G.R. No. 186228 March 15, 2010PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,Plaintiff-Appellee,vs.ANTONIO LAUGA Y PINA ALIAS TERIO,Accused-Appellant.D E C I S I O NPEREZ,J.:Before Us for final review is the trial courts conviction of the appellant for the rape of his thirteen-year old daughter.Consistent with the ruling of this Court in People v. Cabalquinto,1the real name and the personal circumstances of the victim, and any other information tending to establish or compromise her identity, including those of her immediate family or household members, are not disclosed in this decision.The FactsIn an Information dated 21 September 2000,2the appellant was accused of the crime of QUALIFIED RAPE allegedly committed as follows:That on or about the 15th day of March 2000, in the evening, at Barangay xxx, municipality of xxx, province of Bukidnon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being the father of AAA with lewd design, with the use of force and intimidation, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally have carnal knowledge with his own daughter AAA, a 13 year[s]old minor against her will.3On 12 October 2000, appellant entered a plea of not guilty.4During the pre-trial conference, the prosecution and the defense stipulated and admitted: (a) the correctness of the findings indicated in the medical certificate of the physician who examined AAA; (b) that AAA was only thirteen (13) years old when the alleged offense was committed; and (c) that AAA is the daughter of the appellant.5On trial, three (3) witnesses testified for the prosecution, namely: victim AAA;6her brother BBB;7and one Moises Boy Banting,8a "bantay bayan" in the barangay. Their testimonies revealed the following:In the afternoon of 15 March 2000, AAA was left alone at home.9AAAs father, the appellant, was having a drinking spree at the neighbors place.10Her mother decided to leave because when appellant gets drunk, he has the habit of mauling AAAs mother.11Her only brother BBB also went out in the company of some neighbors.12At around 10:00 oclock in the evening, appellant woke AAA up;13removed his pants, slid inside the blanket covering AAA and removed her pants and underwear;14warned her not to shout for help while threatening her with his fist;15and told her that he had a knife placed above her head.16He proceeded to mash her breast, kiss her repeatedly, and "inserted his penis inside her vagina."17Soon after, BBB arrived and found AAA crying.18Appellant claimed he scolded her for staying out late.19BBB decided to take AAA with him.20While on their way to their maternal grandmothers house, AAA recounted her harrowing experience with their father.21Upon reaching their grandmothers house, they told their grandmother and uncle of the incident,22after which, they sought the assistance of Moises Boy Banting.23Moises Boy Banting found appellant in his house wearing only his underwear.24He invited appellant to the police station,25to which appellant obliged. At the police outpost, he admitted to him that he raped AAA because he was unable to control himself.26The following day, AAA submitted herself to physical examination.27Dra. Josefa Arlita L. Alsula, Municipal Health Officer of x x x, Bukidnon, issued the Medical Certificate, which reads:hyperemic vulvae with 4 oclock & 6 oclock freshly lacerated hymen; (+) minimal to moderate bloody discharges 2 to an alleged raping incident28On the other hand, only appellant testified for the defense. He believed that the charge against him was ill-motivated because he sometimes physically abuses his wife in front of their children after engaging in a heated argument,29and beats the children as a disciplinary measure.30He went further to narrate how his day was on the date of the alleged rape.He alleged that on 15 March 2000, there was no food prepared for him at lunchtime.31Shortly after, AAA arrived.32She answered back when confronted.33This infuriated him that he kicked her hard on her buttocks.34Appellant went back to work and went home again around 3 oclock in the afternoon.35Finding nobody at home,36he prepared his dinner and went to sleep.37Later in the evening, he was awakened by the members of the "Bantay Bayan" headed by Moises Boy Banting.38They asked him to go with them to discuss some matters.39He later learned that he was under detention because AAA charged him of rape.40On 8 July 2006, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 9, Malaybalay City, Bukidnon, rendered its decision41in Criminal Case No. 10372-0, finding appellant guilty of rape qualified by relationship and minority, and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.42It also ordered him to indemnify AAAP50,000.00 as moral damages, andP50,000.00 as civil indemnity with exemplary damages ofP25,000.00.43On 30 September 2008, the decision of the trial court was AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS44by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 00456-MIN.45The appellate court found that appellant is not eligible for parole and it increased both the civil indemnity and moral damages fromP50,000.00 toP75,000.00.46On 24 November 2008, the Court of Appeals gave due course to the appellants notice of appeal.47This Court required the parties to simultaneously file their respective supplemental briefs,48but both manifested that they will no longer file supplemental pleadings.49The lone assignment of error in the appellants brief is that, the trial court gravely erred in finding him guilty as charged despite the failure of the prosecution to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt,50because: (1) there were inconsistencies in the testimonies of AAA and her brother BBB;51(2) his extrajudicial confession before Moises Boy Banting was without the assistance of a counsel, in violation of his constitutional right;52and (3) AAAs accusation was ill-motivated.53Our RulingAppellant contests the admissibility in evidence of his alleged confession with a "bantay bayan" and the credibility of the witnesses for the prosecution.Admissibility in Evidence of an Extrajudicial Confession before a "Bantay Bayan"Appellant argues that even if he, indeed, confessed to Moises Boy Banting, a "bantay bayan," the confession was inadmissible in evidence because he was not assisted by a lawyer and there was no valid waiver of such requirement.54The case of People v. Malngan55is the authority on the scope of the Miranda doctrine provided for under Article III, Section 12(1)56and (3)57of the Constitution. In Malngan, appellant questioned the admissibility of her extrajudicial confessions given to the barangay chairman and a neighbor of the private complainant. This Court distinguished. Thus:Arguably, the barangay tanods, including the Barangay Chairman, in this particular instance, may be deemed as law enforcement officer for purposes of applying Article III, Section 12(1) and (3), of the Constitution. When accused-appellant was brought to the barangay hall in the morning of 2 January 2001, she was already a suspect, actually the only one, in the fire that destroyed several houses x x x. She was, therefore, already under custodial investigation and the rights guaranteed by x x x [the] Constitution should have already been observed or applied to her. Accused-appellants confession to Barangay Chairman x x x was made in response to the interrogation made by the latter admittedly conducted without first informing accused-appellant of her rights under the Constitution or done in the presence of counsel. For this reason, the confession of accused-appellant, given to Barangay Chairman x x x, as well as the lighter found x x x in her bag are inadmissible in evidence against her x x x.1avvphi1[But such does] not automatically lead to her acquittal. x x x [T]he constitutional safeguards during custodial investigations do not apply to those not elicited through questioning by the policeor their agentsbut given in an ordinary manner whereby the accused verbally admits x x x as x x x in the case at bar when accused-appellant admitted to Mercedita Mendoza, one of the neighbors x x x [of the private complainant].58(Emphasis supplied)Following the rationale behind the ruling in Malngan, this Court needs to ascertain whether or not a "bantay bayan" may be deemed a law enforcement officer within the contemplation of Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution.In People of the Philippines v. Buendia,59this Court had the occasion to mention the nature of a "bantay bayan," that is, "a group of male residents living in [the] area organized for the purpose of keeping peace in their community[,which is] an accredited auxiliary of the x x x PNP."60Also, it may be worthy to consider that pursuant to Section 1(g) of Executive Order No. 309 issued on 11 November 1987, as amended, a Peace and Order Committee in each barangay shall be organized "to serve as implementing arm of the City/Municipal Peace and Order Council at the Barangay level."61The composition of the Committee includes, among others: (1) thePunong Barangayas Chairman; (2) the Chairman of theSangguniang Kabataan; (3) a Member of theLupon Tagapamayapa; (4) aBarangay Tanod; and (5) at least three (3) Members of existing Barangay-Based Anti-Crime or neighborhood Watch Groups or a Non Government Organization Representative well-known in his community.62This Court is, therefore, convinced that barangay-based volunteer organizations in the nature of watch groups, as in the case of the "bantay bayan," are recognized by the local government unit to perform functions relating to the preservation of peace and order at the barangay level. Thus, without ruling on the legality of the actions taken by Moises Boy Banting, and the specific scope of duties and responsibilities delegated to a "bantay bayan," particularly on the authority to conduct a custodial investigation, any inquiry he makes has the color of a state-related function and objective insofar as the entitlement of a suspect to his constitutional rights provided for under Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution, otherwise known as the Miranda Rights, is concerned.We, therefore, find the extrajudicial confession of appellant, which was taken without a counsel, inadmissible in evidence.Be that as it may, We agree with the Court of Appeals that the conviction of the appellant was not deduced solely from the assailed extrajudicial confession but "from the confluence of evidence showing his guilt beyond reasonable doubt."63Credibility of the Witnesses for the ProsecutionAppellant assails the inconsistencies in the testimonies of AAA and her brother BBB. AAA testified that BBB accompanied her to the house of their grandmother. Thereafter, they, together with her relatives, proceeded to look for a "bantay bayan." On the other hand, BBB testified that he brought her sister to the house of their "bantay bayan" after he learned of the incident.Citing Bartocillo v. Court of Appeals,64appellant argues that "where the testimonies of two key witnesses cannot stand together, the inevitable conclusion is that one or both must be telling a lie, and their story a mere concoction."65The principle, however, is not applicable in the case at bar. In Bartocillo, the two testimonies could not simply stand together because:On one hand, if we are to believe Susan, Orlando could not have possibly seen the hacking incident since he had accompanied Vicente home. On the other hand, if we are to accept the testimony of Orlando, then Susan could not have possibly witnessed the hacking incident since she was with Vicente at that time.Here, the testimony of AAA does not run contrary to that of BBB. Both testified that they sought the help of a "bantay bayan." Their respective testimonies differ only as to when the help was sought for, which this Court could well attribute to the nature of the testimony of BBB, a shortcut version of AAAs testimony that dispensed with a detailed account of the incident.At any rate, the Court of Appeals is correct in holding that the assailed inconsistency is too trivial to affect the veracity of the testimonies.66In fact, inconsistencies which refer to minor, trivial or inconsequential circumstances even strengthen the credibility of the witnesses, as they erase doubts that such testimonies have been coached or rehearsed.67Appellants contention that AAA charged him of rape only because she bore grudges against him is likewise unmeritorious. This Court is not dissuaded from giving full credence to the testimony of a minor complainant by motives of feuds, resentment or revenge.68As correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals:Indeed, mere disciplinary chastisement is not strong enough to make daughters in a Filipino family invent a charge that would not only bring shame and humiliation upon them and their families but also bring their fathers into the gallows of death.69The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that it is unbelievable for a daughter to charge her own father with rape, exposing herself to the ordeal and embarrassment of a public trial and subjecting her private parts to examination if such heinous crime was not in fact committed.70No person, much less a woman, could attain such height of cruelty to one who has sired her, and from whom she owes her very existence, and for which she naturally feels loving and lasting gratefulness.71Even when consumed with revenge, it takes a certain amount of psychological depravity for a young woman to concoct a story which would put her own father to jail for the most of his remaining life and drag the rest of the family including herself to a lifetime of shame.72It is highly improbable for [AAA] against whom no proof of sexual perversity or loose morality has been shown to fake charges much more against her own father. In fact her testimony is entitled to greater weight since her accusing words were directed against a close relative.73Elements of RapeHaving established the credibility of the witnesses for the prosecution, We now examine the applicability of the Anti-Rape Law of 199774to the case at bar.The law provides, in part, that rape is committed, among others, "[b]y a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman" "through force, threat or intimidation."75The death penalty shall be imposed if it is committed with aggravating/qualifying circumstances, which include, "[w]hen the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent."76The consistent and forthright testimony of AAA detailing how she was raped, culminating with the penetration of appellants penis into her vagina, suffices to prove that appellant had carnal knowledge of her. When a woman states that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape was committed.77Further, when such testimony corresponds with medical findings, there is sufficient basis to conclude that the essential requisites of carnal knowledge have been established.78The Court of Appeals pointed out that the element of force or intimidation is not essential when the accused is the father of the victim, inasmuch as his superior moral ascendancy or influence substitutes for violence and intimidation.79At any rate, AAA was actually threatened by appellant with his fist and a knife allegedly placed above AAAs head.80It may be added that the self-serving defense of appellant cannot prevail over the positive and straightforward testimony of AAA. Settled is the rule that, "alibi is an inherently weak defense that is viewed with suspicion because it is easy to fabricate."81"Alibi and denial must be supported by strong corroborative evidence in order to merit credibility."82Moreover, for the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must establish two elements (1) he was not at the locus delicti at the time the offense was committed; and (2) it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene at the time of its commission.83Appellant failed in this wise.Aggravating/Qualifying CircumstancesThe presence of the qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship with the offender in the instant case has likewise been adequately established. Both qualifying circumstances were specifically alleged in the Information, stipulated on and admitted during the pre-trial conference, and testified to by both parties in their respective testimonies. Also, such stipulation and admission, as correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, are binding upon this Court because they are judicial admissions within the contemplation of Section 4, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules of Court. It provides:Sec. 4. Judicial admissions. - An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made.PenaltyFinally, in increasing the amount of civil indemnity and damages each fromP50,000.00 toP75,000.00, the Court of Appeals correctly considered controlling jurisprudence to the effect that where, as here, the rape is committed with any of the qualifying/aggravating circumstances warranting the imposition of the death penalty, the victim is entitled toP75,000.00 as civil indemnity ex delicto84andP75,000.00 as moral damages.85However, the award of exemplary damages should have been increased fromP25,000.00 toP30,000.00.86Also, the penalty of reclusion perpetua in lieu of death was correctly imposed considering that the imposition of the death penalty upon appellant would have been appropriate were it not for the enactment of Republic Act No. 9346, or An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines.87We further affirm the ruling of the Court of Appeals on appellants non-eligibility for parole. Sec. 3 of Republic Act No. 9346 clearly provides that "persons convicted of offenses punished withreclusion perpetua, or whose sentences will be reduced toreclusion perpetuaby reason of the law, shall not be eligible for parole."WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 30 September 2008 in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 00456-MIN is hereby AFFIRMED. Appellant Antonio Lauga is GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of qualified rape, and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole and to pay AAAP75,000.00 as civil indemnity,P75,000.00 as moral damages, andP30,000.00 as exemplary damages.SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 177809 October 16, 2009SPOUSES OMAR and MOSHIERA LATIP,Petitioners,vs.ROSALIE PALAA CHUA,Respondent.D E C I S I O NNACHURA,J.:Challenged in this petition for review on certiorari is the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 89300:1(1) reversing the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 274, Paraaque City in Civil Case No. 04-0052;2and (2) reinstating and affirming in toto the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 78, of the same city in Civil Case No. 2001-315.3First, we sift through the varying facts found by the different lower courts.The facts parleyed by the MeTC show that respondent Rosalie Chua (Rosalie) is the owner of Roferxane Building, a commercial building, located at No. 158 Quirino Avenue corner Redemptorist Road, Barangay Baclaran, Paraaque City.On July 6, 2001, Rosalie filed a complaint for unlawful detainer plus damages against petitioners, Spouses Omar and Moshiera Latip (Spouses Latip). Rosalie attached to the complaint a contract of lease over two cubicles in Roferxane Bldg., signed by Rosalie, as lessor, and by Spouses Latip, as lessees thereof.1 a vv p h ! 1The contract of lease reads:CONTRACT OF LEASEKNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:This Contract of Lease is entered into by and between:ROSALIE PALAA CHUA,Filipino, of legal age, married with office at 2/F JOFERXAN Building, F.B. Harrison St., Brgy. Baclaran, Paraaque City, and hereinafter referred to as the LESSOR,- and -OMAR LATIEFmarriage toMOSHIERA LATIEF,also both Filipino, of legal age with address at 24 Anahan St. RGV Homes Paraaque City, and hereinafter referred to as the LESSEES.W I T N E S S E T H1. That the LESSOR is the owner of the commercial building erected at the lot of the Toribio G. Reyes Realty, Inc. situated at 158 Quirino Ave. corner Redemptorist Road, Barangay Baclaran in Paraaque Ctiy;2. That LESSOR hereby leases two (2) cubicles located at the 1st & 2nd Floor, of said building with an area of 56 square meters under the following terms and conditions, to wit:a. That the monthly rental of the two (2) cubicles in PESOS, SIXTY THOUSAND (P60,000.00), Philippine Currency. However, due to unstable power of the peso LESSEES agrees to a yearly increase of ten (10%) percent of the monthly rental;b. That any rental in-arrears shall be paid before the expiration of the contract to the LESSOR;c. That LESSEES agree to pay their own water and electric consumptions in the said premises;d. That the LESSEES shall not sub-let or make any alteration in the cubicles without a written permission from the LESSOR. Provided, however, that at the termination of the Contract, the lessee shall return the two cubicles in its original conditions at their expenses;e. That the LESSEES agree to keep the cubicles in a safe and sanitary conditions, and shall not keep any kinds of flammable or combustible materials.f. That in case the LESSEES fail to pay the monthly rental every time it falls due or violate any of the above conditions shall be enough ground to terminate this Contract of Lease. Provided, further, that, if the LESSEES pre-terminate this Contract they shall pay the rentals for the unused month or period by way of liquidated damages in favor of the LESSOR.3. That this Contract of Lease is for six (6) yrs. only starting from December _____, 1999 or up to December ______, 2005.IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have hereunto affixed their hands this ___th day of December, 1999 at City of Manila, Philippines.(sgd.)ROSALIE PALAA-CHUAL E S S O R(sgd.)MOSHIERA LATIEFL E S S E E

(sgd.)OMAR LATIEFL E S S E ESIGNED IN THE PRESENCE OF:(sgd.)1. Daisy C. Ramos(sgd.)2. Ferdinand C. Chua

Republic of the Philippines)City of Manila)s.s.A C K N O W L E D G M E N TBEFORE ME, a Notary Public for and in the City of Manila personally appeared the following persons:Rosalie P. Chua with CTC No. 05769706 at Paraaque City on 2/1/99; Moshiera Latief with CTC No. 12885654 at Paraaque City on 11/11/99; Omar Latief with CTC No. 12885653 Paraaque City on Nov. 11, 1999.known to me and to me known to be the same persons who executed this instrument consisting of two (2) pages duly signed by them and the two (2) instrumental witnesses and acknowledged to me that the same is their free and voluntarily acts and deeds.IN FAITH AND TESTIMONY WHEREOF, I have hereunto affixed my hand and Notarial Seal this ____th day of December, 1999 at the City of Manila, Philippines.Doc. No. _____Page No. _____Book No. LXVSeries of 1999ATTY. CALIXTRO B. RAMOSNOTARY PUBLICUntil December 31, 2000PTR # 374145-1/11/99/-Mla.IBP # 00262-Life Member4

A year after the commencement of the lease and with Spouses Latip already occupying the leased cubicles, Rosalie, through counsel, sent the spouses a letter demanding payment of back rentals and should they fail to do so, to vacate the leased cubicles. When Spouses Latip did not heed Rosalies demand, she instituted the aforesaid complaint.In their Answer, Spouses Latip refuted Rosalies claims. They averred that the lease of the two (2) cubicles had already been paid in full as evidenced by receipts showing payment to Rosalie of the total amount ofP2,570,000.00. The three (3) receipts, in Rosalies handwriting, read:1. I received the amount ofP2,000,000.00 (two million pesos) from [O]mar Latip & Moshi[e]ra Latip for the payment of 2 cubicles located at 158 Quirino Ave. corner Redemptorist Rd.[,] Baclaran P[ara]aque City. ROFERLAND5Bldg. with the terms 6 yrs. Contract.P2,000,000.00CHECK # 3767924FAR EAST BANK(sgd.)____________________Rosalie Chua

(sgd.)____________________Ferdinand Chua

2. Received cashP500,000.00From Moshiera Latip12/10/99(sgd.)Rosalie Chua____________________Received by

3. Received cashP70,000.00 fromMoshiera Latip12-11-99(sgd.)____________________Received by:6

Spouses Latip asseverated that sometime in October 1999, Rosalie offered for sale lease rights over two (2) cubicles in Roferxane Bldg. Having in mind the brisk sale of goods during the Christmas season, they readily accepted Rosalies offer to purchase lease rights in Roferxane Bldg., which was still under construction at the time. According to Spouses Latip, the immediate payment ofP2,570,000.00 would be used to finish construction of the building giving them first priority in the occupation of the finished cubicles.Thereafter, in December 1999, as soon as two (2) cubicles were finished, Spouses Latip occupied them without waiting for the completion of five (5) other stalls. Spouses Latip averred that the contract of lease they signed had been novated by their purchase of lease rights of the subject cubicles. Thus, they were surprised to receive a demand letter from Rosalies counsel and the subsequent filing of a complaint against them.The MeTC ruled in favor of Rosalie, viz.:WHEREFORE, premises considered, the [Spouses Latip] and all persons claiming rights under them are hereby ordered to VACATE the property subject of this case located at the 1st and 2nd floors of a Roferxane Building situated at No. 158 Quirino Avenue corner Redemptorist Road, Barangay Baclaran, Paraaque City. The [Spouses Latip] are also ordered to PAY [Rosalie] the amount of SEVEN HUNDRED TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P720,000.00) as rent arrearages for the period of December 1999 to December 2000 and thereafter to PAY [Rosalie] the amount of SEVENTY TWO THOUSAND PESOS (P72,000.00) per month from January 2001 to December 2002, plus ten percent (10%) increase for each and every succeeding years thereafter as stipulated in paragraph 2(a) of the Contract of Lease x x x, until the [Spouses Latip] have completely vacated the leased premises subject of this lease. Finally[,] the [Spouses Latip] are hereby ordered to PAY [Rosalie] the amount of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00) as attorneys fees and TWO THOUSAND PESOS (P2,000.00) per [Rosalies] appearance in Court as appearance fee and to PAY the cost of this suit.[Spouses Latips] counterclaim is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.SO ORDERED.7In stark contrast, the RTC reversed the MeTC and ruled in favor of Spouses Latip. The RTC did not give credence to the contract of lease, ruling that it was not notarized and, in all other substantial aspects, incomplete. Further on this point, the RTC noted that the contract of lease lacked: (1) the signature of Ferdinand Chua, Rosalies husband; (2) the signatures of Spouses Latip on the first page thereof; (3) the specific dates for the term of the contract which only stated that the lease is for "six (6) y[ea]rs only starting from December 1999 or up to December 2005"; (4) the exact date of execution of the document, albeit the month of December and year 1999 are indicated therein; and (5) the provision for payment of deposit or advance rental which is supposedly uncommon in big commercial lease contracts.The RTC believed the claim of Spouses Latip that the contract of lease was modified and supplemented; and the entire lease rentals for the two (2) cubicles for six (6) years had already been paid by Spouses Latip in the amount ofP2,570,000.00. As to Rosalies claim that her receipt ofP2,570,000.00 was simply goodwill payment by prospective lessees to their lessor, and not payment for the purchase of lease rights, the RTC shot this down and pointed out that, apart from her bare allegations, Rosalie did not adduce evidence to substantiate this claim. On the whole, the RTC declared an existent lease between the parties for a period of six (6) years, and already fully paid for by Spouses Latip. Thus, Spouses Latip could not be ejected from the leased premises until expiration of the lease period.The RTC disposed of the appeal, viz.:WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, the appealed decision of the [MeTC] dated January 13, 2004 is reversed as judgment is hereby rendered for the [Spouses Latip] and against [Rosalie], ordering the latter to pay the former (1) the sum of PhP1,000,000.00 as moral damages;(2) the sum of PhP500,000.00 as exemplary damages;(3) the sum of PhP250,000.00 plus PhP3,000.00 per court appearance as and for attorneys fees; and(4) costs of suit.SO ORDERED.8In yet another turn of events, the CA, as previously mentioned, reversed the RTC and reinstated the decision of the MeTC. The CA ruled that the contract of lease, albeit lacking the signature of Ferdinand and not notarized, remained a complete and valid contract. As the MeTC had, the CA likewise found that the alleged defects in the contract of lease did not render the contract ineffective. On the issue of whether the amount ofP2,570,000.00 merely constituted payment of goodwill money, the CA took judicial notice of this common practice in the area of Baclaran, especially around the Redemptorist Church. According to the appellate court, this judicial notice was bolstered by the Joint Sworn Declaration of the stallholders at Roferxane Bldg. that they all had paid goodwill money to Rosalie prior to occupying the stalls thereat. Thus, ruling on Rosalies appeal, the CA disposed of the case:WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition for Review is hereby GRANTED. The assailed decision of RTC Paraaque City Branch 274 dated September 24, 2004 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the January 13, 2004 decision of the MeTC is REINSTATED and AFFIRMED en toto.SO ORDERED.9Not surprisingly, Spouses Latip filed the present appeal.The singular issue for our resolution is whether Spouses Latip should be ejected from the leased cubicles.As previously adverted to, the CA, in ruling for Rosalie and upholding the ejectment of Spouses Latip, took judicial notice of the alleged practice of prospective lessees in the Baclaran area to pay goodwill money to the lessor.We disagree.Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court declare when the taking of judicial notice is mandatory or discretionary on the courts, thus:SECTION 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. A court shall take judicial notice, without the introduction of evidence, of the existence and territorial extent of states, their political history, forms of government and symbols of nationality, the law of nations, the admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their seals, the political constitution and history of the Philippines, the official acts of the legislative, executive and judicial departments of the Philippines, the laws of nature, the measure of time, and the geographical divisions.SEC. 2. Judicial notice, when discretionary. A court may take judicial notice of matters which are of public knowledge, or are capable of unquestionable demonstration or ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions.On this point, State Prosecutors v. Muro10is instructive:I. The doctrine of judicial notice rests on the wisdom and discretion of the courts. The power to take judicial notice is to be exercised by courts with caution; care must be taken that the requisite notoriety exists; and every reasonable doubt on the subject should be promptly resolved in the negative.Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material requisites: (1) the matter must be one of common and general knowledge; (2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain; and (3) it must be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court. The principal guide in determining what facts may be assumed to be judicially known is that of notoriety. Hence, it can be said that judicial notice is limited to facts evidenced by public records and facts of general notoriety.To say that a court will take judicial notice of a fact is merely another way of saying that the usual form of evidence will be dispensed with if knowledge of the fact can be otherwise acquired. This is because the court assumes that the matter is so notorious that it will not be disputed. But judicial notice is not judicial knowledge. The mere personal knowledge of the judge is not the judicial knowledge of the court, and he is not authorized to make his individual knowledge of a fact, not generally or professionally known, the basis of his action. Judicial cognizance is taken only of those matters which are "commonly" known.Things of "common knowledge," of which courts take judicial notice, may be matters coming to the knowledge of men generally in the course of the ordinary experiences of life, or they may be matters which are generally accepted by mankind as true and are capable of ready and unquestioned demonstration. Thus, facts which are universally known, and which may be found in encyclopedias, dictionaries or other publications, are judicially noticed, provided they are of such universal notoriety and so generally understood that they may be regarded as forming part of the common knowledge of every person.11We reiterated the requisite of notoriety for the taking of judicial notice in the recent case of Expertravel & Tours, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,12which cited State Prosecutors:Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material requisites: (1) the matter must be one of common and general knowledge; (2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain; and (3) it must be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court. The principal guide in determining what facts may be assumed to be judicially known is that of notoriety. Hence, it can be said that judicial notice is limited to facts evidenced by public records and facts of general notoriety. Moreover, a judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to a reasonable dispute in that it is either: (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court; or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resorting to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questionable.Things of "common knowledge," of which courts take judicial notice, may be matters coming to the knowledge of men generally in the course of the ordinary experiences of life, or they may be matters which are generally accepted by mankind as true and are capable of ready and unquestioned demonstration. Thus, facts which are universally known, and which may be found in encyclopedias, dictionaries or other publications, are judicially noticed, provided, they are such of universal notoriety and so generally understood that they may be regarded as forming part of the common knowledge of every person. As the common knowledge of man ranges far and wide, a wide variety of particular facts have been judicially noticed as being matters of common knowledge. But a court cannot take judicial notice of any fact which, in part, is dependent on the existence or non-existence of a fact of which the court has no constructive knowledge.1avvphi1From the foregoing provisions of law and our holdings thereon, it is apparent that the matter which the appellate court took judicial notice of does not meet the requisite of notoriety. To begin with, only the CA took judicial notice of this supposed practice to pay goodwill money to the lessor in the Baclaran area. Neither the MeTC nor the RTC, with the former even ruling in favor of Rosalie, found that the practice was of "common knowledge" or notoriously known.We note that the RTC specifically ruled that Rosalie, apart from her bare allegation, adduced no evidence to prove her claim that the amount ofP2,570,000.00 simply constituted the payment of goodwill money. Subsequently, Rosalie attached an annex to her petition for review before the CA, containing a joint declaration under oath by other stallholders in Roferxane Bldg. that they had paid goodwill money to Rosalie as their lessor. On this score, we emphasize that the reason why our rules on evidence provide for matters that need not be proved under Rule 129, specifically on judicial notice, is to dispense with the taking of the usual form of evidence on a certain matter so notoriously known, it will not be disputed by the parties.However, in this case, the requisite of notoriety is belied by the necessity of attaching documentary evidence, i.e., the Joint Affidavit of the stallholders, to Rosalies appeal before the CA. In short, the alleged practice still had to be proven by Rosalie; contravening the title itself of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court What need not be proved.Apparently, only that particular division of the CA had knowledge of the practice to pay goodwill money in the Baclaran area. As was held in State Prosecutors, justices and judges alike ought to be reminded that the power to take judicial notice must be exercised with caution and every reasonable doubt on the subject should be ample reason for the claim of judicial notice to be promptly resolved in the negative.Ultimately, on the issue of whether Spouses Latip ought to be ejected from the leased cubicles, what remains in evidence is the documentary evidence signed by both parties the contract of lease and the receipts evidencing payment ofP2,570,000.00.We need not be unduly detained by the issue of which documents were executed first or if there was a novation of the contract of lease. As had been found by the RTC, the lease contract and the receipts for the amount ofP2,570,000.00 can be reconciled or harmonized. The RTC declared:Definitely, the parties entered into a lease agreement over two (2) cubicles of the 1st and 2nd floors of Roferxane (Roferland) Building, a commercial building located at 158 Quirino Avenue, corner Redemptorist Road, Baclaran, Paraaque City and belonging to [Rosalie]. The lease agreement is for a term of six (6) years commencing in December 1999 up to December 2005. This agreement was embodied in a Contract of Lease x x x. The terms of this lease contract, however, are modified or supplemented by another agreement between the parties executed and or entered into in or about the time of execution of the lease contract, which exact date of execution of the latter is unclear.13We agree with the RTCs holding only up to that point. There exists a lease agreement between the parties as set forth in the contract of lease which is a complete document. It need not be signed by Ferdinand Chua as he likewise did not sign the other two receipts forP500,000.00 andP70,000.00, respectively, which contained only the signature of Rosalie. Besides, it is undisputed that Rosalie owns and leases the stalls in Roferxane Bldg.; thus, doing away with the need for her husbands consent. The findings of the three lower courts concur on this fact.The contract of lease has a period of six (6) years commencing in December 1999. This fact is again buttressed by Spouses Latips admission that they occupied the property forthwith in December 1999, bearing in mind the brisk sales during the holiday season.On the conflicting interpretations by the lower courts of the receipts amounting toP2,570,000.00, we hold that the practice of payment of goodwill money in the Baclaran area is an inadequate subject of judicial notice. Neither was Rosalie able to provide sufficient evidence that, apart from the belatedly submitted Joint Affidavit of the stallholders of Roferxane Bldg., the said amount was simply for the payment of goodwill money, and not payment for advance rentals by Spouses Latip.In interpreting the evidence before us, we are guided by the Civil Code provisions on interpretation of contracts, to wit:Art. 1371. In order to judge the intention of the contracting parties, their contemporaneous and subsequent acts shall be principally considered.Art. 1372. However general the terms of a contract may be, they shall not be understood to comprehend things that are distinct and cases that are different from those which the parties intended to agree.Art. 1373. If some stipulation of any contract should admit of several meanings, it shall be understood as bearing that import which is most adequate to render it effectual.The RTC was already on the right track when it declared that the receipts forP2,570,000.00 modified or supplemented the contract of lease. However, it made a quantum leap when it ruled that the amount was payment for rentals of the two (2) cubicles for the entire six-year period. We cannot subscribe to this finding. To obviate confusion and for clarity, the contents of the receipts, already set forth above, are again reproduced:1. I received the amount ofP2,000,000.00 (two million pesos) from [O]mar Latip & Moshi[e]ra Latip for the payment of 2 cubicles located at 158 Quirino Ave. corner Redemptorist Rd.[,] Baclaran P[ara]que City. ROFERLAND Bldg. with the terms 6 yrs. Contract.P2,000,000.00CHECK # 3767924FAR EAST BANK(sgd.)____________________Rosalie Chua

(sgd.)____________________Ferdinand Chua

2. Received cashP500,000.00From Moshiera Latip12/10/99(sgd.)Rosalie Chua____________________Received by

3. Received cashP70,000.00 fromMoshiera Latip12-11-99(sgd.)____________________Received by:14

There is nothing on the receipts and on record that the payment and receipt ofP2,570,000.00 referred to full payment of rentals for the whole period of the lease. All three receipts state Rosalies receipt of cash in varying amounts. The first receipt forP2,000,000.00 did state payment for two (2) cubicles, but this cannot mean full payment of rentals for the entire lease period when there are no words to that effect. Further, two receipts were subsequently executed pointing to the obvious fact that theP2,000,000.00 is not for full payment of rentals. Thus, since the contract of lease remained operative, we find that Rosalies receipt of the monies should be considered as advanced rentals on the leased cubicles. This conclusion is bolstered by the fact that Rosalie demanded payment of the lease rentals only in 2000, a full year after the commencement of the lease.Finally, we note that the lease ended in 2005. Consequently, Spouses Latip can be ejected from the leased premises. They are liable to Rosalie for unpaid rentals on the lease of the two (2) cubicles in accordance with the stipulations on rentals in the Contract of Lease. However, the amount ofP2,570,000.00, covering advance rentals, must be deducted from this liability of Spouses Latip to Rosalie.WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 89300 is REVERSED. The petitioners, spouses Omar and Moshiera Latip, are liable to respondent Rosalie Chua for unpaid rentals minus the amount ofP2,570,000.00 already received by her as advance rentals. No costs.SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISIONATCI OVERSEAS CORPORATION, AMALIA G. IKDAL and MINISTRY OF PUBLIC HEALTH-KUWAITPetitioners,- versus -MA. JOSEFA ECHIN,Respondent.G.R. No. 178551Present:CARPIO MORALES,Chairperson, J.,BRION,BERSAMIN,VILLARAMA, JR., andSERENO,JJ.Promulgated:October 11, 2010

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -xD E C I S I O NCARPIO MORALES,J.:Josefina Echin (respondent) was hired by petitioner ATCI Overseas Corporation in behalf of its principal-co-petitioner, the Ministry of Public Health of Kuwait (the Ministry), for the position of medical technologist under a two-year contract, denominated as a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA), with a monthly salary of US$1,200.00.Under the MOA,[1]all newly-hired employees undergo a probationary period of one (1) year and are covered by Kuwaits Civil Service Board Employment Contract No. 2.Respondent was deployed on February 17, 2000 but was terminated from employment on February 11, 2001, she not having allegedly passed the probationary period.As the Ministry denied respondents request for reconsideration, she returned to the Philippines on March 17, 2001, shouldering her own air fare.On July 27, 2001, respondent filed with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) a complaint[2]for illegal dismissal against petitioner ATCI as the local recruitment agency, represented by petitioner, Amalia Ikdal (Ikdal), and the Ministry, as the foreign principal.By Decision[3]of November 29, 2002, the Labor Arbiter, finding that petitioners neither showed that there was just cause to warrant respondents dismissal nor that she failed to qualify as a regular employee, held that respondent was illegally dismissed and accordingly orderedpetitioners to pay her US$3,600.00, representing her salary for the three monthsunexpired portion of her contract.On appeal of petitioners ATCI and Ikdal, the NLRCaffirmedthe Labor Arbiters decision by Resolution[4]of January 26, 2004.Petitioners motion for reconsideration having been denied by Resolution[5]of April 22, 2004, they appealed to the Court of Appeals, contending that their principal, the Ministry, being a foreign government agency, is immune from suit and, as such, the immunity extended to them; and that respondent was validly dismissed for her failure to meet the performance rating within the one-year period as required under Kuwaits Civil Service Laws. Petitioners further contended that Ikdal should not be liable as an officer of petitioner ATCI.By Decision[6]of March 30, 2007, the appellate courtaffirmedthe NLRC Resolution.In brushing aside petitioners contention that they only acted as agent of the Ministry and that they cannot be held jointly and solidarily liable with it, the appellate court noted that under the law, a privateemployment agency shall assume all responsibilities for the implementation of the contract of employment of an overseas worker, hence, it can be sued jointly and severally with the foreign principal for any violation of the recruitment agreement orcontract of employment.As to Ikdals liability, the appellate court held that under Sec. 10 of Republic Act No. 8042, the Migrant and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, corporate officers, directors and partners of a recruitment agency may themselves be jointly and solidarily liable with the recruitment agency for money claims and damages awarded to overseas workers.Petitioners motion for reconsideration having been denied by the appellate court by Resolution[7]of June 27, 2007, the present petition for review on certiorari was filed.Petitioners maintain that they should not be held liable because respondents employment contract specifically stipulates that her employment shall be governed by the Civil Service Law and Regulations of Kuwait.They thus conclude that it was patent error for the labor tribunals and the appellate court to apply the Labor Code provisions governing probationary employment in deciding the present case.Further, petitioners argue that even the Philippine Overseas Employment Act (POEA) Rules relative to master employment contracts (Part III, Sec. 2 of the POEA Rules and Regulations) accord respect to the customs, practices, company policies and labor laws and legislation of the host country.Finally, petitioners posit that assumingarguendothat Philippine labor laws are applicable, given that the foreign principal is a government agency which is immune from suit, as in fact it did not sign any document agreeing to be held jointly and solidarily liable, petitioner ATCI cannot likewise be held liable, more so since the Ministrys liability had not been judicially determined as jurisdiction was not acquired over it.The petition fails.Petitioner ATCI, as a private recruitment agency, cannot evade responsibility for the money claims of Overseas Filipino workers (OFWs) which it deploys abroad by the mere expediency of claiming that its foreign principal is a government agency clothed with immunity from suit, or that such foreign principals liability must first be established before it, as agent, can be held jointly and solidarily liable.In providing for the joint and solidary liability of private recruitment agencies with their foreign principals, Republic Act No. 8042 precisely affords the OFWs with a recourse and assures them of immediate and sufficient payment of what is due them.Skippers United Pacific v. Maguad[8]explains:. . .[T]he obligations covenanted in the recruitment agreement entered into by and between the local agent and its foreign principal are not coterminous with the term of such agreementso that if either or both of the parties decide to end the agreement, the responsibilities of such parties towards the contracted employees under the agreement do not at all end, but the same extends up to and until the expiration of the employment contracts of the employees recruited and employed pursuant to the said recruitment agreement.Otherwise, this will render nugatory the very purpose for which the law governing the employment of workers for foreign jobs abroad was enacted.(emphasis supplied)The imposition of joint and solidary liability is in line with the policy of the state to protect and alleviate the plight of the working class.[9]Verily, to allow petitioners to simply invoke the immunity from suit of its foreign principal or to wait for the judicial determination of the foreign principals liability before petitioner can be held liable renders the law on joint and solidary liability inutile.As to petitioners contentions that Philippine labor laws onprobationary employment are not applicable since it was expressly provided in respondents employment contract, which she voluntarily entered into, that the terms of her engagement shall be governed by prevailing Kuwaiti Civil Service Laws and Regulations as in fact POEA Rules accord respect to such rules, customs and practices of the host country, the same was not substantiated.Indeed, a contract freely entered into is considered the law between the parties who can establish stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient, including the laws which they wish to govern their respective obligations, as long as they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy.It is hornbook principle, however, that the party invoking the application of a foreign law has the burden of proving the law, under the doctrine ofprocessual presumptionwhich, in this case, petitioners failed to discharge.The Courts ruling inEDI-Staffbuilders Intl., v. NLRC[10]illuminates:

In the present case,the employment contract signed by Gran specifically states that Saudi Labor Laws will govern matters not provided for in the contract(e.g. specific causes for termination, termination procedures, etc.). Being the law intended by the parties (lex loci intentiones) to apply to the contract, Saudi Labor Laws should govern all matters relating to the termination of the employment of Gran.

In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case has the burden of proving the foreign law. The foreign law is treated as a question of fact to be properly pleaded and proved as the judge or labor arbiter cannot take judicial notice of a foreign law.He is presumed to know only domestic or forum law.

Unfortunately for petitioner, it did not prove the pertinent Saudi laws on the matter; thus, the International Law doctrine ofpresumed-identity approachorprocessual presumptioncomes into play. Where a foreign law is not pleaded or, even if pleaded, is not proved, the presumption is that foreign law is the same as ours. Thus, we apply Philippine labor laws in determining the issues presented before us.(emphasis and underscoring supplied)The Philippines does not take judicial noticeof foreign laws, hence,they must not only be alleged; they must be proven.To prove a foreign law, the party invoking it must present a copy thereof and comply with Sections 24 and 25 ofRule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court which reads:SEC. 24.Proof of official record. The record of public documents referred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody.If the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office.(emphasis supplied)SEC. 25.What attestation of copy must state.Whenever a copy of a document or record is attested for the purpose of the evidence, the attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be.The attestation must be under the official seal of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if he be the clerk of a court having a seal, under the seal of such court.To prove the Kuwaiti law, petitioners submitted the following:MOA between respondent and the Ministry, as represented by ATCI, whichprovides that the employee is subject to a probationary period of one (1) year and that the host countrys Civil Service Laws and Regulations apply; a translated copy[11](Arabic to English)of the termination letter to respondent stating that she did not pass the probation terms, without specifying the grounds therefor, and a translated copy of the certificate of termination,[12]both of which documents were certified by Mr. Mustapha Alawi, Head of the Department of Foreign Affairs-Office of Consular Affairs Inslamic Certification and Translation Unit;and respondents letter[13]of reconsideration to the Ministry, wherein she noted that in her first eight (8) months of employment, she was given a rating of Excellent albeit it changed due to changes in her shift of work schedule.These documents, whether taken singly or as a whole, do not sufficiently prove that respondent was validly terminated as a probationary employee under Kuwaiti civil service laws.Instead of submitting a copy of the pertinent Kuwaiti labor laws duly authenticated and translated by Embassy officials thereat, as required under the Rules, what petitioners submitted were mere certifications attesting only to the correctness of the translations of the MOA and the termination letter which does not prove at all that Kuwaiti civil service laws differ from Philippine laws and that under such Kuwaiti laws, respondent was validly terminated.Thus the subject certifications read:x x x xThis is to certify that the herein attached translation/s from Arabic to English/Tagalog and or vice versa was/were presented to this Office for review and certification and the same was/were found to be in order.This Office, however, assumes no responsibility as to the contents of the document/s.This certification is being issued upon request of the interested party for whatever legal purpose it may serve. (emphasis supplied)Respecting Ikdals joint and solidary liability as a corporate officer, the same is in order too following the express provision of R.A. 8042 on money claims,viz:SEC. 10.Money Claims.Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the Labor Arbiters of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) shall have the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within ninety (90) calendar days after the filing of the complaint, the claims arising out of an employer-employee relationship or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas deployment including claims for actual moral, exemplary and other forms of damages.The liability of the principal/employer and the recruitment/placement agency for any and all claims under this section shall be joint and several. This provision shall be incorporated in the contract for overseas employment and shall be a condition precedent for its approval. The performance bond to be filed by the recruitment/placement agency, as provided by law, shall be answerable for all money claims or damages that may be awarded to the workers.If the recruitment/placement agency is a juridical being,the corporate officers and directors and partners as the case may be, shall themselves be jointly and solidarily liable with the corporation or partnershipfor the aforesaid claims and damages. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)WHEREFORE, the petition isDENIED.SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 185518 April 17, 2013SPOUSES FELIX CHINGKOE AND ROSITA CHINGKOE,Petitioners,vs.SPOUSES FAUSTINO CHINGKOE AND GLORIA CHINGKOE,Respondents.D E C I S I O NSERENO,CJ.:This Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails the 3 July 2008 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) annulling the 30 March 2007 Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City.1The RTC affirmed2the Metropolitan Trial Court's (MTC) dismissal3of the Complaint for unlawful detainer filed by herein respondents.The facts, as culled from the records, are as follows:Respondents are the registered owners of a real property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 82834of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City. They claim that sometime in 1990, out of tolerance and permission, they allowed respondent Faustinos brother, Felix, and his wife, Rosita, to inhabit the subject property situated at No. 58 Lopez Jaena Street, Ayala Heights, Quezon City. Due to the intercession of their mother, Tan Po Chu, Faustino agreed to sell the property to Felix on condition that the title shall be delivered only after Felix and Rositas payment of the full purchase price, and after respondents settlement of their mortgage obligations with the Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC). After further prodding from their mother, however, and at Felixs request, Faustino agreed to deliver in advance an incomplete draft of a Deed of Absolute Sale, which had not yet been notarized. While respondents themselves drafted the deed, the parties again agreed that the document would only be completed after full payment.5On 24 July 2001, respondents sent a demand letter6to petitioners asking them to vacate the premises. To this date, petitioners have refused to do so, prompting respondents to file a complaint7for unlawful detainer with the MTC of Quezon City. In their Answer, petitioners presented a copy of a completed Deed of Absolute Sale dated 10 October 1994, claiming that respondents had sold the property forP3,130,000, which petitioners had paid in full and in cash on the same day. Due to respondents adamant refusal to surrender the title to them as buyers, petitioners were allegedly constrained to file an action for specific performance with Branch 96 of the Quezon City RTC on 31 January 1995.8The MTC gave weight to the Deed of Sale presented by petitioners and dismissed the Complaint, as follows:The defendants herein assert that "since October 1994, when they bought their property in CASH, their stay thereat is by virtue of their absolute ownership thereof as provided for in the Absolute Deed of Sale," x x x. The foregoing would right away tell us that this Court is barred from ordering the ejectment of the defendants from the premises in question so much so that what is at stake only in cases of this nature as above stated is as regards possession only.With the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale whereby the Vendors never reserved their rights and interests over the property after the sale, and the transfer appears to be absolute, beside the fact that the property is now under the control and custody of the defendants, we could conclude that instant case unlawful detainer (sic) is destined to fail,9x x x.The RTC affirmed the findings of the MTC in toto, reasoning thus:x x x (T)here exists a Deed presented in evidence on the sale of the subject property entered into by the herein parties. The Deed of Sale renders weak the claim of tolerance or permission.Although the plaintiffs-appellants questioned the validity and authenticity of the Deed of Sale, this will not change the nature of the action as an unlawful detainer, in the light of our premise of the principal issue in unlawful detainer possession de facto.10The CA reversed the findings of the lower courts and ruled that a mere plea of title over disputed land by the defendant cannot be used as sound basis for dismissing an action for recovery of possession. Citing Refugia v. Court of Appeals, the appellate court found that petitioners stay on the property was merely a tolerated possession, which they were no longer entitled to continue. The deed they presented was not one of sale, but a "document preparatory to an actual sale, prepared by the petitioners upon the insistence and prodding of their mother to soothe in temper respondent Felix Chingkoe."11Petitioners now come before this Court, raising the following arguments:a. The CA committed reversible error when it admitted and gave weight to testimony given in a different proceeding (action for specific performance) pending before the Regional Trial Court in resolving the issue herein (unlawful detainer); andb. The CA committed reversible error when it ruled on the validity of a notarized Deed of Sale in a summary ejectment action.We deny the petition.Anent the first argument, petitioners fault the CA for citing and giving credence to the testimony of Tan Po Chu, who was presented as a witness in another case, the action for specific performance filed by petitioners. The CA stated:In the case instituted by the respondents against herein petitioner for Specific Performance entitled "Felix Chingkoe and Rosita Chingkoe v. Faustino Chingkoe and Gloria Chingkoe," docketed as Civil Case No. Q-95-22865 pending before Branch 96 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Tan Po Chu testified on 25 November 1999 to shed light on the matter once and for all, to wit:xxxxAtty. Nicolas:Q You mentioned that this is the second copy of the deed of absolute sale, you identified the signature appearing here as the signature of Felix, how do you know that this is the signature of Felix?A Well, he is my son. I am familiar with his signature and besides that he signed it in my presence.Q And this is the very document and not as photocopy (sic) of the second document which you brought to Felix?Atty. Flores:Again, Your Honor, very leading.Court:I will allow.A I am not very sure now but I think this is the real one, I think this is the one because I saw him signed (sic) this.Atty. Nicolas:May I request that this be marked as Exhibit "1" and the signature of Felix be signed as Exhibit "1-A"?Court:Mark.Atty. Flores:Just a moment, no basis, Your Honor, please.Atty. Nicolas:Your Honor, the witness said that there was a deed of absolute sale,I was asking if she knows how much Felix paid for the property when she delivered the document.Court:She never testified that there was a sale, she only said that there was a deed of sale.Atty. Nicolas:I will reform, Your Honor.Q When you delivered this document to Felix, what did he give you in return, if any?A He did not give me anything, he had never paid me any single cent.Q When you delivered the deed of sale?A There was no payment whatsoever.Q As far as you know, Ms. Witness, was the property paid for by Felix to Faustino?A I swear to God, no payment, there was no payment at all, I swear.xxxxAs clearly shown in the testimony given in open court which was above-quoted, petitioners merely delivered to their mother a draft of the deed, which they signed to appease her and respondent Felix Chingkoe.12(Emphases supplied.)The CA indeed quoted at length from the testimony of Tan Po Chu, and culled therefrom the factual finding that the purported contract of sale had never been consummated between the parties. The CA cited as basis her testimony from Civil Case No. Q-95-22865: that she witnessed Felix signing the blank deed, and that upon its signing, there was no payment for the property. This account directly contradicts petitioners claim that payment was made simultaneously with the perfection of the contract.Petitioners claim that the CA erroneously considered this testimony in Civil Case No. Q-95-22865. They cite the general rule that courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the contents of the records of other cases. This rule, however, admits of exceptions. As early as United States v. Claveria, this Court has stated: "In the absence of objection and as a matter of convenience, a court may properly treat all or part of the original record of a former case filed in its archives, as read into the record of a case pending before it, when, with the knowledge of the opposing party, reference is made to it for that purpose by name and number or in some other manner by which it is sufficiently designated."13We reiterated this stance in Adiarte v. Domingo,14in which the trial court decided the action pending before it by taking judicial notice of the records of a prior case for a sum of money. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial courts dismissal of the Complaint, after it considered evidence clearly showing that the subject matter thereof was the same as that in the prior litigation. In a 1993 case, Occidental Land Transportation Company, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, the Court ruled:The reasons advanced by the respondent court in taking judicial notice of Civil Case No. 3156 are valid and not contrary to law. As a general rule, "courts are not authorized to take judicial notice, in the adjudication of cases pending before them, of the contents of the records of other cases, even when such cases have been tried or are pending in the same court, and notwithstanding the fact that both cases may have been heard or are actually pending before the same judge." The general rule admits of exceptions as enumerated in Tabuena v. Court of Appeals, the Court, citing U.S. v. Claveria, which We quote:x x x (I)n the absence of objection, and as a matter of convenience to all parties, a court may properly treat all or any part of the original record of a case filed in its archives as read into the record of a case pending before it, when, with the knowledge of the opposing party, reference is made to it for that purpose, by name and number or in some other manner by which it is sufficiently designated; or when the original record of the former case or any part of it, is actually withdrawn from the archives by the court's direction, at the request or with the consent of the parties, and admitted as a part of the record of the case then pending.It is clear, though, that this exception is applicable only when, in the absence of objection, with the knowledge of the opposing party, or at the request or with the consent of the parties the case is clearly referred to or the original or part of the records of the case are actually withdrawn from the archives' and 'admitted as part of the record of the case then pending.xxxxAnd unlike the factual situation in Tabuena v. CA, the decision in Civil Case No. 3156 formed part of the records of the instant case (Civil Case No. 2728) with the knowledge of the parties and in the absence of their objection. (Emphases supplied, citations omitted).15This doctrine was restated in Republic v. Sandiganbayan, viz: "As a matter of convenience to all the parties, a court may properly treat all or any part of the original record of a case filed in its archives as read into the record of a case pending before it, when, with the knowledge of, and absent an objection from, the adverse party, reference is made to it for that purpose, by name and number or in some other manner by which it is sufficiently designated; or when the original record of the former case or any part of it, is actually withdrawn from the archives at the courts direction, at the request or with the consent of the parties, and admitted as a part of the record of the case then pending."16(Underscoring supplied)In the case at bar, as the CA rightly points out in its Resolution dated 28 November 2008,17petitioners never objected to the introduction of the Transcript of Stenographic Notes containing the testimony of Tan Po Chu, which were records of Civil Case No. Q-95-22865. As shown by the records and as petitioners admitted in their Reply, the testimony was already introduced on appeal before the RTC. In fact, it was petitioners themselves who specifically cited Civil Case No. Q-95-22865, referring to it both by name and number, purportedly to bolster the claim that they were constrained to sue, in order to compel delivery of the title.18Given these facts, the CA committed no reversible error in taking judicial notice of the records of Civil Case No. Q-95-22865. In any case, the said testimony was not the only basis for reversing the RTCs Decision. Independent of the testimony, the CA through its perusal and assessment of other pieces of evidence, specifically the Deed of Absolute Sale concluded that petitioners stay on the premises had become unlawful.Concerning the second issue, petitioners object to the assessment of the Deed of Sale by the CA, claiming such a determination is improper in summary proceedings. It should be noted that it was petitioners who introduced the Deed of Sale in evidence before the MTC and the RTC, as evidence of their claimed right to possession over the property.1wphi1They attached the deed to their Answer as Annex "1."19The CA discovered that they falsified their copy of the document denominated as Deed of Absolute Sale in this wise:Said draft of the deed was undated and bears the signature of one witness, as can be clearly noticed upon its very careful perusal. Notably, respondents made it appear in the draft of the Deed of Absolute Sale that there indeed was a valid and consummated sale when in truth and in fact, there was none. The document accomplished by the respondents (herein petitioners) gave them some semblance, albeit highly questionable, of ownership over the property by affixing their signatures, affixing the signature of one Cora Hizon as witness and superimposing the signature of Jane Chan with that of one Noralyn Collado.20Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 states that when the defendant raises the question of ownership in unlawful detainer cases and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of possession.21This Court has repeatedly ruled that although the issue in unlawful detainer cases is physical possession over a property, trial courts may provisionally resolve the issue of ownership for the sole purpose of determining the issue of possession.22"These actions are intended to avoid disruption of public order by those who would take the law in their hands purportedly to enforce their claimed right of possession. In these cases, the issue is pure physical or de facto possession, and pronouncements made on questions of ownership are provisional in nature. The provisional determination of ownership in the ejectment case cannot be clothed with finality."23Trial courts must necessarily delve into and weigh the evidence of the parties in order to rule on the right of possession, as we have discussed in Sps. Esmaquel and Sordevilla v. Coprada:In unlawful detainer cases, the possession of the defendant was originally legal, as his possession was permitted by the plaintiff on account of an express or implied contract between them. However, defendant's possession became illegal when the plaintiff demanded that defendant vacate the subject property due to the expiration or termination of the right to possess under their contract, and defendant refused to heed such demand.The sole issue for resolution in an unlawful detainer case is physical or material possession of the property involved, independent of any claim of ownership by any of the parties. Where the issue of ownership is raised by any of the parties, the courts may pass upon the same in order to determine who has the right to possess the property. The adjudication is, however, merely provisional and would not bar or prejudice an action between the same parties involving title to the property. Since the issue of ownership was raised in the unlawful detainer case, its resolution boils down to which of the parties' respective evidence deserves more weight.24(Emphasis supplied, citations omitted.)WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, we deny the instant Petition for lack of merit. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 100008 (dated 3 July 2008) is AFFIRMED.We make no pronouncement as to attorney's fees for lack of evidence.SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISIONG.R. No. 182356, December 04, 2013DRA. LEILA A. DELA LLANA,Petitioners,v.REBECCA BIONG, DOING BUSINESS UNDER THE NAME AND STYLE OF PONGKAY TRADING,Respondent.D E C I S I O NBRION,J.:Every case essentially turns on two basic questions: questions of fact and questions of law. Questions of fact are for the parties and their counsels to respond to, based on what supporting facts the legal questions require; the court can only draw conclusion from the facts or evidence adduced. When the facts are lacking because of the deficiency of presented evidence, then the court can only draw one conclusion: that the case must fail for lack of evidentiary support.

The present case is one such case as Dra. Leila A. dela Llanas (petitioner) petition for review oncertiorari1challenging the February 11, 2008 decision2and the March 31, 2008 resolution3of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 89163.The Factual Antecedents

On March 30, 2000, at around 11:00 p.m., Juan dela Llana was driving a 1997 Toyota Corolla car along North Avenue, Quezon City.4His sister, Dra. dela Llana, was seated at the front passenger seat while a certain Calimlim was at the backseat.5Juan stopped the car across the Veterans Memorial Hospital when the signal light turned red. A few seconds after the car halted, a dump truck containing gravel and sand suddenly rammed the cars rear end, violently pushing the car forward. Due to the impact, the cars rear end collapsed and its rear windshield was shattered. Glass splinters flew, puncturing Dra. dela Llana. Apart from these minor wounds, Dra. dela Llana did not appear to have suffered from any other visible physical injuries.6

The traffic investigation report dated March 30, 2000 identified the truck driver as Joel Primero. It stated that Joel was recklessly imprudent in driving the truck.7Joel later revealed that his employer was respondent Rebecca Biong, doing business under the name and style of Pongkay Trading and was engaged in a gravel and sand business.8

In the first week of May 2000, Dra. dela Llana began to feel mild to moderate pain on the left side of her neck and shoulder. The pain became more intense as days passed by. Her injury became more severe. Her health deteriorated to the extent that she could no longer move her left arm. On June 9, 2000, she consulted with Dr. Rosalinda Milla, a rehabilitation medicine specialist, to examine her condition. Dr. Milla told her that she suffered from a whiplash injury, an injury caused by the compression of the nerve running to her left arm and hand. Dr. Milla required her to undergo physical therapy to alleviate her condition.

Dra. dela Llanas condition did not improve despite three months of extensive physical therapy.9She then consulted other doctors, namely, Drs. Willie Lopez, Leonor Cabral-Lim and Eric Flores, in search for a cure. Dr. Flores, a neuro-surgeon, finally suggested that she undergo a cervical spine surgery to release the compression of her nerve. On October 19, 2000, Dr. Flores operated on her spine and neck, between the C5 and the C6 vertebrae.10The operation released the impingement of the nerve, but incapacitated Dra. dela Llana from the practice of her profession since June 2000 despite the surgery.11

Dra. dela Llana, on October 16, 2000, demanded from Rebecca compensation for her injuries, but Rebecca refused to pay.12Thus, on May 8, 2001, Dra. dela Llana sued Rebecca for damages before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (RTC). She alleged that she lost the mobility of her arm as a result of the vehicular accident and claimed P150,000.00 for her medical expenses (as of the filing of the complaint) and an average monthly income of P30,000.00 since June 2000. She further prayed for actual, moral, and exemplary damages as well as attorneys fees.13

In defense, Rebecca maintained that Dra. dela Llana had no cause of action against her as no reasonable relation existed between the vehicular accident and Dra. dela Llanas injury. She pointed out that Dra. dela Llanas illness became manifest one month and one week from the date of the vehicular accident. As a counterclaim, she demanded the payment of attorneys fees and costs of the suit.14

At the trial, Dra. dela Llana presented herself as anordinary witness15and Joel as a hostile witness.16Dra. dela Llana reiterated that she lost the mobility of her arm because of the vehicular accident. To prove her claim, she identified and authenticated amedical certificate dated November 20, 2000issued by Dr. Milla. The medical certificate stated that Dra. dela Llana suffered from a whiplash injury. It also chronicled her clinical history and physical examinations.17Meanwhile, Joel testified that his truck hit the car because the trucks brakes got stuck.18

In defense, Rebecca testified that Dra. dela Llana was physically fit and strong when they met several days after the vehicular accident. She also asserted that she observed the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of Joel. She pointed out that she required Joel to submit a certification of good moral character as well as barangay, police, and NBI clearances prior to his employment. She also stressed that she only hired Primero after he successfully passed the driving skills test conducted by Alberto Marcelo, a licensed driver-mechanic.19

Alberto also took the witness stand. He testified that he checked the truck in the morning of March 30, 2000. He affirmed that the truck was in good condition prior to the vehicular accident. He opined that the cause of the vehicular accident was a damaged compressor. According to him, the absence of air inside the tank damaged the compressor.20chanroblesvirtualawlibraryRTC Ruling

The RTC ruled in favor of Dra. dela Llana and held that the proximate cause of Dra. dela Llanas whiplash injury to be Joels reckless driving.21It found that a whiplash injury is an injury caused by the sudden jerking of the spine in the neck area. It pointed out that the massive damage the car suffered only meant that the truck was over-speeding. It maintained that Joel should have driven at a slower pace because road visibility diminishes at night. He should have blown his horn and warned the car that his brake was stuck and could have prevented the collision by swerving the truck off the road. It also concluded that Joel was probably sleeping when the collision occurred as Joel had been driving for fifteen hours on that fateful day.

The RTC further declared that Joels negligence gave rise to the presumption that Rebecca did not exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in Joels selection and supervision of Joel. Rebecca was vicariously liable because she was the employer and she personally chose him to drive the truck. On the day of the collision, she ordered him to deliver gravel and sand to Muoz Market, Quezon City. The Court concluded that the three elements necessary to establish Rebeccas liability were present: (1) that the employee was chosen by the employer, personally or through another; (2) that the services were to be rendered in accordance with orders which the employer had the authority to give at all times; and (3) that the illicit act of the employee was on the occasion or by reason of the functions entrusted to him.

The RTC thus awarded Dra. dela Llana the amounts of P570,000.00 as actual damages, P250,000.00 as moral damages, and the cost of the suit.22chanroblesvirtualawlibraryCA Ruling

In a decision dated February 11, 2008, the CA reversed the RTC ruling. It held that Dra. dela Llana failed to establish a reasonable connection between the vehicular accident and her whiplash injury by preponderance of evidence. CitingNutrimixFeeds Corp. v. Court of Appeals,23it declared that courts will not hesitate to rule in favor of the other party if there is no evidence or the evidence is too slight to warrant an inference establishing the fact in issue. It noted that the interval between the date of the collision and the date when Dra. dela Llana began to suffer the symptoms of her illness was lengthy. It concluded that this interval raised doubts on whether Joels reckless driving and the resulting collision in fact caused Dra. dela Llanas injury.

It also declared that courts cannot take judicial notice that vehicular accidents cause whiplash injuries. It observed that Dra. dela Llana did not immediately visit a hospital to check if she sustained internal injuries after the accident. Moreover, her failure to present expert witnesses was fatal to her claim. It also gave no weight to the medical certificate. The medical certificate did not explain how and why the vehicular accident caused the injury.24chanroblesvirtualawlibraryThe Petition

Dra. dela Llana points out in her petition before this Court thatNutrimixis inapplicable in the present case. She stresses thatNutrimixinvolved the application of Article 1561 and 1566 of the Civil Code, provisions governing hidden defects. Furthermore, there was absolutely no evidence inNutrimixthat showed that poisonous animal feeds were sold to the respondents in that case.

As opposed to the respondents inNutrimix, Dra. dela Llana asserts that she has established by preponderance of evidence that Joels negligent act was the proximate cause of her whiplash injury.First, pictures of her damaged car show that the collision was strong. She posits that it can be reasonably inferred from these pictures that the massive impact resulted in her whiplash injury.Second, Dr. Milla categorically stated in the medical certificate that Dra. dela Llana suffered from whiplash injury.Third, her testimony that the vehicular accident caused the injury is credible because she was a surgeon.

Dra. dela Llana further asserts that the medical certificate has probative value. Citing several cases, she posits that an uncorroborated medical certificate is credible if uncontroverted.25She points out that expert opinion is unnecessary if the opinion merely relates to matters of common knowledge. She maintains that a judge is qualified as an expert to determine the causation between Joels reckless driving and her whiplash injury. Trial judges are aware of the fact that whiplash injuries are common in vehicular collisions.The Respondents Position

In herComment,26Rebecca points out that Dra. dela Llana raises a factual issue which is beyond the scope of a petition for review oncertiorariunder Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. She maintains that the CAs findings of fact are final and conclusive. Moreover, she stresses that Dra. dela Llanas arguments are not substantial to merit this Courts consideration.The Issue

The sole issue for our consideration in this case is whether Joels reckless driving is the proximate cause of Dra. dela Llanas whiplash injury.Our Ruling

We find the petition unmeritorious.

The Supreme Court may review questions of fact in a petition for review oncertiorariwhen the findings of fact by the lower courts are conflicting

The issue before us involves a question of fact and this Court is not a trier of facts. As a general rule, the CAs findings of fact are final and conclusive and this Court will not review them on appeal. It is not the function of this Court to examine, review or evaluate the evidence in a petition for review oncertiorariunder Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. We can only review the presented evidence, by way of exception, when the conflict exists in findings of the RTC and the CA.27We see this exceptional situation here and thus accordingly examine the relevant evidence presented before the trial court.

Dra. dela Llana failed to establish her case by preponderance of evidence

Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides that [w]hoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is a quasi-delict. Under this provision, the elements necessary to establish a quasi-delict case are: (1) damages to the plaintiff; (2) negligence, by act or omission, of the defendant or by some person for whose acts the defendant must respond, was guilty; and(3) the connection of cause and effect between such negligence and the damages.28These elements show that the source of obligation in a quasi-delict case is the breach or omission of mutual duties that civilized society imposes upon its members, or which arise from non-contractual relations of certain members of society to others.29ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Based on these requisites, Dra. dela Llana must first establishby preponderance of evidencethe three elements of quasi-delict before we determine Rebeccas liability as Joels employer.She should show the chain of causation between Joels reckless driving and her whiplash injury.Only after she has laid this foundation can the presumption - that Rebecca did not exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of Joel - arise.30Once negligence, the damages and the proximate causation are established, this Court can then proceed with the application and the interpretation of the fifth paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code.31Under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, in relation with the fifth paragraph of Article 2180, an action predicated on an employees act or omission may be instituted against the employer who is held liable for the negligent act or omission committed by his employee.32The rationale for these graduated levels of analyses is that it is essentially the wrongful or negligent act or omission itself which creates thevinculum jurisin extra-contractual obligations.33

In civil cases, a party who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it.He who alleges has the burden of proving his allegation by preponderance of evidence or greater weight of credible evidence.34The reason for this rule is that bare allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence, are not equivalent to proof.In short, mere allegations are not evidence.35

In the present case, the burden of proving the proximate causation between Joels negligence and Dra. dela Llanas whiplash injury rests on Dra. dela Llana. She must establish by preponderance of evidence that Joels negligence, in its natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produced her whiplash injury, and without which her whiplash injury would not have occurred.36

Notably, Dra. dela Llana anchors her claim mainly on three pieces of evidence: (1) the pictures of her damaged car, (2) the medical certificate dated November 20, 2000, and (3) her testimonial evidence. However, none of these pieces of evidence show the causal relation between the vehicular accident and the whiplash injury. In other words,Dra. dela Llana, during trial, did not adduce thefactum probansor the evidentiary facts by which thefactum probandumor the ultimate fact can be established, as fully discussed below.37ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

A. The pictures of the damaged car only demonstrate the impact of the collision

Dra. dela Llana contends that the pictures of the damaged car show that the massive impact of the collision caused her whiplash injury. We are not persuaded by this bare claim. Her insistence that these pictures show the causation grossly belies common logic. These pictures indeed demonstrate the impact of the collision. However, it is a far-fetched assumption that the whiplash injury can also be inferred from these pictures.

B. The medical certificate cannot be considered because it was not admitted in evidence

Furthermore, the medical certificate, marked as Exhibit H during trial, should not be considered in resolving this case for the reason that it was not admitted in evidence by the RTC in an order dated September 23, 2004.38Thus, the CA erred in even considering this documentary evidence in its resolution of the case. It is a basic rule that evidence which has not been admitted cannot be validly considered by the courts in arriving at their judgments.

However, even if we consider the medical certificate in the disposition of this case, the medical certificate has no probative value for being hearsay. It is a basic rule that evidence, whether oral or documentary, is hearsay if its probative value is not based on the personal knowledge of the witness but on the knowledge of another person who is not on the witness stand.39Hearsay evidence, whether objected to or not, cannot be given credence40except in very unusual circumstance that is not found in the present case. Furthermore, admissibility of evidence should not be equated with weight of evidence. The admissibility of evidence depends on its relevance and competence, whil