Evid First 10 Cases

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1 CARMEN AYALA DE ROXAS, vs. EDWIN CASE, G.R. No. 3544 March 27, 1907

This appeal from the Court of Land Registration involves a right of way claimed by the appellant,Edwin Case, through a passage along the westerly side of the property of Carmen Ayala deRoxas, in the city of Manila, which is bounded on the north by the Escolta and on the east bythe Estero de Sibacon. The appellant owns the two adjoining properties to the south and west,

that to the south lying in the rear of appellees premises, and being the dominant tenement, forthe benefit of which the easement is claimed. It also adjoins the rear of that to the west, whichfaces on the Escolta, but it was formerly owned by another and was occupied as a hotel, towhich the only ingress appears to have been at that time through thispassageway.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The claim of the appellant is not that the right of way exists by necessity, growing out of thepeculiarities of the location, but simply that it arises by prescription, founded not on any writteninstrument but on immemorial use alone. In regard to the nature of this servitude as apparentand discontinuous, its inadmissibility under the provisions of the existing Civil Code, demandinga formal title, as well as the applicability thereto of the antecedent Partidas and theirrequirement of an immemorial prescription in order to establish an easement, nothing need be

added to the very full exposition of the law in the decision of the judge of the Court of LandRegistration.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The appellant, however, here makes the additional point that since the passage of the Code ofCivil Procedure in these Islands an immemorial prescription does not call for the same proof asunder the Spanish procedure. The third Partida in title 31, law 15, after stating the variousdefinite periods applicable to continuous servitudes, says that discontinuous servitudes have nofixed periods, but must be proved by usage or a term so long that men can not remember itscommencement. "Tanto tiempo de que non se pueden accordar los omes, quanto ha que locommencaron a usar."chanrobles virtual law library

In many judgments the supreme court of Spain has refused to accept proof of any definitenumber of years as a satisfaction of this requirement of the law. In the judgment of the 11th ofFebruary, 1895, it was said that the court should consider the testimony and number ofwitnesses over 60 years of age who were acquainted with the servitude during their lives andwho also had heard it spoken of in the same way by theirelders.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

With the first of these requirements the appellant has complied, having produced at least onewitness over 60 years of age and two of 59, familiar with the property, by whom the use of theright of way was described as existing in the year 1859, the passage running then betweenwalls not apparently new. The way was about 3.75 meters in width, with an entrance of 2.61meters on the Escolta, a narrow door on the left, about two-thirds of the way down, leading intothe property of the appellee, a wider door toward the end into that of the appellant, and seemsto have been used for the benefit of both properties, the servient as well as the dominanttenement, a circumstance which renders doubtful the character of the easement by destroyingits exclusiveness.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

With the second requirement, that of the declarations of persons older from the memory of thewitnesses, the appellant has not complied, urging the inadmissibility of such testimony ashearsay under the present Code of Civil Procedure. Had a question been put calling for suchdeclarations, it would have raised the point whether the right to make use of such proof was


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saved under paragraph 6 of section 795 of the Code of Civil Procedure, providing "that nothingin this act contained shall be so construed as to divest or injuriously affect any property right thathas already become vested under existing law."chanrobles virtual law library

We have heretofore held that there is not vested right in a mere rule of evidence.(Aldeguervs. Hoskyn, 2 Phil. Rep., 500.) But the point would be whether this requirement of the

Spanish law is not substantive rather than evidential in its nature, so as to survive the repeal. Ifsubstantive, then the appellant has failed to comply with it; if not substantive, but merely amatter of procedure, then it must be taken to be replaced by the corresponding provisions of ournew code. We find therein no equivalent provision, other than subsection 11 of section 334,establishing as a disputable presumption "that a person is the owner of property from exercisingacts of ownership over it or from common reputation of his ownership." The use of the passageproved in this case can not be held to constitute acts of ownership for the reason that it is quiteconsistent with a mere license to pass, informal in its origin and revocable in its nature. Itseems, however, that under the clause quoted, common reputation of ownership of the right ofway was open to proof and on this theory of the case such testimony, if available, should havebeen offered.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

We are of the opinion that in order to establish a right or prescription something more is requiredthan the memory of living witnesses. Whether this something should be the declaration ofpersons long dead, repeated by those who testify, as executed by the Spanish law, or should bethe common reputation of ownership recognized by the Code of Procedure, it is unnecessary forus to decide.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

On either theory the appellant has failed in his proof and the judgment must be affirmed with thecosts of this instance.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

After the expiration of twenty days let judgment be entered in accordance herewith and ten daysthereafter the case remanded to the court from whence it came for proper action. Soordered.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Arellano, C.J., Torres, and Mapa, JJ., concur.Johnson, J., dissents.


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2 Gloria Garbo v CA, Judge Jocson RTC Bacolod 47, and Gradiola as Admin of

Intestate Estate of Magdalena Garbo [G.R. No. 107698. July 5, 1996]

On March 22, 1989, the Regional Trial Court[1] appointed petitioner Gloria Z. Garboadministratrix of the intestate estate of Manuel G. Garbo. [2] Three months later, or on June 21,1989, the intestate estate of Manuel G. Garbos wife, Magdalena B. Garbo, filed a petition for

the allowance of Manuel G. Garbos Last Will and Testament which devised and bequeathed allof Manuels properties and assets exclusively to his wife Magdalena. Petitioner filed heropposition thereto. On August 16, 1990, the court issued an Order allowing the Last Will andTestament to be probated and appointed private respondent Antonio B. Gradiola, theadministrator of the estate of Magdalena B. Garbo, as administrator of the estate of Manuel G.Garbo. The letters of administration previously issued to petitioner was accordingly recalled.

On August 31, 1990, petitioner filed her notice of appeal and, subsequently, her record onappeal. Contending that pertinent pleadings were not included in the record on appeal, privaterespondent objected to its admission. The probate court thereafter issued an Order datedOctober 15, 1990, requiring petitioner to submit an amended or corrected record on appeal x xx within ten (10) days from receipt [thereof].[3] Petitioner filed her compliance not by filing the

amended record on appeal but by attaching the omitted pages to be annexed or inserted to theoriginal record on appeal which private respondent stressed in his opposition tocompliance[4] dated December 11, 1990, to be improper as it failed to follow what was requiredby the October 15, 1990 Order. On February 5, 1991, private respondent moved for thedismissal of petitioners appeal.[5] Three days after or on February 8, 1991, the probate courtthrough an Order gave petitioner five days within which to comment on the motion to dismissappeal. However, neither the required comment nor the amended record on appeal was filed,thus the probate court dismissed the appeal in its Order dated February 15, 1991.

Meanwhile, on September 6, 1990, the probate court directed the issuance of letters ofadministration in favor of private respondent.[6] Protesting that the issuance of letters ofadministration is unjustified in view of her pending notice of appeal and the alleged non-finalityof the August 16, 1990 Order, petitioner, on September 27, 1990, filed her motion for

reconsideration. The probate court in its Order dated January 29, 1991 denied the motion.

Petitioner, thereafter, filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus before respondent Courtof Appeals[7] to set aside the probate courts Order dated February 15, 1991 dismissing herappeal, and Order dated September 6, 1990, directing the issuance of letters ofadministration. In a decision dated July 17, 1992, respondent court dismissed the petition,without pronouncement as to costs. Petitioner filed her motion for reconsideration but withoutsuccess. Hence, petitioner initiated the instant recourse. We gave due course to the petition inour March 21, 1994 Resolution and required both parties to file their respective memoranda.

The sole issue in this petition is whether or not the probate court and respondent Court ofAppeals properly dismissed petitioners appeal.

Petitioner argues that she has substantially complied with the probate courts order tosubmit an amended record on appeal and that she is entitled to the liberal application of therules. She cites Grearte v. The London Assurance[8], as authority to bolster hercontention. After considering the pleadings filed and arguments raised, both pro and con, wefind the petitioners contention devoid of merit.

Procedural rules are tools designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases. Courts andlitigants alike are thus enjoined to abide strictly by the rules. And while the Court, in someinstances, allows a relaxation in the application of the rules, this, we stress, was never intended


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to forge a bastion for erring litigants to violate the rules with impunity. The liberality in theinterpretation and application of the rules applies only in proper cases and under justifiablecauses and circumstances.[9] While it is true that litigation is not a game of technicalities, it isequally true that every case must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed procedure toinsure an orderly and speedy administration of justice.[10] The instant case is no exception to thisrule.

Petitioner offers no cogent reason and none appears on record to justify her failure to fileher amended or redrafted record on appeal as directed by the probate court twice despite thevehement objection of the private respondent. Petitioners failure, if not an obstinate refusal tocomply with the probate courts orders is fatal.

In correcting a record on appeal, Rule 41, Section 7 of the Rules of Court requires theappellant, within the time limited in the order, x x x, [to] redraft the record by including therein,in their proper chronological sequence, such additional matters as the court may have directedhim to incorporate, and shall thereupon submit the redrafted record for approval, upon notice tothe appellee, in like manner as the original draft. The submission of the redrafted record onappeal as well as its approval are essential to perfect an appeal in special proceedings,[11] as inthis case. Petitioner simply failed to comply with the requirements of the rule, hence the Order

of August 16, 1990, consequently lapsed into finality. It is a settled rule that once an order ordecision acquires finality it may not be altered or modified save in some exceptionalcircumstances none of which, however, is present in this case. Moreover, Rule 41, Section 13of the Rules of Court is quite explicit:

Sec. 13. Effect of failure to file notice, bond, or record on appeal. - Where the notice of appeal,appeal bond or record on appeal is not filed within the period of time herein provided, the appealshall be dismissed.

The dismissal of petitioners appeal was, therefore, beyond cavil.

As a last ditch effort to extricate and excuse herself from her failure to file the amended

record on appeal petitioner draws some parallelism between this case and Grearte v. TheLondon Assurance[12] wherein, petitioner emphasized, the Court liberally construed Rule 41,Section 7 of the Rules of Court. The case ofGrearte is not in point. While there appears to besome similarity of facts between the instant case and Grearte we nonetheless note that in thelatter case respondents therein filed the required amended record on appeal. In the instantcase, however, petitioner never bothered to do so. Reliance on Grearte is thus misplaced.

ACCORDINGLY, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed. Costs against thepetitioner in this instance.


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3 SCC Chemical Corp vs CA, SIHI, Arietta and Halili [G.R. No. 128538. Feb 28, 2001]

Before us is a petition for review, pursuant to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, of the Decision

of the Court of Appeals dated in November 12, 1996 in CA-G.R. CV No. 45742 entitled State

Investment House, Inc., v. Danilo Arrieta, et al., and SCC Chemical Corporation. The

questioned decision affirmed in toto the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch33, dated March 22, 1993, in Civil Case No. 84-25881, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the

plaintiff and against the defendants ordering the latter to pay jointly and severally the

plaintiff the following: a) To pay plaintiff State Investment House, Inc., the sum of

P150,483.16 with interest thereon at 30% per annum reckond (sic) from April, 1984

until the whole amount is fully paid; b) To pay plaintiff an amount equivalent to 25%of the total amount due and demandable as attorneys fees and to pay the cost(s) of

suit.

SO ORDERED.[1]

Equally challenged in this petition is the Resolution of the appellate court dated February 27,

1997, denying SCC Chemicals Corporations motion for reconsideration.

The background of this case, as culled from the decision of the Court of Appeals, is asfollows:

On December 13, 1983, SCC Chemicals Corporation (SCC for brevity) through its

chairman, private respondent Danilo Arrieta and vice president, Pablo (Pablito) Bermundo,obtained a loan from State Investment House Inc., (hereinafter SIHI) in the amount of

P129,824.48. The loan carried an annual interest rate of 30% plus penalty charges of 2% permonth on the remaining balance of the principal upon non-payment on the due date-January 12,

1984. To secure the payment of the loan, Danilo Arrieta and private respondent Leopoldo Haliliexecuted a Comprehensive Surety Agreement binding themselves jointly and severally to pay the

obligation on the maturity date. SCC failed to pay the loan when it matured. SIHI then sent

demand letters to SCC, Arrieta and Halili, but notwithstanding receipt thereof, no payment wasmade.

On August 2, 1984, SIHI filed Civil Case No. 84-25881 for a sum of money with a prayer

for preliminary attachment against SCC, Arrieta, and Halili with the Regional Trial Court of

Manila.

In its answer, SCC asserted SIHIs lack of cause of action. Petitioner contended that the

promissory note upon which SIHI anchored its cause of action was null, void, and of no binding

effect for lack or failure of consideration.

The case was then set for pre-trial. The parties were allowed to meet out-of-court in an effortto settle the dispute amicably. No settlement was reached, but the following stipulation of facts

was agreed upon:


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1. Parties agree that this Court has jurisdiction over the plaintiff and the defendant and

that it has jurisdiction to try and decide this case on its merits and that plaintiff and the

defendant have each the capacity to sue and to be sued in this present action;

2. Parties agree that plaintiff sent a demand letter to the defendant SCC Chemical

Corporation dated April 4, 1984 together with a statement of account of even datewhich were both received by the herein defendant; and

3. Parties finally agree that the plaintiff and the defendant SCC Chemical Corporation

the latter acting through defendants Danilo E. Arrieta and Pablito Bermundo executed

a promissory note last December 13, 1983 for the amount of P129,824.48 with

maturity date on January 12, 1984.[2]

The case then proceeded to trial on the sole issue of whether or not the defendants wereliable to the plaintiff and to what extent was the liability.

SIHI presented one witness to prove its claim. The cross-examination of said witness was

postponed several times due to one reason or another at the instance of either party. The case wascalendared several times for hearing but each time, SCC or its counsel failed to appear despite

notice. SCC was finally declared by the trial court to have waived its right to cross-examine the

witness of SIHI and the case was deemed submitted for decision.

On March 22, 1993, the lower court promulgated its decision in favor of SIHI.

Aggrieved by the verdict, SCC elevated the case to the Court of Appeals where it was

docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 45742.

On appeal, SCC contended that SIHI had failed to show, by a preponderance of evidence,

that the latter had a case against it. SCC argued that the lone witness presented by SIHI to proveits claim was insufficient as the competency of the witness was not established and there was no

showing that he had personal knowledge of the transaction. SCC further maintained that no proof

was shown of the genuineness of the signatures in the documentary exhibits presented asevidence and that these signatures were neither marked nor offered in evidence by SIHI. Finally,

SCC pointed out that the original copies of the documents were not presented in court.

On November 12, 1996, the appellate court affirmed in toto the judgment appealed from.

On December 11, 1996 SCC filed its motion for reconsideration, which the Court ofAppeals denied in its resolution dated February 27, 1997.

Hence, petitioners recourse to this Court relying on the following assignments of error:

I

THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING

THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT PROVED ITS CAUSE OF ACTION AND

OVERCAME ITS BURDEN OF PROOF.

II


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THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AWARDINGATTORNEYS FEES TO THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT.

We find the pertinent issues submitted for resolution to be:

(1) Whether or not the Court of Appeals made an error of law in holding that private respondent

SIHI had proved its cause of action by preponderant evidence; and

(2) Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the award of attorneys fees to SIHI.

Anent thefirst issue, petitioner contends that SIHI introduced documentary evidencethrough the testimony of a witness whose competence was not established and whose personal

knowledge of the truthfulness of the facts testified to was not demonstrated. It argues that the

same was in violation of Sections 36[3] and 48,[4] Rule 130 of the Rules of Court and it wasmanifest error for the Court of Appeals to have ruled otherwise. In addition, SCC points out that

the sole witness of SIHI did not profess to have seen the document presented in evidence

executed or written by SCC. Thus, no proof of its genuineness was adduced. SIHI thus ran afoul

of Section 2,[5] Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, which requires proof of due execution and

authenticity of private documents before the same can be received as evidence. Petitionerlikewise submits that none of the signatures affixed in the documentary evidence presented by

SIHI were offered in evidence. It vehemently argues that such was in violation of therequirement of Section 34,[6] Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. It was thus an error of law on the

part of the appellate court to consider the same. Finally, petitioner posits that the non-production

of the originals of the documents presented in evidence allows the presumption of suppression of

evidence provided for in Section 3 (e),[7] Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, to come into play.

Petitioners arguments lack merit; they fail to persuade us.

We note that the Court of Appeals found that SCC failed to appear several times on

scheduled hearing dates despite due notice to it and counsel. On all those scheduled hearing

dates, petitioner was supposed to cross-examine the lone witness offered by SIHI to prove itscase. Petitioner now charges the appellate court with committing an error of law when it failed to

disallow the admission in evidence of said testimony pursuant to the hearsay rule contained in

Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.

Rule 130, Section 36 reads:

SEC. 36. Testimony generally confined to personal knowledge; hearsay excluded.A

witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge; that

is, which are derived from his own perception, except as otherwise provided in these

rules.

Petitioners reliance on Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court is misp laced. As a rule,

hearsay evidence is excluded and carries no probative value.[8] However, the rule does admit ofan exception. Where a party failed to object to hearsay evidence, then the same is

admissible.[9] The rationale for this exception is to be found in the right of a litigant to cross-

examine. It is settled that it is the opportunity to cross-examine which negates the claim that the

matters testified to by a witness are hearsay. [10] However, the right to cross-examine may bewaived. The repeated failure of a party to cross-examine the witness is an implied waiver of such


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right. Petitioner was afforded several opportunities by the trial court to cross-examine the other

partys witness. Petitioner repeatedly failed to take advantage of these opportunities. No error

was thus committed by the respondent court when it sustained the trial courts finding thatpetitioner had waived its right to cross-examine the opposing partys witness. It is now too late

for petitioner to be raising this matter of hearsay evidence.

Nor was the assailed testimony hearsay. The Court of Appeals correctly found that thewitness of SIHI was a competent witness as he testified to facts, which he knew of his personal

knowledge. Thus, the requirements of Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court as to theadmissibility of his testimony were satisfied.

Respecting petitioners other submissions, the same are moot and academic. As correctly

found by the Court of Appeals, petitioners admission as to the execut ion of the promissory note

by it through private respondent Arrieta and Bermundo at pre-trial sufficed to settle the questionof the genuineness of signatures. The admission having been made in a stipulation of facts at

pre-trial by the parties, it must be treated as a judicial admission. Under Section 4,[11] Rule 129 of

the Rules of Court, a judicial admission requires no proof.

Nor will petitioners reliance on the best evidence rule[12] advance its cause. RespondentSIHI had no need to present the original of the documents as there was already a judicial

admission by petitioner at pre-trial of the execution of the promissory note and receipt of the

demand letter. It is now too late for petitioner to be questioning their authenticity. Its admissionof the existence of these documents was sufficient to establish its obligation. Petitioner failed to

submit any evidence to the contrary or proof of payment or other forms of extinguishment of said

obligation. No reversible error was thus committed by the appellate court when it held petitionerliable on its obligation, pursuant to Article 1159 of the Civil Code which reads:

ART. 1159. Obligations arising from contracts have the force of law between the

contracting parties and should be complied with in good faith.

On the second issue, petitioner charges the Court of Appeals with reversible error for having

sustained the trial courts award of attorneys fees. Petitioner relies onRadio Communications of

the Philippines v. Rodriguez, 182 SCRA 899,909 (1990), where we held that when attorneysfees are awarded, the reason for the award of attorneys fees must be stated in the text of thecourts decision. Petitioner submits that since the trial court did not state any reason for awarding

the same, the award of attorneys fees should have been disallowed by the appellate court.

We find for petitioner in this regard.

It is settled that the award of attorneys fees is the exception rather than the rule, hence it is

necessary for the trial court to make findings of fact and law, which would bring the case within

the exception and justify the grant of the award.[13] Otherwise stated, given the failure by the trial

court to explicitly state the rationale for the award of attorneys fees, th e same shall be

disallowed. In the present case, a perusal of the records shows that the trial court failed to explain

the award of attorneys fees. We hold that the same should thereby be deleted.

Wherefore, decision PARTLY GRANTED. The decision dated November 12, 1996 of the

Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION that the award of attorneys fees to

private respondent SIHI is hereby deleted. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.


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4 SSS v Hon. Chaves RTC Misamis 18 & Sps. Obedencio [G.R. No.151259. Oct 13, 2004]

This PFR on certiorari seeks to reverse the Decision[2] dated February 29, 2000 andthe Resolution[3] dated December 12, 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 38152.

Private respondents, spouses Juanito and Agustina Obedencio, filed Civil Case No. 94-211for Specific Performance at the Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental, Cagayan de Oro City,Branch 18. They prayed that the Social Security System (SSS) be ordered (1) to cancel themortgage on the properties of the spouses; (2) to release the documents covering the saidproperties; and (3) to pay the spouses moral damages in the sum of P80,000; litigationexpenses in the sum of P5,000; and attorneys fees in the sum of P20,000.

The petitioner filed its Answer with Counterclaim alleging that the private respondentshad an unpaid obligation in the amount of P48,188.72 as of September 1, 1994.[4]

After the issues were joined, a pre-trial conference was scheduled on February 16,1995. Atty. Rodrigo B. Filoteo, acting assistant branch manager of the SSS in Cagayan de OroCity and allegedly the only lawyer of the said branch, entered his appearance as counsel for thepetitioner. He manifested that he had filed his pre-trial brief through registered mail. Thehearing was, however, cancelled because the respondent judge was indisposed. The hearing ofthe case was reset on April 18, 1995. This time, Atty. Filoteo failed to attend because of anofficial mission to Zamboanga City from April 7 to May 8, 1995 involving SSS cases.

On motion of Atty. Alberto Bacal, counsel of the respondent spouses, respondent judgeissued an Orderdated April 18, 1995 declaring petitioner in default and allowed privaterespondents to present their evidence ex-parte.

The petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration praying for the lifting of the order ofdefault. The motion was denied for lack of merit in an Order dated May 22, 1995. On August16, 1995, the petitioner appealed the Order denying the Motion for Reconsideration to the Courtof Appeals by way of a petition for certiorari.[5]

In its Decision of February 29, 2000, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition.[6]

We deny the petition.

There is no question that it is the discretion of the trial judge to declare a party-defendant as indefault for failure to appear at a pre-trial conference. The declaration of default for non-appearance at a pre-trial conference is sanctioned by Rule 20, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Court,thus:

- A party who fails to appear at a pretrial conference may be non-suited or considered as indefault.

To be relieved of the effects of the order of default, Sec. 3, Rule 18 of the Rules of Courtprovides that the defendant must file a motion under oath to set aside the order of default; thathe must show that his failure to appear at the pre-trial was due to fraud, accident, mistake orexcusable neglect and accompany the motion with affidavit of merit.

A motion to lift order of default should be under oath, verified and accompanied with an affidavitof merit.


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Aside from the requirements of Sec. 3, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court, the motion to lift the orderof default must further show that the defendant has a meritorious defense or that somethingwould be gained by having the order of default set aside. Otherwise, and if the motion is notaccompanied by affidavits of merits, it may properly be denied.

A perusal of petitioners motion to lift order of default shows that it is neither under oath nor

accompanied by an affidavit of merit. There was no notice of hearing. There was also noshowing, save in the instant petition, that it has meritorious defense or that something would begained by having the order of default set aside. Thus, the trial Court correctly deniedpetitioners motion.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby DENIED DUE COURSE and DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.[7]

On March 16, 2000, the petitioner moved for reconsideration, which was denied.

Hence, petitioner through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) now assails the

Decision and Resolution of the appellate court, alleging that,

THE COURT OF APPEALS, BY ISSUING THE ASSAILED DECISION HAS DECIDED AQUESTION OF SUBSTANCE WHICH WAS NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND THE

APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE HONORABLE COURT CONSIDERING THAT:

A. Rules of Procedure should be liberally construed pursuant to Section 2, Rule 1 ofthe Rules of Court in order to protect the substantive rights of the parties.

B. Petitioner has the right to have its day in court in order to present its meritoriousdefense against the unfounded and baseless claim of respondent spouses.[8]

The core issue particular to this case is whether the default order of the lower court shouldbe lifted, so that substantial justice would prevail over technical rules.

Seeking relief from Section 2, Rule 1 (now Section 6[9]), and Section 2, Rule 20 (nowSection 4, Rule 18[10]) of the Revised Rules of Court, and invoking our pronouncementsinRinconada Telephone Company, Inc. v. Buenviaje,[11] Balagtas Multi-Purpose Cooperative,Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[12] andAlonso v. Villamor,[13] the petitioner asserts that althoughrespondent judge has the discretion to declare a defendant in default for failure to appear duringpre-trial conference, the strict, rigid and arbitrary application thereof denied the petitioner areasonable opportunity to present its meritorious defense, refute the evidence of the privaterespondents, present his own, and exercise his right to due process. The petitioner contendsthat the rules should be liberally construed in order to protect the substantive rights of theparties.

Citing furtherLim Tanhu v. Ramolete[14] and Lucero v. Dacayo,[15] petitioner suggests thatits Motion for Reconsideration was in substance legally adequate, whether or not it was verifiedwith an affidavit of merit since the form of the motion by which the default was sought to be liftedis secondary and the requirements of Section 3, Rule 18 [16] of the Rules of Court need not bestrictly complied with, unlike in cases of default for failure to answer. In sum, petitioner begs forthe liberal construction of the rules.

Petitioner further avers that contrary to the unsubstantiated claim of private respondents,their obligation amounting to P48,188.72 as of September 1, 1994, remains outstanding. This is


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evidenced by the statement of account prepared by the SSS Real Estate LoansDepartment. Consequently, petitioner concludes, private respondents had yet no legal right todemand from petitioner the release of the mortgage over their property.

Private respondents, in turn, insist that petitioner violated Section 2, Rule 20, (now Sections4 and 5 of Rule 18[17]) of the Revised Rules of Court and Sections 4 and 5, Rule 15 as amended

on July 1, 1997.

[18]

Sadly, the records reveal that petitioner failed to comply not only with one rule. Other thanfailing to appear during pre-trial, petitioner does not deny that its Motion for Reconsideration tolift the order of default lacked verification, notice of hearing and affidavit of merit. If notaccompanied by affidavits of merit, the trial court has no authority to consider the same. [19]Amotion to lift an order of default is fatally flawed and the trial court has no authority to considerthe same where it was not under oath and unaccompanied by an affidavit of merit. In effect, thepetitioner failed to set aside the order of default and must suffer the consequences thereof.[20]

Procedural rules are not to be disregarded or dismissed simply because their non-observance may have resulted in prejudice to a partys substantive rights. Like all rules they areto be followed, except only when for the most persuasive of reasons they may be relaxed to

relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in notcomplying with the procedure prescribed.[21] Here, the petitioner has not shown any persuasivereason why he should be exempt from abiding by the rules. Accordingly, the order declaring thepetitioner in default and the denial of the motion to lift the order of default are juridicallyunassailable.

We must stress, however, that a judgment of default against the petitioner who failed toappear during pre-trial or, for that matter, any defendant who failed to file an answer, does notimply a waiver of all of their rights, except their right to be heard and to present evidence tosupport their allegations. Otherwise, it would be meaningless to request presentation ofevidence every time the other party is declared in default. If it were so, a decision would thenautomatically be rendered in favor of the non-defaulting party and exactly to the tenor of hisprayer.[22] The law also gives the defaulting parties some measure of protection because

plaintiffs, despite the default of defendants, are still required to substantiate their allegations inthe complaint.[23]

In the instant case, private respondents claim that they had fully paid their obligation withthe SSS. They allege that they already paid P63,000, an amount that exceeded their supposedaccountability of P56,427. In their prayer in Civil Case No. 94-211 for Specific Performance filedbefore the Regional Trial Court, they ask that petitioner be ordered to cancel the mortgage ontheir properties, to release the documents covering the said properties and to pay themdamages, litigation expenses and attorneys fees.

We note, though, that petitioner had earlier filed an answer stating that the privaterespondent spouses had an unpaid obligation amounting to P48,188.72 as of September 1,1994. Likewise, before the petitioner was declared in default its counsel, Atty. Filoteo, had

manifested that he had filed his pre-trial brief by registered mail. We also note that when therespondent judge issued the default order, it allowed private respondents to present theirevidence ex parte. With the pre-trial brief and answer of petitioner, the trial court could thenproceed to evaluate the evidence like receipts, if any, of the private respondents against theallegations of the petitioner, to determine the private respondents outstanding obligation, acrucial factual question in this case. The petitioners averment that the private respondentsoutstanding balance is P48,188.72 as of September 1, 1994 should be weighed against theprivate respondents own evidence that they had fully paid their obligation to petitioner.


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In a civil case, the burden of proof is on the plaintiff to establish his case through apreponderance of evidence. If he claims a right granted or created by law, he must prove hisclaim by competent evidence. He must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on theweakness of that of his opponent. [24] The private respondents cannot railroad the release of themortgage through a default order. The determination of the accurate outstanding balance of theprivate respondents should first be resolved before the release of the subject mortgage can be

demanded. In this case, when the evidence during trial proves unsatisfactory and inconclusiveas to the full payment of private respondents obligation to SSS, then the mortgage should notyet be cancelled prematurely.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision dated February 29,2000, and the Resolution dated December 12, 2001 of the Court of Appeals,are AFFIRMED. The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental,Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 18, for further proceedings.

SO ORDERED.


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5 QUIAMBAO v CA, National Appellate Board.. [G.R. No. 128305.Mrch 28, 2005]

This petition assails the Resolution[1] dated 10 January 1997 of the Court of Appealswhich affirmed the Decision

[2]dated 25 October 1993 and the Resolution

[3]dated 27

December 1993 of National Appellate Board (Board), Third Division, National Police

Commission (NAPOLCOM). The Boards ruling in turn, which likewise affirmedtheDecision[4] dated 31 October 1992 of Acting PNP Chief and Police Deputy DirectorGeneral dismissing PO3 Felino Quiambao from the police service.

The operative facts of the case follow:

On 22 December 1990, at around 8:00 in the evening, Espie Catolico (Catolico) waswalking along Capulong Street in Tondo, Manila, inquiring as to the whereabouts of herhousemaid Gynalin Garais who left the house the day before. After having asked herneighbors and bystanders to no avail, an old woman told her that a certain policemanwas looking for her as her housemaid was in his custody. She went to the area asdirected by the old woman but there she was allegedly accosted by petitioner, PO3Felino Quiambao, a member of the Philippine National Police (PNP), Western PoliceDistrict Command, and five (5) other persons. Quiambao and his companions forciblytook Catolicos handbag and carried away its contents consisting of precious assortedmerchandise, jewelry and other personal items worth approximately Nine ThousandPesos (P9,000.00). Thereafter, petitioner forcibly herded Catolico to his owner-type jeepand brought her to the dimly lit portion of North Harbor and, while thereat, he slappedher on the face several times and warned her not to look anymore for her housemaid. [5]

In view of the incident, Catolico filed a sworn statement on 24 June 1991 with thePNP Inspectorate Division, accusing petitioner and six (6) others, with robbery-holdupand mauling committed on 22 December 1990.

[6]The complaint was corroborated by

Grace Commendador who witnessed the actual incident and confirmed the statement of

Catolico.[7]

On 22 August 1991, Catolico filed another administrative complaint with the Officeof the Hearing Officer at NAPOLCOM, Western Police District, Manila, chargingpetitioner with grave misconduct for the same incident which occurred on 22 December1990.

[8]An investigation was conducted on this administrative charge by the Office of

the Hearing Officer of NAPOLCOM. On 30 March 1993, the case was forwarded to theCity of Manilas Peoples Law Enforcement Board (PLEB) for adjudication.[9]

The PNP Inspectorate Division likewise conducted an investigation on the chargesfiled. On 31 October 1992, the Summary Dismissal Hearing Officer (SDHO)recommended the dismissal of petitioner. This recommendation was approved by

Acting PNP Chief and Police Deputy Director General, Raul S. Imperial (Acting PNPChief).

[10]

Petitioner appealed the 31 October 1992 resolution to the National Appellate Board(NAB) of the NAPOLCOM. On 25 October 1993, the Third Division of the NAB,rendered a decision affirming the dismissal of petitioner from police service. [11] Themotion for reconsideration filed by petitioner was denied in a Resolution dated 27December 1993.[12] But it was only on 23 September 1996 when petitioner received a


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certified xerox copy of the Resolution of the NAB denying his petition forreconsideration.

[13]

On 7 October 1996, petitioner filed a petition for review with the Court ofAppeals.[14]On 10 January 1997, the appellate court dismissed the petition for review forlack of merit.

The appellate court ruled that the petition did not state all the specific material datesshowing that it was filed within the reglementary period provided by law as it failed tostate the date when petitioner received a copy of the Resolution of NAB dated 27December 1993, denying his motion for reconsideration of NABs decision dated 25October 1993. It found out that NABs decision dated 25 October 1993 was received bypetitioner on 22 November 1993, and on 2 December 1993, he filed his motion forreconsideration. The said motion, however, was denied on 27 December 1993, butaccording to the appellate court, petitioner did not disclose the date when he receivedsuch denial. The fifteen-day reglementary period for filing a petition for review with theCourt of Appeals started to run from such date.

[15]

Further, the appellate court ruled that the issue of which administrative disciplinaryauthority had jurisdiction over the case was raised by petitioner only for the first timebefore it. He did not raise it before the SDHO nor before the NAB. More importantly, itfound that the PNP Inspectorate Division had original, exclusive and summary

jurisdiction over the instant case, and that NAB did not commit any reversible error indeciding the appealed case without aprioripronouncement as to which among thedisciplinary authorities under Republic Act No. 6975 had jurisdiction over the case.

[16]It

also added that NABs not having all the records requested by petitioner after it hadrendered its decision did not necessarily mean that it did not have such documents atthe time it rendered its decision.

[17]Petitioners claim was further belied by the fact that

Catolico was able to obtain certified true copies of the relevant documents which the

PNP Chief transmitted to the NAPOLCOM.

Additionally, the appellate court found that a perusal of the annexes to the commentof Catolico would readily show that NAB resolved petitioners case based on substantialevidence appearing on the record before it.[18] It observed that petitioners claim that hiscase was decided on the basis of an incomplete record was merely an afterthought.Said defense was not raised by petitioner in his motion for reconsideration of NABsdecision dated 25 October 1993.

[19]Likewise, petitioner was not denied due process as

he was afforded reasonable opportunity to be heard and to submit his evidence beforethe SDHO and to appeal to NAB the decision of the Acting PNP Chief dismissing himfrom the police service, the Court of Appeals ruled.

[20]

On 27 January 1997, petitioner filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File Motionfor Reconsideration followed by the filing of his Motion for Reconsideration on 17February 1997. On the same day, the appellate court issued a Resolution denyingpetitioners motion for extension of time. On 5 March 1997, it issued a resolution statingthat theMotion for Reconsideration was merely NOTED, the Resolution dated 10January 1997 being already final.

[21]Hence, the instant judicial recourse.


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The primordial thrust of the petition seeks the reversal of the decisions andresolutions of Acting PNP Chief, the NAB and the Court of Appeals, all upholding thevalidity of the dismissal of petitioner from police service, and his correspondingreinstatement in the police service.

Petitioner argues that the appellate court erred and acted without or in excess of

jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of discretion in holding that the petition is notmeritorious. [22] He specifically assigns the following as errors which need to be rectified,to wit: (1) that the appellate court ruled that petition did not state the date whenpetitioner received a copy of the Resolution of NAB dated 27 December 1993 todetermine if it was filed within the reglementary period;[23] (2) that the appellate courtsustained the findings of the Acting PNP Chief and the NAB without first resolvingand/or giving a reason why it was the Acting PNP Chief and neither the NAPOLCOMHearing Officer nor the PLEB that had the power to hear and decide the case; [24] (3) thatthe appellate court sustained, through misapprehension of facts and/or contrary toevidence, the decision of NAB which was not based on the complete records of thecase;

[25](4) that the appellate court ruled that the petition was not meritorious and

sustained the findings of the Acting PNP Chief and the NAB although such findingswere arrived at without a hearing and absent substantial evidence;

[26](5) that the

appellate courts denial of the motion for reconsideration was based on purely technicalconsiderations;[27] and (6) that the appellate court had been passive to Catolicossurreptitious introduction into the records of the case evidentiary documents of whichpetitioner was not furnished and to the latters prejudice.

[28]

The petition is not imbued with merit.

Readily glaring upon examination of the petition filed by petitioner is its title Petitionfor Review on Certiorari.[29] The title would immediately lead us to conclude that thepetition is primarily anchored on Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.

Under this mode of appeal, only questions of law may be entertained by this Court andfactual issues raised are beyond the ambit of this review. Yet, the issues raised bypetitioner in the petition are fundamentally factual in nature which are inappropriate forresolution via the mode of review he availed of.

However, a perusal of issues in the petition would indicate that the petition isactually anchored on Rule 65 as the issues principally sought to assail the resolutionrendered by the appellate court on the ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting tolack or excess of jurisdiction.[30]

Nonetheless, even assuming that the petition was brought under Rule 65, thepetition would still not lie as the implausibility of the grounds on which the petition rests

are convincingly manifest and the grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excessof jurisdiction as the core of this mode of review is strikingly wanting.

Grave abuse of discretion means such capricious and whimsical exercise ofjudgment which is equivalent to an excess, or a lack of jurisdiction, and the abuse ofdiscretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty ora virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of lawas where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of


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passion or hostility.[31] In certiorariproceedings under Rule 65, questions of fact are notgenerally permitted, the inquiry being limited essentially to whether or not therespondent tribunal had acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuseof discretion.[32]These grounds under Rule 65 are not attendant in the instant case.Even if we take this case as so exceptional as to permit a factual review, the petition at

bar fails to persuade us to rule in favor of petitioner.Petitioner contends that the appellate court acted with grave abuse of discretion

amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in holding that the petition was notmeritorious since the petition filed with the appellate court did not state the date whenpetitioner received a copy of the Resolution of NAB dated 27 December 1993 todetermine if the petition was indeed filed within the reglementary period. There isreason basis for such contention.

The petition with the appellate court by petitioner substantially complied withRevised Administrative Circular No. 1-95[33]. The pertinent portion of the circular reads,

SECTION 6. Contents of the petition.The petition for review shall (a) state the full names ofthe parties to the case, without impleading the court or agencies either as petitioners or

respondents; (b) contain a concise statement of the facts and issues involved and the groundsrelied upon for the review; (c) be accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original or a

certified true copy of the award, judgment, final order or resolution appealed from, together with

certified true copies of such material portions of the record as are referred to therein and othersupporting papers; and (d) contain a sworn certification against forum shopping as provided in

Revised Circular No. 28-91.The petition shall state the specific material dates showing that it

was filed within the period fixed herein.[34]

The records reveal that the petition filed with the Court of Appeals by petitioner

provides the following,

18. On December 27, 1993, respondent National Appellate Board rendered its Resolutiondenying the motion in this manner:

WHEREFORE, finding no merit on this instant petition, the same is hereby denied.

A certified xerox copy thereof, duly RECEIVED BY PETITIONER ON SEPTEMBER 23,

1996 is hereto attached as ANNEX M.[35]

A reading of the foregoing allegation, however, disclosed the fact that on 27

December 1993, NAB rendered a resolution denying petitioners motion forreconsideration. Although it would seem anomalous as it is unnatural that the purportedresolution was received only by petitioner on 23 September 1996, we are inclined tosustain petitioners assertion for the same is supported by the certified xerox copy of theresolution[36] and the evidence is bereft of any showing that will warrant a contraryconclusion. Thus, the aforecited allegation substantially complied with the requirementsunder Section 6. The appellate court believed that petitioner had already been servedwith a copy of the resolution prior to 23 September 1996.[37] Such a conclusion,


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however, is bereft of any evidentiary basis and, thus, has no leg to stand on. It isnoteworthy that the date when petitioner received NABs resolution denying his motionfor reconsideration is material in determining when the fifteen (15)-day reglementaryperiod for filing a petition for review with the Court of Appeals starts to run. [38]

The failure to specifically state in the petition on material dates such as the date

when the resolution or order denying a motion for reconsideration was received is aground for dismissal in accordance with Section 7 of the administrative circular and Rule43.[39] But the scenario is not present in the case at bar for the aforecited paragraph 18of the petition filed with the appellate court reflected the date when petitioner actuallyreceived the resolution denying his motion for reconsideration, which is 23 September1996. Procedural rules must be liberally interpreted and applied so as not to frustratesubstantial justice that this Court seeks to achieve.

Now, on substantial issues rather than on mere technicality. The pivotal questionsposed in this petition are whether the Acting Chief of the PNP had authority to conductsummary dismissal proceedings over members of the PNP and whether the summary

dismissal of petitioner was sufficiently established by the evidence on record.Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6975 or the Department of the Interior and Local

Government Act of 1990, which took effect on 1 January 1991, defines the structuralcomponents, powers and functions of the PNP as the citizens guardian of peace andorder and enforcer of the law. The statute likewise delineates the procedural frameworkin pursuing administrative complaints against erring members of the police organization.Section 41 of the law enumerates the authorities to which a complaint against an erringmember of the PNP may be filed, thus;

Section 41. (a) Citizens Complaints.Any complaint by an individual person against anymember of the PNP shall be brought before the following:

(1) Chiefs of police, where the offense is punishable bywithholding of privileges, restriction to specified limits, suspensionor forfeiture of salary, or any combination thereof, for a period notexceeding fifteen (15) days;

(2) Mayors of cities or municipalities, where the offense ispunishable by withholding of privileges, restriction to specified limits,suspension or forfeiture of salary, or any combination thereof, for aperiod of not less than sixteen (16) days but not exceeding thirty (30)days;

(3) Peoples Law Enforcement Board, as created underSection 43 hereof, where the offense is punishable by withholding ofprivileges, restriction to specified limits, suspension or forfeiture ofsalary, or any combination thereof, for a period exceeding thirty (30)days; orby dism issal. . . . (Emphasis added)

[40]


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It is readily apparent that a complaint against a PNP member which would warrantdismissal from service is within the jurisdiction of the PLEB. However, Section 41 shouldbe read in conjunction with Section 42 of the same statute which reads, thus:

Sec. 42. Summary Dismissal Powers of the PNP Chief and Regional Directors. - The Chief of

the PNP and regional directors, after due notice and summary hearings, may immediatelyremove or dismiss any respondent PNP member inany of the following cases:

(a) When the charge is serious and the evidence of guilt is strong;

(b) When the respondent is a recidivist or has been repeatedly charged and there

are reasonable grounds to believe that he is guilty of the charges; and

(c) When the respondent is guilty of conduct unbecoming of a police officer.

(Emphasis ours)

Evidently, the PNP Chief and regional directors are vested with the power tosummarily dismiss erring PNP members if any of the causes for summary dismissalenumerated in Section 42 is attendant. Thus, the power to dismiss PNP members is notonly the prerogative of PLEB but concurrently exercised by the PNP Chief and regionaldirectors. This shared power is likewise evident in Section 45.

SEC. 45. Finality of Disciplinary Action.The disciplinary action imposed upon a member of

the PNP shall be final and executory: Provided, That a disciplinary action imposed by theregional director or by the PLEB involving demotion or dismissal from the service may be

appealed to the regional appellate board within ten (10) days from receipt of the copy of the

notice of decision: Provided, further, That the disciplinary action imposed by the Chief of the

PNP involving demotion or dismissal may be appealed to the National Appellate Board withinten (10) days from receipt thereof: Provided,furthermore, That the regional or National

Appellate Board, as the case may be, shall decide the appeal within sixty (60) days from receipt

of the notice of appeal:Provided,finally, That failure of the regional appellate board to act on theappeal within said period shall render the decision final and executory without prejudice,

however, to the filing of an appeal by either party with the Secretary. (Emphasis ours)

Once a complaint is filed with any of the disciplining authorities under R.A. No.6975, the latter shall acquire exclusive original jurisdiction over the case although otherdisciplining authority has concurrent jurisdiction over the case. Paragraph (c) of Section41 explicitly declares this point.

(c)Exclusive JurisdictionA complaint or a charge filed against a PNP member shall be

heard and decided exclusively by the disciplining authority who has acquired original

jurisdiction over the case and notwithstanding the existence of concurrent jurisdiction asregards the offense;Provided, That offenses which carry higher penalties referred to adisciplinary authority shall be referred to the appropriate authority which has jurisdiction over

the offense. (Emphasis ours)


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Clearly, the PLEB and the PNP Chief and regional directors have concurrent jurisdictionover administrative cases filed against members of the PNP which may warrantdismissal from service.

This Court in Summary Dismissal Board and the Regional Appellate Board, PNP,Region VI, Iloilo City v. Torcita[41] recognized the authority of both the Summary

Dismissal Board and the Regional Appellate Board of the PNP, Region VI, Iloilo City, toact on twelve (12) administrative complaints filed against C/Insp. Lazaro Torcita, eventhough the controversy occurred in 1994, after the effectivity of R.A. No. 6975. TheCourt further declared that R.A. No. 6975 defines the summary dismissal powers of thePNP Chief and regional directors, among others in cases, where the respondent isguilty of conduct unbecoming of a police officer.

Memorandum Circular No. 92-006 prescribes the rules and regulations in theconduct of summary dismissal proceedings against erring PNP members and definesconduct unbecoming of a police officer under Section 3(c), Rule II, as follows:

Conduct unbecoming of a police officer refers to any behavior or action of a PNP member,irrespective of rank, done in his official capacity, which, in dishonoring or otherwise disgracing

himself as a PNP member, seriously compromise his character and standing as a gentleman insuch a manner as to indicate his vitiated or corrupt state of moral character; it may also refer to

acts or behavior of any PNP member in an unofficial or private capacity which, in dishonoring or

disgracing himself personally as a gentleman, seriously compromises his position as a PNP

member and exhibits himself as morally unworthy to remain as a member of the organization.[42]

The same Memorandum Circular also defines the phrase serious charge as aground for summary dismissal of PNP members. This includes charges for commissionof heinous crimes and those committed by organized/syndicated crime groups wherein

PNP members are involved, gunrunning, illegal logging, robbery, kidnapping forransom, white slave trade, illegal recruitment, carnapping, smuggling, piracy, drugtrafficking, falsification of land title and other government forms, large scale swindling,film piracy, counterfeiting, and bank frauds. Clearly, the robbery-holdup and maulingincident which occurred on 22 December 1990 fall under the summary dismissal powerof PNP Chief and regional directors.

In the case at bar, the complaint for grave misconduct against petitioner was firstfiled by Catolico before the PNP Inspectorate Division on 24 June 1991. However,another case was filed by Catolico with the Office of the Hearing Officer, NAPOLCOM,WPD, on 22 August 1991. The charges filed with the PNP Inspectorate Division wereinvestigated, and on 31 October 1992, the SDHO recommended the dismissal of

petitioner which was approved by the Acting PNP Chief. Petitioner appealed the case tothe NAB which affirmed the decision of the Acting PNP Chief. The motion forreconsideration was also denied. Thus, in accordance with paragraph (c) of Section 41,the PNP Inspectorate Division had acquired exclusive original jurisdiction over thecomplaint of Catolico to the exclusion of other investigating body. It is as if the secondcomplaint filed by Catolico with the Office of the Hearing Officer, NAPOLCOM, WPD,had not been filed.


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Even assuming ex gratia argumentithat the Acting PNP Chief and the NAB werebereft of jurisdiction to rule on the complaint filed by Catolico, petitioner, at the earliestopportunity, neither raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction before the PNP InspectorateDivision nor with the NAB but only before the appellate court. [43] Despite the existenceof a jurisprudential rule

[44]that jurisdictional question may be raised at any stage of the

proceedings, an equitable exceptional rule has also been laid down by this Court bars aparty from raising jurisdictional question on ground of laches or estoppel. [45]Althoughthe lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of the action, a party maybe estopped from raising such questions if he has actively taken part in the veryproceedings which he questions, belatedly objecting to the courts jurisdiction in theevent that the judgment or order subsequently rendered is adverse to him.[46]

Petitioner also argues that the appellate court erred in affirming the findings of theActing PNP Chief and the NAB, which was arrived at without hearing and substantialevidence. We are not persuaded.

Summary dismissal proceedings are governed by specific requirements of

notification of the charges together with copies of affidavits and other attachmentssupporting the complaints, and the filing of an answer, together with supportingdocuments. It is true that consistent with its summary nature, the duration of the hearingis limited, and the manner of conducting the hearing is summary, in that swornstatements may take the place of oral testimonies of witnesses, cross-examination isconfined only to material and relevant matters, and prolonged arguments and dilatoryproceedings shall not be entertained.

[47]

Notably, the recommendation of the SDHO was approved by the Acting PNP Chiefwhose decision was affirmed by the NAB. The findings of the NAB was also affirmed bythe Court of Appeals. The unanimity in their conclusions cannot just be disregarded andtheir factual determinations are conclusive upon this Court for the records show that

petitioner was afforded reasonable opportunity to defend his side, as he filed positionpapers to substantiate his defense and arguments and even filed motions forreconsideration to set aside adverse decisions rendered against him. This opportunity todefend himself was more than sufficient to comply with due process requirements inadministrative proceedings

Well-entrenched is the rule that courts will not interfere in matters which areaddressed to the sound discretion of the government agency entrusted with theregulation of activities coming under the special and technical training and knowledge ofsuch agency. Administrative agencies are given a wide latitude in the evaluation ofevidence and in the exercise of their adjudicative functions, latitude which includes theauthority to take judicial notice of facts within their special competence. [48]

The instant case filed by Catolico is an administrative case for grave misconductagainst petitioner for the alleged robbery-holdup and mauling incident that took place on22 December 1990. In resolving administrative cases, conduct of full-blown trial is notindispensable to dispense justice to the parties. The requirement of notice and hearingdoes not connote full adversarial proceedings.

[49]Submission of position papers may be

sufficient for as long as the parties thereto are given the opportunity to be heard. Inadministrative proceedings, the essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be


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heard, or an opportunity to explain ones side or opportunity to seek a reconsideration ofthe action or ruling complained of.

[50]This constitutional mandate is deemed satisfied if

a person is granted an opportunity to seek reconsideration of an action or a ruling. [51] Itdoes not require trial-type proceedings similar to those in the courts of justice. Whereopportunity to be heard either through oral arguments or through pleadings is accorded,

there is no denial of procedural due process.

[52]

In administrative proceedings, only substantial evidence or that amount of relevantevidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion isrequired.

[53]Thus, findings of fact of quasi-judicial agencies are generally accorded

respect and even finality by the Supreme Court, if supported by substantial evidence, inrecognition of their expertise on the specific matters under their consideration.[54] Thus,factual determinations made by the SDHO and the NAB as affirmed by the Court of

Appeals are undoubtedly beyond review and conclusive upon this Court, they beingtriers of facts. The congruence in their conclusion forecloses any possibility of reversibleerror or misappreciation of facts. Such being the case, we cannot but affirm theircommon conclusion as petitioner failed to advance substantial and convincing evidence

and arguments that will merit the reversal of prior decisions on the case.

Finally, petitioner also argues that the appellate court erred in being passive toCatolicos surreptitious introduction into the records of the case evidentiary documentsof which petitioner was not furnished and to the latters prejudice. Sad to say, the matteris a factual one which is outside the ambit of this mode of review. Besides, this issuewas not even raised in the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner with the Court of

Appeals.[55]

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Petition is hereby DISMISSEDand the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 10 January 1997 AFFIRMED. Costsagainst petitioner.

SO ORDERED.


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6 Barcenas v Tomas [G.R. No. 150321. March 31, 2005]

Petitioners are required by ROC to provide appellate courts with certified true copies of thejudgments or final orders that are the subjects of review, as well as the material portions of therecord. The reason for such requirement is that these documents and pleadings are needed bythe reviewing courts in resolving whether to give due course to petitions. Hence, this

requirement cannot be perfunctorily ignored or violated. Failure to comply with it hinders thereview of cases on the merits, deprives the appellate courts of definitive bases for their actions,results in frustrating delays, and contributes havoc to the orderly administration of justice.

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review[2] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing theOctober 11, 2001 Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA), which dismissed the Petition forReview in CA-GR SP No. 66490 because of procedural defects.[4] The Petition for Reviewbefore the CA questioned the Decisions of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) [5] of Cuyapo, Nueva

Ecija and of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),[6] Branch 33, of Guimba, Nueva Ecija in Civil CaseNo. 1695. Petitioners now ask this Court to pass upon these judgments of the lower courts (CA,RTC, and MTC). The MTCs Decision, which was affirmed by the RTC, disposed as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the [respondents] directing[petitioners]/heirs of Veronica Tolentino including any and all persons acting in their behalf to:

1. Immediately vacate the one-hectare portion of the property described in Transfer Certificate of TitleNo. 16390 of the Land Records of Nueva Ecija which was sold to the [respondents] and reconvey or turn

over the same to the [respondents] the ownership, possession and occupancy thereof;

2. To pay moral and exemplary damages ofP10,000.00;

3. To pay litigation expenses of P5,000.00;

4. To pay attorneys fee ofP10,000.00; and 5. To pay costs of suit.[7] The Facts

A case for recovery of ownership and possession of real property with damages was filedby Respondent Spouses Anastacio Tomas and Candida Caliboso against the heirs of VeronicaTolentino. The Complaint stated, among others, that after the death of her husband, BenedictoGuerzon, Veronica sold to respondents on May 7, 1969, a one-hectare portion of her undividedshare in a 14.6-hectare property. Situated in Barangay Paitan Sur, Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija, theland was co-owned by her and her ten children. The entire property was registered in her name

and that of her late husband and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 16390.Respondents took possession of the property immediately after the sale. In 1989, however,

the couple migrated to the United States, leaving the lot in the possession of Victoriano Tomas,the husbands brother. On April 13, 1989, the heirs of Veronica executed an ExtrajudicialPartition covering the entire property. As a result, a new title was issued in the name of one ofthe heirs, Maximo Guerzon, who in 1995 wrested possession of the lot from Victoriano Tomas.

During the trial, respondents presented a Deed of Sale (Exhibit B) evidencing the sale ofthe one-hectare lot for P2,800. Moreover, an Affidavit (Exhibit C) showed that Veronicas


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children had subsequently confirmed the sale. Petitioners, however, denied knowledge of thetwo documents and claimed that their signatures on the Affidavit had been forged.[8]

Ruling that respondents had the better right of possession and ownership of the land inquestion, the Municipal Trial Court of Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija held that the sale of the one-hectareportion to them had sufficiently been established by the notarized document of sale and by their

continuous possession of the property from 1969 until its interruption by Maximo Guerzon in1995. The MTC added that the authenticity and genuineness of the Deed of Sale, as well as ofthe Affidavit confirming it, could not be assailed by mere unsubstantiated denials that thedocuments were fake. It ordered the defendants to vacate the property immediately and to paymoral damages, litigation expenses, attorneys fees and the costs of the suit.

On appeal, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 33, of Guimba, Nueva Ecija affirmed the MTCDecision. Petitioners thereafter elevated the case to the CA under Rule 42 of the Rules ofCourt.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

As earlier stated, the CA dismissed the Petition for Review because of the followingprocedural infirmities: (1) petitioners had merely referred to themselves as the Heirs ofVeronica Tolentino, instead of stating their full names as required under Section 2(a) of Rule42; (2) the pleadings filed with the lower court had not been appended to the Petition, contraryto Section 2(d) of Rule 42; and (3) among petitioners, only one had signed the Verification andthe Certification of non-forum shopping.

Hence this Petition.[9]

Issues

In their Memorandum, petitioners raise the following issues:

I. Whether or not the challenged Decision dated October 11, 2001 of the Honorable Court of Appeals inCA-G.R. SP No. 66490 should be set aside in the interest of substantial justice [in] view of the facts

obtaining in [the] case at bar clearly showing the superior claim of ownership of petitioners as against

respondents over the land in question.

II. Whether or not both the lower courts in Civil Case No. 1695 and 1695-G, respectively, have

committed grave and serious error in giving evidentiary weight to the purported Deed of Sale (Exhibit

B) and Affidavit (Exhibit C) as proof of the alleged sale by the late Veronica Tolentino in favor of

respondents Anastacio Tomas [and] Candida Caliboso of the disputed land even if said documentaryexhibits have not been properly identified by a competent witness.

III. Whether or not both the lower courts in Civil Case No. 1695 and 1695-G committed grave andserious error in failing to rule that both Exhibits B and C are spurious and fictitious documents andtherefore cannot transfer to them title or ownership over the land in question.

IV. Whether or not both the lower courts in Civil Case No. 1695 and 1695-G committed grave andserious error in failing to rule that the purported sale by the late Veronica Tolentino of the disputed land


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to respondents was null and void because it was without the consent of herein petitioners who are her co-

owners of said land.[10]

In brief, petitioners ask this Court (1) to set aside the CA Resolution in the interest ofsubstantial justice; and (2) to review and reverse the RTC and the MTC Decisions, despite thefact that the CA did not pass upon them on their merits.

The Courts Ruling

The Petition has no merit.

First Issue:Dismiss al Due to Procedural Defects

Assailing the CAs outright dismissal of their Petition for Review, petitioners contend thatthey have substantially complied with the procedural requirements, and that their substantiverights would be prejudiced by a strict observance of the rules.[11]

They point out that, with the exception of Patricio, four surviving heirs of Veronica Tolentinoexecuted a Special Power of Attorney giving Adelina Guerzon Barcenas, one of hereinpetitioners, the right to represent them and to act on their behalf.

As to their failure to attach the material pleadings and other pertinent records, petitionersplead excusable neglect, inadvertence and limited time, as well as the alleged intransigenceand uncooperative attitude of the lower courts personnel in furnishing them copies of thedocuments.

As to a petition for review of a decision of the RTC, the requirements as to form and content

are laid down in Section 2 of Rule 42 of the Rules of Court, which provides thus:

Sec. 2. Form and contents. - The petition shall be filed in seven (7) legible copies, with the original copy

intended for the court being indicated as such by the petitioner, and shall (a) state the full names of the

parties to the case, without impleading the lower courts or judges thereof either as petitioners or

respondents; (b) indicate the specific material dates showing that it was filed on time; (c) set forth

concisely a statement of the matters involved, the issues raised, the specification of errors of fact or law,

or both, allegedly committed by the Regional Trial Court, and the reasons or arguments relied upon for

the allowance of the appeal; (d) be accompanied by clearly legible duplicate originals or true copies of

the judgments or final orders of both lower courts, certified correct by the clerk of court of the Regional

Trial Court, the requisite number of plain copies thereof and of thepleadings and other material portions

of the recordas would support the allegations of the petition.

The petitioner shall also submit together with the petition a certification under oath that he has not

theretofore commenced any other action involving the same issues in the Supreme Court, the Court of

Appeals or different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency; if there is such other action or

proceeding, he must state the status of the same; and if he should thereafter learn that a similar action or

proceeding has been filed or is pending before the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or different

divisions thereof, of any other tribunal or agency, he undertakes to promptly inform the aforesaid courts

and other tribunal or agency thereof within five (5) days therefrom. (Italics supplied)


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Under Section 3 of the same Rule, failure to comply with the above requirements shall besufficient ground for the dismissal thereof.

Peti t ion Defect ive in Form

A review of the Petition for Review easily confirms the defects adverted to by the CA in itsassailed October 11, 2001 Resolution. In the title of the Petition, petitioners referred tothemselves merely as the Heirs of Veronica Tolentino, without stating their full names or thefact that they were represented by Adelina Guerzon Barcenas. This lapse runs counter to therequirement of Section 2(a) of Rule 42, especially because the deficiency could not have beenoffset by the equally incomplete attachments.

Petitioners do not deny that the pertinent pleadings and portions of the record in support oftheir allegations were not attached to the Petition as required by Section 2(d) of Rule 42. Theyattribute this procedural lapse to personal shortcomings, as well as to the purportedunwillingness of lower court personnel to provide the needed documents. No proof was

adduced to validate these excuses, however.Worst of all, only Adelina signed the Verification and the Certification of non-forum

shopping. She did so despite her admission that, among petitioners, she was the onlysignatory; and despite the absence of proof that she had authority to sign for the others. Loquiasv. Office of the Ombudsman[12] has categorically declared that where there are two or morepetitioners, a petition signed by only one of them is defective, unless such signatory has beenduly authorized by the co-parties to represent them and to sign the certification. For that matter,the Court notes that the Special Power of Attorney[13] in Adelinas favor was executed only onNovember 14, 2001, when the CA Resolution was appealed by certiorari to this Court. It wastherefore not intended for the subject CA Petition.

Admittedly, all the infirmities besetting the Petition before the CA affected only its form. In

appropriate cases, they have been waived to give the parties a chance to argue their causesand defenses on the merits.[14] To justify the relaxation of the rules, however, a satisfactoryexplanation and a subsequent fulfillment of the requirements have always been required.[15]

Unfortunately, petitioners have not given any reasonable justification for liberalizing therules here. As pointed out earlier, because they had not moved for a reconsideration of the CAResolution -- for which they cited no reason -- they were not able to show reasonable diligencein subsequently complying with the requirements. They must be reminded that except for themost compelling grounds,[16] procedural rules must be strictly complied with to facilitate theorderly administration of justice.[17]

Petitioners are required by the Rules of Court to provide appellate courts with certified truecopies of the judgments or final orders that are the subjects of review, as well as the material

portions of the record. The reason for such requirement is that these documents and pleadingsare needed by the reviewing courts in resolving whether to give due course to petitions. Hence,this requirement cannot be perfunctorily ignored or violated. Failure to comply with it hindersthe review of cases on the merits, deprives the appellate courts of definitive bases for theiractions, results in frustrating delays, and contributes havoc to the orderly administration of

justice.

Second Issue: Review of RTC and MTC Decisions


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At the outset, note is taken of petitioners error in appealing to this Court factual issuesrelating to the sale and the ownership of the lot in question. This common and persistentprocedural misstep, which has long plagued earlier recourse of this nature, has spelt disaster tomany a petition. Thus, for the guidance of the bench and the bar, we now discuss therequirements of appeals under Rule 45.

Section 1 of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court provides:

SECTION 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court.A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a

judgment or final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial

Court or other courts whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition forreview on certiorari. The petition shall raise only questions of law which must be distinctly set forth.

Subject of Ap peal

Section 1 of Rule 45 clearly states that the following may be appealed to the Supreme

Court through a petition for review by certiorari: 1) judgments; 2) final orders; or 3) resolutions ofthe Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or similar courts, wheneverauthorized by law. The appeal must involve only questions of law, not of fact.[18]

This Court has, time and time again, pointed out that it is not a trier of facts; and that, savefor a few exceptional instances, its function is not to analyze or weigh all over again the factualfindings of the lower courts.[19] There is a question of law when doubts or differences arise as towhat law pertains to a certain state of facts, and a question of fact when the doubt pertains tothe truth or falsity of alleged facts.[20]

Under the principle of the hierarchy of courts, decisions, final orders or resolutions of anMTC should be appealed to the RTC exercising territorial jurisdiction over the former. [21] On theother hand, RTC judgments, final orders or resolutions are appealable to the CA through either

of the following: an ordinary appeal if the case was originally decided by the RTC;[22]

or apetition for review under Rule 42, if the case was decided under the RTCs appellatejurisdiction.[23]

Nonetheless, a direct recourse to this Court can be taken for a review of the decisions, finalorders or resolutions of the RTC, but only on questions of law. Under Section 5 of Article VIII ofthe Constitution, the Supreme Court has the power to

(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari as the law or the Rules

of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:

x x x x x x x x x

(e) All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved.

This kind of direct appeal to this Court of RTC judgments, final orders or resolutions isprovided for in Section 2(c) of Rule 41, which reads:

SEC. 2. Modes of appeal.

x x x x x x x x x


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(c)Appeal by certiorari.In all cases where only questions of law are raised or involved, the appeal shallbe to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45.

Procedurally then, petitioners could have appealed the RTC Decision affirming the MTC (1)to this Court on questions of law only; or (2) if there are factual questions involved, to the CA --as they in fact did. Unfortunately for petitioners, the CA properly dismissed their petition for

review because of serious procedural defects. This action foreclosed their only availableavenue for the review of the factual findings of the RTC.[24]

No Factual Challenges toRTC Decision B efore the SC

Petitioners plea for a review by the Supreme Court of the Decisions of the RTC and theMTC is untenable. First, the questions raised are factual in nature. To reiterate, only questionsof law involved in lower court decisions may be brought directly to this Court. Second, assumingthat reversible factual errors were committed by the RTC and the MTC, these should bereviewed and corrected first by the CA, not by this Court, which -- to repeat -- does notreview factualfindings of the trial courts. For us to do otherwise is to shortcut theprocedures. Certainly, such shortcircuiting would stretch the Courts liberality way beyond thelimits of judicial discretion.

Moreover, the argument that this Court should reverse the factual findings because certainfacts or circumstances of import have allegedly been overlooked or misinterpreted by the lowercourts is unavailing. That kind of review is done only with regard to factual findings of the CA --and there are none here -- not of the RTC or the MTC.

Finally, to satisfy the incessant call of petitioners for a factual review, the Court -- despitethe foregoing invocations -- nonetheless looked over the records. It found no adequate basis fortheir claims. We shall now run through the issues.

First, the evidence did not show that petitioners had presented strong, complete, andconclusive proof[25] that the notarized Deed of Sale was false.[26] Without that sort of evidence,

the presumption of regularity, the evidentiary weight conferred upon such publicdocument[27] with respect to its execution, as well as the statements and the authenticity of thesignatures thereon,[28] stand.

Second, no evidence was presented to establish the fact that the Affidavit confirming thesale (Exhibit C) had been forged. [29] Forgery cannot be presumed.[30] Whoever alleges it mustprove it by clear and convincing evidence.[31]

Third, the sale of the undivided share of Veronica Tolentino was valid even without theconsent of the other co-owners. Both law[32] and jurisprudence[33] have categorically held thateven while an estate remains undivided, co-owners have each full ownership of their respectivealiquots or undivided shares and may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage them. [34] Here, theone-hectare portion sold to respondents was very much less than the ideal share of Tolentino

consisting of her conjugal partnership share of one half of the 14.6-hectare lot (or 7.3 hectares)plus her equal share of 1/11 (0.66 hectare) of the other half. [35]

In sum, the Court has bent over backwards and patiently given this case more thanadequate review and found absolutely no basis to reverse or modify the Decisions of the threelower courts.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Resolution AFFIRMED. Costsagainst petitioners.SO ORDERED.


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7 Daikoku v Alberto Raza G.R. No. 181688, June 5 2009

In this petition for review under Rule 45, Daikoku Electronics Phils., Inc. (Daikoku)

assails and seeks to set aside the Decision[1] dated September 26, 2007 and Resolution[2] dated

February 7, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 96282, effectively dismissingDaikokus appeal from the resolutions dated May 31, 2006 [3] and July 31, 2006,[4] respectively,

of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC CA No. 044001-05.

The Facts

In January 1999, Daikoku hired respondent Alberto J. Raza as company driver,

eventually assigning him to serve as personal driver to its president, Mamuro Ono (Ono,

hereafter). By arrangement, Alberto, at the end of each working day which usually starts earlymorning and ends late at night, parks the car at an assigned slot outside of Onos place of

residence at Pacific Plaza Condominium in Makati City.

On July 21, 2003, at around 8:00 p.m., Alberto, after being let off by Ono, took the

company vehicle to his own place also in Makati City. This incident did not go unnoticed, as Ono

asked Alberto the following morning where he parked the car the night before. In response,

Alberto said that he parked the car in the usual condominium parking area but at the wrong slot.

On July 24, 2003, Alberto received a show-cause notice why he should not be

disciplined for dishonesty. A day after, Alberto submitted his written explanation of the incident,

owning up to the lie he told Ono and apo

Evid First 10 Cases

Documents

Transcript of Evid First 10 Cases