Evidence of the Effects of the Title I Comparability Loophole

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    Evidence o the Efects o the Title IComparability Loophole

    Shining a Light on Fiscal Inequity Within Floridas PublicSchool Districts

    Jennier S. Cohen New America Foundation

    Raegen T. Miller Center for American Progress

    March 2012

    www.americanprogress.org www.aei.o

    American Enterprise Institutefor Public Policy Research

    Tightening Up Title I

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    1 Introduction and summary

    5 Background

    10 Florida, the Sunshine State

    12 Data analysis

    14 Findings

    17 Discussion

    19 Recommendations

    21 Conclusion

    22 Florida background appendix

    24 Technical appendix

    31 Endnotes

    33 About the authors and acknowledgements

    Contents

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    Introduction and summary | American Enterprise Instit

    Introduction and summary

    Ideniying he culpri o unequal school unding in U.S. public schools used o

    be simple. When public schools derived nearly all o heir revenues rom local

    propery axes, he mah was sraighorwardschools in poor areas were poorly

    unded while schools in wealhy areas were well unded. oday, wih ederal and

    sae governmens kicking in nearly hal o unding or public schools, in par o

    address previous inequiies, undersanding why schools wih large concenraions

    o poor sudens are sill being nancially shorchanged is much more complex.

    o dae, legislaive and judicial atenion o inequiy in elemenary and second-

    ary educaion nance has mainly ocused on variaion in resources available o

    school disrics. Tis ocus makes sense because disrics have he auhoriy o

    raise revenue and disribue aid owing rom sae and ederal sources. Ye ocus-

    ing on inequiies wihin school disrics also meris atenion. Budgeing and

    reporing pracices wihin disrics can undermine he inen o even he mos

    equiable sae and ederal unding sreams. Te scal requiremens o ile I o

    he Elemenary and Secondary Educaion Ac seek o preven his possibiliy.

    Te comparabiliy requiremen, one o hree scal requiremens, holds ha

    disrics ha receive unds under ile I mus use sae and local unds o oer ser-

    vices in ile I schools ha are comparable o hose oered in schools ha do no

    receive ile I unds.1 Tis ensures ile I unds are used o provide supplemen-

    ary services or low-income sudens raher han make up or inequiable disri-

    buions o sae and local unds. Disrics may use one o wo main approaches o

    demonsrae compliance wih he comparabiliy provision, bu boh approaches

    ail o disill acual levels o nancial resources.2 Insead hey ocus on he disri-

    buion o sa and supplies, remaining indieren o qualiy issues and explicily

    ignoran o he srong relaionship beween eacher compensaion and experi-ence.3 ogeher hese shorcomings represen a loophole in he requiremen, as

    highlighed in a recen Governmen Accounabiliy Oce repor.4

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    2 Center or American Progress | The Implementation and Eectiveness o Supplemental Educational Services

    Te exen o which he comparabiliy loophole undermines he supplemenary

    purpose o ile I unds is no erribly clear. Tere is good reason o suspec ha

    ile I schools oen receive subsanially ewer resources rom sae and local

    sources, as measured in acual dollars, han non-ile I schools in he same dis-

    rics. eacher salaries, he larges single expendiure caegory and someimes he

    majoriy o spending a he school level, are closely pegged o years o experiencein he majoriy o school disrics.5 And inexperienced eachers are overrepre-

    sened in ile I schools serving, by deniion, high concenraions o low-income

    children. ogeher hese paterns creae hidden salary gaps, as documened by

    Te Educaion rus using daa rom Caliornia, Ohio, and exas, and corrobo-

    raed by he Cener or American Progress using daa rom Caliornia wih a more

    comprehensive approach.6

    ile I schools do no necessarily need highly experienced eachers who, despie

    receiving much higher salaries han eachers wih a ew years o experience, may

    prove o be no more eecive in he classroom.7 Wha ile I schools need is heirair share o sae and local unds. Money, no experience, is he issue, and he

    empirical lieraure ha examines wheher disrics disribue ile I unds on a

    level playing eld is very hin. Te daa necessary o reveal acual expendiures

    a he school level have been hard o come by hisorically bu his is beginning o

    change. Te American Recovery and Reinvesmen Ac o 2009, also known as he

    simulus bill, included a one-ime school-level expendiure reporing requiremen,

    and his requiremen in urn inspired he inclusion o new school-level expendi-

    ure iems in he Oce o Civil Righs biennial survey.8 Tese daa sources should

    enable researchers and advocaes o assess he damage done by he comparabiliy

    loophole in all saes and he Disric o Columbia.

    Bu Floridas raher advanced daa and reporing environmen allows us o ge a

    jumpsar on his endeavor. Tis paper explois a unique daase conaining inor-

    maion on 2,579 unique Florida public schools rom he 2001-02 school year

    hrough he 2007-08 school year. Te daa were drawn rom web-accessible les

    mainained by he Florida Deparmen o Educaion and he Naional Cener

    or Educaion Saisics. Florida is ahead o is peers in reporing acual school

    expendiures, including measures o acual average eacher salaries and per pupil

    expendiures, in oal and by clusers o programs (regular, excepional, voca-ional educaion). Regular expendiures include hose unded by ile I.

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    Introduction and summary | American Enterprise Instit

    We use sraighorward analyic echniques o address quesions abou he

    relaionship beween suden povery raes and expendiure measures a he

    school level. Specically, we employ mulilevel regression analysis ha allows us

    o accoun or he clusering o schools wihin disrics and conrol saisically

    or disric and school characerisics, providing a clearer picure o hidden salary

    gaps and expendiure paterns expeced under he comparabiliy loophole.

    We nd ha, holding all else equal, a 10 percenage poin increase in he suden

    povery rae corresponds o a $213 decrease in average eacher salary. Tis means

    eachers in a school wih a 70 percen suden povery rae make, on average,

    $1,067 less han eachers in an oherwise idenical school wih a 20 percen su-

    den povery rae. Tis relaionship is wiped ou, however, when we accoun or

    schools average level o eacher experience. A one-year increase in average eacher

    experience ranslaes o a $523 increase in average eacher salary. Tis patern

    conorms o expecaions and corroboraes prior research on hidden salary gaps.

    Because eacher salary is he predominan driver o regular per pupil expendiures,

    one would expec any relaionship beween suden povery raes and average

    eacher salary o carry hrough o regular per pupil expendiures. One would also

    expec o nd a posiive relaionship beween suden povery raes and regu-

    lar per pupil expendiures because regular per pupil expendiures include ile

    I unds, which disrics disribue o schools based on suden povery raes.9

    Indeed, we ound ha a 10 percenage poin increase in he suden povery rae

    corresponds wih a $56 increase in regular per pupil expendiures on average,

    conrolling or a hos o school and disric characerisics.

    Ye his overall esimae is no oo reassuring. Te comparabiliy requiremen

    perains o disrics, so we exploi he richness o he daa o esimae simulane-

    ously a separae relaionship beween suden povery rae and regular per pupil

    expendiure or each disric. Te disribuion o hese esimaes suggess ha a

    leas some Florida disrics canno possibly provide ruly comparable sae and

    local resources o heir ile I and non-ile I schools.

    Te U.S. Deparmen o Educaion cied Florida in 2009 or several ailures

    around he exising comparabiliy requiremen, so i sands o reason ha expen-diure paterns rendered in acual dollars are unlikely o demonsrae a compa-

    rable disribuion o resources in Florida during he years sudied.10 Policymakers

    should consider he ollowing recommendaions:

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    Background | American Enterprise Instit

    Background

    Characerizing equiy in U.S. public school nance was once a simple mater

    wealhy communiies had well-unded schools and poor communiies did no.

    Virually all revenues were derived rom local propery axes. Te siuaion oday

    is vasly more complex in wo ways. Firs, he role o sae and ederal unding

    or public educaion has increased dramaically. Te overall proporion o all

    school revenues rom local sources, sill 80 percen in 1930, now hovers rom

    year o year around 44 percen.11 Tis proporion was 43.5 percen in he 2007-

    08 school year, wih sae and ederal revenues accouning or 48.3 percen and8.2 percen o he oal, respecively.12 Second, urbanizaion and adminisraive

    consolidaion in he lae 19h and early 20h cenuries made he school disric,

    no he school, he ocal poin o revenue policies and he agen responsible or

    disribuing resources o schools.

    Wheher schools are unded equiably depends no only on he disribuion o local,

    sae, and ederal unds bu also on resource allocaion pracices wihin school dis-

    rics. Federal unds ow almos exclusively according o he need-based ormulas o

    large programs, mos imporanly ile I, Par A o he Elemenary and Secondary

    Educaion Ac. Commonly called ile I, his program channels unds o school

    disrics o provide addiional services or sudens living in areas o concenraed

    povery. While here are legiimae concerns abou equiy in he allocaion o hese

    unds, he grea majoriy o school nance reorm eors aim o improve equiy in

    he disribuion o nonederal unds beween disrics wihin saes.13

    Between-district equity

    Sae unding ormulas can be progressive, regressive, or somehing in beween.Tese ormulas were sculped by wo generaions o liigaion and legislaion seek-

    ing equiable or adequae unding or propery-poor school disrics.14 In some

    saes, noably New Jersey, sae allocaions o school disrics overcome dispariies

    in local wealh o creae a srong posiive relaionship beween combined sae and

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    6 Center or American Progress | The Implementation and Eectiveness o Supplemental Educational Services

    local revenues available o a school disric and he percenage o is sudens living

    in povery.15 New Jersey, however, is currenly under scruiny or cus o is sae

    unding or public educaion which claimans believe disproporionaely aec low-

    income disrics.16

    In oher saes, he relaionship beween school disrics nonederal revenuesand heir povery raes is negaive. Te legal saus o hese saes unding or-

    mulas remains in ux accordingly. Te Connecicu Supreme Cour, or example,

    recenly paved he way or a challenge o Connecicus school nance sysem by

    reversing a 2007 lower cour decision ha dismissed he consiuional basis or a

    sui brough by a consorium o low-income disrics, ciies, and parens.17

    Within-district equity

    Inequiy in he disribuion o resources wihin school disrics has plagued U.S.educaion or more han 100 years despie decades o eors o address he under-

    lying problems. Equiable resource disribuion was a cenral ineres, or example,

    o numerous cour-moniored desegregaion plans.18 Similarly, disrics receiving

    ederal unds under ile I are required o provide comparable sae and local

    resources, on average, o boh heir schools serving concenraions o low-income

    sudens and heir oher schools.19

    School disrics, however, have managed o appear equiable in he eyes o cour

    moniors or U.S. Deparmen o Educaion audiors wihou necessarily being

    so. Curren compliance regimes ocus on absrac quaniies such as he raio

    o books o sudens or he raio o sudens o sa, raher han acual expendi-

    ures.20 Such quaniies can be reasonably similar across schools even when acual

    per pupil expendiures vary enormously.

    Funds follow experience

    eacher experience is he driving orce behind he disribuion o acual nancial

    resources wihin school disrics. eacher salaries consiue he larges caegoryo school expendiures in a school disrics budge.21 ypically, eacher salaries

    also increase in real erms wih addiional years o experience. Finally, radiional

    ranser policies wihin school disrics privilege senioriy, allowing more experi-

    enced eachers o ranser beween schools as desired.

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    Background | American Enterprise Instit

    Tese rules have clear implicaions or nancial equiy. eachers, no unlike oher

    kinds o workers, preer o work a sies where heir jobs are percepibly easier,

    holding all else equal. Tis preerence ypically does no avor schools serv-

    ing concenraions o low-income children.22 Research shows ha experienced

    eachers oen move away rom high-povery schools, eiher by securing a ranser

    wihin disric, or changing disrics.23

    A any given ime, eachers in low-poveryschools have more experience, on average, han eachers in high-povery schools.

    Tis nding is rue across and wihin disrics.24

    Tere is a limied body o evidence, however, showing ha eachers in low-povery

    schools earn higher salaries han eachers in high-povery schools wihin school

    disrics. Neiher he ederal governmen nor mos sae governmens collec or

    make his inormaion available.

    Te reason or he dearh o school-level inormaion on acual eacher salaries is

    ha school disrics ypically allocae eaching slos o schools insead o unds.School disrics pay eachers salaries and repor he disric average as hough i

    perains o individual schools, hus concealing dierences in acual school-level

    average salary driven by eacher experience.25

    Hidden salary gaps

    Advocaes have begun o assess he magniude and pervasiveness o inequiy in

    acual expendiures on eachers salaries by painsakingly maching school-level

    inormaion on eacher experience o disric-level salary scales. Te Educaion

    rus, a nonpro research and advocacy rm, assessed he hidden salary gap

    wihin he 50 larges school disrics in exas and he 14 larges in Ohio by

    esimaing he average eacher salary in schools serving he highes and lowes

    concenraions o low-income sudens. Te Educaion rusWes assessed he

    hidden salary gap wihin he 50 larges school disrics in Caliornia.26

    Tese sudies yielded wo ndings. Firs, he overwhelming majoriy o disrics

    examined had subsanially lower average eacher salaries in heir high-povery

    schools han in heir low-povery schools. Second, hese hidden dierences inaverage salary were signicancommonly more han $1,000 and as high as

    $6,000 per eacher. Te sudies provide srong evidence ha large disrics in

    Caliornia, Ohio, and exas spend less, on average, o pay eachers in schools serv-

    ing concenraions o low-income children han hey do o pay eachers in schools

    serving more afuen sudens.

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    8 Center or American Progress | The Implementation and Eectiveness o Supplemental Educational Services

    Te Cener or American Progress ook his line o research a sep urher using

    acual school-level average eacher salary daa rom a sample o schools in school

    disrics in Caliornia. Te repor, iled Comparable, Schmomparable, ound ha

    a 10 percenage poin increase in he suden povery rae ranslaes o a $411 drop

    in eacher salary, on average, conrolling or a number o acors ha are known o

    inuence school and disric spending. Once eacher experience was included inhe analysis, however, he eec o suden povery was compleely wiped ou. Te

    nding corroboraed he sudies conduced by Te Educaion rus and Educaion

    rusWes: eachers in high-povery schools end have less experience and earn

    correspondingly lower salaries han heir colleagues in low-povery schools.

    Tis small body o research suggess boh sae and ederal provisions inended

    o ensure equiable unding among schools wihin disrics allow gaps in eacher

    salaries o persis. And since 95 percen o school disrics across he counry

    receive ile I unds, ederal policymakers would bene rom more research on

    he exen and magniude o hidden spending gaps. In paricular, hidden salarygaps represen evidence ha a known loophole in he ile I scal requiremens

    allows disrics o inequiably und heir low-income schools, undermining he

    supplemenary purpose o ile I unds.27

    New era of responsibility

    Tere will soon be a radical upick in he availabiliy o school-level daa on aver-

    age eacher salary and oher expendiure measures. Te American Recovery and

    Reinvesmen Ac o 2009, also known as he simulus bill, required each sae

    educaion agency o urnish he U.S. Deparmen o Educaion wih school-level

    expendiure daa or he 2008-09 school year. U.S. Deparmen o Educaion

    guidance species ha expendiures be repored in several caegories including

    expendiures on personnel salaries or eachers only.28

    On he heels o he simulus bill, he Oce o Civil Righs a he U.S. Deparmen

    o Educaion also decided o require school-level unding inormaion in is

    biennial survey. Tese daa were colleced in 2009-10 rom schools in a sample

    o 7,000 school disrics across he naion. Te sample includes all disrics wihmore han 3,000 sudens. Te U.S. Deparmen o Educaion expecs o release

    hese daa in May 2011.

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    10 Center or American Progress | The Implementation and Eectiveness o Supplemental Educational Services

    Florida, the Sunshine State

    Florida is ahead o he game in publicly reporing acual school expendiures,

    including measures o average eacher salary and per pupil expendiures. As a

    resul, we are able o provide a groundbreaking examinaion o he relaionship

    beween suden povery raes and average eacher salary or per pupil expendi-

    ures using daa rom every school in Florida over seven years.

    Florida makes available or public consumpion a wide variey o educaion-

    relaed daa including acual average eacher salaries and per pupil expendiuresa he school level. Florida is widely considered o be one o he mos advanced

    saes in erms o he availabiliy o educaion daa. In 1968 he Florida legislaure

    passed a law insrucing he Florida Deparmen o Educaion o implemen a

    sysem o ensure he saes educaional programs were eecive and well man-

    aged.29 Tis led o he creaion o sae academic goals and a saewide assessmen

    program ha was originally piloed in 1971. oday he sae annually assesses

    academic achievemen in mah and reading o every suden in grades 3 hrough

    10 via he Florida Comprehensive Assessmen es, or FCA. Te oucomes o

    hese ess are used o assign each school and school disric in he sae wih a

    grade, which can deermine school unding.

    Florida also has a relaively sophisicaed school unding ormula. Te sae

    deermines he disribuion o sae and local unding o school disrics using a

    weighed suden unding ormula ha was rs se in law in 1973.30 Te weighed

    unding ormula assigns a weigh o sudens based on heir paricipaion in

    special programs, which hen is used o deermine how much unding a school

    disric will receive o educae ha suden. School disrics receive addiional

    unding in proporion o he number o sudens hey serve ha paricipae in

    cerain educaion programs like special educaion or English Language Learnerprograms. Te per pupil unding allocaion also accouns or variaion in he cos

    o living and providing educaional services in dieren disrics. Noably, here is

    no addiional weigh or sudens eligible or ree and reduced-price lunch, or any

    oher measure o povery.

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    Florida, the Sunshine State | American Enterprise Institu

    Florida also provides or several supplemenal sources o unding based on di-

    eren school disric needs and paricipaion in special programs. Addiionally,

    school disrics receive unding rom he sae lotery and school recogniion

    program and rom a class-size reducion caegorical program.

    Minimum local unding or K-12 school disrics is also deermined annually byhe sae legislaure. Te sae deermines how much each couny mus conribue

    oward is educaion unding based on heir mos recen ax valuaions.

    In ligh o is unding ormulas indierence o povery, i is no surprising ha

    Florida has been cied or improperly implemening he comparabiliy require-

    men o ile I. According o a review conduced by he U.S. Deparmen o

    Educaions Suden Achievemen and School Accounabiliy Programs, or SASA,

    in November 2009, Florida had been improperly implemening he writen assur-

    ance opion or demonsraing comparabiliy and had been conducing compa-

    rabiliy reviews less requenly han required.31 Specically, Florida had alloweddisrics o demonsrae comparabiliy wih writen assurance ha hey had

    disricwide salary schedules; policies o ensure equivalence among schools in

    eachers, adminisraors and oher sa; orpolicies o ensure equivalence among

    schools in maerials and supplies. Federal regulaions require ha disrics provide

    a writen assurance oall three o hese iems, no one o he hree. Addiionally,

    Floridas Deparmen o Educaion had been conducing comparabiliy reviews

    every ve years, raher han every wo years as required by law.

    Tese audi ndings sugges ha during he period we sudied, i is possible ha

    many disrics were in violaion o even he exising loophole-ridden comparabil-

    iy requiremen. Tus, i would no be surprising i our analysis revealed paterns

    suggesing ha, a leas in some disrics, ile I schools receive lower levels o

    sae and local resources, measured in acual dollar erms, han non-ile I schools.

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    12 Center or American Progress | The Implementation and Eectiveness o Supplemental Educational Services

    Data analysis

    Te daa used in his sudy were drawn rom wo sources. Firs, we downloaded

    publicly available school-level daa rom he 2001-02 school year hrough he 2007-

    08 school year rom he Florida Deparmen o Educaions websie. Tese daa

    include average eacher salary, average per pupil expendiure in each o hree pro-

    grammaic bins (regular, excepional, and vocaional), school ype, charer school

    saus, and oher special school ideniers. Second, daa on suden paricipaion

    in special programs like ree and reduced-price lunch (a proxy or suden pov-

    ery) and special educaion were drawn rom he U.S. Deparmen o EducaionsCommon Core o Daa.32 Tese wo daa sources were merged ogeher o creae a

    seven-year longiudinal daase on every public school in Florida.

    Te nal analyic sample includes 2,579 schools in Floridas 67 radiional

    school disrics. Te sample includes up o seven years o daa or each school.

    Schools wih ewer han wo years o daa have been dropped rom he sample.

    Addiionally, schools wih paricularly low or high per pupil expendiures, average

    eacher salaries, or pupil-eacher raios were dropped rom he sample.33 Missing

    values or ree and reduced-price lunch eligibiliy, special educaion, gied, and

    English language learners were impued wih school-level averages. Aypical

    schools were also dropped rom he sample. Tis includes charer schools, schools

    ha serve ewer han hree grades, early educaion schools, schools ha do no

    occur in radiional setings, special schools or specic populaions, and schools

    or negleced or delinquen sudens.

    Each Florida disric covers an enire couny and serves sudens in kindergaren

    hrough 12h grade, and in some cases pre-kindergaren. Disrics in Florida are

    economically and ehnically diverse and range widely in size. Disrics on he

    souhern coas o Florida, or example, end o be large and have large concenra-ions o Hispanic sudens, while disrics in he panhandle end o be smaller and

    have larger concenraions o Arican-American sudens. Some disrics have ewer

    han 10 schools while ohers have more han 200 schools. During he period rom

    2001-02 hrough 2007-08, he average school in Florida had an average eacher sal-

    ary o $41,766 and an average regular per pupil expendiure o $5,537.

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    Data analysis | American Enterprise Institu

    In his paper, we address wo research quesions:

    Wha is he gap in average eacher salary beween one school and anoher oh-

    erwise idenical school ha serves sudens ha are 10 percenage poins more

    likely o be rom a low-income amily, conrolling saisically or a number o

    characerisics o schools and disrics?

    Wha is he relaionship beween regular per pupil expendiures and he suden

    povery rae in a school, conrolling saisically or a number o characerisics

    o schools and disrics? Does his relaionship vary by disric?

    Tese quesions are bes addressed using muliple regression echniques.

    Specically, we employ regression analysis ha allows us o accoun or he clus-

    ering o schools wihin disrics, saewide ime rends, and school characerisics

    such as grade span and enrollmen. Tese characerisics, in paricular, inorm

    disrics decisions concerning he allocaion o ile I unds o schools. Te longi-udinal naure o he daase allows us o conrol saisically or all ime-invarian

    characerisics o disrics. A echnical appendix oers a horough descripion o

    our analyic approach.

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    14 Center or American Progress | The Implementation and Eectiveness o Supplemental Educational Services

    Findings

    Average teacher salary

    Te ndings addressing he rs research quesion conorm o expecaions arising

    rom heory and prior empirical work: Te higher he proporion o low-income

    sudens served by a school, he lower he average salary o ha schools eachers.

    Conrolling saisically or secular rends and key school characerisics, we nd

    ha a 10 percenage poin increase in he suden povery rae corresponds o a

    $213 decrease in he average salary o a schools eachers. Tis means eachers in aschool wih a 70 percen suden povery rae make, on average, $1,067 less han

    eachers in an oherwise idenical school in he same disric wih a 20 percen su-

    den povery rae. Wih an average o 56 eachers per school in Florida, his salary

    gap represens enough resources o enable a school o hire an addiional eacher.

    Te esimaed relaionship beween suden povery and eacher salary changed

    when we included indicaors o he percenage o sudens ideniying as Arican

    American or Hispanic in he model. Tis is no surprising given he well-docu-

    mened dierences in raes o suden povery by ehniciy. When we conrolled

    saisically or all ime-invarian disric characerisics, observed and unobserved,

    we were unable o deec a saisically signican relaionship beween a schools

    suden povery rae and is average eacher salary. Te proporions o Hispanic

    and Arican-American sudens in a school seem o serve as proxies or suden

    povery wihin a disric.

    Finally, i is imporan o poin ou ha he relaionship beween a schools

    suden povery rae and is average eacher salary vanishes when we accoun or

    eacher experience. In his model, a one-year increase in a schools average eacher

    experience ranslaes o a $523 increase in average eacher salary. Te magniudeo his relaionship conrms Florida is uterly unexcepional among saes because

    eacher salary is closely ied o experience. Moreover, our oher esimaes sugges

    eachers in Florida ake advanage o opporuniies o move rom high-povery o

    low-povery schools wihin or beween disrics. We do no observe his mobiliy

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    Findings | American Enterprise Institu

    because our daa are aggregaed o he level o he school year bu i seems reason-

    able o conclude ha experience-based compensaion policies and eacher-soring

    behavior resuls in a disribuion o resources ha avors low-povery schools.

    Regular per pupil expenditures

    No all resources are ied up in eacher salary and i is conceivable ha high-

    povery schools evenually receive heir air share o sae and local resources

    despie eacher salary and soring. A rs blush, our analyses lend suppor o

    his hypohesis. We ound ha a 10 percenage poin increase in a schools su-

    den povery rae corresponds o a $56 increase in he schools regular per pupil

    expendiure, on average, conrolling saisically or school years, school grade

    span, percenages o sudens in special programs (special educaion, English

    language learners, gied and alened), enrollmen, and all ime-invarian dis-

    ric characerisics.

    Ye his nding is no reason o celebrae. Regular expendiures include unds

    disrics receive as ile I allocaions and disribue o schools based on numbers

    and concenraions o sudens rom low-income amilies and grade span. ile I

    unds are mean o provide addiional unds or services or low-income sudens,

    so one would expec o nd a posiive relaionship beween suden povery raes

    and regular per pupil expendiures. Tus, he quesion becomes wheher he

    esimaed relaionship is large enough such ha schools receiving ile I unds

    also receive sae and local unds ha are comparable o hose o schools no

    receiving ile I unds.

    We canno assess his quesion direcly because our daa do no indicae which

    schools receive ile I unds, jus which schools are eligible. Nor do he daa parse

    regular per pupil expendiures by revenue source. We can, however, speciy a model

    ha aords each disric a unique relaionship beween a schools suden povery

    rae and regular per pupil expendiures. Fiting such a model o our daa allows us

    o consruc Figure 1 where each line segmen represens a unique disric. Te

    endpoins o each segmen represen he lowes and highes povery raes among

    schools in ha disric, along wih saisically adjused regular per pupil expendi-ures or hose schools. Te slope o a segmen represens a crude bu meaningul

    measure o he exen o which ile I unds do indeed provide addiional unding

    or services or low-income sudens. Te gure includes segmens or he 12 dis-

    rics wih he highes slopes and he 12 disrics wih he lowes slopes.

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    16 Center or American Progress | The Implementation and Eectiveness o Supplemental Educational Services

    Figure 1 suggess suden povery raes a he

    school level vary widely wihin many Florida

    disrics. High levels o such variaion, o

    course, highligh he need or ormal mecha-

    nisms ha guaranee comparable disribuions

    o unds among schools. Te posiive relaion-ship beween suden povery raes and regular

    per pupil expendiures in some disrics sug-

    gess i is possible ha ile I and non-ile I

    schools in hese disrics receive comparable

    levels o sae and local resources, and ha

    ile I unds supplemen hose resources. In

    hose disrics exhibiing a negaive relaion-

    ship, however, i is unlikely ha ile I unds

    arrive in schools ha already receive heir air

    share o sae and local resources.

    Figure 2 shows he disribuion o he slopes o

    he prooypical plos relaing adjused regular

    per pupil expendiures and suden povery

    raes a schools or all 67 Florida disrics. Tis

    requency plo suggess ha in 10 disrics

    in Florida, schools wih higher povery raes

    receive ewer unds per pupil han schools wih

    lower povery raes. One o hose disrics even

    has a slope lower han -10. In conras, he

    esimaed slopes are posiive in he remaining

    57 disrics. Schools wih higher povery raes

    exhibi larger regular per pupil expendiures

    han schools wih lower povery raes. Tis

    indicaes ha resource allocaion pracices in

    hese disrics are a leas progressive, overall,

    bu he range o posiive slopes suggess ile I

    unds may no be used solely o provide addi-

    ional services o low-income sudens in manyo hese disrics. Raher, i appears ha ile I

    unds in many disrics predominanly serve o

    resore pariy in regular per pupil expendiures.

    Figure 1

    Adjusted spending as a unction o student poverty,

    by district

    Lines shown or 24 districts, 12 with seemingly most progressive

    regular per pupil expenditures (lines going up to the right),

    12 with the least

    Figure 2

    Distribution o estimated relationships between

    poverty rates and spending within districts

    Floridas 67 traditional districts grouped by similarity in estimated

    slope relating regular per pupil expenditures and student poverty

    rates at the school level

    Regular expenditures (dollars per pupil)

    $8,000

    $7,500

    $7,000

    $6,500

    $6,000

    $5,500

    $5,000

    $4,500

    $4,000

    $3,500$3,000

    0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

    Percentage of students in poverty

    (Range of slopes), district counts

    Units of slope are adjusted dollars of regular per pupil spending

    per 1 percentage point increase in student poverty rate

    (Below -10), 1

    (-10, 0), 9

    (0, 10), 21

    (10, 20), 18

    (20, 30), 12

    (30 and up), 6

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    Discussion | American Enterprise Institu

    Discussion

    Tis paper adds o he small lieraure exploiing school-level measures o expendi-

    ures. Te nding ha average eacher salary is negaively relaed o heir suden

    povery rae, conrolling saisically or a hos o school and disric characerisics,

    is consisen wih salary gap paterns observed in oher saes. Te consisency o

    his patern across jurisdicions and research mehods builds suppor or he under-

    lying heory ha eachers end o exercise ranser privileges or choose o swich

    disrics o obain posiions in schools wih lower raes o suden povery.

    Tis paper also provides a basis or comparisons beween saes. In paricular,

    we nd ha 53 percen o he variaion in school-level average eacher salary

    occurs beween Florida disrics. In comparison, esimaes rom Comparable,

    Schmomparable,which perormed a similar analysis using Caliornia daa,ound ha 70 percen o he variaion in average eacher salaries in Caliornia lies

    beween disrics. Tis means mos variaion in eacher compensaion occurs

    beween disrics in Caliornia, while schools wihin disrics compensae each-

    ers similarly. One explanaion or hese ndings is ha Caliornia has more han

    10 imes as many school disrics as Florida, including many small ones. Anoher

    poenial explanaion is ha Caliornia has a number o disrics, including some

    sizeable ones, wih skewed disribuions o eacher experience and credenials.

    Te wihin-disric salary gaps we observe in Florida reec roubling paterns in

    regular per pupil expendiures. Tese ndings sugges here are some disrics

    in Florida where regular per pupil expendiures in ile I schools are lower han

    hose in non-ile I schools. Conclusive evidence on his patern requires knowl-

    edge o which schools acually receive ile I unds. Our daa lack his crucial

    inormaion bu a closer descripive look a a ew disrics reinorces he roubling

    regression resuls.

    Figure 3 presens he average regular per pupil expendiures or subses o schools

    in ve disrics illusraing he range o concern abou comparabiliy problems in

    Florida. High schools are omited rom his analysis because high-povery high

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    18 Center or American Progress | The Implementation and Eectiveness o Supplemental Educational Services

    schools oen do no receive ile I unds. For

    each disric, he blue bars represen he average

    regular per pupil expendiures among elemen-

    ary and middle schools wih suden povery

    raes in he lowes quarile. Few o hese

    schools are likely o receive ile I unds. Tered bars indicae average spending in schools

    in he highes quarile o povery, which are

    pracically guaraneed o receive ile I unds

    (see Figure 3).

    Polk Couny presens he graves concern. Is

    lowes-povery schools, which generally did

    no receive ile I unds, ouspen he counys

    highes-povery schools, which did receive

    ile I unds. Tis patern srongly suggessile I unds did no play a supplemenal role

    in Polk Counys ile I schools. Te siuaion

    in Osceola Couny is scarcely beter. Te aver-

    age regular per pupil expendiure among he highes-povery schools in Osceola

    was jus $101 more han among he lowes-povery schools. Tis dierence cor-

    responds o abou a quarer o he approximaely $380 per suden ile I alloca-

    ion he counys highes-povery schools received during he period sudied, so

    i is also dubious o conclude ha ile I unds played a supplemenal role in

    Osceolas ile I schools.34

    Te sory is progressively less quesionable in Indian River, Manaee, and

    Marin counies bu i is imporan o keep in mind ha aggregae gures may

    obscure underlying comparabiliy problems, an observaion ha inorms our

    recommendaions.

    Figure 3

    Average spending among elementary and middle

    schools, by district and student poverty rates

    Regular per pupil expenditures

    $8,000

    $7,000

    $6,000

    $5,000

    $4,000

    $3,000

    $2,000

    $1,000

    $0

    Polk Osceola Indian River Manatee Martin

    Lowest quartile Highest quartile

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    Recommendations | American Enterprise Institu

    Recommendations

    Close the comparability loophole

    Widespread hidden salary gaps beween eachers in low- and higher-income

    schools sugges he curren ile I comparabiliy requiremen condones inequiy.

    Te provision explicily excludes rom comparabiliy deerminaions salary di-

    erenials based on eacher experience. As a resul, mos disrics jus repor base

    salaries rom se salary schedules o demonsrae comparabiliy, obscuring inequi-

    ies in eacher disribuion across low- and higher-income schools. Removing hisexclusion rom he law would go a long way oward ensuring high-povery schools

    receive a air share o resources.35 Ideally, he provision would be amended o

    require ha disrics demonsrae comparabiliy using expendiures measured in

    acual dollars, including hose dollars ied up in eacher salary.

    A sronger accounabiliy requiremen, however, would be counerproduc-

    ive i disrics engaged in involunary ransers o eachers among schools in

    order o comply wih he requiremen. Te poenial or such behavior would

    be empered by a srong sysem o accounabiliy or suden achievemen.

    Accounabiliy gives ocials an incenive o ensure ile I schools have eecive

    eachers and exra resources o suppor heir work. Simply moving eachers wih

    relaively high salaries o ile I schools would no serve his goal well because

    high salaries do no necessarily imply higher eacher eeciveness. Similarly,

    sudens in low-income schools may be beter served by addiional services or

    inervenions raher han by more expensive eachers. As a resul, he reauho-

    rized version o comparabiliy should orbid involunary eacher ransers as a

    means o complying wih he comparabiliy requiremen. Tis would encourage

    disrics and schools o look o oher mehods o providing resources o heir

    low-income schools o improve achievemen.

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    20 Center or American Progress | The Implementation and Eectiveness o Supplemental Educational Services

    ESEA reporting requirement in the manner of OCR/ARRA

    Opaciy in he disribuion o nancial resources o schools is unaccepable in

    a new era o responsibiliy marked by scal consrains. Furhermore, school

    disrics wishing o allocae resources in ways ha improve suden achievemen

    and narrow achievemen gaps would do well o rs undersand how and wherehey acually spend heir unds.36 Alhough Florida is a leader in his area, many

    saes are ar behind in making daa on school-level spending publicly available. As

    a resul, he reauhorizaion o ESEA should include a provision ha requires dis-

    rics o repor annually o he U.S. Deparmen o Educaion heir acual school-

    level expendiures, broken ou several ways as in he Oce o Civil Righs biennial

    survey, or each o heir schools.

    Tese daa are necessary or monioring comparabiliy bu here is also a sraegic

    argumen or such a reporing requiremen. Greaer ransparency around how

    acual dollars are allocaed o schools and expended by hem could evenuallylead o shiing a greaer share o discreion over expendiures rom disrics

    cenral oces o school leaders. Such discreion is no a panacea, o course, bu i

    is dicul o promoe sraegic managerial behavior in an environmen where he

    mos imporan lines in school budges reec disric-level averages.

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    Conclusion | American Enterprise Institu

    Tis paper has modeled an analyic approach o summarizing one saes hidden

    eacher salary and per pupil spending gaps. Florida can ake disinc pride as a

    leader in promoing ransparency around he disribuion o acual resources o

    schools. Tis paper has exploied his ransparency o shed ligh on he exen o

    inequiy creaed by policies in which unds ollow eacher experience and cur-

    renly condoned by he very ederal law mean o enhance he educaional experi-

    ences aorded children in areas o concenraed povery. Tere is reason o believe

    wihin-disric expendiure paterns in mos saes and he Disric o Columbiado no avor high-povery schools.

    Federal policymakers should heed hese ndings as hey consider he reauhoriza-

    ion o he Elemenary and Secondary Educaion Ac. I is clear, a leas in Florida,

    ha he comparabiliy requiremen o ile I is no robus enough o ensure schools

    receive heir air shares o sae and local resources, irrespecive o heir ile I saus.

    Beyond implicaions or reauhorizaion o ESEA, his paper should provide civil

    righs aciviss wih new moivaion o ake advanage o he counrywide school-

    level expendiure daa ha he U.S. Deparmen o Educaion plans o release in

    May 2011. Tese daa will undoubedly shed more ligh on persisen inequiy in

    he way disrics allocae resources o heir schools.

    Conclusion

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    22 Center or American Progress | The Implementation and Eectiveness o Supplemental Educational Services

    Florida background appendix

    Public K-12 educaion in Florida is primarily unded hrough he Florida

    Educaion Finance Program, or FEFP, which was passed in 1973.37 Te FEFP

    deermines how much local and sae unding each school disric in he sae

    receives or each school year. Sae unding comes almos enirely rom sales axes

    and lotery revenues. Local unding comes rom propery ax revenues.

    Sae unding is deermined using a weighed coun o ull-ime equivalen su-

    dens paricipaing in educaional programs in each disric. Each disric con-ducs a survey o is suden paricipaion in dieren programs a leas our imes

    during he year. Te sae collecs his inormaion and muliplies he number o

    sudens in each program by a program cos acor deermined by disric repors

    on he cos o implemening each program. Tis produces a weighed ull-ime

    equivalen, or FE, suden coun. Te baseline cos, weighed a 1.000, is ha

    associaed wih basic educaion or ourh- hrough eighh-graders. Sudens in

    kindergaren hrough hird grade; ninh hrough 12h grade; or hose enrolled in

    Excepional Suden Educaion programs (special educaion and gied sudens),

    English or speakers o oher languages, or career educaion programs are assigned

    a weigh above 1.000. Disrics also can add addiional weighs i hey qualiy

    or he Small Disric supplemen; he Small, Isolaed High School Supplemen;

    or one o he bonus FE programs associaed wih achievemen on Advanced

    Placemen, Inernaional Baccalaureae, or Advanced Inernaional Cericae o

    Educaion ess. Tere is no an addiional weigh or sudens eligible or ree and

    reduced-price lunch or any oher measure o povery.

    Te weighed FE suden coun is muliplied by he sae base suden alloca-

    iona minimum per pupil unding amoun ha is deermined annually by he

    sae legislaure. In 2002, he rs year o daa included in his sudy, he basesuden allocaion was $3,298.48. In 2008, he las year o he sudy, he base

    suden allocaion was $4,079.74.38 Tis amoun is hen muliplied by a Disric

    Cos Dierenial o provide a base unding amoun or each disric. Te Disric

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    Florida background appendix | American Enterprise Institu

    Cos Dierenial is based on he hree-year average o each disrics Florida Price

    Level Index. Tis accouns or variaion in cos o living and providing educaional

    services in dieren disrics.

    Aer he base unding amoun is deermined, Florida provides or several supple-

    menal sources o unding. Disrics are provided addiional unding based onseveral acors including he number o sudens enrolled in Juvenile Jusice

    Programs, wheher enrollmen is declining in he disric, and wheher he disric

    is considered sparse. Appropriaions are also disribued o disrics or sae

    schools programs, reading programs, insrucional maerials, suden ranspora-

    ion, and a meri award program. School disrics are also provided wih und-

    ing or supplemenal academic insrucion or sudens ha score poorly on he

    saes sandardized ess and a guaraneed allocaion or sudens paricipaing

    in Excepional Suden Educaion. Finally, school disrics receive unding rom

    he sae lotery and school recogniion program and rom a class-size reducion

    caegorical program. Tis supplemenal unding, combined wih he base undingamoun, is he oal sae conribuion or disric unding.

    Minimum local unding or K-12 school disrics is also deermined annually by

    he sae legislaure. Each year he legislaure ses a oal required level o local

    eor or all counies in he sae, each o which houses a school disric. In 2002

    he required local eor was $4.37 billion and in 2008 he required local eor

    was $7.9 billion.39 Te sae deermines how much each couny mus conribue

    oward his oal based on heir mos recen ax valuaions. Tis inormaion is

    used o deermine each counys local eor millage rae (propery ax rae) ha

    when combined add up o he oal required local eor amoun. Counies, how-

    ever, ypically allocae more unding o heir K-12 school disrics han specied

    in he minimum se by he sae.

    In 2008 K-12 school disric unding in Florida was comprised o 38.8 percen rom

    sae sources, 52.5 percen rom local sources, and 8.6 percen rom ederal sources.40

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    24 Center or American Progress | The Implementation and Eectiveness o Supplemental Educational Services

    Technical appendix

    able A1 provides a breakdown o he analyic sample by he number o schools

    serving each grade level. Tis inormaion has some bearing on our analysis o

    average eacher salaries and per pupil expendiures in schools across Florida

    because school ype ypically aecs he amoun o resources schools receive. All

    school disrics in Florida are K-12 disrics delineaed by couny. Noe: Charer

    schools, early learning schools, and schools ha serve ewer han hree grade

    levels have been eliminaed rom he analyic sample.

    able A2 oers descripive saisics on various indicaors or he 2,579 schools

    in 67 school disrics included in he analyic sample. Te sample includes up

    o seven years o daa or each school. Schools wih ewer han wo years o daa

    were omited rom he sample. Addiionally, schools wih paricularly low or high

    values o per pupil expendiures, average eacher salaries, or pupil-eacher raios

    were omited rom he sample.41 Missing values or ree and reduced-price lunch

    eligibiliy, special educaion, gied, and English language learners were impued

    wih school-level averages over years wihou missing values.

    Table a1

    Counts o the unique schools included in the inal analytic sample,

    by grade coniguration

    School type Count

    Elementary school 1,621

    Middle school 477

    High school 397

    Combination elementary-secondary school 84

    Total 2,579

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    Technical appendix | American Enterprise Institu

    Tis paper discusses wo ses o analyses using he hypohesized regression model

    represened by Equaion 1,

    Yijt

    = + Djt

    + Sijt

    + +

    where Yijt

    represens average eacher salary or regular per pupil expendiures in

    school i in disricj in school year t, Sijt

    represens a vecor o school characerisics,

    Djtrepresens a vecor o disric characerisics, represens a se o school-yearindicaors, and represens a complex error erm. Tis approach ignores random

    variaion wihin a school across he school years bu ted models, including he

    addiional sochasic componens, yielded similar poin esimaes.

    Table a2

    Descriptive statistics or variables representing school characteristics

    as well as student and teacher characteristics aggregated to the schoollevel or 2,579 unique schools over as many as seven years

    Variable Mean Std. Dev.

    Average teacher salary 41,766.11 3,710.14

    Total per pupil expenditure 6,426.51 1,197.48

    Regular per pupil expenditure 5,537.19 1,052.02

    Average years o teacher experience 12.20 3.01

    Enrollment 968.93 581.08

    Pupil-teacher ratio 16.71 2.25

    Full-time equivalent teachers 56.47 27.31

    Proportion American Indian* 0.00 0.00

    Proportion Asian 0.02 0.02

    Proportion Arican American 0.25 0.25

    Proportion Hispanic 0.21 0.22

    Proportion white 0.50 0.29

    Proportion minority 0.49 0.29

    Proportion o students eligible or ree and reduced-price lunch 0.51 0.24

    Proportion special education 0.15 0.05

    Proportion gited 0.04 0.05

    Proportion English language learners 0.09 0.11

    Proportion o teachers with advanced degrees 0.32 0.09

    *Actual mean value is .003 with a standard deviation of .004

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    26 Center or American Progress | The Implementation and Eectiveness o Supplemental Educational Services

    able A3 presens he resuls o ting various model specicaions o he daa.

    Column (1) represens he null model because i includes only error erms. Tese

    resuls are valuable because here is very litle research available on school-levelaverage eacher salary, paricularly on how hese salaries vary wihin and beween

    disrics. In Florida, i appears ha 46.9 percen o he variaion in average eacher

    salary occurs wihin disrics. Tis means variaion in average eacher salaries

    comes almos equally rom wihin and beween disrics.

    Table a3

    Estimated coeicients, p-values, and goodness-o-it statistics or a set o regression models itted to data in

    which the unit o observation is a school year and the outcome is average teacher salary

    Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7

    Student poverty rate -623.9 -2,026*** -1,776*** -2,133*** 152.5 79.28

    Year 2003 1,165*** 1,155*** 1,150*** 1,137*** 1,156*** 1,044***

    Year 2004 1,479*** 1,431*** 1,425*** 1,403*** 1,488*** 1,459***

    Year 2005 2,562*** 2,475*** 2,468*** 2,442*** 2,598*** 2,636***

    Year 2006 3,708*** 3,569*** 3,564*** 3,524*** 3,768*** 3,717***

    Year 2007 6,271*** 6,117*** 6,112*** 6,049*** 6,292*** 6,548***

    Year 2008 8,028*** 7,857*** 7,850*** 7,766*** 8,044*** 8,424***

    Proportion Hispanic 4,876** 4,866** 5,431*** -3,544*** -2,077**

    Proportion Arican American 1,443 1,347 1,403 -3,571*** -1,309**

    Elementary school 716.9 702.0 687.4*** 228.2

    Middle school 488.3 879.6 1,026*** 461.4**

    High school 1,800*** 2,595*** 3,278*** 1,686***

    Natural log o enrollment -993.2*** -1,257*** -375.2**

    Average years o teacher experience 522.5***

    Constant 41,762*** 38,566*** 37,977*** 37,064*** 43,647*** 41,863*** 28,412**

    Observations 17,123 17,123 17,123 17,123 17,123 17,123 17,123

    Schools 2,579 2,579 2,579 2,579 2,579 2,579 2,579

    Districts 67 67 67 67 67 67 67

    Between-district variance 12,054,784 13,162,384 10,387,729 10,355,524 10,368,400 3,900,625 825,554

    Within-district variance 10,666,756 2,295,225 2,289,169 2,289,169 2,250,000 2,250,000 1,985,28

    Intraclass correlation 0.531 0.851 0.819 0.819 0.822 0.634 0.294

    R^2 between districts 0 0.00172 0.0986 0.109 0.0870 0.664 0.898

    R^2 within districts 0 0.785 0.783 0.783 0.786 0.788 0.806

    R^2 overall 0 0.306 0.385 0.391 0.377 0.725 0.864

    ***p

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    Technical appendix | American Enterprise Institu

    Column (2) corresponds o a baseline conrol model ha includes suden pov-

    ery rae and a dummy indicaor or each year. Te addiion o hese indicaors

    explains 78.5 percen o he beween-disric variaion in average eacher salary.

    Alhough he coecien on suden povery is negaive, as would be expeced, i is

    no saisically signican. Column (3) corresponds o his baseline model wih

    he addiion o covariaes or he percen o Hispanic sudens and he perceno Arican-American sudens in each school. Te addiion o hese ehniciy

    variables explains 13.8 percen o he beween-disric variaion in average eacher

    salaries rom he null model. Addiionally, he coecien on suden povery

    becomes more negaive and saisically signican.

    Column (4) presens he model in column (3) wih he addiion o dummy indica-

    ors or school ypeelemenary, middle, and high school. Combinaion elemen-

    ary-secondary schools are used as he baseline. Te coecien on high school is

    boh saisically signican and posiive, indicaing ha high school eachers make

    signicanly more han elemenary-secondary combinaion school eachers.

    Column (5) adds he naural log o school enrollmen o he model, rounding ou

    he ull specicaion. Te esimaed coecien on suden povery in his model

    is -2,133 wih a p-value o less han .01, indicaing saisical signicance. Tis sug-

    gess ha, holding everyhing else in he model equal, a school wih a 100 percen

    povery rae has an average eacher salary $2,133 below ha in a school wih no

    low-income sudens. Similarly, his means ha a 10 percenage poin increase in

    povery rae corresponds o a $213.30 drop in average eacher salary.

    Column (6), however, includes dummy indicaors or each school disric. Tese

    indicaors are equivalen o including disric-level xed eecs in he model

    because hey accoun or boh observable and unobservable disric characer-

    isics. Te addiion o hese disric indicaors explains 53.7 percenage poins

    more o he beween-disric variaion in average eacher salary han he preceding

    model. When disric dummies are included, he coecien on suden povery

    rae is no longer saisically signican, suggesing ha observable and unobserv-

    able disric characerisics wipe ou he predicive power o suden povery.

    Finally, column (7) adds average years o eacher experience o he model wihdisric dummy indicaors. Despie he inclusion o he disric dummies, average

    eacher experience is saisically signican and indicaes ha a one-year increase

    in average eacher experience will ranslae o a $522.50 increase in average

    eacher salary while holding all oher variables equal. Tis is unsurprising because

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    28 Center or American Progress | The Implementation and Eectiveness o Supplemental Educational Services

    eacher salaries are primarily driven by years o eacher experience due o eacher

    salary schedules. Tis nal model explains 93.2 percen o beween-disric varia-

    ion and 81.4 percen o wihin-disric variaion in average eacher salaries.

    able A4 is analogous o able A3 bu wih he oucome variable being regular

    per pupil expendiures. Column (1) presens he null model as i only includeserror erms and no independen variables. Tis model suggess 57.5 percen o he

    variaion in regular per pupil expendiures lies wihin school disrics.

    Table a4

    Estimated coeicients, p-values, and goodness-o-it statistics or a set o regression models itted to data in

    which the unit o observation is a school year and the outcome is regular per pupil expenditure

    Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7

    Student poverty rate 1,218*** 1,294*** 741.4*** 474.0** 555.7*** 79.28

    Year 2003 111.3*** 109.6*** 94.64*** 117.8*** 104.4*** 1,044***Year 2004 448.5*** 446.6*** 423.5*** 414.9*** 412.0*** 1,459***

    Year 2005 875.6*** 873.5*** 852.0*** 844.2*** 841.5*** 2,636***

    Year 2006 1,331*** 1,329*** 1,293*** 1,274*** 1,273*** 3,717***

    Year 2007 2,054*** 2,052*** 1,979*** 1,949*** 1,951*** 6,548***

    Year 2008 2,419*** 2,417*** 2,311*** 2,159*** 2,209*** 8,424***

    Proportion Hispanic -443.0** -511.3*** -534.2*** -513.2*** -2,077**

    Proportion Arican American -863.6*** -242.3 -169.8 -69.48 -1,309**

    Elementary school -267.6* 1,022*** 1,169*** 1,351*** 228.2

    Middle school -1,695*** -1,772*** -1,900*** 461.4**High school 91.59 721.4** 1,686***

    Natural log o enrollment 1,800 470.7 -375.2**

    Average years o teacher experience 2,772*** 1,703*** 522.5***

    Constant 5,531*** 3,818*** 4,260*** 15,717*** 16,044*** 16,509*** 28,412**

    Observations 17,123 17,123 17,123 17,123 17,123 17,123 17,123

    Schools 2,579 2,579 2,579 2,579 2,579 2,579 2,579

    Districts 67 67 67 67 67 67 67

    Between-district variance 909544 781102 728633 602021 541254 294958 825,554

    Within-district variance 1232100 340706 340706 271649 265225 265225 1,985,28Intraclass correlation 0.425 0.696 0.681 0.689 0.671 0.527 0.294

    R^2 between districts 0 0.186 0.231 0.325 0.387 0.648 0.898

    R^2 within districts 0 0.718 0.718 0.772 0.778 0.779 0.806

    R^2 overall 0 0.454 0.478 0.528 0.572 0.717 0.864

    ***p

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    Technical appendix | American Enterprise Institu

    Column (2) represens a baseline conrol model ha includes suden pov-

    ery rae and dummy indicaors or each year o daa. Tis model accouns or

    72.3 percen o he wihin-disric variaion in regular per pupil expendiures.

    Unexpecedly, he coecien on suden povery rae is posiive and saisically

    signican. Column (3) builds upon he model specied in column (2) by adding

    dummy indicaors or school ypeelemenary, middle, and high schoolusingcombinaion elemenary-secondary schools as he baseline. Column (4) adds he

    naural log o enrollmen o he model specied in column (3). Te negaive sign

    on he coecien on he naural log o enrollmen suggess schools wih higher

    enrollmen numbers spend less per pupil.

    Column (5) adds covariaes on he percen o special educaion, gied, and

    English language learner sudens, rounding ou he ully specied model. Tis

    model explains 40.5 percen o he beween-disric variaion and 78.5 percen

    o he wihin-disric variaion in per pupil expendiures. Te esimaed coe-

    cien on suden povery rae is 474.0 wih a p value smaller han .01, indicaingsaisical signicance. Tis means, holding everyhing else equal, a school wih a

    100 percen povery rae will spend $474.00 more per pupil han a school wih no

    low-income sudens. Similarly, a 10 percenage poin increase in suden povery

    would ranslae ino a $47.40 increase in per pupil spending.

    Column (6) presens he ully specied model wih he addiion o dummy indica-

    ors or each disric, accouning or boh observable and unobservable disric char-

    acerisics. Te addiion o hese dummies accouns or 27.1 percenage poins more

    o he beween-disric variaion han he model specied in column (5). Unlike he

    hypohesized model or average eacher salaries, he coecien on suden povery

    rae remains saisically signican even wih he addiion o he disric dummy indi-

    caors. Tis suggess suden povery plays a signican role in deermining per pupil

    expendiures even aer accouning or observable and unobservable disric charac-

    erisics. In his model, he coecien on suden povery rae is 555.7 wih a p value

    less han .01. Tis indicaes ha a 10 percenage poin increase in povery rae, while

    holding all else equal, is associaed wih a $55.70 increase in per pupil expendiure.

    For breviy we do no presen resuls o a nal se o ted regression model. Te

    specicaion or hese models resembles ha in column (6) bu wih he addi-ion o a se o erms represening he ineracion o disrics xed eecs and

    heir schools suden povery raes. In his specicaion, each disric is allowed

    a dieren inercep and slope on he povery covariae. Tese resuls sugges he

    relaionship beween he suden povery rae in a school and is regular per pupil

    expendiures varies sysemaically by disric.

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    30 Center or American Progress | The Implementation and Eectiveness o Supplemental Educational Services

    For example, he coecien on he ineracion erm beween disric and povery

    or one disric is -4,595. aken ogeher wih he esimaed coecien on suden

    povery o 1,695, his means ha a school wih 100 percen povery in his disric

    would have a regular per pupil expendiure ha is $2,900 less han a school wih

    no low-income sudens. Compare his disric wih anoher disric wih an

    esimaed coecien o 1,816 on he ineracion erm. aken ogeher wih heesimaed coecien on suden povery, a school wih 100 percen povery in his

    disric would have per pupil expendiure ha is $3,511 more han a school in ha

    disric wihou any low-income sudens. Resuls or individual disrics should

    no be overinerpreed bu, aken as a whole, hey presen srong evidence ha he

    relaionship beween suden povery raes and regular per pupil expendiures is

    no o sucien magniude or even lacks he appropriae sign, were ile I unds

    arriving o schools receiving a air share o sae and local resources.

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    Endnotes | American Enterprise Institu

    Endnotes

    1 Raegen T. Miller, Comparable, Schmomparable (Washington:Center or American Progress, 2010), available at http://www.ameri-canprogress.org/issues/2010/05/comparable_schmomparable.html.

    2 Non-Regulatory Guidance: Title I Fiscal Issues (Department o Educa-tion, 2008), available at http://ed.gov/programs/titleiparta/scal-guid.pd.

    3 Elementary and Secondary Education Act, Section 1120A(c) (1) (A). 20U.S.C. 6321 (Government Printing Oce, 2004) available at http://www2.ed.gov/policy/elsec/leg/esea02/pg2.html#sec1120A.

    4 Government Accountability Oce, Elementary and SecondaryEducation Act: Potential Eects o Changing ComparabilityRequirements, GAO-11-258, Report to the Chairman, Committee on

    Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions, U.S. Senate, January 2011,Appendix I, p. 14.

    5 To date, educational expenditures are not widely reported at theschool level. Education Resource Strategies, a consultancy, providedthe authors with estimates or the percentage o school-levelexpenditures due to teacher salary in a handul o client districts.Estimates vary signicantly across districts and across analyticalapproaches. The most nuanced estimates range rom 42 percentto 55 percent. This evidence seems reasonable considering that,according to district-level data collected by the National Centeror Education Statistics, 40 percent o expenditures are directedto salaries o instructional personnel ( 60 percent o expendituresare dedicated to instruction, and 67 percent o that spending goestoward salaries). See: Education Finance Statistics Center, availableat http://nces.ed.gov/EDFIN/graph_index.asp.

    6 The Education Trust, Their Fair Share: How Teacher Salary GapsShortchange Poor Children in Texas (2006), available at http://www.

    edtrust.org/sites/edtrust.org/les/publications/les/Texas%20(Poor).pd; The Education TrustWest, Caliornias Hidden Teacher Spend-ing Gap: How State and District Budgeting Practices ShortchangePoor and Minority Students and Their Schools (2005), available athttp://www.hiddengap.org/resources/report031105;Ross Wiener,

    No Accounting or Fairness: Equitable Education Funding RemainsElusive in Ohio (Washington: The Education Trust, 2008), availableat http://www.edtrust.org/sites/edtrust.org/les/publications/les/NoAcctgorFairnessOH.pd.

    7 Jennier King Rice, The Impact o Teacher Experience: Examiningthe Evidence and Policy Implications (Washington: National Centeror Analysis o Longitudinal Data in Education Research, 2010),available at http://www.urban.org/publications/1001455.html.

    8 These data should be publicly available in May 2011. See: AmericanRecovery and Reinvestment Act o 2009: Title I, Part A Funds orGrants to Local Education Agencies, available at http://ed.gov/policy/gen/leg/recovery/actsheet/title-i.html; 2009-10 Civil Rights

    Data Collection (OMB # 1875-0240), available at http://www2.ed.gov/about/oces/list/ocr/docs/crdc-2009-10-p1-p2.doc.

    9 Districts allocate Title I unds to schools based on complicated rulesinvolving grade bands, poverty rates, and threshold levels o poverty.

    10 Charles Edwards and Andrew Brownstein, EDs Recent Title I Monitor-ing Refects R isk-Based Analysis, Title I Monitor16 (1) (2011).

    11 The ractions o school unds rom local, state, and ederal sourcesvary across states. For a concise explanation, see chapter 3, note 59in: Eric A. Hanushek and Alred A. Lindseth, Schoolhouses, Courthouses,and Statehouses: Solving the Funding-Achievement Puzzle in AmericasPublic Schools (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009).

    12 Lei Zhou, Revenues and Expenditures or Public Elementary andSecondary Education: School Year 200708 (Fiscal Year 2008)(Department o Education, 2010), available at http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2010/2010326.pd.

    13 Raegen T. Miller, Secret Recipes Revealed: Demystiying the TitleI, Part A Funding Formulas (Washington: Center or AmericanProgress, 2009), available at http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2009/08/title_one.html.

    14 For a concise treatment o the two strains o school nance litigation,see: Hanushek and Lindseth, Schoolhouses, Courthouses, and State-houses.

    15 Gordon MacInnes, In Plain Sight: Simple, Dicult Lessons rom NewJerseys Expensive Efort to Close the Achievement Gap (New York: TheCentury Foundation Press, 2009).

    16 Geo Mulvihill, School aid cuts argued in court, The PhiladelphiaInquirer, January 6, 2011, available at http://www.philly.com/philly/education/20110106_School_aid_cuts_argued_in_court.html.

    17 Arielle Levin Becker, State High Court Ruling Cites Need or Quanti-ying Education Quality.Hartord Courant, March 23, 2010, availableat http://articles.courant.com/2010-03-23/news/hc-school-unding-lawsuit-0323.artmar23_1_higher-education-adequate-education-public-education.

    18 More than 200 districts remain under the supervision o the Depart-ment o Justice with regards to compliance with court-ordereddesegregation plans. For an interesting current example, see:Stephanie McCrummen, Ruling on racial isolation in Miss. Schoolsrefects troubling broader trend, The Washington Post, April 20, 2010.

    19 Elementary and Secondary Education Act, Section 1120A(c) (1) (A).

    20 Non-Regulatory Guidance.

    21 To date, educational expenditures are not widely reported at theschool level. Education Resource Strategies, a consultancy, providedthe authors with estimates or the percentage o school-levelexpenditures due to teacher salary in a handul o client districts.Estimates vary signicantly across districts and across analyticalapproaches. The most nuanced estimates range rom 42 percentto 55 percent. This evidence seems reasonable considering that,according to district-level data collected by the National Centeror Education Statistics, 40 percent o expenditures are directed

    to salaries o instructional personnel (60 percent o expendituresare dedicated to instruction, and 67 percent o that spending goestowards salaries). S ee: Education Finance Statistics Center.

    22 Eric Hirsch and others, North Carolina Teacher Working Condi-tions Survey I nterim Report (Carrboro, NC: Center or TeachingQuality, 2006), available at http://www.teachingquality.org/pds/2006nctwcinterim.pd.

    http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2010/05/comparable_schmomparable.htmlhttp://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2010/05/comparable_schmomparable.htmlhttp://ed.gov/programs/titleiparta/fiscalguid.pdfhttp://ed.gov/programs/titleiparta/fiscalguid.pdfhttp://www2.ed.gov/policy/elsec/leg/esea02/pg2.html#sec1120Ahttp://www2.ed.gov/policy/elsec/leg/esea02/pg2.html#sec1120Ahttp://nces.ed.gov/EDFIN/graph_index.asphttp://www.edtrust.org/sites/edtrust.org/files/publications/files/Texas%20(Poor).pdfhttp://www.edtrust.org/sites/edtrust.org/files/publications/files/Texas%20(Poor).pdfhttp://www.edtrust.org/sites/edtrust.org/files/publications/files/Texas%20(Poor).pdfhttp://www.hiddengap.org/resources/report031105http://www.edtrust.org/sites/edtrust.org/files/publications/files/NoAcctgforFairnessOH.pdfhttp://www.edtrust.org/sites/edtrust.org/files/publications/files/NoAcctgforFairnessOH.pdfhttp://www.urban.org/publications/1001455.htmlhttp://ed.gov/policy/gen/leg/recovery/factsheet/title-i.htmlhttp://ed.gov/policy/gen/leg/recovery/factsheet/title-i.htmlhttp://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/crdc-2009-10-p1-p2.dochttp://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/crdc-2009-10-p1-p2.dochttp://nces.ed.gov/pubs2010/2010326.pdfhttp://nces.ed.gov/pubs2010/2010326.pdfhttp://nces.ed.gov/pubs2010/2010326.pdfhttp://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2009/08/title_one.htmlhttp://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2009/08/title_one.htmlhttp://www.philly.com/philly/education/20110106_School_aid_cuts_argued_in_court.htmlhttp://www.philly.com/philly/education/20110106_School_aid_cuts_argued_in_court.htmlhttp://articles.courant.com/2010-03-23/news/hc-school-funding-lawsuit-0323.artmar23_1_higher-education-adequate-education-public-educationhttp://articles.courant.com/2010-03-23/news/hc-school-funding-lawsuit-0323.artmar23_1_higher-education-adequate-education-public-educationhttp://articles.courant.com/2010-03-23/news/hc-school-funding-lawsuit-0323.artmar23_1_higher-education-adequate-education-public-educationhttp://www.teachingquality.org/pdfs/2006nctwcinterim.pdfhttp://www.teachingquality.org/pdfs/2006nctwcinterim.pdfhttp://www.teachingquality.org/pdfs/2006nctwcinterim.pdfhttp://www.teachingquality.org/pdfs/2006nctwcinterim.pdfhttp://articles.courant.com/2010-03-23/news/hc-school-funding-lawsuit-0323.artmar23_1_higher-education-adequate-education-public-educationhttp://articles.courant.com/2010-03-23/news/hc-school-funding-lawsuit-0323.artmar23_1_higher-education-adequate-education-public-educationhttp://articles.courant.com/2010-03-23/news/hc-school-funding-lawsuit-0323.artmar23_1_higher-education-adequate-education-public-educationhttp://www.philly.com/philly/education/20110106_School_aid_cuts_argued_in_court.htmlhttp://www.philly.com/philly/education/20110106_School_aid_cuts_argued_in_court.htmlhttp://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2009/08/title_one.htmlhttp://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2009/08/title_one.htmlhttp://nces.ed.gov/pubs2010/2010326.pdfhttp://nces.ed.gov/pubs2010/2010326.pdfhttp://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/crdc-2009-10-p1-p2.dochttp://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/crdc-2009-10-p1-p2.dochttp://ed.gov/policy/gen/leg/recovery/factsheet/title-i.htmlhttp://ed.gov/policy/gen/leg/recovery/factsheet/title-i.htmlhttp://www.urban.org/publications/1001455.htmlhttp://www.edtrust.org/sites/edtrust.org/files/publications/files/NoAcctgforFairnessOH.pdfhttp://www.edtrust.org/sites/edtrust.org/files/publications/files/NoAcctgforFairnessOH.pdfhttp://www.hiddengap.org/resources/report031105http://www.edtrust.org/sites/edtrust.org/files/publications/files/Texas%20(Poor).pdfhttp://www.edtrust.org/sites/edtrust.org/files/publications/files/Texas%20(Poor).pdfhttp://www.edtrust.org/sites/edtrust.org/files/publications/files/Texas%20(Poor).pdfhttp://nces.ed.gov/EDFIN/graph_index.asphttp://www2.ed.gov/policy/elsec/leg/esea02/pg2.html#sec1120Ahttp://www2.ed.gov/policy/elsec/leg/esea02/pg2.html#sec1120Ahttp://ed.gov/programs/titleiparta/fiscalguid.pdfhttp://ed.gov/programs/titleiparta/fiscalguid.pdfhttp://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2010/05/comparable_schmomparable.htmlhttp://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2010/05/comparable_schmomparable.html
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    32 Center or American Progress | The Implementation and Eectiveness o Supplemental Educational Services

    23 Benjamin Scadi, David L. Sjoquist, and Todd R. Stinebrickner, DoTeachers Really Leave or Higher Paying Jobs in Alternative Occupa-tions?,Advances in Economic Analysis & Policy6 (1) (2006).

    24 Charles Clotelter and others, High-Poverty Schools and the Distribu-tion o Teachers and Principals. Working Paper 1 (National Center orthe Analysis o Longitudinal Data in Education Research, 2007), avail-able at http://www.caldercenter.org/PDF/1001057_High_Poverty.pd.

    25 Marguerite Roza, Larry Miller, and Paul Hill, Strengthening Title I toHelp High-Poverty Schools: How Title I Funds Fit Into District Al-location Patterns (Seattle: Center on Reinventing Public Education,

    2005); Marguerite Roza, What i We Closed the Title I ComparabilityLoophole? In Ensuring Equal Opportunity in Public Education (Wash-ington: Center or American Progress, 2008); Karen Hawley Milesand Marguerite R oza, Understanding Student-Weighted Allocationas a Means to Greater School R esource Equity, Peabody Journal oEducation 81 (3) (2006): 3662.

    26 The Education Trust, Their Fair Share; The Education TrustWest,Caliornias Hidden Teacher Spending Gap; Wiener, No Accounting

    or Fairness.

    27 Saba Bireda and Raegen Miller, Walking the Talk: Closing theComparability Requirement Loophole in Title I o the Elementaryand Secondary Education Act (Washington: Center or AmericanProgress, 2010), available at http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2010/03/comparability_brie.html.

    28 The novelty o this reporting requirement may represent a realobstacle to successul reporting in some states. For an example o

    guidance oered by a state educational agency to school districts,see: School Based Reporting, available at http://www.k12.wa.us/sas/bldg_lvl/sbr.asp.

    29 History o Statewide Assessment Program (HSAP), available athttp://www.fdoe.org/asp/hsap/hsap6878.asp.

    30 For a complete explanation o the FEFP, see: Florida Department oEducation, Funding or Florida School Districts (2010), available athttp://www.fdoe.org/ep/pd/epdist.pd.

    31 Florida Title I Monitoring Report, available at http://www2.ed.gov/admins/lead/account/monitoring/reports10/frpt.doc (last accessedDecember 21, 2010).

    32 Common Core o Data, available at http://nces.ed.gov/ccd/.

    33 Schools with per pupil expenditures, average teacher salaries, andpupil-teacher ratios in the .1 percentile and 99.9 percentile weredropped rom the sample. For example, schools with a per pupilexpenditure below or equal to $2,416.692 and equal to or above$15,679.52 were eliminated rom the sample. For average teachersalary, schools with values at or below $29,891.22 and at or above$61,758.91 were dropped.

    34 During the interval studied, Florida received $487 in Title I unds perstudent receiving ree or reduced-price lunch. Counties receivedunding at dierent rates due to complicated ormulas, and countiesdistribute unds to schools in such a way that not all Title I-eligible

    schools receive unds. Osceola Countys high-poverty schoolsaverage 78 percent low-income students, so $380 per student is areasonable estimate o what these schools received in Title I undsduring the years studied, on average. Historical Title I allocationsavailable rom: U.S. Department o Education Budget History, avail-able at http://www2.ed.gov/about/overview/budget/history/index.html; numbers o students participating in special programs such asree or reduced-price lunch come rom: Common Core o Data.

    35 Bireda and Miller, Walking the Talk.

    36 Karen Hawley Miles and Stephen Frank, The Strategic School: Makingthe Most o People, Time, and Money(Thousand Oaks, CA: CorwinPress, 2008).

    37 For a complete explanation o the FEFP, see: Florida Department oEducation, Funding or Florida School Districts (2010), available athttp://www.fdoe.org/ep/pd/epdist.pd.

    38 Data collected rom: Oce o Funding and Financial Reporting,available at http://www.fdoe.org/ep/orep.asp.

    39 Ibid.

    40 Lei Zhou, Revenues and Expenditures or Public Elementary andSecondary Education.

    41 Schools with per pupil expenditures, average teacher salaries, andpupil-teacher ratios in the .1 percentile and 99.9 percentile weredropped rom the sample. Schools, or example, with a per pupilexpenditure below or equal to $2,416.692 and equal to or above$15,679.52 were eliminated rom the sample. For average teachersalary, schools with values at or below $29,891.22 and at or above$61,758.91 were dropped.

    http://www.teachingquality.org/pdfs/2006nctwcinterim.pdfhttp://www.teachingquality.org/pdfs/2006nctwcinterim.pdfhttp://www.teachingquality.org/pdfs/2006nctwcinterim.pdfhttp://www.teachingquality.org/pdfs/2006nctwcinterim.pdfhttp://www.teachingquality.org/pdfs/2006nctwcinterim.pdfhttp://www.teachingquality.org/pdfs/2006nctwcinterim.pdfhttp://www.teachingquality.org/pdfs/2006nctwcinterim.pdfhttp://www.teachingquality.org/pdfs/2006nctwcinterim.pdfhttp://www.teachingquality.org/pdfs/2006nctwcinterim.pdfhttp://www.teachingquality.org/pdfs/2006nctwcinterim.pdfhttp://www.teachingquality.org/pdfs/2006nctwcinterim.pdfhttp://www.teachingquality.org/pdfs/2006nctwcinterim.pdfhttp://www.teachingquality.org/pdfs/2006nctwcinterim.pdfhttp://www.caldercenter.org/PDF/1001057_High_Poverty.pdfhttp://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2010/03/comparability_brief.htmlhttp://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2010/03/comparability_brief.htmlhttp://www.k12.wa.us/safs/bldg_lvl/sbr.asphttp://www.k12.wa.us/safs/bldg_lvl/sbr.asphttp://www.fldoe.org/asp/hsap/hsap6878.asphttp://www.fldoe.org/fefp/pdf/fefpdist.pdfhttp://www2.ed.gov/admins/lead/account/monitoring/reports10/flrpt.dochttp://www2.ed.gov/admins/lead/account/monitoring/reports10/flrpt.dochttp://nces.ed.gov/ccd/http://www2.ed.gov/about/overview/budget/history/index.htmlhttp://www2.ed.gov/about/overview/budget/history/index.htmlhttp://www.fldoe.org/fefp/pdf/fefpdist.pdfhttp://www.fldoe.org/fefp/offrfefp.asphttp://www.fldoe.org/fefp/offrfefp.asphttp://www.fldoe.org/fefp/pdf/fefpdist.pdfhttp://www2.ed.gov/about/overview/budget/history/index.htmlhttp://www2.ed.gov/about/overview/budget/history/index.htmlhttp://nces.ed.gov/ccd/http://www2.ed.gov/admins/lead/account/monitoring/reports10/flrpt.dochttp://www2.ed.gov/admins/lead/account/monitoring/reports10/flrpt.dochttp://www.fldoe.org/fefp/pdf/fefpdist.pdfhttp://www.fldoe.org/asp/hsap/hsap6878.asphttp://www.k12.wa.us/safs/bldg_lvl/sbr.asphttp://www.k12.wa.us/safs/bldg_lvl/sbr.asphttp://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2010/03/comparability_brief.htmlhttp://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2010/03/comparability_brief.htmlhttp://www.caldercenter.org/PDF/1001057_High_Poverty.pdf
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    About the authors and acknowledgements | American Enterprise Institu

    About the authors

    Jennifer S. Cohen is a senior policy analys wih he Educaion Policy Program

    a he New America Foundaion. She manages he programs Federal Educaion

    Budge Projec websie, analyzes school nance daa, and wries policy papers on

    a range o educaion policy opics. She is also he principal conribuor or heprojecs Ed Money Wach blog. Her work includes research and publicaions

    on he American Recovery and Reinvesmen Ac o 2009, ederal ile I grans

    or disadvanaged sudens, eacher disribuion and compensaion issues, and

    ederally unded school reorm eors. Beore joining New America, Ms. Cohen

    worked or he Educaion Policy Cener a he Urban Insiue in Washingon,

    D.C., where she perormed quaniaive and qualiaive research on such issues

    as high school reorm, eacher pensions, school unding, and he need or

    career-relevan courses in odays public schools. She serves on he board o he

    Appleree Early Learning Public Charer School, a school or 3- and 4-year-olds

    in he Disric o Columbia. She earned her bachelors degree in public policyrom Sanord Universiy and holds a masers degree in policy, organizaion, and

    leadership sudies rom he Sanord Universiy School o Educaion.

    Raegen T. Miller is he Associae Direcor or Educaion Research a American

    Progress. His work ocuses on scal equiy and eacher qualiy. Prior o join-

    ing American Progress, Raegen was a Naional Academy o Educaion/Spencer

    Posdocoral Fellow aliaed wih he Cener on Reinvening Public Educaion a

    he Universiy o Washingon. He holds a docorae in Adminisraion, Planning,

    and Social Policy rom he Harvard Graduae School o Educaion, where he

    augh courses on applied daa analysis and he oundaions o schooling and

    eaching. Raegens work in educaion policy is grounded in many years o pracice

    and service. He augh mahemaics in he Unied Saes and abroad, in radiional

    public schools and in charer schools, and in urban and suburban setings. Raegen

    compleed his eacher raining a Sanord Universiy, and he holds an M.S. in

    mahemaics rom Cal Poly, San Luis Obispo. He was a rusee o Prospec Hill

    Academy Charer School in Somerville, Massachusets, and he served as presiden

    o his local eachers union in Palo Alo, Caliornia.

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