Evidence 9-19-15
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Dying Declaration- Exception to the hearsay rule.
People vs De Joya: (Robbery with Homicide)
Accused: Pioquinto De Joya
Victim: Eulalia Diamse (Dying Declaration when asked by grandson Alvin who
asked her"Apo, Apo, what happened?". . . . [Eulalia Diamse held his hand and after
which said: "Si Paqui". After saying these words, she let go of Alvin's hand and
passed away.
It has been held that a dying declaration to be admissible must be complete in itself.
To be complete in itself does not mean that the declarant must recite everything that
constituted theres gestaeof the subject of his statement, but that his statement of
any given fact should be a full expression of all that he intended to say as conveying
his meaning in respect of such fact.3The doctrine of completeness has also been
expressed in the following terms in Prof. Wigmore's classic work:
The application of the doctrine of completeness is here peculiar.The statement
as offered must not be merely apart of the whole as it was expressed by the
declarant; it must be complete as far it goes.But it is immaterial how much of the
whole affair of the death is related, provided the statement includes all that the
declarant wished or intended to include in it. Thus,if an interruption (by death
or by an intruder) cuts short a statement which thus remains clearly less than that
which the dying person wished to make, the fragmentary statement is not
receivable, because the intended whole is not there, and the whole might be of a
very different effect from that of the fragment;yet if the dying person finishes the
statement he wishes to make, it is no objection that he has told only a portion of
what he might have been able to tell.4(Emphasis supplied)
The reason upon which incomplete declarations are generally excluded, or if
admitted, accorded little or no weight, is that since the declarant was prevented (by
death or other circumstance) from saying all that he wished to say, what he did say
might have been qualified by the statements which he was prevented from making.
That incomplete declaration is not therefore entitled to the presumpti
truthfulness which constitutes the basis upon which dying declaration
received.
(Acquitted)
People vs Santos: (Murder)
Accused: Francisco Santos @ Pran andVillamor Asuncion
Victim: David Ambre (Dying Declaration:Lolita asked her husband who ha
him and the latter answered, It wasParePran.[5]She heard Davids words be
like Lolita, she had also placed her head near David who was still alive at the t
A dying declaration is entitled to the highest credence because no perso
knows of his impending death would make a careless and false accusation.[27]
exception to the hearsay rule, the requisites for its admissibility are as follow
the declaration is made by the deceased under the consciousness of his impe
death; (2) the deceased was at the time competent as a witness; (3) the decla
concerns the cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarants death; athe declaration is offered in a criminal case wherein the declarants death
subject of inquiry.[28]
It must be shown that a dying declaration was made under a realization
decedent that his demise or at least, its imminence -- not so much the
eventuation of death -- is at hand.[29]This may be proven by the statement
deceased himself or it may be inferred from the nature and extent of the dec
wounds, or other relevant circumstances.
We stress that when a person is at the point of death, every moti
falsehood is silenced and the mind is induced by the most powerful consideratspeak the truth.
A declaration made spontaneously after a startling occurrence is deem
such when (1) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; (
statements were made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; a
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the statements concern the occurrence in question and its immediately attending
circumstances
(Convicted)
People vs Rada & Sacdalan: (Multiple Murder)
Accused: RADA AND SACDALAN (CAFGUS)
VICTIM:Simeon Castillo, Isidro Castillo and Leonora Castillo (Leonora with
repeated dying declaration while she was being brought to the hospital that it was
the two accused that shot them)
Variations in the testimony of witnesses on the same side in respect to minor,
collateral, or incidental matters do not usually impair the weight of their united
testimony to the prominent facts. The witnesses testifying to the same event do not
have to be consistent in every detail as differences in recollection or viewpoints or
impressions are inevitable (People vs. Fabros, 214 SCRA 694 [1992]). Indeed, if
rights were to be lost merely because witnesses, while agreeing on the essential fact,
fail to testify harmoniously on all the particulars, a very large proportion of casesinvolving wrongs would find no redress in law.
All that accused-appellants could offer by way of defense are alibi and
denial. These defenses cannot prevail over the positive identification of credible
prosecution witnesses (People vs. Villanueva, 242 SCRA 47 [1995]; People vs.
Layno, 264 SCRA 558 [1996]) as well as where there is an ante mortem statement of
the victim received in evidence either as a dying declaration or as part of the res
gestae (People vs. Baguio, 196 SCRA 459 [1991]). Especially must this be so, in view
of defense witnesses Sgt. Verde and Kagawad Tolentino's claim that the place where
they allegedly were at the time of the incident is only about two kilometers from the
crime scene (tsn, Feb. 18, 1992, p. 42; Feb. 19, 1992, pp. 16-17). Essential to avalid defense of alibi is the physical impossibility of the accused to be present at the
scene of the crime at the time of the commission thereof (People vs. Daquipil, 240
SCRA 314 [1995]; People vs. Dayson, 242 SCRA 124 [1995]). Accused-appellants
failed to demonstrate any of these elements in the case at bench.
Both Accused CONVICTED.
PEOPLE VS CERILLA (Murder)
Accused: Joemarie Cerilla @ PATO
Victim: Alexander Parreo (Dying Declaration to his daughters and to his w
well as to the police that it was PATO who shot him. Died the following da
A dying declaration is a statement made by the victim of homicide, ref
to the material facts which concern the cause and circumstances of the killin
which is uttered under a fixed belief that death is impending and is certain to
immediately, or in a very short time, without an opportunity of retraction and
absence of all hopes of recovery. In other words, it is a statement made by a p
after a mortal wound has been inflicted, under a belief that death is certain, s
the facts concerning the cause and circumstances surrounding his/her dea
an exception to the rule against hearsay evidence, a dying declaration o
mortem statement is evidence of the highest order and is entitled to u
credence since no person aware of his impending death would make a carele
false accusation.
is thus admissible to provide the identity of the accused and the deceased,
to show the cause of death of the deceased,
the circumstances under which the assault
was made upon him.
The reasons for its admissibility is necessity and trustworthiness. Nec
because the declarants death renders it impossible his taking the witness
and it often happens that there is no other equally satisfactory proof of the
allowing it, therefore, prevents a failure of justice. And trustworthiness, becaudeclaration is made in extremity, when the party is at the point of death and
every motive to falsehood is silenced and the mind is induced by the most po
considerations to speak the truth. The law considers the point of death
situation so solemn and awful as creating an obligation equal to that wh
imposed by an oath administered in court.
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Four requisites must concur in order that a dying declaration may be admissible,
thus:first,the declaration must concern the cause and surrounding circumstances
of the declarant's death. This refers not only to the facts of the assault itself, but
also to matters both before and after the assault having a direct causal connection
with it. Statements involving the nature of the declarants injury or the cause of
death; those imparting deliberation and willfulness in the attack, indicating the
reason or motive for the killing; justifying or accusing the accused; or indicating the
absence of cause for the act are admissible.[40]Second,at the time the declaration
was made, the declarant must be under the consciousness of an impending death.
The rule is that, in order to make a dying declaration admissible, a fixed belief in
inevitable and imminent death must be entered by the declarant. It is the belief in
impending death and not the rapid succession of death in point of fact that renders
the dying declaration admissible. It is not necessary that the approaching death be
presaged by the personal feelings of the deceased. The test is whether the declarant
has abandoned all hopes of survival and looked on death as certainly impending.[41]Third,the declarant is competent as a witness. The rule is that where the
declarant would not have been a competent witness had he survived, the proffered
declarations will not be admissible. Accordingly, declarations made by a child too
young to be a competent witness or by a person who was insane or incapable ofunderstanding his own statements by reason of partial unconsciousness are not
admissible in evidence.[42]Thus, in the absence of evidence showing that the
declarant could not have been competent to be a witness had he survived, the
presumption must be sustained that he would have been competent.[43]Fourth,the
declaration must be offered in a criminal case for homicide, murder, or parricide, in
which the declarant is the victim.[44]Anent this requisite, the same deserves no
further elaboration as, in fact, the prosecution had caused its witnesses to take the
stand and testify in open court on the substance of Alexanders ante mortem
statement in the present criminal case for murder.
First, Alexanders declaration pertains to the identity of the person who shothim. Second, the fatal quality and extent of the injuries[49]he suffered underscore
the imminence of his death as his condition was so serious that his demise
occurred the following morning after a thirteen (13)-hour operation. Third, he would
have been competent to testify had he survived. Fourth, his dying declarat
offered in a criminal prosecution for murder where he was the victim.
Accused: CONVICTED
DECLARATION AGAINST INTEREST
PEOPLE VS BERNAL (Kidnapping)
Accused: Theodore Bernal
Victim Openda Jr:
Likewise, a certain Salito Enriquez, a tailor and a friend of Openda, Jr., te
that sometime in January 1991, Openda, Jr. confided to him that he and B
wife Naty were having an affair. One time, Naty even gave Openda, Jr. money
they used to pay for a motel room. He advised Naty not to do it again becau
(was) a married woman.[9]Undoubtedly, his wifes infidelity was ample reas
Bernal to contemplate revenge.
Motive is generally irrelevant, unless it is utilized in establishing the iden
the perpetrator. Coupled with enough circumstantial evidence or facts from w
may be reasonably inferred that the accused was the malefactor, motive m
sufficient to support a conviction.[10]Openda, Jr.s revelation to Enriquez reg
his illicit relationship with Bernals wife is admissible in evidence, pursua
Section 38, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, viz.:
Sec. 38. Declaration against interest. -- The declaration made by a person dece
or unable to testify, against the interest of the declarant, if the fact asserted in
declaration was at the time it was made so far contrary to declarants own inte
that a reasonable man in his position would not have made the declaration un
he believed it to be true, may be received in evidence against himself or his
successors-in-interest and against third persons.
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With the deletion of the phrase pecuniary or moral interest from the present
provision, it is safe to assume that declaration against interest has been expanded
to include all kinds of interest, that is, pecuniary, proprietary, moral or even penal.[11]
A statement may be admissible when it complies with the following requisites,
to wit: (1) that the declarant is dead or unable to testify; (2) that it relates to a fact
against the interest of the declarant; (3) that at the time he made said declaration
the declarant was aware that the same was contrary to his aforesaid interest; and(4) that the declarant had no motive to falsify and believed such declaration to be
true.
ACT OR DECLARATION ABOUT PEDIGREE
Tandog vs Macapagal
The above-named petitioners claim that they and their predecessors-in-interest have
been in actual, open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the landsince time immemorial. They trace their rights to Casimiro Policarpio, unmarried,
who died in 1945. He was survived by his nephews and nieces, now deceased,
except Maria Bautista Catanyag. She and Casimiros grand nieces and grand
nephews (herein petitioners) have continued possessing and cultivating the land.
When petitioners decided to apply for the judicial registration of the property, they
found that portions of the land have been occupied by spouses Alfonso and Marina
Calderon and Renato Macapagal, respondents. According to petitioners, spouses
Calderon used falsified documents to justify their possession of 20,116 square
meters of the land which they sold to the government. For his part, Renato
Macapagal applied for and was granted Free Patent which led to the issuance to him
of Original Certificate of Title (OCT). Because of these incidents, petitioners filed
with the RTC a complaint for quieting of title.
Respondent Marina Calderon, in her answer, specifically denied petit
allegations in their complaint. She alleged that she and her husband bough
property in 1958 and, since then, have been in possession of the same
planted trees and crops thereon. Also, they have been paying the correspo
realty taxes. She does not knowpetitioners who are all strangers in the place.
After petitioners had presented their evidence, spouses Calderon filed a demu
evidence. In an Order dated March 20, 1995, the trial court granted their m
and dismissed the complaint.
As a general rule, a cloud which may be removed by suit to quiet title is not c
by mere verbal or parol assertion of ownership of or an interest in property
rule is subject to qualification, where there is a written or factual basis f
asserted right. Thus, a claim of right based on acquisitive prescription or ad
possession has been held to constitute a removable cloud on title.
While petitioners alleged that respondents claim of adverse possession is a clo
their (petitioners) interest in the land, however, such allegation has not
proved.The alleged falsified documents relied upon by respondents to justify
possession were merely marked as exhibits but were never formally offeevidence by petitioners.We have consistently ruled that documents which ma
been marked as exhibits during the hearing, but which were not formally offe
evidence, cannot be considered as evidence, nor can they be given any evide
value.[4]
It is important that petitioners must first establish their legal or equitable title
interest in the real property which is the subject matter of the action.[5]Petit
failed to do so. Parenthetically, they did not present any evidence to prov
Casimiro Policarpio existed and that he is their predecessor-in-interest
testimonies can not be considered declarations about pedigree.In order
pedigree may be proved by acts or declarations of relatives under Section
the Revised Rules of Evidence, it is necessary that (a) the actor or declar
dead or unable to testify; (b) the act or declaration is made by a person r
to the subject by birth or marriage; (c) the relationship between the dec
or the actor and the subject is shown by evidence other than such a
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declaration; and (d) the act or declaration was made ante litem motam, or
prior to the controversy. Records show that petitioners failed to establish by
evidence any or all the above requisites.
Tecson vs. Commission on Elections [GR 151434, 3 March 2004] (Petition to
disqualify FPJ because of his Citizenship)
Tecson vs. Commission on Elections[GR 151434, 3 March 2004]
Facts:
Petitioners sought for respondent Poes disqualification in the presidential elections
for having allegedly misrepresented material facts in his (Poes) certificate of
candidacy by claiming that he is a natural Filipino citizen despite his parents both
being foreigners. Comelec dismissed the petition, holding that Poe was a Filipino
Citizen. Petitioners assail the jurisdiction of the Comelec, contending that only the
Supreme Court may resolve the basic issue on the case under Article VII, Section 4,
paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution.
Issue:
Whether or not it is the Supreme Court which had jurisdiction.
Whether or not Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that Poe
was a Filipino citizen.
Ruling:
1.) The Supreme Court had no jurisdiction on questions regarding qualification of a
candidate for the presidency or vice-presidency before the elections are held.
"Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal" in connection with Section 4,
paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, refers to contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of the "President" or "Vice-President", of the Philippines
which the Supreme Court may take cognizance, and not of "candidates" for
President or Vice-President before the elections.
2.) Comelec committed no grave abuse of discretion in holding Poe as a Filipino
Citizen.
The 1935 Constitution on Citizenship, the prevailing fundamental la
respondents birth, provided that among the citizens of the Philippines are
whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines."
Tracing respondents paternal lineage, his grandfather Lorenzo, as evidenced
latters death certificate was identified as a Filipino Citizen. His citizenship wa
drawn from the presumption that having died in 1954 at the age of 84, Lo
would have been born in 1870. In the absence of any other evidence, Lorenzosof residence upon his death in 1954 was presumed to be the place of residenc
his death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the "en
Filipinization" that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. Being so, Lor
citizenship would have extended to his son, Allan---respondents father.
Respondent, having been acknowledged as Allans son to Bessie, thoug
American citizen, was a Filipino citizen by virtue of paternal filiation as evid
by the respondents birth certificate. The 1935 Constitution on citizenship d
make a distinction on the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the child, thus, the alle
of bigamous marriage and the allegation that respondent was born only befo
assailed marriage had no bearing on respondents citizenship in view established paternal filiation evidenced by the public documents presented.
But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that respo
FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand still
preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty of h
made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in violat
Section 78, in relation to Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code.
Section 39, Rule 130, of the Rules of Court provides
Act or Declaration about pedigree. The act or declaration of a person deceas
unable to testify, in respect to the pedigree of another person related to him by b
marriage, may be received in evidence where it occurred before the controvers
the relationship between the two persons is shown by evidence other than such
declaration. The word pedigree includes relationship, family genealogy,
marriage, death, the dates when and the places where these facts occurred, an
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names of the relatives. It embraces also facts of family history intimately connected
with pedigree.
For the above rule to apply, it would be necessary that (a) the declarant is already
dead or unable to testify, (b) the pedigree of a person must be at issue, (c) the
declarant must be a relative of the person whose pedigree is in question, (d)
declaration must be made before the controversy has occurred, and (e) the
relationship between the declarant and the person whose pedigree is in question
must be shown by evidence other than such act or declaration.
Thus, the duly notarized declaration made by Ruby Kelley Mangahas, sister of
Bessie Kelley Poe submitted as Exhibit 20 before the COMELEC, might be accepted
to prove the acts of Allan F. Poe, recognizing his own paternal relationship with FPJ,
i.e, living together with Bessie Kelley and his children (including respondent FPJ) in
one house, and as one family
"I, Ruby Kelley Mangahas, of legal age and sound mind, presently residing in
Stockton, California, U.S.A., after being sworn in accordance with law do hereby
declare that:
1. I am the sister of the late Bessie Kelley Poe.
2. Bessie Kelley Poe was the wife of Fernando Poe, Sr.
3. Fernando and Bessie Poe had a son by the name of Ronald Allan Poe, morepopularly known in the Philippines as Fernando Poe, Jr., or FPJ.
4. Ronald Allan Poe FPJ was born on August 20, 1939 at St. Luke's Hospital,
Magdalena Street, Manila.
x x x x x x x x x
7. Fernando Poe Sr., and my sister Bessie, met and became engaged while they were
students at the University of the Philippines in 1936. I was also introduced to
Fernando Poe, Sr., by my sister that same year.
8. Fernando Poe, Sr., and my sister Bessie had their first child in 1938.
9. Fernando Poe, Sr., my sister Bessie and their first three children, Elizabeth,
Ronald, Allan and Fernando II, and myself lived together with our mother at our
family's house on Dakota St. (now Jorge Bocobo St.), Malate until the liberation of
Manila in 1945, except for some months between 1943-1944.
10. Fernando Poe, Sr., and my sister, Bessie, were blessed with four (4) more
children after Ronald Allan Poe.
x x x x x x x x x
18. I am executing this Declaration to attest to the fact that my nephew, Ronald
Allan Poe is a natural born Filipino, and that he is the legitimate child of Fernando
Poe, Sr.
Done in City of Stockton, California, U.S.A., this 12th day of January 2004.
Ruby Kelley Mangahas
Declarant
FAMILY REPUTATION OR TRADITION REGARDING PEDIGREE
Section 40. Family reputation or tradition regarding pedigree. The reputat
tradition existing in a family previous to the controversy, in respect to the pe
of any one of its members, may be received in evidence if the witness tes
thereon be also a member of the family, either by consanguinity or affinity. E
in family bibles or other family books or charts, engravings on rings, family po
and the like, may be received as evidence of pedigree.
GRAVADOR VS MAMIGO (Forced Retirement)
Petitioner wrote the Director of Public Schools, protesting his forced retireme
the ground that the date of his birth is not November 26, 1897 but Decemb
1901. Attached to his letter was the affidavit, executed on July 26, 1962, of L
Bandoquillo and Pedro A. Sienes both of Amlan Negros Oriental, in which the
affiants declared that they knew that the petitioner "was born on Decemb
1901, in the Municipality of Amlan formerly known as New Ayuquitan Provi
Negros Oriental, Philippines" because, "we were the neighbors of the late sp
NEPOMUCENO GRAVADOR and AGUEDA REGOROSA [petitioner's parents], a
were present when said PEDRO GRAVADOR was born; furthermore,we wer
invited during the baptismal party a few weeks after the birth of said P
GRAVADOR."
On July 6, 1967 the petitioner asked for the dismissal of the appeal on the g
that the issues posed thereby had become moot with his retirement from the s
on December 11, 1966 and the payment to him of the corresponding retir
benefits. SC deemed it necessary, however, to review the trial court's decision
merits, considering that the computation of retirement annuities is based a
other things, on the number of years of service of a retiree,1 and that paymbenefits already made to the petitioner on the basis of December 11, 1901
date of his birth would not exempt him from the obligation to make a refund s
this Court ultimately rule that he was actually born November 26, 1897,
respondents claim.
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The import of the declaration of the petitioner's brother, contained in a verified
pleading in a cadastral case way back in 1924, to the effect that the petitioner was
then 23 years old, can not be ignored. Madeante litem motam by a deceased relative,
this statement is at once a declaration regarding pedigree within the intendment
and meaning of section 33 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. Thus, December 11,
1901 is established as the date of birth of the petitioner not only by evidence of
family tradition but also by the declaration ante litem motam of a deceased relative.
Finally, the patties are agreed that the petitioner has a brother, Constantino, who
was born on June 10, 1898 and who retired on June 10, 1963 with full retirementpay. The petitioner then could not have been born earlier than Constantino, say in
1897 as pre-war records indicate, because Constantino is admittedly older than he.
PEOPLE VS. ALEGADO (2 counts of rape)
Accused : Alfredo Alegado
Offended Party: Christina Deang (below 12 years old)
Firstly, the accused-appellant contends that the offended party's actual age at the
time of the alleged incidents of rape was not establisher with certainty, hence, it waserror on the part of the trial court to convict the accused-appellant of statutory
rape.
We are not persuaded. The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, the offended
party herself and her maternal grandfather, Cornelio Villarosa, as to the fact that
the victim was born on September 5, 1976 do not constitute hearsay evidence as
claimed by the accused-appellant but rather fall under the exceptions to the hearsay
rule as provided under sections 39 and 40 of Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on
Evidence. Under Section 40 of the said Rule, it is provided, in part, that:
SEC. 40. Family reputation or tradition regading pedigree. The reputation or
tradition existing in a family previous to the controversy, in respect to the pedigree
of any of its members, may be received in evidence if the witness testifying thereon
be also a member of the family, either by consanguinity or affinity. ...
The word pedigree under Section 39 of the same Rule includes relationship, family
genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the dates when and the places where these facts
occurred and the names of the relatives.
In the case of Lazatin v. Campos, 92 SCRA 250, 261 [1979], we stated that:
... [D]eclarations in regard to pedigree, although hearsay, are admitted o
principle that they are natural expressions of persons who must know the
(See Sec. 33, Rule 130 Revised Rules of Court now Sec. 39, Rule 130 under th
Rules). Pedigree testimony is admitted because it is the best that the nature
case admits and because greater evil might arise from the rejection of such
than from its admission.
(In the present case, the applicability of Rule 130, Section 39 of the Revised
on Evidence to prove the victim's age is beyond question. The said pro
contains three requisites for its admissibility, namely: (1) that there is controve
respect to the pedigree of any of the members of a family; (2) that the reputattradition of the pedigree of the person concerned existed previous t
controversy; and (3) that the witness testifying to the reputation or tra
regarding the pedigree of the person must be a member of the family of said p
All these preconditions are obtaining in the case at bar considering that the d
birth of the rape victim is being put in issue; that the declaration of the vi
grandfather relating to tradition (sending a child to school upon reaching the
seven) existed long before the rape case was filed; and that the witness testify
the said tradition is the maternal grandfather of the rape victim.
Moreover, the offended party herself categorically stated in open court that sh
born on September 5, 1976
It is long-settled, that the testimony of a person as to his age is admissible alt
hearsay and though a person can have no personal knowledge of the date
birth as all the knowledge a person has of his age is acquired from what he
by his parents he may testify as to his age as he had learned it from his p
and relatives and his testimony in such case is an assertion of family tra
(Gravador v. Mamigo, 20 SCRA 742) ... (Rollo, p. 93-94)
Inasmuch as the accused-appellant failed to present contrary evidence to d
the prosecution's claim that the victim in this case was below twelve (12) yea
at the time of the rape incidents under consideration, we affirm the trial c
finding that the victim in these rape cases was under twelve years of age.
ACCUSED CONVICTED OF Statutory Rape
COMMON REPUTATION
Section 41.Common reputation. Common reputation existing previous
controversy, respecting facts of public or general interest more than thirty years
respecting marriage or moral character, may be given in evidence. Monument
inscriptions in public places may be received as evidence of common reputation.
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JISON VS CA (Petition for Recognition as an Illegitimate child filed by Monina
Jison against Francisco Jison)
FRANCISCO had been married to a certain Lilia Lopez Jison since 1940. At the end
of 1945 or the start of 1946, however, FRANCISCO impregnated Esperanza F.
Amolar (who was then employed as the nanny of FRANCISCO's daughter,
Lourdes). As a result, MONINA was born on 6 August 1946, in Dingle, Iloilo, and
since childhood, had enjoyed the continuous, implied recognition as an illegitimate
child of FRANCISCO by his acts and that of his family. MONINA further alleged thatFRANCISCO gave her support and spent for her education, such that she obtained a
Master's degree, became a certified public accountant (CPA) and eventually, a
Central Bank examiner. In view of FRANCISCO's refusal to expressly recognize her,
MONINA prayed for a judicial declaration of her illegitimate status and that
FRANCISCO support and treat her as such. FRANCISCO alleged that he could not
have had sexual relations with Esperanza Amolar during the period specified in the
complaint as she had ceased to be in his employ as early as 1944, and did not know
of her whereabouts since then; further, he never recognized MONINA, expressly or
impliedly, as his illegitimate child.
Several witnesses were presented by MONINA consisting of former and present
employees of FRANCISCO and testified that MONINAs filiation was common
knowledge among the people in the office at Nelly Garden.
CA erred in GIVING CREDENCE TO DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY
THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT AS EVIDENCE OF FILIATION CONSIDERING THAT
THE SAME ARE HEARSAY, SELF-SERVING AND CANNOT BIND THE PETITIONER
UNDER THE BASIC RULES OF EVIDENCE.
We likewise disagree with the ruling of the Court of Appeals that the certificates
issued by the Local Civil Registrar and the baptismal certificates may be taken as
circumstantial evidence to prove MONINAs filiation. Since they areper
seinadmissible in evidence as proof of such filiation, they cannot be admitted
indirectly as circumstantial evidence to prove the same.
As to Exhibits S, T, U and V, the various notes and letters writt
FRANCISCOs relatives, namely Mike Alano, Emilio Jison, Mariquit Lope
Fernando Lopez, respectively, allegedly attesting to MONINAs filiation, while
due execution and authenticity are not in issue,[40]as MONINA witnesse
authors signing the documents, nevertheless, under Rule 130, Section 3
contents of these documents may not be admitted, there being no showing th
declarants-authors were dead or unable to testify, neither was the relatio
between the declarants and MONINA shown by evidence other than the docu
in question.[41]
As to the admissibility of these documents under Rule 130, S40, however, this requires further elaboration.
Rule 130, Section 40, provides:
Section 40. Family reputation or tradition regarding pedigree. -- The reputation
tradition existing in a family previous to the controversy, in respect to the pedi
of any one of its members, may be received in evidence if the witness testifying
thereon be also a member of the family, either by consanguinity or affinity. En
in family bibles or other family books or charts, engravings on rings, family po
and the like, may be received as evidence of pedigree. (underscoring supplied)
It is evident that this provision may be divided into two (2) parts: the p
containing the first underscored clause which pertains to testimonial evi
under which the documents in question may not be admitted as the authors t
did not take the witness stand; and the section containing the second under
phrase. What must then be ascertained is whether Exhibits S to V, as p
documents, fall within the scope of the clause and the like as qualified b
preceding phrase [e]ntries in family bibles or other family books or c
engravings on rights [and] family portraits.
We hold that the scope of the enumeration contained in the second por
this provision, in light of the rule ofejusdem generis, is limited to objects whi
commonly known as family possessions, or those articles which represent, in
a familys joint statement of its belief as to the pedigree of a person.[42]Thes
been described as objects openly exhibited and well known to the family,[43]or
which, if preserved in a family, may be regarded as giving a family tradition.[44]
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examples of these objects which are regarded as reflective of a familys reputation or
tradition regarding pedigree are inscriptions on tombstones,[45]monuments or coffin
plates.[46]
Plainly then, Exhibits S to V, as private documents not constituting "family
possessions" as discussed above, may not be admitted on the basis of Rule 130,
Section 40. Neither may these exhibits be admitted on the basis of Rule 130, Section
41 regarding common reputation,[47]it having been observed that:
[T]he weight of authority appears to be in favor of the theory that it is the general
repute, the common reputation in the family, and not the common reputation in
community, that is a material element of evidence going to establish pedigree. xxx
[Thus] matters of pedigree may be proved by reputation in the family, and not by
reputation in the neighborhood or vicinity, except where the pedigree in question is
marriage which may be proved by common reputation in the community.
Their inadmissibility notwithstanding, Exhibits S to V, inclusive, may, in like
manner as MONINA's school records, properly be admitted as part of her testimony
to strengthen her claim that, indeed, relatives of FRANCISCO recognized her as his
daughter.
All told, MONINAs evidence hurdled the high standard of proof required for the
success of an action to establish ones illegitimate filiation when relying upon the
provisions regarding open and continuous possession or any other means allowed
by the Rules of Court and special laws; moreover, MONINA proved her filiation by
more than mere preponderance of evidence. SC RULED IN FAVOR OF MONINA
PART OF RES GESTAE
Section 42. Part of res gestae. Statements made by a person while a starting
occurrence is taking place or immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect to
the circumstances thereof, may be given in evidence as part of res gestae. So, also,
statements accompanying an equivocal act material to the issue, and giving it a legal
significance, may be received as part of the res gestae.
PEOPLE VS ROBERTO NER (MURDER)
VICTIM: JOSE DE LEON
The case hinges on whether or not appellant has been sufficiently identified
killer or one of the killers of Jose de Leon. In this connection, the main witness
the prosecution were Estanislao de Leon, Leonardo Bolea, Rodolfo Rosales
Artemio Tiong.
The defense insists that the testimony of Patrolman Tiong concernin
conversation with Angelina Viray should be disregarded as hearsay, for Angeli
not take the witness stand. Said conversation took place in Boy's apartment, o
17, 1964, between 10:09 and 10:30 p.m., or immediately after the occurrenc
referred to the circumstances surrounding the same. At that time, Angelina ha
as yet, fully recovered from the effects of the assassination of her commo
husband, practically, if not actually, before her own eyes. In fact, she was no
crying; she had, also, been repeatedly saying, almost hysterically, that Boy had
shot by "Pirate". Tiong's testimony about the statements then made by her,
she could deliberated on the events that had transpired a few minutes befor
properly admitted under Sec. 36 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, pursu
which:
... Statements made by a person while a startling occurrence is taking
orimmediately prior or subsequent theretowith respect to the circumstances th
may be given in evidence as a part of the RES GESTAE. ...
Indeed, it has been held:
... that declarations which are the natural emanations or outgrowths
act or occurrence in litigation,although not precisely concurrent in point of t
they were yet voluntarily and spontaneously made so nearly contemporaneous
be in the presence of the transaction which they illustrate and explain, and
made under such circumstances as necessarily to exclude the idea of des
deliberation, must, upon the clearest principles of justice, be admissible as p
the act or transaction itself.2
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It is true that, in saying that Boy had been shot by Pirate, Angelina did not
explain to Patrolman Tiong whether or not she had seen the latter in the act of
firing, although she said so in an affidavit made by her in the City Fiscal's office.
Her story to Patrolman Tiong indicated, however, that she had seen appellant and
Boy talking in the living room of his apartment, shortly before the shooting, and
that, accordingly, she had personal knowledge of appellant'spresenceat the scene of
the occurrence.
The fact that Angelina's statement to Tiong was part of her narration,prompted by his questions about the details of the occurrence, does not detract from
the spontaneity of her statement. All that is required for the admissibility of a given
statement as part of theres gestae, is that it be made under the influence of a
startling event witnessed by the person who made the declaration3before he had
time to think and make up a story4, or to concoct or contrive a falsehood5, or to
fabricate an account6, and without any undue influence in obtaining it7, aside
from referring to the event in question or its immediate attending circumstances.8
Accused Convicted.
PEOPLE VS SANCHEZ (ARSON)
Accused Danilo Sanchez and Juanito Zamora
Arson of the house of SPS. Nepescua.Trial then proceeded against him with the
prosecution presenting as its witnesses Demetrio Matabang, Pedro Parayno, Julieta
Nepuscua and Cesar Nepuscua. The lone eyewitness, Mr. Elpidio Nepuscua, could
no longer be presented because he died on 13 December 1982. 3He, however,
signed a statement on 24 November 1982 before an investigator of the IntegratedNational Police of Aguilar, Pangasinan wherein he implicated the accused as the
person who burned the house.
Accused imputes upon the trial court the commission of the following errors:
1. . . . in not considering the statement of Elpedio (sic) Nepuscu
hearsay evidence.
2. . . . in convicting the accused-appellant by considering the
information made by Elpedio (sic) Nepuscua to his wife Julieta
Nepuscua and his son Cesar Nepuscua as part of the res gestae
According to Julieta, at 4:00 o'clock in the morning of 23 November 198
husband arrived at the house of Filomena and related to her that "on that eof November 22, 1982, there were four (4) persons who went near our hous
they were carrying with them rice stalks or hay and then one of them calle
saying "Tatay, tatay, bangon kayo ta ansakit so eges nen nanay, iyacar ta
hospital", which means, "Father, father wake up because my mother is su
from stomach (sic) ache and we will rush her to the hospital." He further to
that on that same evening, Danilo Sanchez went up to the balcony of their
carrying with him one (1) bundle of rice hay which he then set on fire thus ca
the burning of their house.
In his sworn statement, Elpidio narrated the burning incident. He catego
admitted therein that he reported the incident to the Calasiao Police Station, bdid not mention the names of the culprits for fear that he and his family wo
placed in danger once the culprits discovered that they had been identifi
suspects.
There can, therefore, be no question that the only eyewitness to the burning
house was Elpidio Nepuscua. Unfortunately, he died even before the Inform
was prepared and filed. Thus, he could no longer testify during trial.
A careful scrutiny of the records discloses that the prosecution relied solelyo
sworn statement of Elpidio Nepuscua wherein he named the accused, J
Zamora, and two others whom he failed to identify, as the parties who set his on fire, and the testimony of his wife Julieta Nepuscua to the effect that
November 1982, she, her children and three (3) grandchildren were evacua
Elpidio to the house of her sister-in-law, Filomena Nepuscua, because h
accused and Juanito Zamora were angry with Elpidio because the latter re
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them for having cut on 20 November 1982 the bamboo trees that were mortgaged to
them (Nepuscuas) by Maria Billota, Juanito's mother. Julieta also declared that at
4:00 o'clock in the morning of 23 November 1982 four (4) hours after the burning
of the
house Elpidio told her that in the evening of 22 November 1982, four (4) persons
carrying rice stalks went near their house; one of them uttered "father, father wake
up because my mother is suffering from stomach (sic) ache and we will rush her to
the hospital"; thereafter, Danilo Sanchez went up to the balcony of their house
carrying a bundle of rice stalks and set the same on fire. The court admitted inevidence Elpidio's sworn statement and considered Elpidio's declaration to Julieta
as part of res gestae.
The so-called statement uttered by Elpidio Nepuscua to his wife Julieta at about
4:00 o'clock in the morning of 23 November 1982, or four (4) hours after the
burning, implicating accused, should not have been admitted as part of the res
gestae.
Section 42 of Rule 130 provides:
Statements made by a person while a startling occurrence is takingplace or immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect to the
circumstances thereof, may be given in evidence as part of theres
gestae. So, also, statements accompanying an equivocal act material
to the issue, and giving it a legal significance, may be received as part
of the res gestae.
Res gestae means the "things done". 27It "refers to those exclamations and
statements made by either the participants, victims, or spectators to a crime
immediately before, during, or immediately after the commission of the crime, when
the circumstances are such that the statements were made as spontaneous reaction
or utterance inspired by the excitement of the occasion and there was no
opportunity for the declarant to deliberate and to fabricate a false statement."28A
spontaneous exclamation is defined as "a statement or exclamation made
immediately after some exciting occasion by a participant or spectator and asserting
the circumstances of that occasion as it is observed by him. The admissibility of
such exclamation is based on our experience that, under certain ex
circumstances of physical or mental shock, a stress of nervous excitement m
produced in a spectator which stills the reflective faculties and removes
control, so that the utterance which then occurs is a spontaneous and s
response to the actual sensations and perceptions already produced by the ex
shock. Since this utterance is made under the immediate and uncon
domination of the senses, rather than reason and reflection, and during the
period when consideration of self-interest could not have been fully brought to
the utterance may be taken as expressing the real belief of the speaker as facts just observed by him."29In a manner of speaking, the spontaneity
declaration is such that the declaration itself may be regarded as the event spe
through the declarant rather than the declarant speaking for himself.30Or,
differently, ". . . the events speak for themselves, giving out their fullest me
through the unprompted language of the participants. The spontaneous chara
the language is assumed to preclude the probability of its premeditati
fabrication. Its utterance on the spur of the moment is regarded, with a good d
reason, as a guarantee of its truth."31
There are, therefore, three (3) requisites for the admission of evidenconstituting part of the res gestae: (1) that the principal act, the res gestae
startling occurrence; (2) the statements were made before the declarant had t
contrive or devise; and (3) that the statements must concern the occurren
question and its immediately attending circumstances.
The cases are not uniform as to the interval of time that should separa
occurrence of the startling event and the making of the declaration. W
important is that the declarations were voluntarily and spontaneously ma
nearly contemporaneous as to be in the presence of the transaction which
illustrate and explain, and were made under such circumstances as necessa
exclude the idea of design or deliberation . . ." 40
In the light of the foregoing principle on res gestae and the settled jurispru
thereon, We find the questioned statement of Elpidio Nepuscua to his wife
lacking in spontaneity and to have been given after he had the luxury of
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to concoct a story or fabricate an account. If indeed he was at his house at the
time the accused and the latter's alleged companions came, and the burning took
place at midnight, considering that the house of Filomena where his wife and
children were sleeping was only 150 meters away, and there being no evidence at all
that he was prevented through threats and intimidation by the accused and his
companions or that he was struck by fear which immobilized him from immediately
leaving the scene of the fire, no plausible reason may be summoned to justify or
explain his nearly four-hour delay in reporting the incident to his wife and other
members of his family. He could easily negotiate that distance in less than five (5)minutes. Doubtless, the burning of their house was no ordinary event; such a
dastardly occurrence caused an irreparable loss of property and rendered them
homeless.The shock and excitement it naturally produced was more than
enough to propel his feet to bring him to his family as soon as possible. It
behooved Elpidio to relay the tragic event to those dear to him without any
delay; thus, his conduct cannot be reconciled with human experience,
ordinary habits of men and common sense. It could, however, be easily reconciled
if he were, in fact, with his family in the house of Filomena during the fire. If he
evacuated his family to the house of Filomena on 21 November 1982 because he
was afraid of the accused and Juanito Zamora, there was no reason at all for him torisk his life and limb by staying alone in their house. That he was not in the house
at the time of the burning seems to be supported by the conduct of the members of
his family. As testified to by Julieta and her son Cesar, they just looked out the
window of Filomena's house while their own house was burning. They never
mentioned that they expressed fears as to Elpidio's fate, if in fact the latter was left
in the house. All that Julieta could do was to prevent Cesar from returning to their
burning house for fear that the persons who set it on fire would harm him. Cesar
then left for Manila at 3:00 o'clock early the next morning, 23 November 1982,
barely three (3) hours after the fire. He did not proceed to their house to find out
what had happened to his father. By that time, worry over Elpidio's fate did not seize
or overcome both Julieta and Cesar. If indeed Elpidio was in their house before thefire and he left the scene only four (4) hours later, the conduct of his wife and son
seemed too unnatural.
Another badge of untrustworthiness attributable to the alleged statement giv
Elpidio to his wife is his deliberate suppression of the names of the "suspects"
he reported the incident to the police authorities of Calasiao, Pangasinan
morning of 23 November 1982. The reasons given therefor are palpably unte
In the first place, there is no evidence that the accused and his companions
reputation for being violent; if they were known for their violence and Elpidio w
afraid of revealing their names, then he would have kept their ident
pectoris. This he failed to do during the investigation at the P.C. Headquarte
following day despite the absence of any assurance of protection.
After everything is said and done, it is clear to Us that serious doubts surroun
questioned statement of Elpidio to his wife, especially when viewed in the light
probability of concoction he had every reason to get even with the accuse
Juanito Zamora.
Accused then deserves an acquittal on the ground of reasonable
ACQUITTED.
PEOPLE VS EDELCIANO AMACA @ EDDIE (MURDER)
The ante mortem statement of the victim is sufficient to identify the assailant
case at hand. However, the accused cannot be convicted of murder attend
treachery, because the Information charged him with murder qualified on
evident premeditation. This legal lapse of the prosecution -- for that matte
prosecution lapse -- should benefit the appellant, because in a criminal cas
accused may be held accountable only for the crime charged (or for the
necessarily included therein), and every doubt must be resolved in his favor
we hold him guilty only of homicide. Furthermore, since the heirs of the
waived their claim through an affidavit of desistance, no award for civil inde
should be included in this Decision finding the accused guilty of the homicide.
Victim suffered two gunshot wounds at the back
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Bernardo Mangubat, member of the Philippine National Police of Canlaon City,
testified that as a police investigator one of his companions in the force fetched him
from his residence at about 7:00 in the evening of October 1, 1990, and informed
him of a shooting incident, where the victim was at the clinic of Dr. Cardenas, which
was near his residence. Upon reaching the clinic of Dr. Cardenas, he saw the victim
already on board a Ford Fiera pick up ready for transport to the hospital. He
inquired from the victim about the incident, and the former answered he was shot
by CVO Amaca and Ogang. Upon query why he was shot, the victim said he did not
know the reason why he was shot. Upon being asked as to his condition, the victimsaid that he was about to die. (TSN, p. 22, March 4, 1992) Upon being asked, the
victim identified himself as Nelson (sic) Vergara. He was able to reduce into writing
the declaration of victim Vergara, and have the latter affixed (sic) his thumbmark
with the use of his own blood in the presence of Wagner Cardenas, the brother of
the City Mayor. (Exh. C)
Defense: Alibi
Ante Mortem Statement as Res Gestae
The ante mortem statement may also be admitted in evidence when consideredas part of the res gestae, another recognized exception to the hearsay rule provided
specifically under Rule 130, Section 36 of the Rules of Court. The requisites for the
admissibility of statements as part of the res gestae are: (a) the statement is
spontaneous; (b) it is made immediately before, during or after a startling
occurrence; and (c) it relates to the circumstances of such occurrence.[27]These
requirements are obviously fulfilled in the present case where the statement, subject
of this discussion, was made immediately after the shooting incident and, more
important, the victim had no time to fabricate.
An ante mortem statement may be admitted in evidence as a dying declaration
and as part of the res gestae. This dual admissibility is not redundant and has theadvantage of ensuring the statements appreciation by courts, particularly where the
absence of one or more elements in one of the said exceptions may be raised in
issue. In this manner, the identification of the culprit is assured
PEOPLE VS RESTITUTO MANHUYOD (RAPE)
Private Complainant: Daughter of Accused Rellane and his wife Yo
Manhuyod
However repulsive and condemnable the act of a father raping his daughter, y
Constitution mandates that an accused is entitled to the presumptiinnocence. Thus, after a scrutiny of the record and the evidence in this case, w
ourselves unable to affirm the judgment of the trial court. Acquittal th
compelled by law since the presumption of innocence was not overcom
conviction having been based on hearsay evidence and a miscomprehension
rule on statements forming part of theres gestae.
Subject Exhibits: B, the sworn statement of Yolanda given before Atty. Tom
and subscribed and sworn to before Atty. Icao, Jr. on 8 June 1995; C, the
statement of Relanne given before Atty. Icao, Jr. on 8 June 1995;
Court issued Warrant for indirect contempt of Yolanda and Rellane forappearance. They were not presented. the prosecution rested its case solely o
basis of the testimonies of NBI agent Atty. Tomarong, NBI agent Atty. Icao, J
NBI Medico-Legal Officer Dr. Refe, together with the documents they identifi
testified on.
The trial court held that Exhibits B and C were convincing as they men
details which could not have been concocted, as such, they constitute[d] p
theres gestae, an exception to the hearsay rule
the NBI agents and medico-legal officer had no personal knowledge as to
actually and truthfully happened; hence, their testimony as to what Relann
Yolanda narrated were likewise inadmissible hearsay. Accused further cont
that what was established during trial was that Relanne and Yolanda were no
interested in pursuing the criminal complaint against him; hence the case s
have been dismissed for their lack of interest to prosecute the same.
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It is a basic rule in evidence set forth in Section 36 of Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court that a witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his own
personal knowledge,i.e., which are derived from his own perception; otherwise,
such testimony would be hearsay. Hearsay evidence is defined as evidence not of
what the witness knows himself but of what he has heard from others.[42]Obviously
then, the NBI agents testimonies touching upon what was told them by Relanne and
Yolanda concerning the events relating to the alleged commission of rape in question
was hearsay. As a matter of fact, insofar as Yolanda was concerned, since she was
not an eyewitness to the commission of the rape, but obtained knowledge thereofonly from Relanne, the testimony of Atty. Tomarong with respect to what Yolanda
told him, even constituted double hearsay.
It is settled that unless the affiants themselves take the witness stand to affirm
the averments in their affidavits, the affidavits must be excluded from a judicial
proceeding for being inadmissible hearsay. The rationale for this is respect for the
accuseds constitutional right of confrontation, or to meet the witnesses against him
face-to-face.[43]To safeguard this right, Section 1 of Rule 132, of the Rules of Court
thus provides that the examination of witnesses presented in a trial or hearing must
be done in open court, and under oath or affirmation.[44]At bottom, admitting
Exhibits A, B, and C only as part of the testimonies of the NBI agents could validlybe done, but in light of the foregoing discussion, these exhibits should have been
excluded insofar as their contents related to the truth of the matter concerning the
commission of the rape in question.
All that is required for the admissibility of a given statement as part of
theres gestae, is that it be made under the influence of a startling event
witnessed by the person who made the declaration before he had time to
think and make up a story, or to concoct or contrive a falsehood, or to
fabricate an account, and without any undue influence in obtaining it,
aside from referring to the event in question or its immediate attending
circumstances.
In sum, there are three requisites to admit evidence as part of theres gestae: (1)
that the principal act, theres gestae, be a startling occurrence; (2) the statements
were made before the declarant had the time to contrive or devise a falsehood; and
(3) that the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its imm
attending circumstances.[47]
It goes without saying that the element of spontaneity is critical. The fol
factors are then considered in determining whether statements offered in ev
as part of theres gestaehave been made spontaneously,viz., (1) the tim
lapsed between the occurrence of the act or transaction and the making
statement; (2) the place where the statement was made; (3) the condition
declarant when he made the statement; (4) the presence or absence of interevents between the occurrence and the statement relative thereto; and (5) the n
and circumstances of the statement itself.[48]As to the first factor, the fol
proves instructive:
T]he rule is that the statements, to be admissible, should have been ma
before there had been time or opportunity to devise or contrive anythi
contrary to the real facts that occurred. What the law altogether distrusts
not afterspeech but afterthought.
[T]here are no limits of time within which theres gestaecan be arbitrar
confined. These limits vary in fact with each particular case. The acts declarations are not required to be contemporaneous with the primary fa
but they must be so connected with it as to make the act or declaration a
the main fact particularly inseparable, or be generated by an excited feeli
which extends, without break or let-down, from the moment of the eve
they illustrate. In other words, if the acts or declarations sprang out of t
principal transaction, tend to explain it, were voluntary and spontaneou
and were made at a time so near it as to preclude the idea of delibera
design, they may be regarded as contemporaneous in point of time, and a
admissible.[49]
Tested against the foregoing requisites to admit statements as part of tgestaeand factors to test the spontaneity of the statements, we do not hesit
rule that the sworn statement of Relanne (Exhibit C) fails to qualify as part
res gestae for these reasons: (1) it was executed only on 8 June 1995 or, thi
(36) days after the alleged rape on 3 May 1995, providing her more than suffi
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time to concoct or contrive a falsehood; (2) it was made after she had resolved to file
a case for rape against her father, a decision which required much deliberation and
would cause her obvious pain as the filing would expose her to public humiliation
and shame, bring dishonor to her family and visit upon her father the penalty of
death; (3) she gave the statement after three critical intervening events had
occurred,viz., her pregnancy, filing the complaint sheet and her being referred to
the NBI medico-legal officer for examination; and (4) it was made far from the place
where the principal event -- the alleged rape -- was committed,i.e., the latter took
place in the De la Paz, Liloy, Zamboanga del Norte, while the statement was made inDipolog City, at the sub-office of the NBI, and any map of Zamboanga del Norte will
show that Tampilisan and Dipolog City do not even adjoin each other.
Turning to the sworn statement of Yolanda (Exhibit B), with more reason should
this not qualify as forming part of theres gestae. Yolanda did not witness the
principal event and all she knew of it was told to her by Relanne. Even if the issue of
admissibility is confined to what Relanne had told Yolanda, the same conclusion
would be reached for it clearly appears in Exhibit A that Relanne had not
spontaneously told Yolanda of the alleged rape. In fact, the latter had to confront the
former only after the accused confessed to Yolanda that he had molested
Relanne. Moreover, the confrontation took place on 3 June 1995, or a month afterthe alleged rape.
Ineluctably then, the trial court erred in admitting Exhibits B and C as part of
theres gestae.
PEOPLE VS OSCAR MANSUETO (MURDER)
Victim: Jacinto Pepito
Jacinto Pepito (hereafter JACINTO) lived at his mothers house in Liloan, Cebu
with his son Jeovani and 17-year-old daughter Cleofe (hereafter CLEOFE). At
around 8:25 p.m. on 26 October 1991, CLEOFE roused JACINTO from his sleep and
informed him that a man outside the house was calling for him. JACINTO got up
and went down the house. Downstairs, JACINTO saw the man who was sta
outside the gate of the house. Are you Jacinto? the man asked. Yes, I am Ja
JACINTO replied. Without warning, the man drew a gun and fired one s
JACINTO.
The man tried to shoot JACINTO a second time but the gun woul
fire. Summoning whatever strength was left in him, JACINTO reached out f
assailant. The man, however, hurriedly ran across the street to where a moto
was waiting. He boarded the motorcycle; he and the driver sped away. At thatJACINTOs body lay on the ground lifeless.
The gunman was never brought to court to answer for his dastardly a
remained at-large. The driver of the getaway motorcycle was identified a
investigation conducted by the police to be the accused-appellant, Oscar Man
as conspirator for the crime of Murder.
The States principal witness, CLEOFE, testified on the circumstances lead
the death of her father as already narrated.[5]When asked whether she had a
look (at) the man who was driving the motorcycle, CLEOFE said that she is fa
with his face because (she) often see(s) him. She further explained that shegood view of said driver for about five seconds as he and the gunman sped
Besides, the place where the driver waited for the gunman was illuminated b
light coming from a nearby vulcanizing shop owned by one Arnold Hernande
then identified the driver of the motorcycle as OSCAR, whom she claimed w
paramour of her mother, Moisesa Pepito.
Accused challenges CA in ruling and giving credence to the stateme
witness CLEOFE immediately after the shooting incident as part of the res ges
The trial court believed CLEOFE and found her to be a credible witness
she testified that OSCAR was the driver of the getaway motorcycle. In its de
the trial court stated that:
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On the other hand, the identification by witness, Cleofe Pepito of the accused as
the motorcycle driver, who was waiting in the wings to facilitate the escape of the
gunman was never destroyed by the defense. In fact, in answer to the question of
private prosecutor whether witness Cleofe Pepito had a good look at the man who
was driving the motorcycle, her answer was a definite yes, and when she was asked
as to why she was definite, her answer was that she was familiar with his face
because she had often seen him. Later on, as records show, this witness was able to
explain her familiarity and it was the result of having been instructed by her mother
to collect accounts supposedly due her mother from the accused.
In his Appellants Brief, OSCAR additionally attempts to impeach the credibility
of CLEOFE on the grounds of bias and her failure to mention OSCAR as the driver
of the getaway motorcycle when she reported the shooting incident to the Liloan
Police immediately after it occurred should form part of the res gestae. OSCAR
contends that the omission, as part of theres gestae, should have been afforded
evidentiary weight.
OSCAR, however, misunderstands the admissibility in evidence of statements as
part of the res gestae which is considered in Section 42, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court as an exception to the rule on hearsay evidence. Res Gestae refers to thoseexclamations and statements made by either the participants, victims, or spectators
to a crime immediately before, during, or after the commission of the crime, when
the circumstances are such that the statements were made as a spontaneous
reaction or utterance inspired by the excitement of the occasion and there was no
opportunity for the declarant to deliberate and to fabricate a false statement.
[34]The rule in res gestae applies when the declarant himself did not testify and
provided that the testimony of the witness who heard the declarant complies with
the following requisites: (1) that the principal act, the res gestae, be a startling
occurrence; (2) the statements were made before the declarant had the time to
contrive or devise a falsehood; and (3) that the statements must concern the
occurrence in question and its immediate attending circumstances.
Since CLEOFE herself testified, there is absolutely no room for the application
of the rule on res gestae. Besides, subject matters not mentioned or are outside the
statements or explanations given by the declarant, in this case CLEOFE, obv
do not form part of the res gestae.
Accused Convicted.
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JUANITO TALIDANO VS FALCON MARITIME (Illegal Dismissal Case)
Petitioner submits that the Court of Appeals erred in relying merely on fax
messages to support the validity of his dismissal from employment. He maintains
that the first fax message containing the information that the vessel encroached on
a different route was a mere personal observation of the ship master and should
have thus been corroborated by evidence, and that these fax messages cannot be
considered as res gestae because the statement of the ship master embodied thereinis just a report. He also contends that he has not caused any immediate danger to
the vessel and that if he did commit any wrongdoing, the incident would have been
recorded in the logbook. Thus, he posits that the failure to produce the logbook
reinforces the theory that the fax messages have been concocted to justify his
unceremonious dismissal from employment. Hence, he believes that his dismissal
from employment stemmed from his filing of the complaint with the ITF which his
superiors resented.
Section 42 of Rule 13040of the Rules of Court mentions two acts which form part
of the res gestae, namely: spontaneous statements and verbal acts. In spontaneous
exclamations, the res gestae is the startling occurrence, whereas in verbal acts, theres gestae are the statements accompanying the equivocal act.41We find that the
fax messages cannot be deemed part of the res gestae.
To be admissible under the first class of res gestae, it is required that: (1) the
principal act be a startling occurrence; (2) the statements were made before the
declarant had the time to contrive or devise a falsehood; and (3) that the statements
must concern the occurrence in question and its immediate attending
circumstances.42
Assuming that petitioners negligencewhich allegedly caused the ship to deviate
from its courseis the startling occurrence, there is no showing that the statementscontained in the fax messages were made immediately after the alleged incident. In
addition, no dates have been mentioned to determine if these utterances were made
spontaneously or with careful deliberation. Absent the critical element of
spontaneity, the fax messages cannot be admitted as part of the res gestae of t
first kind.
Neither will the second kind of res gestae apply. The requisites for its admissib
are: (1) the principal act to be characterized must be equivocal; (2) the equivoca
must be material to the issue; (3) the statement must accompany the equivoca
and (4) the statements give a legal significance to the equivocal act.43
Petitioners alleged absence from watch duty is simply an innocuous act or at l
proved to be one. Assuming arguendo that such absence was the equivocal act
nevertheless not accompanied by any statement more so by the fax statements
adverted to as parts of the res gestae. No date or time has been mentioned to
determine whether the fax messages were made simultaneously with the purp
equivocal act.
Furthermore, the material contents of the fax messages are unclear. The matte
route encroachment or invasion is questionable. The ship master, who is the a
of the fax messages, did not witness the incident. He obtained such informatio
from the Japanese port authorities. Verily, the messages can be characterized double hearsay.
Private respondents sole reliance on the fax messages in dismissing petitioner
clearly insufficient as these messages were addressed only to itself. No notice w
ever given to petitioner apprising him in writing of the particular acts showing
neglect of duty. Neither was he informed of his dismissal from employment.
Petitioner was never given an opportunity to present his side. The failure to com
with the two-notice rule only aggravated respondents liability on top of dismis
petitioner without a valid cause.
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ENTRIES IN THE COURSE OF BUSINESS
Section 43. Entries in the course of business. Entries made at, or near the time of
transactions to which they refer, by a person deceased, or unable to testify, who was
in a position to know the facts therein stated, may be received as prima
facie evidence, if such person made the entries in his professional capacity or in the
performance of duty and in the ordinary or regular course of business or duty.
AZMAR VS CITIBANK
EMMANUEL B. AZNAR, Petitioner, vs.
CITIBANK, N.A., (Philippines), Respondent.
G.R. No. 164273; March 28, 2007
Facts:
Petitioner is a holder of a credit card and claims that when he presented his credit
card in some establishments in Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia, the same wasnot honored. And when he tried to use the same in Ingtan Tour and Travel Agency
(Ingtan Agency) in Indonesia to purchase plane tickets to Bali, it was again
dishonored for the reason that his card was blacklisted by the respondent bank.
To prove that respondent blacklisted his credit card, Petitioner presented a computer
print-out, denominated as ON-LINE AUTHORIZATIONS FOREIGN ACCOUNT
ACTIVITY REPORT, issued to him by Ingtan Agency with the signature of one
Victrina Elnado Nubi which shows that his card in question was
DECL OVERLIMIT or declared over the limit.
The Regional Trial Court rendered its decision dismissing petitioners complaint forlack of merit. It held that as between the computer print-out presented by petitioner
and the Warning Cancellation Bulletins presented by respondent, the latter had
more weight as their due execution and authenticity was duly established by
respondent.
Upon motion for reconsideration, the decision was reversed. Judge De la Pea
that the computer print-out was printed out by Nubi in the ordinary or r
course of business in the modern credit card industry and Nubi was not a
testify as she was in a foreign country and cannot be reached by subpoena
same took judicial notice of the practice of automated teller machines (ATM
credit card facilities which readily print out bank account status, therefo
print-out can be received as prima facie evidence of the dishonor of petiti
credit card.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals ruled that the computer print-out is an elec
document which must be authenticated pursuant to Section 2, Rule 5 of the
on Electronic Evidence or under Section 20 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Cou
anyone who saw the document executed or written; Petitioner, however, fai
prove its authenticity, thus it must be excluded.
Issues:
i. Whether or not the On Line Authorization Report is an elec
document?
ii. Whether or not the On Line Authorization Report cons
electronic evidence?
Held:
The petition was denied by the Supreme Court for lack of merit.
Petitioner puts much weight on the ON-LINE AUTHORIZATION FOREIGN ACC
ACTIVITY REPORT, a computer print-out handed to petitioner by Ingtan Agen
prove that his credit card was dishonored for being blacklisted. On said pri
appears the words DECL OVERLIMIT.
As correctly pointed out by the RTC and the CA, however, such exhibit cann
considered admissible as its authenticity and due execution were not suffi
established by petitioner.
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The prevailing rule at the time of the promulgation of the RTC Decision is Section
20 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. It provides that whenever any private
document offered as authentic is received in evidence, its due execution and
authenticity must be proved either by (a) anyone who saw the document executed or
written; or (b) by evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the
maker.
Petitioner, who testified on the authenticity did not actually see the document
executed or written, neither was he able to provide evidence on the genuineness of
the signature or handwriting of Nubi, who handed to him said computer print-out.
Even if examined under the Rules on Electronic Evidence, which took effect on
August 1, 2001, and which is being invoked by petitioner in this case, the
authentication of the computer print-out would still be found wanting.
Petitioner claims that his testimony complies with par. (c), i.e., it constitutes the
other evidence showing integrity and reliability of Exh. G to the satisfaction of the
judge. The Court is not convinced. Petitioners testimony that the person from
Ingtan Agency merely handed him the computer print-out and that he thereafter
asked said person to sign the same cannot be considered as sufficient to show saidprint-outs integrity and reliability. As correctly pointed out by Judge Marcos in his
May 29, 1998 Decision, Exh. G does not show on its face that it was issued by
Ingtan Agency as petitioner merely mentioned in passing how he was able to secure
the print-out from the agency. Petitioner also failed to show the specific business
address of the source of the computer print-out because while the name of Ingtan
Agency was mentioned by petitioner, its business address was not reflected in the
print-out.
Indeed, petitioner failed to demonstrate how the information reflected on the print-
out was generated and how the said information could be relied upon as true.
Related:
Aznar next invokes Section 43 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, which perta
entries in the course of business, to support Exh. "G". Said provision reads:
Sec. 43. Entries in the course of business. Entries made at, or near the time
transactions to which they refer, by a person deceased or unable to testify, wh
in a position to know the facts therein stated, may be received as
facie evidence, if such person made the entries in his professional capacity or
performance of duty and in the ordinary or regular course of business or duty
Under this rule, however, the following conditions are required:
1. the person who made the entry must be dead, or unable to testify;
2. the entries were made at or near the time of the transactions to which they
3. the entrant was in a position to know the facts stated in the entries;
4. the entries were made in his professional capacity or in the performanc
duty, whether legal, contractual, moral or religious; and
5. the entries were made in the ordinary or regular course of business or duty
As correctly pointed out by the RTC in its May 29, 1998 Decision, there appe
the computer print-out the name of a certain "Victrina Elnado Nubi" a
signature purportedly belonging to her, and at the left dorsal side were handw
the words "Sorry for the delay since the records had to be retrieved. Regards.
Mario." It is not clear therefore if it was Nubi who encoded the information sta
the print-out and was the one who printed the same. The handwritten anno
signed by a certain Darryl Mario even suggests that it was Mario who print
same and only handed the print-out to Nubi. The identity of the entrant, requi
the provision above mentioned, was therefore not established. Neither did pet
establish in what professional capacity did Mario or Nubi make the entr
whether the entries were made in the performance of their duty in the ordin
regular course of business or duty.
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G.R. No. 155550 January 31, 2008
NORTHWEST AIRLINES, INC.,petitioner,
vs.
STEVEN P. CHIONG,respondent.
D E C I S I O N
NACHURA,J.:
Before us is a petition for review oncertiorariunder Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking the
reversal of the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision1in CA-G.R. CV No. 503082which affirmedin
totothe Regional Trial Court (RTC) Decision3holding petitioner Northwest Airlines, Inc.
(Northwest) liable for breach of contract of carriage.
On March 14, 1989, Philimare Shipping and Seagull Maritime Corporation (Philimare), as the
authorized Philippine agent of TransOcean Lines (TransOcean), hired respondent Steven
Chiong as Third Engineer of TransOceans vesselM/V Elbiaat the San Diego, California Port.
Under the service crew agreement, Chiong was guaranteed compensation at a monthly salary
of US$440.00 and a monthly overtime pay of US$220.00, or a total of US$7,920.00 for one
year.
Subsequently, on March 27, 1989, Philimare dispatched a Letter of Guarantee to CL Hutchins
& Co., Inc., TransOceans agent at the San Diego Port, confirming Chiongs arrival thereat in
time to board theM/V Elbiawhich was set to sail on April 1, 1989 (California, United States