Evidence Case Digest Rule 130

8/10/2019 Evidence Case Digest Rule 130

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Abalos vs CA

(case #4)

Delfin Abalos was charged and convicted of murdering Liberato Damias.

Veronica Bulatao, the girlfriend of the victim, witnessed the killing. Shetestified that Abalos shot the victim in her house at a close range.

Delfin denied the contention, saying that he was at the tobacco fields,

working with his father, which was corroborated by Delfins father andtwo other persons.

Abalos argues that there is not evidence to convict him because the

paraffin test conducted on him yielded negative for powder burns on hishand, hence confirming that he never fired the shot that killed the victim.

Issue:

1. Whether or not the innocence of the defendant can be proved by

the negative result of the paraffin test.

2. Whether or not the defendant has a solid alibi.

Held:

1. The court ruled in the negative. Anent the paraffin test, it is true

that it produced a negative result but such fact does not ipso

factomerit Delfin's acquittal. This Court acknowledges that the

absence of powder burns in a suspect's hand is not conclusiveproof that he has not fired a gun. In fact, the traces of nitrates

can easily be removed by the simple act of washing one's hand.

2. For alibi to prosper, petitioner must not only prove that he was

not at the crime scene but that it was also physically impossible

for him to have been present there at the time the offense wascommitted. He miserably failed to satisfy the second requisite.

Delfin himself testified that the distance between the tobacco

fields to Veronica's house was only around 400 meters and it only

took eight (8) minutes to traverse such path. Evidently, it was notimpossible for Delfin to be present at the locus criminis.

3. Borje vs Sandiganbayan

(case #11)

Borje, a provincial plant officer of the bureau of plant industry in La

Union, was accused of the crime of falsification of public document.Herein complainant Ducusin alleged that the petitioner took advantage

of his position in falsifying the time book and payroll of his office for the

periods January to March 1977, daily time record of Ducusin by making it

appear that Ducusin participated in the same and affixed his signatures,when in fact he did not sign the documents, in order to receive P225

which was supposed to have been received by Ducusin.

To prove that Borje committed the crime, the prosecutor presentedseveral documents such as: the time book and payro;; of the accuseds

office for the period of January to March 1977; the daily time record for

the same period of Rodrigo Ducusin and the certification that Ducusin

was detailed to the program.

On appeal, Borje argued that proof beyond reasonable doubt was not

established since; a. the originals of the alleged falsified documents werenot presented in court hence, the corpus delicti was not established as

held in US vs Gregorio and; b. there is no iota of evidence that the

petitioner falsified the complainants signature on the alleged falsified

documents.

ISSUE:

1.

WON Ducusins testimony with regard to his non-participation in

the program is admissible

2.

WON the presentation of the photocopies of the falsified

documents is enough to prove the crime of falsification of publicdocuments

HELD:

1. No. The alleged verbal order is doubtful for under normal and

usual official procedure, a written special order issued by a


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government office is cancelled, amended or modified only by

another written special order, not only for purposes of record on

file but also to prevent conflict and confusion in government

operations. Moreover, under the best evidence rule, Section 2,

Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the supposed verbal order cannotprevail over the written Special Order No. 172 which lists Ducusin

in the payroll for the program.

2.

No. In U.S. vs Gregorio, it was held that:In a criminal case for the falsification of a document, it is

indispensable that the judges and the courts have before

them the document alleged to have been simulated,

counterfeited or falsified, in order that they may find,pursuant to the evidence produced at the trial, whether

or not the crime of falsification was actually committed;

in the absence of the original document, it is improper to

conclude, with only a copy of the said original in view,

that there has been a falsification of a document which

was neither found nor exhibited, because, in such a case,

even the existence of such original document may bedoubted.

The SB is incorrect to dismiss the ruling in the Gregorio

case. Firstly the Gregorio ruling makes no distinction for

the doctrine itself applies in criminal proceedings for thefalsification of a document, whether simulated,

counterfeited, or falsified. Secondly, the Gregorio

doctrine is still tenable notwithstanding modern copying

devices for a falsified document, passed off as an original

can also be duplicated by xeroxing and thereafter,

certified as true copy of the original. And thirdly,considering that in the case at bar, the xeroxing was

done or caused to be done by complainant Ducusin after

taking out the original documents without the official

authority and permission of the Disbursing Officer andCashier, Remedios Lorenzo, who was then out on rural

service and thereafter the originals were lost, misplaced

and are now missing, the failure to present the originals

is suspicious for complainant had ulterior and ill motives

in accusing the petitioner Borje.

Lechugas vs CA

(case #18)

Petitioner filed an unlawful entry case against private respondent theLozas. Victoria Lechugas allegedly bought the subject properties from

Leonicia Lasangue, as evidenced by a public Deed of Absolute Sale,

which is duly registered with the Registered of Deeds. Another case was

filed for recovery and possession of the same property and both caseswas tried jointly. Private respondent contended that their father, Hugo

Loza, bought the same land in question from Victorina Limor, and

another adjoining land from one Emeterio Lasangue. The remaining

portion of the lot bought from Limor was allegedly the one bought by

Lechugas. Lasangue corroborated this in her testimony, who although

illiterate, was able to specifically point out the land sold to Lechugas,

which is contrary to the deed of sale between Lasangue and Lechugas.

ISSUE:

WON parole evidence be admitted to determine the land bought by

Lechugas.

HELD:

YES. The parol evidence rule does not apply, and may not properly be

invoked by either party to the litigation against the other, where at least

one of the parties to the suit is not party or a privy of a party to thewritten instrument in question and does not base a claim on the

instrument or assert a right originating in the instrument or the relation

established.

The petitioner's reliance on the parol evidence rule is misplaced. The rule

is not applicable where the controversy is between one of the parties to


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the document and third persons. The deed of sale was executed by

Leoncia Lasangue in favor of Victoria Lechugas. The dispute over what

was actually sold is between petitioner and the private respondents. In

the case at bar, through the testimony of Leoncia Lasangue, it was

shown that what she really intended to sell and to be the subject ofExhibit A was Lot No. 5522 but not being able to read and write and fully

relying on the good faith of her first cousin, the petitioner, she just placed

her thumbmark on a piece of paper which petitioner told her was the

document evidencing the sale of land. The deed of sale described thedisputed lot instead.

17. PARADISE SAUNA V. NG

Facts:The case arose from the Petitioners act of terminating the

Respondents appointment as manager-administrator of his

alleged failure to comply with the terms and conditions of his

appointment.

Respondent Ng filed a case for specific performance and

damages with prayer for a preliminary injuction. Later on, he

amended his complaint to one for breach of contract withdamages.

LC rendered judgment in favour of Ng

IAC affirmed TC, Hence this petition

Issues:

How contract between Petitioner and Respondent is a lease ormanagement contract.

Held:

Subject contract is a lease contract and NOT a management

contract.

When a pleading is amended, the original one is deemed

abandoned. Hence, amended pleading replaces the originalwhich no longer forms part of the record and the trial of the case

is the basis of the amended pleading.

In this case, parol evidence was introduced to prove that the

contract in question was not a management contract as itappears on its face but a base contract.

Section 9. Evidence of written agreements. When the terms of

an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is considered as

containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be, between

the parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of such

terms other than the contents of the written agreement.However, a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add

to the terms of written agreement if he puts in issue in his

pleading:

(a) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the writtenagreement;

(b) The failure of the written agreement to express the true

intent and agreement of the parties thereto;

(c) The validity of the written agreement; or(d) The existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their

successors in interest after the execution of the written

agreement.

The term "agreement" includes wills. (7a)

In the instant case, failure of a contrast to express the true intent and

agreement of the parties is raised. The fact that allegations of

respondent Ng with respect to his rights as lesser of the petitioner corpwere made on the basis of Exhibit A in the amended complaint meets

the procedural requirements that paid failure be put in issue by the

pleadings.

10. HEIRS OF LOURDES SABANPAN V. COMORPOSA

Facts:

This case arose from a complaint for unlawful detainer filed in

MTC by Petitioner against Respondent involving possession of a

parcel of land.

Respondent argued that they have acquired just and validownership of the premises and that the Regional Director of

DENR has already upheld their possession over the land in

question, when it ruled the rightful claimants and per possessors.

CA Ruled that although not yet final, the order issues by theRegional Director of DENR remained in full force and effect;

unless declared null and void. The certification issued by the


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DENRs community environment and natural resources officer

was proof that when the cadastral survey was conducted, the

land was still alienable and was not yet allocated to any person.

Issues:

1.) WON the DENR Officers certification which only means thefacsimile of the alleged signature of a certain Jose F Tagerda are

admissible as evidence.

2.) WON the affidavits are admissible as evidence.

Held:1.) Pleadings filed via fax machines are not considered

orginals and are at best exact copies. As such, they are NOT

admissible as evidence, as there is no way of determining

whether they are genuine or authentic.Neither the ROP nor jurisprudence would sanction the

admission of evidence that has not been formally offered during

trial. But this evidentiary rule is applicable to only ordinary trials,

not to cases covered by the rules on summary procedure cases

in which no full blown trial is held.

2.) The admissibility of evidence should be distinguished

from its probative value. Just because a piece of evidence isadmitted does not ipso facto mean that it conclusively proves the

fact in dispute.

3. PEOPLE V. NARVASA

Facts:Accused-appellants were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt

of the crime of illegal possession of FIREARMS in its aggravated

form and was sentenced to RP

SPO3 Primo Camba & PO2 Simeon Navora, while on patrol

received a report that the gang of the appellants were carrying

various firearms.The 2 policemen decided to investigate before they could search

the house of Navasa, they were met by a valley of gunfire.

Unfortunately SPO3 Camba was hit and he eventually died.

Shortly afterwards the accused appellants were apprehended.Issues:

In the absence of the firearms themselves, may illegal possession

of firearms be proven by Parol evidence.

Held:

The existence of firearms can be established by testimony even

without the presentation of the said firearm.In the case of People v. Orchuela, the court held that the

existence of the firearm can be established by testimony, even

without the presentation of the said firearm. In the said case,

appellant Orchuela was convicted of qualified illegal possessionof firearms despite the fact that the firearms used were not

presented as evidence.

The existence of weapon was deemed amply established by the

testimony of the witness that Orchuela was in possession of itand had used it to kill the victim.

The witness is NOT expected to remember an occurrence with

perfect recollection of the minute details.

5. Abella vs. CA

Facts:

On May 26, 1987, petitioner Abella, as lessor, and private

respondent Colarina, as lessee, signed a contract of lease ofapportion of building in Nag City, from July 1, 1987 until July 1,

1991 for 4 years, with a monthly rental of 3,000. Upon signing of

the contract, Colorina paid an amount of 40,000 to Abella which

the latter acknowledge by issuing the corresponding receipt.

Colorina paid the monthly rental but discontinued payment fromNovember 1987 to April 1988.

Thereafter, Abella took possession of the premises; hence, in

1988 Colorina filed an action for enforcement of contract of

lease with preliminary mandatory injunction and damages

against Abella. RTC, favours Abella but on Appeal CA reversed

the decision stating that Colorina did not violate the contract forit is stated in the receipt received by Abella that THE SUM OF

40,000 AS ADVANCE DEPOSIT, TO ANSWER FOR ANY RENTAL

WHICH MR. CONDRADO COLORINA MAY FAIL TO PAY

DURING THE TERM OF THE LEASE AS PER CONTARCT.Hence, this petition.


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Isuue: whether or not, the receipt is considered documentary

evidence.

Held:

The Supreme Court ruled that, the receipt expresses truly the

parties intent on the purpose of said payment as against the oraltestimony of the petitioner that said amount is but only a good

money. Without any doubt, oral testimony as to ascertain fact

depending as it does exclusively on human memory is not as

reliable as written or documentary evidence. I would soonertrust the smallest ship of paper for truth said Judge Limpkin of

Georgia. Than the strongest and most retentive memory ever

bestowed on mortal man.

Thus, uphold the findings of the CA.

12. CITI Bank N.A. Mastercrd vs. Teodoro

Facts:

Efren Teodoro was one such cardholder of the petitioner.

Respondent, Teodoro, made various purchase through his credit

card. Thereafter petitioner claims that of January 1995, the

obligations of the respondent stood at 191,693.25 pesos. Severaltimes it demanded payment from him, but he refused to pay,

claiming that the amount demanded did not correspond to his

actual obligations.

During the trial, petitioner represented several sales

invoice or charge slips, which added up to only 24,388.36 pesos.Although mere photocopies of the originals, the invoices were

marked in evidence as exhibits F to F-4 because all these copies

appeared to bear the signature of respondent, the trial court

deemed, them sufficient proof of his purchases with the use of

the credit card. Petitioner claimed that respondents obligation

to ballooned to 191,693.25 as shown by statement of accounts.MTC and RTC ruled in favour of the petitioner. CA reversed.

Hence this petition.

Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in holding that

petitioner failed to prove the due execution and the cause of theunavailability and non-production of the charge slips marked in

evidence as exhibits F to F-4.

Held: NO

The original copies of the sales invoices are the best evidence to

prove the alleged obligation. Photocopies thereof are mere

secondary evidence. As such, they are inadmissible because

petitioner, as the offeror, failed to prove any of the exceptionsprovided under Section 3 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, as well

as the conditions of their admissibility. Because of the

inadmissibility of the photocopies in the absence of the originals,

respondents obligation was not established.Section 5 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court states:

SEC. 5. When original document is unavailable. When the

original document has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be

produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution orexistence and the cause of its unavailability without bad faith on

his part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its

contents in some authentic document, or by the testimony of

witnesses in the order stated.

Applying the above Rule to the present case, before a party is

allowed to adduce secondary evidence to prove the contents of

the original sales invoices, the offeror must prove the following:(1) the existence or due execution of the original; (2) the loss and

destruction of the original or the reason for its nonproduction in

court; and (3) on the part of the offeror, the absence of bad faith

to which the unavailability of the original can be attributed.[14]

The correct order of proof is as follows: existence, execution,loss, and contents. At the sound discretion of the court, this

order may be changed if necessary.

In the present case, the existence of the original sales invoices

was established by the photocopies and the testimony of

Hernandez. Petitioner, however, failed to prove that the

originals had been lost or could not be produced in court afterreasonable diligence and good faith in searching for them.

19. Pilipinas Bank vs. CA

Facts:Petitioner obtained from Private respondent Meridian assurance

Corp. a Money Security and Payroll Comprehensive Policy


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(Insurance Policy). While the policy was in full force and effect,

petitioners armoured vehicle was robbed while on it way to

deliver the payroll withdrawal of it client.

Petitioner filed a formal notice of claim under its insurance

policy. However, private respondent averred that the insurancedoes not cover the deliveries of the withdrawals to petitioner

client.

During trial, petitioner presented Mr. Tubianosa to testify on the

existence and due execution of the insurance policy.After almost a year, petitioner filed a motion to recall witness,

praying that it be allowed Tubianosa to testify on the

negotiations, pertaining to the terms and conditions of the policy

before its issuance to determine the intention of the partiesregarding the said terms and conditions.

Private respondent objected thereto, on the ground that the

same would violate the parol evidence rule.

The RTC denied the motion to recall, thereafter affirmed by the

CA.

Issue: WON the CA erred in affirming the decision of the RTC.

Held: NO.Petitioners Complaint merely alleged that under the provisions

of the Policy, it was entitled to recover from private respondent

the amount it lost during the heist. It did not allege therein that

the Policys terms were ambiguous or failed to express the true

agreement between itself and private respondent. Such beingthe case, petitioner has no right to insist that it be allowed to

present Tubianosas testimony to shed light on the alleged true

agreement of the parties, notwithstanding its statement in its

PreTrial Brief that it was presenting said witness for that

purpose.

Section 9, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court expresslyrequires that for parol evidence to be admissible to vary the

terms of the written agreement, the mistake or imperfection

thereof or its failure to express the true agreement of the parties

should be put in issue by the pleadings.As correctly noted by the appellate court, petitioner failed to

raise the issue of an intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection

in the terms of the Policy, or of the failure of said contract to

express the true intent and agreement of the parties thereto in

its Complaint. There was therefore no error on the part of the

appellate court when it affirmed the RTCs Order disallowing the

recall of Tubianosa to the witness stand, for such disallowance isin accord with the rule that when the terms of an agreement

have been reduced to writing, it is considered as containing all

the terms agreed upon and there can be, between the parties

and their successors

in

interest, no evidence of such otherterms other than the contents of the written agreement.

PEOPLE OF THE Philippines vs. Hon. Judge Sixto Domondon

Facts: The three respondents, Filomena Gabriel, Jose Arenas and

Estela Nicanor were accused of violating the Anti Graft and

Corrupt Practices Act. The charges arose in connection with the

alleged leakage of test questions in the Teachers Selective

Examination. Originally, there was a fourth information filed with

the same court against another defendant, Jessie Siapno, but

upon the Peoples motion, on the ground that the said defendantwould be utilized as a state witness, the trial court ordered her

discharge as defendant and dismissed the case against her.

Extrajudicial confession has been signed by Jessie Siapno which

was allowed by court. That when Jessie asked by the Prosecutor

to identify her signature, the defense objects on the ground thatthe answer to the question would tend to incriminate the

witness. The defense counsel also objected when she asked by

the prosecutor to describe the test booklet on the ground that

the best evidence was the booklet itself.

Issue: Whether or not the extrajudicial admission Of JessieSiapno is admissible

Ruling: Yes, the extrajudicial confession of discharged defendant

Siapno is admissible. Although as a general rule an extrajudicialconfession is evidence only against the person making it, the

same may be taken into consideration as a circumstance in


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assessing and passing upon the weight and credibility of the

accomplice as well as those of the opposing parties. The two

defendants also executed extrajudicial confession which the

court found identical with that of Jessie on material points.

Unless, therefore, it is shown that there was collusion in makingthe confession, they are admissible as circumstantial evidence

against the persons implicated to show the probability of their

criminal participation.

SISON VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Facts: Eleven accused were indicted for the crime of murder

against Salcedo arising from the mauling incident occurred

during the Marcos Regime at Luneta Park. All these accusedwere allegedly kicked, boxed and mauled Salcedo to death.

Photographs were taken of the victim as he was being mauled

and chased by his assailants at the Luneta. During the trial, the

prosecution presented photographs allegedly depicting the

incident. The defense counsel objects on the ground that the one

who took the picture was not presented to identify them.

ISSUE: Whether or not the photographs taken is admissible

Ruling: Yes, the photographer, however, is not the only witness

who can identify the pictures he has taken. The correctness of

the photographs as a faithful representation of the objectportrayed can be proved prima facie, either by the testimony of

the person who made it or by other competent witness after

which the court can admit subject to impeachment as to its

accuracy. Photographs, therefore, can be identified by the

photographer or by any other competent witness who can testify

to its exactions and accuracy.

1. TIJING vs CA (354 SCRA 17)

FACTS:

Petitioners, Tijing are husband and wife. They have six children.The youngest is Edgardo Tijing, Jr., who was born on April 27,

1989. Petitioner Bienvenida served as the laundrywoman of

private respondent Angelita Diamante, then a resident of Tondo,

Manila. In August 1989, Bienvenida went to the house of Angelita

Diamante for an urgent laundry job. Since Bienvenida was on her

way to do some marketing, she asked Angelita to wait until she

returned. She also left her four-month old son, Edgardo, Jr.,under the care of Angelita as she usually let Angelita take care of

the child while Bienvenida was doing laundry.

When Bienvenida returned from the market, Angelita and

Edgardo, Jr., were gone. Four years later or in October 1993,Bienvenida read in a tabloid about the death of Tomas Lopez,

allegedly the common-law husband of Angelita, and whose

remains were lying in state in Hagonoy, Bulacan. Bienvenida lost

no time in going to Hagonoy, Bulacan, where she allegedly sawher son Edgardo, Jr., for the first time after four years.

Bienvenida and Edgardo filed their petition for habeas corpus

with the trial court in order to recover their son. As the case

ensued, To substantiate their petition, petitioners presented two

witnesses, namely, Lourdes Vasquez and Benjamin Lopez. The

second witness, Benjamin Lopez, declared that his brother, the

late Tomas Lopez, could not have possibly fathered John ThomasLopez as the latter was sterile.

For her part, Angelita claimed that she is the natural mother of

the child. She asserts that at age 42, she gave birth to John

Thomas Lopez on April 27, 1989, at the clinic of midwife Zosima

Panganiban in Singalong, Manila. She added, though, that shehas two other children with her real husband, Angel Sanchez.

She said the birth of John Thomas was registered by her

common-law husband, Tomas Lopez, with the local civil registrar

of Manila on August 4, 1989.

On March 10, 1995, the trial court concluded that since Angelita

and her common-law husband could not have children, thealleged birth of John Thomas Lopez is an impossibility. The trial

court also held that the minor and Bienvenida showed strong

facial similarity. Accordingly, it ruled that Edgardo Tijing, Jr., and

John Thomas Lopez are one and the same person who is thenatural child of petitioners. The Court of Appeals reversed the


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decision on the ground that evidence adduced was insufficient,

hence, this case.

ISSUE: WON the finding of the trial court as to the facial

similarity of the petitioners and John Thomas Lopez, their

alleged son is tenable?HELD:

Yes. The Court noted the pieces of evidence adduced: first

Angelita could no longer bear children due to her ligation, second

her common-law husbands sterility, third the falsity of JohnThomas birth certificate and fourth the similarity/ resemblance

between the minor and his alleged parent is competent and

material evidence to establish parentage.

A final note. Parentage will still be resolved using conventionalmethods unless we adopt the modern and scientific ways

available. Fortunately, we have now the facility and expertise in

using DNA test for identification and parentage testing.

The analysis is based on the fact that the DNA of a child/person

has two (2) copies, one copy from the mother and the other from

the father. The DNA from the mother, the alleged father and

child are analyzed to establish parentage. Of course, being anovel scientific technique, the use of DNA test as evidence is still

open to challenge. Eventually, as the appropriate case comes,

courts should not hesitate to rule on the admissibility of DNA

evidence.

8. Roble vs Arbasa

FACTS:

On January 2, 1976, spouses Dominador Arbasa and Adelaida

Roble (hereinafter referred to as respondents) purchased from

Fidela Roble an unregistered parcel of land located at Poblacion,Isabel, Leyte. As reflected on the deed of sale, the property had a

total land area of two hundred forty (240) square meters. Due to

their diligent efforts in reclaiming a portion of the sea, using

stones, sand and gravel, the original size of two hundred forty(240) square meters increased to eight hundred eighty four (884)

square meters.

Since 1976 and until the present, respondents have been in

actual, open, peaceful and continuous possession of the entire

parcel of land in the concept of owners and had it declared for

taxation purposes in the name of respondent Adelaida Arbasa.

Included in the sale were the improvements found on the land,consisting mainly of the house of Fidela.

Adelaida tolerated her sister Fidelas continued stay at the house.

Latter and her husband thereon died. Petitioners Roble claimed

ownership of the house and the southern portion of the land withan area of 644 square meters.

Arbasa then filed an action for quieting of title with damages. At

the pre-trial conference held on July 4, 1990, the parties defined

the issue to be: whether the deed of sale executed on January 2,1975 by Fidela Roble in favor of respondents conveyed the entire

eight hundred eighty four (884) square meters parcel of land,

including the house of Fidela, or it covered only two hundred

forty (240) square meters located at the northern portion of the

property.

RTC ruled that the deed of absolute sale executed by Fidela

Roble covered only a total area of two hundred forty (240) squaremeters in favor of respondents and not the entire eight hundred

eighty four (884) square meters claimed by respondents. On

appeal, CA observed that from the wording of the deed of sale,

Fidela Roble sold to respondents the whole parcel of

residential land bounded on the south by the seashore. . TheCourt of Appeals opined that this technical description, as

contained in the deed of sale, lent credence to the claim of

respondents that they were responsible for reclaiming the 644

square meters claimed by petitioners. CA ruled in favor of the

Arabsa. Hence this case.

ISSUE: WON Fidela sold the whole of the parcel of land toArbasa?

HELD: Yes. The Court finds no ambiguity in the terms and

stipulations of the deed of sale. Contracts are the laws between

the contracting parties. It shall be fulfilled according to the literalsense of their stipulations. If their terms are clear and leave no

room for doubt as to the intention of the contracting parties, the


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contracts are obligatory no matter what their forms may be,

whenever the essential requisites for their validity are present.

Sale, by its very nature, is a consensual contract because it is

perfected by mere consent. The essential elements of a contract

of sale are the following: (a) consent or meeting of the minds,that is consent to transfer ownership in exchange for the price;

(b) determinate subject matter; and (c) price certain in money or

its equivalent. All these elements are present in the instant case.

Moreover,. parol evidence rule forbids any addition to orcontradiction of the terms of a written instrument by testimony

or other evidence purporting to show that, at or before the

execution of the parties written agreement, other or different

terms were agreed upon by the parties, varying the purport ofthe written contract. When an agreement has been reduced to

writing, the parties can not be permitted to adduce evidence to

provide alleged practices, which all purposes would alter the

terms of written agreement. Whatever is not found in the writing

is understood to have been waived and abandoned.

The rule is not without exceptions, however, as it is likewise

provided that a party to an action may present evidence tomodify, explain, or add to the terms of the written agreement if

he puts in issue in his pleadings: (a) an intrinsic ambiguity,

mistake or imperfection in the written agreement; (b) the failure

of the written agreement to express the true intent and

agreement of the parties thereto; (c) the validity of the writtenagreement; or (d) the existence of other terms agreed to by the

parties or their successors in interest after the execution of the

written agreement.

None of the aforecited exceptions finds application to the instant

case. Nor did respondents raise this issue at the proceedings

before the trial court.

15.PEOPLE VS. TANDOY

FACTS:Mario Tandoy was accused feloniously sold eight (8) pieces of

dried marijuana flowering tops, two(2) pieces of dried marijuana

flowering tops and crushed dried marijuana flowering tops,

which areprohibited drug, for and in consideration of P20.00.

The accused-appellant raises the following assignment of errors

in this appeal:

The Court a quo erred in admitting in evidence against the

accused Exh. "E-2-A" which is merely axerox copy of the P10.00

bill allegedly used as buy-bust money.

The evidence of the prosecution may be summarized as follows:

One of them was the accused-appellant, who said withoutpreamble: "Pare, gusto mo bangumiskor?" Singayan said yes.

The exchange was made then and theretwo rolls/pieces

ofmarijuana for one P10.00 and two P5.00 bills marked ANU

(meaning Anti-Narcotics Unit).

The team then moved in and arrested Tandoy.The accused-

appellant invokes the best evidence rule and questions theadmission by the trial court of the xerox copy only of the marked

P10.00 bill.

The Solicitor General, in his Comment, correctly refuted thatcontention thus:

a. This assigned error centers on the trial court's admission

of the P10.00 bill marked money which, according to the

appellant, is excluded under the best evidence rule for being a

mere xerox copy.b. Apparently, appellant erroneously thinks that said

marked money is an ordinary document falling under Sec. 2, Rule

130 of the Revised Rules of Court which excludes the introduction

of secondary evidence except in the five (5) instances mentionedtherein.


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The best evidence rule applies only when the contents of the

document are the subject of inquiry.

Issue:

Whether or not such document was actually executed, or exists,or in the circumstances relevant to orsurrounding its execution,

the best evidence rule does not apply and testimonial evidence is

admissible.

Held:

1. Since the aforesaid marked money was presented by the

prosecution solely for the purpose of establishing its existence

and not its contents, other substitutionary evidence, like a Xeroxcopy thereof, is therefore admissible without the need of

accounting for the original. Moreover, the presentation at the

trial of the "buy-bust money" was not indispensable to the

conviction of the accused-appellant because the sale of the

marijuana had been adequately proved by the testimony of the

police officers. So long as the marijuana actually sold by the

accused-appellant had been submitted as an exhibit, the failureto produce the marked money itself would not constitute a fatal

omission. We are convinced from the evidence on record that the

prosecution has overcome the constitutional presumption of

innocence in favor of the accused-appellant with proof beyond

reasonable doubt of his guilt.He must therefore suffer thepenalty prescribed by law for those who would visit the scourge

of drug addiction upon our people.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED and the challenged

decision AFFIRMED in toto, with costsagainst the accused-

appellant.

:

Transpacific Industrial Supplies Inc v CA and Associated Bank

235 SCRA 494

FACTS: Petitioner Transpacific Industrial Inc applied for and was

granted loans by respondent Associated Bank. The loans were

evidenced and secured by four promissory notes, a real estate

mortgage and a chattel mortgage. Subsequently, Associated

Bank returned the duplicate original copies of the promissory

notes to Trans-Pacific with the word PAIDstamped thereon.

Despite such return, Associated demanded from Transpacific thepayment of the amount of P 492,100 representing the accrued

interest on one of the promissory notes and stated that the

promissory notes were erroneously released. At first,

TransPacific expressed its willingness to pay the amountdemanded but change its mind and initiated an action instead

before the RTC for specific performance and damages against

the respondent bank and prayed for the obligation to the bank to

be declared fully paid. The RTC ruled in favor of TransPacificwhere it held that Transpacific has fully discharged its obligation

by virtue of its possession of the documents evidencing

indebtedness, applying thereon the legal presumption provided

by Art. 1271 of the Civil Code, to wit;

Art. 1271. The delivery of a private document evidencing a credit,

made voluntarily by the creditor to the debtor, implies the

renunciation of the action which the former had against thelatter.

Associated Bank then appealed to the respondent court, CA, who

reversed the decision of the RTC and held that the documents

found in possession of TransPacific are mere duplicate and

cannot be the basis of petitioners claim that its obligation hasbeen fully paid. CA contends that since the promissory notes

submitted by the petitioner were duplicates and not the

originals, the delivery thereof by respondent bank to the

petitioner does not merit the application of Art. 1271. Art. 1271

must be construed to mean the original copy of the document

evidencing the credit.ISSUE: WON CA erred in its decision to disregard the promissory

notes as evidence of payment by Transpacific on the ground that

such were just mere duplicates and not the originals.

RATIONALE: The Supreme Court held that the pronouncementof the CA regarding the documents is groundless. Its undisputed

that the documents presented were duplicate originals and


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therefore admissible as evidence. The SC cited its ruling in

People v. Tan where it held:

When carbon sheets are inserted between two or more sheets

of writing paper so that the writing of a contract upon the

outside sheet, including the signature of the party to be chargedthereby, produces a facsimile upon the sheets beneath, such

signature being thus reproduced by the same stroke of pen which

made the surface or exposed impression, all of the sheets so

written on are regarded as duplicate originals and either of themmay be introduced in evidence as such without accounting for

the nonproduction of the others.

Pursuant to Sec 2[b], Rule 130; A duplicate copy of the original

may be admitted in evidence when the original is in thepossession of the party against whom the evidence is offered,

and the latter fails to produce if after reasonable notice, as in the

case of respondent bank.

The SC also held that the presumption created by Art. 1271 of the

CC is not conclusive but merely prima facie. If theres no evidence

to the contrary the presumption stands. On the other hand, the

presumption loses its legal efficacy in the face of proof orevidence to the contrary. In the case at bar, the SC found

sufficient justification to overthrow the presumption of payment

made by the delivery of the documents evidencing petitioners

indebtedness. The rationale for allowing presumption of

renunciation in the delivery of a private instrument is that, unlikethat of a public instrument, there could be just one copy of

evidence of the credit. Where several originals are made out of a

private document, the intendment of the law would thus be to

refer to the delivery only of the original original rather than to the

original duplicate of which the debtor would normally retain a

copy.

People v. Ulzoron

286 SCRA 641

FACTS: Accused-Appelant Samuel Ulzoron was charged of rapewith the use of a deadly weapon by complaining witness, Emily

Gabo, when he allegedly, armed with a 2 foot long bolo and with

the use of physical force, forcibly and against the will of the

latter, engaged in sexual intercourse with Gabo. Ulzoron was

adjudged guilty and subsequently sentenced by the trial court

with the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Appelant argued in his

defense that the undisputed facts and circumstance made itmore likely that him and Emily was involved in an adulterous

relationship for there was nothing to support the victims claim of

struggle since the examining physician could not conclude that

there was physical force inflicted due to the lack of any physicalinjury on Emily. He also called the attention of the court on the

circumstance that the judge who wrote the decision did not

personally tried the case and thus lacked the opportunity to

observe the demeanor of the parties and their witnesses.ISSUES:

1. WON Ulzorons claim of innocence due to the lack of

physical injury on the victim of the alleged rape is correct.

2. WON Ulzoron raising the sweetheart defense in his

appeal may be given credence by the court.

3. WON the circumstance that the judge who wrote the

decision was not the one who personally tried the caseprejudiced the accused.

RATIONALE:

1. On the matter of Ulzorons defense of the lack of

physical injury on Emily, the Supreme Court held that its not

necessary for the commission of rape that thered be marks ofphysical violence on the victims body. In the particular case at

bar, the absence of bodily harm on Emily can be adequately

explained by the testimony given by the latter during the cross-

examination proceedings when asked to describe the manner

they traversed the 40 meters distance to the scene of the crime.

2. With regards to the claim of adulterous relationship with

the victim, the Court did not agree with the Office of the Solicitor

General that the sweetheart defense being raised as a defense

for the first time in Ulzorons appeal should be disallowed toconform with the established jurisprudence. The SC held that

Ulzoron could only be emphasizing the point that the facts and


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circumstances established could lead to a conclusion of the

existence of adulterous relationship between him and Emily and

not of rape. Simply put, the appellant could only be using the

sweetheart theory not necessarily as a defense but as a focal

point in disputing the appreciation by the trial court of theevidence of the prosecution. Thus, the defense may not be

totally disregarded.

3. On the issue that the judge who wrote the decision hadnot heard the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, the SC

held that such circumstance does not taint or disturb the decision

of the judge since after all, the judge had the records of the case

before him including the transcript of the stenographic notes.The validity of a decision is not necessarily impaired by the fact

that its writer only took over from a colleague who had earlier

presided at the trial, unless there is a clear showing of grave

abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts. The records

adequately support the factual findings of the trial court and its

assessment of the credibility of the witnesses. Furthermore, the

SC stated that the circumstance of force and intimidationattending the case at bar were manifested clearly not only on the

victims testimony but also on the physical evidence presented

during the trial consisting of her torn dress and underwear as well

as the medico-legal support. Such pieces of evidence are more

eloquent than a hundred witnesses.

Thus, the SC affirmed the decision of the RTC.

Inciong Jr. v. CA

257 SCRA 578

FACTS: Petitioner Baldomer Inciong Jr. co-signed a promissory

note in the amount of P50, 000 with Rene Naybe and Gregorio

Pantanosas holding themselves jointly and severally liable to

private respondent Philippine Bank of the Communications.Upon the expiration of the term specified for payment in the

promissory note without the promisors paying for the obligation,

PNB filed a complaint for collection of sum against the three

obligors. The lower court dismissed the case against Pantanosas

while Naybe had already gone to Saudi Arabia at the time the

summons were served thus, leaving Inciong to be the only one

duly served with the summons and the action to prosper against.Inciong, in his defense, alleged that at that time the 5 copies of a

blank promissory note where brought to him by his friend at his

office, he affixed his signature thereto but in one copy he

indicated that he binds himself only for the amount of P5,000. Hefurther claims that his consent to the promissory note was

vitiated by fraud. The RTC ruled against him and such decision

was later on affirmed by the respondent court, CA. In his petition

for review on certiorari on the decision of the CA, one of hisassertions is that since the promissory note is not a public deed

with the formalities prescribed by law, but a mere commercial

paper which does not bear the signature of attesting witnesses,

parol evidence may overcome the contents of the promissory

note.

ISSUE: WON

HELD: The Supreme Court found no merit in Inciongs assertion.The first paragraph of the parol evidence rule states:

"When the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing,

it is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and there

can be, between the parties and their successors-in-interest, no

evidence of such terms other than the contents of the writtenagreement."

Its clear from the wording of the rule that it does not specify that

the written agreement be a public document. What is required is

that the agreement be in writing as the rule was in fact founded

on long experience that written evidence is much more certain

and accurate than that which rests in fleeting memory only andthat it would be unsafe when parties have expressed the terms of

their contract in writing to admit weaker evidence to control and

vary the stronger and to show that the parties intended a

different contract from that expressed in writing signed by them.Thus, the SC held that for the parol evidence rule to apply, a

written contract need not be in any particular form, or be signed


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by both parties. As a GENERAL RULE; Bills, notes and other

instruments of a similar nature are not subject to be varied or

contradicted by parol or extrinsic evidence.

Thus, Inciongs petition was denied and the SC affirmed the

findings of the CA.

Case no. 14

MAGDAYAO v. PEOPLE

An Information was filed charging petitioner with violation of

B.P. Blg. 22 of drawing a check with insufficient funds to Ricky

Olvis in the amount of P600,000.00. When arraigned, thepetitioner entered a plea of not guilty. At trial for the

presentation to adduce its evidence, the petitioner was absent.

On motion of the prosecution, the court allowed it to adduce

evidence. The prosecution presented the private complainant,

Ricky Olvis, who testified on direct examination that, the

petitioner drew and issued to him the check of P600,000.00

which was dishonored for the reason "Drawn Against InsufficientFunds". Olvis also testified that, the petitioner pleaded for time

to pay the amount thereof, but reneged on his promise. Olvis

then filed a criminal complaint against the petitioner for violation

of B.P. Blg. 22. The petitioner again offered to repay Olvis.

Taking pity on the petitioner, he agreed. He then returned theoriginal copy of the check to the petitioner, but the latter again

failed to make good on his promise and failed to pay the

P600,000.00. The prosecution wanted Olvis to identify the

petitioner as the drawer of the check, but because of the latters

absence, the direct examination on the witness could not be

terminated. The prosecution moved that such direct examinationof Olvis be continued on another date, and that the petitioner be

ordered to appear before the court so that he could be identified

as the drawer of the subject check. The trial court granted the

motion. After several postponements at the instance of thepetitioner, he failed to appear before the court for continuation

of trial. The trial court rendered judgment convicting the

petitioner of the crime charged.

ISSUE:

WON THE LOWER COURT ERRED WHEN IT RENDERED THE

DECISION WITH ALLEGED FINDINGS OF FACTS NOTSUFFICIENTLY SUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE.

HELD: DENIED

1.As long as the original evidence can be had, the court should

not receive in evidence that which is substitutionary in nature,such as photocopies, in the absence of any clear showing that the

original writing has been lost or destroyed or cannot be produced

in court

2. To warrant the admissibility of secondary evidence when theoriginal of a writing is in the custody or control of the adverse

party, Section 6 of Rule 130 provides that the adverse party must

be given reasonable notice, that he fails or refuses to produce the

same in court and that the offeror offers satisfactory proof of its

existence.

3. The offeror must prove that he has done all in his power to

secure the best evidence by giving notice to the said party toproduce the document. When such party has the original of the

writing and does not voluntarily offer to produce it or refuses to

produce it, secondary evidence may be admitted.

Case no. 7CALLANTA V. NLRC

Petitioner was appointed as sub-agent by respondent company

under supervision of Edgar Rodriguez with specific assignment at

Iligan City and Lanao Province. He was promoted to the position

of national promoter salesman of respondent company for IliganCity, Lanao del Norte and Lanao del Sur. However, a "spot audit"

was conducted and he was found to have a tentative shortage in

amount of P49,005.59. He rendered his resignation effective on

the same date. Thereafter, he wrote a letter complaining abouthis false resignation and demanding for the refund of the amount

of P76,465.81 as well as reinstatement to his former position.


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Respondent company ignored above demands. Petitioner filed a

complaint against, respondent company before the NLRC for

illegal dismissal, unpaid commission and receivable and/or claims

due, non-payment of vacation leaves, holiday pays, 13th month

pay, COLA and other company benefits and damages. The LaborArbiter rendered a decision declaring termination of petitioner's

services illegal. Respondent company appealed. Respondent

NLRC issued an order requiring private respondent company to

post a cash or surety bond in the amount equal to the monetaryaward in the Labor Arbiter's judgment and also ordered

immediate reinstatement of petitioner to his former position.

Two months from the date of the Order, private respondent filed

the required bond but did not reinstate petitioner. Meanwhile,petitioner filed with respondent NLRC a Motion for Writ of

Execution pending appeal which was not acted upon up to the

time where public respondent NRLC decided the appeal which

set aside the decision of the Labor Arbiter and dismissed the

complaint of petitioner for lack of merit.

ISSUE:

WON THE HONORABLE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONSCOMMISSION ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION AND WITH

GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT RULED THAT THE

ALLEGED RESIGNATION LETTER COMPLAINANT WAS VALID

AND EFFECTIVE CONTRARY TO THE FINDINGS OF THE LABOR

ARBITER THAT THE SAME WAS FORCED UPONCOMPLAINANT.

HELD: DISMISSED

1.A highly educated employee cannot be rattled by results of a

spot audit to the extent of resigning in a state of confusion.

- On top of the absence of evidence adduced by petitioner to the

contrary, the Court also finds it unbelievable that petitioner wasrattled and confused into signing the resignation letter on

account of a mere spot audit report

- A man of high educational attainment and qualification is

expected to know the import of everything he executes, whetherwritten or oral

- Petitioner cannot now be allowed of any evidence to the

contrary, the Court believes was tendered voluntarily by him

2. Unsigned summation of accounts not admissible as evidence

- For its claims for refund, petitioner presented written

summation of accounts reflecting the amounts allegedly ownedby responded company to him. But it is not dated nor signed,

thus, inadmissible and uncertain as to its origin and authenticity

Evidence Case Digest Rule 130

Documents

Transcript of Evidence Case Digest Rule 130