Evidence - Xiii. Burden of Proof and Presumptions

8/3/2019 Evidence - Xiii. Burden of Proof and Presumptions

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520 F.2d 250

United States Court of Appeals,

First Circuit.

UNITED STATES of America, Appellee,

v.

Roland William DUBE, Jr., Defendant-Appellant.

No. 75-1034.

Argued May 5, 1975.

Decided June 30, 1975.

Defendant was convicted in the United States District Court for the District of Maine, Gignoux,

J., for robbery of a federally insured bank and he appealed. The Court of Appeals, McEntee,

Circuit Judge, held that testimony of defendant's expert witnesses, and cross-examination of the

witnesses and lay testimony of bank tellers, made question for jury as to defendant's sanity at the

time of the offense.

Affirmed.

Levin H. Campbell, Circuit Judge, filed concurring opinion.

West Headnotes

[1] Headnote Citing References KeyCite Citing References for this Headnote


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Key Number Symbol110 Criminal Law

Key Number Symbol110XVII Evidence

Key Number Symbol110XVII(B) Presumptions and Inferences

Key Number Symbol110k305 Presumptions

Key Number Symbol110k311 k. Sanity. Most Cited Cases

Key Number Symbol110 Criminal Law Headnote Citing References KeyCite Citing References

for this Headnote


Key Number Symbol110XVII(V) Weight and Sufficiency

Key Number Symbol110k570 Insanity or Other Incapacity

Key Number Symbol110k570(2) k. Degree of Proof. Most Cited Cases

A criminal defendant is presumed sane, but the introduction of evidence of insanity dispels the

presumption and subjects the prosecution to the burden of proving sanity beyond a reasonable

doubt.



Key Number Symbol110XX Trial

Key Number Symbol110XX(F) Province of Court and Jury in General

Key Number Symbol110k733 Questions of Law or of Fact

Key Number Symbol110k740 k. Defense of Insanity. Most Cited Cases


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Insanity is a jury question unless a reasonable man viewing the facts and reasonable inferences

therefrom in the light most favorable to the prosecution must necessarily possess a reasonable

doubt as to the defendant's sanity.




Key Number Symbol110XVII(R) Opinion Evidence

Key Number Symbol110k492 Effect of Opinion Evidence

Key Number Symbol110k494 k. Experts. Most Cited Cases

Prosecution need not counter defendant's expert medical evidence on question of insanity with

expert testimony of its own.







Expert testimony as to defendant's insanity may be rebutted in various ways apart from the

introduction of countervailing expert opinion.



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Psychologist's and psychiatrist's diagnoses of defendant's sanity at time of bank robbery were

suspect where based on minimal observation of defendant.



Key Number Symbol110XX Trial

Key Number Symbol110XX(F) Province of Court and Jury in General

Key Number Symbol110k733 Questions of Law or of Fact

Key Number Symbol110k740 k. Defense of Insanity. Most Cited Cases

Evidence in bank robbery prosecution, including testimony of defense psychiatrist and

psychologist, and cross-examination of the experts and lay testimony of two bank tellers, made

question for jury as to defendant's sanity at time of robbery.

*251 Peter L. Murray, Portland, Maine, by appointment of the Court, Murray, Plumb & Murray,

Portland, Maine, was on brief, for appellant.

Peter Mills, U. S. Atty., for appellee.


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Before COFFIN, Chief Judge, McENTEE and CAMPBELL, Circuit Judges.

McENTEE, Circuit Judge.

Defendant Dube was tried on an indictment charging him with robbery of a federally insured

bank. He did not deny that he committed the robbery, but introduced the testimony of a

psychiatrist and a psychologist that he was insane when he committed the offense. The

prosecution did not present expert opinion evidence but relied instead on cross-examination and

the lay testimony of two bank tellers and Dube's accomplice to rebut his case. Dube moved for a

judgment of acquittal on the ground that the prosecution had failed as a matter of law to sustain

its burden of proving his sanity beyond a reasonable doubt, but the motion was denied. The juryreturned a verdict of guilty and Dube appeals.

[1] Headnote Citing References[2] Headnote Citing References[3] Headnote Citing

References[4] Headnote Citing References A criminal defendant is presumed sane, but the

introduction of evidence of insanity dispels the presumption and subjects the prosecution to the

burden of proving sanity beyond a reasonable doubt. Beltran v. United States, 302 F.2d 48, 52

(1st Cir. 1962). Insanity is a jury question unless a reasonable man viewing the facts and

reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the prosecution must necessarily

possess a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's sanity. United States v. Coleman, 501 F.2d 342

(10th Cir. 1974). The nature and quantum of rebuttal evidence sufficient to present a jury

question is to some extent determined by the strength of the case for insanity. United States v.

Bass, 490 F.2d 846, 851 (5th Cir. 1974). There is no general principle that the prosecution must

counter defendant's expert medical evidence with expert testimony of its own. See United States

v. Shackelford, 494 F.2d 67 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, *252 417 U.S. 934, 94 S.Ct. 2647, 41

L.Ed.2d 237 (1974). The expert testimony is not conclusive even where uncontradicted; its

weight and credibility are for the jury to determine, United States v. Lutz, 420 F.2d 414, 415 (3d

Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 911, 90 S.Ct. 1709, 26 L.Ed.2d 73 (1970), and it may be rebutted in

various ways apart from the introduction of countervailing expert opinion.[FN1]

FN1. In Mims v. United States, 375 F.2d 135, 143-44 (5th Cir. 1967), the court stated that

expert testimony may be rebuttedby showing the incorrectness or inadequacy of the factual

assumptions upon which the opinion is based, the reasoning by which he progresses from his

material to his conclusion, the interest or bias of the expert, inconsistencies or contradiction in


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his testimony as to material matters, material variations between the experts themselves, and

defendant's lack of co-operation with the expert. Also in cases involving opinions of medical

experts, the probative force of that character of testimony is lessened where it is predicated on

subjective symptoms, or where it is based on narrative statements to the expert as to past events

not in evidence at the trial. In some cases, the cross-examination of the expert may be such as to

justify the trier of facts in not being convinced by him. One or more of these factors may,

depending on the particular facts of each case, make a jury issue as to the credibility and weight

to be given to the expert testimony . . .. (footnotes omitted).See also United States v. McGraw,

515 F.2d 758 (9th Cir. 1975), holding that defendant's expert testimony may be rebutted by

cross-examination or evidence from which the jury could infer that the defendant's expert

testimony depended upon an incorrect view of the facts.

[5] Headnote Citing References We do not think the evidence in this case was such that a

reasonable man must necessarily have entertained doubts as to defendant's sanity. Both Dr. Voss,

the psychiatrist, and Dr. Bishop, the psychologist, testified that in their opinion defendant was a

schizophrenic and substantially incapable of conforming his conduct to the requirements of the

law at the time of the crime. [FN2] They arrived at those diagnoses nearly five months after the

robbery and only a week before trial. Dr. Voss's opinion was based on two hours of interviews

and Dr. Bishop's on a one-hour interview and three hours of intelligence and personality testing.

Diagnoses based on such minimal observation are suspect. Mims v. United States, 375 F.2d 135,

146 (5th Cir. 1967). Though both examined and diagnosed defendant separately, they

subsequently discussed his case together before testifying. Neither had any prior acquaintancewith defendant nor did either treat him at any time. In fact, in contrast to most of the cases

defendant cites, he had no organic manifestations, had never received any psychiatric treatment

and had experienced no earlier abnormal episodes of any kind. Id. Some of the factors the

experts relied on in reaching their diagnoses were contradictory or unconvincing.[FN3]

FN2. Dr. Voss qualified his opinion by noting that he of course was not present on the day of

the robbery and that his diagnosis was predicated in large part on the defendant's own description

of his thought processes that day, the accuracy and completeness of which are open to gravedoubt in the light of the accomplice's testimony. Dube remembered very little of the incident,

according to Dr. Voss.


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FN3. Thus Dr. Bishop opined that Dube's emotional response was flat, a judgment based in

part on his wet fish handshake, while Dr. Voss characterized Dube as open and friendly. Dr.

Bishop also stated that Dube had a basic thought disturbance illustrated by his response

Holler fire to the question If you were the first one in a movie to discover smoke or see a fire,

what would you do? Dr. Bishop considered this response inappropriate since it deviated from

the response given by a majority of 3,000 of the control group, but admitted that Dube's

educational background would affect his response. See United States v. Shackelford, supra.

[6] Headnote Citing References Most importantly, Dr. Voss's diagnosis was based almost

entirely on the subjective history narrated by defendant and his counsel, see United States v.

Ingman, 426 F.2d 973 (9th Cir. 1970), and Dr. Bishop undoubtedly interpreted the test results in

light of the history he received. Both testified that they were able to detect malingering and thatdefendant could not fabricate a history suggesting schizophrenia, but of course a jury would not

be bound to believe these assertions. Id. Indeed the factual assumptions they derived from Dube's

narrative,*253 on which they predicated their conclusions, did not comport with the testimony at

trial. On the basis of defendant's statements, both regarded the robbery as compulsive and

irrational, but the testimony of Mrs. Kyllonen, the accomplice, furnished abundant evidence of a

carefully planned and executed crime.[FN4] The experts' testimony also seemed to rest in part on

the notion that bank robbery is an irrational activity in the first place, making the competence of

a bank robber at least suspect.[FN5] Both concluded that defendant was shy, a loner, unable to

form emotional attachments to others, but Mrs. Kyllonen testified that she was in love with

defendant, that they had lived together for as long as three weeks before the robbery and thatthey had arranged to get back together after defendant disposed of some stolen checks in New

York. She also testified that during the period immediately after the robbery she did not notice

anything peculiar about defendant's activities. Since expert opinion rises no higher than the

reasons on which it is based, Dusky v. United States, 295 F.2d 743 (8th Cir. 1961), cert. denied,

368 U.S. 998, 82 S.Ct. 625, 7 L.Ed.2d 536 (1962), we cannot say that it would be unreasonable

to discount the testimony of Drs. Voss and Bishop heavily. We agree with our concurring brother

that the prosecution was remiss in not offering psychiatric testimony of its own. However, on all

the evidence we think the court correctly allowed the case to go to the jury. See United States v.

Coleman, supra.

FN4. According to Dr. Bishop, Dube stated he had no intention of robbing a bank when he left

home that day, and that he and Mrs. Kyllonen passed a bank while driving along and that he did

not know whose idea it was to enter the bank and rob it. Based upon this statement Dr. Bishop

concluded that Dube's behavior was inappropriate. Mrs. Kyllonen, however, testified that


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Dube first discussed robbing the bank after arising that day. He cased and rejected several banks

on the ground that they were too well protected, or otherwise unsuitable, and finally chose one

which was unprotected, staffed by only two women, empty of customers and about to close, with

a parking space for the getaway car nearby. After robbing the bank defendant changed clothing,

hid his old clothes, and had Mrs. Kyllonen drive to a hospital parking lot (he knew just where

he wanted to go, she testified) where they waited for a few hours listening to the radio for a

report of the crime. They then counted the money and drove down the coast to avoid capture, and

Dube disposed of his gun along the way by tossing it in a river. Dr. Bishop was apparently

unaware of these details indicating deliberation. Dr. Voss heard Mrs. Kyllonen's testimony but

believed Dube could have planned out a much better robbery, although he could not suggest

how.

FN5. Dr. Voss testified:Q. Well, you wouldn't expect ordinary people to think that that was

the act of a crazy person would you?A. I wouldn't know what an ordinary person would think. I

would think that the man might be crazy at that point.Q. Because he robbed a bank?A. No, I

don't say that anybody who robs a bank is crazy, but I would suspect that the person doing it

might be under some emotional disorder. I don't know. You would have to see the person.And

Dr. Bishop testified If a rational person were going to rob a bank, to me that's a rather logical

contradiction. . . .

Affirmed.

LEVIN H. CAMPBELL, Circuit Judge (concurring).

I find this a difficult case to analyze though, on the facts, I concur in the result. The court dwells

on the inadequacy of the psychiatrist's and psychologist's diagnoses. While in certain respects Ithink it is overly critical, I agree that the jury was entitled to be skeptical of opinions of insanity

based upon relatively brief examinations made several months after the crime and at a time when

Dube had everything to gain from a finding of insanity. There were, besides, indications from

which a jury might wonder if the experts were confusing insanity in the criminal sense with a

less fundamental disorder.


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Still it is not simple to identify the affirmative evidence from which the jury could find defendant

sane beyond a reasonable doubt. Certain conclusions, could, it is true, be drawn from Dube's girl

friend's description of his conduct *254 before and after the crime. She had lived with Dube for

several weeks and was in his company when he fled. While the defense argues that by selecting a

bank to rob on the spur of the moment, Dube behaved in a bizarre manner, this behavior does not

necessarily compel an inference of mental abnormality; and his conduct during and after the

robbery, including precautions to avoid detection such as discarding the gun and driving to a city

where he felt the police were less likely to be on the lookout, seems rational enough. The two

tellers, who saw him briefly during the robbery, observed nothing bizarre, and the jury was able

to add to this evidence its own observations of Dube while in the courtroom. Thus, there was

evidence that Dube at certain times had behaved in a way which, to the average eyes, might seem

normal. Still one wonders by what standard the fleeting glimpses of behavior transmitted by

Dube's girl friend and the tellers allowed a finding of sanity beyond a reasonable doubt.[FN*]

Dr. Voss, the psychiatrist, testified that the girl friend's version of Dube's behavior was consistent

with a diagnosis of schizophrenia. Whether or not that is so, it is questionable whether herassociation with Dube was extensive enough, and her behavioral testimony detailed enough, to

permit a positive diagnosis of sanity either by a layman or an expert.

FN* Our approach is not easily reconciled with that taken in Beltran v. United States, 302

F.2d 48 (1st Cir. 1962), in which Judge Aldrich wrote, 302 F.2d at 52,The introduction of

evidence of insanity places a burden on the government of proving sanity beyond a reasonable

doubt. . . . This burden cannot be spirited away by the simple method proposed by the

government of the court's saying it does not believe the evidence, therefore there is no evidence,

therefore there is no burden . . . (S)uch thinking would render the whole principle meaningless.

Rather, the record must be looked at as a whole, with the burden on the government to overcome

any reasonable doubt.Beltran was, however, on its facts a stronger case for the defense. The

diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia had been made at about the time of the crime and was

subsequently confirmed. It was accepted by the court with respect to Beltran's competency to

stand trial for a different offense. Nonetheless, I think it fair to say that our approach in the

present case is closer to Judge Magruder's dissenting opinion in Beltran than to the court's.

Yet not without some hesitation I think the jury was entitled to receive help from another quarter.In Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469, 16 S.Ct. 353, 40 L.Ed. 499 (1895), the Supreme Court

did not characterize the presumption of sanity as belonging to that category of presumption

which vanishes once the defense shows evidence of insanity. Instead, it stated,

If the whole evidence, including that supplied by the presumption of sanity, does not exclude


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beyond a reasonable doubt the hypothesis of insanity, of which some proof is adduced, the

accused is entitled to an acquittal. . . .

160 U.S. at 488, 16 S.Ct. at 358 (Emphasis supplied).

Except for the quoted reference in Davis (which was the case that established the federal rule

requiring the prosecution to prove sanity beyond a reasonable doubt) there has been little

attention paid in federal cases to whether the presumption of sanity, once questioned, continues

to have evidentiary force. Some courts, like the court here, see it as a presumption that

evaporates once evidence of insanity is introduced. Yet viewed as a common sense inference that

a person without marked symptoms to the contrary is likely to be sane, I think the presumption is

entitled to be given reasonable weight in determining whether on all the evidence the

Government gets to a jury.

Massachusetts courts have for years relied upon the presumption of sanity as sufficient to take a

case to the jury notwithstanding an absence of affirmative evidence of sanity. See, e. g.,

Commonwealth v. Masskow, Mass., 290 N.E.2d 154, 159 (1972). But cf. Commonwealth v.

Mutina, Mass., 323 N.E.2d 294, 297 n. 2 (1975) (questioning but not deciding *255 the

continued viability of this doctrine in light of In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25

L.Ed.2d 368 (1970)). Cases such as Winship and, most recently, Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S.

684, 95 S.Ct. 1881, 44 L.Ed.2d 508 (1975), call into question the use of devices designed to shiftthe Government's burden of proof. Still the presumption of sanity in the limited sense suggested

states a commonly perceived probability and can be distinguished from a mere contrivance to

undercut the Government's burden.

Moreover, the approach falls well short of the rule adopted by England, Canada and many states

that insanity is an affirmative defense, the burden of proving which is on the defense. That rule,

while different from that applied in federal prosecutions, was held constitutional in Leland v.

Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 72 S.Ct. 1002, 96 L.Ed. 1302 (1952), and Leland was defended as being

still good law by Mr. Justice Rehnquist in his concurring opinion in Mullaney v. Wilbur, supra.

In the present case, given the evidence of an ability to function normally, and an absence of

evidence of abnormal behavior, I think the jury could summons assistance from the inference, or

presumption, that Dube was sane. Evidence bearing upon insanity has never been restricted to


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expert evidence. Conduct, lay observations and even lay opinions have traditionally been given

much weight. 2 J. Wigmore Evidence, ss 227 et seq. (3d ed. 1940). And the jury could add to

factors such as the reasonableness of Dube's conduct before and after the crime and his apparent

lack of any history of mental disturbance, an inference of sanity drawn from its common

experience that most people (at least those without marked outward symptoms) are sane. With

the aid of this inference it could reach the conclusion that he was sane beyond a reasonable

doubt. I recognize that this rationale is not without its difficulties, but it seems more satisfying

than to pretend that the Government's meager evidence of Dube's conduct established, or could

establish, by itself, much of anything.

Had there been somewhat less evidence of ordinary behavior, or slightly stronger evidence of

abnormality, reversal might be in order. But without condoning the Government's failure to call

an expert or otherwise bolster its case I think the issue was properly submitted to the jury.

C.A.Me. 1975.

U. S. v. Dube,

520 F.2d 250

END OF DOCUMENT


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432 U.S. 197, 97 S.Ct. 2319, 53 L.Ed.2d 281

Briefs and Other Related Documents

Supreme Court of the United States

Gordon G. PATTERSON, Jr., Appellant,

v.

State of NEW YORK.

No. 75-1861.

Argued March 1, 1977.

Decided June 17, 1977.

Defendant appealed from an order of the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, 41

A.D.2d 1028, 344 N.Y.S.2d 836, affirming his conviction of second-degree murder in the

Steuben County Court. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, 39 N.Y.2d 288, 383 N.Y.S.2d

573, 347 N.E.2d 898, and upon defendant's appeal, probable jurisdiction was noted. The

Supreme Court, Mr. Justice White, held that: (1) defendant's conviction of second-degree murder

under New York statute did not deprive him of due process by placing on him the burden of

proving by a preponderance of the evidence the affirmative defense of acting under the influence

of extreme emotional distress, in order to reduce the crime to manslaughter in the first degree,

where such defense did not serve to negative any of the facts of the crime which the state had to

prove in order to convict for murder, and (2) the due process clause requires the prosecution to

prove beyond a reasonable doubt all elements included in the definition of the offense of which

defendant is charged, but proof of nonexistence of all affirmative defenses is not constitutionally

required, though there are constitutional limits beyond which states may not go in reallocatingburdens of proof by labeling as affirmative defense at least some of the elements of the crimes

now defined in their statutes.

Affirmed.


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Mr. Justice Powell, with whom Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr. Justice Marshall joined, filed a

dissenting opinion.

West Headnotes


Key Number Symbol360 States

Key Number Symbol360I Political Status and Relations

Key Number Symbol360I(A) In General

Key Number Symbol360k4 k. Status Under Constitution of United States, and Relations to

United States in General. Most Cited Cases

Preventing and dealing with crime is much more the business of the states than of the federal

government, and it is normally within the power of the states to regulate procedures under which

their laws are carried out, including the burden of producing evidence and the burden of

persuasion.


Key Number Symbol92 Constitutional Law

Key Number Symbol92XXVII Due Process

Key Number Symbol92XXVII(H) Criminal Law

Key Number Symbol92XXVII(H)1 In General

Key Number Symbol92k4500 k. In General. Most Cited Cases


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(Formerly 92k257)

State's decision with respect to criminal procedures is not subject to proscription under the due

process clause unless it offends some principle of justice so deeply rooted in the traditions andconscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental. U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14.





Key Number Symbol92XXVII(H)5 Evidence and Witnesses

Key Number Symbol92k4653 k. Presumptions, Inferences, and Burden of Proof. Most

Cited Cases

(Formerly 92k266(7))

Defendant's conviction of second-degree murder under New York statute did not deprive him of

due process by placing on him the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence the

affirmative defense of acting under the influence of extreme emotional distress, in order to

reduce the crime to manslaughter in the first degree, where such defense did not serve to

negative any of the facts of the crime which the state had to prove under its statute in order to

convict for murder, namely, intending to cause the death of another person and causing the death

of such person or a third person, but constituted a separate issue. U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14;

Penal Law N.Y. 125.20, 125.25.





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Key Number Symbol92k4694 k. Degree of Proof; Reasonable Doubt. Most Cited Cases


State is not required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt every fact, the existence or nonexistence

which it is willing to recognize as an exculpatory or mitigating circumstance affecting the degree

of culpability or the severity of punishment; due process clause does not put state to the choice of

abandoning those defenses or of undertaking to disprove their existence in order to convict for a

crime which otherwise is within its constitutional power to subject to substantial punishment.

U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14.




Key Number Symbol110XVII(C) Burden of Proof

Key Number Symbol110k326 Burden of Proof

Key Number Symbol110k330 k. Matters of Defense and Rebuttal in General. Most Cited

Cases

If a state, having proved crime beyond a reasonable doubt, nevertheless chooses to recognize a

factor that mitigates the degree of criminality or punishment, the state may assure itself that the

fact has been established with reasonable certainty, and to recognize at all a mitigating

circumstance does not require the state to prove its nonexistence in each case in which the fact isput in issue, if in its judgment this would be too cumbersome, too expensive, and too inaccurate.



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Key Number Symbol92k4653 k. Presumptions, Inferences, and Burden of Proof. Most

Cited Cases


Due process requires the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt all of the elements

included in the definition of the offense of which defendant is charged, but proof of nonexistence

of all affirmative defense is not constitutionally required; however, there are constitutional limitsbeyond which states may not go in reallocating burdens of proof by labeling as affirmative

defenses at least some of the elements of the crimes now defined in their statutes, and it is not

within the province of a legislature to declare an individual guilty or presumptively guilty of

crime or to command that the finding of an indictment or mere proof of identity of the accused

should create a presumption of the existence of all the facts essential to guilt. U.S.C.A.Const.

Amends. 5, 14.




Key Number Symbol110XVII(B) Presumptions and Inferences

Key Number Symbol110k305 Presumptions

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for this Headnote



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Key Number Symbol110XVII(V) Weight and Sufficiency

Key Number Symbol110k561 Reasonable Doubt

Key Number Symbol110k561(1) k. In General. Most Cited Cases

A state must prove every ingredient of an offense beyond a reasonable doubt, and may not shift

the burden of proof to the defendant by presuming an ingredient upon proof of the other elements

of the offense.

**2320 *197 Syllabus FN*

FN* The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the

Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber &

Lumber Co., 200 U.S. 321, 337, 26 S.Ct. 282, 287, 50 L.Ed. 499.

New York law requiring that the defendant in a prosecution for second-degree murder prove by a

preponderance of the evidence the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance in order

to reduce the crime to manslaughter held not to violate the Due Process Clause of the FourteenthAmendment. Mallaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 95 S.Ct. 1881, 44 L.Ed.2d 508, distinguished.

Pp. 2322-2330.

(a) Such affirmative defense does not serve to negative any facts of the crime which the State

must prove in order to convict, but constitutes a separate issue on which the defendant is required

to carry the burden of persuasion. P. 2325.

(b) The Due Process Clause does not put New York to the choice of abandoning such an

affirmative defense or undertaking to disprove its existence in order to convict for a crime which

is otherwise within the State's constitutional powers to sanction by substantial punishment. If the

State chooses to recognize a factor that mitigates the degree of criminality or punishment, it may

assure itself that the fact has been established with reasonable certainty, and to recognize at all a

mitigating circumstance does not require the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt its


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nonexistence in each case in which the fact is put in issue, if in its judgment this would be too

cumbersome, expensive, and inaccurate. Pp. 2325-2326.

39 N.Y.2d 288, 383 N.Y.S.2d 573, 347 N.E.2d 898, affirmed.

Victor J. Rubino, New York City, for the appellant.

John M. Finnerty, Steuben County Dist. Atty., Bath, N.Y., for the appellee.

*198 Mr. Justice WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.

The question here is the constitutionality under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause

of burdening the defendant in a New York State murder trial with proving the affirmative

defense of extreme emotional disturbance as defined by New York law.

**2321 I

After a brief and unstable marriage, the appellant, Gordon Patterson, Jr., became estranged from

his wife, Roberta. Roberta resumed an association with John Northrup, a neighbor to whom she

had been engaged prior to her marriage to appellant. On December 27, 1970, Patterson borrowed

a rifle from an acquaintance and went to the residence of his father-in-law. There, he observed

his wife through a window in a state of semiundress in the presence of John Northrup. He

entered the house and killed Northrup by shooting him twice in the head.

Patterson was charged with second-degree murder. In New York there are two elements of this

crime: (1) intent to cause the death of another person; and (2) caus(ing) the death of such

person or of a third person. N.Y.Penal Law s 125.25 (McKinney 1975).FN1 Malice

aforethought is not an element of the crime. In addition, the State permits a person accused of

murder to raise an affirmative defense that he acted under the influence of extreme emotional

disturbance for which there was a reasonable explanation or excuse. FN2


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FN1. References herein to the charge of murder under New York law are to this section. Cf.

N.Y.Penal Law s 125.27 (McKinney 1975) (murder in the first degree).

FN2. Section 125.25 provides in relevant part:A person is guilty of murder in the second

degree when:1. With intent to cause the death of another person, he causes the death of such

person or of a third person; except that in any prosecution under this subdivision, it is an

affirmative defense that:(a) The defendant acted under the influence of extreme emotional

disturbance for which there was a reasonable explanation or excuse, the reasonableness of which

is to be determined from the viewpoint of a person in the defendant's situation under the

circumstances as the defendant believed them to be. Nothing contained in this paragraph shall

constitute a defense to a prosecution for, or preclude a conviction of, manslaughter in the first

degree or any other crime.

*199 New York also recognizes the crime of manslaughter. A person is guilty of manslaughter if

he intentionally kills another person under circumstances which do not constitute murder

because he acts under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance. FN3 Appellant confessed

before trial to killing Northrup, but at trial he raised the defense of extreme emotional

disturbance. FN4

FN3. Section 125.20(2), N.Y. Penal Law s 125.20(2), (McKinney 1975), provides:A person

is guilty of manslaughter in the first degree when:2. With intent to cause the death of another

person, he causes the death of such person or of a third person under circumstances which do not

constitute murder because he acts under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance, as

defined in paragraph (a) of subdivision one of section 125.25. The fact that homicide was

committed under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance constitutes a mitigating

circumstance reducing murder to manslaughter in the first degree and need not be proved in anyprosecution initiated under this subdivision.

FN4. Appellant also contended at trial that the shooting was accidental and that therefore he


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had no intent to kill Northrup. It is here undisputed, however, that the prosecution proved beyond

a reasonable doubt that the killing was intentional.

The jury was instructed as to the elements of the crime of murder. Focusing on the element of

intent, the trial court charged:

Before you, considering all of the evidence, can convict this defendant or any-one of murder,

you must believe and decide that the People have established beyond a reasonable doubt that he

intended, in firing the gun, to kill *200 either the victim himself or some other human being. . . .

Always remember that you must not expect or require the defendant to prove to your

satisfaction that his acts were done without the intent to kill. Whatever proof he may have

attempted, however far he may have gone in an effort to convince you of his innocence or

guiltlessness,**2322 he is not obliged, he is not obligated to prove anything. It is always the

People's burden to prove his guilt, and to prove that he intended to kill in this instance beyond a

reasonable doubt. App. A70-A71.FN5

FN5. The trial court's instructions to the jury focused emphatically and repeatedly on theprosecution's burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.The burden of proving the

guilt of a defendant beyond a reasonable doubt rests at all times upon the prosecution. A

defendant is never obliged to prove his innocence.Before you can find a defendant guilty, you

must be convinced that each and every element of the crime charged and his guilt has been

established to your satisfaction by reliable and credible evidence beyond a reasonable doubt.

App. A48-A49.

The jury was further instructed, consistently with New York law, that the defendant had the

burden of proving his affirmative defense by a preponderance of the evidence. The jury was told

that if it found beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant had intentionally killed Northrup but

that appellant had demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that he had acted under the

influence of extreme emotional disturbance, it had to find appellant guilty of manslaughter

instead of murder.


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The jury found appellant guilty of murder. Judgment was entered on the verdict, and the

Appellate Division affirmed. While appeal to the New York Court of Appeals was pending, this

Court decided Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 95 S.Ct. 1881, 44 L.Ed.2d 508 (1975), in

which the Court declared Maine's murder statute unconstitutional. Under the Maine statute, aperson accused of murder could rebut the statutory presumption that he committed*201 the

offense with malice aforethought by proving that he acted in the heat of passion on sudden

provocation. The Court held that this scheme improperly shifted the burden of persuasion from

the prosecutor to the defendant and was therefore a violation of due process. In the Court of

Appeals appellant urged that New York's murder statute is functionally equivalent to the one

struck down in Mullaney and that therefore his conviction should be reversed.FN6

FN6. In Hankerson v. North Carolina, 432 U.S. 233, 97 S.Ct. 2339, 53 L.Ed.2d 306, we hold,as did the New York Court of Appeals in the present case, that Mullaney is to be applied

retroactively. The fact that Patterson was tried prior to our decision in Mullaney does not insulate

this case from the principles of Mullaney.

The Court of Appeals rejected appellant's argument, holding that the New York murder statute is

consistent with due process. 39 N.Y.2d 288, 383 N.Y.S.2d 573, 347 N.E.2d 898 (1976). The

Court distinguished Mullaney on the ground that the New York statute involved no shifting ofthe burden to the defendant to disprove any fact essential to the offense charged since the New

York affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance bears no direct relationship to any

element of murder. This appeal ensued, and we noted probable jurisdiction. 429 U.S. 813, 97

S.Ct. 52, 50 L.Ed.2d 72 (1976). We affirm.

II

[1] Headnote Citing References[2] Headnote Citing References It goes without saying that

preventing and dealing with crime is much more the business of the States than it is of theFederal Government, Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 134, 74 S.Ct. 381, 384, 98 L.Ed. 561

(1954) (plurality opinion), and that we should not lightly construe the Constitution so as to

intrude upon the administration of justice by the individual States. Among other things, it is

normally within the power of the State to regulate procedures under which its laws are carried

out, including the burden of producing evidence and the burden of persuasion, and its decision

in this regard is not subject to proscription *202 under the Due Process Clause unless it offends


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some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked

as fundamental. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 523, 78 S.Ct. 1332, 1341, 2 L.Ed.2d 1460

(1958); Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 798, 72 S.Ct. 1002, 1007, 96 L.Ed. 1302 (1952); Snyder

v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105, 54 S.Ct. 330, 332, 78 L.Ed. 674 (1934).

**2323 In determining whether New York's allocation to the defendant of proving the mitigating

circumstances of severe emotional disturbance is consistent with due process, it is therefore

relevant to note that this defense is a considerably expanded version of the common-law defense

of heat of passion on sudden provocation and that at common law the burden of proving the

latter, as well as other affirmative defenses indeed, all . . . circumstances of justification, excuse

or alleviation rested on the defendant. 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *201; M. Foster, Crown

Law 255 (1762); Mullaney v. Wilbur, supra, 421 U.S., at 693-694, 95 S.Ct., at 1886-1887.FN7

This was the rule when the Fifth Amendment was adopted, and it was the American rule when

the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified. Commonwealth v. York, 50 Mass. 93 (1845). FN8

FN7. See also F. Wharton, A Treatise on the Law of Evidence in Criminal Issues 240-269 (9th

ed. 1884); H. Kelley, Criminal Law and Practice 124-128, 131 (1876); Fletcher, Two Kinds of

Legal Rules: A Comparative Study of Burden-of-Persuasion Practices in Criminal Cases, 77

Yale L.J. 880, 882-884 (1968); Note, Affirmative Defenses After Mullaney v. Wilbur : New

York's Extreme Emotional Disturbance, 43 Brooklyn L.Rev. 171, 190 (1976).

FN8. York, which relied on American authorities dating back to the early 1800's, confirmed

that the common-law and prevailing American view was that the burden was on the defendant to

prove provocation. York is said to have governed a half century of American burden-of-proof

decisions in provocation and self-defense cases. Fletcher, supra, n.7, at 903-904.

In 1895 the common-law view was abandoned with respect to the insanity defense in federal

prosecutions. Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469, 16 S.Ct. 353, 40 L.Ed. 499 (1895). This

ruling had wide impact on the practice in the federal courts with respect to the burden of proving

various affirmative defenses, and the prosecution*203 in a majority of jurisdictions in this

country sooner or later came to shoulder the burden of proving the sanity of the accused and of

disproving the facts constituting other affirmative defenses, including provocation. Davis was


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not a constitutional ruling, however, as Leland v. Oregon, supra, made clear.FN9

FN9. Meanwhile, the Court had explained that although the State could go too far in shifting

the burden of proof to a defendant in a criminal case, the Due Process Clause did not invalidateevery instance of burdening the defendant with proving an exculpatory fact. In Morrison v.

California, 291 U.S. 82, 54 S.Ct. 281, 78 L.Ed. 664 (1934), a state law made it illegal for an alien

ineligible for citizenship to own or possess land. Initially, in a summary dismissal for want of a

substantial federal question, Morrison v. California, 288 U.S. 591, 53 S.Ct. 401, 77 L.Ed. 970

(1933), the Court held that it did not violate the Due Process Clause for the State to place on the

defendant the burden of proving citizenship as a defense, 291 U.S., at 88, 54 S.Ct. at 284, once

the State's evidence had shown that the defendant possessed the land and was a member of a race

barred from citizenship. In the later Morrison case the Court reiterated and approved its previous

summary holding, even though it struck down more drastic burden shifting permitted under

another section of the statute. The Court said that its earlier per curiam ruling was notnovel:The decisions are manifold that within limits of reason and fairness the burden of proof

may be lifted from the state in criminal prosecutions and cast on a defendant. The limits are in

substance these, that the state shall have proved enough to make it just for the defendant to be

required to repel what has been proved with excuse or explanation, or at least that upon a

balancing of convenience or of the opportunities for knowledge the shifting of the burden will be

found to be an aid to the accuser without subjecting the accused to hardship or oppression. Cf.

Wigmore, Evidence, Vol. 5, ss 2486, 2512 and cases cited. Special reasons are at hand to make

the change permissible when citizenship vel non is the issue to be determined. Citizenship is a

privilege not due of common right. One who lays claim to it as his, and does this in justification

or excuse of an act otherwise illegal, may fairly be called upon to prove his title good. Id., at 88-

89, 54 S.Ct., at 284.In ruling that in the other section of the statute then at issue the State had

gone too far, the Court said:For a transfer of the burden, experience must teach that the

evidence held to be inculpatory has at least a sinister significance (Yee Hem v. United States,

(268 U.S. 178, 45 S.Ct. 470, 69 L.Ed. 904 (1925)); Casey v. United States, (276 U.S. 413, 48

S.Ct. 373, 72 L.Ed. 632 (1928))), or if this at times be lacking, there must be in any event a

manifest disparity in convenience of proof and opportunity for knowledge, as, for instance,

where a general prohibition is applicable to every one who is unable to bring himself within the

range of an exception. Greenleaf, Evidence, Vol. 1, s 79. Id., at 90-91, 54 S.Ct., at 285.The

Court added that, of course, the possible situations were too variable and that too much dependedon distinctions of degree to crowd them all into a simple formula. A sharper definition was to

await specific cases. Of course, if the Morrison cases are understood as approving shifting to the

defendant the burden of disproving a fact necessary to constitute the crime, the result in the first

Morrison case could not coexist with In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d

368 (1970), and Mullaney.


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*204 **2324 At issue in Leland v. Oregon was the constitutionality under the Due Process

Clause of the Oregon rule that the defense of insanity must be proved by the defendant beyond a

reasonable doubt. Noting that Davis obviously establish(ed) no constitutional doctrine, 343

U.S., at 797, 72 S.Ct. at 1007, the Court refused to strike down the Oregon scheme, saying thatthe burden of proving all elements of the crime beyond reasonable doubt, including the elements

of premeditation and deliberation, was placed on the State under Oregon procedures and

remained there throughout the trial. To convict, the jury was required to find each element of the

crime beyond a reasonable doubt, based on all the evidence, including the evidence going to the

issue of insanity. Only then was the jury to consider separately the issue of legal sanity per

se. . . . Id., at 795, 72 S.Ct. at 1006. This practice did not offend the Due Process Clause even

though among the 20 States then placing the burden of proving his insanity on the defendant,

Oregon was alone in requiring him to convince the jury beyond a reasonable doubt.

In 1970, the Court declared that the Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction

except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with

which he is charged. *205 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1073, 25 L.Ed.2d

368 (1970). Five years later, in Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 95 S.Ct. 1881, 44 L.Ed.2d

508 (1975), the Court further announced that under the Maine law of homicide, the burden could

not constitutionally be placed on the defendant of proving by a preponderance of the evidence

that the killing had occurred in the heat of passion on sudden provocation. The Chief Justice and

Mr. Justice Rehnquist, concurring, expressed their understanding that the Mullaney decision did

not call into question the ruling in Leland v. Oregon, supra, with respect to the proof of insanity.

Subsequently, the Court confirmed that it remained constitutional to burden the defendant with

proving his insanity defense when it dismissed, as not raising a substantial federal question, a

case in which the appellant specifically challenged the continuing validity of Leland v. Oregon.

This occurred in Rivera v. Delaware, 429 U.S. 877, 97 S.Ct. 226, 50 L.Ed.2d 160 (1976), an

appeal from a Delaware conviction which, in reliance on Leland, had been affirmed by the

Delaware Supreme Court over the claim that the Delaware statute was unconstitutional because

it burdened the defendant with proving his affirmative defense of insanity by a preponderance ofthe evidence. The claim in this Court was that Leland had been overruled by Winship and

Mullaney. We dismissed the appeal as not presenting a substantial federal question. Cf. Hicks v.

Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 344, 95 S.Ct. 2281, 2289, 45 L.Ed.2d 223 (1975).

III


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[3] Headnote Citing References We cannot conclude that Patterson's conviction under the New

York law deprived him of due process of law. The crime of murder is defined by the statute,

which represents a recent revision of the state criminal code, as causing the death of another

person with intent to do so. The death, the intent to kill, and causation are the facts that the State

is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt if a person is to be convicted of murder. No

further facts are either presumed or inferred *206 in order to constitute the crime. The statute

does provide an affirmative defense that the defendant acted under the influence of

extreme**2325 emotional disturbance for which there was a reasonable explanation which, if

proved by a preponderance of the evidence, would reduce the crime to manslaughter, an offense

defined in a separate section of the statute. It is plain enough that if the intentional killing is

shown, the State intends to deal with the defendant as a murderer unless he demonstrates the

mitigating circumstances.

Here, the jury was instructed in accordance with the statute, and the guilty verdict confirms thatthe State successfully carried its burden of proving the facts of the crime beyond a reasonable

doubt. Nothing in the evidence, including any evidence that might have been offered with respect

to Patterson's mental state at the time of the crime, raised a reasonable doubt about his guilt as a

murderer; and clearly the evidence failed to convince the jury that Patterson's affirmative defense

had been made out. It seems to us that the State satisfied the mandate of Winship that it prove

beyond a reasonable doubt every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which (Patterson

was) charged. 397 U.S., at 364, 90 S.Ct., at 1073.

In convicting Patterson under its murder statute, New York did no more than Leland and Rivera

permitted it to do without violating the Due Process Clause. Under those cases, once the facts

constituting a crime are established beyond a reasonable doubt, based on all the evidence

including the evidence of the defendant's mental state, the State may refuse to sustain the

affirmative defense of insanity unless demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence.

The New York law on extreme emotional disturbance follows this pattern. This affirmative

defense, which the Court of Appeals described as permitting the defendant to show that his

actions were caused by a mental infirmity not arising to the level of insanity, and that he is less

culpable for having committed them, *207 39 N.Y.2d, at 302, 383 N.Y.S.2d, at 582, 347

N.E.2d, at 907, does not serve to negative any facts of the crime which the State is to prove in

order to convict of murder. It constitutes a separate issue on which the defendant is required to

carry the burden of persuasion; and unless we are to overturn Leland and Rivera, New York has

not violated the Due Process Clause, and Patterson's conviction must be sustained.


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[4] Headnote Citing References We are unwilling to reconsider Leland and Rivera. But even if

we were to hold that a State must prove sanity to convict once that fact is put in issue, it would

not necessarily follow that a State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt every fact, the

existence or nonexistence of which it is willing to recognize as an exculpatory or mitigatingcircumstance affecting the degree of culpability or the severity of the punishment. Here, in

revising its criminal code, New York provided the affirmative defense of extreme emotional

disturbance, a substantially expanded version of the older heat-of-passion concept; but it was

willing to do so only if the facts making out the defense were established by the defendant with

sufficient certainty. The State was itself unwilling to undertake to establish the absence of those

facts beyond a reasonable doubt, perhaps fearing that proof would be too difficult and that too

many persons deserving treatment as murderers would escape that punishment if the evidence

need merely raise a reasonable doubt about the defendant's emotional state. It has been said that

the new criminal code of New York contains some 25 affirmative defenses which exculpate or

mitigate but which must be established by the defendant to be operative.FN10 The Due **2326

Process Clause, as we see it, does not *208 put New York to the choice of abandoning those

defenses or undertaking to disprove their existence in order to convict of a crime which

otherwise is within its constitutional powers to sanction by substantial punishment.

FN10. The State of New York is not alone in this result:Since the Model Penal Code was

completed in 1962, some 22 states have codified and reformed their criminal laws. At least 12 of

these jurisdictions have used the concept of an affirmative defense and have defined that phrase

to require that the defendant prove the existence of an affirmative defense by a preponderanceof the evidence. Additionally, at least six proposed state codes and each of the four successive

versions of a revised federal code use the same procedural device. Finally, many jurisdictions

that do not generally employ this concept of affirmative defense nevertheless shift the burden

of proof to the defendant on particular issues. Low & Jeffries, DICTA: Constitutionalizing the

Criminal Law ?, 29 Va.Law Weekly, No. 18, p. 1 (1977) (footnotes omitted).Even so, the trend

over the years appears to have been to require the prosecution to disprove affirmative defenses

beyond a reasonable doubt. See W. LaFave & A. Scott, Criminal Law s 8, p. 50 (1972); C.

McCormick, Evidence s 341, pp. 800-802 (2d ed. 1972). The split among the various

jurisdictions varies for any given defense. Thus, 22 jurisdictions place the burden of proving the

affirmative defense of insanity on the defendant, while 28 jurisdictions place the burden of

disproving insanity on the prosecution. Note, Constitutional Limitations on Allocating the

Burden of Proof of Insanity to the Defendant in Murder Cases, 56 56 B.U.L.Rev. 499, 503-505

(1976).


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The requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal case is bottomed on a

fundamental value determination of our society that it is far worse to convict an innocent man

than to let a guilty man go free. Winship, 397 U.S., at 372, 90 S.Ct., at 1077 (Harlan, J.,

concurring). The social cost of placing the burden on the prosecution to prove guilt beyond areasonable doubt is thus an increased risk that the guilty will go free. While it is clear that our

society has willingly chosen to bear a substantial burden in order to protect the innocent, it is

equally clear that the risk it must bear is not without limits; and Mr. Justice Harlan's aphorism

provides little guidance for determining what those limits are. Due process does not require that

every conceivable step be taken, at whatever cost, to eliminate the possibility of convicting an

innocent person. Punishment of those found guilty by a jury, for example, is not forbidden

merely because there is a remote possibility in some instances that an innocent person might go

to jail.

[5] Headnote Citing References It is said that the common-law rule permits a State to *209

punish one as a murderer when it is as likely as not that he acted in the heat of passion or under

severe emotional distress and when, if he did, he is guilty only of manslaughter. But this has

always been the case in those jurisdictions adhering to the traditional rule. It is also very likely

true that fewer convictions of murder would occur if New York were required to negative the

affirmative defense at issue here. But in each instance of a murder conviction under the present

law New York will have proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant has intentionally

killed another person, an act which it is not disputed the State may constitutionally criminalize

and punish. If the State nevertheless chooses to recognize a factor that mitigates the degree ofcriminality or punishment, we think the State may assure itself that the fact has been established

with reasonably certainty. To recognize at all a mitigating circumstance does not require the

State to prove its nonexistence in each case in which the fact is put in issue, if in its judgment

this would be too cumbersome, too expensive, and too inaccurate.FN11

FN11. The drafters of the Model Penal Code would, as a matter of policy, place the burden of

proving the nonexistence of most affirmative defenses, including the defense involved in this

case, on the prosecution once the defendant has come forward with some evidence that thedefense is present. The drafters recognize the need for flexibility, however, and would, in some

exceptional situations, place the burden of persuasion on the accused.Characteristically these

are situations where the defense does not obtain at all under existing law and the Code seeks to

introduce a mitigation. Resistance to the mitigation, based upon the prosecution's difficulty in

obtaining evidence, ought to be lowered if the burden of persuasion is imposed on the defendant.

Where that difficulty appears genuine and there is something to be said against allowing the


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defense at all, we consider it defensible to shift the burden in this way. ALI Model Penal Code s

1.13, Comment, p. 113 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).Other writers have recognized the need for

flexibility in allocating the burden of proof in order to enhance the potential for liberal legislative

reforms. See, e. g., Low & Jeffries, supra, n. 10; Christie & Pye, Presumptions and Assumptions

in the Criminal Law: Another View, 1970 Duke L.J. 919, 933-938. See also Allen, Mullaney v.

Wilbur, the Supreme Court, and the Substantive Criminal Law An Examination of the Limits of

Legitimate Intervention, 55 Texas L.Rev. 269 (1977).

**2327 [6] Headnote Citing References *210 We thus decline to adopt as a constitutional

imperative, operative countrywide, that a State must disprove beyond a reasonable doubt every

fact constituting any and all affirmative defenses related to the culpability of an accused.

Traditionally, due process has required that only the most basic procedural safeguards beobserved; more subtle balancing of society's interests against those of the accused have been left

to the legislative branch. We therefore will not disturb the balance struck in previous cases

holding that the Due Process Clause requires the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt

all of the elements included in the definition of the offense of which the defendant is charged.

Proof of the nonexistence of all affirmative defenses has never been constitutionally required;

and we perceive no reason to fashion such a rule in this case and apply it to the statutory defense

at issue here.

This view may seem to permit state legislatures to reallocate burdens of proof by labeling as

affirmative defenses at least some elements of the crimes now defined in their statutes. But there

are obviously constitutional limits beyond which the States may not go in this regard. (I)t is not

within the province of a legislature to declare an individual guilty or presumptively guilty of a

crime. McFarland v. American Sugar Rfg. Co., 241 U.S. 79, 86, 36 S.Ct. 498, 500, 60 L.Ed.

899 (1916). The legislature cannot validly command that the finding of an indictment, or mere

proof of the identity of the accused, should create a presumption of the existence of all the facts

essential to guilt. Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463, 469, 63 S.Ct. 1241, 1246, 87 L.Ed. 1519

(1943). See also Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S., at 523-525, 78 S.Ct., at 1340-1341. Morrison v.

California, 291 U.S. 82, 54 S.Ct. 281, 78 L.Ed. 664 (1934), also makes the point with sufficientclarity.

*211 Long before Winship, the universal rule in this country was that the prosecution must prove

guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. At the same time, the long-accepted rule was that it was

constitutionally permissible to provide that various affirmative defenses were to be proved by the


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defendant. This did not lead to such abuses or to such widespread redefinition of crime and

reduction of the prosecution's burden that a new constitutional rule was required. FN12 This was

not the problem to which Winship was addressed. Nor does the fact that a majority of the States

have now assumed the burden of disproving affirmative defenses for whatever reasons mean that

those States that strike a different balance are in violation of the Constitution.FN13

FN12. Whenever due process guarantees are dependent upon the law as defined by the

legislative branches, some consideration must be given to the possibility that legislative

discretion may be abused to the detriment of the individual. See Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S., at

698-699, 95 S.Ct. at 1889. The applicability of the reasonable-doubt standard, however, has

always been dependent on how a State defines the offense that is charged in any given case; yet

there has been no great rush by the States to shift the burden of disproving traditional elements of

the criminal offenses to the accused.

FN13. As Chief Judge Breitel cogently stated in concurring in the judgment and opinion

below:A preliminary caveat is indicated. It would be an abuse of affirmative defenses, as it

would be of presumptions in the criminal law, if the purpose or effect were to unhinge the

procedural presumption of innocence which historically and constitutionally shields one charged

with crime. Indeed, a by-product of such abuse might well be also to undermine the privilege

against self-incrimination by in effect forcing a defendant in a criminal action to testify in his

own behalf.Nevertheless, although one should guard against such abuses, it may be misguided,

out of excess caution, to forestall or discourage the use of affirmative defenses, where defendant

may have the burden of proof but no greater than by a preponderance of the evidence. In the

absence of affirmative defenses the impulse to legislators, especially in periods of concern about

the rise of crime, would be to define particular crimes in unqualifiedly general terms, and leave

only to sentence the adjustment between offenses of lesser and greater degree. In times when

there is also a retrogressive impulse in legislation to restrain courts by mandatory sentences, the

evil would be compounded.The affirmative defense, intelligently used, permits the gradation of

offenses at the earlier stages of prosecution and certainly at the trial, and thus offers the

opportunity to a defendant to allege or prove, if he can, the distinction between the offensecharged and the mitigating circumstances which should ameliorate the degree or kind of offense.

The instant homicide case is a good example. Absent the affirmative defense, the crime of

murder or manslaughter could legislatively be defined simply to require an intent to kill,

unaffected by the spontaneity with which that intent is formed or the provocative or mitigating

circumstances which should legally or morally lower the grade of crime. The placing of the

burden of proof on the defense, with a lower threshold, however, is fair because of defendant's


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knowledge or access to the evidence other than his own on the issue. To require the prosecution

to negative the element of mitigating circumstances is generally unfair, especially since the

conclusion that the negative of the circumstances is necessarily a product of definitional and

therefore circular reasoning, and is easily avoided by the likely legislative practice mentioned

earlier.In sum, the appropriate use of affirmative defenses enlarges the ameliorative aspects of a

statutory scheme for the punishment of crime, rather than the other way around a shift from

primitive mechanical classifications based on the bare antisocial act and its consequences, rather

than on the nature of the offender and the conditions which produce some degree of excuse for

his conduct, the mark of an advanced criminology. 39 N.Y.2d 288, 305-307, 383 N.Y.S.2d 573,

583-585, 347 N.E.2d 898, 909-910 (1976).

*212 **2328 IV

It is urged that Mullaney v. Wilbur necessarily invalidates Patterson's conviction. In Mullaney

the charge was murder,FN14 which the Maine statute defined as the unlawful killing of a human

being with malice *213 aforethought, either express or implied. The trial court instructed the

jury that the words malice aforethought were most important because malice aforethought is

an essential and indispensable element of the crime of murder. Malice, as the statute indicated

and as the court instructed, could be implied and was to be implied from any deliberate, cruel

act committed by one person against another suddenly . . . or without a considerable

provocation, in which event an intentional killing was murder unless by a preponderance of the

evidence it was shown that the act was committed in the heat of passion, on suddenprovocation. The instructions emphasized that malice aforethought and heat of passion on

sudden provocation are two inconsistent things'; thus, by proving the latter the defendant would

negate the former. 421 U.S., at 686-687, 95 S.Ct. at 1883 (citation omitted).

FN14. The defendant in Mullaney was convicted under Me.Rev.Stat.Ann., Tit. 17, s 2651

(1964), which provided:Whoever unlawfully kills a human being with malice aforethought,

either express or implied, is guilty of murder and shall be punished by imprisonment for life.

Wilbur's conviction, which followed, was affirmed. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court held that

murder and manslaughter were varying degrees of the crime of felonious homicide and that the

presumption of malice arising from the unlawful killing was a mere policy presumption

operating to cast on the defendant the burden of proving provocation if he was to be found guilty


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of manslaughter rather than murder a burden which the Maine law had allocated to him at least

since the mid-1800's.

The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit then ordered that a writ of habeas corpus issue,holding that the presumption unconstitutionally shifted to the defendant the burden of proof with

respect to an essential element of the crime. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court disputed this

interpretation of Maine law in State v. Lafferty, 309 A.2d 647 (1973), declaring that malice

aforethought, in the sense of premeditation, **2329 was not an element of the crime of murder

and that the federal court had erroneously equated the presumption of malice with a presumption

of premeditation.

Maine law does not rely on a presumption of premeditation (as Wilbur v. Mullaney assumed)

to prove an essential element of unlawful homicide punishable as murder. *214 Proof beyond a

reasonable doubt of malice aforethought (in the sense of premeditation) is not essential to

conviction. . . . (T)he failure of the State to prove premeditation in this context is not fatal to

such a prosecution because, by legal definition under Maine law, a killing becomes unlawful and

punishable as murder on proof of any deliberate, cruel act, committed by one person against

another, suddenly without any, or without a considerable provocation. State v. Neal, 37 Me.

468, 470 (1854). Neal has been frequently cited with approval by our Court. Id., at 664-665.

(Emphasis added; footnote omitted.)

When the judgment of the First Circuit was vacated for reconsideration in the light of Lafferty,

that court reaffirmed its view that Wilbur's conviction was unconstitutional. This Court,

accepting the Maine court's interpretation of the Maine law, unanimously agreed with the Court

of Appeals that Wilbur's due process rights had been invaded by the presumption casting upon

him the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he had acted in the heat of

passion upon sudden provocation.

Mullaney's holding, it is argued, is that the State may not permit the blameworthiness of an act or

the severity of punishment authorized for its commission to depend on the presence or absence

of an identified fact without assuming the burden of proving the presence or absence of that fact,

as the case may be, beyond a reasonable doubt.FN15 In our view, *215 the Mullaney holding

should not be so broadly read. The concurrence of two Justices in Mullaney was necessarily

contrary to such a reading; and a majority of the Court refused to so understand and apply

Mullaney when Rivera was dismissed for want of a substantial federal question.


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FN15. There is some language in Mullaney that has been understood as perhaps construing the

Due Process Clause to require the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt any fact

affecting the degree of criminal culpability. See, e. g., Note, Affirmative Defenses After

Mullaney v. Wilbur: New York's Extreme Emotional Disturbance, 43 Brooklyn L.Rev. 171(1976); Note, Affirmative Defenses in Ohio After Mullaney v. Wilbur, 36 Ohio St.L.J. 828

(1975); Comment, Unburdening the Criminal Defendant: Mullaney v. Wilbur and the

Reasonable Doubt Standard, 11 Harv.Civ.Rights-Civ.Lib.L.Rev. 390 (1976). It is said that such a

rule would deprive legislatures of any discretion whatsoever in allocating the burden of proof,

the practical effect of which might be to undermine legislative reform of our criminal justice

system. See Part II, supra; Low & Jeffries, supra, n. 10. Carried to its logical extreme, such a

reading of Mullaney might also, for example, discourage Congress from enacting pending

legislation to change the felony-murder rule by permitting the accused to prove by a

preponderance of the evidence the affirmative defense that the homicide committed was neither a

necessary nor a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the underlying felony. See Senate bill S.

1, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 118 (1975). The Court did not intend Mullaney to have such far-

reaching effect.

[7] Headnote Citing References Mullaney surely held that a State must prove every ingredient of

an offense beyond a reasonable doubt, and that it may not shift the burden of proof to the

defendant by presuming that ingredient upon proof of the other elements of the offense. This istrue even though the State's practice, as in Maine, had been traditionally to the contrary. Such

shifting of the burden of persuasion with respect to a fact which the State deems so important

that it must be either proved or presumed is impermissible under the Due Process Clause.

It was unnecessary to go further in Mullaney. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court made it clear

that malice aforethought, which was mentioned in the statutory definition of the crime, was not

equivalent to premeditation and that the presumption of malice traditionally arising in intentional

homicide cases carried no factual meaning **2330 insofar as premeditation was concerned. Even

so, a killing became murder in Maine when it resulted from a deliberate, cruel act committed by

one person against another, suddenly without any, or without a considerable provocation. State

v. Lafferty, supra, at 665. Premeditation was not within the definition of murder; but *216

malice, in the sense of the absence of provocation, was part of the definition of that crime. Yet

malice, i. e., lack of provocation, was presumed and could be rebutted by the defendant only by

proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he acted with heat of passion upon sudden

provocation. In Mullaney we held that however traditional this mode of proceeding might have


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been, it is contrary to the Due Process Clause as construed in Winship.

As we have explained, nothing was presumed or implied against Patterson; and his conviction is

not invalid under any of our prior cases. The judgment of the New York Court of Appeals is

Affirmed.

Mr. Justice REHNQUIST took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

Mr. Justice POWELL, with whom Mr. Justice BRENNAN and Mr. Justice MARSHALL join,

dissenting.

In the name of preserving legislative flexibility, the Court today drains In re Winship, 397 U.S.

358, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970), of much of its vitality. Legislatures do require broad

discretion in the drafting of criminal laws, but the Court surrenders to the legislative branch asignificant part of its responsibility to protect the presumption of innocence.

I

An understanding of the import of today's decision requires a comparison of the statutes at issue

here with the statutes and practices of Maine struck down by a unanimous Court just two years

ago in Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 95 S.Ct. 1881, 44 L.Ed.2d 508 (1975).

A

Maine's homicide laws embodied the common-law distinctions along with the colorful common-

law language. Murder *217 was defined in the statute as the unlawful killing of a human being

with malice aforethought, either express or implied. Manslaughter was a killing in the heat of

passion, on sudden provocation, without express or implied malice aforethought. Id., at 686,


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and n. 3, 95 S.Ct., at 1883. Although express malice at one point may have had its own

significant independent meaning, see Perkins, A Re-Examination of Malice Aforethought, 43

Yale L.J. 537, 546-552 (1934), in practice a finding that the killing was committed with malice

aforethought had come to mean simply that heat of passion was absent. Indeed, the trial court in

Mullaney expressly charged the jury that malice aforethought and heat of passion on sudden

provocation are two inconsistent things. 421 U.S., at 686-687, 95 S.Ct., at 1883. And the Maine

Supreme Judicial Court had held that instructions concerning express malice (in the sense of

premeditation) were unnecessary. The only inquiry for the jury in deciding whether a homicide

amounted to murder or manslaughter was the inquiry into heat of passion on sudden provocation.

State v. Lafferty, 309 A.2d 647, 664-665 (Me.1973). See 421 U.S., at 686, n. 4, 95 S.Ct. at 1883.

Our holding in Mullaney found no constitutional defect in these statutory provisions. Rather, the

defect in Maine practice lay in its allocation of the burden of persuasion with respect to the

crucial factor distinguishing murder from manslaughter. In Maine, juries were instructed that ifthe prosecution proved that the homicide was both intentional and unlawful, the crime was to be

considered murder unless the defendant proved by a preponderance of **2331 the evidence that

he acted in the heat of passion on sudden provocation. Only if the defendant carried this burden

would the offense be reduced to manslaughter.

New York's present homicide laws had their genesis in lingering dissatisfaction with certain

aspects of the common-law framework that this Court confronted in Mullaney. Critics charged

that the archaic language tended to obscure the factors*218 of real importance in the jury'sdecision. Also, only a limited range of aggravations would lead to mitigation under the common-

law formula, usually only those resulting from direct provocation by the victim himself. It was

thought that actors whose emotions were stirred by other forms of outrageous conduct, even

conduct by someone other than the ultimate victim, also should be punished as manslaughterers

rather than murderers. Moreover, the common-law formula was generally applied with rather

strict objectivity. Only provocations that might cause the hypothetical reasonable man to lose

control could be considered. And even provocations of that sort were inadequate to reduce the

crime to manslaughter if enough time had passed for the reasonable man's passions to cool,

regardless of whether the actor's own thermometer had registered any decline. See generally W.

LaFave & A. Scott, Criminal Law 528-530, 539-540, 571-582 (1972); Wechsler, Codification ofCriminal Law in the United States: The Model Penal Code, 68 Colum.L.Rev. 1425, 1446 (1968);

ALI, Model Penal Code s 201.3, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959); Perkins, supra. Cf. B.

Cardozo, Law and Literature and Other Essays 99-101 (1931).

The American Law Institute took the lead in moving to remedy these difficulties. As part of its


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commendable undertaking to prepare a Model Penal Code, it endeavored to bring modern

insights to bear on the law of homicide. The result was a proposal to replace heat of passion

with the moderately broader concept of extreme mental or emotional disturbance. The

proposal first appeared in a tentative draft published in 1959, and it was accepted by the Institute

and included as s 210.3 of the 1962 Proposed Official Draft.

At about this time the New York Legislature undertook the preparation of a new criminal code,

and the Revised Penal Law of 1967 was the ultimate result. The new code adopted virtually word

for word the ALI formula for distinguishing murder from manslaughter. N.Y.Penal Law ss

125.20(2), *219 125.25(1)(a) (McKinney 1975).FN1 Under current New York law,FN2 those

who **2332 kill intentionally are guilty of murder. But there is an affirmative defense left open

to a defendant: If his act was committed under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance

for which there was a reasonable explanation or excuse, the crime is reduced to manslaughter.

The supposed defects of a formulation like Maine's have been removed. Some of the rigidobjectivity of the common law is relieved, since reasonableness is to be determined from the

viewpoint of a person in the defendant's situation under the circumstances*220 as the defendant

believed them to be. s 125.25(1)(a). The New York law also permits mitigation when emotional

disturbance results from situations other than direct provocation by the victim. And the last

traces of confusing archaic language have been removed. There is no mention of malice

aforethought, no attempt to give a name to the state of mind that exists when extreme emotional

disturbance is not present. The statute is framed in lean prose modeled after the ALI approach,

giving operative descriptions of the crucial factors rather than attempting to attach the classical

labels.

FN1. There are also other forms of manslaughter set forth in the New York statute, not all of

which conform to the ALI recommendations. Those provisions are not implicated in this case.

FN2. The 1967 provisions marked a considerable departure from the prior New York statutes

defining manslaughter. As we noted in Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 694, 95 S.Ct. 1881,

1887, 44 L.Ed.2d 508 (1975), the grounds for distinguishing murder from manslaughter

developed along two distinct paths in this country. Prior to the 1967 change New York, with a

handful of other jurisdictions, see ALI, Model Penal Code, s 201.3, Comment, p. 43 (Tent. Draft

No. 9, 1959), pursued the first path: to establish malice (and hence to convict of murder) the

prosecution bore the burden of persuasion, being required to establish a substantive element of

intent that the defendant possessed a design to effect death. See 39 N.Y.2d 288, 299, 383

N.Y.S.2d 573, 580, 347 N.E.2d 898, 905 (1976) (case below); Stokes v. People, 53 N.Y. 164

(1873). Maine, in contrast, followed the second path, marked out most prominently by Chief


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Justice Shaw's opinion in Commonwealth v. York, 50 Mass. 93 (1845): malice was presumed

unless the defendant established that he acted in the heat of passion.This difference between the

old New York practice and the York approach was substantial as noted by the Court of Appeals

below. But that court placed entirely too much weight on this distinction as a basis for

concluding that Mullaney's holding was inapplicable. The statute at issue here is the 1967

Revised Penal Law, not the earlier formulation. In 1967, New York broke from the first branch

and aligned itself with York, although casting its statute in more modern language. No matter

how extensive the differences between the pre-1967 practice and the Maine statutes found

deficient in Mullaney, this case must be decided on the basis of current New York law.

Despite these changes, the major factor that distinguishes murder from manslaughter in New

York extreme emotional disturbance is undeniably the modern equivalent of heat of passion.

The ALI drafters made this abundantly clear. They were not rejecting the notion that some of

those who kill in an emotional outburst deserve lesser punishment; they were merely refining theconcept to relieve some of the problems with the classical formulation. See ALI, Model Penal

Code, s 201.3, Comment, pp. 46-48 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959). The New York drafters left no

doubt about their reliance on the ALI work. See 39 N.Y.2d 288, 300-301, 383 N.Y.S.2d 573,

580-581, 347 N.E.2d 898, 906 (1976). Both the majority and the dissenters in the New York

Court of Appeals agreed that extreme emotional disturbance is simply a new formulation for

the traditional language of heat of passion. Id., at 301, 383 N.Y.S.2d, at 581, 347 N.E.2d, at 906;

id., at 312, 383 N.Y.S.2d, at

Evidence - Xiii. Burden of Proof and Presumptions

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