, local government had obviously preceded national

government. Man first evolved his neighbourhood government-before he could

ever visualize, or even succumb to, a more remote authority like the national

government. Even after the rise and growth of the national government. Even

after the rise and growth of the national government, local governments

continued to exist as units of national government. For, the national

government took over only such function as appeared to be of general nature

leaving functions of local interest and application to be performed, as hither

fore, by the local government. Lor Bryce writes; “in the process of time nations

were formed by the expansion of these small communities, or by their fusion, or

by their absorption into larger units. The other functions of the assembly were

either assumed by the whole nation (as was defense) or transferred to special

authorities. In the ancient Greek and Italian republics regular courts were set

up. In most parts of Europe judicial functions passed to the feudal land-owners,

and ultimately, first in England and later in Scotland, to the kind. Thus, popular

self-government came to lose what may be called its political (including its

military) and its judicial functions. But it usually retained the right of managing

whatever land belonged to the community; and in some countries functions

connected with the parish church, while afterwards other matters of local

welfare came under its care”.1

Local government is also necessary precisely because some public

requirements, at least, are local in their intensity, character and scope. In other

58

words, they are not common to all the areas or the degree of their intensity

shows marked variations from region to region. Such local problems can be

overcome by evolving local solution only. Local government prevents

establishment of administrative uniformity, which is the aim of the state

bureaucracy. And lastly, local government provides an extensive range of

services to the people and performs functions of great variety and magnitude.

Mere pragmatic reasons speak well for the continuance and even

strengthening of local government, it is impossible for the state government to

take over all of these functions. There are so many mundane matters of living

together, which can be performed only by a local government. Even otherwise,

the state government should not dissipate its energy by engaging in the

performance of such routine affairs rather, it should concern itself with matters

of wider import. Local government, thus, relieves the state government of a

sizeable volume of routine work, which is its responsibility to carry out.

Further, in tackling problems, knowledge of local conditions and

environment is necessary. What jobs should be taken up, timing of execution

of the jobs and how to execute them require intimate and close understanding

of local conditions. In fact, the basic concept of local government springs from

these requirements. The local government is a well settled instrument of

political education. It mostly concerns with the tangibles-parks, water supply,

sewage disposal etc., the effect of decision-making in the local council can thus

be more easily perceived by everyone in the community. As such functions are

performed within a restricted locality, each person sees for himself how the

local tasks are being performed by the local council. He develops the habit of

judging the elected representative by his performance rather than by the

59

promises he makes. Since everything is apparently occurring before the eyes

of the people a keen debate and discussion on affairs of local import ensues,

which chastens and educates them and, exercises a wholesome influence over

the local council. Thus, local government keeps alive political life. It facilitates

active participation of local people in the administration in the affairs of the

community and, thus, enlists their co-operation and support. Being closest to

the people, local government is also most easily accessible to them, and

people can generally expect to exert influence to a greater on it than on the

remote state or central government. Decentralized areas of administration pave

the way towards a better understanding between citizens and the officials.

Further, local government serves as an admirable training ground for the

politicians to function at the state and central levels. It provides an outlet for

competent and public-spirited persons of the locality to render social service to

the community. From such a band of experienced and tested persons, emerge

leaders who can take up responsibilities for state and national levels. Local

government, thus, ensures a regular flow of talent to higher levels. Lord Bryce

has correctly pointed out: “It is enough to observe that the countries in which

democratic government has most attracted the interest of the people and drawn

from their ranks have been Switzerland and the United States, especially those

northern and western states in which rural local government has been most

developed. These examples justify the maxim that the best school of

democracy and the best guarantee for its success is the practice of local self

government”.2 It may also be pointed out that every community has a share of

individuals who have an urge to serve the neighboring community but are, for

various reasons, wary of moving away from the locality. Such persons must be

60

encouraged to specialize in the local problems and to emerge as the civic

leaders.3

Finally, local government contributes to the resilience, strength and

richness of democracy by promoting diversification of political experience, and

by setting itself up as yet another centre of creative activity through democratic

action. In countries where the organs of local government are under the thumb

of the central authority, although the efficiency of administration may be great,

the political character of the people will make up the government of the country,

is a British creation.4 The ancient village communities were constituted on a

narrow basis of hereditary privilege or caste, closely restricted in the scope of

their duties-collection of revenue and protection of life and property were their

main functions- and were neither conscious instruments of political education

nor important parts of the administrative system”.5 A beginning of local

government may be said to have been made in 1687 when, for the first time, a

local governing body a municipal corporation-was set up for the city of Madras.

Local government is thus slightly less than three centuries old in India. Its

history since 1687 is rather chequered and even exotic. Broadly it may be

divided into the following five periods, each period characterized by a definite

aim and purpose.

1. 1687-1881 Local government was viewed and utilized to ease central

and provincial finances, and, thus, to subserve imperial needs.

2. 1882-1919 Local government began to be viewed as self-government.

3. 1920-1937 Local government came within the jurisdiction of provinces

and, further, was transferred to popular control.

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4. 1938-1949 Local government was in a state of repair and reconstruction.

Evolution of Decentralisation in India:

The municipal administration was extended to the district towns in

Bengal in 1842 when the Bengal Act was passed, which enabled the setting up

of a town committee for sanitary purposes upon applications made by two-

thirds of householders in a town. This act, however, proved to be an abortive

attempt. As the taxation was to be direct, it encountered resistance

everywhere. As the setting up of a municipality was an entirely voluntary affair,

no town came forward to ask for it. “The Act (of 1842) was far in advance of the

times. Based upon the voluntary principle, it could take effect in no place

except on the application of two-thirds of the house-holders, and the taxation

enforceable under it was of a direct character, the law nowhere met with

popular acceptance. It was only introduced into one town, and there the

inhabitants, when called on to pay the tax, not only refused, but prosecuted the

collector for trespass when he attempted to levy it”.6 In 1850, an Act was

passed for the entire country and it, unlike the earlier status, provided for

indirect taxation to which people had been accustomed since times

immemorial.

A fresh impetus to the growth of local government came in 1863 when

the Royal Army Sanitary Commission expressed its concern, among others,

over the filthy conditions of towns in India. As a result a series of Acts were

passed, which extended municipal administration to the various parts of the

country. Voluntarism which was hitherto the basic principle in setting up local

government in India was now abandoned when the provincial governments

62

were empowered to constitute municipal committees charged with the

responsibility for sanitation, lighting and water supply.

The main features of this period are indicated below:

1. Local government in India was introduced primarily to serve the British

interest rather than promote self-governing bodies in the country. The

Taxation Enquiry Commission (1953-54) correctly points out: “It was the

need for the association of Indians with administration (in order, for one

thing, that taxes could be more readily imposed and collected) that

prompted the early British Indian administration to embark on the

introduction of local self-governing institutions in this country. The

resolution of Lord Mayo (1870) on financial decentralization also

visualized the development of local self-government institutions; but this

was subordinate to the need for tapping local sources of revenue and of

affecting economy by decentralized administration”.7

2. Local government institutions were dominated by the British and, thus,

most of the Indian population remained deprived of participation in their

functioning.

3. The dominant motive behind the institution of local government in India

was to give relief to the imperial finances.

4. Election as the basis of membership of local bodies was not introduced

except in the (old) Central Provinces. It may be pointed out that in 1881

four out of every five municipalities were wholly nominate bodies.

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Period - I (1881-1919):

Hitherto, local government had remained almost wholly non-Indian and,

therefore, from the Indians point of view, was to a great extend neither „local‟

nor „self-government‟. Meanwhile, political consciousness was gradually

spreading among Indians, giving rise to new aspirations. Largely due to his

innate liberalism and partly to satisfy public opinion, Lord Ripon, who

succeeded Lord Mayo as the Governor-General of India, resolved in 1882 to

make local government self-governing. He is rightly credited with the

articulation of a new philosophy of local government. To him, local government

was predominantly „an instrument of political and popular education.‟ The

resolution embodying this doctrine has been hailed as the Magna-Charta and

Lord Ripon, its author, as the father of local self-government in India. A

document of such historic importance is worth quoting:8 Lord Ripon‟s resolution

enunciated the following principles, which were henceforth to inform and guide

local government in India:

1. Local bodies should have mostly elected non-governmental, members

and chairman.

2. The state control over local bodies should be indirect rather than direct.

3. These bodies must be endowed with adequate financial resources to

carry out their functions. To this end, certain sources of local revenue

should be made available to the local bodies, which should also receive

suitable grants from the provincial budget.

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4. Local government personnel should operate under the administrative

control of the local bodies. The government personnel who are deputed

to the local government must be treated as employees of the local

government and subject to its control.

5. The resolution of 1882 should be interpreted by the provincial

governments according to the local conditions prevalent in the

provinces.

“I regard, “Surendra Nath Banerjea commented in 1882, “the concession

of local self-government as the prelude, the precursor of national (may I

venture to hope?) of imperial self government.”9 This resolution led to the

passage of new Acts in various provinces. But the bureaucracy was too strong

and well entrenched; and it succeeded admirably in frustrating Ripon‟s

intentions. The reforms proposed by Lord Ripon were significantly whittled

down by the provinces, which enjoyed the freedom to interpret the resolution

according to local conditions. Also, Lord Ripon was succeeded by viceroys who

lacked his liberalism and who were not prepared to put political education

above administrative efficiency.

Another significant stage in the history of local government was the

publication in 1909 of the report of Royal commission upon Decentralization,

set up in 1907. It made the following principal recommendations:

1. The village should be regarded as the basic unit of local self-government

institutions and every village should have a panchayat. Municipalities

should be constituted in urban areas.

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2. There should be a substantial majority of elected members in the local

bodies.

3. The municipality should elect its own president, but the district collector

should continue to be the president of the district local board.

4. Municipalities should be given the necessary authority to determine the

taxes and to prepare their budgets after keeping a minimum reserve

fund. The government should give grant for public work like water

supply, drainage schemes, etc.

5. The bigger cities should have the services of a full-time nominated

officer. Local bodies should enjoy full control over their employees‟

subject, of course, to certain safeguards for the security of service.

6. Outside control over the local bodies should be restricted to advice,

suggestion and audit.

7. The government control over the municipal powers of raising local loan

should continue and the prior sanction of the government should be

obtained for lease or sale of municipal properties.

8. The responsibility for primary education should rest with the municipality

and, if it so desires and if resources permit, it may spend some amount

of secondary schools also.

Little, however, was accomplished until 1918 when the Government of

India issued to resolution re-affirming: “The object of local self-government is to

train the people in the management of their own local affairs and the political

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education of this sort must in the main take precedence on consideration of

departmental efficiency. It follows from this that local bodies should be as

representatives as possible of the people whose affairs they are called upon to

administer, that their authority in the matter entrusted should be real and not

nominal and that they should not be subjected to unnecessary control, should

learn by making mistakes and profiting by them.” The resolution contained the

following:

1. Panchayats should be revived in the villages.

2. Local bodies should contain a large elective majority.

3. Local government should be made broad-based by suitably extending

the franchise.

4. The president of the local body should be a member of the public and

elected, rather than nominated.

5. Local bodies should be allowed freedom in the preparation of the

budget, the imposition of taxes and sanction of works.

Period - II (1920-1937):

As stated earlier, the national movement for independence started

gaining momentum-causing anxiety to both government in Britain and India.

With the outbreak of the first Great War (1914-1918) the British Government

felt it necessary to gain support and co-operation from the people in India. The

British Government ultimately came out with the historic announcement to seek

increasing association of Indians is every branch of the administration and the

gradual development of self-governing institutions with a view to the

progressive realization of responsible government in India. This announcement

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marked the end of one epoch in India and the beginning of new one. The

Government of India Act of 1919 was enforced in 1920 to lead the country

made in the provinces by introducing, a dyarchical system of government.

Certain functions, which were of developmental nature, like local self-

government, co-operation, agriculture, etc. were transferred to the control of the

popularly elected ministers who were responsible to the legislature and elected

on a wider franchise. The Government of India Act of 1919, thus, inaugurated

an era of new interest and activity in the field of local government. This period

witnessed a series of amending acts on local government in every province.

The practice of having a civil servant as the president disappeared from all

municipal bodies, and from a number, though not from all, of district or local

boards; the franchise was further democratized; the local bodies were freed

from many restrictions in respect of preparation of budget; and, finally, the

executive direction passed into the hands of the elected members of the public.

Men like Jawaharlal Nehru, Sardar Vallabhai Patel and Pursottam Das Tandon

entered the municipal councils and gained insight into the functioning of

democratic institutions. Jawaharlal Nehru who was chairman of the Allahabad

municipal board in 1924 and 1925 thus wrote about his experiences of the

working of local self government in India; “Years after year government

resolutions and officials and some newspapers criticized municipalities and

local boards and point out their many failings. And from this the moral is drawn

that democratic institutions are not suited to India. Their failings are obvious

enough but little attention is paid to the framework within which they have to

function. This framework is neither democratic nor autocratic, it is a cross

between the two, and has the disadvantages of both”.10 The local government

was thus set to move in the direction of democracy. A most penetrating

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analysis of the functioning of this first experiment in self-government in India

was made by the Indian Statutory Commission (the Simon Commission)

in 1930.

Period – III (1937-1949):

With the enforcement (only the provincial part was enforced), in 1937, of

Government of India Act 1935, the diarchic system of government at the

provincial level was replaced by provincial autonomy. The national movement

for independence was also reaching new proportions. With the growing

strength of the national movement and the achievement of provincial

autonomy, the local government in India ceased to be a mere experimental

station of Self-government; it became, indeed, the constituent the local

government for the country as a whole. Although stable base, the deficiencies

and drawbacks from which it was suffering were too vivid and serious to remain

unidentified, undiagnosed and even unverified. During this period provinces

launched investigations into local governing bodies with a view to making them

apt institutions for conducting local affairs. The Central Provinces set up an

enquiry committee in 1935, the United Provinces in 1938, and Bombay in 1939.

Although the recommendations of the municipal enquiry committees were

unevenly carried out in various provinces, there was a definite trend towards

democratization of local government by further lowerin of the franchise and

abolition of the system of nominations, and secondly by the separation of

deliberative functions from executive ones.

The independence of the country in 1947 ushered in a new period in the

history of local government in India. With the termination of alien rule there was

69

self-government at all the levels–central, provincial and local. The local

government was, thus, enabled to function for the first time under an

atmosphere of national independence. In 1948 the ministers on local self-

government in the provinces met under the chairmanship of the central Minister

for Health. Jawaharlal Nehru who inaugurated the conference expounded the

vital role of local government in free India. He remarked: “Local self-

government is and must be the basis of any true system of democracy. We

have got rather into the habit of thinking of democracy at the top and not so

much below. Democracy at the top may not be a success unless you build on

this foundation from below.”11

Period – IV : 1950 to present day:

As the present Constitution came into force in 1950, the local

government may be said to have entered a new phase in that year. The

Constitution has allotted local government to the state list of functions and

secondly, in the directive principles of state policy, affirmed: “State shall take

steps to organize village panchayats to endow them to function as units of self-

gvernment.”12 Identification of one sector of local government for the purpose of

special attention and development in the Constitution is understandable as

rural India represents three-fourths of India. In fact, significant changes have

taken place in the structure and system of rural local government since the

inauguration of the Constitution in 1950. As a result of the report of the Team

for the Study of Community Projects and National Extension Service (1957), a

three-tier system of rural local government has emerged in most state – zilla

parishad at the district level, panchayat samiti at the block level and panchayat

70

at the village level. They are endowed with sufficiently wide powers over a large

range of functions including developments.

Many state governments set up committees to enquire into the

functioning of local government institutions and to suggest remedial measures.

The central government also appointed committees to this end. The panchayati

raj was, indeed, recommended by a committee set up by the central

government. The central government is credited with setting up the largest

number of committees to examine various facets of panchayati raj.

Maharashtra, Gujarat, Rajasthan, and Mysore set up committees to

recommend suitable forms of panchayat raj to be introduced. Local government

falls within the jurisdiction of the states. As is, therefore, to be expected, there

are some notable variations in nomenclature, pattern, of local government and

its working in various states. Yet, there is an unusually high degree of

uniformity in the system of local government in the country. This is so, because,

historically, local government in India is a product of an exceptionally

centralized administrative system. Under the present constitution it has been

shaped by centralized planning.

Origin and Development of Panchayati Raj Instituons in Karnataka:

The origins of decentralization can be traced to 1862. From then on and

especially from 1902 a number of enactments were legislated and few schems

innovative for the times initiated. Chief among these are the Act in 1926, which

abolished Taluk Boards and the institution of the Mysore Economic Conference

and the District Economic Conference. The Conferences aimed at providing an

opportunity for ventilating public grievances.

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Principal post-independence landmarks:

V. Venkatappa Committee (1950) and Mysore Village Panchayats

and District Boards Act (1952) The Committee recommended Group

Panchayats and District Boards indirectly elected by members of the former.

The 1952 Act was based on this model. There was opposition to the absence

of Taluk Boards, abolition of single village panchayats and indirect elections.

The Act was never fully implemented.

Local Boards Enquiry (D.H. Chandrashekaraiya) Committee (1954)

This Committee suggested a three-tier system with Village Panchayats,

Taluk Boards and District Boards. It recommended reservation for SCs, STs

and women. The Venkatappa and Chadrashekaraiya Committees differed from

each other in significant ways. The former did not recommend a taluk level

institution. It opted for Group panchayats and district councils. Indirect elections

were recommended for the latter. While agreeing with the need for

representation for the Depressed Classes (SCs) the method suggested was

cooption. The Chadrashekaraiya Committee was more innovative. It

recommended a three-tier structure comprising Village Panchayats, Taluk

Boards and District Boards, all elected. It wanted reservation by election for

SCs and women.

Mysore Village Panchayats and Local Boards Act (1959)

This was based, to a considerable degree, on the 1954 Committee

except that at the apex level it provided for District Development Councils

wholly comprising ex-officio and nominated members. It incorporated provisions

for reservation for Scheduled Castes and women in both elected tiers.

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Committee on Panchayati Raj (Kondajji Basappa Committee – 1963)

Its principal recommendations were:

A three-tier structure consisting of Village Panchayats, Taluk

Development Boards and Zilla Parishads.

Legislators only as associate members (optional).

Reservation for SCs, STs and women.

Constitution of Gram Sabha.

Representation of Panchayats in TDBs and for the latter in ZPs.

Constitution of Nyaya Panchayats

Mysore Panchayat Raj Bill (1964)

In the main, this Bill followed the recommendations of the Kondaji

Basappa Committee Report on Local Self Government (1964). However, after

the Joint Select Committee report, the Bill was not processed.

The Karnataka Zilla Parishads, Taluk Panchayat Samitis, Mandal

Panchayats and Nyaya Panchayats Act, 1983.

This pioneering act had strong antecedents in the then proposed 1964

Bill. However, it went further in terms of power of local bodies. It was the first

act to contemplate devolution, which was explicitly political in character. It

anticipated the 73rd amendment in several respects.

The 73rd Amendment:

The 73rd Amendment gives village, block and district level bodies a

constitutional status under Indian law. The more important features of the

Amendment are summarized as below.

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1. The establishment of a three-tier PRI structure, with elected bodies at

village, block and district levels (States with populations less than 2

million are not required to introduce block-level Panchayats);

2. The recognition that the Gram Sabha constitutes a deliberative body at

the village level;

3. Direct elections to five year terms for all members at all levels;

4. One-third of all seats are reserved for women; reservations for SCs and

STs Proportional to their populations;

5. Reservations for chairpersons of the Panchayats-Sarpanches following

the same guidelines;

6. State legislatures may provide reservations for other backward groups;

7. A State Election Commission (SEC) will be created to supervise,

organize and oversee Panchayat elections at all levels.

8. A State Finance Commission (SFC) will be established to review and

revise the financial position of the Panchayats on five-year intervals, and

to make recommendations to the State government about the

distribution of Panchayat funds.

At the village level, the most important provisions relating to participation

and accountability are those governing reservations and the Gram Sabha.

Under the 73rd Amendment one-third of all seats must be reserved for women.

Likewise, reservations for Scheduled Castes (SCs) and Scheduled Tribes

74

(STs) are made in proportion to their population. At the village level, the Gram

Sabha, which constitutes all eligible voters within a Gram Panchayat area, is

meant to serve as a principal mechanism for transparency and accountability.

Among its principal functions are:

To review the annual statement of accounts;

To review reports of the preceding financial year;

To review and submit views on development programmes for the

following year;

To participate in the identification of beneficiaries for some

government schems.

This last provision is particularly important because it confers

substantive authority over an area that is particularly prone to misallocation and

corruption (Sections 3 and 4).

As Jha (2000: 103) has argued:

The 73rd and 74th Amendments Acts are designed to promote self-

government through statutory recognition of local bodies. The latter are

expected to move away from their traditional role of simply executing the

programs handed down to them by higher levels of government and to

formulate and implement their own programs of economic development and

social justice.

The „Eleventh Schedule‟ of the 73rd Amendment identifies 29 areas over

which Panchayats can legitimately have jurisdiction. Many of these – such as

agriculture, minor irrigation, animal husbandry, fisheries, social forestry, small-

scale industries, and implementation of land reforms – focus on particular

75

sectors within the rural economy. Others – such as rural housing, rural

electrification, and transportation and communication linkages – are primarily

concerned with the provision and maintenance of rural infrastructure. Some

cover the provision of key rural services, such as health, sanitation and

primary, secondary and vocational education. Others still govern the provision

of targeted welfare benefits – such as the PDS, and benefits for scheduled

castes and tribes, women and children and the handicapped.

In short, the 73rd Amendment covers many areas that would enable the

Panchayats to improve the lives and wellbeing of poor and vulnerable groups.

Moreover, it contains specific provision that guarantees the participation of

traditionally excluded groups, such as women, SCs and STs, and transparency

for local institutions such as the Gram Panchayats and the Gram Sabha.

However, as Mukarji (1999) has argued, the ambiguity surrounding the concept

of „self-government‟ and the substantial power that still rests with the State

governments have prevented most States from devolving any substantive

power to the Panchayats. Such findings are consistent with a wider literature on

the problems most commonly associated with decentralization in India.

The Karnataka Panchayat Raj Act, 1993:

Brought in avowedly as conformity legislation after the 73rd Amendment,

it also introduced other changes. These, critics argue, have diluted the intent,

purpose and power of the 1983 Act.

The chronological analysis of important legislation on devolution listed

above does not completely capture the nuances of the evolutionary

perspective. Decentralization was present in the state‟s overall policy frame for

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most of the pre-independence period. And this was not withstanding colonial

rule and monarchy in the state. New structures were thought of and some

relatively progressive practices introduced. In 1926 a two tier structure was

adopted with District Boards and village Panchayats excluding an intermediate

structure. This ruled the roost till the mid 1950s. More by implication than open

discussion the comparative merits of viability (in terms of development activity)

and accessibility (in terms of being able to articulate people‟s felt needs) was

an issue of concern. The two versus three-tier debate became controversial in

relation to the taluka traditionally an important administrative unit in Mysore.

The 1926 acts abolished taluka boards. This provoked strong protest. The

Legislative Council (established in 1907) provided a forum for ventilating this

discontent. The protests could achieve little but a point had been made. The

importance of the taluka derived not merely from its traditional administrative

importance but equally by virtue of offering a viable and manageable territory

for political activity. The 1926 decision was charged with the ulterior motive of

thwarting political action.

Curiously this theme has persisted. The Venkatappa Committee (1950)

recommended a two-tier structure by-passing the taluk. This too led to criticism

and was one of the reasons for a de novo examination by another committee in

1954. This, the Chadrashekaraiya Committee, opted for a three-tier model with

a fully elected taluk body. This recommendation received some reinforcement

from the Balvantraya Mehta Study Team report (1957) which favoured a virtual

two-tier system with village and intermediate level bodies. The 1959 Act

created elected village panchayats and Taluk Development Boards and non-

elected District Development Councils. The taluk had regained ground lost in

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1926. This continued until 1983 despite irregular elections. But the story does

not end here.

A related point of some important is the nomenclature used in the 1959

Act in Karnataka. It was titled the Mysore Village Panchayats and Local Boards

Act but the intermediate level body was called Taluk Development Board. It

must have signified that local government institutions were essentially

conceived of as agencies for development rather than political institution. The

same term was employed by the Kondajji Basappa Committee report as also

the 1964 bill (which lapsed) despite the more political aspect, which PRIs were

under the latter. The point needs to be reiterated that the 1983 legislation

resembled the 1964 bill but in the literature this is not emphasized.

Ashok Mehta Report – its Influence:

After the unsuccessful 1964 bill, came the first real attempt at

empowering PRIs as political institutions and units of governance. This was the

act legislated by the state‟s first ever non-Congress ministry which brought in

the Karnataka Zilla Parishads, Taluk Panchayat Samitis, Mandal Panchayats

and Nyaya Panchayats Act, 1983. In its original forms there was a two-tier

structure comprising Mandal Panchayats and Zilla Parishad. An intermediate

level such as Taluk was not envisaged. The Congress, then in opposition, was

insistent on a taluk level unit- reminiscent of the fierce opposition to the 1926

Act, which removed this. The Government found a modus vivendi. There would

be a taluk level body but it was to be ex officio. As a result the Act included the

Taluk Panchayat Samiti, a non-elected body with the local member of the

Legislative Assembly as the Chairman with the following members, all

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members of the State Legislature and Zilla Parishad from within the Taluk

Pradhans of Mandal Panchayats and members co-opted to represent

Scheduled Cases, Scheduled Tribes, Backward Classes and women. This was

a purely advisory body.

The Janata Dal Government seeking a rural base must have wanted to

shift the locus of activity from the taluk where the Congress was perhaps best

organized. This is of course in addition to preferring Mandal Panchayats by dint

of their potential to become growth centers and afford a threshold for planning.

Apart from the Congress political preference for the taluk its difference with the

Janata Dal flowed from another quarter. Congress wanted the Balvantray

Mehta model where the district level was underemphasized, the Janata dal

based itself on the Ashok Mehta report which by-passed the intermediate level.

It would be a mistake, though, to assume that the difference was limited to

terminology. It extended this and infact went beyond considerations of levels of

governance even while they were all relevant and germane to the problem. The

Ashok Mehta report aimed at achieving a balance between a threshold for

planning and development on the one hand and access and representation on

the other. In the Ashok Mehta Committee‟s view the Mandal fulfilled both

criteria. In passing it may be observed that this report stands out by virtue of its

constant concern with the development imperative.13

The Watershed – 1983 Act:

The 1983 Act followed, in large measure, the Ashok Mehta pattern. The

Congress disagreed with the two-tier model and inveighed especially against

the move to eliminate the taluk level. Five members of the Joint Select

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Committee appended a note of dissent to the report. The minute stated that the

dissenting members disagreed with the move to eliminate the “well developed

taluk level elected body, Taluk Development Boards” and added : “In other

words what the bill seeks to achieve is not decentralization of powers but to

centralize the same at district levels”. The dissenters pointedly referred to the

Balvantray Mehta report and drew strength from the track record of Taluk

Development Boards, which was good despite irregular elections. It should be

noted, however, that the 1983 Act did not introduce some recommendations of

the Ashok Mehta Committee. Possibly the most prominent was the one in

respect of a linkage between Zilla Panchayats and bigger municipalities by

providing for nominees of the later in the former. In this the Ashok Mehta report

was particularly far-sighted by focusing on the growing rural-urban nexus.14

The passage of time has only served to strengthen this logic. The

Karnataka act adopted the report‟s fundamental approach by creating Mandal

Panchayats thereby emphasizing the blend between viability and

representative character of PRIs. This too is barely noticed in the literature.

Finally the act used terms such as Pradhan, which the report employed.

The 73rd Amendment and Karnataka:

The 73rd Constitutional amendment caused further change. It mandated

a uniform three-tier structure with a few exceptions. Not long after the

amendment became law the Congress was back in power in Karnataka. It was

one of the first states to pass a conformity legislation, for which purpose a new

law was enacted, the Karanataka Panchayat Act 1993. This Act was largely

patterned on the 1987 Act. A major change, however, was the introduction of

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an elected body at the taluk level. Although the Act ensured the devolution of

29 items to the PRIs, the administrative structure it envisaged was much

weaker than the one provided by the earlier Act, according to some experts.

For political reasons, there was also some delay in holding elections under the

new Act. The reduction in the terms of the elected heads of the PRIs on the

recommendations of an official-level reforms committee, the State governments

failure to provide for budgetary allocations commensurate with the functional

devolution, and the emergence of numerous parallel development agencies are

seen by experts as some of the factors that hamper the PRIs efforts to fulfill

their constitutional responsibilities.

Utilizing the requirement of a three-tier structure the taluk was

resuscitated. The Janata Dal could not oppose this in view of the constitutional

mandate but leaders of the party did argue that a body at the intermediate level

with limited powers would have amply satisfied the constitutional stipulation

while retaining the spirit of the 1983 act. But the Congress could defend its

position using the Constitution as a shield. This position continues although

there are complaints that the taluk finds itself sandwiched between the other

two tiers. As far as the district level is concerned there has been, comparatively

speaking, less controversy. Certainly after 1983 its place has not been in doubt

despite the apprehension that the 1983 Act would culminate in concentration of

power at the district level.15

Organic linkages of Local Self Government in Karnataka:

Organic linkages among PRIs are a much-discussed issue. From the

Venkatappa Committee onwards various modes have been suggested. The

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Chandrashekaraiya Committee suggested that one-third of the seats in the

Taluk Board should be reserved for representatives of Village Panchayats and

Town Municipal Councils. The Taluk Board-District Board connectivity was

sought to be assured through having the members of the former elect members

to the latter from among themselves. The 1959 Act envisaged no linkage

between Village Panchayats and Taluk Boards. A link between the latter and

District Development Councils was provided for with the Presidents of Taluk

Boards being members of the district level body. The 1983 Act had no linkage

between Mandal Panchayats and Zilla Parishads, the two elected tiers.

However the Pradhans of Mandal Panchayats and members of the Zilla

Parishad were ex-officio members of the Taluk Panchayat Smaiti. As described

above this was an advisory body, which was incorporated as compromise

formula.

Organic linkages have been a part of the 1993 Act from inception. One-

fifth of the Adhyakashas of Grama Panchayats are members of the Taluk

Panchayat by rotation for a period of one year. Further, all Adhyakshas of Taluk

Panchayats are members of Zilla Panchayats. Certain other institutions

described as innovations made by the 1983 Act are also part of the continuities.

One is the Grama Sabha. Its constitution was first proposed as part of the 1964

bill. Similarly the state Panchayat Council, constituted in 1997 was suggested

by the Kondajji Basappa Committee. It is obvious that legacies have had some

influence over the turn of events, antecedents are apparent.

Throughout pre and early post independence days the trend was in

favour of treating local government institutions as agencies for promoting and

executing development work and blending this with popular representation. A

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significant recommendation of the Chandrashekaraiya Committee needs to be

noted. This was that non-statutory advisory bodies should be avoided since

they served no useful purpose. Regrettably even at present this has not been

given up. It should be readily conceded that it was the 1983 Act, which gave

decentralization an explicitly political character. There are no doubt continuities

from the past, nevertheless a distinct change in orientation is discernible. The

following provisions of this Act reflect the change.

1. Declaring the Adhyaksha the Executive head and placing the Adhyaksha

and Upadhyaksha on par with Minister of State and Deputy Minister

respectively.

2. Making the Chief Secretary of the Zilla Parishad function subject to the

powers of the Adhyaksha.

3. Vesting power in the Zilla Parishad to suspend resolutions/orders of

Mandal Panchayats and dissolve them on grounds such as persistent

default in the performance of duties etc. (In the case of the Zilla Parishad

this power vested with Government).

4. Absence of a chapter, common in most such legislations, dealing with

inspection and control.

5. Providing for a finance commission at the state level.

It is these provisions, which led to the legislation being acclaimed as

being truly devolutionary. Allied to this is the term of office of Adhyaksha and

Upadhyaksha. It impinges on leadership and is therefore considered here. The

terms of office are no longer conterminous with those of PRIs. They are

83

reduced to thirty months in Grama Panchayats and twenty for the other tiers.

This came in through an amendment in 1996 and was based on the

recommendations of an Expert Committee. The Committee‟s thinking was

influenced by the need to encourage a larger degree of participation, which

would help development of leadership. Also government was under pressure to

reduce the terms. Most likely this emanated from legislators who had begun to

apprehend that if some fetters were not put on local level leadership their

position would be seriously jeopardized. While they are not unhappy about

truncated terms the perception at PRI level, not unnaturally, is wholly different.

A commonly encountered poser in training sessions is why this limit should not

be imposed on members of the legislature and even Parliament.

Membership in PRls for members of Parliament and the state legislature

is an extensively discussed issue. Since a consensus could not be reached it

was left to the states in an enabling provision in the 73rd amendment. In

Karnataka this practice originated with the 1959 Act, which gave them

membership with voting rights in local bodies. Following suit the 1983 Act

conferred membership for them in the Zilla Parishad. The 1964 bill had

contemplated a different scheme-membership only for legislators in Taluk

Boards and for them as well as members of Parliament in Zilla Parishads.

However, there were two members who dissented from this in the Joint Select

Committee. One wanted that such ex officio members be barred from voting in

elections to offices of President and Vice-President. Their fear was that

legislators and members of Parliament could manipulate the functioning of local

government. During the discussions on the 1983 act there were no dissenting

views. The present act has conferred membership for legislators and MPs in

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Taluk and also Zilla Panchayats. However they have no voting rights in

elections to the offices of Adhyaksha and Upadhyaksha and no confidence

motions against them.

The argument in favour of membership for MPs and legislators is that it

will enable them to be in constant touch with development work in their

constituencies. An interesting defence was given by a senior minister of the

then Congress government; legislators, in particular, would anyhow feel

threatened by the emergence of local government, it would be better to co-opt

them into the system rather than provoke them into hostility from outside. Sofar

neither the Janata Dal nor the Congress government has attempted to

implement a recommendation of the Expert Committee that this class of

membership be removed. Strains in the relations between elected

representatives at different levels have led to measures to placate those in

Parliament and legislatures. Constituency grants are an excellent example and

these can be expanded by-passing the PRIs. As a matter of historical interest it

is worth recalling that two members of the Venkatappa Committee dissented

from the recommendation of membership in local bodies for this group of

members and their grounds of dissent remain just as valid today.

Reservation for women is accepted mainly because the Constitution

mandates it. Yet there is a evidence of resentment, even mild disapproval,

subtly expressed. The following questions in training sessions are illustrative of

these patriarchal attitudes. “Uneducated women are manipulated by other

members. Would it not be appropriate to prescribe minimum educational

qualifications for them?” “Women holding office are often subjected to

harassment. In their own interest would it not be better to do away with such

85

reservations?” “Women are only proxies. Their husbands are the ones who

make decisions, so of what use is reservation?” It is unnecessary to add that

the questioners are invariably men. Only recently there was a case in Kodagu

district, an area hardly known for social turbulence. In a certain Grama

Panchayat the post of Adhyaksha was reserved for a Scheduled Caste woman.

There being only one such number her election ought to have been a foregone

conclusion. In actual fact the other members saw to it that her nomination could

not secure a propose. The Returning Officer allowed the incumbent President

to continue after the expiry of the term. It transpired that the women

approached the High Court of Karnataka under what circumstances it is not

known-and the Court expressed itself strongly against what was clearly a

conspiracy and ordered that the Panchayat be superseded and that she be

appointed the Administrator unitl the term of the Panchayat ceases.

Recent developments in Decentralisation:

A Report of the World Bank in June 2001 on rural decentralization in

India has also pinpointed several lapses in the political, administrative and

financial functioning of the PRIs. The Bank‟s findings resulted in the then

Minister for Rural Development and Panchayat Raj M.Y. Ghorpade launching a

fresh act of reforms aimed at confronting problems instead of glossing over

them, finding operational solutions within the existing political and legal

framework, initiating strong legislative measures to address devolution through

executive action, and building the necessary fiscal frame work with the same

purpose. One of the salient features of the reforms was that the PRIs were

given greater freedom to form joint committees among themselves so that they

could collectively pursue common objectives. The members of panchayats

86

were required to disclose any pecuniary interest they might have in any

question that would come up for discussion at the panchayat meetings.

The reforms also included significant provisions that required taluk

panchayat and Zilla Panchayat members to declare their assets and also to

maintain election expenses accounts. Gram panchayat presidents were made

executive heads, as in the case of taluk and Ziilla panchayat heads. The

attendance of officials in gram panchayat meeting was made mandatory.

Provisions were also made to ensure that adequate devolution of finances and

functionaries accompanied the new activity mapping framework devolving

functions, besides an enhanced statutory development grant of Rs. 5 Lakhs a

year for every panchayat. Yet another achievement was the announcement of

a taxation policy for the panchayat due from panchayats on power consumption

was withdrawn. Instead, a new scheme was put in place under which the

government would release the full amount and the panchayats would pay the

bill amount calculated on the basis of the metered units of consumption. This

came as a big relief because the deduction of power bill dues wiped out half of

their development grants in the case of most panchayats. Thanks to the revised

billing scheme, panchayats are said to have claimed drastic cuts in their power

bills.16

Even as these measures to expand the activities of the PRIs were

encouraging the newly empowered panchayat leaders, discontent among

people with vested interests was increasing steadily. Just as elected Dalit and

women leaders had to confront resistance from upper caste Hindus at the early

stages; all elected panchayat leaders now face hostility from some legislators

and even Ministers who are apparently reluctant to share power with village

87

leaders. For instance, when the government revised some guidelines relating to

the Ashraya (housing) scheme recognizing the right of the gram sabha to select

beneficiaries and of gram panchayats to implement the programme, the move

was resented strongly by some legislators. Sections of bureaucrats, who feel

that their powers have been clipped, are also said to be intolerant of any

widening of panchayat heads powers. A repeated complaint from these

sections is that the panchayat leaders are inefficient and incapable of

managing large funds. Under pressure from some Ministers and legislators, the

government constituted a Cabinet sub-committee to review the devolution to

panchayats.17

The panchayat leaders, nearly half of whom are newly empowered

women and Dalits, are certainly in a better position now to take on the

challenges from the growing groups of people with vested interests, thanks to

the experience they have gained in office and the training provided to them by

governmental and non-governmental agencies. Lending their support to this

new political class in rural Karnataka are some progressive legislators and

Ministers, who are committed to the cause of gram swaraj. This section, said a

panchayat head, would always be on the alert against any retrograde

administrative or legislative action that might slow down the process of

devolution of functions, functionaries and finances Networking has enabled

panchayat heads to interact with one another and even establish links with their

counterparts in other States. This has facilitated the emergence of pressure

groups to prevail on the government whenever needed. Organizations such as

the Elected Women Representatives Federation and the Grameena Mahila

Mukkoottu, a federation of 6,000 Self-Help Women‟s Groups have also been

88

mobilizing support for the cause of larger powers and funds to panchayats.

Increased powers and greater responsibilities may open up the possibility of an

unprecedented role for the newly empowered women and Dalits.

A recent development is the constitution of the Task Force (2002),

officially the Working Group on Decentralization. Among its many

recommendations the following are significant.

* Institution of the Ward Sabha.

* Appointment of Ombudsman.

* Prohibiting symbols of political parties in Grama Panchayat elections.

* Doing away with the requirement that removal of Adhyaksha/

Upadhyaksha or any tier by government may include obtaining the

opinion of the higher tier.

* Increasing the frequency of meetings of the Grama Panchayat.

* Dispensing with the approval of the higher tier for acquiring, holding and

disposal of property.

* Removing the maximum limit on levels of taxation of Grama Panchayats.

* Providing for representation of Adhyakshas of Taluk and Grama

Panchayats in the State Panchayat Council.

* Direct transmission of `development‟ plans from each tier to the District

Planning Committee.

* Some of these have been incorporated into the Act as amendments.

Principal among them are:

* Institution of the Ward Sabha each ward consisting of an electoral

Grama Panchayat constituency.

89

* Prescribing a quorum for meetings of the Ward Sabha, not less than ten

percent of the total numbers of members or twenty whichever is less.

* Minimum attendance of women at Ward Sabha meetings, at least thirty

per cent of those attending should be women.

* Raising the quorum for meetings of all Panchayats from one third to one

half of the total membership.

* Adhyaksha as Executive Head of the Grama Panchayat.

* State Panchayat Council composition altered as shown below :

Chief Minister – Chairman.

Minister for Rural Development and Panchayat Raj-Vice-

Chairman.

Ten Adhyakshas of Zilla Panchayats (instead of all Adhyakshas).

Adhyakshas of one Grama Panchayat and one Taluk Panchayat

nominated by each Zilla Panchayat (addition).

Five members of the Legislative Assembly and two members of

the Legislative Council (addition)

Secretary, Department of Rural Development and Panchayat Raj

as Member-Secretary.

This is not in line with what the Working Group recommended. In

particular the amendment has not implemented the recommendation of giving

representation to ten Adhyakshas of Taluk Panchayats and Grama

Panchayats. Further, the Group did not suggest membership for legislators.

This inclusion must be seen as encroachment on the territory of PRIs. In

addition the number of ZP Adhyakshas has been reduced and only nominal

representation given to Adhyakshas of the other two tiers. There are other

90

recommendations, which invite comment. One is that while the Ward Sabha

has been recommended and constituted there is no organic link between this

and the Grama Sabha. Also the recommendation that there should be no

supervision of a higher tier over a lower tier seems to negate the principle of

political as opposed to governmental control; Government has not acted on the

recommendation to remove maximum limits on taxation for Grama Panchayats.

Conclusion:

The 1983 Act was significant in that it contemplated devolution of

political authority and on a scale which had not been attempted before in

Karnataka. The 1983 act resulted in several changes in Karnataka politics.

Reservation of 25 percent in favour of women was particularly important

because as one politician remarked in 1987 he and his colleagues were forced

to go literally from house-to-house to persuade women to contest local

elections. This must be regarded as an extremely significant part of the opening

up process, something akin to what the Devaraj Urs period witnessed with

respect to the mobilization of backward classes. Even though the 1983 Act did

not provide for reservation to backward classes there was a provision that

where no candidate was elected from this group two could be nominated. Just

as Devaraj Urs had succeeded in creating enough awareness among the BCs

and in fostering an atmosphere where the government was seen as being pro-

poor and pro-backward the Janata experiment with devolution did something

similar and its importance can hardly be exaggerated. It had other effects as

well. Academics and persons active in public life, many strong believers in

devolution, hailed the Hegde-Nazeer Sab vision as unique.

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NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. Bryce, James “Modern Democracies”, New York, Macmillan, 1921,

p. 130.

2. Bryce, James, Op. Cit., p. 133.

3. Jenks, Edward; “An Outline of English Local Government”. London,

Methuen and Co., 1925 (Sixth Edition), p. 9.

4. Mill, J.S. “Representative Government”. London, Everyman‟s Library

Edition, 1957, p. 351.

5. Government of India: “Memorandum on the Development and Working

of Representative Institutions in the Sphere of Local Self Government”

Vol. V. p. 1056, quoted in the Report of the Indian Statutory

Commission: cmd, 3658, Vol.1, London, H.M.S.O., 1930, p. 298.

6. The Imperial Gazetter of India, Vol. IV. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1909,

p. 286.

7. Report of the Taxation Enquiry Commission, 1953-54, Vol. III, Manager

of Publications, New Delhi, 1955, p. 336.

8. Quoted from Report of the Indian Statutory Commission, p. 299.

9. Babu Surendra Nath Banerjea, Madras, G.A., Natesan and Co., p. 17.

10. Nehru, Jawaharlal “An Autobiography”, Bodley Head, London, 1955,

p. 144.

11. Ibid p. 146.

92

12. Report of the Rural Local Self Government Committee, Bhopal,

Government Central Press, 1959, p. 18.

13. Aziz, A. Decentralised Planning : The Karnataka Experience, New Delhi

: Sage Publications, 1993.

14. Government of Karnataka, Report of the Finance Commission for Zilla

Parishads and Mandal Panchayats, Bangalore: Government of

Karnataka, 1989.

15. Singh, S.S. and Suresh Misra, Legislative Framework of Panchayati Raj

in India, New Delhi : Intellectual Publishing House, 1993.

16. Institute of Social Sciences, Status of Panchayati Raj in the States of

India 1994, Concept Publishing Company, New Delhi, 1995.

17. Buch, Nirmala, Status of Panchayati Raj in the States and Union

Territories, Concept Publishing Company, New Delhi, 2000.