1225 Observatory Drive, Madison, Wisconsin 53706

608-262-3581 / www.lafollette.wisc.edu

The La Follette School takes no stand on policy issues; opinions expressed

in this paper reflect the views of individual researchers and authors.

Robert M.

La Follette School of Public Affairs at the University of Wisconsin-Madison

Working Paper Series La Follette School Working Paper No. 2011-002 http://www.lafollette.wisc.edu/publications/workingpapers

Evidence on Financial Globalization and Crises:

Global Imbalances

Menzie D. Chinn Professor, La Follette School of Public Affairs and Department of Economics at the University of Wisconsin-Madison mchinn@lafollette.wisc.edu February 2011

Evidence on Financial Globalization and Crises:

Global Imbalances

By

Menzie D. Chinn*

University of Wisconsin and NBER

January 30, 2011

Abstract

Global imbalances are defined. Several explanations for the development of large current

account deficits and surpluses in key economies during the period after 1997 are discussed,

including the saving-investment approach, the intertemporal approach, mercantilism and the

Bretton Woods II hypothesis, and the global saving glut view. A discussion of the literature

linking the financial crisis of 2008-09 to the development of global imbalances concludes.

JEL Classification Nos.: F32, F41

Keywords: Current account; net foreign assets; saving glut; investment drought; panel

regressions; capital controls, institutional development.

Acknowledgements: Forthcoming, Encyclopedia of Financial Globalization, edited by Gerard

Caprio (Elsevier). This work is drawn upon joint work conducted with Hiro Ito. I thank the

editor, Stijn Claessens, and Joe Gagnon, Steve Kamin, and Hiro Ito, for helpful comments.

Chinn acknowledges the financial support of faculty research funds of the University of

Wisconsin.

* Chinn: Robert M. La Follette School of Public Affairs; and Department of Economics,

University of Wisconsin, 1180 Observatory Drive, Madison, WI 53711. Email:

mchinn@lafollette.wisc.edu

1

2

1. The Contested Landscape of Global Imbalances

In the years from 1998-2008, economists focused their attention on the causes and

consequences of the expanding current account deficits and surpluses. The pattern of current

account balances was interesting from an economic standpoint, in that it did not appear to

conform to what would be predicted by standard economic theories. They were troubling from

a policy standpoint in that they were unprecedentedly large by post-war standards.

Throughout the first decade after 2000, the United States ran enormous current account deficits.

China, the rest of East Asia, and the oil exporting countries ran correspondingly large current

account surpluses. In 2008-09, these current account balances drastically reversed, albeit

incompletely, as a global financial crisis engulfed the world economy. The proximity of the two

events naturally leads to the question whether the two phenomena are related, or causal in

nature.

In this chapter, the various explanations for the rise of global imbalances, defined as large

current account balances, are reviewed. These explanations include (1) trends in saving and

investment balances, (2) a U.S. productivity surge, (3) East Asian mercantilist behavior, (4) the

global saving glut, and (5) distortions in financial markets. Note that the explanations are not

mutually exclusive.

The first approach relies upon the definition of the current account as the difference between

national saving and investment, driven by fiscal and demographic effects. The second

interpretation imbeds a productivity surge into the standard economist‟s explanation for lending

and borrowing – namely the tendency to smooth consumption in the face of time variation in

output. The third view focuses upon the export oriented development path undertaken by East

Asian countries as an explanation for the pattern of deficits and surpluses. The fourth

interpretation assumes there is a distortion in less developed country financial markets, in so far

as they are not able to channel capital from savers to borrowers domestically. The financial

intermediation activity is thus outsourced to developed countries. The fifth perspective locates

the key distortion in financial markets of the United States, and to a lesser extent, other

developed countries. Different implications regarding the nature of the crisis of 2008-09 flow

from each approach.

2. Global Imbalances Defined

Global imbalances can be defined in a number of ways. In this chapter, they are interpreted as

pertaining to international relationships, including the current account, the private financial

account, or official reserves transactions. These variables linked by the balance of payments

accounting identity.

3

Where CA is the current account, KA is the private financial account, and ORT is official

reserves transactions. Usually global imbalances are equated with the first term, current account

imbalances.

However, global imbalances presumably does not refer to current account deficits and

surpluses per se. Rather, the term refers to the relatively large magnitude (in absolute value) of

those current account balances. This pattern of increasing imbalances is illustrated in Figure 1.

Figure 1: Current account surpluses and deficits, as a share of world GDP, in percentage points. CHN+EMA is China plus emerging Asia, OCADC is other advanced countries, DEU+JPN is Germany and Japan, OIL is oil exporters, US is US and ROW is Rest-of-World. Forecasts for 2010-2014. Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook, October 2010.

Figure 1 highlights the fact that the United States started run increasingly large deficits starting

in 1998, in the wake of the East Asian financial crisis. The trend continued largely unabated

until 2006 (the only year it shrank was in the US recession year of 2001).

One interesting observation is that through 2005, Germany and Japan accounted for a larger

combined current account surplus than China and emerging Asia. Another observation is that

oil exporters accounted for a larger share than China and emerging Asia until 2006. These

points are worth highlighting if only to remind readers that China has not always been the sole

economy running a large current account surplus.

4

The changing pattern of current account balances can also be examined from the perspective of

each individual country. Here too one sees the widening of the distribution of current account

to GDP balances, as illustrated in this histogram, from Faruqee and Lee (2009).

Figure 2: Current account balances as a share of GDP. Source: Figure 1 from Faruqee and Lee (2009).

The distribution is the tightest in 1960, while the flattest distribution applies to 2004.1 Clearly,

over time some very large current account balances (expressed as a share of world GDP) have

developed. At the same time, normalized by GDP current account balances have also increased

in dispersion.

One interpretation for this increased dispersion in current account balances is increasing capital

mobility across borders (see Greenspan, 2005). According to several measures, capital

openness has indeed increased over time. For instance, the Chinn and Ito (2006) index of

capital openness indicates a steady upward movement over time.

1 Interestingly, the distribution in 1980 is fairly flat as well.

5

Figure 3: Chinn-Ito Capital Openness Indices (KAOPEN) for Industrial Countries, Emerging Market Countries and LDCs. Source: Chinn and Ito.

The Chinn-Ito (2006) capital openness index is a de jure measure, based upon the IMF‟s Annual

Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER). Other indicators of de jure

capital openness are highly correlated with this index, so one can be fairly confident that these trends in

KAOPEN are representative.2

An alternative perspective looks at private financial account balances as the proper measure of

global imbalances. To the extent that the model in question focuses on capital flows as the

central variable of interest, such an approach makes sense. However, in practice, it is not clear

that there is much of a distinction, empirically. In a sample over the 1970-2004 period, each

one percentage point increase in the current account is associated with a 0.91 percentage point

decrease in the private financial account (i.e., increase in private capital inflows), suggesting

that on average countries do not intervene extensively.3 Of course, certain countries do

intervene extensively; for the emerging market economies, current account balances are

correlated with reserve accumulation with a coefficient of 0.9.4 For those cases, the private

capital flows and the current account do diverge substantially.

For the remainder of the discussion, I will interpret imbalances as pertaining to current account

balances.

2 See Chinn and Ito (2008). 3 Regression estimated over the 1970-2004 period, with the private financial account estimated using the current

account and the change in foreign exchange reserves excluding reserves. The adjusted R2 is 0.80. 4 This correlation coefficient is based on IMF, World Economic Outlook data, over the 1996-2008 period. Note

that official flows from developing to advanced economies are recorded as private flows in advanced country data.

For each country, official refers to its government only, not other governments.

-10

12

3

Cap

ital A

cco

un

t O

pen

ne

ss

1970 1980 1990 2000 2010year

Industrial Countries Less Developed

Emerging Markets

6

3. Spendthrift America and the Saving-Investment Approach

The saving-investment approach takes the perspective from the national saving identity.

Where the T is tax receipts net of transfer payments, G is government spending, S is private

saving, and I is private investment; (T-G) is the budget balance, and (S-I) is the private sector

saving-investment balance.

Hence, the current account is, by an accounting identity, equal to the budget balance and the

private saving-investment gap. This is a tautology, unless one imposes some structure and

causality.

One particularly simple variant of this approach relies upon assuming that the shocks primarily

hit the government sector. Then changes in the budget balance are quasi-exogenous, and the

current account consequently responds. The inspiration for this perspective is the mid-1980‟s

experience with the Reagan era tax cuts and defense buildup. During that episode, the budget

deficit and current account deficits both yawned to unprecedentedly large magnitudes, inspiring

the term “the twin deficits”.

Figure 4 plots the two deficits, the current account and budget.

Figure 4: U.S. Current Account to GDP, Federal Budget Balance to GDP, and cyclically-adjusted Federal Budget Balance. NBER defined recession dates shaded gray. Source: BEA, CBO (September 2009), and NBER.

-.10

-.08

-.06

-.04

-.02

.00

.02

.04

75 80 85 90 95 00 05

CurrentAccount

Federalbudgetbalance

Cyclically-adjustedFederal budget balance

7

Upon inspection, the simple interpretation of the twin deficits clearly does not hold, beyond the

mid-1980s, and 2001-2004. Of course, other types of shocks perturb the economy, and once

one allows for shocks to the other components of aggregate demand, or to the supply side, then

no such positive correlation need hold at all times. However, that does not deny the validity of

that view during the last decade.5

One way in which to account for the endogeneity of the budget balance is to focus on the

cyclically adjusted budget balance. Figure 4 also displays the Congressional Budget Office

(2009) series. The correlation between the current account and budget balance is now more

pronounced. A more formal approach requires an econometric evaluation. Even then, this

approach would only explain the behavior of the United States current account, and not current

account balances in general.

A more systematic approach models the current account explicitly focusing on the determinants

of private investment and saving, and adds those variables to the budget balance. Chinn and

Prasad (2003) is one early example of this approach.6 They analyze a sample encompassing 18

industrial and 71 developing countries over the period 1971-95, using non-overlapping 5 year

averages of the data. The analysis includes a number of explanatory variables to account for

private saving and investment behavior, including demographic variables, per capita income,7

trade openness, as well as variability of terms of trade shocks and GDP growth. In addition, the

budget balance enters in as a key macroeconomic policy variable. Additional explanatory

variables include net foreign assets, and capital controls.

They find that government budget balances, initial net foreign asset positions and, for

developing countries, indicators of financial deepening are positively correlated with current

account balances. Among developing countries, they also find that higher terms of trade

volatility is associated with larger current account surpluses (or smaller deficits). Greater

macroeconomic uncertainty apparently increases domestic saving and also has a slightly

negative impact on investment. The degree of openness to international trade appears to be

weakly associated with larger current account deficits among developing countries.8 Note that

because they include average GDP growth and initial net foreign assets9 in the regressions, the

saving-investment approach is consistent with some aspects of the intertemporal approach

(discussed below).

5 See for instance Chinn (2005). A somewhat dissenting view is Truman (2005). 6 This line of research is closely related upon the voluminous savings retention regression literature of Feldstein

and Horioka (1980); see also Dooley, Frankel and Mathieson (1987). 7 One reason the pattern of capital flows has been so puzzling is that capital seems to be flowing from poor to rich

countries. See Alfaro, Kalemli-Ozcan and Volosovych (2008). 8 They also find limited evidence to support the patterns of evolutions in current accounts predicted by the stages-

of-development hypothesis. Other potentially important variables such as indicators of capital controls and average

GDP growth, however, appear to bear little systematic relationship with current account balances.

9 The initial net foreign assets variable is expressed as a share of GDP, and pertains to the beginning of each panel.

The data are from Sinn (1990) and various versions of the Lane and Milesi-Ferretti data base(2006).

8

Gruber and Kamin (2007) obtain similar results for a smaller panel of 61 countries spanning the

1982-2003 period. They find that including a crisis dummy for the East Asian countries

statistically explains those countries‟ current account balances. However, their results do not

shed light on the source of US deficits. Hence, while the stylized facts are relevant to the

question at hand, they pertain to the period before the appearance of global imbalances.

Chinn and Ito (2007, 2008) expand the sample period to 1971 to 2004. In this analysis, the goal

was to determine whether American and East Asian current account balances were evolving in

a manner inconsistent with historical correlations. The regression analysis controls for a similar

set of variables as used in Chinn and Prasad (2003), but focuses in on the role of budget

balances, financial development, and institutions.

Their key findings include the following. First, the budget balance is an important determinant

of the current account balance for industrial countries; the coefficient for the budget balance

variable is 0.15 in a model controlling for institutional variables. A series of robustness checks

yield the results that a one percent point increase in the budget balance leads to a 0.1 to 0.5

percentage point increase in the current account balance.10

For the United States, their analysis

confirms the view that it is a saving drought – not investment boom – that is contributing to the

enlargement of current account deficits, although there is some evidence of anomalous

behavior in the 2001-04 period. For the East Asian countries, Chinn and Ito find some evidence

that the budget balances are somewhat larger than predicted by their empirical models.

Chinn and Ito extend their analysis by accounting for endogeneity in two ways. First, they use

an instrumental variables approach, and second they replace the budget balance with the

cyclically adjusted budget balance.11

In both cases, the coefficient on the budget balance in

both cases rises considerably, ranging from 0.45 to 0.49. The US current account deficit in

2001-04 was significantly different from that predicted by the model, but just barely. China‟s

current account was within the 95% prediction band.

Fiscal, structural and demographic factors account for a large portion of the variation in current

account balances, across countries, and across time. However, the current account balances of

the United States and China are not entirely explained by these factors, particularly during the

period of pronounced global imbalances.

4. A U.S. Productivity Surge and the Intertemporal Approach

The intertemporal approach is the mainstay of the rigorous approach to explaining current

account imbalances. Suppose one maximizes an intertemporal utility function subject to a

budget constraint. If agents are not constrained by borrowing restrictions, and if they have

10 Smaller estimates of the fiscal impact are reported by Bussiere (2005), Corsetti and Muller (2006), and Gruber

and Kamin (2007). In regressions extending up to 2008, Chinn, Eichengreen and Ito (2010) obtain corresponiding

estimates for industrial countries of 0.29. 11 For the IV approach, they use a dummy for the left-wing government, political constraint (democracy) index,

military spending as a ratio to GDP, yearly changes in unemployment rates, and regional dummies. The “trend”

budget balance is estimated using the HP filter.

9

rational expectations, then the agents should smooth consumption. In order to smooth

consumption, they borrow and save accordingly.

In this perspective, consumption today is to equal a share of the present discounted value of

future expected net output, or net wealth. Hence, changes in consumption are due solely to

changes in either the interest rate, or changes in expectations about future net output due to

productivity shocks or reductions in investment and government spending.

What does this mean in the context of the question at hand? Suppose that in the early 2000‟s,

Americans thought that productivity would boom in the future. Then rather than waiting for

that anticipated productivity boom in the future to increase consumption, it makes sense for

them to start consuming more now, so as to smooth consumption as much as possible.12

In the

context of America in the 2000‟s, to consume more now means to import more and export less.

In this perspective, deficits signal future economic strength. For the United States, deficits

could result from the relative attractiveness as a place to invest due to relatively high rates of

return. This argument would be more convincing if GDP growth were being maintained by

investment rather than consumption and, more importantly, if the lending to the United States

took the form of purchases of stock and direct investment. Instead, a large proportion of capital

flowing to the United States takes place in the form of purchases of U.S. government securities

– not purchases of American stocks or direct investment in its factories, as it did in the years

leading up to 2000.13

Moreover, the heavy involvement of foreign central banks in purchasing

U.S. assets suggests that the profit motive is not behind the ongoing flows to the United States.

There are numerous ways in which to account for intertemporal effects in current account

dynamics. Chinn and Lee (2009) apply a structural VAR approach, which allows for transitory

and permanent shocks to drive the current account and the real exchange rate. The key

identifying assumption is that the current account is stationary, while the real exchange rate is

integrated of order one. Using the same approach as in Lee and Chinn (2006), they examine the

US, the euro area and Japan, and find that a large share of the 2004-07 US current account is

inexplicable using their model.

Some early formal analyses of the present value approach were conducted by Sheffrin and Woo

(1990a, b). These studies were applied to small countries, which fit the theoretical framework.

A formal test of the intertemporal approach, as applied to the United States, was conducted by

Engel and Rogers (2006). They model the current account as a function of the expected

discounted present value of its future share of world GDP relative to its current share of world

GDP (where the world is the advanced economies). The key difficulty in testing this approach

is in modeling expected output growth; using a Markov-switching approach, they find that the

U.S. is not keeping on a long-run sustainable path.14

15

However, using survey data on

12 See Pakko (1999) for an early interpretation in this vein. Note that the empirical evidence for the theoretical

model underpinning this argument is weak. See Nason and Rogers (2006). 13 It is possible for consumption to jump immediately in response to anticipated future higher income. See for

instance Erceg, et al. (2006). 14 Engel and Rogers use data over the 1790-2004 period for one of their sustainability tests. The survey-based tests

rely upon a shorter sample, 1994-2004.

10

forecasted GDP growth in the G-7, their empirical model appears to explain the evolution of

the U.S. current account remarkably well.

These contrasting findings suggest that, while expectations regarding future output do explain

in part the pattern of advanced country current account balances, those expectations do not

appear unbiased.

5. East Asian Mercantilism and Bretton Woods II versus Self-Protection

One view attributes the East Asian surpluses to explicitly mercantilist behavior. From this

perspective, the developing countries of East Asia have followed an export led development

strategy. That export led strategy resulted in rapid growth; however, starting in the mid-1990‟s,

current account surpluses evolved into current account deficits, as investment boomed.

In the wake of the 1997 financial crisis, investment levels collapsed, while saving rates

remained relatively high. Currencies depreciated sharply in the region; however, over time,

East Asian central banks maintained their currencies at fairly weak levels. For some observers,

this observation is sufficient to explain the relatively large and persistent current account

surpluses in the region. One difficulty with this explanation is that the export led development

path has been in place for decades; the explanation for the sharp break post-1997 is missing.

In addition, in the traditional monetarist approach to the balance of payments, pegging the

nominal exchange rate at a weak level is no guarantee that the real exchange rate will be

commensurately weak. Over time, with reserve accumulation, the money supply will increase

thereby inducing an increase in the price level which undoes the exchange rate undervaluation.

In the short run, price stickiness and sterilization of the impact of the reserve accumulation on

the money base can prevent the adjustment process. However, in standard interpretations, one

cannot maintain this undervaluation by way of the foreign exchange intervention over many

years (see CEA, 2007, chapter 7).

Note that while the model explains one half of the current account imbalances, it does not

explain the other side – namely why it is that the United States, United Kingdom, and specific

other developed countries ran substantial deficits.

In a series of papers, Dooley, Folkerts-Landau, and Garber (2003; 2008) interpret the U.S.

current account deficit as the outcome of concerted mercantilist efforts by East Asian state

actors. In this context, the financing of America‟s trade (and budget) deficit is an explicit quid

pro quo for continued access to American markets. Their explanation argues that the entire

panoply of government interventions are aimed at supporting exporting industries.

There are also problems with this thesis. Most notable is the mysterious aspect of timing: East

Asian savings began flowing to the United States in 2003. Why not earlier, if the mercantilist

impetus had been there all along? For a thorough critique, see Prasad and Wei (2005).

15 Choi, Mark and Sul (2008) allow for different rates of discount, and can replicate the pattern of imbalances in a

two-country model.

11

An alternative interpretation for the large scale reserve accumulation has been attributed to the

self-insurance or precautionary demand. Foreign exchange reserves can reduce the probability

of an output drop induced by capital flight or sudden stop. This self-insurance motivation rose

substantially in the wake of the East Asian crises; this point was verified by Aizenman and

Marion (2003).16

Aizenman and Lee (2007) evaluated the relative importance of these of the

various motivations by augmenting the conventional specifications for reserve holdings with

proxy variables associated with the mercantilism and self-insurance/precautionary demand

approaches. While variables associated with both approaches are statistically significant, the

self-insurance variables play a greater economic role in accounting for recent trends. In results

that are consistent with both the mercantilist and self-insurance motives, Gagnon (2010) finds

that a one percentage point of GDP increase in official financial outflows (including reserve

accumulation) causes a 0.4-0.5 percentage point of GDP increase in current account.17

6. A Global Saving Glut?

The “global saving glut” explanation has been expounded by Bernanke (2005), Clarida

(2005a,b), and Hubbard (2005). This argument views excess saving from Asian emerging

market countries, driven by rising savings and collapsing investment in the aftermath of the

financial crisis (and to a lesser extent Europe), as the cause of the U.S. current account deficit.

More recently, the burgeoning surpluses of the oil exporters, ranging from the Persian Gulf

countries to Russia, have moved to the fore as sources of excess saving. From this perspective,

the U.S. external imbalance is a problem made abroad; the lack of well-developed and open

financial markets encourages countries with excess savings to seek financial intermediation in

well-developed financial systems such as the United States. Hence, a solution may only arise in

the longer term, as better developed financial systems mitigate this excess savings problem.

Caballero, Farhi and Gourinchas (2008) model the saving glut explanation as a shortage of

assets in the developing world. Mendoza, Quadrini and Rios-Rull model financial development

as the increase in the degree of enforcement of financial contracts.

The strongest point in favor of the saving glut hypothesis is the observation of a widening

current account deficit in the United States, combined with low real world interest rates.

However, the saving glut versus twin deficits view is not an either-or proposition. Figure 5

depicts how it is possible for both motivations to coexist. Two regions are graphed – East Asia

and the United States. The National Savings (NS) schedules are functions of fiscal policy,

demographics, and the real interest rate. The Investment schedules (I) are functions of the

interest rate and many other factors. In this model, the real interest rate is assumed to be

equalized, such that international capital markets would clear, i.e., the current account

imbalances between the two economies balance out each other.18

16 See also Aizenman and Lee (2007), and Jeanne and Ranciere (2005). 17 On the other hand, it‟s not clear to me that the greater exchange rate flexibility that comes with less intervention

would necessarily lead to more rapid current account adjustment. See Chinn and Wei (2010). 18 In practice, the real interest rate is not necessarily equalized; capital controls, risk premia and expected real

depreciation would be expected to drive a wedge between real rates of different countries.

12

Figure 5: National Saving, Investment and Current Account Balances

In period 0, the world interest rate is r0, and the U.S. runs a current account deficit, while East

Asia runs a corresponding current account surplus.19

In period 1, the U.S. undertakes an

expansionary fiscal policy that pulls in the NS schedule. At the same time, the investment

schedule shifts inward in East Asia (e.g., as a result of a financial crisis).20

This confluence of

events drives down the real world interest rate to r1. Thus, using a simple open macro model,

one can explain the recent rise in U.S. current account deficits, East Asian current account

surpluses, and the recent fall in global interest rates by both deficit spending by the U.S. and

investment drought in East Asia. However, also note that the in the absence of a change in

fiscal policy, the U.S. current account imbalance would have been much smaller.

In order to formally test the financial under-development interpretation of the saving glut

hypothesis, one can evaluate whether financial development and institutional development

explain the pattern of imbalances, using the framework laid out in Section 3. The estimation

19 The “world” in this model can be considered as one small closed economy composed of two large open

economies, East Asia and the U.S. Hence, the world real interest rate (R) is the real interest rate that equilibrates

cross-border lending and borrowing between the two economies such that the world current account will be in

balance. In this model, when shocks arise as they do in the text, the world real interest rate would vary so as to

keep the absolute values of the current account balances of the two economies equal to each other. See Obstfeld

and Rogoff (1996). 20 For simplicity, I focus on the US and East Asia, since the behavior of the two regions are the most difficult to

explain. Oviously, part of the global saving glut arose from the windfall received by commodity (particularly oil)

exporting countries.

NSEAsia

NSUS

NSUS‟

IEAsia IUS RUS REAsia

R0

R1

CA1EAsia > 0 CA1

US < 0

13

results are reported in Table 1, extracted from Chinn and Ito (2008).21

One interesting result

shown in the table is the significantly positive relationship (with the p-value of less than 10%)

between current account and government budget balances found for the industrialized countries

group. This result differs from the results obtained in Chinn and Prasad (2003), who examined

a shorter sample from 1971 to 1995. A one percentage point increase in the budget balance

would lead to a 0.16 percentage point increase in the current account balance for industrialized

countries and 0.24 for less developed countries except for African countries.

[Table 1 about here]

One noteworthy aspect of Table 1 relates to the financial deepening variable. Only in the

industrial countries‟ current account regressions does it exhibit a negative coefficient, though

statistically insignificantly. With these results, one may not be able to conclude that more

developed financial markets lead to decreased current account balances, as posited by the

adherents of the global saving glut thesis.

Because the economic environmental factors may affect the way in which financial

development might affect saving and investment we include interaction involving these

variables. Interactions between the financial development and legal variables (PCGDP times

LEGAL), interactions between the financial development and financial openness variables

(PCGDP times KAOPEN), and interactions between legal development and financial openness

(LEGAL times KAOPEN). The financial and legal interaction effect is motivated by the

conjecture that deepening financial markets might lead to higher saving rates, but the effect

might be magnified under conditions of better developed legal institutions. Alternatively, if

greater financial deepening leads to a lower saving rate or a lower investment rate, that effect

could be mitigated when financial markets are equipped with highly developed legal systems.

A similar argument can be applied to the effect of financial openness on current account

balances.

In order to examine the importance of institutions, Chinn and Ito augment their basic model

specification with variables aimed at capturing institutional factors, namely the legal

development variable (LEGAL), financial openness (KAOPEN), and associated interaction

terms (including those with PCGDP). Table 2 displays results from panel OLS regressions with

institutional variables. They obtain several notable results.

[Table 2 about here]

Despite the inclusion of institutional variables and their interactions, the significantly positive

relationship between current account and government budget balances is detected in almost all

sample groups like in Table 1 from the previous analysis. The point estimate on budget

balances is a statistically significant 0.15 for the industrialized countries group, about the same

as in the previous estimates, implying that the coefficient on the budget balance for the IDC

21 Since these results are sensitive to the inclusion of the African countries, we also report separate sets of results

with and without the African countries included, for the developing country sample. We also report separate

results for an emerging market group that differs somewhat from the developing country sample.

14

group is robust to inclusion of institutional variables (Note that a ±2 standard error confidence

interval encompasses values as high as 0.34). The estimated coefficients on budget balances

remain close to that reported in Table 1 the other sample groups.22

Second, financial development is found to have different, and nonlinear, effects on saving and

investment. Chinn and Ito use the estimates from Table 2 to identify the countries for which

financial development would reduce the current account. With only Hong Kong and Singapore

categorized as countries in East Asia at the highest tenth percentile in legal development and

highest tenth percentile in financial openness, only they would experience a reduction in their

current account balances as financial development proceeds. For the majority of Asian

emerging market countries that are categorized as middle or lower level in terms of legal

development and financial openness, they will experience an increase in the ratio of national

savings to GDP if financial markets develop further. Given these results, Chinn and Ito

conclude that financial development reduces the level of current account balances, especially

for Asian emerging market countries, but that effect is achieved, not through a reduction in

savings rates, but through increased levels of investment.

Overall, Chinn and Ito‟s results present evidence against the argument that emerging market

countries, especially those in East Asia, will experience lower rates of saving once these

countries achieve higher levels of financial development and better developed legal

infrastructure. In addition, more open financial markets do not appear to have any impact on

current account balances for this group of countries (see also Gruber and Kamin, 2009).

One key challenge in this type of empirical exercise involves the proper measurement of

financial development. Ito and Chinn (2009) pursue this issue by using alternative indicators of

financial development, namely measures of equity, bond, and insurance market activity, as well

as different aspects of financial development such as the cost performance, size, and activeness

of the industry. The drawback of using these types of data is that the sample size is shortened;

their sample includes the 1986-05 period.23

They obtain the following results. First, they confirm a role for budget balances in industrial

countries when bond markets are incorporated. Second, empirically both credit to the private

sector and stock market capitalization appear to be equally important determinants of current

account behavior. Third, while increases in the size of financial markets induce a decline in the

current account balance in industrial countries, the reverse is more often the case for

developing countries, especially when other measures of financial development are included.

However, because of nonlinearities incorporated into the specifications, this characterization is

conditional. Fourth, a greater degree of financial openness is typically associated with a smaller

current account balance in developing countries.

22 Gruber and Kamin (2007) report similar results. 23 These alternative financial measures are based on updated versions of the Beck, Demirgüc-Kunt and Levine

(2001) data set.

15

7. Imbalances and the Financial Crisis

Some observers have taken to claiming the saving glut caused the crisis, by inducing a search

for yield and excessive leverage, and/or risk taking. This view is succinctly summarized in

CEA (2009: 22-23):

• The roots of the current global financial crisis began in the late 1990s. A rapid

increase in saving by developing countries (sometimes called the “global saving

glut”) resulted in a large influx of capital to the United States and other

industrialized countries, driving down the return on safe assets. The relatively low

yield on safe assets likely encouraged investors to look for higher yields from

riskier assets, whose yields also went down. What turned out to be an

underpricing of risk across a number of markets (housing, commercial real estate,

and leveraged buyouts, among others) in the United States and abroad, and an

uncertainty about how this risk was distributed throughout the global financial

system, set the stage for subsequent financial distress.

• The influx of inexpensive capital helped finance a housing boom. House prices

appreciated rapidly earlier in this decade, and building increased to well-above

historic levels. Eventually, house prices began to decline with this glut in housing

supply.

In this interpretation, the trigger is excess savings associated with the inflows. What is missing

from the story is the explanation for why the capital had to flow to the United States.24

In

contrast, Obstfeld and Rogoff (2009) argue:

We too believe that the global imbalances and the financial crisis are intimately

connected, but we take a more nuanced stance on the nature of the connections. In

our view, both originated primarily in economic policies followed in a number of

countries in the 2000s (including the United States) and in distortions that

influenced the transmission of these policies through U.S. and ultimately through

global financial markets.

Financial market distortions in the developing world led to the excess of saving; financial

distortions in America pulled those flows to America. These financial distortions have been

highlighted in a number of analyses of the financial crises. Irrationality, or waves of excess

optimism and pessimism, is stressed by Akerlof and Shiller (2009). Stiglitz (2010) stresses the

credit market imperfections associated with asymmetric information. Rent seeking and

regulatory capture dominate the discussion by Johnson and Kwak (2010). Interestingly, excess

saving from East Asia does not appear as a causal factor in any of these accounts. Roubini and

Mihm (2010: 80-82) and Chinn and Frieden (2011) argue that excess saving combined with

domestic financial distortions were central to the development and extent of the crisis.

24 Caballero, Farhi and Gourinchas (2008b) view the link from inflows to crisis through the prism of the asset

shortage interpretation (Caballero, Farhi and Gourinchas, 2008a).

16

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20

Table 1: Current account regressions

Dependent variable: 5-yr average of current account (% of GDP): 1971 – 2004

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)

Full IDC LDC LDC w/o Africa EMG

Gov‟t budget balance 0.15 0.16 0.15 0.242 0.219 [0.068]** [0.086]* [0.081]* [0.092]*** [0.076]*** Lane‟s NFA (initial) 0.049 0.063 0.047 0.05 0.043 [0.005]*** [0.011]*** [0.005]*** [0.006]*** [0.009]*** Relative income 0.027 0.059 0.032 0.09 0.1 [0.019] [0.025]** [0.085] [0.090] [0.082] Relative income squared 0.016 -0.212 0.008 0.118 0.073 [0.029] [0.080]*** [0.096] [0.105] [0.092] Rel. dependency ratio (young) -0.06 0.021 -0.071 -0.075 -0.013 [0.020]*** [0.073] [0.025]*** [0.025]*** [0.022] Rel. dependency ratio (old) -0.205 0.001 -0.313 -0.241 -0.347 [0.061]*** [0.081] [0.093]*** [0.098]** [0.106]*** Financial deepening (PCGDP) 0.001 -0.006 0.005 0.013 0.003 [0.008] [0.010] [0.013] [0.014] [0.013] TOT volatility -0.013 0.063 -0.017 -0.006 -0.016 [0.019] [0.058] [0.020] [0.018] [0.019] Avg. GDP growth -0.151 -0.101 -0.161 -0.145 -0.187 [0.141] [0.207] [0.155] [0.117] [0.115] Trade openness 0.003 0.037 -0.003 -0.008 -0.005 [0.009] [0.011]*** [0.010] [0.011] [0.010] Oil exporting countries 0.046 – 0.047 0.039 0.028 [0.013]*** – [0.013]*** [0.011]*** [0.013]**

Observations 502 132 370 235 210

Adjusted R-squared 0.42 0.50 0.39 0.53 0.49 Robust standard errors in brackets, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

The estimated coefficients for the time-fixed dummies and constant are not shown.

Table 2: Current account regressions with institutional factors

Dependent variable: 5-yr average of current account (% of GDP): 1971 – 2004

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)

Full IDC LDC

LDC w/o

Africa EMG

Gov‟t budget balance 0.159 0.154 0.168 0.251 0.23

[0.065]** [0.095]* [0.079]** [0.091]*** [0.075]***

Lane's NFA (initial) 0.049 0.069 0.047 0.051 0.041

[0.005]*** [0.011]*** [0.005]*** [0.006]*** [0.009]***

Relative income 0.062 0.058 0.115 0.16 0.216

[0.028]** [0.028]** [0.096] [0.106] [0.103]**

Relative income squared 0.032 -0.097 0.057 0.157 0.166

[0.038] [0.120] [0.102] [0.121] [0.111]

Rel. dependency ratio (young) -0.061 -0.027 -0.076 -0.099 -0.044

[0.018]*** [0.082] [0.022]*** [0.030]*** [0.023]*

Rel. dependency ratio (old) -0.2 0.099 -0.368 -0.331 -0.529

[0.058]*** [0.098] [0.096]*** [0.114]*** [0.127]***

Financial Develop. (PCGDP) -0.008 0.01 -0.043 -0.038 -0.082

[0.009] [0.012] [0.032] [0.040] [0.038]**

Legal development (LEGAL) -0.003 0.002 -0.017 -0.02 -0.018

[0.004] [0.007] [0.008]** [0.009]** [0.010]*

PCGDP x LEGAL -0.003 -0.035 -0.021 -0.025 -0.037

[0.004] [0.015]** [0.011]* [0.012]** [0.016]**

Financial open. (KAOPEN) -0.001 -0.002 0.002 0.005 0.008

[0.003] [0.003] [0.007] [0.008] [0.010]

KAOPEN x LEGAL 0.002 0.012 0.002 0.002 0.005

[0.001]* [0.003]*** [0.002] [0.002] [0.003] KAOPEN x PCGDP -0.003 0.002 0 0.002 -0.002 [0.005] [0.009] [0.007] [0.008] [0.009]

TOT volatility -0.013 0.1 -0.015 -0.002 -0.003

[0.017] [0.054]* [0.018] [0.019] [0.022]

Avg. GDP growth -0.123 -0.036 -0.09 -0.107 -0.132

[0.087] [0.243] [0.096] [0.124] [0.118]

Trade openness 0.006 0.046 0.005 0 0.004

[0.009] [0.014]*** [0.013] [0.014] [0.014]

Oil exporting countries 0.041 – 0.04 0.035 0.025

[0.013]*** – [0.013]*** [0.012]*** [0.013]*

Observations 471 126 345 234 203

Adjusted R-squared 0.47 0.55 0.46 0.54 0.51

Robust standard errors in brackets, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

The estimated coefficients for the time-fixed dummies and constant are not shown.