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Landell Mills International December 2018 Evaluation of Humanitarian Logistics within EU Civil Protection and Humanitarian Action, 2013-2017 Annexes 1-29
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Landell Mills International December 2018
Evaluation of Humanitarian
Logistics within EU Civil Protection and Humanitarian
Action, 2013-2017
Annexes 1-29
Final Report - Evaluation of Humanitarian Logistics within EU
Civil Protection and Humanitarian Action, 2013-2017
Directorate-General for Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations
2018
EUROPEAN COMMISSION
Directorate-General for Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations
Directorate A – Emergency Management
Unit A3 – Disaster Risk Reduction, EU Aid Volunteers
Contact: [email protected]
European Commission
B-1049 Brussels
EUROPEAN COMMISSION
Directorate-General for Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations
2018
Evaluation of Humanitarian Logistics within EU Civil
Protection and Humanitarian Action, 2013-2017
Final Report
LEGAL NOTICE
This document has been prepared for the European Commission however it reflects the views only of the
authors, and the Commission cannot be held responsible for any use which may be made of the information
contained therein.
More information on the European Union is available on the Internet (http://www.europa.eu).
Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2019
ISBN 978-92-79-96704-7
doi: 10.2795/673639
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Reproduction is authorised provided the source is acknowledged.
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Evaluation of Humanitarian Logistics within EU Civil Protection and Humanitarian Action, 2013–17
Authors: Simon Lawry-White, George Fenton, Peter Forbes and Simon Hale with support
from Anastasia Lubkovskaya, Corey Pembleton (Universalia), Yvan Conoir (Universalia),
Diletta Carmi (Landell Mills) and Hannah Isaac (Landell Mills).
Date: December 2018
Evaluation of Humanitarian Logistics within EU Civil Protection and Humanitarian Action, 2013–17
Contents
List of acronyms v
Annexes 9
Annex 1 – Documents consulted 9
Annex 2 – List of interviewees 17
Annex 3 – Country field reports 22
Annex 4 – Efficiency case study 58
Annex 5 – Evaluation Framework 63
Annex 6 – Key informant interview questions 75
Annex 7 – Staff survey summary results 78
Annex 8 – Partner survey summary results 92
Annex 9 – Key DG ECHO documents 108
Annex 10 – Transport and logistics as key elements of preparedness and
response 110
Annex 11 – DG ECHO portfolio of investments 2013-2017 112
Annex 12 – Summary of relevant observations from DG ECHO evaluations 117
Annex 13 – Evolution of the DG ECHO logistics function 121
Annex 14 – DG ECHO co-financing to civil protection transport ex-EU 123
Annex 15 – DG ECHO investments in logistics 2006–15 under €1 million 125
Annex 16 – DG ECHO-funded stock levels in UN Humanitarian Response
Depots 127
Annex 17 – Humanitarian Procurement Centres – annual turnover 129
Annex 18 – Logistics and emergency preparedness 132
Annex 19 – Policies, guidelines and standards for humanitarian logistics 136
Annex 20 – USAID/OFDA logistics requirements 138
Evaluation of Humanitarian Logistics within EU Civil Protection and Humanitarian Action, 2013–17
Annex 21 – DG ECHO procedures for partner eligibility and suitability
assessment 140
Annex 22 – Keyword search for evidence of logistics considerations 143
Annex 23 – Analysis of logistics costs in selected DG ECHO projects 147
Annex 24 – Humanitarian logistics training and certification 153
Annex 25 – Private sector engagement in logistics 155
Annex 26 – Key Performance Indicators for humanitarian supply chains 157
Annex 27 – Report on DG ECHO-funded Humanitarian Air Services 159
Annex 28 – ECHO flight cost analysis - 2017 198
Annex 29 – Evaluation Terms of Reference 199
Evaluation of Humanitarian Logistics within EU Civil Protection and Humanitarian Action, 2013–17
List of tables
Table 9: Evaluation Framework ................................................................................ 63
Table 10: Principal recipients of DG ECHO funding (€) – UN Agencies ................. 112
Table 11: DG ECHO funding (in €) to the Red Cross Red Crescent Movement ..... 113
Table 12: NGO (all NGO family) recipients of DG ECHO funding (in €) 2013–17 receiving more than €100 million ..................................................................... 113
Table 13: DG ECHO funding (in €) to Humanitarian sectors 2013–17 ................... 114
Table 14: DG ECHO funding to the Support to Operations sector in € 2013–17, top ten countries .......................................................................................................... 114
Table 15: DG ECHO funding (in €) to the Support to Operations sector 2013–17, UN agencies and top ten NGOs ............................................................................ 115
Table 16: Value of Support to Operations projects by partner ................................ 116
Table 17: Value of DG ECHO co-financing to civil protection transport employed in humanitarian aid operations outside Europe ................................................... 123
Table 18: DG ECHO logistics projects based on the agreements for humanitarian assistance 2004–17 ........................................................................................ 126
Table 19: Projects selected for keyword search ..................................................... 143
Table 20: Fiches selected by partner Table 21: Fiches selected by beneficiary country 144
Table 22: Keyword frequency of sectors in appraisal documents ........................... 146
Table 23: Number of occurrences of keyword in fiches .......................................... 146
Table 24: Keyword frequency of sectors in appraisal documents ........................... 146
Table 25: Number of occurrences of keyword in fiches .......................................... 146
Table 26: Budget costs items grouped by cost headings ....................................... 148
Table 27: Bangladesh project sample analysis ....................................................... 150
Table 28: Selected projects from ODI cost analysis report ..................................... 150
Table 29: Sample of six major WFP projects from 2014 ......................................... 151
Table 30: DG ECHO – Contribution to humanitarian air services (by type) – € million ........................................................................................................................ 163
Table 31: DG ECHO – Overall country and humanitarian aid funding – 2017 ........ 166
Table 32: ECHO Flight routings – DR Congo 2017 ................................................ 168
Table 33: ECHO Flight routings – Kenya 2017 ....................................................... 169
Table 34: ECHO Flight routings – Mali 2017 .......................................................... 169
Table 35: ECHO Flight – aircraft chartered (DAC Aviation) – 2013–17 .................. 170
Table 36: ECHO Flight – Aircraft Utilisation 2017 .................................................. 173
Table 37: ECHO Flight – estimated ‘maximum’ passenger load factors – 2017 ..... 175
Table 38: ECHO Flight – service availability – 2017 ............................................... 176
Table 39: ECHO Flight – No of medical and security evacuation flights – 2013–17 180
Table 40: ECHO Flight costs – 2017 ...................................................................... 182
Table 41: ECHO Flight v UNHAS – Operating cost per pax-cargo (equiv) – 2017 . 182
Table 42: Evaluation assessment against the Evaluation Framework for air transport ........................................................................................................................ 194
List of figures Figure 10: Sandcone Model for value for money in humanitarian logistics ............. 158
Figure 11: DG ECHO – Overall country and humanitarian aid funding – 2017 ....... 167
Figure 12: ECHO Flight – annual passengers (ticketed basis) (2013–17) .............. 172
Figure 13: ECHO Flight – Annual cargo tonnes (ticketed basis) (2013–17) ........... 172
Figure 14: ECHO Flight – Annual Flight Hours Flown (2013–17) ........................... 173
Evaluation of Humanitarian Logistics within EU Civil Protection and Humanitarian Action, 2013–17
List of acronyms ACAS Airborne Collision Avoidance System
ACF Action Against Hunger/Action Contre la Faim
AOC Air Operators Certificate
ASF Aviations Sans Frontières
CAA Civil Aviation Authority
CADRI Capacity for Disaster Reduction Initiative
CaLP Cash Learning Partnership
CAR Central African Republic
CBP Cash Based Programming
CBT Cash Based Transfer
CDD Civil Defence Directorate
CDEMA Caribbean Disaster Emergency Management Agency
CECIS Common Emergency Communication and Information System
CEHA Comprehensive Evaluation of EU Humanitarian Aid, 2012–2016
CHL Certificate in Humanitarian Logistics
CHMP Centrale Humanitaire Medico-Pharmaceutique
CHS Core Humanitarian Standards
CP Civil Protection
CRRF Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework
CTP Cash Transfer Programme
DAC Development Assistance Committee
DEMA Danish Emergency Management Agency
DEVCO Development and Cooperation – Europe Aid
DFID UK Department for International Development
DG Directorate-General
DG ECHO Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations
DO Desk Officer
DP Disaster Preparedness
DRC Democratic Republic of Congo
DRC Danish Refugee Council
DRR Disaster Risk Reduction
EC European Commission
EDF European Development Fund
EF ECHO Flight
EQ Evaluation Question
ERC Enhanced Response Capacity
ERCC Emergency Response Coordination Centre
Evaluation of Humanitarian Logistics within EU Civil Protection and Humanitarian Action, 2013–17
ESUPS Emergency Supplies Prepositioning Strategies
EU European Union
EUD EU Delegation
EVA ECHO Visual Analytics
FAFA Financial and Administrative Framework Agreement
FAO Food and Agriculture Organization
FFP Food For Peace Programme (USAID)
FichOp Fiche Opérationnelle (DG ECHO tool for aid projects follow-up)
FPA Framework Partnership Agreement
GARD Get Airports Ready for Disaster
GLC Global Logistics Cluster
HA Humanitarian Aid
HIP DG ECHO Humanitarian Implementation Plan
HPC Humanitarian Procurement Centre
HPPP humanitarian private sector partnerships platform
HRD Humanitarian Response Depot
HQ Headquarters
IAF Integrated Assessment Framework
IASC Inter-Agency Standing Committee
ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross
ICT Information and Communications Technology
IDRL International Disaster Response Law
IFRC / FICR International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
IHP International Humanitarian Partnership
IMPACCT Importation and Customs Clearance Together
INGO International Non-Governmental Organisation
IOM International Organization for Migration
IP Implementing Partners
IRC International Rescue Committee
ISG Inter-service Steering Group
K&N Kuehne and Nagel
KEMSA Kenya Medical Supplies Agency
KII Key Informant Interview
KPI Key Performance Indicator
LAC Latin America and the Caribbean
LC Logistics Cluster
LET Logistics Emergency Team
LOG Logistics Operational Guide (Global Logistics Cluster)
LRT Logistics Response Training
Evaluation of Humanitarian Logistics within EU Civil Protection and Humanitarian Action, 2013–17
LWG Logistics Working Group
MAF Mission Aviation Fellowship
MAM Moderate Acute Malnutrition
MICIC Migration Intervention in Countries In Crisis
MS Member States
MSB Myndigheten För Samhällsskydd och Beredskap/Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency
MSF Médecins sans Frontières
NEAR Neighbourhood and Enlargement Region
NFI Non-Food Items
NGO Non-Governmental Organisation
NOHA Network on Humanitarian Action
NRC Norwegian Refugee Council
ODI Overseas Development Institute
OECD DAC Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, Development Assistance Committee
OFDA (USAID) Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance
PA Programme Assistant
PARCEL Partners for Enhanced Response Capacity in Logistics
PRM US State Department, Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration
PS Participating States
RCRC Red Cross Red Crescent Movement
REDLAC Risk Emergency Disaster Working Group for Latin America and the Caribbean
RO Regional Office (DG ECHO)
SAG Strategic Advisory Group (cluster)
SCI Save the Children International
SF Single Form (DG ECHO)
SIPRI Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
STC Save the Children
TA Technical Assistant
THW Germany Federal Agency for Technical Relief
ToR Terms of Reference
UAE United Arab Emirates
UCPM Union Civil Protection Mechanism
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNDSS United Nations Department for Safety and Security
UNFPA United Nations Population Fund
UNHAS United Nations Humanitarian Air Service
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNHRD UN Humanitarian Response Depot
Evaluation of Humanitarian Logistics within EU Civil Protection and Humanitarian Action, 2013–17
UNICEF United Nations Children's Fund
UNISDR United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction
UNJLC United Nations Joint Logistics Centre
UNOCHA United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
UNOPS United Nations Office for Project Services
USA United States of America
USAID United States Agency for International Development
VfM Value for Money
WASH Water, Sanitation and Hygiene
WCO World Customs Organisation
WFP World Food Programme
WHS World Humanitarian Summit
WHO World Health Organization
Evaluation of Humanitarian Logistics within EU Civil Protection and Humanitarian Action, 2013–17
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Annexes
Annex 1 – Documents consulted
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ADE. Study on Approaches to Assess Cost-Effectiveness of DG ECHO’s Humanitarian Aid Actions.
Anjomshoae, A., Hassan, A., Kunz, N., Yew Wong, K. and Sander de Leeuw. Toward a dynamic balanced
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Annual Fleet Forum Conference 2017, Conference Highlights.
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Department for International Development (DFID). Humanitarian Response Funding Guidelines for NGOs. 2015
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Annex 2 – List of interviewees
(Names removed at DG ECHO request as the individual interviewees were not asked to give
permission for their names to be given in the report)
DG ECHO HQ
Deputy Director, Emergency Response Coordination Centre (ERCC), A1
Deputy Head of Unit, A3
Deputy Team Leader ERCC and Emergency Coordinator, A1
Deputy Head of Unit, East and Southern Africa, Great Lakes, C3
Deputy Head of Unit, Middle East, B4
Deputy Head of Unit, Policy Development and Regional Strategy 1, B1
Deputy Head of Unit, Policy Development and Regional Strategy II, C1
Desk officer, Central and South America Desk, C4
Director, Directorate A, for Emergency Management
Evaluation Manager, A3
Evaluation Sector Head, A3
Food assistance expert, C1
Formerly dealing w/ efficiency & effectiveness of operations, C3
Head of Sector, ERCC, A1
Head of Unit, A2
Head of Unit, East and Southern Africa, Great Lakes, C3
Head of Unit, ERCC, A1
Head of Unit, Field Network, D4
Head of Unit, Middle East, B4
Head of Unit, Policy Coordination, International and Multi-lateral Relations, Legal Affairs, D1
Head of Unit, Policy Development and Regional Strategy II, C1
HOPE expert, D5
Humanitarian Civil-Military Relations Officer, D1
International Aid Officer, Afghanistan Desk, B4
Legal Affairs Officer, D1
Legal Officer, D1
Logistics Desk, C4
Policy Officer, Policy Development and Regional Strategy II, C1
Team Leader, ERCC, A1
Team leader for Southern Africa, C3
Team Leader, Transport and Logistics, ERCC, A1
Agency HQ, others
ACAPS, Director
Agility Logistics (LET), Director, Corporate Social Responsibility
Atlas Logistique, Technical Coordinator, Humanity & Inclusion
Avenir Analytics, General Manager, (LET programme coordinator)
British Red Cross, Head of Logistics Humanity & Inclusion, Atlas Logistique Director
Committee for Humanitarian Response, Director, Steering
Danish emergency management agency, Chairman IHP
Fritz Institute, Chief Logistics Officer
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German Federal Agency for Technical Relief (THW), Head of Logistics Division,
Global Logistics Cluster, Coordinator IFRC, Director of Logistics, Procurement Department
Global Logistics Cluster, Deputy Coordinator
IFRC, Senior Global Advisor for Compliance
ICRC, Head of Air Operations Unit
ICRC, Head of Logistics Division
ICRC, Deputy Head of Logistics Division
IFRC, Global Coordinator, IDRL
IFRC, Senior Officer, Partnerships and Resource Development (a)
IFRC, Senior Officer, Partnerships and Resource Development (b)
IFRC, Manager, Emergency Operations Centre
Independent, Former DG ECHO Director-General
OCHA, Head, Emergency Response Support Services
OCHA, Response Partnerships Adviser
Oxfam Intl., Head of Humanitarian Supply Operations
Oxfam GB, Head of Supply
UNDP, Co-chair, IASC Reference group, Risk, Early warning, preparedness
UNHCR (Grand Bargain), Head of Section, Humanitarian Financing and Field Support
UNHCR, Head of Shelter
UNHCR, Supply Chain Director
UNHRD, Network Coordinator
UNOCHA, Response Services Section (IHP Secretariat) WFP, Chief, Logistics
UNOPS, Head of Partnerships Development
WFP, Chief of Aviation
WFP, Deputy Chief, Aviation
WFP, Deputy Director, Supply Chain
WFP, Supply Chain Director
Nairobi
CARE-Kenya, Country Director
CARE International (Kenya), Director Humanitarian Assistance and Resilience
CHMP Kenya (HPC), Sales Operations
DAC Aviation, Program Manager Kenya
DAC Aviation, Director of Programmes
Danish Refugee Council, position unknown (a)
Danish Refugee Council,, position unknown (b)
Danish Refugee Council, Senior Advisor
Danish Refugee Council, Head of programmes, position unknown
DFID Kenya, Team Leader
DG DEVCO (Nairobi), EU Flight Manager
DG ECHO Kenya, TA Kenya (focal point regional refugee crisis)
DG ECHO Regional, Head of Regional Office (Eastern & Southern Africa)
DG ECHO Regional, Logistics Coordinator (South, Central, East Africa and Indian Ocean)
DG ECHO Regional, Programme Officer (Southern Africa and Indian Ocean)
DG ECHO Regional, TA Regional Food Assistance
DG ECHO Somalia, Head of Office
DG ECHO South Sudan, Head of Office
DG ECHO, TA Aviation & Logistic Coordinator
International Rescue Committee, Finance Manager
International Rescue Committee, position unknown (a)
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International Rescue Committee, position unknown (b)
IOM, CCCM Program Manager, Somalia
Lutheran World Federation (LWF), position unknown (a)
Lutheran World Federation (LWF), position unknown (b)
LORI (Truck optimisation), Director
OXFAM GB, Operations Director
OXFAM GB, Logistics Advisor
Relief Reconstruction and Development Organisation, position unknown
Save the Children Somalia, Humanitarian Director Somalia/Somaliland
UNHCR Regional, Head of Regional Service Centre (RSC)
UNHCR Regional, Senior Regional Nutrition and Food Security Officer
UNHCR Regional, Senior Regional Site planner
UNHCR Regional, Senior Regional Supply Officer
UNICEF Kenya, Emergency programme manager
UNICEF Kenya, Supply officer
UNOCHA Regional, Head of Office
USAID Regional, Food for Peace, Commodity Mgt Specialist
USAID Somalia, Food for Peace
HANDICAP INTERNATIONAL, Finance and Logs coordinator
World Vision, ICT Technical Specialist
WFP Somalia, Head of Logistics & Logistics Cluster Coordinator
WFP Regional, Deputy Regional Director
WFP Aviation, Air Transport Officer (UNHAS Somalia & Kenya)
WFP Aviation, Chief Air Transport Officer (UNHAS Somalia & Kenya)
WFP Regional, Senior Logistics Officer
Zipline (Drone-based medical supply chain), Director
Panama
DG ECHO Managua, Head of Regional Office, Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC)
IFRC Regional Office for the Americas, Head of the regional Unit for Logistics, Procurement and
Supply chain
IFRC Regional Office for the Americas, Logistics Manager
IOM, Regional Emergency & Post-Crisis Advisor for the Americas – Panama Administrative
Centre
OCHA, Humanitarian Affairs Officer
OCHA, Regional Disaster Response Adviser,
Save the Children, Regional Supply Chain Manager
UNICEF Latin America and Caribbean Regional Office, Contract Specialist
UNICEF Latin America and Caribbean Regional Office, Regional emergency and DRR Specialist
WFP, UNHRD Panama Manager
WFP, Logistics Officer
WFP, Logistics Officer, UNHRD
WFP, Programme Officer (b)
WFP, Programme Officer (a)
WFP, Regional Partnership Officer
WFP, Regional Procurement Officer
Haiti
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ACF, Country Director
ACTED, Country Director
Atlas Logistics, Director of Atlas Logistics within HI
CESVI, Project Manager
COOPI, Field coordinator
COOPI, Head of logistics
DG ECHO Haiti, Head of Office (newly appointed)
DG ECHO Haiti, Programme Assistant
DG ECHO Haiti, Technical Assistant DG ECHO PaP
DG ECHO Managua, Regional Coordinator for Security and Logistics
DG ECHO, Resilience and Rapid Response Coordinator for Latin America and the Caribbean
EUD Haiti, Attaché de Coopération, Section Infrastructure
EUD Haiti, Chargé de programmes
EUD Haiti, Team Leader – Urban Development and Infrastructure
Handicap International, Programme Director
IOM Haiti, Chief of Mission
IOM Haiti, Head of Operations/Deputy Chief of Mission
OCHA Haiti, Head of Office
Save the Children Haiti, Country Director interim
Solidarites International, Desk Headquarters
Solidarites International, Director
WFP, Coordinateur des projets d'appui au secteur semencier et à la Sélection variétale
WFP, Head of Supply Chain
Jordan
Danish Refugee Council, Regional Supply Chain Manager
DG ECHO, Head of Regional Office
DG ECHO, PA Jordan
DG ECHO, Regional TA Health
DG ECHO, Regional TA Logistics
DG ECHO, TA Yemen
DG ECHO, TA Jordan
EUD Iraq/Yemen, DEVCO Head of Cooperation
EUD Jordan, DEVCO Head of Cooperation
ICRC, Deputy Head of Delegation
ICRC, Head of Logistic Support Centre
IMC, DCD Operations
IMC, Logistics Coordinator
IMC, Regional Logistics Coordinator
INTERSOS, Country director
NRC, Head of Support
Save the Children, Associate Program Director
Save the Children, Finance Director
Save the Children, Logistics Director
UNHCR, Head of Programme/ Supply
UNICEF, Deputy Representative
UNICEF, Supply and Logistics Manager
USAID/FFP, Food for Peace Officer
USAID/OFDA, Team Leader, DART team WFP, Head of supply chain
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Bangladesh
Atlas/Humanity and Inclusion, Area Manager – Cox's Bazar
Atlas Logistics/Humanity and Inclusion, role unknown
Danish Refugee Council, Head of Logistics and Procurement
DFID, Humanitarian Advisor
DG ECHO, Humanitarian Expert East and SE Asia, Pacific
DG ECHO, Surge Response Expert
IOM, Emergency Coordinator
Ministry of Disaster Management and Relief, Additional Secretary
MSF Holland, Emergency Programme Coordinator
Save the Children, Deputy T&L Operations
Save the Children, Head of Supply Chain
UNDP, Consultant – DRR and Recovery
UNHCR, Assist Field Officer (Distribution)
UNHCR, Senior Supply Officer
UNICEF, Chief of Supply and Logistics USAID, Project Design Team Leader
USAID/OFDA, Senior Adviser, Food Security
WFP, Logistics Sector Coordinator
WHO, Lead in Operation and Logistic Support
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Annex 3 – Country field reports
Summary observations from field visits
Four field visits (including one with a sub-regional focus) were carried out to Bangladesh, Haiti
and Panama, Jordan, and Kenya (for a focus on Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia and South Sudan).
The intention of the four field visits was to assess:
• How partners perceive DG ECHO as a donor to humanitarian logistics (both direct investments and funding to partner projects) and other strategic areas where DG ECHO might contribute.
• The challenges to effective and efficient humanitarian logistics in the emergency context.
• To what extent to which parties have an overview of the logistics environment and supplier market place and make use of their analysis strategically.
• How well logistics is coordinated (among donors, among agencies, with government).
• Examples of good practice in humanitarian logistics worthy of wider promotion.
• The contribution and performance of DG ECHO-funded humanitarian air services (East Africa only).
This first section of this Annex summarises the key observations from these visits, grouping them
into the topic headings used in the standard interview questions used with key informants (this
section does not cover humanitarian air services, discussed in Section 6 of the main report
above).
Context
• Very different logistics solutions are needed for different emergency contexts, for example Bangladesh versus South Sudan. DG ECHO and its partners have to adapt accordingly.
• Even the better developed national emergency management systems can be overwhelmed by a major natural disaster or mass population movement, so standby humanitarian logistics capacity of international partners is still needed where there is a risk of Level III emergencies in relatively high capacity countries.
• In all countries visited, agencies were experiencing funding shortages. Whether these disproportionately affect funding to logistics is not known.
• In all countries visited, NGOs reported that they have various supply chain management initiatives underway, including global supply chain studies, value for money (VfM) studies, development of key performance indicators (KPIs), and Enterprise Risk Planning initiatives to improve data management and provide donors with the information they demand (although DG ECHO data demands are very light).
Role of DG ECHO
Positive views from partners include:
• DG ECHO is seen as a significant and engaged donor. Relationships with partners are often good and conducted in a spirit of partnership.
• DG ECHO is an effective advocate in coordination meetings.
• DG ECHO asks lots of questions of partners, usually constructively (but seldom about logistics).
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• DG ECHO sometimes allows partners to start spending before the contract award, which other donors do not allow.
• DG ECHO is good at connecting different agencies together.
• DG ECHO works to achieve a balanced portfolio that works as a whole and pushes agencies to cover gaps where the most vulnerable are underserved.
• DG ECHO challenges agencies to prepare for potential disasters and funds some agencies to include rapid response mechanisms in their proposals.
• DG ECHO sometimes challenges partners on project costs (especially direct versus support costs) and may look for a more cost-effective partner where value for money is seen to be a concern.
• In some cases, DG ECHO is promoting the humanitarian-development nexus.
• DG ECHO may encourage multiple partners to provide integrated services at the point of delivery (but has not generally promoted shared logistics systems).
Less positive
• Some partners reported that DG ECHO does not fund partners’ preparedness and resilience yet presses them to move their programmes in that direction.
• Because of funding shortages, DG ECHO exerts downward pressures on budgets (whether this encourages better or worse value for money in logistics is not known).
• Some partners consider that DG ECHO capacity in logistics is too low, which can mean that staff do not understand the implementation challenges partners face and may record that these simply as ‘implementation delays’ without meaningful engagement on how challenges can be tackled.
• DG ECHO is relatively slow and inflexible in allowing partners to make changes to projects. While DG ECHO generally has a good understanding of the context, it is slow to approve changes as the operating context changes (partly because most decisions have to be referred back to HQ).1
• Like most donors, DG ECHO funding is too short-term, sometimes just a few months at a time, which is highly inefficient and can cause interruptions in the response. It prevents long-term planning, challenges project continuity, makes it hard to retain qualified staff, leads to delays and rushing to spend funds quickly, which itself leads to inefficiency. DG ECHO insists on short-term achievement of objectives: ‘DG ECHO funds but it does not invest’.
Box 4: How DG ECHO influences efficiency, other than in humanitarian logistics
Our limited field visits indicate that DG ECHO does add value by taking a principled approach in trying to
ensure that the most vulnerable, neglected populations receive humanitarian assistance and that geographic
and sectoral coverage is achieved, as far as possible, by the range of DG ECHO partners active in the
response. The Bangladesh Efficiency case study concluded that DG ECHO is active and sometimes effective
in influencing partners and authorities to improve efficiency and effectiveness in areas that impact on logistics
indirectly. Examples included:
• Utilisation of partner staff time: DG ECHO uses its influence with government to press for humanitarian visas and partner travel authorisations, both of which are major efficiency issues for partners.
• Preparedness: At the time of the visit, the DG ECHO country office was in dialogue HQ about the use of Member State Civil Protection assets for preparedness in anticipation of a major (Category 5) cyclone.
• Shared services: DG ECHO funds the joint IOM-WFP-UNHCR Site Maintenance Engineering Project programme for infrastructure maintenance (road and culvert) in the Rohingya camps. This helps deliveries to keep moving within the camp.
1 All financial decisions over €2,500 are referred to Brussels.
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• Partner coordination and beneficiary time saving: DG ECHO has asked partners to coordinate their services, so that refugees can access multiple services in multi-function centres, thus saving refugees considerable time in walking between otherwise separate centres.
• Cash versus commodities: Where a partner persists with commodity distribution, DG ECHO quantifies the potential savings to be made in moving from commodities to cash, makes a market and protection assessment, and challenges the partner to move to cash. DG ECHO supports Oxfam as a champion for cash.
• Gaps in coverage: DG ECHO has challenged WFP to improve its coverage, both of the mega-camp (Kutupalong) and the smaller southern camps, by mapping WFP distribution points and correlating them with population maps, demonstrating where caseloads are underserved.
• Addressing service gaps: DG ECHO noted that only 13% of moderate acute malnutrition cases are being treated and is pressing UNICEF for a scale-up plan.
• Inappropriate aid: DG ECHO observes that WFP dried food is partially wasted or sold. DG ECHO then funds other partners to run household trials and subsequently scale up fresh food vouchers, thereby increasing the efficiency of the utilisation of food overall.
DG ECHO approach to partner logistics
• DG ECHO scrutinises partner logistics in the following types of projects:
> Logistics capacity provided though projects under the sub-sector ‘Support to Operations’, especially WFP, IOM, Atlas Logistique and others provision of common services;
> Procurement of drugs, specialised health equipment, and health clinics;
> Projects with security considerations.2
• All donors exercise lighter scrutiny of UN operations compared with NGOs.
• Scrutiny of costs to determine whether they are ‘reasonable’ is not backed by any recorded analysis (sometimes reference is made to unit costs; otherwise benchmarks are not used).
• While DG ECHO is not scrutinising projects for logistics planning and capacity, DG ECHO does examine alignment to DG ECHO strategy (especially the HIP), technical sector standards; financial value (in general terms in relation to results), and coverage of sector needs.
• The current project assessment processes are said to be intense, covering processes to publish and explain the Humanitarian Implementation Plan to partners, to receive and assess proposals, to complete dashboards and discuss comments between country, region and HQ, and to go back to partners for revisions (sometimes several times). This means there would be little time to spend on logistics considerations, even if they were deemed important.
Strategic overview of humanitarian logistics
• Neither DG ECHO nor any other actor maintains a strategic overview of the humanitarian logistics, meaning:
1 Mapping the assets and capacity of governments, humanitarian actors, local civil society organisations (CSOs) and the private sector;
2 Understanding the challenges to effective logistics including the country or regional supply chains needed to meet the needs of an actual or potential emergency;
3 Understanding the challenges to address customs regulations that often impede the rapid importation of relief items to a disaster-affected country;3
2 In countries where ECHO Flight operates, security assessments are made by the security officers of the EU Delegation. (UN Department of Safety and Security makes security assessments separately for UN Humanitarian Air Services). 3 There is very limited interaction with the World Customs Organisation (WCO), UN Trade Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), OCHA and IFRC (regarding the coordination of humanitarian relief stockpiles and International Disaster Response Law).
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4 Generating an action plan jointly agreed by donors and humanitarian actors, including DG ECHO partners, to address the challenges identified.
• No actor or forum has been given, or has adopted, this function. Some assume that this is the job of the Logistics Cluster, but this is outside the cluster mandate and the reach of WFP. The logistics cluster Logistics Capacity Assessments cover point 1 and some of 2, but not 3 and not, most importantly, 4 – Joint action. The cluster does provide assessment and information functions that would support a strategic logistics function, should DG ECHO or another actor decide to promote or enable this function.
• Several key stakeholders agreed that a strategic logistics function is needed and that it should be provided by an independent entity. Divided loyalties mean that clusters can end up in competition with their ‘own’ Cluster (in-country visits, the evaluation team heard no complaints about WFP bias in their role as Logistics Cluster Lead Agency).
• OCHA and/or the Resident/Humanitarian Coordinator might be the best location for a strategic logistics coordination role.
Logistics costs
• Partners typically estimated their logistics costs at 30–35% total costs, with some as low as 10% and others up to 60%.
• DG ECHO no longer demands the budget detail necessary to understand partner logistics costs. Some TAs see this as a good thing (streamlining processes), others see it as a gap (failure to ensure financial accountability).
Logistics challenges
Key logistic challenges common to the countries visited include:
• Access. Access challenges are security related (banditry, non-state actors exacting fees at road blocks) and physical (poor roads, congested ports and airports, unsafe locations for beneficiaries, e.g. landslides).
• Bureaucracy. Customs bureaucracy was identified as a key challenge in all countries visited.4 Humanitarian cargo may take months to clear. Some authorities do not conform to international customs standards and agreements. Partners want DG ECHO to exert more political leverage on international disaster response law to tackle chronic challenges with customs formalities/bureaucracy.
• Permission to operate. NGOs may have difficulty gaining permission to operate or in obtaining visas for humanitarian workers. UN organisations may be used by DG ECHO as funding intermediaries because they are subject to fewer restrictions, even if ideally the NGO implementing partner would have been funded directly by DG ECHO.
• Taxes. Many countries do not offer tax exemption to humanitarian goods, e.g. Turkey levies 20–30% and Iraq 15–20%. Again, partners want DG ECHO to lobby governments on behalf of its partners.
• Supplier reliability. Partners report that sometimes their orders are not delivered, and suppliers may insert substandard items into big consignments.
• Impact of a major emergency on logistics. Even where logistics capacity is generally good and suppliers are many (e.g. Jordan), if the market is over-extended by a major emergency, some suppliers will not cope: ‘We can get range, but not depth’. An emergency may lead to logjams in customs, ports and airports.
• Use of military assets. The evaluation team heard examples of military assets and personnel being deployed for humanitarian response. This can present challenges for
4 OCHA cited the challenges in dealing with national customs authorities as being more due to a lack of understanding of customs formalities on the part of most aid organisations (and donors) as well as limited procedures within customs authorities to enable the correct implementation of regulations.
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humanitarians who, for various reasons, may not wish to be associated with them (although mentioned in the evaluation ToR, civil-military coordination and challenges with the use of military assets, including for civil protection, featured less than expected in the country visits).
• Medicines. One of few areas of logistics to which DG ECHO pays careful attention is the procurement of drugs. Increasingly, countries are limiting the importation of drugs, which presents a challenge to quality assurance for medicines, especially where there is no Humanitarian Procurement Centre (HPC). MSF and ICRC have the required expertise, including logisticians and the pharmacists (and UNICEF for vaccines) but others are not set up to assess drug quality. DG ECHO does not have the capacity to provide proper oversight of this process.
• Corruption. Various forms of corruption were mentioned: suppliers forming cartels or otherwise colluding to keep prices high, falsification of needs assessments, or bribes being demanded at road check points.
Human resources for humanitarian logistics
In all countries visited, human resource constraints were highlighted.
• Lack of logistics experts. DG ECHO does not have enough logistics expertise to interact meaningfully on logistics with partners, though in general it does sometimes challenge its partners on their delivery capacity, which often concerns logistics. In the absence of a DG ECHO logistics policy, the space given to DG ECHO logistics staff for greater engagement in the design of partner projects currently depends on the choice of the Head of Office locally and the Desk at HQ. Most of their effort goes into supporting DG ECHO offices rather than partner projects. Some logisticians, and some other staff, consider the lack of local knowledge within DG ECHO on logistics and supply chain matters a potential risk to ensuring value for money, effectiveness and efficiency. The first DG ECHO expatriate regional logistics coordinator position was recruited in 2007, with a further three positions added in 2011/2012, and a fourth in 2014. (One of these positions was abolished in 2016.)
• Partner logistics capacity. The lack of logistics expertise in some partners was mentioned by DG ECHO and by some partners. Partners were concerned about the challenge of hiring sufficiently skilled logisticians and the difficulty in retaining them with the short-term funding they receive from DG ECHO, which prevents them from issuing longer-term contracts the more experienced staff expect.
• Two-tier system. DG ECHO staff noted that there tends to be a ‘two-tier system’ of humanitarian agencies, with those that take logistics to be a core part of their business, which make logistics a high priority and hire logisticians at a senior programme manager level, while others regard logistics just as a support function and hire less experienced staff with a finance and admin background rather than logistics.
Logistics coordination
• Logistics clusters. The key coordination structure of interest to this evaluation is the Global Logistics Cluster (GLC) and country logistics clusters. Overall, informants recognised the importance of the logistic cluster and appreciated the coordination and other support services it provides, including the common services it provides in some countries. The cluster routinely provides information in its website logscluster.org, which is well used. It also provides Logistics Capacity Assessments (carried out by WFP).
• Informal clusters. Haiti and Bangladesh do not have a formally declared Logistics Cluster (or other clusters). However, in both cases, WFP dispatched a logistics team because logistics coordination is still required (in Bangladesh, the local logistics sector was seen to be performing well, while in Haiti it was seen by DG ECHO to be ineffective). The lack of coordination, information and services functions typically provided by the logistics cluster is felt as an absence where no substitute structure is put in place, for example in Jordan, which
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has no cluster or any other form of humanitarian logistics coordination (an NGO tried unsuccessfully to start one).
• Alternative mechanisms. There is a wide variety of logistics coordination mechanisms in use. For example, REDLAC (the Risk Emergency Disaster Working Group for Latin America and the Caribbean) has a logistics working group that is activated on an ad hoc basis. This type of coordination arrangement does not feature in any IASC guidance and there is an increasing need to fit within the varied coordination mechanisms led by governments.
• NGO joint logistics. While NGOs value logistics coordination meetings for information exchange and planning purposes, in-field four visits evaluation team found no instances of their coordinating purchasing, warehousing, delivery or combined use of assets, nor were other cases reported via the surveys. DG ECHO likes NGOs to work in consortia but ‘even then, there is not much supply chain coordination, everyone is doing their own thing’. NGOs tend to resist sharing information: ‘No one wants to show they got the wrong prices.’
• High-level donor coordination. USAID and DFID reported good coordination between donors at a ‘whole of crisis’ level, including in supporting and influencing the relevant governments. The evaluation team found no instances of donor coordination concerning logistics challenges, apart from reports of a joint DG ECHO-USAID approach to logistics in South Sudan. DFID and USAID deploy logistics advisors where the situation demands, e.g. Syria and Iraq.
Logistics common services
• UN Humanitarian Response Depots remain relevant and have maintained demand for their services. Some agencies do not use UNHRD (e.g. UNICEF). While the UN and IFRC regional depots still have a role, there is also a strong desire for more localised prepositioning of relief supplies.
• HPCs are well used, where they are available. They are audited by DG ECHO as part of a regular process. In some countries, DG ECHO requires partners to use to relevant HPC to assure quality, but if a partner can guarantee quality in another way, they are not obliged to use an HPC. They may choose to use an HPC because it is easier or less bureaucratic but not necessarily cheaper than the DG ECHO procurement system.5 If an agency does not use an HPC then DG ECHO procurement process has to be followed.
• In South Sudan, common pipelines generally work well. The management of common pipelines (cash, food, nutrition, NFIs) could be more strongly supported by donors (the South Sudan logistics cluster is regarded as unique, having its own fleet of trucks and aircraft that are separate).
• In some countries, UN agencies have organised joint procurement of services such as security, car rental, protocol, fuel, IT, mobile networks etc. These may have knock-on efficiency benefits for humanitarian programmes.
• While it is understood that more joint contracting of services could bring efficiency savings, NGOs value their independence and do not necessarily want to be corralled into one collective effort. ‘Complete standardisation may not be possible or desirable.’ DG ECHO itself seems to favour having more than one delivery channel for any one sector. In two field visits, the evaluators found that Atlas Logistique is providing common logistics services for NGOs.
Civil protection (CP)
• While CP deployments for humanitarian aid have been few, Heads of Offices/TAs are aware of the growing importance given to the UCPM in DG ECHO HQ. The potential of CP is recognised but there are challenges:
> The CP mechanism is not understood by all field staff.
5 In Kenya, a NGOs said they could save 20%- 30% of costs if procurement was not conducted through an HPC (not verified).
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> Cases of Members States (MS) not responding to requests were mentioned and there is concern that it takes too long for Emergency Response Coordination Centre (ERCC) and the MS discussions to decide whether to respond to a request.
> MS tend to seek bilateral arrangements with affected country governments through political channels that bypass the ERCC. The Dutch naval ships6 deployed to support the response to hurricane Matthew in Haiti (2016) were a case in point.
Cash based programming
• Cash based programming is growing in (almost) all emergency contexts.
• Cash may now represent 40% or more of DG ECHO country budgets.
• Almost all humanitarian agencies are investing heavily in cash, and cash programming is advancing through various partnerships and consortia.
• Cash programming reduces the need for humanitarian organisations to have their own logistics capacity, which is instead taken care of by private sector logistics companies. However, there are sometimes challenges with poor quality from service providers.
• Cash based transfers (CBT) tends to force organisations to work together closely so as to ensure coherence between programmes.
• CBTs are seen to have a very positive impact, when well designed, but are not a panacea. In-kind assistance and logistics support for supply management and distribution is still needed in the immediate aftermath of a disaster and in situations where the support infrastructure does not function well enough (e.g. availability of goods, mobile banking, phone networks, road networks).
• Governments may block the use of cash transfers to beneficiaries.
• In Jordan, WFP now has no pure logistics projects because of its focus on cash transfers. It is instead focused on retail management, with half a million people redeeming assistance against debit cards recharged each month and via ATMs, while accessing a network of 200 shops with 52 retailers. In Jordan, WFP is the only agency working outside the Cash Consortium.
• Cash coordination can be contentious (between WFP and UNHCR specifically).
Private sector engagement in logistics
• The Logistics Emergency Team (LET) was mentioned in 3 out of 4 country visits (not Jordan).
• DHL and FedEx are involved in air and water transport in Panama; Walmart is working with IFRC national societies in the Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) region; Kuehne Foundation is involved with logistics trainings. In Peru and Colombia, OCHA works with the private sector on preparedness, mitigation and response.
• Banks and other financial institutions are involved as service providers for cash based programming in all regions.
• Following the WHS ‘connecting business’ initiative, the humanitarian private sector partnerships platform (HPPP) was initiated with partner NGOs, UNOCHA and several companies in Kenya and Uganda (progress of the HPPP at field level seems limited).
• It was suggested that greater use could be made of Fourth Sector7 logistics suppliers to help design supply chains.
6 The Caribbean-stationed offshore patrol vessel HNLMS Holland and logistic support vessel HNLMS Pelikaan were sent to Haiti in wake of the hurricane Mathew. https://navaltoday.com/2016/10/11/dutch-navy-sends-ships-to-haiti-for-relief/ 7 Fourth sector: organisations that combine market-based approaches of the private sector with the social and environmental aims of the public and non-profit sectors.
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Preparedness, the Grand Bargain and the ‘Nexus’
• We found various points of action at the humanitarian-development nexus, including DG ECHO-DEVCO cooperation:
> A joint DG ECHO-DEVCO post-Matthew strategy for Haiti8 that committed €30m from the EDF for food assistance, livelihoods, education, shelter, WASH and infrastructure improvements (Haiti is also a pilot country for the humanitarian- development nexus collaboration between DG ECHO and DEVCO).
> The EU Delegation/DEVCO in Haiti has supported Caribbean Disaster Emergency Management Agency (CDEMA) through UNISDR, while DG ECHO funds capacity development through WFP.
> In Jordan, DG NEAR is working with the government on a chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear disaster preparedness project, for which the partner is the CDD. It is also working with the CDD on a twinning programme for civil defence with French Civpol.9
> For social protection in Yemen, DG NEAR/DG ECHO agreed that DG ECHO would provide funding for three months in support of a limited form of the social protection and DG NEAR would provide funding for another 12 months.
> DG ECHO is funding capacity development in the Bangladesh Ministry of Disaster Management.
> The Joint Humanitarian Development Framework has been applied in some countries.
• While noting these positive examples, the evaluators did not find a strong connection between DG ECHO and DG DEVCO in terms of planning humanitarian-development initiatives. Several agencies noted the need to encourage more synergy between DG DEVCO and DG ECHO.
• An obvious area for DG ECHO/DEVCO cooperation would be to develop the national capacity to respond to emergencies, including logistics capacity. This does not feature in e.g. the Jordan DG ECHO/DEVCO Joint Humanitarian and Development Framework.
• DG ECHO supports CADRI10 at HQ level (CADRI being in effect a ‘nexus’ initiative) but it is not clear that DG ECHO at country level is fully involved in CADRI.
• Implementation of the Grand Bargain at country level is proceeding slowly, in particular for localisation, multi-year funding and simplified reporting. Donors and implementing agencies seem to be waiting for the other ‘side’ to make good on their side of the bargain.
8 Devco.g.1.dir (2016)7118758. 9 The consulting and service company of the French Ministry of the Interior. 10 Capacity for Disaster Reduction Initiative (CADRI) https://www.cadri.net/.
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Bangladesh field report
Introduction
The evaluation team leader and senior cost-effectiveness visited Bangladesh (Dhaka and Cox’s
Bazar) during the period 14–19 July 2018. The team interviewed DG ECHO staff, partners and
other stakeholders in both Dhaka and Cox’s Bazar and made a half day-visit to Kutupalong
refugee camp with the Logistics Sector Coordinator based in Cox’s Bazar. The team also held
informal conversations during their visit to Kutupalong with the manager of the International
Organization for Migration (IOM) warehouse and the staff at the WFP logistics hub. 21 interviews
were undertaken.11,12
The Bangladesh field visit focused on the 2018 Rohingya refugee crisis in south-east
Bangladesh, with limited attention to the many other disaster risks to which the country is subject,
or to the support DG ECHO provides to longer-term disaster risk reduction. The period of the
Rohingya response stands largely outside the 2013-2017 timeframe of the evaluation. However,
in line with the Inception Report case study selection criteria, the country was selected as an
example of an ongoing response.
This report differs from the other three country field reports undertaken for the evaluation, in that it
incorporates the Bangladesh specific elements of the evaluation’s efficiency study, which forms
part of the evaluation methodology.
Strategic overview of humanitarian logistics
At the national level, the country has made significant progress over the past 20 years in
improving its response to cyclones, with cyclone shelters and early warning systems having been
installed and proven effective in reducing mortality.13 Government, donors and agencies
acknowledge that the country has no preparedness for a major earthquake and more needs to be
done with regard to flood protection.
The government has not granted refugee status to the new influx of Rohingyas. There are some
1.1 million refugees in about 30 camps. Kutupalong alone holds 650,000. Refugees are not
allowed to leave the camp, cannot work (apart from food-for-work in the camp) and no formal
education is provided.
Until February 2018, refugees were arriving so fast that the scale could not be kept up with. They
settled close together leaving no space for services. It has not been possible to plan integrated
services to be provided by multiple agencies in multi-function centres. (DG ECHO has been
encouraging the establishment of integrated services – see below)
The area settled by the new refugees is becoming uninhabitable and local people cannot cultivate
their land because the area settled was their cropping land. The World Bank has offered loans to
the government, which is unwilling to take on loans to provide services for people from Myanmar.
There is no strategic plan for how to support the camps over an extended period. World Bank and
11 Many more people, particularly DG ECHO staff at regional level and NGO representatives in Cox’s Bazar, were asked for interview but declined or did not respond, at least in part because of evaluation fatigue. The evaluators heard from DG ECHO in Cox’s Bazar that the office had been involved in 78 evaluation visits in less than a year and that four evaluation teams had been in Cox’s Bazar only the previous week. 12 One from the Ministry of Disaster Management (MoDM), five from donors (DG ECHO, DFID and USAID), seven from UN agencies operational in Cox’s Bazar (UNICEF, UNHCR, WFP, IOM, WHO, UNDP) and seven from NGOs operational in Cox’s Bazar (MSF Holland, STC, Danish Refuge Council, HI/Atlas). 13 There are 50,000 volunteers in place ready to respond to a signal. There are 3000 cyclone shelters in coastal areas which can accommodate up to 800 people shelter food medicine rice money and. Stocks are held at district HQ; 200 metric tons of rice, 1 million Taka, etc.
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Asian Development Bank funding is becoming available. The government does not accept that
new refugees should integrate and is considering moving 100,000 refugees to an island in the
Bay of Bengal, which it has spent $200 million of its own funds to develop in preparation.
It is no longer an acute emergency situation and DG ECHO partners are talking of how to scale
back their involvement. The situation is regarded as a protection and public health emergency.
There are no sustainable solutions without improvement in the legal status of the Rohingyas. The
1 million Rohingyas are unlikely to return to Myanmar under current conditions. The Joint
Response Plan for Rohingya Refugee Crisis14 is for more than US$900 million for 2018 but is
only 34% funded at time or writing, according to OCHA Financial Tracking Service, which means
that many actors are not able to reach their planned targets for assistance.
There is no humanitarian coordinator in Bangladesh and no OCHA-led cluster system. Instead,
there is a complex coordination structure under the Inter-cluster Steering Group (ICSG), led by
government. The ICSG itself is overseen by the Strategic Executive Group, on which donors have
two rotating seats. Differences between UNHCR and IOM concerning their respective roles has
reportedly been a challenge. While coordination was originally given to IOM it is now shared
between UNHCR and IOM.15
Overall, the logistics capacity available in Bangladesh is stronger than many emergency prone
countries. Humanitarian workers can use the regular scheduled air services to Cox’s Bazar. The
trucking sector is well developed, and the market place can meet all emergency needs, though
not at the volume and speed required for the refugee influx in 2017. There are challenges in
obtaining some medicines, specialised medical or other equipment, e.g. heavy machinery.
There are three main donors to humanitarian logistics: Japan, DFID and USAID (i.e. not DG
ECHO). Logistics specific services have received US$2.5 million (50% of US$5 million budgeted),
which is well-funded compared to most other sectors.
Key humanitarian logistics challenges
Access to and within the camp at Kutupalong ‘mega-camp’ is difficult. Roads are few and narrow,
making access limited, especially to the interior of the camp, where extensive use of porters is
required, and families have to walk sometimes for hours to reach services. In case of severe
rains, access will be blocked. IOM is now building a ‘porter highway’ to improve access into the
interior of the camp. There is an urgent need for decongestion in the camps.
There is a major challenge for some international NGOs to achieve registration and permission to
work in the camps. Even if they do manage to be registered, they are still obliged to work through
local implementing partners. Local authorities can make it difficult to get permits, the so-called
FD6 and FD7.
All NGOs who are not subcontractors to UN agencies must have every load of goods they take to
the camps inspected by the district commissioner before it can be distributed. This introduces
significant delays and potential for corruption. Cox's Bazar is the only district where these truck
inspections happen. Reportedly, there is some softening of approach by the local authorities
following lobbying from various quarters.
14https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/bangladesh/document/rohingya-refugee-crisis-response-plan-march-%E2%80%93-december-2018 15 The majority of the coordination was originally given to IOM (as the Rohingya are not regarded as refugees). Competition between the organisations led to camp coordination responsibilities being divided north-south between them. The evaluators heard from several sources about the negative impact caused by competition between these organisations.
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It is difficult to get visas for humanitarian workers, especially for workers from those organisations
the government wishes to discourage from operating in the Rohingya crisis. Some NGO staff fly
to Nairobi to get their visas, which wastes time and money.
The government has levelled and stabilised many areas to reduce the risk of landslides and loss
of life. Even so, much of the mega-camp is built on unstable ground.
Due to congestion, there is a shortage of space for warehouses and facilities in general. Major
warehouses are outside the camp, for example WFP warehouse space adjacent to the camp.16
There are hundreds of shipping containers, each of which has a small footprint, placed in the
camps, holding monsoon disaster kits and other immediate emergency supplies.
Since the emergency phase passed, the bulk of supplies arrive through the port at Chittagong.
The port itself is congested, as is the road to Cox’s Bazar, with journey times for trucks having
doubled from 4 to 8 hours. The capacity of Dhaka airport to handle humanitarian goods is limited.
A new humanitarian staging area is being planned.17
While availability of trucks is generally good, the local authorities have imposed a weight limit of
3 tonnes on trucks operating within camps to reduce the potential for damage to roads. However,
there are not enough small trucks in the area and this has led to increased prices.
Partners report that sometimes their orders are not delivered, and suppliers may insert
substandard items into big consignments. There is reportedly a challenge in getting enough
qualified logistics personnel to work in Cox’s Bazaar. It is not a desirable location, and sometimes
the only solution is to bring in international staff.
The Bangladesh Army plays a central role in the management of the refugee camps. The Army
quickly constructed the ‘military road’ through the camp which has provided important additional
access. DG ECHO objected on principle to the Army being contracted by UNHCR to build 14,000
latrines (using the military should be the last resort), when there is a dynamic private sector with
numerous WASH specialists that could have been employed.
Procurement of drugs can be difficult. There is no HPC in the country and agencies are not
allowed to import drugs, therefore some other arrangements must be found. (Some agencies,
MSF, Red Cross Red Crescent are clearly importing drugs.) The evaluators heard that WFP does
not understand the requirements for the storage of medicines. WFP requested a refrigerated
storage unit from Agility logistics, but this unit does not work.
Bamboo is the primary construction material for the camps, especially given that no permanent
structures are allowed. There is said to be a bamboo cartel operating in the district, which keeps
prices artificially high.
Processes followed when reviewing funding for implementing partner projects
DG ECHO has had a staff member based in Cox’s Bazar since October 2017, with other staff
from the Bangkok and Delhi offices making periodic visits. This has allowed an unusually high
level of monitoring. Visits are now weekly, as against the initial three times per week.18 However,
16 UNHCR has a warehouse of 6,000m2 in Cox’s Bazar, and 2,400m2 in Chittagong. 17 There is a plan for a humanitarian staging area to be placed within five kilometres of the airport, similar to that completed in Nepal, just before the earthquake there. The staging area has a preparedness focus. If it goes ahead this would be a major logistics intervention 18 The evaluators meet two staff from the Delhi office providing support to the in DG ECHO Surge Response Expert in Cox’s Bazar.
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DG ECHO has no dedicated logistician able to focus on partner logistics at either country or
regional level.
In terms of capacity development, DG ECHO is funding a consortium of agencies to place officers
into local offices of the Ministry of Disaster Management, with a dual reporting line to the ministry
and the district commissioner, to help maintain social safety net programmes. UNDP is also
training local government representatives on disaster management. According to UNDP, there is
an attempt to link humanitarian and development approaches. Of total DG ECHO funding in
Bangladesh perhaps 35–40% is now going to cash based programming, which is seen to
overcome some of the logistics challenges.
The crisis has a very high political profile and DG ECHO is in regular touch with its partners. Most
partners see that DG ECHO is playing a positive role in Cox’s Bazar. Feedback included:
• DG ECHO is good at connecting different agencies.
• DG ECHO has pushed agencies to look at underserved and risky camps (in line with humanitarian principles).
• DG ECHO is actively pushing the humanitarian-development link and is making substantive inputs to the government-led emergency preparedness task force.
• DG ECHO is relatively inflexible in allowing changes to projects.
• (Like most donors) DG ECHO funding is too short-term, sometimes just a few months at time.
According to DG ECHO, it has pressed agencies to be ready to respond to the scale of the risk
presented by the monsoon season. DG ECHO is consciously trying to diversify the portfolio of
partners responding to the Rohingya crisis, including the UN, NGOs, and the Red Cross Red
Crescent. According to DG ECHO, the various actors ‘keep each other in check’. NGOs are seen
to be more flexible and cheaper, normally. DG ECHO has asked WFP and NGOs to go beyond
their mandate and set up multi-agency, multi-purpose shops. According to one informant, there is
little incentive to achieve value for money: ‘In this context, the focus is more on getting the money
out of the door.’
Proportion of funding for humanitarian logistics
DG ECHO has provided funds to the Rohingya response in Bangladesh at a lower level than
either DFID or USAID: €47 million from August 2017 to July 2018 (€34m in 2018).19 This is
modest compared with the needs. The budget for feeding Rohingya refugees is estimated by DG
ECHO at €20 million per month. The total budget for the Bangladesh Rohingya Refugee Crisis
Joint Response Plan 2018 is US$951 million (€839 million at July 2018 rates).20
According to DFID, UK humanitarian funding to date to Rohingya in Bangladesh is £170 million
(€190m approx.), of which 25% is reserved for local community development. USA funding for
2018 only is US$70 million (according to OCHA financial tracking system, this looks like an
underestimate).
Politically, the EU is not seen as one of the more powerful foreign actors in the country. These
are the regional powers: India, China, Japan, plus the USA.
19 According to a poster in the DG ECHO Cox’s Bazar office, as at 15.1.2018, total EU funding to the Rohingya crisis was €77.9 million (DEVCO €46.1m, IcSP €5m, DG ECHO €26.8m). The evaluators did not hear about any cross-over between DEVCO and DG ECHO funding. 20 https://fts.unocha.org/appeals/656/summary accessed 16 August 2018.
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In Dhaka, donors report good coordination between themselves at the high level of overall
support to the Government of Bangladesh in its response to the crisis, including how to address
gaps in the response, solidarity on the need for the creation of conditions for refugee return to
Myanmar or (informally) support to refugees who may have to stay in the country for some time.
There is no donor coordination concerning logistics challenges or making best use of partner
logistics capacity. Like DG ECHO, neither DFID nor USAID have logistics advisors in-country.
They both appear to exercise little scrutiny on partner logistics, especially over the UN. The
logistics sector in Cox’s Bazar is seen to provide a good overview of logistics for the Rohingya
crisis response.
Coordination between humanitarian organisations and donors
There is a Logistics Cluster based in Dhaka, chaired by WFP and co-chaired by the Ministry of
Disaster Management (and sometimes by the Army). In Cox's Bazar, there is a Logistics Sector
(not cluster), led by WFP.21 The local sector meets frequently, while the national cluster meets
every two months (which slows down decision-making). The sector raises logistics issues with the
national logistics cluster that cannot be solved locally.
The Logistics Sector is predominantly engaged in information sharing, warehousing services,
information on road access and other discussions, e.g. of clearing and forwarding agents. The
sector puts data online using the logistics cluster website.22 While most NGOs attend the
coordination meeting,23 they do not actively coordinate logistics between themselves.
A Logistics Capacity Assessment was undertaken, including for the Port of Chittagong. The
Global Logistics Cluster (GLC) came to Cox’s Bazar to undertake the assessment independently
of WFP. The sector has established a link with the LET (Logistics Emergency Team, comprising
major international logistics companies) and has tapped into the knowledge of Agility concerning
the national logistics set-up.
The logistics sector provides a logistics common service in the form of warehousing, whereby
free storage is available to agencies for a period of up to 90 days (currently used by 18
organisations).24
Warehousing is also provided by Atlas Logistics to eight NGOs, and also offers free trucking
services, and a kitting area.
21 The current sector coordinator is out-posted from the Global Logistics Cluster in Rome. 22 https://logcluster.org/ 23 Not all agencies are interested in logistics cooperation. MSF is operating at a large-scale, with 200 international staff and 30 logisticians. It is not interested in being part of the logistics sector, and does not see how it would gain from being part of a shared logistics capacity (should that be attempted). 24 Atlas Logistiques/HI, CARE, Christian Aid, Danish Refugee Council, Dhaka Ahsania Mission, GoB, IFRC, IOM, Medical Teams International, NGO Forum for Public Health, Oxfam, Plan International, Save the Children, Solidarites International, Terres des Hommes, UNICEF, WFP, WHO, and WaterAid.
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Haiti/Panama field report
Introduction
The senior expert for logistics and cash based programming visited Panama from 2–3 July and
Haiti 4–6 July 2018, assisted by the Landell Mills project manager for the evaluation.
Several regional humanitarian organisations are based in Panama. DG ECHO’s regional office is
in Managua. WFP, IOM, UNICEF, OCHA, Save the Children and IFRC were interviewed over 2
days (a total of about 15 people). A visit to UNHRD was also undertaken.
The following organisations (18 people) were interviewed in Haiti: EU Delegation (DEVCO – 3
people), DG ECHO (Head of Office, 2 TAs, regional security and logistics coordinator), IOM (2),
OCHA (1), Save the Children (1), WFP (1), FAO (1), 6 NGOS (ACTED, Solidarite International,
COOPI, CESVI, ACTED and ACF – group discussion). The following is a summary of notes and
findings.
Strategic overview of humanitarian logistics
Maintaining a strategic and/or comprehensive regional oversight of human logistics is not
common practice in the region and in fact there is limited oversight of logistics, both among
implementing partners (IPs) and donors. However, through some of its 87 members UNHRD (UN
humanitarian response depot network) has developed an overview of available supplies within
the LAC region. Its usage rate doubled in the last 10 years (e.g.: 2013: 32 inbound and outbound
shipments; in 2017 it was 65). UNHRD also serves as a Humanitarian Procurement Centre (HPC)
although the local team did not appear to be familiar with this aspect of their global operations.
There is an annual global partners meeting (next one in November 8th 2018, in Rome) at which
prepositioning requirements and plans are reviewed.
For IFRC and Save the Children, procurement and supply chain management are centralised at
HQs, whereas regional offices tend to focus on capacity building, programme support and
advisory services. More specifically, IFRC Panama maintains an inventory of relief items/
equipment held by each national society in the region. The regional IFRC office provides advice
on the structure of logistics functions and provides guidance to national society teams. UNICEF
Panama also mainly engages in supply chain/disaster preparedness capacity building,
coordination and information sharing.
In Haiti, there has been a limited approach to strategic humanitarian logistics preparedness
during the evaluation period, although Haiti was chosen as one of the six GLC preparedness
priority countries shortly before hurricane Matthew struck (October 2016). Haiti was piloted by the
GLC as a ‘proof of concept’ for GLC preparedness activities, including simulation exercises, the
mapping of supply chain risks and logistics capacities, the assessment and mapping of critical
logistics infrastructure, response planning and capacity strengthening.
Strategic perspectives are also hampered because many smaller donors have reportedly been
pulling out of Haiti as it is no longer seen as a priority country (DFID did not have an in-country
office). This has had an impact on funding for NGOs, which in some cases could only hire staff for
very short-term assignments.
Key humanitarian logistics challenges
Accessibility within the Caribbean is a major issue with many small islands where it is difficult to
land both aircraft and vessels. In addition, there is limited knowledge of the infrastructure of these
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islands (including suppliers and local markets) and how best to intervene during a disaster.
Similarly, within the islands, there is difficult access to remote areas/vulnerable populations.25
DG ECHO has not funded preparedness activities, nor does the Haitian government budget for
this under its national plan, although OCHA is attempting to support the National Disaster
Management Agency to run assessments, in preparation for the next crisis. There have been
various initiatives to support better preparedness but these have not been sustainable; e.g.
UNDP and the World Bank supported the civil protection department (DPC) for 6 years but
stopped doing so in 2017. As at the end of 2017, the DPC had not received funding and did not
have capacity to respond effectively to disasters.
There have been few interventions to better adapt shelter such as earthquake resistant houses
(apparently both USAID and the government are against such interventions). However, DG
ECHO has funded the trial of one design that uses a mixture of traditional and modern building
techniques (at a cost of approximately $2,000 per each housing unit).
Through discussions concerning the humanitarian-development nexus (linking relief,
rehabilitation and development), the team learned that humanitarian access and seaports/
infrastructure (roads and bridges) are key issues that have been to some extent addressed
through a joint DG ECHO-DEVCO post-Matthew strategy for Haiti26 that committed €30 million
from the EDF for food assistance, livelihoods, education, shelter, WASH and infrastructure
improvements.
Customs bureaucracy is a key challenge with some humanitarian cargo taking months to clear.
There is apparently a perceived level of inequality in the way goods are handled, presumably due
to the high levels of corruption. There is a programme to improve customs regulations supported
by DEVCO (details requested but not received). The importation of relief goods is a high priority
given the poor quality but highly priced items available in local markets. There have been differing
approaches among donors to this issue with DG ECHO supporting cash based assistance and
USAID focusing on relief item imports such as tarpaulins.
Common operational/logistics challenges in Latin and Central America and the Caribbean:
• Diversity of languages, environments and contexts, needing different approaches to operations that slow implementation (need to adapt all steps to the specificities of the country or island), as well as coordination and cooperation. This applies both within and between the three sub-regions of Central America, Caribbean and Latin America;
• Procurement is difficult due to (i) scale of needs vs production capacity of manufacturers/suppliers, (ii) limited knowledge/mapping of existing suppliers, (iii) standards required. Most goods come from abroad (e.g. IFRC mainly procure in China, and then use Panama-based humanitarian dealers). There seems to be potential for broader engagement of local producers;
• Customs regulations/bureaucracy, which significantly delays delivery. Most authorities do not confirm to international standards and agreements and sometimes take weeks to clear goods. There is scope for donors to advocate to overcome this issue. (IFRC comment: ‘yet it is difficult to collaborate with regional governments and risk compromising impartiality;’)
25 For example, WFP acknowledged that during the hurricanes (in 2016 and 2017) in the Caribbean, that they lacked knowledge of the islands. This led to the setting up of a Trust Fund, which receives funds from DG ECHO. The TF has three main components: 1. Strengthening Information management and sharing though WFP expertise in vulnerability and food security assessments; 2. Strengthening response mechanisms and coordination (adding to CDEMA coordination mechanism); 3. Social protection approach. The aim is to build on country systems to help with response operations. 26 devco.g.1.dir(2016)7118758
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• Political support: in some cases governments do not welcome external support or humanitarian aid;
• Limited use of framework agreements (for supply of goods and services) to enable prompt responses when the crises hit (no preparedness). There is a need for political relationships and influence over policy-making;
• Funding: donor support limited as most countries in the region are regarded as being middle income and there are a relatively small number of beneficiaries. Therefore, the region is not a priority for Europe;
• Personnel: lack of appointed logistics personnel (except for IFRC and WFP) and issues with limited staff capacity;
• Insufficient agency and donor coordination both pre- and post-emergency;
• Dispersion of capacity and loss of momentum (dispersion of engagement and interest) when disasters do not occur;
• No preparedness: for many of the reasons above and overall, fairly outdated humanitarian outlook and approaches.
Processes followed when reviewing funding for implementing partner projects:
Due to their regional scope few organisations/donors in Panama are involved in the selection of
partners. For WFP, logistics did not appear to be a key factor and more attention is paid to
operational/programmatic capacity building. NGO regional offices are generally not involved in
logistics, although IFRC tries to support the development of in-house programme and logistical
capacities of national Red Cross National Societies in the region (Honduras, Nicaragua, Haiti,
Dominican Republic, Jamaica).
DG ECHO does not discuss or negotiate with partners specifically regarding logistics functions
but rather considers budget requests for support costs within projects. They reported that there
was a time when they paid more attention to the set-up of logistics elements within programmes.
Now the DG ECHO Single Form does not have this structure. Also, there are differences between
partners: the UN presenting limited detail within budgets and NGOs providing very detailed
financial plans. Typically, allocations are 60% funded for operations and 40% for human
resources (HR) and support. Capital items such as vehicles can be purchased but at the end of
projects these must be returned. It was not clear how these are disposed of or reused. DG ECHO
tends to question increased expenses for HR more than for logistics, although it is different for
no-cost extensions.
Proportion of funding for humanitarian logistics
It was difficult to determine the proportion of funding channelled for humanitarian logistics as
none of the organisations interviewed had data available.27 WFP was willing to gather data but
preferred to defer to Rome. UNHRD figures should be available through their dashboard/global
coordinator.
In general, most organisations noted that, inclusive of procurement, about 30% goes to logistics
(both UN and NGOs regional offices). IFRC stated that the region overall is not heavily logistically
orientated, apart from the Caribbean where air charters are needed. In some cases, air and sea
charters are advantageous if market costs and congestion of transport routes are considered.
FAO Haiti reported that 20% to 30% of their budget goes to logistics, which they regarded as
27 OCHA’s Regional Response Plan for 2017 requested US$27 million for response, of which 12 to 15 million was related to logistics and communications. Less than 20% of what was requested was received.
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being significant due to difficulties in accessing rural areas, for example to construct or manage
warehouses and undertake other operational activities.
During the hurricane responses in 2017, OCHA was questioned over the amount of funding going
to logistics, which led to the reactivation of the Panama Logistics Working Group (LWG) co-
chaired by WFP and OCHA.
Initiatives to support improved performance in humanitarian logistics and donor
investment to improve effectiveness of humanitarian response
OCHA engages with the private sector and academia to undertake studies drawing on learning
exercises to provide recommendations (among others) for best practice for logistics. OCHA set
up REDLAC some years ago, which is a regional platform for preparation and response,
comprising NGO, IFRC and UN agencies. The LWG sits under REDLAC but is activated on an ad
hoc basis, with intensified activity during emergencies. According to OCHA, REDLAC affiliation
ensures sustainability of various working groups.
CDEMA, based in Barbados, is a key example of an inter-governmental initiative that is aimed at
improving performance through coordination and information sharing between Caribbean
countries. They organise regional activities and coordinate regional responses (not logistics).
CDEMA develops action plans that provide guidance for operational organisations and maintain
good levels of collaboration in the sub-region. According to UNICEF, CDEMA is effective in
supporting emergencies and it would be helpful to strengthen its capacity through improved
funding.
IOM launched the Migration Intervention in Countries in Crisis (MICIC): an initiative to address
needs of migrants when caught in environmental hazards. IOM also tries to consider
assessments of logistics as part of country operations in support of REDLAC.
As part of a post-hurricane REDLAC lessons-learned exercise in 2017, partners identified that
humanitarian organisations were not well prepared for the scenario and recommended that more
effort was required to develop logistics capacity.
As noted above, Haiti has been an informal pilot country for the humanitarian-development nexus
collaboration between DG ECHO and DEVCO. The EU Delegation maintains a ‘Recovery
Observatory’ working on mapping and infrastructure initiatives, along with capacity building for
government institutions.28
NGOs are constrained by donors’ requirements in the preparation of their budgets. There is little
coordination or shared use of resources between partners, leading to inefficiencies and possible
wasted resources. Although more recently some NGOs in Haiti have started to work in
partnership for logistics based on the format of a previously used LWG,29 as this is becoming a
necessity given decreasing resources available.
28 DG ECHO and DEVCO contracts differ: DG ECHO grants are for 1 year (max 2) and can only support international organisations (national organisations and the government are excluded. Private sector entities have to be an official partner). DEVCO issues contracts for up to 5 years (in line with multi-annual indicative plans). There is no common contracting tool for DEVCO and DG ECHO that could enable a medium term (say 3 year) LRRD contract to be created. At one point (not sure when) DEVCO did have contracts with DG ECHO for 2–3 years, which made things easier. DEVCO may have medium term financing programmes to cover this medium term funding gap. DG ECHO has annual budgets, DEVCO’s are for 4 years. If anything unforeseen occurs, DEVCO cannot redirect funds to other activities. 29 The Logistics Working Group was a national logistics coordination mechanism established after the Haiti earthquake in 2010. The focus of the group was on preparedness and ad hoc response to national crisis situations such as the 2014 drought. The group has ad hoc meetings (but has no formal leader) and was ‘reactivated’ after Hurricane Matthew (2016) to facilitate the coordination of the humanitarian response.
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Coordination between humanitarian organisations and donors
According to NGOs interviewed, coordination in Haiti is reactive and informal coordination occurs
among the NGO community based on personal relationships (with limited coordination of
logistics). There is no framework for partnership and no NGO has the capacity to act as a leader
to call for regular meetings. Local organisations appeared to be the best coordinated during the
response to hurricane Matthew. Although the Logistics Cluster30 was not formally activated, it
deployed a Logistics Response Team to support the government-led (Department of Civil
Protection, DPC) LWG, which established coordination units in Port-au-Prince, Les Cayes and
Jérémie. Programme coordination is perceived to be more important than logistics coordination.
Areas for potential improvement cited by key informants:
• Disaster preparedness agreements with neighbouring countries (strengthening the role of CDEMA);
• Disaster risk management is not a priority for the Haitian government. OCHA see that there could be a stronger preparedness linkage made to the issue of climate change or resilience in order to leverage more funding. OCHA Haiti plans to request donors to lobby the government to include in their national budget a line for emergency preparedness and response;
• Donors such as DG ECHO could play a stronger role to support logistics preparedness;
• NGOs interviewed agreed that strategic logistics coordination is a gap. E.g. For food security programmes better market analysis and information sharing is needed;
• Based on experience in responding to hurricane Matthew, DG ECHO/ERCC support to more quickly mobilise civil protection disaster response modules,31 in collaboration with CDEMA, would be helpful.
The EU Delegation/DEVCO in Haiti has supported CDEMA (despite difficulties associated with
the fact that Haiti is French-speaking and CDEMA largely represents the requirements of English-
speaking Caribbean nations); DG ECHO-funded a €10 million project to support links between
Haiti and CDEMA. (DEVCO funding is channelled to CDEMA through UNISDR, and DG ECHO
funds through WFP). IOM noted that CDEMA is a valuable coordinating body but it would be
challenged to adequately address crises responses without international support. The Haitian
government recognises that civil protection is very important (but is not able to fund it).
The perception (of DG ECHO Haiti) is that EU Member States need to be convinced by the
usefulness of EU civil protection coordination mechanisms. The ERCC has limited ability to
coordinate with Member States (MS) and has challenges in coordinating/activating the Volunteer
Pool, which is sometimes seen as a bottleneck in the rapid response to crises. The case of the
Dutch naval ships during the hurricane Matthew response operation in Haiti32 was a case in point
whereby they were deployed through bilateral negotiations that bypassed the ERCC. One ship
had to stay at sea for several days before being granted permission to berth at Port-au-Prince, by
which time much expectation had been raised among beneficiaries waiting for assistance. When
it did finally berth, there were riots near the port and one woman was killed. Further, DG ECHO
reported that during the hurricane Matthew emergency 70 firemen plus their equipment were
30 https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/haiti_lessons_learned_hurricane_matthew_operation_april_2018.pdf 31 The International Humanitarian Partnership (IHP) deployed / setup a team support basecamp during the hurricane Matthew response operation. 32 The Caribbean-stationed offshore patrol vessel HNLMS Holland and logistic support vessel HNLMS Pelikaan were sent to Haiti in wake of the hurricane Mathew. https://navaltoday.com/2016/10/11/dutch-navy-sends-ships-to-haiti-for-relief/
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deployed from France but were not able to operate without close guidance. Only one person from
DG ECHO was available to provide assistance.
DG ECHO does not fund cluster coordination in Haiti, as the mechanism33 is seen as largely
ineffective, and any funding obtained by clusters depends very much on the efforts of the person
in charge.
Capacity development of partners or governments to ensure better responses
The Government of Panama is supporting the creation of a regional humanitarian logistics hub for
the UNHRD and the IFRC and participates in the LWG. While it was already contributing earlier
through the facilitation of operations, its engagement is being enhanced further.
All donors appear to be engaged in capacity building for governments and local organisations.
IOM and WFP train government NDMAs on logistics. Specifically, WFP invest in emergency
preparedness through capacity building, training, capacity assessment and look at how best to
hand over capabilities to national offices.
IFRC is engaged in building capacities of national societies and confirmed that better disaster
preparedness is required overall and local authorities’ capacities should be reinforced. Currently
relief item prepositioning for the region is mainly in Panama34 (although some organisations hold
inventory nationally), but this presents challenges for response organisation, mobilisation of
stocks, and timeliness of delivery. A more proactive approach for local/in-country prepositioning is
needed.
In the past, the EU Delegation in Haiti had an emergency fund to ensure prompt interventions but
this is no longer the case. There has been a strong push to elevate the status (to that of a
directorate) of the government’s Department of Civil Protection (DPC), but this has not been
achieved. Donors’ support to the DPC has indirectly been weakened through the interventions of
other ministries.
Most agencies interviewed agreed that prepositioning of relief supplies within Haiti is needed as it
is regarded as a useful sub-regional logistics hub (as well as a country in constant need). NB. In
September 2017, Haiti provided emergency support to the Dominican Republic in response to the
disaster caused by hurricane Maria.
Effectiveness and efficiency of humanitarian air transport services
IFRC mainly use air charters, provided through brokers. UNHAS operates a passenger flight from
Barbados, but IFRC normally does not use it in order to maintain independence. According to
IFRC, air transport services are not widely used, although they proved helpful in some instances.
The main challenges are costs and the size of aircraft that can land on small islands.
Improved private sector engagement to increase the efficiency of supply
The private sector is generally recognised as a valuable partner despite some local limitations
and constraints. Examples of operating partnerships are: DHL and FedEx involved in Panama
with air and water transport; Walmart working with IFRC national societies; Kuehne Foundation
involved with trainings (e.g. on return on investment from operations). However, there is little
engagement with IT companies.
33 The specific reasons for the lack of support to clusters in Haiti was not made clear to the evaluation team and further discussion with DG ECHO is needed in this regard. 34 In Panama, IFRC have stocks for 20,000 families as well as in Peru and other Central America locations.
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OCHA stated that governments are changing their approach to private sector engagement. For
example, the private sector was able to provide effective support during emergency operations in
Mexico. In Peru and Colombia, OCHA works with the private sector on preparedness, mitigation
and response. They also aim to help increase knowledge of humanitarian operations within the
Participating States (PS) and have invited companies to International Mechanism For
Humanitarian Assistance (MIHA) biannual meetings.
There are concerns about working with the PS in Haiti because a few wealthy families dominate
the market. Also, NGOs claimed that as their own interventions are small they have a limited
impact on the local economy.
To improve food assistance, FAO works with the PS for value chain strengthening: food
production, transformation and commercialisation of products such as fruit juices, cacao,
cassava, and seed production; FAO has funded silos for seed storage.
DG ECHO has funded cash programmes in Haiti with Mercy Corps, which works with DIGICELL
(supplying services for cash transfer). WFP and other NGOs also work with DIGICELL. Mercy
Corps is regarded as the lead NGO for cash programming and they contribute to action planning
of the cash working group and support the Markets in Crisis discussion group.35 DG ECHO sees
a need for a broader range of logistics/supply chain actors to provide stronger support to local
market development.
During the hurricane Matthew response, support was provided by the LET (Logistics Emergency
Team) – an emergency response partnership with Agility, Maersk Group and UPS that assists the
Logistics Cluster with emergency response.
Implications for growth of cash based programming (CBP)
CBP is recognised as important but is subject to government approval as well as market
considerations, such as inflated prices, in the aftermath of a crisis. There is a need to align with
governmental safety net programmes. WFP is investing more on CBP; they manage fully fledged
cash based programmes in Ecuador; Peru (only technical assistance on top), El Salvador (from
2018) and Haiti where WFP assistance is one third cash based and two thirds in-kind.
Registration systems still need improving. For example, UNICEF advised that they need to better
understand where social safety nets are used and how best to help strengthen them. They wish
to work with governments on this in order to intervene with vertical and horizontal expansion
programmes. UNICEF also recognises the need to work more with Western Union and other
money transfer companies.
Key informants acknowledged the overall positive impact of cash programmes if they are well
designed. However, the modality should not be a standard intervention and it must be weighed
against specific needs.36 Save the Children was very positive about CBP and is making use of
learning from Mercy Corps in order to link programmes with capacity building and training for
financial literacy. However, in-kind assistance and logistics support for supply management and
distribution is still needed in the immediate aftermath of a disaster. Save the Children sees that it
35 https://dgroups.org/dfid/mic 36 IFRC noted that CBT increased by 200% in the last 2 years and is a good way to compliment the distribution of relief items. CBT is not possible everywhere, and is especially difficult in Caribbean. E.g. It was not possible in Antigua. In Cuba IFRC can only do in-kind. Operations teams have a cash unit for distribution and livelihood programmes and monitor the markets’.
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would be good if CBP coordination could be centralised to avoid duplication and waste.37 IOM
does not do much in CBP, although HQ is currently pushing for it.
NGOs recognise that there is a need to upgrade working methods for humanitarian assistance,
such as through using technology (tablets and mobiles) for the registration of beneficiaries. This
would improve the management of both cash based and in-kind assistance.
FAO runs cash for work programmes and provide technical support. WFP also has moved more
strongly to cash based assistance using e-vouchers for inputs. 70% of WFP’s programme in the
sub-region is cash based, which has had a big impact on the way that logistics personnel
operate.
OCHA supports the cash working group in Haiti and noted that it would be helpful for DG ECHO
to:
• Support coordination mechanisms set by the governmental coordination structures;
• Invest in countries such as Haiti to maximise local market knowledge through analysis/assessment conducted at country level;
• Develop stronger political leverage in the area of international disaster response law to tackle chronic challenges with customs formalities / bureaucracy, which has a negative impact on market performance and frequently causes delays in the importation of relief supplies.
37 SCI has a cash programme in Guatemala. Cash has potential, but needs to be facilitated through agreements with banks and money transfer companies. Experienced senior staff and experts who understand the problems specific to the region are important.
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East Africa field report
Introduction
The evaluation team leader, the senior expert for logistics and cash based programming, and the
senior air transport expert visited Nairobi from 11–14 June 2018.
A number of regional humanitarian organisations are based in Nairobi including DG ECHO’s
regional office. Representatives from DG ECHO & DEVCO, WFP, DFID, USAID, UNHCR, OCHA,
UNICEF, IOM, UNICEF, the private sector and 11 NGOs were interviewed. The following is a
summary of notes and findings.
Strategic overview of humanitarian logistics
The strategic assessment of logistics for the region and within countries is only partially apparent.
No humanitarian agency or donor in particular takes responsibility; WFP perhaps comes the
closest (UNHCR specifically for refugees, UNICEF for nutrition). WFP is starting a new initiative
to both assess strategic logistics capacity, and then to plan for how it can be addressed. (This will
need to be a multi-stakeholder initiative to be successful.)
The region’s countries are very different and provide illustrations of the range of approaches
required between, for example, Kenya, where markets function and the private sector is relatively
strong, and on the other hand, South Sudan where a large and continuing humanitarian logistics
set-up is required. If DG ECHO were to adopt a programme approach it would allow it to be more
strategic.38 This in turn would be good for the overall assessment and planning of investments in
humanitarian logistics.
There was discussion around the role (strategic and operational) of logistics TAs (international
and local posts). The expat logistics position was introduced 5–6 years ago. Part of the ToRs
require consideration of partner logistics (one of three main tasks). DG ECHO office logistics
should be localised, allowing a more strategic approach to be taken by the (limited number of)
international logistics TAs and thus more focus on programme learning, to develop knowledge
and influence other organisations and donors. (ToRs for Logs TA could be revised.)
An area where DG ECHO has a demonstrated example of strategic oversight is on cash
preparedness in Southern Africa, where it has developed knowledge of financial service
providers, mobile network operators and mobile phone usage in each country. The current
constraint to further innovation and progress in cash programming is that the ‘financial regulation’
does not allow DG ECHO to finance the private sector or national NGOs directly.
The Logistics Cluster in South Sudan did not provide a comprehensive strategy for logistics
coordination but had a good understanding of humanitarian needs and has coordinated well from
an operational perspective, including the support for common pipelines. It has been good at
managing and deploying assets in ways that complement other resources and is a good example
(from a Grand Bargain perspective) of an effective and efficient function, even though it is an
unusual (long-term) cluster deployment.
It was observed that DG ECHO did not always help to empower the coordination system (in
South Sudan) to work effectively; e.g. DG ECHO ‘set up’ its own logs capacity in South Sudan by
38 The evaluation team understands that this means bigger tranches of money to one organisation to cover several projects – more an institutional partnership approach than programme.
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directly funding rapid response partners such as Medair (and five other NGOs).39 However, DG
ECHO can be very catalytic and so should incentivise coordination through the cluster system for
the benefit of the whole operation. On the other hand, it is unclear where DFID is heading
regarding multi-year funding, VfM etc. in relation to coordination. They introduced the
Humanitarian Aid and Resilience in South Sudan (HARISS) programme in 2015/16 and dropped
out of operational (or strategic) discussions. USAID is more hands on and supportive of the
clusters/logs cluster. DG ECHO is promoting resilience programming (e.g. inclusion of local
populations in refugee programming). NGOs perceive that DG ECHO is strongly committed to
preparedness but does not want to pay for it.
At country level UNICEF does not go into strategic decision-making concerning logistics but does
coordinate with UNHCR and WFP (to compare costs etc.). They also attempt to consolidate
cargo with other agencies as part of the One UN approach. Donors such as DFID have requested
UN agencies to coordinate better on preparedness and response. UNHCR regional office
manages 13 country operations from Nairobi and provides quality assurance to operations.
Donors (like DG ECHO and the US State Department, Bureau of Population, Refugees and
Migration (BPRM) often require partners to coordinate with UNHCR (e.g. 2011 in Ethiopia for
Somali refugees).
Key humanitarian logistics challenges
The lack of infrastructure in the region and lack of reliable suppliers makes humanitarian
operations very expensive. The self-imposed lack of local knowledge within DG ECHO around
logistics and supply chain matters is a potential risk to ensuring VfM, effectiveness and efficiency.
In Somalia and South Sudan, security is the main problem. In Somalia, the government, clans
and Al Shabaab take taxes (Mogadishu to Baidoa checkpoints etc.). Similar challenges exist in
South Sudan and so aid benefits are diluted. In Uganda there has been major corruption over
refugee numbers. DG ECHO’s influence is purely with budgets and so there is scope as a donor
to become much more innovative in ways that aid can be delivered.
In a context like South Sudan the coordination component is central, and this supports the use of
common pipelines (WASH, NFI, food etc.). Too great a focus on the development of annual
Humanitarian Response Plans often became a distraction to effective coordination and attention
to operations. This may have led to a high turnover of cluster coordinators (the education cluster
had four coordinators in one year).
Having the right people who can coordinate is critical. Clusters generally need to be more
operational than strategic. It is not possible to solve issues of strategic coordination and cluster
effectiveness just by making the coordinator senior P5 post. Clusters need to be empowered to
be neutral but lead agencies sometimes end up being in competition with their ‘own’ Cluster. DG
ECHO could help to elevate this concern at the IASC (there may need to be some ceding of
power). DG ECHO South Sudan Head of Office agreed that a neutral logistics function would be
valuable.
Donor coordination is often a key challenge and frequently personality driven; OFDA was cited as
having been a strong advocate for effective logistics coordination. DG ECHO could play a
stronger role in this area. DG ECHO needs to find synergies with other donors. There is a risk of
double funding activities.
39 DG ECHO-funded NGOs to create a rapid response team in Juba. The challenge with this approach was that they did not have to get everyone to agree on issues of coordination and prioritisation.
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In terrorist/conflict contexts organisations are not as open about costs; for example, Al Shabab
checkpoint fees paid by traders supplying local markets (that receive aid cash through beneficiary
purchases). DG ECHO (and other donors such as USAID and DFID) needs to create an effective
space for difficult discussions with partners.
UNICEF does not use UNHRD because the closest location is Dubai (so would be impractical
and expensive to rely on). Instead they source from UNICEF Supply Division (in Copenhagen),
which has agreements with suppliers locally. UNICEF also does not use HPCs. UNICEF does not
get support to preposition directly but this happens through drawdown contracts/LTAs with private
sector partners (e.g. NFI kits).
DG ECHO and BPRM have supported UNHCR with capacity building for response as a standby
capacity. UNHCR also have an emergency stockpile in Kenya. Cross-border operations usually
work OK but UNHCR partners still face challenges. Trainings may help for the customs
authorities to improve their services and ability to recognise how to better handle humanitarian
cargo.
Underfunding has been a big challenge as at the moment only about 35% of UNHCR
requirements are funded. This has a big impact on logistics in terms of delivery of services.
However, challenge faced regionally is not just funding but the delivery of food. WFP often face
problems. During emergency, logistics accounts for the biggest cost. Then move to set up of
permanent services like water systems.
Among the many challenges, the supply import process and/or cross-border clearances are the
most difficult. DG ECHO/EU could invest in applying political pressure to ensure a smoother and
more seamless importation of humanitarian goods. This is partly an issue of customs regulations
in terms of obtaining tax exemptions etc. Authorities don’t always comply with internationally
agreed regulations pertaining to humanitarian goods. It is (and has been for many years) difficult
to determine what documentation is needed and when.
Processes are kept deliberately vague. In the case of USAID there is a unit that helps with
customs paperwork and the pre-negotiation of import clearances. NGOs usually pay tax and then
are able to recover costs.
Processes followed when reviewing funding for implementing partner projects
There appears to be agreement that greater engagement of logisticians in the design of partner
projects would be helpful, but this depends within HQ on how much attention is paid to logistics in
practice. There is ambivalence in DG ECHO (HQ) about whether the (expat) logistics role is
needed. At present, there is little direct engagement on logistics when discussing partner project
proposals. DG ECHO does not have the capacity to recognise where logistics capacity gaps
exist. The Grand Bargain means asking for less information from partners, not more.
Under the new budget procedure, DG ECHO must follow an intense process to publish and
explain the Humanitarian Implementation Plan (e.g. for Somalia), receive and assess proposals,
complete dashboards and discuss comments between country, region and HQ, and then go back
to partners for revisions (sometimes as many as eight versions, now from a wide range of
partners) to proposals before contracts can be agreed. Logistics does not receive the attention it
deserves in this process (partly due to time constraints and partly a lack of logistics advice on
proposals). Partners regard monitoring missions as important because this is an opportunity for
practical discussions (i.e. on logistical challenges). Country colleagues are knowledgeable, and
have a programme background, but they don’t always understand the bottlenecks or the need to
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engage a logistician to determine/resolve structural problems. A multi-annual, programme
approach could be more appropriate and efficient.
Partners had differing views on how well DG ECHO interacts with them. Some were very satisfied
but others noted that they only see DG ECHO TAs at a year-end audit. In general, NGOs do
receive technical feedback (e.g. The Health TA visits programmes every 6 months). DG ECHO is
regarded as being influential. Some TAs do not actually visit the refugee camp.
Some NGOs are not asked to explain their logistics capacity or strategy in their grant proposals,
although there is a budget line for transport, storage. Discussion with TAs is more related to
programme: WASH, resilience and other sectors, although some logistics is recognised as being
involved. As part of DG ECHO’s project appraisal process, formal comments on the logistical
aspects of proposals are made occasionally.
For refugee operations, DG ECHO supports engagement through UNHCR programmes and so
complements those; UNHCR usually covers 80% of the cost of logistics.
Financial reporting is generally seen as straightforward. VfM is often considered and NGOs use
local goods and materials when feasible (in camps). Several NGOs use HPCs as they are
required to do so. However, they said that they could save 20–30% of costs if procurement was
not conducted through an HPC.
DG ECHO’s rationale for using HPCs is to ensure quality, but similar quality products are
available in the local market (according to some NGOs interviewed). CHMP Kenya (HPC medical
supplier) do not always have stock that is needed and their biggest challenge is onward dispatch
into hard-to-reach areas (like South Somalia). They have to use air transport as well as trucking
and it is then problematic in terms of budget. At project design stage it is difficult to predict what
transport will be needed.
DG ECHO sometimes asks about procurement processes and framework agreements with
suppliers etc. The type of programme dictates whether there is a discussion on logistics – WASH,
cash etc. Once a proposal is approved agencies can spend according to what has been agreed
and can use their own procurement procedures. Use of DG ECHO procurement procedures is
complicated.
Generally, DG ECHO is transparent and up front. Agencies can sometimes start spending ahead
of a contract award. Other donors don’t allow that. However, DG ECHO funding is short-term, so
there is a short-term focus on the achievement of objectives and is not very flexible when projects
need to change quickly to adapt to changing circumstances (e.g. access in Somalia).
Cash programme budget (formats) are a more useful means to prompt discussion. The Single
Form budget contains a line for transport (but not ‘logistics’). Logistics costs are usually classified
as supplies and transport.
Access to DG ECHO funding is seen as competitive (in Kenya) and they could be more flexible
by considering quality rather than just cost.
There is strong pressure from DG ECHO to increase resilience for water systems. There is
potential in the mid-term for direct funding to refugees to pay for water (‘Water ATMs’ – money
collected is used to maintain systems), which could be replicated for shelter.
Several agencies noted the need to encourage more synergy between DEVCO and DG ECHO.
In Kenya this is a unique time to advance localisation and the humanitarian-development nexus.
Proportion of funding for humanitarian logistics
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The standardised budget format does not enable effective cost analysis of proposals, so analysis
specific to logistics is not feasible. An attempt was made to introduce a percentage for support
costs in the new Single Form at a global level (only for NGOs, UN is exempted) but this has not
been successful as internally there isn’t agreement around the definition of support costs. A
common donor format for budgets would be helpful to enable joint reporting (linked to the GB
commitments).
Initiatives to support improved performance in humanitarian logistics and donor
investment to improve effectiveness of humanitarian response
Humanitarian funding cannot be relied on to leverage development results but development
funding, say for infrastructure projects in East Africa, would better enable humanitarian activities.
Past investments have been useful and have created capacity. The UNHRD (globally) is still an
interesting concept but is not being used to its full potential; management by the UN does not
necessarily inspire trust (or knowledge of its capability) among NGOs. Similar IFRC warehouses
have improved. There is a stronger desire for more forward prepositioning locations (i.e. more
localised). (Should DG ECHO stay involved in stockpiling – UNHRD facilities may not be in the
right places?).
Logistics trainings have been very useful and appreciated (did they make a real difference?). In
SE Asia DG ECHO sees more emergency deployments. Civil Protection is a classic means of
responding to natural disasters. EU Triplex simulation exercises in Africa would be valuable. MSB
(Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency) is a key standby partner with a big network. Common
services need to be better developed and the private sector better engaged in preparedness and
response. Seaport management companies on the Red Sea coast have massive interests, and
opportunities.
Copernicus was activated for the Madagascar emergency after tropical storm (15 March 2018) to
produce satellite images/maps that were very useful to show the extent of floods. This was the
second time it was activated in 2018. ERCC supplied daily maps and data on infrastructure
damage. DG ECHO has also supported the use of drones in Malawi (though COOPI and Swiss
Foundation, pioneers of drone technology) that mapped needs assessments.
There does not seem to be a strong connection between DG ECHO and DEVCO in terms of
planning humanitarian-development initiatives. The successful development of logistics capacity
will depend on combining short-term humanitarian and long-term development approaches. More
emphasis will need to be placed to support national capacities – linked to the Sustainable
Development Goals (SDGs), Sendai DRR Framework, and Comprehensive Refugee Response
Framework (CRRF). It is becoming more widely accepted that humanitarian and development
programming must work together to improve emergency response capacity.
Neutrally managed common pipelines and common procurement could bring tremendous cost-
benefit. At the same time, investment in empowered logistics (and other) cluster coordinators is
vital as this supports common visibility and shared priorities.40
There is a risk of making short-term investments that don’t have long-term benefits. DG ECHO /
DEVCO should consider a focus on supporting investments in physical infrastructure, not just on
resources like ECHO Flight.
Continued funding of preparedness is very important. In Kenya, the dialogue has changed. It is
the government and the Kenya Red Cross who are the first responders. Investment needs to be
40 In Ethiopia, UNHCR had contingency stocks for emergency response partly funded by DG ECHO.
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done in concert with the National Development Plan to ensure sustainability. For example, if there
were investment in airstrips near refugee operations there would be support to the development
of commercial capacity (this happened in Dolo Ado in Somali region of Ethiopia).
Coordination between humanitarian organisations and donors
Overall, more neutral expertise (non-WFP) for inter-agency coordination of logistics is required.
DG ECHO has their biggest interest in refugee camps. The management of common pipelines
(cash, food, NFIs) could more strongly be influenced. In South Sudan pipelines generally work
well (all funding is essentially for logistics).
Partners generally rely on common services and pipelines, apart from ICRC; MSF are also
independent and no longer request funds. IOM and UNICEF were recently found to be in
‘competition’ operating two WASH pipelines in South Sudan, indicating the need for better donor
oversight – strategically.
The South Sudan logistics cluster is regarded as unique as they have their own fleet of trucks
and aircraft that are funded separately from those of WFP. DG ECHO agrees that OCHA should
play a stronger strategic logistics coordination role, perhaps in support of the inter-cluster working
group(s).
There is some coordination between donors but not clearly on humanitarian logistics, although
there are examples in the region of good logistics cluster coordination. There is an issue to
explore of how far donors could better empower clusters or sector coordination groups, including
for logistics, in order that a more common approach and shared utilisation of assets can take
place (i.e. DG ECHO could help to ensure that a cluster lead agency does not have too much
control or take advantage of its lead role).
Successful engagement between DG ECHO and partners, and between donors is dependent
upon having the right personnel in place. This equally applies to logistics. While having good
people allows you to bridge gaps, they need to be supported by systems that encourage
collective approaches including to the provision and utilisation of common services for the good
of the whole humanitarian community (i.e. make sure that gaps are reduced in the first place).
UNICEF transfers supplies to Kenya Medical Supplies Agency (KEMSA, a parastatal for medical
supplies) which manages warehousing down to local level. KEMSA has generated 14% savings.
The World Bank injected funds to capitalise KEMSA and put in place new equipment. Some other
efforts have been taken to improve supply chain management but these have not been realistic
because there were too many partners to manage and coordinate. Even in HIV programming,
PEPFAR and Gates are doing their own thing.
For nutrition supply chains, inter-UN coordination is generally good and there is an extensive
network of Ministry of Health staff, donors, WFP, UNICEF implementing partners and KEMSA.
Ready to Use Therapeutic Food (RUTF) is fully integrated for all partners. There is an approved
supplier in Kenya.
Coordination of refugees (Refugee Coordination Model – RCM) considers the cluster system as a
part of the CRRF).41 The integration of humanitarian initiatives with the National Development
Plan of host nations is critical. Regional coordination needs to be encouraged, as agency
41 The CRRF specifies key elements for a comprehensive response to any large movement of refugees. These include rapid and well-supported reception and admissions; support for immediate and ongoing needs; assistance for local and national institutions and communities receiving refugees; and expanded opportunities for solutions.
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systems are complicated; common services should be enhanced. UNHCR see that the logistics
sector has not been active in many places in the same way as the health and WASH sectors etc.
Ability to coordinate comes back to the need for a neutral entity to be empowered. Strategic
coordination capability – through clusters when they are deployed or through other means when
they are not – could be improved.
Capacity development of partners or governments to ensure better responses
Under the Grand Bargain many commitments were made (including 100 commitments from DG
ECHO). The most relevant are for localisation, multi-year funding and simplified reporting; the GB
has two sides: donors and implementing agencies. Donors work on efficiency of the management
systems and the UN is supposed to rationalise costs, providing VfM. The process is challenging.
Localisation (in Somalia) is beginning and a local NGO is usually benefiting within every project.
There is slow progress on common reporting and harmonisation, as well as predictability of
funding.
HPCs (Humanitarian Procurement Centres) are audited (as part of a regular process). It is a
requirement that they are used to assure quality, but if a partner can guarantee quality they are
not obliged to use an HPC. They may choose to use an HPC because it is easier/less
bureaucratic but not necessarily cheaper than the DG ECHO procurement system. (But if an
agency does not use an HPC then the DG ECHO procurement process has to be followed.)
Cross-border supply operations are challenging due to bureaucracy. Customs authority capacity
building is not a role for DG ECHO but could be coordinated (politically) at the donor level.
Effectiveness and efficiency of humanitarian air transport services
DG ECHO supports UNHAS’ common services in South Sudan (where there is no ECHO Flight).
Generally, the services are good as the context needs fleet diversity. There was a concern that
UNHAS prioritised their regular schedule over special flights (security, medivac, priorities to
respond to shock) but this matter was resolved (through joint lobbying with OFDA).
Over the period 2013-2017, the highest level of funding has been to UNHAS operations in South
Sudan, although there were significant one-off contributions to UNHAS in Guinea in 2014 (due to
the Ebola crisis), to Nepal in 2015 (due to the earthquake in the country) and to Yemen in
2016/17 (due to the civil war). DG ECHO’s influence on UNHAS operations is variable although
its expected impact on EU-funded humanitarian aid projects is assessed as part of the funding
application process. DG ECHO is also a member of the UNHAS Steering Committee in those
countries where it has provided funding.
The overall level of ECHO Flight aircraft utilisation is relatively low – although this is also the case
for UNHAS and other humanitarian aviation services due to the comparatively low capital (or
leasing) cost of the aircraft themselves. There may be scope in future contracts to reduce the
number of aircraft used without any major changes to the overall schedule; although this would
give some loss of flexibility for other ad hoc flights.
The ECHO Flight supports EU-funded humanitarian aid projects in DR Congo, Mali, Kenya and
Uganda. Other EU-funded projects (e.g. for development) and those funded by European
Member States or other international organisations are given a lower priority. Users indicated that
EF generally meets most needs. The booking system needs further examination. EF generally
adds to the European Union’s visibility in providing support to its humanitarian programmes and
could be promoted more strongly within the countries it operates and globally.
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Regular audits undertaken by the Kenyan Civil Aviation Authority, BARS (Basic Aviation Risk
Standard) and by WFP Aviation, appear to be satisfactory. There is a higher safety risk of all
humanitarian air services in comparison to commercial air services, largely due to the dangers of
using remote airstrips, which are often unpaved and unmanned. Nevertheless, there are currently
no safe alternative commercial air services for any of the routes that EF operates.
The existence of two separate European Commission air services for EU-funded projects in
Central and West Africa (ECHO Flight and EU Flight) might be regarded as an anomaly –
although it is recognised that the EU Flight in Somalia is used largely by EU-funded development
staff and by EU military organisations rather than by EU-funded humanitarian staff, which account
for about 10% of all users. EU Flight is currently managed by DG DEVCO, who have indicated
willingness to transfer this management to DG ECHO in 2020.
The logistics cluster structure (for operational coordination) may offer a better platform for
UNHAS (South Sudan) in order to more efficiently match flights for the movement of people with
cargo movements. UNHAS was seen as less flexible in its operations, so DG ECHO-funded
‘special flights’ for rapid response. DG ECHO pushed UNHAS for indicators of their grant so that
things could be better tracked. (UNHAS is not transparent on costs.)
UNICEF finds that commercial air operators are sufficient for most locations in Kenya except
Dadaab and Kakuma and use ECHO Flight for higher-level missions.
Some agencies will prioritise ECHO Flight over UNHAS. They see a healthy level of competition
and find that EF is a better service than UNHAS (for Somalia). In South Sudan, UNHAS is
beholden to United Nations Department for Safety and Security (UNDSS) who are often a block
to access. Security sometimes is a challenge in northern parts of Kenya and airstrips there are
not all-weather, so this sometimes causes delays.
Improved private sector engagement to increase the efficiency of supply
An outcome of the WHS was the connecting business initiative. The HPPP was initiated with
partner NGOs, OCHA and several companies in Kenya and Uganda. The aim was to determine
how better to engage the private sector in emergencies. If donors were aligned, supply pipelines
could be outsourced. The HPPP has made limited progress.
As a UCPM (Union Civil Protection Mechanism) component, DG ECHO holds a renewable 4-year
framework contract with Kuehne & Nagel utilisation, which has been limited because Member
States prefer to deploy their own assets or services. Better use of K&N would be feasible.
Equity Bank and Safaricom in Kenya have been key for the delivery of cash within refugee
camps. (e.g. ‘Bamba Chakula’ managed through WFP). Equity bank has been used by the
Hunger Safety Net Programme. Equity has a network of mobile agents. There are some issues of
ID but the system encourages financial inclusion. The World Bank conducted a market system
study on the new Kalobye settlement to determine needs / demand and opportunities for
business to invest. EU are looking to fund the IFRC to implement parts of study. DG ECHO may
provide cash into the system to support the cash programme. Mastercard proposed a ‘smart
community’ project but at the moment DG ECHO legally cannot fund this directly.
WFP, FAO, ICRC and Kenya Red Cross Society have formed a regional Cash Consortium. The
goal is to get to an 80% cost-efficiency for cash programmes over €10 million per year. DG
ECHO is working with Concern Worldwide in Somalia because its cost structure is transparent.
The same data could not be obtained from WFP.
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WFP has better connections than OCHA and UNICEF and understands the private sector well.
WFP’s partnership with LET (logistics emergencies team) has been valuable.
UNICEF outsource warehousing, customs and distribution. For some services there are adequate
suppliers and therefore competition drives down costs (e.g. trucking) although for warehousing,
there are too few trusted suppliers being chased by too many agencies.
The likes of Mastercard will take over from aid organisations in the cash space. Often the
shortage of donor funding can drive innovation and inclusion of the private sector.
Implications for growth of cash based programming
Cash programming is clearly having a major impact and there is consensus that this will only
grow in importance. It reduces the need for humanitarian organisations to have their own logistics
capacity, which is instead taken care of by the private sector. It will eventually change the role of
humanitarian organisations away from service delivery towards protection, upholding
humanitarian principles and human rights and, where necessary, supporting the functioning of
market-based approaches. (Even in Somalia, markets are proving surprisingly resilient.)
However, challenges with cash based assistance include issues with follow-up by service
providers, such as Equity Bank whose systems don’t work for very poor or vulnerable people that
don’t know about complaints mechanisms and are afraid to report problems. Safaricom has
committed to increase network coverage so that people do not have to travel to get ‘cash’ but the
process has been slow. Coordination between aid partners in the field is not easy although cash
working groups are improving performance. For now, cash programming is not/cannot be(ing)
used in South Sudan. The governments of Ethiopia, Kenya and South Sudan have all resisted
cash going directly to refugees (now some latitude in Kenya?).
Cash affects the aid system and coordination – particularly for multi-sector cash. However, this is
very contextual. Some 80% of emergencies are complex so it is challenging to use cash for
programming (in terms of market-based support etc.). Cash coordination is also controversial at a
high level (between the big agencies WFP and UNHCR specifically). Nevertheless, cash can be
transformative but is not a magic bullet. In the future, agencies must focus on humanitarian
principles, as humanitarian operations will be the norm for the foreseeable future.
UNICEF is developing Nutritional Improvements through Cash and Health Education (NICHE) in
three to four countries in the East Africa region. Cash based interventions can have a negative
impact on life-saving approaches, e.g. in Uganda, WFP is only giving $10/month, which is
equivalent to the value of a typical food ration. The ‘distribution’ of e-vouchers is managed in a
similar way to the distribution of in-kind products. There needs to be a more streamlined
approach. Unconditional cash transfers for longer time periods are important.
DG ECHO could play a useful role to improve the approach to using cash for refugee operations.
Need to transform cash to enable self-reliance but this is very much dependent on government
policy – as in Tanzania they stopped cash for refugees as the government does not want
refugees to stay.
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Jordan field report
Introduction
The evaluation team leader visited Amman, Jordan from 17–20 June 2018. Due to an
unexpected extension of the Eid holiday, interviews were compressed into two working days.
Even so, the visit proved productive thanks to the efforts of the DG ECHO Regional Logistics TA,
who made every effort to reorganise interviews. A list of interviewees can be found in Annex 2.
Jordan was selected as a field study in part because of the extensive use of cash based
assistance, and because Jordan is used as a base by DG ECHO and some agencies for their
work in Yemen.42 The following is a summary of notes and findings.
Strategic overview of humanitarian logistics
Jordan is a middle-income country with plenty of services available including for logistics; it is no
longer considered an emergency situation. The pace of humanitarian intervention is seen to be
slowing and there is reduced sense of urgency.43 A major gap is the lack of support to
unregistered refugees and migrants from Syria and other countries, of which there are some
600,000–700,000. ‘We are not meeting the unreached’ (UN interviewee). There are concerns that
there may be a new influx of refugees from Syria because of conflict in the south of the country
but most informants felt that this would not happen.
Jordan has closed its borders to new refugees and the nature of the emergency response is more
focused on care and maintenance and social protection, with the exception of displaced people
stuck at the border at the ‘Berm’, who still require emergency life-saving assistance.
Donor interest in providing humanitarian funding for Jordan has declined and all agencies appear
to be struggling to meet their budgets. DG ECHO funding has declined over recent years and
some key partners have received no funding during 2017-18. (WFP has had no funding from DG
ECHO since 2016). DG ECHO has stopped funding partner programmes in the refugee camps
but still supports programmes at the ‘Berm’.
It was stated that there are limits to what can be achieved in working with government authorities
because they do not take ownership for the management of refugee camps.
Key humanitarian logistics challenges
The Berm. Operations at the Berm are logistically complex. It is a military area: movement is
restricted and no cell phones are allowed; there are also no roads. 50,000 people are stuck on
the Syria side of the border and some are allowed to cross the border daily to receive services.
DG ECHO continues to fund UNICEF and other actors to support those stranded at the border. ‘If
there was a good road to the Berm, it would save millions in transport but would also cost millions
to build.’ (This illustrates the challenge of balancing long-term investment to improve national
capacity – from development partners – versus short-term to meet short-term humanitarian need.
The relevant cost-benefit analysis is not done.)
Drug procurement. According to DG ECHO, in Jordan health logistics presents a major
challenge around the deployment of hospitals, laboratories and isolation units, and the
procurement of drugs and some specialised medical equipment. Only MSF and ICRC have the
42 The EU delegation is highly dependent on the United Nations for its operations in Yemen. EU Officials are not allowed to travel there but TAs can, as they are not technically officials of the EU. 43 For example, UNICEF is closing down 103 of 210 Makani centres, which provide vulnerable children and youth with learning opportunities, life skills training and psychosocial support services, all under one roof.
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expertise, including logisticians and the pharmacists (vaccines are managed by UNICEF). Other
partners do not have the capacity to check the quality of drugs. DG ECHO normally recommends
the use of HPCs but there is none in the region and increasingly countries do not allow
importation. DG ECHO needs long-term solution to how the quality of drugs is assessed.
Cluster functions. There is no formal logistics cluster, or any logistics coordination forum. An
attempt to form one was unsuccessful, indicating that there is insufficient incentive to do so. At
the same time, the information sharing that would take place within a cluster was acknowledged
by partners as lacking. WFP has undertaken a Logistics Capacity Assessment (available on the
Log Cluster website). There is minimal logistics coordination between agencies. Agencies do their
own warehousing. (In Yemen, the cluster is operational, and providing important functions.)
Security in conflict zones. Poor security restricts access, causes delays and there is the risk of
being bombed. In Yemen, many authorisations are needed to move goods, which can be
cancelled or countermanded by various parties. (There is a special system for UN cargo and
ICRC has its own system, bringing trucks into Yemen from Amman and Oman.)
Lack of overview. There is no strategic overview of logistics (Yemen or Jordan) and competition
between agencies limits strategic and operational coordination.
Warehousing. There is adequate private sector warehousing supply in Jordan but few service
providers are reliable.
Civil protection. CP deployments cannot be made in an overly politicised environment. For
example, in Yemen in 2017, a deployment was proposed when there was a cholera outbreak.
There was no response. Now the situation is too politicised to make a deployment possible.
Variable attention by partners. Not all NGOs give logistics the same level of attention. MSF,
ACF, and the Red Cross all have logistics departments where senior personnel are seen as
having the same level as senior programme managers, while for others logistics and supply are
seen as support functions.44 DG ECHO is concerned that some NGOs lack the necessary
procurement expertise.
NGO concerns:
• DG ECHO now provides little funding to support the supply chain.
• Many countries don’t offer tax exemption for imported humanitarian goods. Turkey taxes at 20–30%, and Iraq 15–20%. DG ECHO could lobby governments on behalf of its partners.
• When DG ECHO interrupted funding, the flow of drugs to hospitals stopped – this cannot be allowed to happen.
• DG ECHO encourages resilience and preparedness but does not pay for example prepositioning (i.e. it will not invest upfront). Partners have to find other ways to pay for contingency stocks.
• It takes months to get tax exemption certificate. ‘the dilemma [for partners] with DG ECHO is – how do we get the certificate before March or April and so avoid the 16% sales tax?’
• Importation for non-pharma is admin and paper heavy without specific customs permissions.
• Consistency of supply is a challenge. When ordering large amounts of relief goods, the quality goes down. ‘We can get range but not depth.’
44 ICRC regional logistics centre reported that they have recently brought in professional buyers (from e.g. Carrefour) and professional quality teams (with their own machines), with a major impact on reducing cost and improving quality. ICRC is soon to start a consultancy on supply chain at HQ level (perhaps Kuehne institute?).
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• ‘Procurement is where all the risk is.’ Collusion between suppliers is definitely happening.
• While logistics capacity in Jordan is generally good, if the market is over-extended, some firms will ‘hit the wall’. An emergency scenario will see logjams in customs, ports and airports.
• ‘Even when you have a long-term agreement in place with a supplier, when demand increases you find all the stock has been sold to the UN at a higher price.’
• Localisation is not happening. ‘Donors need to be pushed to engage with local partners [government and NGOs].’
• NGOs resist sharing information. No one wants to show they got the wrong prices.
• The DG ECHO proposal template has a section on equipment and goods but nothing on the logs processes to be followed. No procurement plan is requested. ‘Information that is relevant for proper planning should be requested.’
• DG ECHO funds but does not invest (i.e. in progressively developing NGO or govt capacity). Grants are very short-term. ‘There is not enough trust.’
• There has been pressure for NGOs to work in consortia. ‘Even then, there is not much supply chain coordination, everyone is doing their own thing.’ Donors like consortia but they may end up increasing costs – the lead NGO may need to set up its consortium own management unit.
• NGOs reported that they have various supply chain management initiatives underway, including global studies, VfM studies, development of KPIs, ERP initiatives to improve management and provide donors with the data they demand (not DG ECHO).
• In one of the group meetings between the consultant and NGOs, it was proposed that DG ECHO could implement a platform for NGOs (or all agencies) to record and track their goods, to provide a standardised view of values, volumes, warehousing. This would allow donors to take a strategic view of stocks across all partners. This could be supported by technology (for example, systems now exist to know where any ship is at any time).
Processes followed when reviewing funding for implementing partner projects
There are two regional logistics advisors, so the regional office is comparatively well off compared
with others. The international TA is mostly occupied with supporting DG ECHO offices: 12
offices are supervised from the Amman regional office; 3 offices have opened in the last 2–3
years (the Turkey team has grown to 3 offices and over 30 staff in less than 2 years). There are
significant security considerations/alterations to be managed.
The Regional Logistics Advisor is occasionally involved in monitoring projects or advising on the
revision of the HIP and is also increasingly called on by DG ECHO Unit A2 to support Union civil
protection deployments (he was deployed to the Caribbean). The TA was asked to provide back-
up for deployment to the Ebola outbreak in DR Congo but was not used in the end. DG ECHO
has no other dedicated logistics capacity in the region.
DG ECHO TAs had different perspectives on the need to address partner logistics. In practice, in
most cases, partners are left to manage logistics themselves (health procurement excepted – see
above). DG ECHO TAs do not have expertise to ask about other aspects of logistics.
There is a consensus that ‘good partners are those with good supplies, well stocked and timely
delivery’ but no agreement on how much data DG ECHO needs to oversee partners supply chain
management. With budget pressures, TAs are pressuring partners to reduce their budgets and do
the same with less, ‘it’s not about logistics’. (The same observation was made in Nairobi.)
‘Reasonable cost’ in project proposals means little. ‘It is more about a gut feeling that the budget
is too heavy.’
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Both DG ECHO and NGOs see there is value in diversity of partners and not putting all the DG
ECHO’s ‘eggs in one basket’. Complete standardisation may not be possible or desirable.
According to partners:
• Overall DG ECHO partners view DG ECHO colleagues positively. There is a good working relationship in Jordan.
• DG ECHO is seen to be effective advocate in coordination meetings.
• DG ECHO asks lots of questions of partners (but not about logistics).
• DG ECHO has been one of few donors to fund both registered refugees and undocumented.
• In Yemen, DG ECHO/EU gives partners great flexibility in where they work.
Also noted:
• DG ECHO invites selected partners to include a rapid response mechanism in their projects (insufficient detail was obtained on this).
• In Jordan, DG ECHO bought land cruisers because NGOs had problems with customs.
Proportion of funding for humanitarian logistics (only USAID interviewed)
USAID does not have dedicated logistics support for Jordan because the situation does not justify
it; Amman looks to Washington for advice. By contrast, USAID deploys logisticians to Syria
(where USAID funds a unified supply chain for NFIs with IOM).
OFDA has its own supply stocks in Dubai, while Food For Peace FFP holds stocks in Jordan.
FFP evaluates its partners’ supply tracking and warehousing and demands a logistics and
operations section within project proposals. OFDA asks some partners to include rapid response
mechanisms in their proposals (like DG ECHO).
Donors coordinate at the whole of crisis level, but not at sector level. There is no forum for
broader regional strategy, logistics or otherwise.
Coordination between humanitarian organisations and donors
The UN in Jordan has organised shared procurement of support services such as security, car
rental, protocol, fuel, IT, mobile networks etc. (which might be assumed to provide some
efficiencies for humanitarian programmes, but this was not explored).
The UN common procurement team is chaired by WFP. (DG ECHO wonders if more use could
be made of United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) in purchasing common services.)
Capacity development of partners or governments to ensure better responses
According to WFP there is a programme of preparedness training; multi-donor, especially
Germany.
In Jordan, DG NEAR is working with the government (also with Lebanon and Iraq) on a chemical,
biological, radiological and nuclear disaster preparedness project, for which the partner is the
Civil Defence Directorate (CDD). It is also working with the CDD on a twinning programme for
civil defence with French Civpol.45 This was not mentioned by DG ECHO.
45 The consulting and service company of the French Ministry of the Interior.
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As a country with a long-term crisis and the extended presence of perhaps a million Syrian
refugees, Jordan should provide potential for programming at the humanitarian-development
‘nexus’. One obvious area would be for DG ECHO/DEVCO to develop the national capacity to
respond to emergencies. This seems to be happening to an extent but not with DG ECHO. There
is no such initiative in the DG ECHO/DEVCO Joint Humanitarian and Development
Framework.46,47 The Framework was not mentioned by DG ECHO.
• DG ECHO supports CADRI48 at HQ level (CADRI is another potential ‘nexus’ initiative). A 2017 CADRI mission to Jordan49 recommended, among other measures, the need for an umbrella disaster risk management law and an updated national DRR strategy, targeted investment in drought monitoring and flood early warning system for wadis in high population density areas and public awareness campaigns. It is not clear whether DG ECHO engaged with the CADRI visit or the follow-up. (DG ECHO did not mention it.)
Improved private sector engagement to increase the efficiency of supply
In Jordan, the private sector has considerable capacity to provide the support to humanitarian
logistics required, including fourth sector50 logistics suppliers. However, suppliers are not always
reliable in terms of quality.
Implications for growth of cash based programming
Jordan was selected as a study for this evaluation in part because of the substantial use of multi-
purpose cash transfers in support of refugees. Donors, government, UN and INGOs are all
behind its expansion. There is a mixture of cash and e-vouchers, with no conditionality. The cost
of administering cash transfers in Jordan is very low. UNHCR has reduced its overhead for cash
programmes to 1.5%.
The majority of actors work through the common cash facility, the main exception being WFP.
WFP has adopted block-chain technology for the management of the distribution of cash for food
to beneficiaries. This approach is not shared by UNICEF, UNHCR and others and is a source of
disagreement. The government also does not support it. The cash transfer approach is
sophisticated with iris scanning being the major innovation mentioned by all, which has greatly
improved security of transfers.
WFP now has no pure logistics projects in Jordan because of the focus on cash transfers. It is
instead focused on retail management, with half a million people redeeming assistance against
debit cards recharged each month and by ATM withdrawal. There are 200 shops with 52 retailers.
WFP has achieved an 80:20 ratio, cash to beneficiaries versus total costs. WFP is strengthening
46 The Joint Humanitarian and Development Framework (JHDF) was introduced in Jordan in 2015. According the Jordan JHDF for 2018-19: ‘The JHDF is the result of strategic discussions between the EU Delegation and DG ECHO to address the humanitarian, mid-term and development priorities in Jordan, and aims at a more cost-effective division of labour, based on regular exchange of information and coordination.’ (p1) The Jordan JHDF focuses on five sectors, Education; Protection; Health; Livelihood/Basic Needs Approach/Social Protection; and Water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) and aims to ‘promote synergies between the respective objectives foreseen within the EU funding instruments in Jordan’, in particular DG ECHO funding, the EU Regional Trust Fund in Response to the Syrian Crisis, (Madad Fund') and the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI). 47 Using is the instruments contributing to stability and peace (ICSP), DG near has supported the Jordanian Armed Forces and IOM (In Jordan, the ICSP continues to fund the IOM project, ‘Support the national efforts in managing migration flows and refugee influx in the context of the Syria crisis’ (€5.28m in 2017-18, of a total €25.5m for Jordan). IOM is working with refugees at the border, where they were welcomed screened and supported. Ambulances, pickups, and water tankers were all purchased under the ICSP. 48 Capacity for Disaster Reduction Initiative (CADRI) https://www.cadri.net/ 49 Capacity Assessment of the Disaster Risk Management System in Jordan, March 2017. 50 Fourth sector = organisations that combine market-based approaches of the private sector with the social and environmental aims of the public and non-profit sectors.
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the ministry of education logistics capacity in order to improve its management and funding of
school feeding.
In Yemen, the social welfare system has collapsed. DG NEAR/DG ECHO agreed that DG ECHO
would provide funding for three months and DG NEAR would then provide funding to a restricted
version of the welfare system for another 12 months. This includes small-scale projects at
community level. Beneficiaries are selected are those who have the greatest chance of achieving
resilience. Households headed by women are selected first so that the funds are less likely to go
to the purchase of khat.51
51 DG near is also supporting FAO in maintaining the food security information system (FSIS).
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Annex 4 – Efficiency case study
The evaluation has assessed the processes DG ECHO uses to assess logistics within partner
projects, including the relevant procedures for partner and project assessment. This was
supplemented by a review of project documentation from a sample of DG ECHO projects
implemented in Bangladesh during the evaluation period in combination with interviews with DG
ECHO staff and partners in Bangladesh, specifically the Rohingya refugee crisis response.
Concept Note
The Concept Note for the efficiency case study included in the Inception Report intended that the
field visit would ask the following questions of DG ECHO and partners:
• Project assessment: To what extent do DG ECHO field experts (TAs) scrutinise partner logistics design? What do TA look for? Do TA look at costs? If so, what costs? How do TAs assess costs? Does this scrutiny vary according to the type of partner or the sector? Do TAs have rules of thumb about what is efficient? What are they? Are they tested with other experts? How are judgements made overall?
• Partner engagement: What is the nature, scope and outcome of TA dialogue with partners on logistics, both at the assessment stage and throughout implementation? Is the engagement formal through rounds of comments or informal and undocumented? How often does dialogue on logistics influence partner logistics practice?
• Learning: Is the learning from partner engagement captured by DG ECHO systems? Is it used for future assessments? Is it shared with partners?
• Outcomes: Logistics has outputs (goods and services delivered), but its choice of modalities and its efficiency may affect project outcomes. Are there examples of this? Is this link made by partners in their planning? How might it be?
• Overall: What is your view of partner logistics competence and performance? Can you disaggregate between types of partner or sectors? What might DG ECHO do to improve the performance and/or reduce the cost of partner logistics activities? How would this be achieved, what would it take, and what would it cost?
Reported effectiveness of field TA in ensuring efficient delivery of aid
The field visit took place against the backdrop of the recently completed Comprehensive
Evaluation of EU Humanitarian Aid, 2012–16, (CEHA), which presents a positive view of the
effectiveness of DG ECHO field experts (TA):
The absolute majority of the field network itself considers its own monitoring to be very effective
(68%) and somewhat effective (26%). Similarly, widespread positive views were noted in relation
to the field network effectively guiding the partners, monitoring their progress and ensuring an
effective and efficient delivery of aid in the local contexts. This positive view of successful
field network support to the implementation is largely echoed by the DG ECHO framework and
local partners surveyed, among whom the absolute majority also considered the DG ECHO field
support to be sufficient to the project implementation. Indeed, it is also positive that almost 60% of
local partners surveyed reported being in frequent contact with DG ECHO staff, indicating a close
relationship and interaction on the ground.52
52 Comprehensive Evaluation of EU humanitarian aid, 2012-2016, Section 3.1.4.2: ‘The field network successfully contributed (in terms of monitoring) and provided support to the implementation of DG ECHO actions’, page 62, emphasis added.
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Earlier KIIs in Brussels provided examples of where DG ECHO’s field experts (TA), together with
desk officers (DO) with humanitarian experience, enhanced efficiency and effectiveness of
operations with interventions at the portfolio level, that is, making an appropriate choice of
partners, deciding their respective roles, and proposing to the DO how they would fit together into
an efficient and coherent response. In particular, the evaluators heard examples of TAs
considering the merits and drawbacks of funding UN agencies versus funding NGOs directly,
depending on their comparative advantage in the particular operating context. However, these
HQ interviews also indicated that DG ECHO field staff pay little attention to humanitarian logistics
within partner programmes either at project assessment or monitoring levels.
Interviews took as their starting point the interview questions for DG ECHO partners used for all
the evaluation field visits. In addition, the cost-effectiveness expert attempted to probe the areas
listed above, primarily with TA and partners, focusing on logistics. Many of the questions were
motivated by observations made in the Comprehensive Evaluation (CEHA) and this evaluations’
Efficiency Desk Report.
Bangladesh – findings on efficiency
DG ECHO engages in detail with logistics projects that provide logistics capacity for other
organisations, especially WFP’s provision of warehousing as a common service and Atlas’
Logistique services to NGOs, as discussed above. Otherwise, DG ECHO is not systematic in its
engagement with partners on logistics costs and plans through the project cycle.
In line with responses from previous interviews, the Bangladesh visit confirmed that scrutiny of
costs to determine whether they are ‘reasonable’ was a matter of general impression rather than
analysis. DG ECHO staff agreed there was no objective way of assessing ‘reasonableness’ of
costs.
The evaluation reviewed the 2017–18 Rohingya humanitarian response dashboard,53 which
includes comments by TA, Regional Office (DG ECHO) and DO on project proposals and provide
the rationale for partner funding decisions. Thirty partners submitted proposals against the HIP (in
several cases as consortium lead); of these 16 were funded in amounts varying from €700,000 to
€5 million; with a total humanitarian allocation of €26 million.54
To highlight the criteria that DG ECHO is using to assess project proposals, two representative
(and slightly re-edited) extracts from the dashboard illustrate the focus and nature of DG ECHO’s
analysis, one from a partner granted funding (‘Proposal A’), the other from a partner refused
funding (‘Proposal B’).
53 Ares(2018)3051314 – Annex – Dashboard (HIP 2018 – 29MIL) FINAL4.xlsx 54 Reportedly, a further round of funding was in process at the time of our visit bringing total DG ECHO spending on the Rohingya crisis in Cox’s Bazar since August 2017 to €47 million.
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Proposal A
• ‘Overall a sound proposal, and a continuation of an ongoing intervention, aligned with DG ECHO priorities for the Rohingya refugee crisis; fully focused on undernutrition management (MAM treatment through specialised foods-WSB+/WSB++, vegetable oil).
• Standalone nutrition project. Strong collaboration and synergies reported for MAM management with blanket & targeted supplementary feeding.
• Appropriate needs assessment and logical and needs-based plan of actions. LFA is SMART with numbers KRI and KOI.
• Recommended for funding.’
Proposal B
• ‘The proposal is only for a small part matching the DG ECHO strategical objectives. Where the title of the action assumes the integration of protection and wash into one program, there is no sign of integration. It is also unclear where the action is taking place and who the beneficiaries will be. The outcome of the assessments is not stated, the analysis is not given. There is a very poor connection between assessment and problem statement and analyses. The beneficiaries’ selection criteria should be more precise.
• Overall weak proposal, with no link between problem analysis and response strategy. WASH: Not cost-effective with €33 per beneficiary, and works through implementing partners such as [partner name removed], regarding the latter, it would probably be more effective to fund them directly.
• Technically, the proposed twin pit latrine has low coverage of users. Rather than the proposed twin pits for latrines with a low coverage of 20 users, a single pit of equivalent capacity or 2 pits connected would be more effective and could easily be designed / sized so that they do not fill up.
• Very short light budget with no details for big figures: those should be explained.
• Not recommended for funding.’
The commentary from these and other examples in the dashboard points to the proposals being
assessed according to:
• Alignment to DG ECHO strategy (especially the HIP).
• Technical standard: its needs analysis, beneficiary selection, technical standard of the proposed interventions, and the overall logic of the plan: how the activities are to be integrated, how they will lead to outputs and outcomes, and how this will be monitored.
• Financial value (though not necessarily with any analysis presented).
• Coverage of sector needs.
In response to Proposal B, unit costs are referred to (rare) but without a benchmark, so it is
unclear why the writer judges it not to be cost-effective. There is also a reference to the ‘short
light’ budget, without any budget analysis.
DG ECHO is alert to the savings that can be made through direct funding of framework partners,
rather than, as in Proposal B, funding them through a partner as its implementing partners (IP)
with the consequent 7% administration charge; but there is no discussion of the possible extra
workload direct funding would entail and how that compares with paying the 7%.
Overall, as discussed, there is no reference to partner logistics. Interviews with DG ECHO staff
and other stakeholders in Dhaka and Cox’s Bazar did demonstrate a concern with partner
efficiency and effectiveness in general, even without attention to logistics within partner project
proposals.
How DG ECHO addresses efficiency
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At a whole-of-response level DG ECHO did take implementation challenges – including some
logistics considerations – into account in its own planning and discussion with partners. Examples
of efficiency-related concerns taken up by DG ECHO included (some with positive outcome, other
not):
Efficiency – partner staff time
• DG ECHO uses its influence with government to press for humanitarian visas and partner travel authorisations, both of which are major efficiency issues for partners.
Efficiency – preparedness
• DG ECHO is in dialogue with Brussels over the use of Member State Civil Protection assets for preparedness in anticipation of a major (Category 5) cyclone.
Efficiency – shared services
• DG ECHO funds the joint IOM-WFP-UNHCR Site Maintenance Engineering Project programme for infrastructure (road and culvert) maintenance in the Rohingya camps.
Efficiency – partner coordination and beneficiary time saving
• DG ECHO has asked partners to coordinate their services, so that refugees can access multiple services in multi-function centres, thus saving refugees considerable time in walking between otherwise separate centres.
Efficiency – cash versus commodities
• Where a partner persists with commodity distribution, DG ECHO quantifies the potential savings to be made in moving from commodities to cash, makes a market and protection assessment, and challenges the partner to move to cash. DG ECHO supports partners such as Oxfam that champion cash.
• DG ECHO has challenged WFP to improve its coverage, both of the mega-camp (Kutupalong) and the smaller southern camps, by mapping WFP distribution points and correlating them with population maps, demonstrating where caseloads are underserved. This is both an effectiveness issue (reaching the population) and an efficiency issue (reducing the distance refugees have to walk over hilly terrain to reach distribution points).
Efficiency – early identification of gaps and getting partner to act
• DG ECHO notes that only 13% of moderate acute malnutrition (MAM) cases are being treated and presses UNICEF for a scale-up plan.
Efficiency – waste or sale of inappropriate aid
• DG ECHO observes that WFP dried food is partially wasted or sold. DG ECHO then funds other partners to run household trials and subsequently scale up fresh food vouchers, thereby increasing the efficiency of the utilisation of food overall.
Conclusion on efficiency
Based on the limited number of interviews and timeframe for the visit, the evaluators conclude in
the case of the Rohingya response that:
A. DG ECHO does not systematically engage partners in discussion of logistics costs and operational practices at the project proposal stage, unless the project purpose is logistics related.
B. DG ECHO is active and sometimes effective in influencing partners and authorities to improve efficiency and effectiveness in areas that involve logistics only indirectly, both individually and
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across the portfolio with multiple partners. To this extent, our findings are consistent with the CEHA conclusions noted in the opening section of the annex.
For more on the assessment the efficiency of logistics in DG ECHO projects, see Annexes 21 to
23.
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Annex 5 – Evaluation Framework
Table 9 shows the Evaluation Framework included in the Inception Report and agreed with the ISG.
Table 1: Evaluation Framework
Evaluation question/ sub-questions Judgement criteria Indicators Data sources
RELEVANCE
1. How well were DG ECHO's humanitarian logistics activities funded, designed and tailored to the needs of its partners?
To what extent do DG ECHO partners
consider DG ECHO’s humanitarian
logistics activities an added value to their
humanitarian response(s) and to
beneficiaries?
DG ECHO partners were consulted prior to DG
ECHO decisions and investments in
humanitarian logistics activities
Partners give a high rating to the contribution of
DG ECHO humanitarian logistics activities to
their own performance
Partners are able to define specific added values
to their humanitarian response as the result of
DG ECHO support
Partner interviews in-country
Partners survey (if email lists
available)
Interviews with HRD management
Interviews with DG ECHO
Interviews with government
2.How well has DG ECHO responded to its humanitarian logistics approach, activities and funding to i) changing humanitarian needs, ii) recent policy developments in
humanitarian aid and civil protection
What key policy developments have
taken place in humanitarian aid that DG
ECHO needed to, or should have
responded to regarding humanitarian
logistics?
Partners were consulted and were part of
humanitarian logistics policy or standards
development
DG ECHO regulations covered logistics policies
and standards
DG ECHO recognised changes required to
humanitarian logistics and adjusted its approach
accordingly
DG ECHO exercised intellectual leadership in
the use of new developments/technologies, as
applied to humanitarian logistics
DG ECHO policy documents that show
appreciation of changes in the humanitarian
landscape
Evidence of DG ECHO leadership in the Grand
Bargain
Policy/other DG ECHO documents
discussing/proposing new approaches to
humanitarian air
Level of utilisation / uptake of new technologies
DG ECHO attendance at network meetings
where new technologies discussed
Judgements of DG ECHO officials and partners
in regard to policy developments in the field of
humanitarian logistics
DG ECHO policy documents
Project evaluation reports
Needs assessment reports
Post distribution monitoring
reports
Network meeting background
papers involving DG ECHO
Interviews with DG ECHO officials
and partners
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Evaluation question/ sub-questions Judgement criteria Indicators Data sources
How did DG ECHO adjust its approach
to humanitarian logistics in response to
its promotion and financial support to
cash based programming?
DG ECHO supported partners to use new
technologies and approaches (such as cash
transfers)
DG ECHO understands the logistics implications
for partners and recipients of the shift to cash
based approach
Value of cash transfers funded by DG ECHO as
a proportion of the whole
Number of cash transfer projects and partners
versus in-kind projects
Appreciation and evaluation of cash transfer
projects by beneficiaries and partners
Project documents
DG ECHO HIPs
Evaluation reports and guidance
on cash based programming
To what extent has DG ECHO's
Emergency Management Policy covered
humanitarian logistics?
Humanitarian logistics appears as a strategic
component of emergency management plans
Funding was allocated for humanitarian logistics
activities
Sufficient personnel were assigned for the
management of humanitarian logistics activities
Project evaluation reports
DG ECHO HIPs
Interviews with DG ECHO staff
3. To what extent has DG ECHO taken a strategic approach to humanitarian logistics activities and funding decisions to maximise DG ECHO’s relevance for humanitarian
logistics in international humanitarian aid?
To what extent does DG ECHO have a
strategic overview of developments in
the logistics market (capacity, suppliers,
technology)?
DG ECHO has maintained a strategic overview
of how humanitarian logistics can be improved
DG ECHO has the analytical capacity to develop
and maintain the strategic approach to
humanitarian logistics
Implementation plans coming from strategy
DG ECHO demonstrates understanding of
developments in the logistics market
Partner interviews
Donor interviews
Strategy documents
DG ECHO interviews
What, if any, strategy has DG ECHO
employed to select its humanitarian
logistics investments and the levels of
funding to each investment?
How strategic have DG ECHO’s
humanitarian logistics investments been?
DG ECHO has a clear, shared strategy for
making investments in humanitarian logistics
DG ECHO has considered alternatives and
made rational choices between the options
based on:
● Need,
● Likely impact on the delivery of humanitarian aid, and
● Consistency with DG ECHO overall objectives
Evidence of a strategy for making investments in
humanitarian logistics
Evidence of analysis of:
● Humanitarian logistics needs,
● Likely impact of various humanitarian logistics investments on delivery of humanitarian aid, and
● Consistency of investments with DG ECHO overall objectives
Evidence that such analysis was considered in
decision-making
Policy or strategy documents
(either DG ECHO or joint and
shared with other parties)
Minutes or reports of decision-
making processes
Evaluation cost-effectiveness
study
Evaluation air services study
To what extent were partners engaged in
the development of DG ECHO strategy
towards the development of global
humanitarian logistics capabilities such
as GLC and HRDs?
DG ECHO had an articulated strategy for its
humanitarian logistics capacity investments
Partners were aware of DG ECHO’s
humanitarian logistics policies and strategy
Partners feedback on the level of inclusion and
support within the strategy
Evidence from DG ECHO that it undertook a
participative and consultative process in support
Logistics Cluster reports
Logistics Cluster website
Meeting minutes
WFP special operations reports
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Evaluation question/ sub-questions Judgement criteria Indicators Data sources
related to the development of common logistics
services
of its strategy towards the development of global
humanitarian logistics capabilities
UNHRD reports
DG ECHO strategy documents
To what extent has DG ECHO developed
a strategic overview of logistics needs,
gap identification and capacity at
emergency or country level?
DG ECHO has supported / funded country-level
Logistics Capacity Assessments (including
retail/market Logistics Capacity Assessments)
Number of Logistics Capacity Assessments
supported / funded at emergency or country level
Partner Logistics Capacity
Assessment reports
DG ECHO strategic T&L
documentation
To what extent has DG ECHO
contributed to models/practice for
increased efficiency in humanitarian
logistics as part of meeting its
commitments to the Grand Bargain?
DG ECHO has supported the need for strategic
interventions that can optimise the use of
humanitarian logistics resources between
stakeholders, including as the result of the
Grand Bargain recommendations
Level of funding allocated to inter-agency /
coordination functions and activities related to
humanitarian logistics preparedness and
response
Level of alignment of DG ECHO policies and
practice to the Grand Bargain recommendations
Grand Bargain progress reports
Interviews
Partner proposals
Partner interviews
To what extent has DG ECHO
considered and promoted, where
relevant, recent innovations in
humanitarian logistics?
DG ECHO has analysed and documented
developments and innovations in humanitarian
logistics and encouraged their application
New humanitarian logistics innovations appear in
partner programme proposals
Evidence that DG ECHO documents and reviews
humanitarian logistics innovations
DG ECHO interviews
Partner interviews
Partner proposals
Documentary review
COHERENCE AND COMPLEMENTARITY
4. To what extent are the different activities of DG ECHO's humanitarian logistics portfolio coherent and complementary to each other, including between humanitarian
action and civil protection?
To what extent were DG ECHO’s policy,
guidance and standards for humanitarian
logistics applied to (1) DG ECHO field
network; and (2) partners?
DG ECHO has a communication policy and
materials on its humanitarian/CP policy for
partners and governments
Partners were aware of all humanitarian logistics
policies and CP support modalities and were
able to benefit from them
Number of partners that used or were supported
by CP transport or other services during
humanitarian operations
Number of instances where the DG ECHO field
network / offices / Logistics TAs supported
emergency operations
Operational reports
Reports on member state CP
interventions
Interviews
How well has DG ECHO ensured
coherence, synergies and
complementarity in transport and
logistics between civil protection and
humanitarian aid operations?
Directorates have a mutually reinforcing
approach to humanitarian logistics/ CP/ and
policy
Funding / support for partner programmes that
include humanitarian logistics elements have
been aligned between the different DGs
Number of partners’ humanitarian logistics
programmes (or programme elements) that were
supported by each DG ECHO DG
Frequency of contact/ collaboration between
Logisticians in Directorates A and D
Partner programme reports
Interviews
Internal reports / data
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Evaluation question/ sub-questions Judgement criteria Indicators Data sources
The DG ECHO field network complemented
humanitarian logistics emergency operations
when needed
Evidence or perceptions of complementarity
between different humanitarian logistics activities
within DG ECHO
5. To what extent does DG ECHO’s policy and practice for humanitarian logistics complement or differ from that of other donors?
With regard to preparedness? DG ECHO developed a strategy for
preparedness
DG ECHO coordinated its preparedness policy
and investments with other donors
Evidence of commonality/differences between
donor approaches
Number of donors supporting the prepositioning
relief items within the UNHRD network
UNHRD reports
UNHRD website
Donor policy and guidance
documents related to
humanitarian logistics
With regard to capacity development? DG ECHO identified humanitarian logistics
capacity development needs (globally and
nationally) and funded suitable interventions
DEVCO and DG ECHO worked together to
create a joint preparedness/resilience strategy
Level of DG ECHO investment with other donors
(inc. DEVCO) in capacity development
Number of donors supporting the humanitarian
logistics capacity-building initiatives
Number of individuals or organisations registered
to participate in capacity building and / or training
activities
Donor reports
Training service provider reports
Partner capacity-building reports
Interviews
How well has DG ECHO coordinated its
funding to humanitarian logistics with
other donors at emergency/country level
and international level?
Other donors were aware of DG ECHO
humanitarian logistics policies and CP support
modalities and were able to complement them
ECHO Flight and UNHAS services were
complementary
DG ECHO identified humanitarian logistics
funding gaps and intervened where appropriate
Number of partners that used or were supported
by DG ECHO’s humanitarian logistics
interventions during humanitarian operations
Number and funding levels, of donors that
complemented DG ECHO humanitarian logistics
interventions, including ECHO Flight during
emergency operations
DG ECHO interviews in-country
Other donor interviews HQ and
in-country
Joint emergency plans showing
evidence of joint approaches
ECHO Flight and UNHAS reports
/ data
Donors' funding reports
How well has DG ECHO coordinated its
support to logistics with local and
national authorities?
National Disaster Management Authorities were
aware of DG ECHO humanitarian logistics
policies and CP support modalities and were
able to benefit from them
The DG ECHO field network complemented
national humanitarian logistics emergency
operations when needed
Number of national authorities that were
supported by CP transport or other services
during humanitarian operations
Number of instances where the DG ECHO field
network / offices / Logistics TAs supported
national authorities
National Disaster Management
Agency reports from selected
countries
Interviews
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Evaluation question/ sub-questions Judgement criteria Indicators Data sources
How coherent are DG ECHO’s
humanitarian logistics actions with those
of the United Nations, Red Cross Red
Crescent and NGOs?
DG ECHO has strategic partnerships with the
UN and RCRC to improve humanitarian logistics
DG ECHO humanitarian logistics strategy
supported the UN to develop the logistics cluster
and the UNHRD network
DG ECHO complemented humanitarian logistics
initiatives activated by the Red Cross Movement
DG ECHO supported NGO humanitarian
logistics requirements for emergency response
operations
Number of partners that used or were supported
by the logistics cluster and UNHRD during
humanitarian operations
Number and value of Red Cross humanitarian
logistics initiatives supported by DG ECHO
Number and value of NGO humanitarian logistics
interventions that DG ECHO supported
Ratio of DG ECHO supported interventions vs
UN and RCRC self-funded interventions
Interviews in-country with UN,
Red Cross and NGOs
Other donor interviews HQ and
in-country
Joint emergency plans showing
evidence of joint approaches
Logistics cluster and UNHAS
reports / data
Partner feedback on the ongoing
value of these investments
EFFECTIVENESS
6. To what extent have DG ECHO's humanitarian logistics activities contributed to DG ECHO’s overall objective to save lives, alleviate suffering and maintain and protect
human dignity in terms of: rapid and efficient response in the event of disasters and complex emergencies (including preparedness)?
To what extent have DG ECHO’s
thematic and ERC investments had a
positive impact on the effectiveness of
humanitarian response?
DG ECHO humanitarian partners were able to
respond more quickly thanks to DG ECHO-
funded prepositioned stocks
Value of DG ECHO investments in
preparedness, direct and indirect through
partners
Utilisation rates/value of stock rotation of DG
ECHO-funded emergency preparedness stocks
HRD and other preparedness
investments
HRD stock records
HIPs
Project record allocations to
preparedness
Partner interviews
Survey results
To what extent are Humanitarian
Response Depots being used, and by
whom?
Partners have maintained inventory within the
HRD network consistently over several years
Number of partners contributing inventory to the
HRD network
Level of inventory deployed during emergencies
HRD reports
To what extent has the prepositioning of
stocks in UNHRDs considered by DG
ECHO partners to have improved their
response time, relevance, efficiency or
effectiveness?
Partners that have maintained inventory within
the HRD network consistently deploy relief items
for emergency responses
Number of consignments of relief items deployed
to emergency operations
HRD reports
Partner reports
Partner Interviews – How did
HRDs perform and how can they
improve
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Evaluation question/ sub-questions Judgement criteria Indicators Data sources
To what extent are Humanitarian
Procurement Centres (HPCs) being used
and by whom?
Partners have procured supplies from one or
more HPC globally on a regular basis
Number of partners procuring from HPCs
Level of inventory procured from HPCs
HPC reports
Audit data
To what extent do partners consider
HPCs have improved the response time,
relevance, efficiency or effectiveness of
their humanitarian response?
Partners prefer to procure through HPCs rather
arrange to have their own procurement
processes approved by DG ECHO
Partners have used HPCs to supply their
humanitarian programmes
Number of partners procuring from HPCs
Evidence/impressions from partners of improved
performance through HPCs
User surveys
Key informant interviews
HPC reports
Audit data
Partner interviews (How HPCs
performed and how they can
improve)
How effective has DG ECHO-funded
logistics training been?
Members of the humanitarian aid community
have regularly used DG ECHO-funded logistics
training services
Number of DG ECHO-funded humanitarian
logistics training programmes available
Number of trainees that have participated in the
training programmes
Perceptions about the quality of DG ECHO-
funded humanitarian logistics
Interviews with
DG ECHO logistics platform
Training service providers
Trainee feedback/surveys
To what extent has DG ECHO’s joint
initiatives with DEVCO (humanitarian-
development nexus, resilience) included
the strengthening of the local response
capacity, supply chain and markets?
DG ECHO and DEVCO have articulated a joint
approach to resilience in national preparedness
and response capacity
DG ECHO has invested in government and/or
partner initiatives increase preparedness and
response capacity
Evidence of DEVCO and DG ECHO working on
joint strategy
Number of DG ECHO-funded projects with
preparedness and response capacity
components, and value of those components
Strategy documents
HIPs that promote preparedness
and response capacity
Project data
7. To what extent have DG ECHO humanitarian logistics activities had a positive impact on the protection of the goods and staff of DG ECHO and its partners?
How well have partners analysed the
security aspects of transport? To what
extent have partners demonstrated
rational choices in the use of unmarked
vs marked vehicles, versus the use of
helicopters in insecure environments?
DG ECHO partners conducted humanitarian
logistics security risk assessments as part of
their programme / project designs
As part of risk assessments, partners
determined the safest means of personnel
transport
Number of partner risk assessments evaluated
by DG ECHO
Number of Medevac and other special flights
Perceptions of the security by one logistical form
of logistics versus another
Partner risk assessment reports
Reported security incidents
Aid worker security database
(AWSD)
Partner interviews
To what extent have DG ECHO
humanitarian logistics activities and
investments enabled humanitarian
Joint cargo flights from UNHRD provided
opportunities to partners to respond in
difficult/insecure environments
Number of partners using flights to move relief
cargo and passengers
Tonnes moved
UNHRD records
ECHO Flight and UNHAS data
Partner reports / data
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Evaluation question/ sub-questions Judgement criteria Indicators Data sources
responses in difficult, and / or insecure
environments?
ECHO Flight and UNHAS have supported
humanitarian access in contexts of conflict and
insecurity
Passengers transported by air
Number of humanitarian responses served by
DG ECHO Hum Log activities
To what extent are the relatively high
transport costs in insecure contexts (e.g.
South Sudan and Somalia) justified in
terms of improved access, speed or
security?
Beneficiaries receive planned assistance
Partner programmes and operational objectives
achieved
Partner requests for secure transport services
met
Number of beneficiaries assisted by partners in
difficult to access contexts
Number of insecure areas, requiring
humanitarian assistance, accessed by air
Number of partners’ personnel using air transport
services
Cost of humanitarian logistics activities in
insecure contexts
Partner project reports
Distribution reports
Flight booking records over time
Operating budgets
Evaluation reports
Interviews with air charter
operators ECHO Flight/UNHAS
coordinators, security advisors,
Civil Aviation Authorities etc.
What were the major factors influencing
the effectiveness of DG ECHO’s
humanitarian logistics investments?
Factors supporting and acting as obstacles to
efficient and effective humanitarian logistics are
documented
Evidence of HIPs addressing causes of
insecurity
Evidence of projects addressing causes of
insecurity
Interviews
Surveys
8. To what extent has the deployment of Civil Protection assets by EU Member States, coordinated by DG ECHO, contributed to the effectiveness of humanitarian
programming beyond Europe?
Which CP deployments have taken place
outside Europe and to what extent have
they been co-funded?
CP transport assets have been utilised
effectively in major humanitarian emergencies
The ERCC (emergency response coordination
centre) has been activated effectively to support
coordination efforts during humanitarian
emergencies
Number of global humanitarian emergencies
where UCPM has been activated
Number of CP transport assets deployed per
year in humanitarian contexts
Number of ERCC reports / maps / other data
produced for humanitarian operations
DG ECHO/UCPM reports
ERCC data
Interviews with ERCC staff
Interviews with humanitarian
partners
How have CP/HA coordination
arrangements developed over the
evaluation period?
DG ECHO progressively invested in CP
coordination capacity
The ERCC has been utilised by an increasingly
wide range of partners
The deployment and use of CP assets were well
coordinated with the UN/government systems
Level of DG ECHO investment in CP
coordination capacity
Number of partners using or supporting the
ERCC
Perceptions of partners about the use and
relevance of ERCC
DG ECHO/UCPM reports
ERCC data
Interviews with ERCC and UCPM
staff
Interviews with partners and other
donors
What are the perceived benefits and
disadvantages of CP deployments?
The ERCC made CP transport interventions
during response operations visible
Number of global humanitarian emergencies
where UCPM has been activated
DG ECHO / UCPM evaluation
reports
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Evaluation question/ sub-questions Judgement criteria Indicators Data sources
ERCC effectively coordinated CP assets for
maximum effectiveness
Humanitarian principles were adhered to in CP
deployments
Number of CP transport assets deployed per
year in humanitarian contexts vs those deployed
by the UN and other humanitarian actors
Level of MS satisfaction with coordination by DG
ECHO
ERCC data
Interviews with ERCC / UCPM
staff
Interviews with partners
Interviews with Member States
EFFICIENCY
9. To what extent are DG ECHO-funded humanitarian logistics services efficient and cost-effective?
To what extent are DG ECHO-funded air
services managed efficiently?
See separate detailed framework for air services
study Annex 4
To what extent are UNHRDs managed
efficiently?
Inventory turnover has been efficient / regular
Inventory is not heavily duplicated among
partners
Unbranded inventory is available to partners
Individual warehouses have been well utilised
Inventory stock reports provided in real-time
Stock turnover targets
Inventory plans
Number of emergency responses
Number of partners using HRDs
UNHRD stock reports
Annual reports
Key informants
WFP audit reports
Evaluation reports
To what extent are HPCs managed
efficiently?
UNHRD (and other selected HPCs) provided
efficient procurement services to partners
HPCs hold, or can quickly source sufficient
stocks, to defined quality standards, readily
available in the event of demand by partners
HPCs provide high quality products
HPCs provide products at competitive prices
Number of HPCs
Level of utilisation among DG ECHO partners
Type of products most regularly supplied
Product price comparisons
DG ECHO data and audits
Individual HPC data
Product price comparison data
Evaluation reports
10. How well has DG ECHO allocated funds to different investment strategies in humanitarian logistics?
To what extent does DG ECHO monitor
its own humanitarian logistics
investments?
To what extent does it have the
information to do so?
DG ECHO holds financial and performance data
on its humanitarian logistics activities
DG ECHO regularly reviews its investments for
● Relevance – do they meet current needs? ● Impact on the delivery of humanitarian aid ● Consistency with overall DG ECHO
objectives
Evidence of monitoring and review in line with
the JC
Evidence of coherent and consolidated
information available to DG ECHO to monitor
funds allocated
Reviews of humanitarian logistics
investments in the terms given in
the JC
Minutes or reports of periodic
reviews of the humanitarian
logistics investment strategy and
portfolio
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Evaluation question/ sub-questions Judgement criteria Indicators Data sources
To what extent does it have the incentive
to do so?
DG ECHO uses logistics data for management
decision-making
11. Specifically, how well has DG ECHO allocated funds to air services? See separate detailed framework for air services study Annex 4
12. What has DG ECHO done, and how well, to ensure that its partners organise humanitarian logistics activities in an efficient and cost-effective way?
To what extent are DG ECHO partners’
procurement, humanitarian logistics (i)
strategy; and (ii) costs visible to and
understood by DG ECHO, in partners’
project proposals or otherwise?
DG ECHO partners’ humanitarian logistics
strategy and costs are clear in project proposals
or other documents and are assessed by DG
ECHO field experts
Evidence that field experts have clear views on
the appropriateness of the partner’s
humanitarian logistics
Evidence that DG ECHO takes (and records) a
view on whether partner humanitarian logistics
costs are reasonable
Evidence that partners value DG ECHO
investment in their logistics
Project appraisal documentation
from a selection of actions in one
country/region and KIIs with the
country FEs, the regional and
district offices
Interviews with partners
Interviews with FEs
To what extent does DG ECHO monitor
the humanitarian logistics activities within
DG ECHO-funded partner actions?
DG ECHO FEs monitor project humanitarian
logistics and advise DG ECHO and the partner
on its appropriateness
Partners hold cost data and tracking data
Partners are prepared to share hum logs
performance data with DG ECHO
Monitoring reports or other correspondence from
FEs about humanitarian logistics
Evidence that partners are sharing data and
humanitarian logistics performance with DG
ECHO
KIIs at country office level with
FEs and others, and with partner
staff
Partner interviews at HQ
Partner accounts data
What incentives, if any, does DG ECHO
have to ensure partner’s humanitarian
logistics is efficient?
DG ECHO exercises scrutiny of partner
humanitarian logistics efficiency
DG ECHO policy and practice in scrutinising
partner humanitarian logistics efficiency
Evidence that partners are sharing data and hum
logs performance with DG ECHO
KIIs at country office level with
FEs and others, and with partner
staff
To what extent does DG ECHO make
judgements of partner humanitarian
logistics efficiency and of the contribution
humanitarian logistics makes to overall
effectiveness?
Are these judgements used to promote
better humanitarian logistics practices?
FEs make and communicate expert judgements
on:
● The operational efficiency of humanitarian logistics in an action, and
● What aspects of the humanitarian logistics approach make a significant difference to outcomes
Partners respond to this advice
Evidence of FEs making and communicating
these judgements, and practice changing as a
result
Evidence of partners, FE and DG ECHO
dialogue on the efficiency of humanitarian
logistics
KIIs at country office level with
FEs and others, and with partner
staff
Partner interviews at HQ
To what extent does DG ECHO exercise
influence over the GLC and country-level
logistics clusters?
DG ECHO influences the GLC to become more
effective
Number of partners participating in Logistics
Cluster
Logistics Cluster reports
Logistics Cluster minutes
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Evaluation question/ sub-questions Judgement criteria Indicators Data sources
DG ECHO influences logs cluster to maximise
assets of cluster partners and reduce duplication
Cluster partners understand DG ECHO’s role in
financial support to logistics
DG ECHO together with Cluster partners
ensures that duplication of resources is avoided
Number of partners using Logistics Cluster
services
Perceptions of changes within the GLC as part of
DG ECHO's influence and recommendations
Partner and Logistics Cluster
interviews
GLC interviews
13. To what extent has DG ECHO influenced the greater engagement of the private sector to contribute to humanitarian logistics at national and international level?
How well has DG ECHO sought greater
efficiencies through the engagement of
(or promotion of engagement) with the
private sector?
DG ECHO’s policies enabled engagement with
private sector actors to help deliver humanitarian
logistics services in both humanitarian and
UCPM contexts
Number of private sector actors engaged
Number of private sector humanitarian logistics
innovations supported
Evidence of policy enabling DG ECHO's
engagement with private sector
Private sector partner reports and
website
DG ECHO policy and operations
reports
Interviews
To what extent does DG ECHO use
private sector humanitarian logistics
framework agreements (FAs)?
Cost-efficiency, speed, and reliability for
humanitarian logistics services is achieved
through utilisation of FAs by DG ECHO
DG ECHO partners have access to the FAs
Partners’ utilisation rate of framework
agreements
DG ECHO appreciation of the benefits and
limitations of working with private sector partners
in humanitarian logistics
Procurement records
Partners reports
DG ECHO interviews
Partner interviews
Partner surveys
EU ADDED VALUE
14. What is the specific Added Value of DG ECHO's activities in humanitarian logistics, and how well is it achieved?
What actions to improve humanitarian
logistics has DG ECHO taken that EU
Member States or other states, have not,
or could not?
DG ECHO’s humanitarian logistics interventions
have enabled the EU and international
humanitarian community to respond quickly and
effectively to crises
DG ECHO understood the strategic need to
preposition relief supplies
Proportion of total DG ECHO budget that has
gone towards the improvement of humanitarian
logistics preparedness
Proportion of DG ECHO funding has gone to co-
financing of civil protection humanitarian logistics
to humanitarian operations outside Europe
Extent to which UNHRD relief supplies were
utilised
CP deployments and financial
records of co-financing
DG ECHO reports
Audit data
UNHRD reports
To what extent has used its financial
resources to intentionally shift the
performance the broader humanitarian
DG ECHO’s humanitarian logistics funding
levels have enabled the international
humanitarian community to respond quickly and
effectively to crises
Proportion of total DG ECHO budget that has
gone to the improvement of systems / capacity
(rather than simply to response)
HIPs
Donor reports
Partner programme evaluation
reports
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Evaluation question/ sub-questions Judgement criteria Indicators Data sources
logistics sector been over the evaluation
period?
Level of ambition and intentionality shown by DG
ECHO in bringing change to humanitarian
logistics sector
Interviews
To what extent has DG ECHO made
specific humanitarian logistics
investments for forgotten or other crises
that other donors have not been
able/ready to do?
DG ECHO’s has invested in humanitarian
logistics where other donors have not been
prepared to
DG ECHO’s humanitarian logistics interventions
have enabled the international humanitarian
community to respond effectively to forgotten
crises
Proportion of total DG ECHO budget that has
gone to supporting the forgotten crises or other
emergencies that have had insufficient funding
levels that include humanitarian logistics
components
Partner and donor perceptions of EU added
value to the humanitarian logistics
HIPs
Donor reports
Project records
Interviews
15. To what extent has DG ECHO used its position as a leading humanitarian (‘reference’) donor to influence humanitarian logistics in the humanitarian sector?
In relation to the GLC?
In relation to academic research/
humanitarian forums (EU Joint Research
Centre, ALNAP, NOHA)
In relation to the WHS and Grand
Bargain?
DG ECHO has championed humanitarian
logistics innovation initiatives
Proportion of DG ECHO funding provided for
projects that use innovative technologies or the
investment in the development of such
technologies
Perceptions of GLC and academic research/
humanitarian forums about DG ECHO
‘championing’ humanitarian logistics innovation
initiatives
DG ECHO humanitarian logistics
strategy
DG ECHO projects data
GLC reporting
Academic forum reports
Interviews
How have DG ECHO’s humanitarian
logistics investments raised the profile of
the EU’s visibility as a humanitarian
actor?
Extent of general public awareness of
ECHO Flight within countries of
operation and globally?
DG ECHO has been regarded as the ‘reference
donor’ among its peers for providing effective
humanitarian logistics investments
ECHO Flight has added positive visibility to DG
ECHO’s humanitarian relief operations
Proportion of DG ECHO funding provided for
projects and initiatives that have been cited in
journals and industry reports / articles
Proportion of funding used for ECHO Flight in
humanitarian relief operations
Perceptions of local/national actors/partners in
regard to the public awareness of ECHO Flight
services
Industry reports and journals etc.
ECHO Flight reports
DG ECHO Partners perceptions
DG ECHO Communication
services
Survey
To what extent has DG ECHO supported
the development of new initiatives in the
use of air and other transport services for
the delivery of humanitarian aid?
DG ECHO has made a distinctive contribution to
humanitarian air services
DG ECHO has promoted new innovations in
humanitarian logistics
Level of involvement in international conferences
(e.g. Global Humanitarian Aviation Conference
and other initiatives), e.g. UAViators (for
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles)
Interviews with key stakeholders
and project partners
Conference reports / information
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Evaluation question/ sub-questions Judgement criteria Indicators Data sources
To what extent has DG ECHO
humanitarian logistics and civil protection
interventions raised the EU’s profile?
DG ECHO is perceived a fulfilling the stated
aspiration that the ‘EU Protects’
Level of endorsement by other donors and
partners that EU reputation is enhanced
Interviews
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Annex 6 – Key informant interview questions
For partners
About your partnership with DG ECHO
1. Does /how does DG ECHO address logistics when discussing and deciding to fund projects (emergency health, shelter, WASH, education etc.)
2. In your DG ECHO-funded projects, how much DG ECHO funding goes to humanitarian logistics, including the supply chain from procurement, to storage, transport, and last mile delivery? (We would be interested to receive data on logistics, supply chain and transport costs within your DG ECHO-funded projects).
3. In what areas of logistics could DG ECHO (or other donors) invest to make the most impact on the effectiveness of humanitarian response?
Your organisation
4. Does your organisation maintain a strategic overview of humanitarian logistics at country, regional or global level? If not, do you rely on other organisations that do?
5. What are the key challenges you face in humanitarian logistics? (for example, shortages, competition for suppliers, costs, quality, security, access, use of civil-military assets, customs etc.)
6. What initiatives have you taken/are taking to improve performance in humanitarian logistics?
Coordination
7. How well coordinated is humanitarian logistics between humanitarian organisations and (where relevant with the government)? How well do donors support logistics coordination?
Service providers
8. (If you use them) How effective and efficient is the humanitarian air transport services provided by ECHO Flight, UNHAS and other service providers?
9. To what extent is your organisation achieving value for money through private sector service providers (supply, storage, transport, construction etc.)? How can engagement with the private sector be improved?
Programming initiatives
10. Is your organisation taking initiatives related to the Grand Bargain that involve logistics, for example, improving efficiencies by sharing logistics assets, building local response capacity including preparedness and prepositioning?
11. What are the implications for of the growth of cash based programming for humanitarian and private sector-based supply chains?
For donors
1. Does your government maintain a strategic overview of humanitarian logistics at country, regional or global level? If not, do you rely on other organisations that do?
2. What are the key humanitarian logistics challenges faced by implementing partners? (shortages, competition for suppliers, costs, quality, security, access, use of civil-military assets, customs etc.)
3. What process do you follow when discussing, reviewing and deciding to fund implementing partner projects (emergency health, shelter, WASH, education etc.) in terms of the costs of assessing need, procurement, storage, and delivery?
4. In the projects you fund, what proportion of the funding goes to humanitarian logistics? (Do you hold or analyse the relevant data?)
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5. Have you taken/are taking initiatives to support improved performance in humanitarian logistics? Where could humanitarian donors invest to make the most impact on the effectiveness of humanitarian response?
6. How well coordinated is humanitarian logistics between humanitarian organisations (including government)? How well do donors coordinate their support to humanitarian logistics?
7. To what extent is your government investing in capacity development of partners or government to ensure better response in future, through reducing risk, preparedness, prepositioning of emergency stocks etc).
8. (Where relevant) How effective and efficient are the humanitarian air transport services provided by ECHO Flight, UNHAS and other service providers?
9. How can engagement of the private sector be improved to increase the efficiency of supply, storage, transport, construction etc.?
10. What are the implications for of the growth of cash based programming for humanitarian and private sector-based supply chains?
Civil Protection agencies/authorities
1. In the past five years, has your agency been involved in deploying civil protection personnel, equipment or other assets within EU humanitarian response outside Europe?
2. How much interest does your agency have in doing so in future? Is this a priority for your government?
3. Do you think there is potential for European Members States to be make a greater contribution to humanitarian response outside Europe, or to being part of EU emergency preparedness mechanisms?
4. What are the limitations of civil protection in supporting humanitarian response? What elements done work well? How might (some of) the limitations be overcome?
5. How well does the ERCC work as a coordination mechanism for civil protection deployments outside Europe?
6. How well does the decision-making work with regard to matching requests for emergency assistance from the country affected, and offers coming from EU countries? (if not answered under 5)
7. Currently, there are no civil protection ‘modules’ specifically for humanitarian logistics – would it make sense to create them (e.g. for air, sea transport, or specialist teams of logisticians)?
8. How well does the civil protection co-financing mechanism work? (the 55-85% DG ECHO co-financing for getting air/sea assets to and from the theatre of operations)
9. How well coordinated is your agency’s response with UN coordinated mechanisms like UNDAC and INSARAG? How well joined-up are Member States civil protection+ UN + ERCC mechanisms?
10. If the proposed RescEU mechanism is approved and goes ahead, how might this change Member States’ contribution to humanitarian response?
For the Global Logistics Cluster
1. If DG ECHO were to invest $10m into the GLC, what should it best spend its money on?
2. What do you see are the biggest challenges to humanitarian logistics in 2018 and beyond?
3. From the GLC’s perspective, what are the best examples of 1) operational logistics coordination at field level and 2) strategic (high-level, non-operational) coordination? What would it take to make those good practices work well elsewhere?
4. How can the equivalent functions of the logistics cluster be achieved when no formal cluster has been activated? (We note the GLC deploys teams even where there is no formal cluster e.g. Bangladesh).
5. Survey results point to the fact there would be efficiency gains for working more collectively. What is the potential for increasing the number of common logistics services / common pipelines/joint
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procurements? Are there significant savings and improvements to be made this way? If so, what donor incentives should there be for organisations to combine supply chains and logistics assets?
6. Logistics preparedness and prepositioning are regarded as important, both globally and (increasingly) locally. How well does the current system work and how well do/should the UNHRD and DG ECHO supported HPCs (humanitarian procurement centres) fit into this?
7. How do country-level logistics clusters ensure that they are, or are seen to be, independent of WFP and working for the interests of all parties?
8. What is the progress of the 2018 review of the GLC strategy? Would it be possible to obtain a copy of the results? How do you see the GLC evolving over the next 5 years?
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Annex 7 – Staff survey summary results
This annex provides a summary of the responses to the staff survey. The survey received 132
responses.
Question 3. In which country are you working? Responses came from 30 countries, with the
most frequent: Belgium (66), Jordan (11), Kenya (8), DR Congo and Turkey (4), Mali, Nicaragua
and Nigeria (3).
18.94%
5.30% 4.55%
12.12%
3.79%1.52%
4.55%3.03% 3.79%
0.76%
25.76%
15.91%
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
Question 1: What type of position do you hold in ECHO?
28.79%
22.73% 23.48%25.00%
0-2 years 3-5 years 6-10 years More than 10 years
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
Question 2: Your length of service with ECHO
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Q6: What do you consider ECHO's most important interventions in humanitarian logistics
in civil protection or humanitarian aid in the last five years (please give at least one
practical example) 43 valid responses
There is strong agreement that DG ECHO air services (for both evacuation of personnel and
delivery of items), including for UNHAS) is DG ECHO's most important intervention in
humanitarian logistics in civil protection or humanitarian aid in the last five years. This appear 25
times, namely in more than 50% of the responses. A few respondents indicate specific crisis,
rather than a service. These include: the Ebola crisis (8 mentions), Typhoon Haiyan in the
Philippines (3), Syrian crisis (2), Hurricanes in the Caribbean (3), Ukraine (2), Nepal (3), the
Rohingya crisis (1), Ecuador (1), Venezuela (1).
Q7: Can you suggest 1-2 key actions ECHO could take concerning logistics and supply
chain interventions that would make a significant difference to the efficiency and
effectiveness of civil protection or humanitarian aid? 41 valid responses
Responses vary with a few recurring themes: having standby arrangements and framework
contracts to allow rapid interventions; provide storage facilities, prepositioning and delivering of
items; strengthening civil protection; strengthening the logistic clusters.
Q8: Please highlight any good practices in humanitarian logistics from which ECHO can
learn (whether or not the relevant interventions were ECHO-funded)? 33 valid responses
15.15%13.64%
6.82%
18.18%
12.12%
28.03%
6.06%
Asia, LatinAmerica,
Caribbean,Pacific
East andSouthern
Africa, GreatLakes
EasternNeighbourhood
Middle East North, Westand Central
Africa
General role,applying to all
regions
Other
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
Question 4: In which ECHO region are you working (or for HQ staff, for which region are you working)?
19.70%
24.24%
49.24%
6.82%
Regional office Country office Headquarters Other
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
Question 5: What type of ECHO office are you working in?
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Responses vary greatly vary: standby arrangement and standing agreements, direct cash
donations, pooled resources, HPC, UNICEF supply chain for nutritional products, logistics of MSF
and hubs of IFRC (as an example of how to roll our assistance swiftly during an emergency),
support to partners with logistical knowledge and resources, the Log Cluster approach, starting
cross-border operations even before political agreement (e.g. UN resolutions) are approved, use
of partial cost recovery for operations where there are commercial flights, Air Bridge, setting up of
base camp, DHL GoHelp initiative, setting up of a Risk management unit (as in Afghanistan),
importation of drugs for implementing partners, providing support to a logistic experts from an
NGO, to support them in their deployments at the aftermath of a crisis.
Q9: Please describe any internal, organisational challenges you consider are reducing the
effectiveness of ECHO's contribution to humanitarian logistics? 40 valid responses
Serious concern is expressed about the lack of a standard approach to logistics in DG ECHO (8
responses). The lack of strategy, standards, policies and procedures for logistics, is seen as a
challenge, as it makes first response very challenging, and undermines the availability of funding
for logistics. As reported by a respondent ‘ECHO should take stock of what it is and what it would
like to be. Would ECHO be willing to be more involve directly in operations (logistically speaking),
it should invest in this sector, propose a conceptual architecture in support to its operation. Today
ECHO still is rather on the soft coordination role, but the next step in getting more operational will
require a new approach and some investments’. With six responses, the next most common
response is bureaucracy, which leads to slow contracting and long negotiations. In line with the
two concerns above, the silo approach in DG ECHO is seen as undermining effectiveness. For
instance, one reports that ‘Directorate A still seems quite delinked from the two operational
directorates’. Four people claimed that DG ECHO should engage more towards the provision of
technical expertise, rather than only funding.
From the comments: logistics needs more attention for two main reasons: (1) monitor and ensure
partners do not misspend the money, and (2) improve effectiveness, including better planning
and better use of resources. Others think that logistics ‘is the partners’ responsibility’. Even if
more attention is paid to logistics, DG ECHO should ensure that this does not burden partners.
One person sees logistics examination as a way to know whether the programme achieved its
goal and benefited targeted people. (The meaning of some comments was not clear.)
0.00%5.88%
33.33%
60.78%
Not important Slightly important Moderately important Very important
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
Question 10: How important is it that ECHO pays greater attention to the efficiency and effectiveness of logistics within ECHO partner
projects? (51 responses, 25 comments)
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There is strong agreement that UCPM has great potential, but little awareness of UCPM and how
to call on it. Respondents generally believe that the mechanism is under-used. Many state that
the use of the UCPM would allow to make best use of MS capacities in numerous areas of
expertise, while enhancing knowledge sharing for both recipient countries and DG ECHO.
Efficiency and cost must be taken into consideration while deciding whether to use it; it is not
adequate in all context (e.g. highly insecure countries or where there is a complex political
situation or man-made disasters).
33 respondents agreed to continue to answer further questions, the remainder skipped to the
end.
Sub-question 13 asked ‘What level of logistics expertise will ECHO need in future?’ (22
responses). Most respondents indicate that more in-house expertise is needed, while the
available knowledge should be better used. More positions should be created, including: logistics
TA, staff in A1, staff who can deal with modern logistics solutions (e.g. social media needs
assessment, cash, high technologies, SAP), staff with coordination functions, senior logisticians
both at local level and in HQ. Only three people believed no change is needed. Much depends on
the extent to which DG ECHO would like to be involved in operations.
1.96%
9.80%13.73%
52.94%
21.57%
No potential Slight potential Moderate potential Significantpotential
Don't know
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
Question 11: How much potential is there to expand the deployment of Union Civil Protection assets for humanitarian response outside the EU?
(51 responses, 23 comments)
2.192.47
1.47
At Country level At Regional level At Headquarters
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
Question 13: In your view, does ECHO have sufficient logistics expertise at country, regional and HQ levels? (Yes/No for each level)
Weighted average: 1=No, 2=Yes, 32 responses
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1.8 1.81
2.28
ECHO country and regional officelogistics (IT, vehicles, office set
up, equipment, evacuation plans)
Advice concerning logisticsaspects of ECHO funded projects
(coordination, consultation,assess logistics plans,
monitoring)
Advice on/ support to Europeancivil protection deployments
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
Question 14: According to their TOR, ECHO Regional Logistics Coordinators have various tasks. In your view, what should be the order of priority for their
three main responsibilities? (32 responses)
18.75%
46.88%
6.25%9.38%
18.75%
Global or regionallevel (e.g. GlobalLogistics Cluster,
donor coordination,civil protection
coordination, UN orNGO forums)
Crisis level ie countryor sub-region (e.g.country logistics
clusters, collectiveaction on logistics andmarkets, cross-borderoperations, collective
responsepreparedness)
Partner level (e.g.working with individual
partners on theirsupply chain
management, pre-crisis market analysis)
National/local level(e.g. building the
logistics capacity ofnational or local
partners foremergency responseand market analysis)
Don't know
0%5%
10%15%20%25%30%35%40%45%50%
Question 15: Understanding that ECHO works at all levels, at which level could ECHO intervene to make the greatest impact on the efficiency and effectiveness
of humanitarian logistics (choose one)? (32 responses)
3
3.18
3
3.11
2.94
UN HumanitarianResponse Depots
HumanitarianProcurement
Centres
IFRC RegionalLogistics Hubs
Support toestablishing theGlobal Logistics
Cluster
Logistics Training
2.8
2.85
2.9
2.95
3
3.05
3.1
3.15
3.2
Question 16: In the past, ECHO made significant investments to improve systems for humanitarian logistics. In your view, what level of lasting benefit has
resulted? No benefit=1, Slight benefit=2, Moderate benefit=3, Significant benefit=4; (32 responses)
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Responses included: ‘ECHO's work on imposing and controlling standards and procedures on
HPCs has had a significant contribution on quality controls. It is positive that ECHO has funded
and can fund HRD stocks and their management fees’, while other two comments state that the
HPC and UNHRD have not ‘come out of their shelter more’.
Q18 received 30 answers. Respondents were asked to comment on the following statements:
• Combining NGO partners into consortia improves their combined logistics performance and reduces costs – There is general disagreement on this: 1) too much responsibility on the leading IP, 2) this does not translate in better coordination of logistics, 3) dependent on strong leadership and personality, 4) difficult to put in place as mandates differ, 5) forcing NGOs to work together may be problematic.
• Without more operational data from partners, DG ECHO cannot understand or work with partners to improve their logistics (i) DG ECHO needs to get further involved and proactively seek this information, as the FichOp does not require this info, versus (ii) ECHO is not be the most relevant institution to improve partners' logistics.
• DG ECHO partners typically have good logistics expertise: It really depends on the partners. For instance, UN has invested a lot of time and energy on logistics. Small NGOs tend to face important challenges.
3.59
3.43
3.12
ECHO Flight Other Humanitarian AirServices
Support to individual countrylogistics clusters
2.8
2.9
3
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
3.5
3.6
3.7
Question 17: In your view, how important are the following ongoing ECHO investments in humanitarian logistics?
No benefit=1, Slight benefit=2, Moderate benefit=3, Significant benefit=4; (32 responses)
2.67
3.142.79
2
Combining NGO partnersinto consortia improvestheir combined logistics
performance and reducescosts
Without more operationaldata from partners,
ECHO cannotunderstand or work withpartners to improve their
logistics
ECHO partners typicallyhave good logistics
expertise
ECHO is tracking thebenefits of itsinvestments in
humanitarian logisticseffectively
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
Question 18: To what extent do you agree with the following statements? (Add a brief comment after each statement, where relevant)
No benefit=1, Slight benefit=2, Moderate benefit=3, Significant benefit=4; (30 responses)
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• DG ECHO is tracking the benefits of its investments in humanitarian logistics effectively: Little is done in this respect, with the only exception of ECHO Flight, which is closely monitored.
Q19 received 30 answers. Respondents were asked to comment on the following statements:
• As a donor, DG ECHO focuses on results: how partners do logistics is not our concern: General agreement but also many claim more attention should be paid to how logistics is done (to ensure efficiency leading to better results).
• DG ECHO risks contravening humanitarian principles by funding the deployment of military assets for use in humanitarian response: Diverging opinions: some strongly against it, others strongly favour. It depends on the type of the crisis (man-made vs natural), humanitarian actors need to make sure Oslo principles are respected, it would be better if military assets are mobilised by MS rather than DG ECHO.
• There are significant obstacles to increasing the use of Union civil protection deployments for humanitarian response outside Europe: Mixed statements. There seem to be issues particularly in Asia, whereas deployment in LAC seems smoother. Key statements include: CP is not humanitarian aid and sometimes it creates more problems than solutions; there is not sufficient political will; CP assets should only be used where they make the difference; many countries have developed their own capacity and do not need external CP; funding is a serious problem for deployment.
• If DG ECHO invested more in logistics capacity (of partners, governments, communities) before emergencies happen, the response would be significantly more effective: There is general agreement that DRR and preparedness are critical, but many are unsure that this is a priority for DG ECHO.
2.13
2.63 2.76 2.79
As a donor, ECHO focuseson results: how partners dologistics is not our concern
ECHO risks contraveninghumanitarian principles byfunding the deployment ofmilitary assets for use inhumanitarian response
There are significantobstacles to increasing theuse of Union civil protection
deployments forhumanitarian response
outside Europe
If ECHO invested more inlogistics capacity (of
partners, governments,communities) before
emergencies happen, theresponse would be
significantly more effective
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
Question 19: To what extent do you agree with the following statements? Strongly Disagree=1, Disagree=2, Agree=3. Strongly Agree=4; (30 answers)
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Q20 received 30 answers. Respondents were asked to comment on the following statements.
• Better donor coordination of funding to humanitarian logistics would result in significantly more efficient and effective response. General agreement, but seen as extremely complicated, especially because each donor has its own procedures and working methods.
• The wider use of cash based assistance will make humanitarian logistics less and less relevant: Cash is not viable in every crisis and country; cash is only a modality and will co-exist with others; even with increased cash, there will be a need for logistics (even if of a different type).
• Logistics clusters provide all the logistics coordination required: Clusters are unfortunately not sufficient or adequately functional.
• DG ECHO needs a better overview of humanitarian logistics at country and regional level: Agreement that it would be good for DG ECHO to have that overview, at country level rather than global level; an overview is not sufficient/helpful if there is no room to address issues and participate in operations; support from the UN would be helpful.
Ranking the combined responses from questions 18-20 produces the following result:
There is strong agreement that DG ECHO needs more operational data from partners to
understanding their logistics, and that efficiency and effectiveness would increase with better
donor coordination of funding to logistics. There is much less agreement that donor logistics are
not DG ECHO’s business or that DG ECHO is effectively tracking the benefits of its investments
in logistics.
3.07
2.552.32
3.04
Better donor coordination offunding to humanitarianlogistics would result in
significantly more efficientand effective response
The wider use of cash-basedassistance will make
humanitarian logistics lessand less relevant
Logistics clusters provide allthe logistics coordination
required
ECHO needs a betteroverview of humanitarianlogistics at country and
regional level
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
Question 20: To what extent do you agree with the following statements? Strongly Disagree=1, Disagree=2, Agree=3. Strongly Agree=4; (30 answers)
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Comments stress the fact that (i) this are guess, (ii) it greatly depends on the sector and country
(and if transport and/or procurement is counted as part of it).
50%
53%
58%
64%
66%
67%
69%
70%
70%
76%
77%
79%
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%
ECHO is tracking the benefits of its investments in humanitarianlogistics effectively
As a donor, ECHO focuses on results: how partners do logisticsis not our concern
Logistics clusters provide all the logistics coordination required
The wider use of cash-based assistance will make humanitarianlogistics less and less relevant
ECHO risks contravening humanitarian principles by funding thedeployment of military assets for use in humanitarian response
Combining NGO partners into consortia improves their combinedlogistics performance and reduces costs
There are significant obstacles to increasing the use of Unioncivil protection deployments for humanitarian response outside
Europe
ECHO partners typically have good logistics expertise
If ECHO invested more in logistics capacity (of partners,governments, communities) before emergencies happen, the
response would be significantly more effective
ECHO needs a better overview of humanitarian logistics atcountry and regional level
Better donor coordination of funding to humanitarian logisticswould result in significantly more efficient and effective response
Without more operational data from partners, ECHO cannotunderstand or work with partners to improve their logistics
Q18-20: To what extent do you agree with the following statements?Strongly disagree = 0%, Strongly Agree = 100%
10.00%
13.33% 13.33%
3.33%
16.67%
6.67%
3.33%
10.00%
0.00% 0.00%
23.33%
Up to 10% >10%-20% >20%-30% >30%-40% >40%-50% >50%-60% >60%-70% >70%-80% >80%-90% More than90%
Don't know
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
Question 21: On average, what percentage of ECHO funding goes to logistics, including procurement, storage, transport, and distribution, as a rough estimate?
30 responses, 13 comments)
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One person states ‘If any, savings would be very slight and largely compensated through
administrative burden and additional delays in aid delivery’. Another doesn’t know. All others
claim there would be a major saving.
6.67%
16.67%
23.33%
40.00%
13.33%
No saving Slight saving 0-5%
Moderate saving>5-10%
Significantsaving >10%
Don't know
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
45%
Question 22: If ECHO worked more closely with ECHO partners to make their logistics more efficient (individual partners and partners
working together), what level of cost savings might be achieved, as a rough estimate? (30 responses, 7 comments)
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56.67%
63.33%
33.33%
53.33%
23.33%
73.33%70.00%
13.33%
33.33%30.00%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
Question 23: What are the key external challenges limiting efficient and effective humanitarian logistics? Please select up to 5 key challenges from the list below
(30 responses, 3 valid comments)
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Comments note: administrative and bureaucracy procedures, the lack of funding for logistics
cluster and lack of professional staff deployed as part of Log Cluster, and the lack of proper
coordination.
In comments, respondents report: 1) Donated goods (even more for assets) are not necessarily
what is relevant in a certain crisis; 2) DG ECHO policy on stocks (contingency) is complex and
not understood; 3) How to prevent logistics hubs and supplies becoming conflict resources? (e.g.
South Sudan).
A sub-question asks respondents what logistics coordination mechanism is in use: 1) sector
instead of cluster; 2) a mix of the above depending on the situation/country, 3) informal INGO
24.00%
32.00%
20.00%
4.00%
20.00%
None Formallyestablished
logistics cluster
Inter-agencycoordination
mechanism otherthan a 'cluster'
Coordinationmechanism ledby government
Don't know
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
Question 25: Which type of logistics coordination structure is being used in the current crisis(if any)? (25 responses, 4 comments)
70.00%
43.33%
30.00%
23.33%
63.33%
30.00%
50.00%
40.00%
Poorcoordination(government,
agencies,donors, private
sector)
Inadequatefunding for
implementation(and therefore
logistics)
Lack ofcommon
standards forhumanitarian
logistics
Donated goodsare not
relevant to theaffected
population
Lack ofcollectiveaction toaddresslogistics
challenges
Humanitarianagencies lack
qualifiedlogisticians
Insufficientpreparedness
andprepositioning
of reliefsupplies
Donorbureacracy
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
Question 24: What are the key challenges internal to humanitarian systems to efficient and effective humanitarian logistics? Please select up to 4 key
challenges from the list below (max 4 allowed) (30 responses, 5 comments)
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discussion and fine-tuning; 4) import of goods by UN agencies (using their leverage with
government), delivered later to NGOs.
In the comments, respondents state that there is no dedicated/institutionalised coordination; the
quality of the coordination varies. However, it is claimed that this is generally insufficient, and
depends on the person in charge.
Q28: A significant amount of ECHO funding goes to a few major partners. Between 2013-
2017, ECHO provided more than one quarter of its total funding to seven partners (approx.
€2.6 billion, with €1.3 billion to WFP alone). How could ECHO work with its major partners
for them to become more effective in humanitarian logistics, if at all?
Of 27 valid responses, there are only four recurring themes/opinions: a) DG ECHO is not in a
position to teach the UN; 2) reinforce logistics and create an informal logistics group gathering
partners to exchange on the logistics challenges they encounter and find common responses/
ensuring sound response programming as a way to decrease logistic costs, 3) take a more
inclusive approach with WFP logistics more open to serve other actors; secure common
logistics service to all partners at equal access; ensure major partners are able to open up and
secure logs pipelines for essential goods (centralised/pooled) to smaller organisations; 4) perform
more audit, make sure that major partners deliver, and increase direct monitoring.
3.85%
15.38%
50.00%
3.85%
26.92%
Very poor Poor Good Very good Don't know
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
Question 26: How effective is the coordination of logistics for the emergency response? (26 responses, 7 comments)
2.61
3.35
2.67
UN Humanitarian ResponseDepots
ECHO funded Humanitarian AirServices
Humanitarian ProcurementCentres
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
Question 27: What proportion of ECHO partners are making use of the following common services?
None=1, Few=2, Several=3, Majority=4; (30 responses)
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Q29: Please add any final recommendations for how ECHO can maximise its contribution
to humanitarian logistics.
Key recommendations are for DG ECHO to: better define what logistics is; appoint and train
logistic staff, including TA’s in the field. Others responses include: funding development too;
decrease the scope of work but improve the quality; for each crisis, appoint an organisation in
charge of logistic; convince DG ECHO senior management of the importance of prompt response
and quick exit with (‘our resources are increasingly swallowed by complex and protracted crisis
where longer-term solutions are required – and DG ECHO gets stuck, with limited added value’);
better factor in delays in humanitarian logistics; only send material to the field that are still of use
in a couple of months’ time; push senior logisticians to work together across partners to provide
consensus on Good Humanitarian Logistics.
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Annex 8 – Partner survey summary results
This annex provides a summary of the responses to the partner survey. The survey received 429
responses.
Question 3. In which country are you working? Responses came from 83 countries, the most
frequent being: Iraq (22), Kenya (21), Jordan (20), Syrian Arab Republic (19), Switzerland (18),
UK (18), Turkey (17), France (14), Italy (13), Afghanistan (12), Uganda (12), Lebanon (10).
58.41%
16.82%
3.50%0.70% 1.17%
14.49%
4.91%
Logistics,supply chain,procurement
Programme oroperations
management
Administration Policy/Strategy Planning,Monitoring and
Evaluation
SeniorManagement
Other
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
Question 1. What kind of job do you have?
28.21%
32.63%
17.95%
21.21%
0-2 years >2-5 years >5-10 years > 10 years
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
Question 2: How long have you been working for your organisation?
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Q6: What are the main logistical challenges your organisation faces in delivering its
humanitarian programmes? (266 responses).
Many challenges were identified. The key challenges cited most frequently were:
• Access (transport, access to remote areas, lack of infrastructure, humanitarian space);
• Poor security;
• Lost time (administration and procedure are lengthy – i.e. budget approval, permits, customs, clearance, procurement processes (especially for medicines). These all delay the response);
• Lack of quality goods/materials in-country/market limitation;
• Cross-border access;
• Taxes on humanitarian goods;
• Limited capacity of local implementing partners (and challenges of remote management in the Syrian crisis);
• Political interference and bureaucratic impediments by controlling actors/governments;
73.83%
9.35%13.55%
3.27%
NGO Red Cross RedCrescent
United Nations Other
0.00%
10.00%
20.00%
30.00%
40.00%
50.00%
60.00%
70.00%
80.00%
Question 4: What kind of organisation are you working for?
12.69%
43.81%
7.55%
34.74%
1.21%
Field/Sub-office Country office Regional office Headquarters Other
0.00%
5.00%
10.00%
15.00%
20.00%
25.00%
30.00%
35.00%
40.00%
45.00%
50.00%
Question 5: In what kind of location are you working?
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• Insufficient staff size and staff turnover; inability to obtain goods and services strategically at the best value for money.
Q7: What are the most important improvements in humanitarian logistics and market-
based assistance in recent years (in your organisation or otherwise)? 266 responses
There was a consensus that the most important improvements included:
• Cash transfers and mobile money;
• Use of technologies, such as ICT for data collection, real-time management, barcoding, GIS;
• Market improvements, and availability of better-quality goods;
• There was also agreement on the following policy and organisational improvements;
• Improved understanding of the importance of logistics and supply chain.
Enhancement of the policies and procedures, including better coordination and pooling of
resources between IPs, and improved coordination among donors, the United Nations agencies
and NGOs (national and international), and inter-agency collaboration;
• Existence of better internal systems, e.g. list of providers, policies, guidelines; improved knowledge and professionalisation of all actors, also through discussion and learning forum (ELAN, CaLP, CTP TaskForce funded by OFDA);
• Establishment of the Logistics Cluster;
• Establishment of Framework Agreement and Long-Term Arrangements; decentralisation.
Q8: How could DG ECHO, or donors in general, best contribute to improving the efficiency
and effectiveness of humanitarian logistics? 266 responses.
The most frequently cited were (most frequent first):
• Involving in negotiation with government counterparts to ease the policies and procedures; negotiating easier and quicker import/export processes, administrative facilitation in obtaining visa and other travel documentations for humanitarian personnel;
• Give training on DG ECHO policies and procedures, especially to logistics staffs, and build capacity of IPs on logistics and procurement;
• Increase maximum allowed budget for logistics;
• Make a procurement plan compulsory at the project conception level, and hire logistics staff in DG ECHO, to support partners and to review those procurement plan/ insisting that partners produce robust and thought-through supply plans in the early stages of assessing funding proposals;
• Simplifying rules and regulations and the standard procedures on process to be more efficient, productive, systematic, logical and cost-effective;
• Agree and align with other donors on common standards and procedures, also on common standards;
• Funding prepositioning and CBT;
• Offering a platform for Logistics where individuals can share knowledge, experiences, lessons learned etc. (supporting and facilitating synergies);
• Help to check the quality goods & best suppliers/ validate national suppliers;
• Support the development of an information system for NGO's, fitting donors, procurement, contracts and supply;
• Funding simulation exercises;
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• Funding studies, training and collaboration to improve the effectiveness of humanitarian aid.
Comments indicated a strong consensus among partners that DG ECHO should play more
attention to logistics, as this intrinsically linked with effectiveness, as logistics is the backbone of
humanitarian aid. Knock-on effects caused by supply and logistical delays can have significant
impacts on projects, and logistics/supply chain effectiveness and timeliness are important to
ensure cost-effectiveness. ‘The ability of a partner to deliver a program, depends 80% on the
ability of its supply chain to get the programme supplies and staff to the required locations on-
time every time.’ ‘Logistics (and the inherent access issues of difficult contexts) is one leg of a
three-legged stool, it will fall over if they don't work.’ As DG ECHO funding represents a major
part of partners project funding, including logistics, it should pay more attention to logistics costs.
Partners should be made aware of performance indicators used to measure success, through
guidelines which include key performance indicators. Several respondents state that DG ECHO is
not sufficiently accountable: ‘We get questioned when we cause delays in the delivery of aid, but
DG ECHO is not, when delays in delivery are caused by them’. As donors have the power, they
have a duty to ensure the best possible service delivery. DG ECHO funding of the Partners for
Enhanced Response Capacity in Logistics (PARCEL) standard is said to be useful.
0.75%5.26%
14.66%
74.44%
4.89%
Not important Slightly important Moderatelyimportant
Very important Don't know
0.00%
10.00%
20.00%
30.00%
40.00%
50.00%
60.00%
70.00%
80.00%
Question 9: How important is it that DG ECHO pays attention to the efficiency and effectiveness of its partners' logistics capacity?
266 responses, 63 comments
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There was mixed feedback from those working in countries where the cluster is active (note:
about half of those commenting appear not to have participated in a logs cluster). Where the
cluster is not active, NGOs have initiated informal platforms, in some cases, to collaborate and
exchange best practices. Some claim that the Logs Cluster is the ‘UN Cluster that works the
best’. Areas where the Cluster could be more helpful include:
• More trainings for local authorities;
• More platforms for shared work;
• More involvement of NGO staff;
• Having an app;
• Liaising between NGOs and government on importation and transport regulations;
• Conducting a market survey from time to time.
Some respondents stated that it would be helpful if the Cluster had a formal authority, thus
allowing for more impact;
256 respondents agreed to continue to answer further questions, the remainder skipped to the
end.
10 respondents indicated they are not currently receiving funds from DG ECHO.
3.76%
11.28%
35.71%
24.44% 24.81%
Very poor Poor Good Very good Don't know
0.00%
5.00%
10.00%
15.00%
20.00%
25.00%
30.00%
35.00%
40.00%
Question 10: DG ECHO supported the development of the Logistics Cluster and provides funds to some country-level Logistics Clusters. How
would you rate the effectiveness of the Logistics Cluster as a coordination mechanism for humanitarian logistics? 265
5.21% 6.77%
22.40%
60.42%
5.21%
Not significant Slightly significant Moderatelysignificant
Very significant Don't know
0.00%
10.00%
20.00%
30.00%
40.00%
50.00%
60.00%
70.00%
Question 12: How significant is DG ECHO funding to your organisations' humanitarian work? (192 responses)
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Competence in-country varies country by country, although generally logistic capacity is limited
(due to budgetary constraints). Staff turnover (especially in-country) challenges retention of
knowledge and high-performing logistics professionals can be hard to find. Many people claim
that ‘funding for logistics profiles seems to be reducing within programme budgets’. Many say that
developing capacity is in progress. Very few consider that their organisation does not pay enough
attention to logistics functions but equally ‘logistics is persistently understaffed compared to
programmes’.
Elements of logistics strategy were many and various, falling under the following main headings
for improvement:
• Capacity building, staff training, staff retention
• Logistics planning/strategy
• Long-term agreements and strategic sourcing
• Information systems, software, IT platforms and support
• Regional and country support structures and rapid response units
• Procurement at regional and local level (closer to affected people)
• Process development and standardisation
1.74
1.78
1.84
At Country level At Regional level At Headquarters
1.68
1.7
1.72
1.74
1.76
1.78
1.8
1.82
1.84
1.86
Question 13: In your view, does your organisation have sufficient logistics expertise at country, regional and HQ levels?
1=No, 2=Yes192 responses, 42 comments
73.54%
14.81%11.64%
Yes No Don't know
0.00%
10.00%
20.00%
30.00%
40.00%
50.00%
60.00%
70.00%
80.00%
Question 14: Does your organisation have a strategy to improve its humanitarian logistics? (189 responses, 102 comments)
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• Procurement/supply chain manuals and SOPs, including fast track response procedures
• Localisation
• Specialist supply chain requirements, e.g. pharmaceutical, construction, cash transfers
• Warehouse systems
• Logistics KPIs (which ones, how, when)
• Prepositioning of stock
• Move from old school logistics to modern supply chain management
‘ICRC and IFRC together with many other NS, want software that allow all partners working within
the same countries to use the same system that allows the traceability from reception and
purchasing of materials to the final beneficiary.’
A very few respondents reported that no strategy exists / logistics is not priority for their
organisation.
In their comments, most respondents simply report that they do capacity building for local
partners and the government, including training local government, support to government
capacity, building warehouses, and investment in prepositioning of stocks for emergency
response.
7.33%
24.08%25.65%
30.37%
12.57%
No progress Slight progress Moderate progress Significant progress Don't know
0.00%
5.00%
10.00%
15.00%
20.00%
25.00%
30.00%
35.00%
Question 15: How much progress has your organisation made in helping develop the capacity of government or local organisations to prepare for and
respond to emergencies (including logistics)? 192 responses, 52 comments
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Cash based assistance is seen as an effective means of ‘uplifting the poverty and hunger’. It is
not ‘a silver bullet or a one-size-fits-all’. Some respondents indicate that it requires new expertise
and a broader skillset. Most respondents appear to use it already or being in the process of
setting it up, though it is not relevant to the work of some.
The very wide responses in terms of percentage spent on logistics are reflected in the comments
that it greatly depends on location, and on what is considered part of logistics: warehouse?
supply? HR? (although this was specified in the question). Some indicate that they include
disaster preparedness. For some the last mile is to the local warehouse, for others it means
delivery to a beneficiary.
7.29%
14.06%13.02%
11.46%9.38%
10.42% 9.90%
2.08% 2.60%0.52%
19.27%
0.00%
5.00%
10.00%
15.00%
20.00%
25.00%
Question 17. Understanding that projects vary, please estimate the average percentage of your organisation's humanitarian funding goes to logistics (including procurement, storage, transport, and distribution)?
Consider funding from all sources, not just
13.09%15.71%
28.80% 27.75%
14.66%
Not at all Slightly Moderately Significantly Don't know
0.00%
5.00%
10.00%
15.00%
20.00%
25.00%
30.00%
35.00%
Question 16: To what extent has your organisation adopted cash or voucher based programming as a means of humanitarian assistance? (145 responses,
45 comments)
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Comments stressed that all levels are important, with a tendency to the global level being
particularly relevant: ‘A global approach would allow to create political awareness’. Also: ‘Local
volunteer groups and small local NGOs are the first responders, and yet the least equipped due
to funding limitation or capability limitation.’
(The comments indicate that some respondents misunderstood the question). Some have never
received feedback from DG ECHO on logistics; one comment states that there are no questions
at the proposal stage, but many questions come later on. Another says their organisation gets
more questions than others as they do not ‘do cash’. One claimed: ‘Only when security is
involved DG ECHO is supportive on logistical aspect’.
24.87%21.69%
16.40%
30.69%
6.35%
Global or regionallevel (e.g. GlobalLogistics Cluster,
donor coordination,civil protection
coordination, UN orNGO forums)
Crisis level iecountry or sub-
region (e.g. countrylogistics clusters,
collective action onlogistics and
markets, cross-border operations,collective response
preparedness)
Partner level (e.g.working with
individual partnerson their supply
chainmanagement, pre-
crisis marketanalysis)
National/local level(e.g. building the
logistics capacity ofnational or local
partners foremergency
response andmarket analysis)
Don't know
0.00%
5.00%
10.00%
15.00%
20.00%
25.00%
30.00%
35.00%
Question 18: At which level could DG ECHO exert the greatest influence on the efficiency and effectiveness of humanitarian logistics?
(189 responses, 19 comments)
5.29%
15.34%
23.81%
27.51% 28.04%
None Slight Moderate Significant Don't know
0.00%
5.00%
10.00%
15.00%
20.00%
25.00%
30.00%
Question 19: When DG ECHO reviews your organisation's project applications, what level of attention does DG ECHO typically pay to the
logistics capacity of your organisation to deliver the project(s)?189 responses, 27 comments
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The few and varied responses point to the style of monitoring depending on the [DG ECHO]
person in charge.
No meaningful comments were received to Q21.
The few comments received point to the importance of the training provided through the logs
cluster or other logistics coordination mechanism.
4.23%
15.87%
28.57%24.87%
26.46%
None Slight Moderate Significant Don't know
0.00%
5.00%
10.00%
15.00%
20.00%
25.00%
30.00%
Question 20: When DG ECHO makes monitoring visits to your projects, what level of attention does DG ECHO typically pay to
logistics?189 responses, 16 comments
10.63%
42.50%
30.00%
4.38%
12.50%
None Logistics cluster Inter-agencycoordination
mechanism (not aformal 'cluster')
Coordinationmechanism led by
government
Don't know
0.00%
5.00%
10.00%
15.00%
20.00%
25.00%
30.00%
35.00%
40.00%
45.00%
Question 21: Which type of logistics coordination structure is in place for the crisis you are responding to?
160 responses, 7 comments
5.13%
17.95%
51.28%
12.82% 12.82%
Very poor Poor Good Very good Don't know
0.00%
10.00%
20.00%
30.00%
40.00%
50.00%
60.00%
Question 22: How effective is the coordination of logistics for the current crisis response?
156 responses, 5 comments
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Respondents were asked to mention any joint action taken to improve efficiencies in logistics.
These included:
• Logistics platform; jointly planned and coordinated transportation, warehousing and distribution
• Joint procurement
• Import of medical pharma, consumable and equipment. Central management and distribution at capital level
• One agency providing logs services to DG ECHO partners within regions / countries
• Joint market survey
• Use of HPCs
• Shared flights
• Bringing of the programme experts together with supply chain staffs to do the logistics planning together, causing improvements in lead times, and securing volume discount from procurement
• Logistics cluster; HELP Logistics by Kuehne Foundation; Logistics preparedness initiative under the auspices of WFP Logistics cluster
On respondent noted: ‘Log Cluster has started well but lacks ‘authority’ to further move forward’.
Some respondents were positive about the potential for efficiencies, for example:
• I do think there could be substantial savings if resources could be pooled and better use of purchasing power
• I think we could achieve good cost savings, but I am not able to fix a percentage
• There are too many INGO's doing the same thing (with not so different mandates). Less actors, greater leverage in the market would benefit beneficiaries and donors
• I can imagine that a central depot providing certain stocks / managing the supply chain for all would be very good. But [to meet demand] organisations conduct their own to meet deadlines and avoid unhappy beneficiaries and donors
• The LC largely is driving efficiencies; a singly managed coordinated response by one organisation is still preferred
• If you purchase in bulk, you can save big money
4.79%
7.45%
17.55%
26.06%
13.83%
10.11%
20.21%
None >0-10% >10-20% >20-30% >30-40% >40% Don't know
0.00%
5.00%
10.00%
15.00%
20.00%
25.00%
30.00%
Question 23: If humanitarian organisations planned and pooled logistics resources together, what level of logistics cost savings
might be achieved?(188 responses, 46 comments)
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• Import of medical pharma, consumable and equipment. Central management and distribution at capital level
• One agency providing logs services to DG ECHO partners within regions / countries
• Avoid competition in market for transport services
• Joint market survey reduced costs and improved reach
• Mostly possible on international pipelines / in-country corridors
• This could be monumental in securing supply efficiencies, if reliable and well-coordinated
• Shared flights, shared warehousing, shared transport all help control the markets and stop price escalation.
However, others were opposed to joint logistics initiatives because:
• Joint procurement causes delay to response on time
• Mandate, capacities, speed are different between organisation, reason why to pool logistics resources will be difficult in the Americas context
• The costs would be same but there will be more delays in service delivery owing to centralised logistics strategy
• It would be heavy and it did not improve coordination, generally humanitarian sector is missing good managers
• This would at the cost of less flexibility and slower process.
Some respondents were very positive about the potential to improve performance, for example:
• Si les organisations humanitaires avaient planifié et mis en commun leurs ressources logistiques, la performance globale de la réponse humanitaire s’améliorerait énormément … les amélioration dans le cadre du processus logistique profiterons à tous.
• C'est une stratégie qu'DG ECHO devrait pousser, collaborer davantage entre partenaires de mise en œuvre pour réduire les coûts et améliorer l'efficacité de la réponse.
Others were more cautious, pointing out that it would depend on; exactly how such initiatives
were implemented, on the operating environment, on the level of coordination achieved, and on
how good the common services actually were (i.e. the end might be worse than the beginning).
One respondent remarked on the need to remove competition for assets and resources that
occurs in emergencies: ‘The more you pay, the more likely your relief item with donor logo gets
distributed, but at what cost?!’
4.79%
11.17%
27.66%
45.21%
11.17%
Not at all Slightly Moderately Significantly Don't know
0.00%
5.00%
10.00%
15.00%
20.00%
25.00%
30.00%
35.00%
40.00%
45.00%
50.00%
Question 24: If humanitarian organisations planned and pooled logistics resources together, how much would the overall
performance of the humanitarian response improve?(188 responses, 20 comments)
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In the comments, the majority of respondents claimed that donor coordination is not sufficient,
every donor has its own agenda, and there is no interest to coordinate. Only two said donor
coordination is good.
About half those making comments seemed to indicate that they were users of one or more
common services. Asked about the reasons for using or not using the services, responses
included:
Reasons for:
• Providing logistics capabilities especially in the hard-to-reach environments and ensuring supplies are available for immediate distribution
• HPCs can play a pivotal role if inventory management and Lead-time is improved
• Effective, meets our needs
• HPCs decreases the Logistics efforts and save a lot of time
• Very helpful in moving staff (UNHAS)
Reasons for not using:
• Usually difficult to access and time-consuming
• Heavy and slow
5.32%
24.47%
33.51%
11.70%
25.00%
Very poor Poor Good Very good Don't know
0.00%
5.00%
10.00%
15.00%
20.00%
25.00%
30.00%
35.00%
40.00%
Question 25: How good is the coordination between donors in their financial support to humanitarian programmes (inc. to logistics?)
188 responses, 16 comments
2.742.4
3.13 3.22
HumanitarianProcurement
Centre(s) HPCs
United NationsHumanitarian
Response Depots(UNHRD)
Humanitarian airservices (UN HAS,ECHO Flight etc.)
Logistics Cluster
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
Question 26: How important are the following common services to your organisation?184 responses, 47 comments
(Not important=1, Very important=4)
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• Limited knowledge of these services by respondents
• Other prepositioned stocks and standards are in use by respondents
• Not present in-country, which increases the cost of goods (due to customs and taxes)
• Service not relevant to respondents.
Other important challenges not listed above included:
• Lack of support from the development side. Need for interventions to make infrastructures resilient
• Political interference, intimidation & manipulation
• Market monopolies, lack of tax exemptions and unclear tax exemption regimes
• Economic situation of the country
• Not really relevant to the Greek context
• Occupation and blockade
• Lack of regional stock with competitive prices
• The fact that NGOs first worry about future audit and results and logistics come after, priority-wise.
40.11%
53.48%
35.29%
48.13%
10.70%
80.21%
50.27%
24.06%
37.97%
49.73%
0.00%
10.00%
20.00%
30.00%
40.00%
50.00%
60.00%
70.00%
80.00%
90.00%
Question 27: In your view, what are the key external challenges limiting efficient and effective humanitarian logistics? Please select up to 5 challenges
from the list below: 187 responses, 12 comments on other challenges
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Other important challenges noted by respondents in the comments included:
• Lack of connectivity / coordination between logistics staff and programmes staff …
• Exhaustive/ bureaucratic recruitment procedures
• Sometimes donors (in general) put a ceiling amount to project and it is not realistic, causing NGO to make a project based on amount and not real need for beneficiaries
• Very difficult to abide to requested electronic payment terms
• Lack of standardised specifications for aid items which hinders effective global systematic prepositioning
• Obligation to purchase medicines from Europe
• Burden of reporting: ‘Sometimes very heavy and finally takes 40% of our work’…’I sometimes ask myself about the cost of the transparency versus the cost of our emergency answer’.
Question 29: Any final comments or recommendations
From the 108 answers, key points include:
• As a big donor, DG ECHO has the unique opportunity to invest seed funding for creative bottom-up solutions among local NGOs/academia
• DG ECHO can provide scholarship on humanitarian logistics, so that capacity building of supply chain in emergency response is built
• In humanitarian responses, life-saving should come first at any point, and the donor procedures should be flexible enough to accommodate the operational context
• Having a dedicate specialist who will look to log aspect in proposal, accept to fund logs need further, accept to fund for buffer stock in medicine, promote logistics coordination between funded NGO
• Develop an information management system that comply with donor requirements
• Further discuss and agree with UN agencies and NGOs on a common humanitarian approach
55.38%58.60%
32.26%
13.44%
55.38%
32.26%
46.24%48.39%
Poorcoordination(government,
agencies,donors, private
sector)
Inadequatefunding for
implementation(and therefore
logistics)
Lack ofcommon
standards forhumanitarian
logistics
Donated goodsare not relevantto the affected
population
Lack ofcollective action
to addresslogistics
challenges
Humanitarianagencies lack
qualifiedlogisticians
Insufficientpreparedness
andprepositioning
of relief supplies
Donorbureacracy
0.00%
10.00%
20.00%
30.00%
40.00%
50.00%
60.00%
70.00%
Question 28: In your view, what are the key challenges internal to humanitarian systems that limit efficient and effective humanitarian logistics? Please select up to 4 key challenges from the list below: (186 responses, 8 comments on challenges not liste
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• Provide funds to organisations, train staff and put systems in place for better logistics
• Run regional trainings for logistics teams
• More support for the dissemination of PARCEL Materials
• Build common website only for tenders or quotations distribution process
• Increase the number of trips to the field at least twice a week
• Providing contribution to enhance and develop the logistics in terms of prepositioning and preparedness
• Send Audit teams from time to time, which will increase partners’ understanding of DG ECHO rules
• In alignment with the localisation agenda, DG ECHO should look into supporting the Local and Regional Humanitarian Logistics development
• The humanitarian logistics landscape is changing, with cash transfers now being part of the picture and future technology that may play pivotal role in how we manage and operate humanitarian logistics. DG ECHO can be the lead in fostering technology adaptation and innovation for humanitarian logistics
• Hold regular meetings with other donors and humanitarian logisticians, to help leverage the collective influence and resources and improve the sector as a whole
• Give logistics the same importance as, for example, finances or project implementation
• Widely sharing the results of this survey and inviting logistics forum members / actors involved in the sector to propose actions / thoughts sharing through meeting / symposium
• I understand that there is a great level of coordination between DG ECHO and the Global Logistics Cell, but I would also recommend for DG ECHO to be engaged directly with field logistics cluster coordinators to better understand context of every operation.
Finally, the survey itself receives appreciation from some respondents: ‘The survey itself points to
the very important areas that need to be addressed by DG ECHO and other donors in partnership
with government.’: ‘Thanks for the survey. It's quite rare to have a donor interested in logistics’.
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Annex 9 – Key DG ECHO documents
The evaluation takes account of the most relevant DG ECHO documents that frame the
European Commission’s Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection.
Humanitarian Aid Regulation
Article 2(c) of the Humanitarian Aid Regulation 1257/96 includes the following specific objective
for EU humanitarian assistance:
To help finance the transport of aid and efforts to ensure that it is accessible to those for whom it
is intended, by all logistical means available, and by protecting humanitarian goods and
personnel, but excluding operations with defence implications.
The use of military assets is considered only as a last resort. According to the ToR, the definition
of ‘last resort’ is not clear, therefore the practical application of the principle is a sensitive issue
because of perceived lack of neutrality and impartiality on the part of military actors in
humanitarian operations, especially in conflict zones.55
DG ECHO Strategic Plan
Under DG ECHO’s current strategic plan for 2016-2020, DG ECHO has two specific objectives,
with related result indicators, as follows:
People and countries in need are provided with adequate and effective humanitarian and civil
protection assistance.
• Result indicator 1: The number of beneficiaries of DG ECHO-funded humanitarian aid operations
• Result indicator 2: The number of beneficiaries of Education in Emergencies projects
• Result indicator 3: The percentage of humanitarian aid funded projects which integrate gender and age considerations (i.e. a Gender-Age marker value of 2)
• Result indicator 4: The average speed of interventions under the Union Civil Protection Mechanism (from the acceptance of the offer to deployment)
• Result indicator 5: The number of modules included in the Voluntary Pool of the European Emergency Response Capacity
People and communities at risk of disasters are resilient.
• Result indicator 1: The number of national risk assessments submitted by IPA II14 and EU Neighbourhood countries
• Result indicator 2: The number of beneficiaries reached through the European Union Aid Volunteers initiative
• Result indicator 3: The percentage of humanitarian aid funded projects which integrate resilience (i.e. resilience marker value of 2)
Financial regulation
55 https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/files/misc/FMA/SIPRI08FMAprelims.pdf
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The European Commission has revised its approach to the controls exercised over funding to
projects. ‘The main aspects of the control strategy developed by DG ECHO, its supervision and
monitoring procedures and the ex ante and ex post controls are:
• ‘Selection and quality control mechanisms for partners (through regular and ad hoc assessment of NGOs and 6-pillar review and regular assessment of international organisations);
• Needs-based assessment for identification of actions to be funded;
• Ex ante controls on the selection of projects, and before the contract's signature;
• Regular monitoring of all projects by DG ECHO, including field visits of the actions;
• Control of eligible expenditure both by DG ECHO operational and financial desk officers to ensure that financial transactions are in conformity with the applicable rules;
• Financial audits and verification missions done during and after implementation of the actions;
• Evaluation and review programmes.’56
Financial Regulation emphasises ex ante and ex post assessments of intended and actual
results, plus adherence to financial regulations.
DG ECHO partnerships
DG ECHO manages its partnerships with the humanitarian organisations it funds through various
well-documented processes using different instruments: For NGOs (FPA = Framework
Partnership Agreement), for ICRC and IFRC (also termed FPA but with different content from that
used with NGOs), for the UN agencies (FAFA = Financial and Administrative Framework
Agreement), and MSSAs.
All partnership processes have a common structure:
• Partners are assessed as eligible and suitable for a 4-year period, with periodic re-assessments and audits.
• Partner project proposals are submitted using the Single Form and assessed against the Strategic criteria described in the country/regional funding decision set out in the Humanitarian Implementation Plan (HIP) and the operational criteria set out in an annex to the Fiche Opérationnelle (FichOp) management tool.
• Partners are subject to general conditions, including cost justification requirements.
• Partners sign a grant agreement or, for UN agencies, a delegated management agreement. In almost all cases, funding is for a maximum of one year.
56 From DG ECHO Strategic plan 2016-2020, page 25.
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Annex 10 – Transport and logistics as key elements of preparedness and response Extracted from Section 4.4 of DG ECHO, 2017, Proposal for an improved Operational Emergency
Management Policy
Transport and logistics are central for all sectors of disaster response and humanitarian action,
from initial access to carry out needs assessment to the ‘last mile delivery’. This is particularly
relevant in sudden-onset emergencies where the major challenges of the initial response tend to
be linked to logistics.
As DG ECHO's mandate encompasses both humanitarian response and civil protection, there
are opportunities for complementarity in operations in sudden-onset disasters (e.g. Haiti) and for
synergies and knowledge-transfer between humanitarian and civil protection actors in logistics. In
the past, DG ECHO's Enhanced Response Capacity Funding HIP has been used to boost the
logistics of major humanitarian actors (notably, IFRC and WFP). As a donor, the European
Commission supports the Logistics Cluster in different crises. DG ECHO participates in the
Global Logistics Cluster (GLC) and has just been elected as a member of the Global Strategic
Advisory Group. In order to capitalise on previous investments on transport and logistics, the
following proposals are made to strengthen DG ECHO's capacity to respond efficiently to sudden-
onset large-scale emergencies:
• On an international level, transport and logistics capacities should be further developed in conjunction with the GLC. Target areas of interest include addressing sector-wide measurement and improvement of performance, the general strengthening of Logistics Common Services, increased training and capacity building, in particular at local level as the decisive step to deliver assistance on the often complicated and crucial ‘last mile delivery’.
• Prepositioning and the possibility to procure own supplies should be explored as part of DG ECHO's Emergency Management Policy. Having adequate stocks of key relief items available and ready to be deployed in addition to the transport means already available could greatly enhance the speed and visibility of EU disaster response. An assessment of the value added and possible reactivation of existing DG ECHO stocks in UN Humanitarian Response Depots will be carried out in coordination with the DG ECHO TA logisticians.
• The provision of transport solutions and efficient humanitarian flight services as part of a humanitarian response, monitoring and access strategy should continue to match needs. However, the means to ensure access for humanitarian aid workers, to deliver urgent stocks and to ensure medical and security evacuations if needed should be maintained. This can be achieved with the two framework contracts at our disposal, namely ‘Provision of air transport services in Africa’ (ECHO Flight), more broadly through DG ECHO's transport broker K&N as well as ongoing support through the HIPs to UNHAS, PACTEC, etc. A strategic review of support to humanitarian air services should take place. The possibility of covering all Commission supported humanitarian air services under a dedicated HIP should be examined in order to ensure coherence and consistency.
• More extensive use can be made of the expertise of logistics experts in DG ECHO's Field Network for logistics assessment, monitoring and evaluation of humanitarian logistics set-up in sudden-onset disasters and other specific humanitarian contexts. In sudden-onset emergencies, DG ECHO needs to have the capacity to deploy logisticians both in support of humanitarian logistics and in support of EUCP Teams to maximise the speed of deployment of the assistance. Civil protection training for logisticians in DG ECHO's Field Network could increase the efficiency of the roll out of civil protection operations.
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• DG ECHO should also consider if it wishes to expand its thematic guidance on transport and logistics. So far, DG ECHO has developed and disseminated existing guidance on thematic and cross-cutting issues in different sectors (food, protection, gender, cash, WASH).
• Lessons learned showed that logistics training to ERCC staff, notably duty officers, should be strengthened. To further increase logistics expertise in the ERCC, the possibility to make use of regional office logistics experts from Participating States should be considered for emergencies with such specific requirements.
The above proposals are in line with a vision of continuing to work with partners to improve
response time, foster professionalism in the supply chain and improve procurement processes. It
is estimated that costs of logistics and supply chain activities add up to between 40–60% of the
overall budget of a humanitarian organisation. However, in order to become a driving force in
humanitarian logistics, DG ECHO needs to invest in logistics and secondly, to make greater use
of the existing capacity of professional logistics staff both in the field and headquarters. There is
the potential also to derive greater visibility for the EU through a more active engagement in
logistics.
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Annex 11 – DG ECHO portfolio of investments 2013-2017
United Nations Agencies
During the evaluation period, the World Food Programme (WFP) has been by far the largest of
DG ECHO’s partners, receiving almost €2.4 billion of a total of less than €9 million. WFP has
championed the development of humanitarian logistics capabilities in key common logistics
services (UN Humanitarian Air Services (UNHAS), UNHRD, Logistics Cluster, Emergency
Telecommunications Cluster) that have enabled other partners to implement humanitarian
programmes. Both UNICEF and UNHCR have also been key partners, receiving €0.8 and €0.6
billion respectively (see Table 10 below). Overall, DG ECHO funding to UN agencies steadily
increased between 2013 and 2017 from €0.6 to €4.5 billion. OCHA is not an implementing
agency but performs important coordination functions, including inter-cluster coordination,
mapping, and other country-level information services.
Table 2: Principal recipients of DG ECHO funding (€) – UN Agencies
Name 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Total
WFP 238,808,241 209,247,076 207,125,000 766,919,347 961,400,383 2,383,500,047
UNHCR 140,465,843 91,950,000 126,790,000 237,504,758 287,236,517 883,947,118
UNICEF 111,659,092 86,307,900 108,562,000 148,432,907 215,818,793 670,780,692
IOM 32,401,745 45,812,214 39,885,000 69,910,000 70,464,000 258,472,959
WHO 19,440,142 10,790,000 19,952,785 22,966,076 41,940,000 115,089,003
OCHA 16,324,780 17,865,500 13,932,900 19,057,968 15,707,585 82,888,733
UNFPA 3,000,000 1,000,000 10,500,000 18,410,000 40,525,000 73,435,000
FAO 14,494,551 11,386,500 7,380,200 14,490,475 25,525,000 73,276,726
Grand total € 576,594,394 474,359,190 534,127,885 1,297,691,531 1,658,617,278 4,541,390,278
Red Cross Red Crescent
The RCRC has also been an important DG ECHO partner with the ICRC alone receiving almost
€0.6 billion (see Table 11). IFRC’s Logistics, Procurement and Supply Chain Management
Department provided humanitarian logistics services to the RCRC network, partners and
governments.
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Table 3: DG ECHO funding (in €) to the Red Cross Red Crescent Movement
Name 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Total
ICRC 68,467,000 109,720,000 108,550,000 166,412,500 128,190,000 581,339,500
Nat. Societies 27,535,239 36,470,779 30,380,019 35,182,796 27,531,734 157,100,567
IFRC 15,415,369 15,225,000 13,080,000 35,883,113 24,427,950 104,031,432
Grand total € 111,417,608 161,415,779 152,010,019 237,478,409 180,149,684 842,471,499
Non-governmental organisations
Of the top ten international NGOs (those receiving over €100 million during the evaluation
period), the Save the Children network received the highest level of funding (€321 million), with
Danish Refugee Council, Norwegian Refugee Council, Oxfam, Action Contre la Faim and
International Rescue Committee all receiving over €200 million (see Table 12).
Table 4: NGO (all NGO family) recipients of DG ECHO funding (in €) 2013–17 receiving more than €100 million
Name 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Total
STC (all) 59,257,227 49,327,092 71,418,370 92,384,910 48,845,543 321,233,142
DRC 52,667,875 31,359,600 34,160,294 61,954,430 93,060,000 273,202,199
NRC 49,287,518 32,473,000 43,048,246 70,132,957 77,967,540 272,909,261
OXFAM (all) 46,106,066 60,781,130 36,952,933 55,109,534 61,670,000 260,619,663
ACF (all) 48,144,961 41,820,203 44,888,391 61,293,701 55,492,854 251,640,110
IRC 31,594,493 30,248,967 30,350,098 59,684,468 60,955,000 212,833,026
CARE 28,214,500 15,361,032 14,533,460 44,503,702 25,969,999 128,582,693
SI 32,078,073 21,965,000 21,030,000 24,645,897 21,915,000 121,633,970
IMC 12,575,763 20,613,233 24,567,366 35,705,000 27,720,000 121,181,362
ACTED 24,941,236 19,680,000 13,750,000 18,605,000 27,395,000 104,371,236
Grand total € 384,869,725 323,631,271 334,701,173 524,021,615 500,992,953 2,068,206,662
Funding by sector
Over the evaluation period, DG ECHO made funding contributions to humanitarian sectors, as
shown in Table 13:
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Table 5: DG ECHO funding (in €) to Humanitarian sectors 2013–17
Sector 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Total
Food sec/livelihoods 359,217,684 347,247,119 684,919,877 566,861,536 448,140,616 2,406,386,832
Multi-purpose cash transfer
352,781,432 743,703,016 1,096,484,448
Health 149,415,731 178,759,938 206,236,535 287,307,769 205,294,367 1,027,014,339
Protection 126,955,660 107,445,039 134,544,843 298,111,432 247,785,451 914,842,425
Shelter and settlements 165,595,067 120,495,649 144,807,816 202,668,646 143,800,606 777,367,784
WASH 143,578,678 134,323,835 160,812,432 169,936,751 121,210,725 729,862,422
Nutrition 145,485,343 127,996,992 175,423,885 132,407,613 128,557,028 709,870,860
DRR / preparedness 46,803,867 50,684,158 52,950,674 70,425,484 70,527,462 291,391,645
Coordination 38,672,915 41,930,078 64,830,211 64,130,106 67,582,022 277,145,331
Support to operations 38,509,841 39,747,487 37,400,005 61,493,745 51,492,978 228,644,056
Education in emergencies
1,083,686 127,879,276 98,033,051 226,996,013
Child protection 17,884,870 8,186,609 14,487,885 1,680,233
42,239,596
Mine actions 2,710,508 265,937 1,894,673 1,916,967 1,815,721 8,603,806
Gender 358,646
358,646
Grand total € 1,235,188,809 1,157,082,841 1,679,392,523 2,337,600,988 2,327,943,044 8,737,208,205
Humanitarian logistics will have formed part of project expenditure across all these sectors,
though the proportions are unknown as DG ECHO does not hold the data required to make such
an analysis. Food security and livelihoods will most likely have used at least half of the funds
provided within the supply chain, that is, at least €1.2 billion over the evaluation period in that
sector alone.
DG ECHO Funding to ‘Support to Operations’
Of direct interest for this evaluation is the sector ‘Support to Operations’. Over the evaluation
period, total funding was €229 million (some 3% of total DG ECHO project funding), comprising
355 projects divided into subsectors; logistics, capacity development, security etc. The
breakdown between subsectors will be reviewed further in the data analysis stage.
The top ten countries in receipt of Support to Operations Funding are shown in Table 14 below
(11 including ‘country not specified’). The proportion going to logistics is unknown because for
some projects, it is mixed with other activities in the same project.
Table 6: DG ECHO funding to the Support to Operations sector in € 2013–17, top ten countries
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Country/Year 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Total
SOUTH SUDAN REPUBLIC 9,600,000 5,000,000 6,500,000 6,326,612 5,000,000 32,426,612
COUNTRY NOT SPECIFIED 3,800,000 5,759,051 6,146,147 8,436,443 3,000,000 27,141,640
TURKEY 698,739 9,893,926 11,135,290 21,727,955
AFGHANISTAN 3,358,901 3,249,411 2,263,054 3,723,215 1,743,945 14,338,526
SUDAN 3,000,000 3,000,000 2,000,000 2,530,000 1,950,000 12,480,000
CHAD 3,082,082 2,094,961 2,200,000 2,500,000 1,700,000 11,577,043
SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC - 1,287,360 1,723,703 4,412,372 4,086,969 11,510,404
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC 665,741 2,910,000 3,500,000 1,961,609 2,006,032 11,043,382
NIGERIA 1,000,000 1,882,210 7,523,838 10,406,047
GUINEA 8,649,000 8,649,000
YEMEN 580,574 342,259 420,349 856,834 6,000,000 8,200,016
MALI 350,000 3,390,000 3,100,000 1,100,000 7,940,000
The top ten partners in receipt ‘Support to Operations’ over the evaluation period as shown in
Table 15:
Table 7: DG ECHO funding (in €) to the Support to Operations sector 2013–17, UN agencies and top ten NGOs
Partner 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Total
WFP 21,779,596 24,629,090 20,056,004 30,060,025 33,481,771 130,006,486
INSO
3,870,000 6,990,000 4,900,000 15,760,000
UNHCR 2,008,392 1,687,721 602,296 7,023,309 432,350 11,754,068
IOM 900,000 740,073 500,000 1,515,103 3,406,879 7,062,055
MAF 1,759,000 1,850,000 878,000 863,175 730,000 6,080,175
NRC 1,242,130 2,428,505 1,450,350 341,381 204,990 5,667,355
CARE 515,581 1,602,936 390,000
97,589 2,606,106
UNICEF 400,000
1,000,000 403,483 562,632 2,366,115
REDR 1,000,000
700,000 634,990
2,334,990
OXFAM 1,679,247 76,208
526,129 29,454 2,311,038
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WFP was by far the largest recipient of funding from Support to Operations, receiving €130
million or 84% of a total €155 million to United Nations agencies, and 57% of the total €229
million to this sector.
In the evaluation period, funding to key organisations in the sub-sector of ‘Support to Operations’
called ‘Logistics’ was €116 million, with more than half of that funding going to South Sudan,
Sudan, Chad and Central African Republic (CAR). Funding by organisation (89% went to WFP),
is shown in Table 16:
Table 8: Value of Support to Operations projects by partner
Partner No. projects Funding
WFP-IT 74 103,064,201
MAF-UK 10 6,080,175
UNHCR-
CH
4 2,614,497
IOM-CH 3 2,113,848
PUI-FR 5 810,000
MCE-UK 1 698,739
ASF-BE 1 582,082
ACTED-FR 1 332,059
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Annex 12 – Summary of relevant observations from DG ECHO evaluations
During the inception phase, more than 40 evaluations and studies relevant to the evaluation were
collected. The most important DG ECHO evaluation for this evaluation to draw on is the recently
completed Comprehensive Evaluation of EU Humanitarian Aid 2012–16.57 The Comprehensive
Evaluation synthesised DG ECHO evaluations over the evaluation period as well as reports from
the European Court of Auditors.58,59 The Comprehensive Evaluation was finalised in early 2018
and DG ECHO management released its response to that evaluation during the course of this
evaluation.
Key extracts from the most pertinent DG ECHO evaluations are included below, from DG ECHO
evaluations only. (References to several non-DG ECHO evaluations are made in the main text of
the report.)
Efficiency and cost-effectiveness
The DG ECHO Evaluation on Efficiency and Cost-effectiveness (not specifically focused on
logistics) found that there was no systematic or standardised consideration of value for money
(VfM) based on quantitative indicators, with a low prominence of cost-effectiveness in project
documentation.60 While ‘DG ECHO administrative mechanisms and systems were generally
viewed as efficient’,
When selecting proposals, DG ECHO rarely conducted detailed efficiency analyses on new or
innovative health projects. Instead they preferred to fund action types that were already known to
be good VfM or where the largest percentage of funding was allocated to beneficiaries rather
than to overhead costs.61,62
The Comprehensive Evaluation concluded that Commission-funded humanitarian actions were
overall needs-based and implemented in line with humanitarian principles, and made an
important contribution to core humanitarian objectives.63 However, it also found that ‘DG ECHO
has no formal process in place to weigh the costs and benefits and value for money of its
strategic portfolio choices ex-ante’,64 and ‘Humanitarian actions funded by the EU are overall
57 European Commission, Comprehensive Evaluation of the EU Humanitarian Aid, 2012 – 2016 Final Report, 2018. 58 Including, Did the Commission effectively manage the Humanitarian aid provided to populations affected by conflicts in the African Great Lakes Region? 2016. 59 The Comprehensive Evaluation does not cover 2017, as this evaluation does. 60 Pg. 127, Comprehensive Evaluation. 61 Page 12, European Commission, Evaluation of the European Commission’s interventions in the Humanitarian Health sector, 2014 – 2016 Final Report, 2017. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/echo/sites/echo-site/files/1._health_evaluation_main_report_europa.pdf 62 The Comprehensive Evaluation also noted that: ‘Cost-effectiveness of EU-funded actions Humanitarian actions funded by the EU are overall seen as being cost-effective but the assessment is mainly based on qualitative indicators and stakeholder views. There have been attempts by DG ECHO to provide quantitative evidence, for example, by calculating the share of assistance which reached the final beneficiary but only on rather small samples and benchmarks for comparison with other donors are lacking. This effort needs to be further supported and made systematic’... The fact that DG ECHO is willing to accept variations of costs across projects when duly justified by the context is currently much appreciated by the framework partners…A positive aspect is that DG ECHO has a Single Form with the same template being used throughout the project cycle. However, reporting requirements are still considered as complex and not harmonised with those of other donors, thereby impeding their efficiency’ (p. 14). 63 Comprehensive Evaluation, p. 5. 64 Comprehensive Evaluation, p. 13.
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seen as being cost-effective but the assessment is mainly based on qualitative indicators and
stakeholder view.’65
The evaluation recommended that:
DG ECHO should adapt its management and monitoring systems to make them more suitable to
analyse the effectiveness and value for money of its actions66 [which would] respond to various
calls to make increasing and better use of existing data to drive effectiveness and value for
money in the humanitarian system as a whole [Grand Bargain], in the EU in general [Financial
Regulation guidelines] and within DG ECHO.’67
This recommendation is similar to one made by the Africa Great Lakes region audit, which lead to
changes in the dashboard process for the assessment of projects, with the addition of a new
check list and requiring better documentation of the project assessment process.
Capacity building
According to the Mid-term Evaluation of Enhanced Response Capacity (ERC) Funding, 2014, in
the period 2010–13, ‘logistics and other needs’ accounted for ‘35.3% of ERC funding’.68 The
evaluation concluded that: ‘The potential scale of some of the specific priorities (enabling
environment for DRR, local capacity building, prepositioning and stockpiling) is hardly compatible
with the ERC budget, which is limited to €24 million a year’ [i.e. inadequate to the needs]. The
evaluation questions whether the ERC should restrict itself to contribute to strengthening the
global response capacity through ‘seed money’, leverage and pilot projects, or initiate quasi-
programmatic activities for longer-term prepositioning and stockpiling for logistics.
Regarding the specific investments already made by the ERC, the evaluation concludes: ‘The list
of identified needs … is still comprehensive, but some of the needs have now been entirely
(logistics) or largely fulfilled (clusters, needs assessments).’69 Presumably, this evaluation finding
added to the case for the significant reduction in logistics investments made by DG ECHO in the
following years. However, the evaluation also recommended that ‘the ERC should encourage
more projects to be submitted which could include budget lines for strengthening local
preparedness.’70
Working with authorities
A theme noted in the Comprehensive Evaluation, and others, is the need for DG ECHO to pay
attention to coordination with national and local ministries regarding logistics, facilitated by DG ECHO
through the development of Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs) with local governments for tax
exemptions and working permits.71 The UCPM evaluation (see below) recommends that DG ECHO
‘recognise the need to develop context-specific approaches towards involving national and local
authorities whenever possible.’72
65 Comprehensive Evaluation, p. 14. 66 Comprehensive Evaluation, p. 15.
67 Comprehensive Evaluation, Recommendation 5, p. 19. 68 This does not mean that 35% of ERC funds went to logistics, as the basket term ‘logistics and other needs’ included the cross-cutting issues of gender and protection, as well as security, logistics, prepositioning and stockpiling. 69 Mid-Term Evaluation of ERC Funding – Final Report, p. 11. 70 Mid-Term Evaluation of ERC Funding – Final Report, pp. 27 and 85. 71 Page 48, European Commission, Evaluation of the European Commission’s interventions in the Humanitarian Health sector, 2014–16 Final Report, 2017. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/echo/sites/echo-site/files/1._health_evaluation_main_report_europa.pdf 72 European Commission, Comprehensive Evaluation of the EU Humanitarian Aid, 2012–16 Final Report, 2017, p. 11. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/echo/sites/echo-site/files/cha_final_report_01032018_master_clean.pdf
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Union Civil Protection Mechanism
The EU Court of Auditors found that in coordinating disaster response among different actors, the
UCPM was seen to have strengthened its on-the-ground coordination by ‘exploiting the DG
ECHO field network experts and further involve EU Delegations’73 and DG ECHO is seen to
successfully coordinate its interventions with other actors in the humanitarian sector.74 Activation
of the UCPM was seen to be timely, and to effectively facilitate coordination with PS teams, and
UN bodies for transition into recovery. It recommends that the UCPM strengthen on-the-ground
coordination through improved reporting and through the ERCC, (itself cited as a key resource in
planning for logistics that has proven effective in facilitating logistics and transport).75
The interim evaluation of the Union Civil Protection Mechanism, 2014–16, of 2017 concluded
that:
‘The Emergency Response Coordination Centre (ERCC) supported and coordinated a quicker
response to disasters both inside and outside Europe, using resources from the countries
participating in the mechanism … In addition to its coordination role, the ERCC acted as an
operational hub, playing a pivotal role in facilitating logistics and transport.’76
Donor coordination
The UCPM evaluation also found that DG ECHO is seen to have recently strengthened
cooperation with other donors to promote complementarity and was recommended to ‘continue its
effort to reinforce its relationship with the UN agencies (e.g. UN OCHA) and, where needed,
challenge them in cooperation with its key partners.’
Cluster coordination
Regarding coordination, the Comprehensive Evaluation noted that:
at least six [prior] evaluations…called for a more consistent participation of DG ECHO in existing
clusters across sectors and a more proactive approach in promoting some thematic practices
within established structures both at HQ and field level’.77
This evaluation will consider whether DG ECHO needs to change the way it engages with the
GLC, remembering that donors are not formally a part of the IASC-led cluster coordination
approach. (DG ECHO is represented on the GLC Strategic Advisory Group.)
Cost-effectiveness
The Comprehensive Evaluation concluded that:
There would be scope for DG ECHO to follow a more pre-defined approach to the analysis of
cost-effectiveness, e.g. produce a detailed checklist to be used as part of the appraisal process
73 European Court of Auditors, Union Civil Protection Mechanism: the coordination of responses to disasters outside the EU have been broadly effective, 2016, (pursuant to Article 287(4), second subparagraph, TFEU), pp. 6–7. Available at: https://www.eca.europa.eu/en/Pages/DocItem.aspx?did=40303 74 European Court of Auditors, Union Civil Protection Mechanism: the coordination of responses to disasters outside the EU have been broadly effective, 2016, (pursuant to Article 287(4), second subparagraph, TFEU). Available at: https://www.eca.europa.eu/en/Pages/DocItem.aspx?did=40303 75 European Commission, Ex-post evaluation of Civil Protection Financial Instrument and Community Civil Protection Mechanism (recast) 2007–13, 16 Dec 2014. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/evaluation/2015/CPM_final_report_en.pdf 76 Interim evaluation of the Union Civil Protection Mechanism, 2014-2016, Final Report, August 2017, p. 5. 77 Page 96, European Commission, Comprehensive Evaluation of the EU Humanitarian Aid, 2012–16 Final Report, 2018. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/echo/sites/echo-site/files/cha_final_report_01032018_master_clean.pdf
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and while monitoring projects, this is partly answered by the FichOp Guidelines published by DG
ECHO in 2016 … and recommends that cost-effectiveness should be more embedded in the DG
ECHO project cycle.’78
Innovation
The evaluation of the use of different transfer modalities in DG ECHO Humanitarian Aid Actions,
2011–14, of 2016, concludes that there is evidence of DG ECHO adopting and promoting
innovations and best practices driving cost-effectiveness. On the specific topic of cash transfers
for instance, the EU is largely recognised as a key donor, which led the way to the ‘normalisation’
of the use of cash transfers.
78 Page 127, European Commission, Comprehensive Evaluation of the EU Humanitarian Aid, 2012–16 Final Report, 2018. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/echo/sites/echo-site/files/cha_final_report_01032018_master_clean.pdf
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Annex 13 – Evolution of the DG ECHO logistics function
Evolution of the logistics function
In 2008, there was a single department in DG ECHO dealing with finance, the supervision of
logistics contracts and the field network, including logisticians. This has since been divided. The
transport and logistics function was then, and still is, largely concerned with the logistics of DG
ECHO country offices.
In September 2014, it was decided to regroup all logistics into Section B1 (now A1), with all
logistical issues regrouped into a small cell. C1 continued to manage thematic, horizontal funding
(later renamed Emergency Response Capacity – ERC) of approximately €30 million per year,
including for logistics capacity development. Much of this funding was provided in support of UN
reform, in particular, the establishment of the Cluster system under the Inter-Agency Standing
Committee (IASC), including the Global Logistics Cluster (GLC). DG ECHO determined that it
was a strategic investment to provide significant financial support to the establishment of the GLC
and other clusters, and to the establishment of UN Humanitarian Response Depots (UNHRDs).
When responsibility for transport and logistics were moved into B1 (now A1), this was not
accompanied by any budget for capacity building (refer to DG ECHO organigram DG ECHO
below for meaning of section names and where they sit in the DG ECHO structure).
In 2013, the then head of the logistics unit issued a memo79 setting out proposals for the further
development of the DG ECHO logistics function. The memo highlighted the importance of
logistics as part of the effectiveness and efficiency of disaster response and called for
strengthening and professionalising the logistics support for the field network and cooperation
with European External Action Service (EEAS) and other services. The memo proposed:
• Strengthening the logistics procedures of DG ECHO teams.
• Strengthening the development of coordination mechanisms, standards and quality services in logistics the humanitarian community.
• Operation and provision of logistics support in the aftermath of large-scale disasters to the DG ECHO field network and humanitarian community.
• Management of the transport service contract and provision of strategic transport services to other partners.
• Technical support to project proposals/implementation and funding of logistics projects to promote best practices.
This initiative to strengthen (or perhaps re-strengthen) the logistics function gained limited traction
within DG ECHO HQ, but it did lead to the establishment of the logistics platform, as discussed
below. Notably, the relevant Note from the then DG80 did not include the engagement of logistics
advisors in the management of partner projects under the geographic units, as proposed in the
2013 memo.
DG ECHO operational transport and logistics platform
79 Draft outline of DG ECHO logistics, July 2013. 80 Note to all DG ECHO staff, Director General DG ECHO, 6.2.2015.
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Recognising the strategic importance of logistics and transport,81 in September 2014 the concept
of the DG ECHO logistics platform was created as part of a wider reorganisation of the DG ECHO
Directorate. Under that process, DG ECHO was expanded to include a fourth directorate, with ‘A’
holding responsibility for the newly created ERCC set-up to coordinate the EU Civil Protection
Mechanism (UCPM). DG ECHO Unit A1 also hosted the new logistics platform. The following
logistics and transport initiatives were transferred to the logistics platform from the original units
B2 and C4 as part of the reorganisation of activities within the DG:
1 ECHO Flight and UNHAS coordination, which has been the primary function of the logistics platform and long-term role of DG ECHO’s non-field network logistics activity.
2 Coordination with the Humanitarian Response Depots (UNHRD).
3 Coordination with the GLC.
4 A 4-year renewable framework contract with Kuehne & Nagel, initially awarded in 2008, for the transport and storage of relief goods for different actors. The contract was, for example, used for Civil Protection operations several times in 2014/15 for operations in Central African Republic, for cargo flights to Ebola-affected countries, and also for the Ukraine crisis. As noted in the ToR, however, the resource is generally under-used. During 2014–16, fewer than 20 calls were made on the framework contract. PS tend to work with their own brokers instead.
5 The development of a Medevac system in 2014 during the Ebola epidemic in collaboration with the ERCC, DG SANTE and WHO. The system supported the deployment and safety of international aid workers, combining assets available through Member States via the UCPM and the framework contract with Kuehne and Nagel.
6 OCHA’s logistics project on ‘Unsolicited bilateral donations’ and their tracking project for humanitarian goods (LOgik), which have played a key role in preparing for customs facilitation in the context of humanitarian crises. DG ECHO’s coordination with OCHA included feedback on policy papers and exchange of information.
7 Transport coordination of humanitarian assistance through the UCPM. In 2014 and 2015, total EU transport co-financing exceeded €10 million.
Related to, but not part of the logistics platform, are:
8 The Voluntary Pool,82 consists of a pool of pre-committed response capacities of the Member States and includes civil protection modules, other response capacities and experts.83
9 The International Humanitarian Partnership (IHP), which complements the UCPM as an informal network of PS (mainly Nordic countries) dedicated to the delivery of humanitarian assistance. They have contributed logistical support (usually to the UN) in sudden-onset disasters and complex emergencies. Two specialised member agencies, MSB84 and THW,85 can receive funding from DG ECHO. IHP members have been encouraged to join the Voluntary Pool.
81 Draft Outline of DG ECHO's approach to logistics 2013 – Herman Mosselmans Ref. DG ECHO/HM/LLZ/SB. 82 https://ec.europa.eu/echo/what-we-do/civil-protection/european-emergency-response-capacity_en 83 There are currently 90 accredited modules of 17 different types (for example shelter, medical, evacuation) within the Voluntary Pool. The Modules comprise specialised teams and capacity offered by EU Member States. The capacity of the modules is tested and certified. The ERCC plans to upgrade its current expert roster to create a voluntary pool of experts. The required profiles have been identified (including) logistics. The experts will be certified to guarantee quality. Once in the pool, they have to be available in 6-12 hours after request and MS have to ensure rotation, so someone is available in the response time agreed (Interview). 84www.msb.se/en/About-MSB 85www.thw.de/EN/Homepage/homepage_node.html
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Annex 14 – DG ECHO co-financing to civil protection transport ex-EU
Table 9: Value of DG ECHO co-financing to civil protection transport employed in humanitarian aid operations outside Europe
Year Number of
PS funded
Country Emergency
type
Total request
€
Total funded
€
Year total €
2017 1 Bangladesh Refugees 257,084 233,608
5 Chile Forest fires 847,248 789,218
6 Iraq Conflict 927,520 886,747
5 Haiti Tropical
Cyclone
638,026 600,219
2,509,792
2016 1 Albania Floods 431 431
2 Israel Forest fires 562,164 205,009
1 DR Congo Yellow Fever 136,030 70,793
1 Sri Lanka Floods 9,075 8,890
4 Ecuador Earthquake 954,798 640,616
1 Fiji Tropical
Cyclone
57,574 57,574
983,313
2015 1 Myanmar Floods 17,710 17,710
1 Malawi Floods 70,791 53,845
15 Nepal Earthquake 3,595,264 2,950,429
1 Yemen Conflict 151,250 151,250
2 Albania Floods 5,954 5,019
7 Ukraine Conflict 84,350 84,346
5 Iraq Conflict 1,252,589 895,519
Evaluation of Humanitarian Logistics within EU Civil Protection and Humanitarian Action, 2013–17
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4,158,116
2014/15 12 Guinea/Liberia
/ Sierra Leone
Epidemics 17,436,600 14,877,702 14,877,702
2014
1 Cape Verde Volcano 126,697 63,602
10 Bosnia and
Herzegovina
Floods 158,390 127,852
5 Serbia Floods 39,416 16,664
1 Slovenia Sleet 2,962 2,962
1 South Sudan Conflict 151,311 144,597 355,677
2013 1 Bosnia and
Herzegovina
Forest fires 86,215 55,307
6 Philippines Typhoon
Haiyan
1,754,978 1,725,266
1,780,572
Total transport co-financing outside the EU, 2013–17 24,665,173
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Annex 15 – DG ECHO investments in logistics 2006–15 under €1 million
From 2006 to 2015, capacity-building investments totalled over €19 million,86 making the logistics
sector the second biggest recipient of DG ECHO ERC funding, after Coordination. In addition to
the major investments in logistics capacity discussed in the main report, smaller investments (<€1
million), were as follows:
1 As the forerunner to the logistics cluster, DG ECHO-funded the UN Joint Logistics Centre (endorsed by the IASC) to provide strategic logistics assistance and non-food item management / coordination to humanitarian agencies working in Sudan. Total funding of €800,000 in 2004–11.87
2 Through the International Rescue Committee, the Fritz Institute and the Chartered Institute of Logistics & Transport developed the Humanitarian Certification Programme88 in 2006 (updated in 2017) to address the need for training and professional recognition of logisticians working in humanitarian organisations, with DG ECHO funding of €400,000 in 2006–07.89
3 The inter-agency Partners for Enhanced Response Capacity in Logistics (PARCEL) Project90 (led by Oxfam) developed training materials for aid agencies to use when building logistics capacity of their local NGO partners. A set of minimum standards was agreed among a consortium of 11 international humanitarian organisations. DG ECHO funding of €294,109 was provided via Oxfam for the period 2013–14.
4 The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) received DG ECHO funding91 in 2009 for ‘Conflict Sensitive Logistics & Ethical Transportation Clearinghouse’, totalling €244,446.92 EthicalCargo.org provided tools, training and advice to encourage the adoption of conflict sensitive logistics guidelines and ethical transportation policies.
5 To ‘Invest in people in order to increase the availability of skilled people for implementing humanitarian aid’, DG ECHO-funded academic institutions,93 some with linkages to humanitarian logistics. €200,000 was provided by DG ECHO for this purpose in 2008.94
6 Logistics response training is a 7-day simulation exercise run by the GLC to develop operational logistics surge capacity. DG ECHO provided €160,230 for training in 2016–17.
7 In 2013, Fleet Forum,95 through a consortium with Groupe URD and INSEAD University, was funded to evaluate DG ECHO fleet operations. DG ECHO provided €76,400.96
86 World Humanitarian Summit, side event on humanitarian logistics 23/05/2016. 87 Project DG ECHO/SDN/BUD/2004/05009. 88 Certification programme (Fritz Institute via IRC) Ref. DG ECHO/-GF/BUD/2007/01004. 89 DG ECHO/-GF/BUD/2007/01004 for ‘Certification in Humanitarian Logistics (CHL) Level II’. 90 http://parcelproject.org 91 In collaboration with the Swedish International Development & Cooperation Agency (SIDA), with support from the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 92 Project number DG ECHO/-GF/BUD/2009/01006. 93 Lugano University, INSEAD, London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), Mango UK, Copenhagen Business School, HANKEN (Swedish school of Economics and Business Administration), INTRAC (International NGO Training and Research Centre), Cambridge University, Oxford Business School, SDA Bocconi, IESE Spain, Cranfield University, Erasmus University Rotterdam, HEC Paris, University of Manchester, ESADE Spain, ESC Toulouse, Humacoop Grenoble. 94 HIIP DG ECHO/-GF/BUD/2008/01000. 95 Established in 2004 as an association to develop solutions for the humanitarian sector and established a platform to share knowledge and best practices in transport. 96 Project DG ECHO/ADM/BUD/2012/01206.
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DG ECHOs logistics capacity investments are shown below in Table 18. (Major investments
stopped in 2013.)
Table 10: DG ECHO logistics projects based on the agreements for humanitarian assistance 2004–1797
Reference number Year Partner Action title/description EC amount
DG
ECHO/ERC/BUD/20
13/91013
2013 OXFAM Enhancing the Logistics capacity in-country to
respond in partnership through Enhanced Capacity
Funding
294,109
DG
ECHO/ADM/BUD/20
12/01206
2012 Groupe
URD
DG ECHO Fleet evaluation by Fleet Forum 76,400
DG
ECHO/ERC/BUD/20
11/01005
2011 WFP Enhanced Logistics Response 6,000,000
DG
ECHO/ERC/BUD/20
11/01006
2011 IFRC Enhancing humanitarian logistics capacity for effective
response to disasters and crisis
3,000,000
DG
ECHO/THM/BUD/20
10/01005
2010 WFP Humanitarian Logistics: from Preparedness to
Response
1,930,000
DG
ECHO/DIP/BUD/200
9/07003
2009 WFP Emergency logistics preparedness and readiness to
respond in the Pacific Island Nations
189,015
DG ECHO/-
GF/BUD/2009/01006
2009 SIPRI Conflict Sensitive Logistics & Ethical Transportation
Clearinghouse
244,446
DG
ECHO/THM/BUD/20
09/01002
2009 WFP Humanitarian Logistics: from preparedness to
response. (UNHRD)
4,830,000
DG ECHO/-
GF/BUD/2007/01004
2007 IRC Certification Programme (Certification in Humanitarian
Logistics Level I and Level II)
200,000
DG
ECHO/THM/BUD/20
07/01006
2007 WFP Strengthening Humanitarian Logistic Capacities –
‘The Establishment of the Humanitarian Response
Depot (HRD) Network’, WFP Special Operation 10522
and prepositioning of other relief items. UNHRD
4,300,000
DG ECHO/-
GF/BUD/2006/01004
2006 Groupe
URD
To improve the performance of the humanitarian
response system by strengthening the organisational
preparedness of NGOs with the provision of targeted
sectoral and human resource training
100,000
2006 2006 IRC Certification in Humanitarian Logistics (CHL) Level II 200,000
DG
ECHO/SDN/BUD/20
04/05009
2004 WFP Establishment of a UN Joint Logistics Centre
providing assistance in logistics coordination to
humanitarian agencies working in Sudan
800,000
97 Sourced from https://ec.europa.eu/echo/funding-evaluations/funding-humanitarian-aid/grants-and-contributions_en
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Annex 16 – DG ECHO-funded stock levels in UN Humanitarian Response Depots
Data provided by the UNHRD Network Coordinator, WFP
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Annex 17 – Humanitarian Procurement Centres – annual turnover Annual turnover €
# HPC NAME Stock-
holding
Countries where HPC's offices or
warehouses are located
Regions,
countries
serviced by
HPC
Main supplies and services offered: 2013 2014 2015
1 Association régionale
d’approvisionnement en
médicaments essentiels
(ASRAMES)
www.asrames.org
YES Democratic Republic of the Congo Democratic
Republic of
the Congo
Pharmaceutical products & medical supplies;
medical devices & equipment; water &
sanitation; engineering, radio &
telecommunications; transport;
administration, & services
4,232,447
2 Beschaffungsgesellschaft
mit beschränkter Haftung
für kirchliche, caritative
und soziale Einrichtungen
(BEGECA)
www.begeca.de
NO Germany Worldwide Pharmaceutical products & medical supplies;
medical devices & equipment; food;
livelihood support; water & sanitation;
shelter & non-food items; engineering, radio
& telecommunications; transport;
administration, & services
10,830,320 16,003,808
3 Centrale Humanitaire
Medico-Pharmaceutique
(CHMP Kenya)
http://www.chmp-
kenya.org
YES Kenya Africa Pharmaceutical products & medical supplies;
medical devices & equipment & services
3,630,474
4 Deutsches
Medikamenten- Hilfswerk
Action Medeor (Action
Medeor) www.medeor.org
YES Germany Worldwide Pharmaceutical products & medical supplies;
medical devices & equipment &
pharmaceutical expertise services
4,254,962 4,508,318
5 Farmacéuticos mundi –
Área Logística
Humanitaria
(Farmamundi)
www.farmamundi.org
YES Spain Worldwide Pharmaceutical products & medical supplies;
medical devices & equipment; food;
water & sanitation; & shelter & non-food
items
5,972,309
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6 International Dispensary
Association (IDA
Foundation)
www.idafoundation.org
YES Netherlands; India; Nigeria; Kenya;
Afghanistan; Chile; USA & China
Worldwide Pharmaceutical products & medical supplies;
medical devices & equipment; shelter & non-
food items; & services
247,713,966 447,276,574
7 International Federation of
Red Cross and Red
Crescent Societies, Global
Logistics Service (IFRC-
GLS)
http://procurement.ifrc.org
YES Switzerland; United Arab Emirates;
Malaysia; Panama; Canary Islands
(Spain) and several sub-regional
locations
Worldwide Pharmaceutical products & medical supplies;
food; water & sanitation; shelter & non-food
items; transport;
services
85,363,043
8 Médecins sans Frontières
Logistique
(MSF Logistique)
www.msflogistique.org
YES France Worldwide Pharmaceutical products & medical supplies;
medical devices & equipment; food;
water & sanitation; shelter & non-food items;
engineering, radio & telecommunications;
transport;
administration, & services
46,244,429
9 Médecins sans Frontières
Supply (MSF Supply)
www.msfsupply.be
YES Belgium Worldwide Pharmaceutical products & medical supplies;
medical devices & equipment; food;
water & sanitation; shelter & non-food items;
engineering, radio & telecommunications;
transport;
administration, & services
47,321,910 66,711,534
10 Oxfam GB (OXFAM)
http://www.oxfam.org.uk/e
quipment/catalogue
YES United Kingdom Worldwide Response modules, water testing, water
treatment, ground water development, well
digging, water pumping, water storage, water
distribution, fittings, latrines and sanitation,
health and hygiene; emergency shelter,
vector control; tools and safety equipment,
power, communications; vehicles and
accessories; administration, accommodation
4,416,709
11 WFP/UN Humanitarian
Response Depot
(UNHRD)
www.unhrd.org
YES Italy (Rome & Brindisi), UAE
(Dubai), Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur),
Panama, Ghana (Accra), Spain
(Las Palmas)
Worldwide Provision of Storage & Transport Services
for:
Pharmaceutical products & medical supplies
Medical devices & equipment Prosthetic
Technology Veterinary
Provision of Procurement, Storage &
Transport Services for: Food, Livelihood
31,678,611 50,100,000 53,000,000
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support Water & Sanitation, Shelter & Non-
Food items Engineering, Radio and
Telecommunications Transport
Provision of: Administration Services
12 United Nations Children’s
Fund, Supply Division
(UNICEF SD)
www.unicef.org/supply
YES Offices: Denmark (Copenhagen) &
USA (New York).
Warehouses: Denmark
(Copenhagen); United Arab
Emirates (Dubai); China (Shanghai)
& Panama (Colon)
Worldwide Pharmaceutical products & medical supplies;
medical devices & equipment; water &
sanitation;
(Other specialist supplies include mosquito
nets, insecticides; midwifery kits &
educational supplies)
1.65 billion 120,300,000
13 United Nations Office for
Project Services (UNOPS)
https://www.unops.org/eng
lish/
Services/Procurement/Pa
ges/Humanitarian-
Procurement- Centre.aspx
NO Afghanistan, Argentina, Brazil,
Belgium, Cambodia, Côte d'Ivoire,
Democratic Republic of Congo, El
Salvador, Ethiopia, Guatemala,
Haiti, Indonesia, Jordan, Kenya,
Kosovo*, Liberia, Maldives,
Myanmar, Nicaragua, Nigeria,
Pakistan, Palestine (state of),
Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Senegal,
Serbia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka,
Switzerland, Tunisia, Uruguay, USA
Worldwide Various vehicles types (4x4s, trucks, buses,
sedans, and armoured);
power generation: solar panels, generators
and hybrid energy systems;
ICT: communication devices, antennas and
servers; adapters and batteries; prefabricated
homes; tents and blankets;
services: air and sea freight forwarding
services; travel service; cargo and
warehouse inventory insurance
706,480,000 665,999,000
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Annex 18 – Logistics and emergency preparedness
Normative framework
The Sendai Framework 2015–30 is the current inter-governmental agreement on disaster risk
reduction. The Framework includes Priority 3. Investing in disaster risk reduction for resilience,
and 4. Enhancing disaster preparedness for effective response.98
Adopted in 2013 jointly by the IASC, ISDR and UNDP, the Common Framework for
Preparedness ‘supports the development of preparedness capacity in a (more) coherent manner
using a systematic country-level approach that collectively assesses capacity and need and …
implements programmes and plans to strengthen preparedness’.99 Its Operating Principles
include:
• National Leadership: National and local governments, complemented by civil society, have the lead role for preparedness for all scales of emergencies, and should be supported by the international community in that role, wherever this is consistent with humanitarian principles and human rights norms.
• Joint Planning and Coordination: Under the leadership of national governments and in countries that have identified preparedness for response as a development priority, the full range of actors, including the UN, Red Cross Red Crescent Movement, NGOs and bilateral cooperation [will] need to strengthen joint planning and coordination of programmes and resources to provide predictable, reliable support to national capacity development for preparedness.
DG ECHO policy, strategy and guidance for preparedness
Resilience and DRR (including emergency preparedness) are embedded in the HIPs. The ISG
reports that Unit C1 coordinates and determines the allocation of some €50 million between HIPs
on the basis of proposals from operational units. Objective 2 of DG ECHO’s Strategic Plan states
that: ‘People and communities at risk of disasters are resilient’, which necessarily involves
preparedness.100
According to the DG ECHO Management Plan for 2018:
In 2018, DRR activities will be mainstreamed in 50% of all humanitarian operations and will focus
on preparedness for response and early action, considering DG ECHO's added value gained
over the years’, and ‘DG ECHO recognises the strong link between relief, recovery and
development by working with DG DEVCO and EU Delegations in the analysis, prioritisation and
design of recovery strategies in the aftermath of crises and disasters.101
98 Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030, https://www.unisdr.org/we/coordinate/sendai-framework. 99 Common Framework for Preparedness, IASC, ISDR, UNDP, p. 1. https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/system/files/common_framework_for_preparedness.pdf 100 https://www.unisdr.org/we/coordinate/sendai-framework. 101 Management Plan 2018, Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (DG ECHO) p11.
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The DG ECHO thematic policy on disaster risk reduction barely touches on the development of
national and local logistics capacity, which would appear to be a significant omission, given the
centrality of logistics capacity to preparedness.102
Logistics as a foundation for preparedness
Being prepared to respond to an emergency response depends heavily on having logistics
planning and assets in place for immediate deployment when a crisis begins. This means
harnessing and/or building local capacity to respond, including the necessary human resources,
early warning and response systems, physical assets and emergencies stocks.103
Return on Investment in preparedness
Donors have recognised that it is more cost-effective to prevent and prepare for a crisis than to
wait for it to happen. Various research efforts have shown a positive return from preparedness
both financially and in terms of speed of response. An ACF study found that €1 invested in supply
chain and logistics preparedness prior to a disaster can save €7 when responding.104 A pilot
study by WFP and UNICEF found a $2 return on $1 investment in humanitarian preparedness
interventions.105
Studies just completed by HELP Logistics and Kuehne Logistics University looked at 23
emergency operations from 2005–18106 across five organisations and found that, regardless of
the type of emergency disaster (i.e. natural, complex, etc.), all organisations showed that 60–80%
of emergency expenditure107 is in supply chain and logistics. These studies also found that oft-
quoted UNDP estimate from 2012 that $1 invested prior to a disaster would save $7 afterwards,
the studies show that this return on investment ratio is true in all cases under certain
conditions.108
102 The policy includes just a single reference to logistics capacity – though useful one – to provide an illustration of public-private partnership for preparedness: ‘In Peru, the level of exposure to high magnitude disasters would require a major deployment of logistic resources, most of which belong to private companies. As part of the DIPDG ECHO programme, WFP has promoted an agreement between the main private companies, which are present in the areas exposed to seismic events, and the National Institute of Civil Defense. With the agreement signed, several of these companies engage in the humanitarian coordination mechanisms and commit to lend their storage and transport facilities to the humanitarian response in case of a major event’. DG ECHO Thematic Policy Document n° 5, Disaster Risk Reduction Increasing resilience by reducing disaster risk in humanitarian action, September 2013, p. 40. 103 DG ECHO staff raised the following examples of missed opportunities for investing in preparedness during the evaluation period:
1.In the case of Greece, EU Member States were not prepared to invest in prepositioning of stocks and when the migration crisis accelerated in 2015, there were no stocks available. 2. There were no repositioned stocks with which to respond to the recent hurricane damage to Dominica. 104 Analysis of the Haiti and Nepal emergency responses shows that a 1:7 Return on Investment (RoI) or more can be achieved.
ACF, KLU and Help Logistics: Supply Chain Expenditure & Preparedness Investment Opportunities in the Humanitarian
Context, November 2017.
105 Evaluations from nearly 50 different preparedness investments in three project countries showed that US$5.6 million invested
in preparedness efforts resulted in savings of US$12 million. While cost savings resulted from 75% of preparedness
investments, and savings of time resulted from 93%, 64% of investments saved both cost and time. (WFP Report of the
Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ) June 2016, p. 5.)
106 With combined total operations expenditure for the studied emergencies was €250 million. Of this, €188 million or 75% was in supply chain and logistics. 107 Supply chain expenditure categories include: personnel with supply chain function, IT systems, commodities (procurement), cash programs, equipment such as generators, warehouse rent or MSU, transport, distribution, supply chain overhead allocation, etc. 108 Email correspondence of 24.9.2018 with the Managing Director, HELP Logistics AG.
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Prepositioning for preparedness
As noted above, DG ECHO is committed to DRR, including preparedness. ‘DRR/Preparedness’ is
treated as a sector by DG ECHO, in which it has invested €291 million during the evaluation
period An obvious area for the improvement of efficiency in logistics is to have the right stockpile
of relief goods available in sufficient quantity, so that time and expense are minimised in
responding to an emergency event. (The evaluation is trying to determine the extent of
prepositioning in DG ECHO’s preparedness investment.)
Ideally, the prepositioned goods are placed in optimal locations,109 but this is not necessarily easy
to achieve. According to the 2018 paper from the Tokyo Institute of Technology, A multi-actor
multi-objective optimisation approach for locating temporary logistics hubs during disaster
response,110 there is currently no model for optimising the location of temporary logistics hubs.111
The use of such optimisation models is not part of the routine business of logistics clusters or the
UNHRD. Efficiency might improve if they were.
According to the evaluation ToR:
Donors need to address112 local-level response capacity issues, which can be decisive in
determining the success of a humanitarian and/or a relief operation and reduce operational costs.
Local capacity in disaster prevention and preparedness can often be reinforced by working with
local actors and National Disaster Management organisations or Local Emergency Management
Authorities).
As the humanitarian landscape is changing, and emergency response is increasingly tackled at a
national rather than international level, a thorough analysis of logistics preparedness and
prepositioning impact and sustainability, within countries most prone to sudden-onset disasters, is
needed.
GLC Preparedness project
The Global Logistics Cluster (GLC) Preparedness project launched in 2016 aims to help
strengthen national supply chain resiliency and emergency preparedness, focusing on supply
chain mapping, supply chain capacity gap identification and analysis, and subsequently supply
chain risk mitigation. The project has six pilot countries.113 This project could be regarded as the
first global strategic logistics programme undertaken by the GLC to help address shortcomings in
preparedness activities. Within these countries, as well as in regions of interest, the platform
maintains an overview of ongoing partner preparedness initiatives, and supports governments
and stakeholders in developing plans to address logistics gaps, while engaging civil protection,
public and private sectors, as well as other clusters and local actors able to assist in addressing
logistics gaps. This project should generate important learning on preparedness.
DFID-funded Disasters Emergency Preparedness Programme
109 The evaluation has not yet discussed the extent to which the €50 million per year investment DG ECHO is making in
preparedness is going into prepositioning.
110 Journal of Humanitarian Logistics and Supply Chain Management: ‘A multi-actor multi-objective optimization approach for locating temporary logistics hubs during disaster response’, Rajali Maharjan, Shinya Hanaoka, 2018. 111 Using the Nepal earthquake as an example, the paper discusses the trade-off between minimising total costs in establishing such hubs and the risk of leaving demand for relief goods unsatisfied. The authors claim that the sensitivity analysis can help decision-makers to decide where and how much emergency relief materials should be made available. 112 Donors can contribute by relevant funding and advocacy; implementation is the responsibility of partners. 113 Haiti, Madagascar, Nigeria, Indonesia, Myanmar and Bangladesh.
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The DFID-funded Disasters Emergency Preparedness Programme is a £40 million humanitarian
capacity development programme being implemented in 10 countries considered to be at high
risk for disasters and emergencies.114 Implemented by Save the Children and World Vision, the
programme aims to
significantly improve the speed and delivery of humanitarian assistance to disaster-affected
communities in high-risk countries by improving the knowledge and understanding of national civil
society organisations staff and their counterparts, so they can be better prepared for emergencies
and better able to deliver an effective response when disasters strike.115
114 Kenya, Ethiopia, South Sudan, DR Congo, Mozambique, Jordan, Myanmar, Philippines, Bangladesh, Pakistan. 115 https://devtracker.dfid.gov.uk/projects/GB-1-203044/
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Annex 19 – Policies, guidelines and standards for humanitarian logistics
Donor policies and guidelines
• DG ECHO’s policy on cash and vouchers,116 published in 2013, summarised the position on the use of cash and vouchers in responding to humanitarian needs. It provided guidance on the funding of projects and the distribution of cash and vouchers to beneficiaries.
• Non-food items (NFIs) and logistics were mentioned in the DG ECHO thematic policy document ‘Humanitarian Shelter and Settlements Guidelines’ published in 2017,117 acknowledging the importance of logistics when conducting NFI and shelter operations.
• USAID Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) policy on humanitarian action118 referenced response logistics within ‘Strategic Goal 1 – Excel in Provision of Assistance’ and outlined response deployment policy and procedures. The Field Operations Guide included logistics and transport chapters.
• ‘The Logistics Handbook, a Practical Guide for the Supply Chain Management of Health Commodities’ was developed under USAID’s Deliver Project and used by WHO and other NGOs working in the Health sector. USAID innovations included the use of GIS systems for supply chain modelling and optimisation techniques, Logistics Management Information Systems and the digitalisation of logistics to improve data capture for decision-making.
• In September 2017, DFID issued its policy on humanitarian assistance ‘Saving lives, building resilience, reforming the system: the UK Government’s Humanitarian Reform Policy’.119 This placed emphasis on building resilience, resolving conflicts, and for disaster response. Although humanitarian logistics was not directly mentioned, inter-agency collaboration to strengthen response team capacity and prepositioning of relief supplies to shorten response times is implied.
United Nations logistics policy, systems, guidance
• The United Nations Global Marketplace is a common procurement portal, representing a global market of over US$17 billion annually for products and services, through which potential suppliers can register and subscribe to a Tender Alert Service.
• UNICEF has followed the Common Guidelines for Procurement by Organizations in the UN System.120 It uses primarily competitive tendering for all procurement and purchases products that comply with recognised technical standards.121
• WFP’s Emergency Operations Pocket Book122 included a chapter on logistics; supplemented by the Logistics Operational Guide123 from the Global Logistics Cluster.
• UNHCR’s logistics emergency handbook124 provides guidance, policies and procedures for operational planning and programmes, supply chain management, administration, budget and finance, human resources and ICT. UNHCR largely adopts Sphere Standards and also
116 http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/policies/sectoral/them_policy_doc_cashandvouchers_en.pdf 117 http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/policies/sectoral/shelter_and_settlement_guidelines.pdf 118https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1866/Humanitarian%20Policy%20Framework_digital.pdf 119 https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/659965/UK-Humanitarian-Reform-Policy1.pdf 120 https://www.unicef.org/supply/index_procurement_policies.html 121 https://www.unicef.org/supply/index_41948.html 122 https://www.unicef.org/emerg/files/WFP_manual.pdf 123 http://dlca.logcluster.org/display/LOG/Logistics+Operational+Guide+%28LOG%29+Home 124 https://emergency.unhcr.org/topic/29045/logistics
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had policies standards and guidelines for fleet management125 outlined in the ‘Operational Guidelines for the Management and Use of UNHCR Vehicles’.
Red Cross
• IFRC manages a state-of-the-art Procurement Portal and Emergency Items Catalogue126 that has become the de facto standard for many international aid organisations and suppliers.
NGOs
• MSF best practice Procurement Guidelines were established for medical supplies and other products.127
• Save the Children International (SCI) goods and services are sourced according to SCI Procurement Procedures. The procurement of medical, food and construction supplies and services meet relevant international quality and safety standards.
• In 2011, Action Against Hunger (ACF) developed an innovative emergency preparedness and response planning kit128 to help manage response to humanitarian crises.
International organisation and NGO guidelines
• MSF Procurement Guidelines were established for medical supplies and other products.129
• Save the Children International (SCI) goods and services are sourced according to SCI Procurement Procedures. The procurement of medical, food and construction supplies and services meet relevant international quality and safety standards.
• In 2011, Action Against Hunger (ACF) developed an innovative emergency preparedness and response planning kit130 to help manage response to humanitarian crises.
• Oxfam, cash and markets systems and scenarios for CTP.131
• Logistics cluster, toolkit for logistics in cash & vouchers.132
In 2015 the Core Humanitarian Standard (CHS) Alliance133 the Sphere Project and Groupe URD
published the ‘CHS Guidance Notes and Indicators’. While logistics is not specifically mentioned
within standards, Commitment 2 ‘Humanitarian response is effective and timely’134 provides the
principles for all humanitarian actors, including for all aspects of logistics and supply chain
management.
125 http://www.fleetforum.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/The-UNHCR-Fleet-Management-Handbook.pdf 126 http://itemscatalogue.redcross.int 127 https://www.msflogistique.org/suppliers.html 128 http://www.missions-acf.org/kitemergency/HTML_STATIC/homepageEN.html 129 https://www.msflogistique.org/suppliers.html 130 http://www.missions-acf.org/kitemergency/HTML_STATIC/homepageEN.html 131 http://www.logcluster.org/document/oxfam-market-systems-and-scenarios-ctp-rag-model- 2013 132 http://www.logcluster.org/sites/default/files/wfp_trade_logistics_assessment_2014.pdf 133 The Humanitarian Accountability Partnership and People in Aid merged in 2015 to form the CHS Alliance. 134 https://corehumanitarianstandard.org/resources/chs-guidance-notes-and-indicators
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Annex 20 – USAID/OFDA logistics requirements
The following excerpt is taken from USAID/OFDA Proposal Guidelines, May 2018 v.2, pages
79–80.
All partners managing commodities in any sector must submit information regarding logistics
operations. Even in fluid disaster contexts, USAID/OFDA partners must plan to the extent
practicable for supply chain management, including procurement, transport, and
warehousing of commodities. USAID/OFDA recognises that in sudden-onset emergencies
several aspects of supply chain planning may not be fully known at the time of proposal
submission. In these cases, USAID/OFDA requires partners to provide as many details as
available during the proposal submission, and to clearly note what information is unknown.
USAID/OFDA recognises that partners develop documents addressing logistics and
procurement plans in varying formats. USAID/OFDA does not require a specific format for
any of the requirements below, so long as they include the information requested. However,
USAID/OFDA requests that specific elements be included in the submission, based on the
type of activity, as detailed below.
For the guidance in this section, commodities are defined as any materials purchased and
directly benefiting or distributed to beneficiaries as part of the project implementation. The
below requirements are applicable to proposals submitted under all sectors that include
procurement, warehousing, or transport of commodities, excluding pharmaceuticals, other
medical commodities, and other restricted commodities. Procurement, transport, storage
and/or distribution of USAID-restricted goods must follow the applicable USAID regulations,
which are described in the Restricted Goods section.
1. If you plan to use USAID/OFDA funds for procurement, storage, or transport, of commodities, provide a brief (one page or less) description of logistics/operational structures. Include logistics teams, offices, warehouses, and transport relevant to achieving goals of this project.
2. If you plan to use USAID/OFDA funds in excess of $50,000 for procurement of commodities, provide:
a. A procurement plan in your format including:
Core Humanitarian Standard
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i. List of commodities planned for procurement, including unit description, cost per unit and cost per kit;
ii. Planned location of procurement (international, national, local);
iii. Timeframe when ready for distribution;
iv. Quality control processes and concerns, specifying whether third-party inspection or other methods of quality control will be used to ensure that the commodities received match the original specifications; and
v. If commodities are imported, steps taken to facilitate import and anticipated issues with importation.
b. A current procurement policy that is applicable in the country of operation. This includes the bidding policy, selection of vendors, basic details for vendor selection, and the process for approving any deviations from such policies. If your organisation intends to deviate from its standard organisational procurement practices for procurements under the proposed award, the proposal package must outline the procurement policies that will be applied.
c. A transport plan detailing how the commodities will be transported from vendor to warehouse and/or distribution sites. The transport plan must include a risk mitigation statement to detail how risks, such as: accidents, damage, diversion and theft of goods will be mitigated.
3. If you plan to store commodities in support of USAID/OFDA funded projects(s):
a. You must submit a storage plan (number of warehouses, storage space required) detailing the adequacy of storage facilities and capacity and how you will keep commodities secure until they are distributed.
b. You must confirm the presence of a warehouse management policy applicable in the country of operation. USAID/OFDA requires you to submit your current warehouse management policy.
4. You must provide details of the fleet vehicles including cars, trucks, scooters, motorcycles, boats, and aircraft or generators, demonstrating they are sufficient to support the project:
a. List of vehicles in fleet transferred onto this project (if applicable) including number, type, make, and model.
b. List of vehicles in fleet (type, make, and model) planned for purchase or rent in the current proposal.
c. If this information is available at the time of submission, specify how you plan to use fleet vehicles and generators purchased/transferred onto this project once the project concludes.
5. If you plan to purchase fleet vehicle(s) including cars, trucks, scooters, motorcycles, boats, and aircraft or generators with USAID/OFDA funds or request USAID/OFDA funds to rent or maintain a vehicle fleet:
a. You must submit a management plan that includes service/maintenance of USAID/OFDA funded-vehicles and generators, or of rented vehicles and generators, if your organisation is responsible for maintaining them.
b. You must submit your current fleet management policy that is applicable in the country of operation.
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Annex 21 – DG ECHO procedures for partner eligibility and suitability assessment
Partner Framework Assessments: FPAs and FAFA
DG ECHO funds partners under:
• A Framework Partnership Agreement (FPA) for NGOs (currently 213 agreements in place);
• A Financial and Administrative Framework Agreement (FAFA) for UN agencies (18 agreements);
• A Framework Partnership Agreement for IFRC and ICRC, modelled on the FAFA.
NGOs are accredited as eligible and suitable for DG ECHO project funding under their FPA by
means of a questionnaire; UN agencies and ICRC/IFRC undergo a ‘pillars assessment’. The
assessments incorporate the mandatory requirements of the EU Financial Regulation.135
Framework Assessment: NGOs
NGOs go through a two-stage process to assess their suitability and eligibility to receive DG
ECHO project funding.
Pre-selection: eligibility criteria under EU Council Regulations concerning such matters as
location of Head Office and audited accounts.
Detailed questionnaire comprising criteria for:
1. Eligibility (registration in an EU country).
2. Suitability (governance, management and financial requirements).
3. Technical and logistical capacity (adherence to Sphere Standards, use of project cycle management, previous evaluations, procurement policy).
4. Experience in the humanitarian field and results of previous operations.
5. Readiness to take part in the coordination system set up for a humanitarian operation.
6. Ability and readiness to work with humanitarian agencies and the basic communities in the third countries concerned (e.g. implementing partners (IP)).
FichOp Guidelines and Single Form
DG ECHO partners with an FPA or FAFA make project submissions
on the Single Form (SF), in line with guidance in the Single Form
Guidelines.136 DG ECHO desk officers and technical assistants
(DO/TA) assess project proposals using an internal form: the Fiche
Opérationnelle, guided by the FichOp Guidelines.137 The FichOp
supports decision-making by the authorising officer, documents the
basis on which decisions were taken and serves, later, to evaluate a
given action. It can be used for statistical purposes and audit trail.138
135 Financial Regulation applicable to the general budget of the Union and its rules of application, EU, 2012. 136 DG ECHO Single Form Guidelines, Updated 27.11.2017. 137 FichOp Guidelines, Version 4, 15/08/2017. 138 FichOp Guidelines, p. 6.
FichOp to be used for:
• Request (RQ)
• Modification (MR)
• Interim report (IR)
• Monitoring report (NR)
• Suspension (SU)
• Final report (FR)
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The FichOp Guidelines Annex 1 states that ‘elements to be looked at when assessing proposals’
may include Procurement and Cost-efficiency.
What scrutiny is there of partner logistics?
In principle, partner logistics can be assessed at three levels:
• Institutional level: Is the partner an organisation that has the competence to handle humanitarian logistics? Does it have the necessary systems, skilled staff and experience? In the DG ECHO partnership management system this level of scrutiny is provided by the Framework Assessment Process (and associated follow-up processes).
• Project-specific logistics design and implementation: How well is the partner designing and implementing their logistics activities to ensure good value, reduce waste and make a speedy response? This takes place at the Project Assessment Stage and subsequent Partner Monitoring.
• Partner portfolio at the crisis response level: What are the roles of DG ECHO-funded and other actors in a response, what are their capabilities and comparative advantages, and how might they best work together? This takes place as DG ECHO considers the fit of individual projects with the HIP and how together they meet the needs identified, informed by project monitoring.
Although Criterion 3 refers to ‘Technical and Logistical Capacity’, only procurement policy is
scrutinised.139 The partner Procurement Policy is assessed against a 12-page set of procurement
principles and procedures,140 using a short checklist.141 Failure is a red flag and disqualifies the
humanitarian organisation from partnership until remedial action is taken by the partner. It is
required that DG ECHO partners downstream implementing partners must have mirror clauses in
their sub-contracts requiring compliance with EU procurement rules.
From an efficiency perspective, the relevant check is compliance with the principle of sound
financial management:142 ‘The Humanitarian Organisation shall ensure that contracts are
awarded to the tenderer or candidate offering the best value for money, namely the tender or
offer providing the best price-quality ratio available in the quantity and within the time frames
required.’143
The assessment does not look beyond policies. Compliance is an issue handled at a later stage
by finance staff on a project by project basis at project closure (liquidation). Partners are expected
to adhere to the principles of ‘sound financial management’; if DG ECHO finance officers decide
that they have not done so, then costs may be ruled ineligible for reimbursement.
In summary, there is scrutiny of partner procurement policy, but no assessment of post-
procurement operational logistics capabilities of the kind discussed in Annex 13.
Pillar Assessment: UN/ICRC/IFRC
UN agencies, plus the IFRC and ICRC, operate under Indirect Management Delegation
Agreements (IMDAs) with delegated powers. Their internal control systems are assessed under
what is called the ex ante pillars assessment.
139 FPA Application Questionnaire/Detailed Questionnaire/Section 3 Technical and logistical capacity/Question 16 140 Principles and Procedures applicable to the procurement contracts awarded within the framework of humanitarian aid actions financed by the EU, Annex III to the FPA. 141 FPA Candidate Assessment-Procurement: Checklist. 142 FPA Annex III, Article 3 Mandatory principles, page 3. 143 The EU here uses the term Value for Money to mean what is defined above as Economy. The term Value for Money is avoided in this paper to avoid confusion.
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Procurement policies must comply with the principle of ‘sound financial management’ requiring
compliance with the principles of economy and efficiency.144 Procurement systems are not
checked by DG ECHO at this stage; rather, compliance is an audit issue. If an audit finds
deficiencies, DG ECHO imposes ‘remedial clauses’ and re-audits in later years to check if the
agency has complied with these clauses.
Although the process is different and UN/RCRC powers are wider than those of NGOs, the scope
of the pillars assessment is similar to that of the assessment applied to NGOs: it scrutinises
procurement policies, but it does not scrutinise the agency’s post-procurement logistics
capabilities of the kind discussed in Annex 13.
Project Final Report and Liquidation
The project liquidation stage involves a scrutiny of actual partner costs by DG ECHO finance
officers to check for eligibility, in line with financial regulatory framework set out in the FPAs and
FAFA.
Eligible costs are costs which meet the following criteria:
• necessary for the action
• incurred during the eligibility period
• identifiable and verifiable
• reasonable, justified and in line with sound financial management
• covered by the estimated overall budget of the action
• compliant with applicable tax and social legislation.
Under the fourth bullet, costs are eligible to the extent that DG ECHO finance officers accept that
the partner has observed the requirements of Economy and Efficiency, defined in the guidance
as follows:
• Economy: ‘the partner has taken all steps to secure the best price-quality ratio available in the quantity and within the timeframes required’145
• Efficiency: the partner achieved the ‘best relationship between resources employed and results achieved’.146
No methodology for making these assessments is provided for Finance Officers in the FichOp
Guidelines. These assessments call for operational judgements, but as one key informant put it,
‘Finance Officers are not in a position to judge the operational value of costs.’
The FPA Guidelines state: ‘An important element of this analysis is to make the link between the
necessity of the costs against the actual achievements of the action.’147 Reportedly, it is rare for
costs to be ruled ineligible, as long as results are achieved. This rather bypasses the question of
efficiency: a cost (such as air drops) may have been necessary in the context to achieve the
result (the output), and so would be ruled as eligible; but a different operational strategy (for
example, prepositioning stocks) might have been cheaper and equally effective.
144 The principle of ‘Sound Financial Management’ appears in the General Conditions applicable to IMDAs. General Conditions applicable to delegation agreements relating to humanitarian actions financed by the Union, Section 19.1 (c), p. 18. 145 FPA Guidelines, Section 9.4 Procurement (B). 146 FPA Guidelines, Section 9.3 Eligibility of Costs, 9.3.1 Criteria (D). 147 FPA Guidelines Section 11.4 Analysis of Partner’s Final Report by DG ECHO.
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Annex 22 – Keyword search for evidence of logistics considerations
An analysis has been made of a sample of 20 FichOps for high-value actions over the period of
the evaluation (2013–17). The methodology is set out below. A word search of logistics-related
terms was made on the text fields recording the assessments made by the TA, the regional and
district offices, and in the TAs’ monitoring reports. The aim was to count the number of
occurrences of words relating to logistics and then to make a qualitative assessment of the texts
in which they occur.
The word ‘logistics’ or ‘transport’ occurred 32 times in total with other related words occurring 14
times in all, a total of 46 occurrences. All the FichOps registered at least one reference to logistics
or a related term. The terms were most frequent in food security (13) and nutrition (13)
interventions.
A qualitative analysis was made of the texts in which the words occurred. Of the 46 occurrences
of ‘logistics;’ and related words, 19 were in contexts expressing a favourable efficiency-related
judgement by the TA, regional or district offices. Using the categorisation from Section 3.2.1:
• Partner logistics capability judgement: 5 instances
• Partner logistics planning and implementation efficiency judgement: 10 instances
• Partner coordination judgement: 4 instances
Two of the partner efficiency judgements relate to WFP budgets (which are provided in detail in a
standard format showing commodity costs and land transport storage and handling). In neither
case is there any indication of budget analysis by the DG ECHO assessor; both comments are
about the overall appropriateness of the total budget.
With a caveat about the small sample size, the conclusion from the analysis is that in perhaps
40% of high-budget actions, DG ECHO TA make one or more mentions of logistics-related issues
in making project assessment judgements, noting either the efficiency of the proposed action, the
capacity of the partner, or the efficiency of coordination. A rough sectoral analysis found most of
the judgements occurred in food security/livelihoods and nutrition programmes, a few in health
and WASH, with only one in education and none in DRR.
The judgements are almost all qualitative, and where costs are mentioned the comment does not
appear to be based on any analysis of costs. Instead comments are based on the TA’s general
sense of what works in the context and what an operation should cost. However, just noting costs
does not amount to a reasoned assessment.
FichOps Selection Criteria
Twenty DG ECHO Fiches were selected between the years 2013 and 2017 based upon
geographic, partner, and funding scale, with considerations on the representativeness of sectors
being reflective of the overall proportion of projects ongoing at this time (Table 19). Random
stratified samples based upon proportionality were made in the R programming language using
the sample {base} R library.
Table 11: Projects selected for keyword search
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Partner Beneficiary country Contract ID Contract amount
WFP-IT SOUTH SUDAN REP. DG ECHO/-AF/BUD/2013/91004 € 15,000,000.00
WFP-IT SUDAN DG ECHO/-AF/BUD/2013/91016 € 20,000,000.00
UNICEF-US NIGER DG ECHO/-WF/BUD/2013/91019 € 15,000,000.00
WFP-IT NIGER DG ECHO/-WF/BUD/2013/91043 € 15,500,000.00
PLAN INTERNATIONAL-UK PHILIPPINES DG ECHO/PHL/BUD/2013/91011 € 1,857,293.21
CICR-CH IRAQ DG ECHO/-ME/BUD/2014/91001 € 19,000,000.00
WFP-IT SYRIAN ARAB REP. DG ECHO/SYR/BUD/2014/91033 € 38,000,000.00
UNHCR-CH IRAQ DG ECHO/SYR/BUD/2014/91037 € 32,600,000.00
UNICEF-US BURKINA FASO DG ECHO/-WF/BUD/2015/91048 € 16,000,000.00
CICR-CH SOUTH SUDAN REP. DG ECHO/-AF/BUD/2015/91022 € 18,000,000.00
UNICEF-US IRAQ DG ECHO/IRQ/BUD/2015/91006 € 13,500,000.00
STC-DK LEBANON DG ECHO/SYR/BUD/2015/91056 € 31,300,000.00
WFP-IT ETHIOPIA DG ECHO/-HF/EDF/2015/01003 € 102,000,000.00
STC-DK LEBANON DG ECHO/SYR/BUD/2016/91034 € 31,100,000.00
IOM-CH GREECE DG ECHO/-EU/BUD/2016/01010 € 32,700,000.00
CICR-CH NIGERIA DG ECHO/-WF/BUD/2017/91036 € 15,800,000.00
WFP-IT SOUTH SUDAN REP. DG ECHO/-AF/BUD/2016/91046 € 30,722,768.50
IRC-UK ETHIOPIA DG ECHO/-HF/BUD/2017/91008 € 14,600,000.00
CICR-CH SYRIAN ARAB REP. DG ECHO/SYR/BUD/2016/91064 € 23,300,000.00
DRC-DK JORDAN DG ECHO/SYR/BUD/2017/91019 € 16,150,000.00
These, when grouped by partner and beneficiary country gives the representation found in tables
20 and 21, respectively.
Table 12: Fiches selected by partner Table 13: Fiches selected by beneficiary country
Partner Number of
fiches selected
WFP-IT 6
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CICR-CH 4
UNICEF-US 3
STC-DK 2
DRC-DK 1
IOM-CH 1
IRC-UK 1
PLAN INTERNATIONAL –
UK
1
UNHCR – CH 1
Once selected, each fiche document set had its
respective appraisals (Request Appraisal, Monitoring
Report (pre-2015 fiches), Field Expert Appraisal, Desk
Officer Appraisal, Complete Appraisal, and Regional
Office Appraisal) downloaded, compiled and searched
based on 13 commonly used words in logistics:
transport, logistics, supply/supplies, procurement,
warehouse/ing, distribution, stock, materials,
purchase, fleet, vehicles, infrastructure, ship/ping.
Word counts were not double-counted for standard
paragraphs or sections such as summary sections, or
when used within the same context / paragraph.
The sectors ‘Food Security and Livelihoods’ and ‘Nutrition’ yielded the most keywords used in the
appraisal documents (Table 22), while overall the word ‘logistic’ occurred most frequently
throughout the fiches (Table 23).
Beneficiary country Number of
fiches selected
IRAQ 3
SOUTH SUDAN REPUBLIC 3
ETHIOPIA 2
LEBANON 2
NIGER 2
SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC 2
BURKINA FASO 1
GREECE 1
JORDAN 1
NIGERIA 1
PHILIPPINES 1
SUDAN 1
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Table 14: Keyword frequency of sectors in appraisal
documents
Sector Keyword
frequency
Food security and livelihoods 13
Nutrition 13
Education in emergencies 7
Disaster risk reduction /disaster
preparedness 5
Health 4
WASH 3
Protection 1
Table 15: Number of occurrences of keyword in fiches
Keyword Number of
occurrences
Logistic 22
Transport 10
Supply 5
NA 5
Procurement 3
Warehouse 1
Table 16: Keyword frequency of sectors in appraisal
documents
Sector Keyword
frequency
Food security and livelihoods 13
Nutrition 13
Education in emergencies 7
Disaster risk reduction/ disaster
preparedness 5
Health 4
WASH 3
Protection 1
Table 17: Number of occurrences of keyword in fiches
Keyword Number of
occurrences
Logistic 22
Transport 10
Supply 5
NA 5
Procurement 3
Warehouse 1
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Annex 23 – Analysis of logistics costs in selected DG ECHO projects
The ISG expressed a strong interest in using this evaluation to understand how far it is possible to
analyse logistics costs within partner projects. At the same time, the ISG made it clear that DG ECHO
data systems do not hold the relevant data, thereby presenting the evaluation team with a considerable
challenge. The foregoing analysis of project assessment confirmed that partner budgets were in diverse
formats, that logistics costs were not readily identifiable and that ECHO’s reporting tool148 could not be
used to analyse partner budgets.
As part of this review the evaluators have attempted an analysis of logistics costs from two sets of DG
ECHO-funded projects:
1. A selection of 20 ongoing projects from Bangladesh, representative of the diversity of partners and proportion of funding allotted to the country as a percentage of total ongoing project funding.
2. A global selection of 22 projects,149 taken from the set analysed in the ODI report From Grand Bargain to beneficiary: an analysis of funding flows through the humanitarian system.150
3. 6 major WFP projects from 2014.
The dataset draws on logistic-specific components from project budgets held as annexes to the project
Single Forms on the DG ECHO’s project database151 (Annex 6).
The ODI report was commissioned by Unit C1 in DG ECHO. One objective was to understand better
the cost-breakdown within DG ECHO-funded projects.152 The report classified and analysed the costs
of a selection of 28 projects implemented by 5 DG ECHO partners (ACF, STC, UNHCR, UNICEF, and
WFP) into four ‘tiers’:
• Tier 1: Goods and services received by beneficiaries.
• Tier 2: ‘Delivery’ costs comprising transport, distribution, warehousing and front-line staff.
• Tier 3: In-country ‘support’ costs: office and equipment costs, utilities, stationery, communications and support staff.
• Tier 4: A DG ECHO standard 7% indirect cost and visibility costs.
148 EVA. 149 From the original 28 projects analysed by ODI, 6 were WFP projects with 15% or less of the total project funding coming from DG ECHO. Therefore, these were excluded because the DG ECHO portion will not have a representative portion of logistics costs. Of the remainder, 18 projects have 80% DG ECHO funding. The evaluators have therefore assumed that by using projects with majority DG ECHO funding the logistics portion of the costs will be representative. 150 From Grand Bargain to beneficiary: an analysis of funding flows through the humanitarian system, ODI, May 2017. 151 HOPE. 152 The report noted a limitation on the data, equally applicable to the analysis in the present report, as follows: ‘To interpret the findings accurately, it is important to consider certain characteristics of the data that was collected and analysed. While this study analysed the full project expenditure of € 302.2 million reported to DG ECHO, in many cases, this still does not represent the full costs of activities incurred by partners. In particular, UN agencies have a programme approach, which means that the project expenditure reported does not necessarily represent the full costs incurred by the agency, but what is presented as a ‘project’. For example, one of the UN agencies reported expenditure of just under €7 million for a project that sought to address the assistance needs of Iraqi refugees in Jordan and Lebanon. However, this did not include the cost of staffing, which was covered by another project or by the UN agency’s existing country programmes. In another example, DG ECHO financed 100% of the expenditure of a UN agency project based in South Sudan on cholera preparedness and response. However, this did not include any office rental costs and covered only 30% of the cost of 11 boreholes because the remaining 70% of the borehole costs were covered by another project. NGO projects also do not always reflect the full cost of commodities provided in a project report to DG ECHO. One INGO project that provided relief and protection to children and their families affected by the Syrian crisis spent 60% of project funding on items for beneficiaries. Yet this did not include the full cost of 626 baby kits that the NGO distributed, or the cost of food baskets for 9,260 people in north-west Syria because some or all of the costs for this was funded by a previous DG ECHO project and carried over.’
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Cutting across the classification, because not routinely disaggregated by partners, were the
implementing partner costs.
In the case of both data sets described above, the analysis presented here uses data from HOPE,
ECHO project database, and the ODI analysed data to aggregate logistics costs from partner budgets
under four headings, as shown in Table 26.
Table 18: Budget costs items grouped by cost headings
Logistics component Budget costs Included
Procurement Food and nutrition supplies, WASH-related materials and equipment, shelter
equipment, general project equipment, DRR supplies, project-specific construction
Transportation National and international flights, national and international freight, local travel,
domestic personal transport, costs of (transport) goods
Fleet management Car / vehicle rental and running, other running costs
Distribution Warehouse rental and running costs, local distribution, warehouse equipment
The analysis is adapted from the ODI cost classification with which it has a clean fit:
• Procurement is the goods element of the ODI report Tier 1 costs
• Transportation, fleet management and distribution equate to Tier 2 costs
For neither data set were office running costs included as logistics. Neither were costs under ‘basket
headings’, with miscellaneous costs which might be considered as logistics costs. Therefore, logistics
costs may be somewhat understated (others may take a wider view of logistics costs. See, for example,
11.4).
Bangladesh project analysis
The first set of data is a selection of 20 of the larger ongoing projects in Bangladesh, spanning 2016 –
2018. These do not include new projects recently initiated or in the process of being initiated for the
Rohingya crisis. The figures relate only to the DG ECHO-funded portion of projects and only to projects
for which DG ECHO is a substantial proportion of the total project funding (thus, the table excludes
WFP, because DG ECHO does not provide the majority of funding for WFP projects).
The table shows that DG ECHO-funded logistics costs as a percentage of total DG ECHO-funded costs
span a wide range, from <1% to 63%, most of this proportion being procurement costs. The costs of
logistics vary considerably between sectors, which may be reflective of the way in which overall action
costs are covered outside of DG ECHO funding through other project, programme, or partner funding
modalities, and are therefore ‘invisible’ in this study.
Global project analysis
The 22 projects analysed here are a subset of the 28 analysed in the ODI paper, spanning the period
2013–15; the remaining six projects being WFP projects, and are therefore not included for reasons
mentioned above. Overall, the percentages are higher in the older projects, although this may be
reflective of the increased level of detail attained at the project-level during this financial analysis.
Tentatively, minded of the limitation expressed in the ODI report, the higher percentages relate to food
security in Ethiopia.
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WFP project sample
A sample of six major WFP projects from 2014 were analysed for logistics costs using the same four
headings as the other two samples. These projects appear to show the logistics costs for the whole
project budget not just the DG ECHO-funded portion. These projects show a range of logistics costs
from 22–70% and an average of 39%.
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Table 19: Bangladesh project sample analysis
Partner Contract ID
DG ECHO
contract
amount
Procure-
ment Transportation
Fleet
management Distribution
DG ECHO-
funded logs
as %
contract
2016
UNHCR-CH153 2016/91002 200,000 Not Found Not Found Not Found Not Found 0
FAO-IT 2016/91004 600,000 137,573 47,187 11,309 Not Found 33
ACF-FR 2016/91006 1,000,000 Not Found 8,273 13,925 Not Found 2
IR-UK 2016/91008 1,100,000 Not Found 36,262 4,638 Not Found 4
IOM-CH 2016/91012 1,100,000 270,447 Not Found Not Found Not Found 25
SI-FR 2016/91018 1,100,000 234,461 52,380 NA 14,074 27
2017
FED
HANDICAP-FR 2017/91001 349,999 Not Found 12,552 12,587 Not Found 7
ACF-FR 2017/91008 5,000,000 2,277,441 133,063 249,656 89,111 55
STC-UK 2017/91014 749,999 893 2,143 1,071 Not Found 1
UNHCR-CH154 2017/91015 1,200,000 Not Found Not Found Not Found Not Found 0
CROIX-
ROUGE-DE 2017/91018 949,979 55,385 12,200 57,000 Not Found 13
SI-FR 2017/91020 1,300,000 649,428 75,427 Not Found 3,205 56
CHRISTIAN
AID-UK 2017/91033 800,000 22,988 13,802 4,092 Not Found 5
SI-FR 2017/91035 1,000,000 597,531 32,297 Not Found 520 63
STC-UK 2017/91037 1,200,000 Not Found 17,734 Not Found Not Found 1
OXFAM-UK 2017/91038 1,000,000 462,753 23,194 Not Found 26,022 51
STC-UK 2017/91039 1,500,000 633,584 18,606 10,650 Not Found 44
2018
IOM-CH 2018/91007 4,000,000 680,993 31,217 815.66 Not Found 18
DRC-DK 2018/91001 2,000,000 644,924 6,819 95,200 Not Found 37
CROIX-
ROUGE-DE 2018/91002 4,000,000 Not Found Not Found 12,300 Not Found 0
TOTAL 34,799,977 6,668,401 523,156 473,244 132,932
Percentage of
total 19% 1.5% 1.4% 0.4%
Table 20: Selected projects from ODI cost analysis report
153 No logistics components were found in the budget of this project. 154 No logistics components were found in the budget of this project.
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Partner Country Contract ID
DG ECHO
contract
amount
Procure-
ment
Transport-
ation
Fleet
management
Distri-
bution
DG
ECHO-
funded
logs as
%
contract
2013
UNICEF Ethiopia 2013/00141 2,908,158 1,599,728 48,721 Not Found 14,770 57
STC Ethiopia 2013/00550 800,000 69,623 99,369 Not Found 4,191 22
STC Ethiopia 2013/00558 1,300,000 131,402 27,219 356,092 3,781 40
UNHCR Ethiopia 2013/01263 6,739,443 9,808,796 1,759,085 Not Found 176,784 87
STC Myanmar 2013/01327 1,000,000 246,864 18,212 13,626 12,667 29
2014
ACF Afghanistan 2014/00176 400,000 40,624 5,923 16,179 6,971 17
UNICEF Syria 2014/00256 8,315,920 1,198,964 19,862 Not Found 80,601 16
STC Syria 2014/00347 10,973,000 3,570,982 Not Found Not Found 152,239 34
UNHCR Ecuador 2014/00387 1,552,600 Not Found 70,645 867 Not Found 5
UNHCR Jordan 2014/00435 6,975,653 Not Found 32,550 Not Found Not Found 0
ACF Ethiopia 2014/00553 2,086,436 471,762 69,794 225,296 Not Found 37
UNICEF Uganda 2014/00606 1,892,717 493,199 31,097 Not Found Not Found 28
UNHCR Uganda 2014/00609 5,171,138 4,160,611 331,075 261,672 Not Found 92
ACF South
Sudan 2014/00636 770,000 39,809 6,956 70,933 17,595 18
STC Iraq 2014/00750 750,000 375,465 Not Found 10,006 78,994 62
UNICEF South
Sudan 2014/00772 3,084,729 413,323 59,133 Not Found 127,991 19
ACF Jordan 2014/00812 500,000 38,535 Not Found 44,880 Not Found 17
2015
STC Somalia 2015/00272 2,525,239 209,908 12,921 178,989 41,082 18
ACF Lebanon 2015/00504 600,000 19,740 Not Found 15,486 Not Found 6
ACF Guatemala 2015/00717 1,000,000 23,165 25,425 21,658 4,757 8
UNICEF South
Sudan 2015/01028 3,206,215 11,328 Not Found Not Found 141,207 5
UNICEF Ethiopia 2015/01036 1,805,142 918,179 22,625 Not Found Not Found 52
TOTAL 64,356,390 23,973,410 2,667,831 1,571,778 867,412
% of total 37% 4.1% 2.5% 1.3%
Table 21: Sample of six major WFP projects from 2014
Country DG
ECHO
amount
WFP total %
logs/total
Total logs Proct. Transport Fleet Distrib.
Syria 1,400,000 20,411,747 22 4,533,149 3,202,239 52,845 26,436 1,251,629
S Sudan 9,000,000 113,858,026 59 66,783,872 12,845,964 938,888 125,280 52,873,740
S Sudan 9,000,000 232,805,420 25 57,662,015 18,448,028 - - 39,213,987
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Kenya 4,200,000 54,504,800 43 23,329,135 14,910,019 14,641 - 8,404,476
Ethiopia 3,000,000 48,221,231 43 20,792,669 10,838,208 1,926 - 9,952,536
Ethiopia 4,000,000 32,913,203 70 23,115,368 12,842,655 731 298,744 9,973,237
502,714,427 39 196,216,209 73,087,113 1,009,030 450,461 121,669,605
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Annex 24 – Humanitarian logistics training and certification
In 2006-07, DG ECHO invested €400,000155 into the development of the Humanitarian Certification
Programme156 (the design of which was updated in 2017). This was an initiative of the International
Rescue Committee, the Fritz Institute and the Chartered Institute of Logistics & Transport (CILT UK) to
address the need for training and professional recognition of logisticians working in humanitarian
organisations.
Senior logistics and supply chain personnel from UN, NGOs, and the Red Cross/Red Crescent
Movement together defined the comprehensive skills required of a professional humanitarian
logistician, both at an operational and at a higher, more tactical or strategic level. The Certification
Programme157 has three courses: the Certification in Humanitarian Logistics (CHL); the Certification in
Humanitarian Supply Chain Management, and; the Certification in Humanitarian Medical Logistics
Practices.
With over 3,000 students having participated in the courses (as at the end of 2017), the programme
represents a valuable example of inter-agency and private-public collaboration that has been
established as a sustainable (not for profit) model to meet the need for training and professional
recognition of logisticians.158 This requirement was identified as a key issue for humanitarian
organisations during the Humanitarian Logistics Conferences of 2003 and 2004, run by the Fritz
Institute, which became the catalyst for the development of the Certification Programme. The initiative
brought together key humanitarian players and experts in commercial logistics training to define the
content and objectives of the courses.
The changing humanitarian operations environment and the emergence of cash transfers as a modality
of choice require organisations to expand and deepen the skills and knowledge base of personnel.
Responding to this need, in 2015 the Fritz Institute set out to develop capacity-building resources for
supply chain and logistics functions to support the implementation and delivery of cash transfer
programmes (CTP). However, it became clear that the humanitarian sector’s needs extended beyond
support for only supply chain and logistics as all other operations functions (such as finance, ICT and
security) are involved.
Subsequently, in cooperation with the Cash Learning Partnership, and again funded by USAID, a core
CTP skills training course was developed under the guidance of a task force comprised of
representative organisations from the UN, international NGOs, and the Red Cross Red Crescent
Movement. The strategic intent of the collaboration was to leverage the extensive work that already
existed in the area of CTP, avoiding duplication, and identifying the gaps and common challenge areas
specific to operations.
Partly because of the success of the Certification Programme, several other training organisations also
run similar humanitarian logistics courses. For example, Bioforce, RedR and the Kuehne Foundation,
155 DG ECHO/-GF/BUD/2007/01004 for ‘Certification in Humanitarian Logistics (CHL) Level II’. 156 Certification programme (Fritz Institute via IRC) Ref. DG ECHO/-GF/BUD/2007/01004. 157 Details of topics covered are listed in the Competence Models for each course, available on the Humanitarian Logistics Certification Program website: http://www.hlcertification.org/mod/page/view.php?id=12 158 The programme is delivered through a three-way partnership between CILT UK, as the awarding organisation for the qualification; the Logistics Learning Alliance (LLA) as the lead administrator and coaching organisation, and the Certification Advisory Group, which is comprised of senior logistics officers from various aid organisations. Currently CILT UK provides the system of quality assurance for the programme but does not own it, rather the programme is seen to belong to the Humanitarian Sector as a whole under the supervision of the Certification Advisory Group.
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and other universities around the world now offer specialised degree courses, such as the University of
Lugano and Georgia Tech, or include humanitarian logistics as a module of supply chain management
courses. To ‘Invest in people in order to increase the availability of skilled people for implementing
humanitarian aid’, DG ECHO-funded academic institutions,159 some with linkages to humanitarian
logistics. (€200,000 was provided by DG ECHO for this purpose in 2008.)160
The inter-agency Partners for Enhanced Response Capacity in Logistics (PARCEL) Project161
developed training materials for aid agencies to use when building logistics capacity of their local NGO
partners. A set of minimum standards was agreed among a consortium of 11 international humanitarian
organisations. (DG ECHO funding of €294,109 was provided via Oxfam for the period 2013-14). Key
informants interviewed expressed strong interest in revitalising this programme as an effective means
of supporting local training and capacity development initiatives for disaster preparedness and
response as the model could be used not only for humanitarian logistics training but also other
functions and sectors.
Overall, there is limited coordination between academic institutions and few standards related to
humanitarian logistics training. Perhaps the NOHA network (Network on Humanitarian Action), as an
international association of universities (part-funded by DG ECHO) that aims to enhance
professionalism within the humanitarian sector, has an opportunity to provide some level of coordination
through its projects. The Humanitarian Passport Initiative (HPass)162 is working to facilitate greater
access to quality humanitarian learning and professional recognition through training and qualifications,
but also recognition of skills and field experience, and aims to provide a global level of coordination for
humanitarian training services. Also, the Professionals in Humanitarian Action and Protection
Credentialing Programme certifications provide an opportunity for humanitarian practitioners in all parts
of the sector to demonstrate their professional competencies.163
159 Lugano University, INSEAD, London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), Mango UK, Copenhagen Business School, HANKEN (Swedish school of Economics and Business Administration), INTRAC (International NGO Training and Research Centre), Cambridge University, Oxford Business School, SDA Bocconi, IESE Spain, Cranfield University, Erasmus University Rotterdam, HEC Paris, University of Manchester, ESADE Spain, ESC Toulouse, Humacoop Grenoble. 160 HIIP DG ECHO/-GF/BUD/2008/01000. 161 http://parcelproject.org 162 https://hpass.org 163 https://phap.org/credentialing-program
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Annex 25 – Private sector engagement in logistics
As aid budgets fall short of humanitarian needs, operational capacity within humanitarian organisations
is also reducing. This trend has meant that the delivery of humanitarian aid is increasingly being
undertaken by the private sector; globally, such as through DFID’s contracting of a large consulting
company in partnership with a global logistics services provider;164 regionally, such as during the 2017
Caribbean hurricane responses by major US-based technology companies; and, by local private sector
companies. Furthermore, experiments with outsourcing of key tasks, such as procurement or staff
recruitment,165 have been found to be effective.
In recent years, the aid system has begun to recognise that some aspects of the private sector could be
regarded as a part of the humanitarian logistics community of practice. For example, to help to prepare
for and overcome the chaos and bottlenecks that occur at airports that are used as logistics hubs for
responding to crises, Deutsche Post DHL (DPDHL), partnered (in 2011) with the United Nations
Development Programme (UNDP)166 and UNOCHA. The Get Airports Ready for Disaster programme
(GARD) team has worked in over 29 airports globally to better prepare for natural disasters by the
training airport personnel to cope with potential surges in air traffic.167 Companies (including many small
non-profit businesses) have been encouraged to engage with the aid sector during the OCHA-led
Humanitarian Networks and Partnerships Week (February 2015) and as part of the H2H (humanitarian
to humanitarian) initiative,168 which was started in order to better connect organisations for the
sustainable delivery of humanitarian assistance.
The Logistics Emergency Teams (LET) comprises four global logistics and transportation companies:
UPS, A.P. Moeller Maersk, Agility and DP World. Started through the World Economic Forum in 2005,
the LET partnership acts as a key resource to the Global Logistics Cluster169 and has provided support
to humanitarian organisations during responses to large-scale crises such as the Haiti and Nepal
earthquake responses (in 2010 and 2014). The LET also provides essential information to national
Logistics Capacity Assessments that help humanitarian logisticians prepare for emergency responses.
Although the LET was initially established to respond only to natural disasters, the Logistics Cluster is
required to respond to all types of disaster when the Emergency Relief Coordinator activates the cluster
system. While the LET has not always been relevant it can leverage additional private sector support as
humanitarian contexts evolve.
Under DG ECHO’s Operational Transport and Logistics Platform, Kuehne & Nagel holds a 4-year
renewable framework contract, first awarded in 2008, for the transport and storage of relief goods for
different actors. The contract is a Civil Protection mechanism designed for Member States to access
during emergencies, such as in 2014/15 for operations in the Central African Republic, for cargo flights
to Ebola-affected countries, and also for the Ukraine crisis. Interviews, however, have confirmed that
164 Palladium and DHL partnership. 165 For example, during the 2016/17 drought emergency in Ethiopia, the logistics cluster outsourced the recruitment of staff to a local private company on behalf of the government’s national disaster management authority. 166 The programme is implemented by the Geneva hub of UNDP’s Climate Change and DRR Team (interviewed by the evaluation team in June 2018). 167 The GARD project is also a good example, within UNDP, of a ‘linking relief, rehabilitation and development’ (LRRD) initiative. 168 Using funding from DANIDA, the H2H secretariat was established to support a network providing products and services to other humanitarian organisations. An H2H humanitarian logistics and security channel has been established https://www.h2hworks.org/channels/1474 169 LET Annual Report 2017.
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the resource is generally under-used.170 During the evaluation period the framework contract was used
only a small number of times, as it is understood that EU Member States instead tend to prefer to work
with their own brokers.
Smaller, innovative private sector start-up businesses have also been entering the humanitarian
logistics sector during the evaluation period. These include drone operators such as Zipline,171 which
operates the world’s only drone delivery system at national scale (as of 2017 only in Rwanda, but with
the aim to expand to other African countries) to send urgent medicines, such as blood and vaccines, to
medical facilities in remote locations.172 Also, a long-haul transport optimisation company called LORI173
that is based in Kenya (again with plans to expand throughout Africa) has demonstrated the successful
use of mobile technology to coordinate customer demand and cargo availability with the availability of
trucking capacity. According to WFP, the approach has seen significant reductions in truck waiting
times at the port of Mombasa and reductions in port congestion.
170 In a recent case, the use of the K&N contract was contemplated for transport of emergency kits to Ethiopia but it could not be activated for the simple reason that the word ‘Transport’ did not appear in the 2018 HIP for Ethiopia. 171 http://www.flyzipline.com (interviewed in Nairobi, June 2018). 172 According to Zipline, globally, more than two billion people lack adequate access to essential medical products due to challenging terrain and gaps in infrastructure 173 [email protected] (interviewed in Nairobi, June 2018)
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Annex 26 – Key Performance Indicators for humanitarian supply chains
To be considered capable, humanitarian organisations, and indirectly their donors, need to be able to
oversee operations and complex humanitarian supply chains, and make pre- and post-crisis market
assessments. KPIs are needed to guide donor programmes towards the achievement of qualitative and
cost-efficient assistance, and which provide meaningful data on supply chain performance against
benchmarks.
The sector-wide KPI project, initiated by the Fritz Institute in 2005, has aimed to enable the adoption of
a performance measurement framework for the humanitarian sector to improve supply chains, identify
gaps, and strengthen the ability to meet beneficiaries’ needs.174 This is of particular relevance given the
increasing role of the private sector in aid delivery. One of the key objectives of the KPI project has
been to create a process to enable benchmarking between comparable organisations, as a proven way
to compare the efficiency and effectiveness of internal operations.175
According to interviews conducted by the evaluation team, the KPI project has faced challenges in
gaining widespread acceptance among organisations because it has not been easy to find a ‘one-size-
fits-all’ set of metrics that can encompass the varied nature of aid operations. The KPI project has
attempted to create a performance management system that links supply chain inputs and activities to
an organisation’s performance and ultimate impact on beneficiaries.176 Transparent and effective
benchmarks for DG ECHO framework partners’ supply chains could improve the management of, for
example, the €2.3 billion channelled through WFP between 2013 and 2017. Harmonised supply chain
and logistics performance indicators could achieve behavioural change within partner organisations and
help donors to meet their Grand Bargain commitments.
Some organisations have comprehensive sets of KPIs while others use few measurements; the
strategic relevance of supply chain management and
logistics as a key competence for humanitarian action
has been harnessed by only a few large international
NGOs and UN organisations. While donors focus on
‘value for money’, the Sandcone Model177 (Figure 10)
argues that supply chains improve their performance by
addressing aspects of performance in a specified
sequence: quality, dependability, speed, flexibility and,
finally, cost-efficiency. Understanding that cost is the last
component that can be controlled, measuring and
174 The KPI project vision has been to establish:
1. A select number of common KPIs accepted and used by stakeholders in the sector. 2. A platform that will enable sharing of the KPIs. 3. An entity appointed to ensure viability and relevance of the KPIs. 4. Organisations using KPIs to benchmark against other similar organisations. 5. Benchmarking data for use as a starting point for organisations to learn from each other.
175 The project has selected 6 KPIs as those that best contribute to communicating the value of logistics: 1.Agreed timeframe; 2.Budget versus spend (operations); 3.Supply chain costs; 4.Stock turnover; 5.Beneficiaries reached; 6.Waivers (for procurement compliance). 176 In order to establish a shared KPI framework, two models were explored: the SCOR (supply chain operations reference) model and Balanced Scorecard (a strategic planning and management system). The Balanced Score Card was found to be the most appropriate tool because it helps to align business activities with organisational vision and strategy. 177 Robert J. Vokurka, Gail M. Zank and Carl M. Lund III (2002) ‘Improving competitiveness through supply chain management: A cumulative improvement approach’, An International Business Journal, Vol. 12(1): 14–25.
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controlling the components that build to cost becomes more important.
Figure 1: Sandcone Model for value for money in humanitarian logistics
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Annex 27 – Report on DG ECHO-funded Humanitarian Air Services
1 Introduction
1.1 Background to the evaluation
1.2 Key issues covered in this report
2 DG ECHO’s contribution to humanitarian air services (2013–17)
2.1 Breakdown by type and country
2.2 Relationship with DG ECHO’s overall funding of humanitarian aid
3 ECHO Flight
3.1 Historical background
3.2 Countries of operation
3.3 Nature of service
3.4 Aircraft chartered
3.5 Traffic levels (passengers and freight)
3.6 Flight hours flown / aircraft utilisation
3.7 Aircraft load factors
3.8 Service quality
3.9 Standard operating procedures / flight booking
3.10 Aviation safety and security safeguards
3.11 Tender and contractual details
3.12 Relevance
3.13 Impact and effectiveness
3.14 Efficiency
3.15 Visibility
4 UNHAS
4.1 Background
4.2 Nature of service
4.3 UNHAS operations funded by DG ECHO
4.3.1 Cameroon
4.3.2 Central African Republic
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4.3.3 Chad
4.3.4 Ethiopia
4.3.5 Mali/Mauritania/Niger
4.3.6 Nigeria
4.3.7 South Sudan
4.3.8 Sudan
4.3.9 Yemen
4.4 Summary
5 Other DG ECHO funding of humanitarian air services
5.1 WFP Aviation (Log Cluster)
5.2 MAF/PACTEC
5.3 ICRC
5.4 Civil Protection Mechanism (CPM)
6 Other initiatives
6.1 Participation in international conferences
6.2 New technologies for the distribution of relief aid
7 Areas for improvement: Conclusions and recommendations
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1 Introduction
1.1 Background
This annex of the Final Report provides an assessment of air transport services funded by DG ECHO
for the delivery of humanitarian and disaster relief aid.
Expenditure on air transport represents a significant component of ECHO funding. In 2017, DG ECHO
contributed some €38.6 million towards the funding of its own humanitarian air service, ECHO Flight
and other humanitarian air services, including United Nations Humanitarian Air Service (UNHAS) and
others operated by the WFP Aviation, by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and by
Mission Air Aviation Fellowship (MAF) services in Afghanistan (PACTEC). This represented
approximately 0.9% of DG ECHO’s overall aid budget in 2017 (some €3.9 billion). Further funding for
air transport for relief relating to natural disasters is also available through DG ECHO’s Civil Protection
Mechanism (CPM). Furthermore, some funding to NGO partner organisations under the FPA may
include air transport – although this cannot be specifically identified in the documentation provided to
DG ECHO.
In many instances, air transport is the most effective and efficient method of delivery of both staff and
supplies for humanitarian and disaster crises, particularly where there are poor road access or security
risks. The transport of staff and supplies by fixed wing aircraft, helicopter or by air drop is often the only
available option, particularly in time sensitive situations. Dependent on the country involved, there is
normally a suitable airport, airstrip or helicopter landing site that can be used, although often a further,
often difficult, journey by truck is needed to reach the final delivery destination. It should be noted that
the use of commercial rather than military aviation is often preferred by beneficiaries, although the latter
is used for immediate disaster relief on occasion.
DG ECHO’s annual funding towards humanitarian air services has remained broadly constant 2013–17.
Over the 5-year period, DG ECHO provided €178.8m as a direct contribution towards humanitarian air
services. This included €68.2m towards its own air charter service, ECHO Flight in Central and West
Africa, €97.1m towards UNHAS, which is a common service for all humanitarian aid organisations,
€6.6m towards air transport services for humanitarian and disaster relief managed by WFP Aviation
through the Log Cluster and €6.8m towards Mission Air Aviation Fellowship (MAF) services in
Afghanistan (PACTEC). Further DG ECHO co-funding for specialist air services in response to civil
emergencies is available through the CPM. Normally this covers between 55% and 85% of the total
cost depending on circumstances, with the balance funded by EU Member States. Although the Union
CPM (UCPM) was originally designed for civil emergencies in Europe, it provides co-financing of
transport to national governments when they use civil protection assets for humanitarian aid, including
the chartering of aircraft. Military aircraft can be used as a last resort. Examples of the UCPM’s use
over the period 2013–17 include the Nepal earthquake in 2015; the Haiti tropical cyclone in 2016; the
yellow fever outbreak in DR Congo in 2016; and the tropical cyclone Irma in 2017. As an integral part of
the UCPM, DG ECHO established a framework contract in 2016 with Kuehne and Nagel for the direct
provisioning of ad hoc transport services, including air transport, together with other specialist
consultancy services, although the drawdown for air transport services has so far been minimal.
1.2 Key issues covered in this report
This report is designed to support an evaluation of all humanitarian logistics funding provided by DG
ECHO over the period 2013–17. While the assessment is primarily an historic one, it does take account
of any changes during 2018 to date – so that a full appraisal of the current situation can be made. In
this context, it should be noted that ECHO Flight moved to a new 4-year contract in May 2018, albeit
with the same air charter operator, DAC Aviation.
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The study follows the OECD criteria for project evaluation, as detailed in the Inception Report Annex 4.
The study has been based on a review of all available documentation, including that held on DG
ECHO’s HOPE database and interviews with DG ECHO staff, with NGOs using these air services, and
with the contracted air charter operators. In this context, a field trip to Nairobi was undertaken, where
DG ECHO maintains its main field office for humanitarian aviation as well as one of its bases for ECHO
Flight. A field trip to WFP Aviation in Rome was undertaken in August 2018 and data on UNHAS and
WFP Aviation’s services have been provided to the project team.
As a basis for the evaluation, a number of questions relating to the evaluation criteria were put forward
in the Inception Report, including specific data requirements, such as key performance indicators on
ECHO Flight and UNHAS services.
The evaluation results are incorporated in the report itself, and question by question analysis is included
in Table 42 at the end of the report. This report takes account of the results of interviews carried out
with ECHO Flight staff in Goma.178
Following this introduction, the various sections of this report include (a) a breakdown of DG ECHO’s
direct contribution to humanitarian air services between 2012–17; (b) an overview of the operation and
management of ECHO Flight; (c) an overview of UNHAS services funded by DG ECHO, (d) an
assessment of other humanitarian aviation operations funded (or part-funded) by DG ECHO including
UNHAS, WFP Aviation (via the Log Cluster), ICRC and MAF/PACTEC; and (d) a review of other
funding for air transport operations for emergency relief through the CPM, including that financed under
the Kuehne and Nagel Framework Contract. An overview also is provided of other humanitarian
aviation activities that DG ECHO is, or potentially could be involved in, including international
conferences and research into new techniques such as the use of drones for the transport of relief
supplies. The report concludes with conclusions and recommendations to DG ECHO based on the
findings of the evaluation.
2 DG ECHO contribution to humanitarian air services (2013–17)
2.1 Breakdown by type and country
This breakdown of DG ECHO’s direct contribution to humanitarian air services 2013–17 is given in
Table 30 below. These figures indicate that the contribution given to WFP/UNHAS formed the largest
component (54%) of this funding. The funding level remained broadly consistent in each year, apart
from 2014. Closer examination shows that there were reductions in the funding of contributions to
UNHAS operations in all countries funded by DG ECHO except Ethiopia – although this was partially
offset by a once-off contribution of €6.0m to UNHAS in Guinea.
The funding for ECHO Flight increased from €11.6m in 2013 to €16.0m in 2017 with an increase from
four to six aircraft in 2014, although the figure for 2017 includes operations in January–April 2018, prior
to the commencement of a new contract with the operator, DAC Aviation. The contributions given to
MAF and ad hoc air transport services funded through WFP’s Log Cluster both declined over the 5-year
period.
178 Undertaken as part of a parallel evaluation for DG ECHO by ICF concerning the Africa Great Lakes region.
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Table 22: DG ECHO – Contribution to humanitarian air services (by type) – € million
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Total %
UNHAS
South Sudan 5.8 4.0 6.5179 5.0180 5.0181 26.3 14.7%
Sudan 3.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 2.0 11.0 6.1%
Chad 2.5 0.3 2.2 2.5 1.7 9.2 5.1%
Central African Republic 0.7 0.8 3.0 1.5 0.5 6.4 3.6%
Mali/Mauritania/Niger 3.0 1.5 3.0 2.7 2.1 12.3 6.9%
Ethiopia 1.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 4.0 2.2%
Cameroon 0.0 0.0 0.4 1.3 0.5 2.2 1.2%
Congo, Democratic Rep 3.0 1.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.2 2.3%
Guinea 0.0 6.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.0 3.4%
Nigeria 0.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 2.0 4.0 2.2%
Uganda 1.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.6 0.9%
Yemen 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.3 6.0 8.3 4.6%
Nepal 0.0 0.0 1.7 0.0 0.0 1.7 1.0%
Total UNHAS 20.5 16.3 19.8 19.8 20.8 97.1 54.3%
WFP/Log Cluster
South Sudan 2.8 2.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.8 2.7%
Madagascar/Irma 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.1 1.1 0.6%
Mozambique/Ukraine 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.6 0.0 0.8 0.5%
Total Log Cluster 2.8 2.0 0.2 0.6 1.1 6.6 3.7%
MAF/ASF
Afghanistan (MAF) 1.8 1.9 0.9 0.9 0.7 6.1 3.4%
179 Part of this related to non-aviation expenditure under the Log Cluster. 180 See footnote no. 300 above. 181 See footnote no. 300 above.
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Chad (ASF) 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.4%
Total ONG 2.5 1.9 0.9 0.9 0.7 6.8 3.8%
ECHO Flight
Kenya 4.6 2.7 3.4 3.2 4.0 18.0 10.1%
DR Congo 7.0 6.7 7.7 7.3 8.0 36.6 20.5%
Chad 0.0 0.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.9 0.5%
Mali 0.0 2.0 3.1 3.5 4.0 12.6 7.0%
Total ECHO Flight 11.6 12.4 14.3 13.9 16.0 68.2 38.1%
Total 37.4 32.5 35.1 35.3 38.6 178.8 100.0%
On a year-by-year basis, the funding contribution given DG ECHO towards humanitarian air services
has been broadly consistent, averaging at some €35.8m annually over the period 2013–18, within a
range of €32.5m to €38.6m. This reflects the long-term nature of many humanitarian aid requirements,
particularly in sub-Saharan Africa.
There appears to have been some fluctuation in the funding allocations in 2014 which represents the
lowest year of funding (€32.5m) over the 5-year period. In 2014, for example, there was a decline in
UNHAS funding in Chad which was redirected to ECHO Flight which started operations in Chad that
year – although these ceased in 2015 and the funding was transferred to ECHO Flight in Mali.
Interestingly, there was a decline in the funding of ECHO Flight in Kenya in the year, which reduced to
€4.6m in 2013 from €2.7m in 2014 although, in practice, traffic levels increased from 14,553
passengers in 2013 to 19,474 passengers in 2014.
Of particular note are some one-off funding contributions given for specific or heightened humanitarian
crises in particular countries. These include a €6.0m funding for UNHAS in Guinea in 2014, a
contribution of €6.0m in 2017/2018 to support UNHAS services in Yemen, and the special funding of air
drops for relief supplies in South Sudan by WFP Aviation (€1.8m in 2013 and €1.9m in 2014).
Further analysis of the funding contributions to UNHAS and WFP Aviation through the Log Cluster is
provided in Section 5 below.
2.2 Relationship with DG ECHO’s overall funding of humanitarian aid
As part of our assessment, the evaluators have examined the relationship between DG ECHO’s funding
of humanitarian air services and its overall funding of humanitarian aid in each country in 2017. This is
shown in Table 31 below.
In general terms, the evaluators would expect the level of overall DG ECHO funding would, to some
extent, determine the number of EU-funded project staff in each country and hence the level of funding
on humanitarian air services. However, there are some exceptions to this. In some countries,
commercial air services to the various project locations are available and are regarded as acceptable
for use by humanitarian aid staff and for the delivery of related relief supplies. This acceptability is
largely dependent on the cost, the service frequencies and whether they can be regarded as safe and
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secure. In certain countries, some or all of the commercial airlines have been placed on the EU banned
airline list as they are unable to meet ICAO aviation safety standards and, consequently, they must be
seen as unsuitable for use by EU-funded project staff. In other countries, such as Syria or Iraq, regular
humanitarian air services or even air drops may be too dangerous.
It should, of course, be noted that there is a wide variation in the type and nature of the humanitarian air
services required in each country. The proportion of funding given to countries where ECHO Flight
operates is significantly higher than those where it does not.
It could be argued that staff working on EU-funded projects in these countries have a substantial
advantage as ECHO Flight is free, whereas those working on EU-funded projects in other countries
may need to pay for UNHAS or possibly for commercial air services, if these exist. It should also be
noted that, while DG ECHO clearly wishes to support EU-funded projects by funding humanitarian aid
services, it will also want to support other non-EU aid funding projects. No data are, however, available
on the overall humanitarian aid funding within each country on a global basis.
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Table 23: DG ECHO – Overall country and humanitarian aid funding – 2017
Rank Country Country total
(€m)
Hum Aviation
(€m)
% Comments
1 Turkey 1,298.9 - - Commercial services acceptable
2 Greece 487.1 - - Commercial services acceptable
3 Syria 210.1 - -
4 Somalia 156.4 - - EU Flight funded by DG DEV
5 Lebanon 154.7 - -
6 South Sudan 151.8 5.0 3.3
7 Iraq 124.7 - -
8 Yemen 115.6 6.0 5.2
9 Ethiopia 99.7 1.0 1.0
10 Jordan 87.4 - - Commercial services acceptable
11 Nigeria 86.5 2.0 2.3
12 Chad 72.2 1.7 2.4
13 Uganda 69.1 - -
14 Sudan 60.7 2.0 3.2
15 DR Congo 51.7 6.9 13.3
16 Niger 51.5 1.0 1.9
17 Kenya 43.8 3.4 7.8 ECHO Flight serves Kenya
18 Afghanistan 41.5 0.7 1.8
19 Mali 34.6 4.1 11.9
20 Pakistan 33.5 - -
21 Haiti 32.9 - - Funding via CRM
22 Cameroon 28.7 0.5 1.7
23 Bangladesh 27.0 -
24 CAR 23.8 0.5 1.7
25 Mauritania 12.4 0.4 3.2
26 Madagascar 5.4 1.1 19.3
Total 3,881.0 36.3 0.9
The relationship between DG ECHO’s overall humanitarian aid funding and that for humanitarian air
services in each country in 2017 is shown graphically in Figure 1 below.
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Figure 2: DG ECHO – Overall country and humanitarian aid funding – 2017
3 ECHO Flight
3.1 Background
ECHO Flight, which is managed and funded by DG ECHO, provides humanitarian air services in DR
Congo, Kenya, Uganda, Mali and Chad (2014). ECHO Flight carried an annual average of some 26,000
passengers and 278,000 kg of relief supplies182 over the period 2013–17 and directly supported over
300 humanitarian projects, many of which are funded by the EU.
ECHO Flight was established in 1994 and initially covered DR Congo, Sudan and Somalia, focusing on
freight rather than passenger traffic. In 2004, the service switched to a predominately passenger model,
although some relief supplies are carried, mainly in DR Congo. The service was set up with the primary
objective of supporting EU-funded humanitarian relief projects, many of which are located in remote
areas not served by commercial airlines or which cannot be accessed quickly or securely by road. Staff
and relief supplies for these projects are given Priority 1 status on the flights, although other NGO staff
can use the service on a space available basis.
ECHO Flight has now expanded to serve destinations in Kenya, Mali and Uganda and is free for all
users. Although UNHAS is present in all countries where ECHO Flight operates (with the exception of
Uganda), there is very little overlap in the routes served and/or the flight timings. As such, ECHO Flight
can be regarded as coherent with UNHAS. There is also some collaboration with UNHAS on general
matters of aviation safety and security, although this could be improved through increased data sharing
(e.g. relating to safety incidents). Other humanitarian air services in the region include those by
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and by Médecins sans Frontières (MSF) who each
operate their own aircraft and share a third aircraft. Use of these services is restricted to ICRC and MSF
staff and other associated personnel. In addition, there are some limited flights by Aviation Sans
Frontières (ASF) operated under an UNHAS banner and by Mission Aviation Fellowship (MAF).
In 2006, ECHO Flight services to and within Somalia were taken over by DG DEVCO, largely because
most of its users were staff working on EU development rather than humanitarian aid projects. Initially
renamed as the EC Flight, it is now known as the EU Flight, largely because some of its users are from
182 Total passengers and cargo ticketed (i.e. excludes the use of onward connecting flights).
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European Union rather than European Commission institutions such as the EU Training Mission
Somalia and EUCAP Nestor.
3.2 Countries of operation
As indicated in Section 3.1, ECHO Flight currently operates in DR Congo, Kenya and Mali. Some
services to Uganda are flown from Goma, the main base in DR Congo. In 2014, an ECHO Flight aircraft
was based in N’Djamena in Chad and operated services within the country. In 2015, this aircraft was
transferred to Mali.
DR Congo
DR Congo has a long history of war and humanitarian crises. Over the period 2012–17 there have been
ongoing refugee and food shortage issues, together with armed conflict and heightened political
tension. The road infrastructure to access the areas of humanitarian need is poor and often insecure.
There are no reliable commercial air services between the main population centres of Goma, Bunia and
Kinshasa or between the remote areas – particularly in the east of the country. Due to inadequate
aviation safety oversight by the regulatory authority, the DR Congo Civil Aviation Authority (Autorité de
l'aviation civile), all registered commercial airlines in the country, are banned from operating in the EU
and so can be regarded as not meeting the safety standards appropriate for international humanitarian
relief operations. It should be noted that up to 2016, ECHO Flight services were operated to Kinshasa
although these were discontinued due to changes in project locations. As a result, the ECHO Flight
base in Kinshasa was closed giving a cost-saving. The current183 ECHO Flight routings in DR Congo
are summarised in Table 32 below.
Table 24: ECHO Flight routings – DR Congo 2017
Flight No Routing Day of operation
ECHO 1 Goma-Entebbe-Arua-Adjumani-Entebbe-Goma Monday
Goma-Beni-Bunia-Beni-Goma Tuesday
Goma-Bukavu-Kalemie-Lubumbashi Wednesday
Lubumbashi-Kalemie-Bukavu-Goma Thursday
ECHO 3 Goma-Bukavu-Shabunda-Lulingu-Kolula-Bukavu-Goma Monday
Goma-Bukavu-Shabunda-Kalima-Lulingu-Bukavu-Goma Wednesday
Goma-Beni-Bunia-Beni-Goma Thursday
Goma-Bukavu-Lusenge-Shabunda-Kolula-Bukavu-Goma Friday
ECHO 4 Kalemie-Manono-Lubumbashi Monday
Lubumbashi-Manono-Kalemie Tuesday
Kalemie-Moba-Pureto-Manano-Kalemie Wednesday
Kalemie-Nyunzu-Kabalo-Kalemie Thursday
Kalemie-Moba-Pureto-Kalemie Friday
Kenya
183 Based on the latest flight schedules provided by DG ECHO.
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ECHO Flight serves remote destinations not covered by commercial airlines, including the important
refugee camps at Dadaab and Kakuma. Flights to these destinations can also be used to serve
humanitarian relief projects located on the Ethiopian / Somalia border. The ECHO Flight routings in
Kenya are summarised in Table 33 below.
Table 25: ECHO Flight routings – Kenya 2017
Flight No Routing Day of operation
ECHO 2 Nairobi-Wajir-Takaba-Mandera-Moyale-Marsabit-Nairobi Monday
Nairobi-Dadaab-Nairobi-Kakuma-Nairobi Tuesday
Nairobi-Dadaab-Nairobi-Kakuma-Nairobi Friday
Mali
ECHO Flight provides air services to humanitarian relief projects using aircraft based in Mopti.
Table 26: ECHO Flight routings – Mali 2017
Flight No Routing Day of operation
ECHO 5 Bamako-Mopti Monday
Mopti-Niafunke-Goundam-Tombouctou-Goundam-Niafunke-Mopti Tuesday
Mopti-Niafunke-Goundam-Tombouctou-Goundam-Niafunke-Mopti Thursday
Mopti-Bamako Saturday
ECHO 6 Mopti-Gao-Menaka-Gao-Mopti Monday
Mopti-Tombouctou-Gourma-Bourem-Gao-Gossi-Mopti Tuesday
Mopti-Gossi-Gao-Bourem-Gourma-Tombouctou-Mopti Thursday
Mopti-Gao-Menaka-Gao-Mopti Friday
3.3 Nature of service
ECHO Flight is operated by DAC Aviation, a Kenyan-based air charter company. Six aircraft are
chartered by DG ECHO on an exclusive, full-time basis (three aircraft based in DR Congo and one in
Kenya and two in Mali corresponding to ECHO Flights 1-6). Each aircraft is flown for a set number of
minimum guarantee hours per month, dependent on the annual budget available within the country of
operation and the proposed flight schedule, although there is a further small budget for additional flight
hours (e.g. for any ad hoc flights required).
ECHO Flight is operated on a semi-scheduled basis according to a published flight schedule. The
destinations served and flight routings can vary dependent on user requirements and other factors,
including safety and security issues. It fulfils a variety of needs for humanitarian relief organisations and
their staff. In many cases it provides the only safe, secure and timely method of accessing humanitarian
project locations in the field. As such, the service is used by those working at these locations on a long-
term basis and as well as by support staff, including those managing, monitoring or evaluating the
various projects in the field. The service also supports the rotational travel for passengers to and from
hardship duty stations. Air cargo transported covers a range of small items, typically involving medical
supplies or equipment rather than more bulky food supplies. The availability of regular, semi-scheduled
services by ECHO Flight enables the supplies held in the field to be maintained at relatively low levels,
thereby reducing the risk of pilferage.
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ECHO Flight is free to all users – although booking priority is given to those working on (or supporting)
EU-funded humanitarian aid projects. This priority booking system is defined within the standard
operating procedures (see Appendix C). In 2016, 73% of passengers and 87% of cargo transported
related to EU-funded projects. Further details on the booking procedures are given in Section 3.9
below.
All passengers using ECHO Flight are issued with a ticket by DAC Aviation in line with the Warsaw
Convention. Similarly, a waybill is issued for all cargo carried. Passengers travelling from Nairobi check-
in at DAC Aviation’s main office at Nairobi Wilson airport for processing; they are then transferred by
minibus to the airport’s main terminal for a security check prior to boarding. Passengers travelling from
other airports check in at the main airport/airfield terminal. All cargo carried is checked in at the
passenger facilities (i.e. not through a specialist airport cargo shed).
All flights are operated in accordance with ICAO flight and cabin crew requirements. The ECHO 1 and
ECHO 2 flights using a DH Dash-8 aircraft require a cabin attendant. A mandatory safety briefing is
made on all flights and all seat pockets contain the statutory safety instructions as well as a folder
providing further information about ECHO Flight. The main operating bases have an administration
office, crew briefing rooms and accommodation facilities.
ECHO Flight is managed at a local level by two DG ECHO TAs and two PA (programme assistant) staff
based in Nairobi and Goma who act as flight coordinators. These are supervised by DG ECHO in
Brussels. In addition, DAC Aviation have dedicated ECHO Flight reservation staff in their offices in
Nairobi, in Mopti and in Goma.
3.4 Aircraft chartered
Over the period 2013–17, ECHO Flight deployed six dedicated aircraft owned or leased by DAC
Aviation. These are listed in Table 35 below.
Table 27: ECHO Flight – aircraft chartered (DAC Aviation) – 2013–17
Aircraft type Main base Period of operation Area of operation Flight No Max pass.
capacity*
DH8-100 (Dash-8) Goma Jan 2014-Dec 2017 DR Congo, Uganda ECHO 1 37
Cessna C208
(Caravan)
Goma Jan 2014-
Dec 2017
DR Congo ECHO 3 11
Cessna C208
(Caravan)
Kalemie Jan 2014-Dec 2017 DR Congo ECHO 4 11
DH8-100 (Dash-8) Nairobi Jan 2014-Dec 2017 Northern Kenya ECHO 2 37
Cessna C208
(Caravan)
Mopti Jan 2014-Dec 2017 Mali ECHO 5 11
Cessna C208
(Caravan)
Mopti Jan 2015 –Dec 2017 Mali ECHO 6 11
Cessna C208
(Caravan)
N’Djamena Feb 2014-Nov 2014 Chad ECHO 6 11
*The actual capacity for specific flights is dependent on the cargo payload carried and other variables including the airport/airstrip
runway lengths, fuel loads, alternate airfield requirements and weather constraints
The Cessna Caravan based in Chad in 2014 was transferred to Mopti in Mali in February 2015. The
aircraft deployed were of varying ages.
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The DH8-100s (Dash-8s) are an older aircraft type and although this in itself does not present a major
aviation safety concern, they may require increased maintenance and are likely to be less cost-efficient
(on a per flight hour basis) than more modern aircraft. Furthermore, the condition of the aircraft interior
and in-flight service is more basic than that for a commercial air service. The Cessna Caravans
deployed area mix of older and younger aircraft. Both the Dash-8s and the Cessna Caravans are flown
with a co-pilot for additional safety. Dual pilot operations are a mandatory ICAO requirement for the
Dash-8s although technically Cessna Caravans can be certified for single pilot operation.
All ECHO Flight aircraft are contractually required to possess specialist avionics equipment. This
includes a field self-start capability, an Airborne Collision Avoidance System (ACAS) Class II, a Terrain
Awareness and Warning System Class A, a weather radar, dual global positioning system (GPS), a
digital flight data recorder, an emergency locator transmitter 406, single high frequency radio, a
satellite-based tracking system transmitting every 3 minutes and a satellite phone. In addition, the
Cessna Caravan aircraft are fitted with an Electronic Engine Condition Trend Monitoring System (this is
not specified as a requirement for the Dash-8 aircraft, as these are dual-engined. While this avionics
equipment is certainly comprehensive, it should be pointed out not all aviation safety risks can be
eliminated. In particular, ECHO Flight operates in uncontrolled airspace for many flights, there are
virtually no navigational or airport/airfield landing aids and the runway conditions, particularly at the
more remote airfields, can be hazardous. Further details on the aviation safety aspects of ECHO Flight
operations are given in Section 3.10.
DAC Aviation holds a Kenyan Airline Operating Certificate (AOC) and the aircraft chartered are either
registered in Kenya with Kenyan Certificates of Airworthiness (CoAs) or, in the case of leased aircraft,
are registered in and have CoAs from their country of ownership. From a geographic standpoint, any
contracted operator would almost certainly need to have a Kenyan AOC as it is very unlikely that an
operator with another AOC would get permission to fly in all four countries where ECHO Flight
operates. As such this restricts the pool of air charter operators which potentially can bid for the
contract and may ultimately impact on the overall cost.
The aircraft are maintained at DAC Aviation’s main base at Wilson Airport in Nairobi, although ground
engineers and DAC handling staff are in place at the main outstations (Goma, Kalemie, Nairobi and
Mopti). In the event that an aircraft becomes unserviceable or additional ad hoc flight(s) are required,
back-up aircraft can be made available from Nairobi. Under the new 4-year contract starting in May
2018, DAC Aviation has agreed to have two additional dedicated back-up aircraft on standby in Nairobi
(one DH Dash-8-100 and one Cessna Caravan). Under the contract, DAC Aviation is required to have
an all-risks insurance policy with a minimum cover of €40 million per single occurrence.
3.5 Traffic levels (passengers and freight)
The number of passengers and the volume of cargo transported by ECHO Flight can be measured on
two bases – (a) a ticketed basis covering the full passenger or cargo journey and (b) a cumulative basis
in which all sectors flown by passengers are counted. In this way, a passenger flying from Goma to
Adjumani on flight ECHO 1 (Goma-Entebbe-Arua-Adjumani) would be counted as one ticketed
passenger or three cumulative passenger sectors.
Over the period 2013–17, across all countries ECHO Flight carried an annual average of 26,211
ticketed passengers per annum or 37,624 cumulative passenger sectors. In terms of cargo, ECHO
Flight carried some 278,821 kg per annum on a ticketed basis and 385,336 kg on a cumulative basis. It
should be noted that, in terms of aircraft capacity, the volume of cargo carried is relatively low, apart
from ECHO 1 (Dash-8 flights) in DR Congo. Measured on a passenger-equivalent basis of 100 kg of
cargo equating to one passenger, this indicates that about 10% of the total aircraft payload is used for
cargo shipments.
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The breakdown of annual passenger and cargo tonnes carried over the period 2013-2017 is shown in
Figures 2 and 3 below. These figures indicate that the total number of passengers carried by ECHO
Flight in DR Congo and Kenya was consistent over the 5-year period, but increased in Mali albeit from
a low base. The volume of cargo carried within DR Congo dropped significantly between 2013 and
2016 but increased slightly in 2017. The volume of cargo transported in Mali was significantly lower
than those in DR Congo and Kenya, where the larger Dash-8-100 aircraft were not deployed.
Figure 3: ECHO Flight – annual passengers (ticketed basis) (2013–17)
Figure 4: ECHO Flight – Annual cargo tonnes (ticketed basis) (2013–17)
3.6 Flight hours flown / aircraft utilisation
The total number of flight hours flown covers both the minimum guaranteed hours and the additional
hours for the aircraft chartered, and is dependent on the budget available by country and by
aircraft/flight number (i.e. ECHO 1, ECHO 2 etc.). The total number of flight hours flown over the period
2013–17 is shown in Figure 4. The total budgeted number of flight hours for 2018 (4,680 hours)
represents a slight increase on the 2017 figure (4,560 hours).
0
5,000
10,000
15,000
20,000
25,000
30,000
35,000
40,000
45,000
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Chad
Mali
Kenya
DRC Congo
0
100,000
200,000
300,000
400,000
500,000
600,000
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Chad
Mali
Kenya
DRC Congo
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Figure 5: ECHO Flight – Annual Flight Hours Flown (2013–17)
The reduction in the number of flight hours flown in DR Congo over the period 2013–17 could reflect a
reduction in the service frequencies or sector lengths. The increase in the flight hours flown in Mali
could reflect both an increase in service frequencies and the use of a second aircraft during the 5-year
period.
Based on these figures it is possible to calculate the daily hourly aircraft utilisation for the six aircraft
chartered. The aircraft utilisation statistics for 2017 are given in Table 36 below.
Table 28: ECHO Flight – Aircraft Utilisation 184 2017
Flight No/aircraft deployed Aircraft type Annual flight
hours
Average daily
hourly utilisation
ECHO 1 DHC8-100 874 2.40
ECHO 2 DHC8-100 969 2.66
ECHO 3 Cessna
Caravan
628 1.72
ECHO 4 Cessna
Caravan
709 1.94
ECHO 5 Cessna
Caravan
589 1.61
ECHO 6 Cessna
Caravan
1031 2.82
Total 4800 2.19
Given the comparatively low level of budgeted flight hours, the average daily hourly utilisation is low in
comparison to commercial air services in Europe and North America, and can be restricted by airport
operating hours, weather conditions etc. As such, all humanitarian air services have lower average daily
184 In line with common aviation practice, the average daily utilisation is calculated as the total annual flight hours divided by the total no of days in the year (i.e. 365).
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
6,000
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Chad
Mali
Kenya
DRC Congo
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hourly utilisation than commercial services. Furthermore, humanitarian air services have a more
variable pattern of traffic demand and spare capacity is often needed (e.g. for additional ad hoc flights).
To ensure the maximum cost-effectiveness of ECHO Flight it is important that, at the contract tendering
stage, the proposed number of aircraft, flight hours and budget is appropriate for forecasted number of
passengers and cargo expected to use the service. This will require an analysis of potential
humanitarian relief locations, the potential scale of relief by EU (and non-EU) humanitarian aid
organisations, the numbers of field-based staff etc.
Any analysis of aircraft utilisation and, ultimately the overall cost of ECHO Flight, needs to be
considered in the light of its mandate to provide an air service for all EU-funded humanitarian project
staff where no other appropriate method of access is available. As such, lower levels of average hourly
aircraft utilisation and higher ‘per passenger’ costs can, in certain circumstances, be considered as
necessary in order to fulfil this mandate. Nevertheless, some attention needs to be paid to the cost-
efficiency of the service as ultimately DG ECHO’s overall budgets are limited.
As a general rule, aircraft become more cost-efficient with greater hourly utilisation. Theoretically it
might be desirable to introduce new services, subject to user demand, by increasing the number of
budgeted flight hours, thereby improving the overall cost-efficiency of the service. Conversely, it might
be more cost-efficient of hours flown, e.g. by cutting back on the flight frequencies to some destinations
with low traffic volumes or perhaps by cancelling some flights with very low passenger loads and
requesting passengers to transfer to the next suitable flight. Such changes to the flight schedules can
be in the best interests of ECHO Flight users as a whole. However, while the flight hours for each
aircraft deployed are adjusted to meet the demand for both scheduled and ad hoc flights throughout the
year, the overall level of annual expenditure is essentially as specified in the contract budget.
Ultimately, it is a matter of balance to set an appropriate budget for ECHO Flight to meet the overall
needs of the humanitarian aid community, while recognising that it may not be cost-efficient to provide
air services to those destinations with a very high ‘per passenger’ cost.
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3.7 Aircraft load factors
The aircraft load factor measures the utilisation of the aircraft’s capacity and is an important indicator of
the performance of all air transport operations.185 Typically, the average passenger load factor of most
European commercial airline flights is between 70% and 90% (i.e. 70–90% of all seats are used) –
although this is lower in Africa (typically 50–60%). The passenger load factor for ECHO Flight is not
analysed by DAC Aviation or by DG ECHO although some approximate ‘maximum’ estimates are
proposed for all services in 2017 in Table 37 below. The analysis suggests that the estimated
passenger load factors are higher for ECHO 2 (flights to Kenya) than other services. Of the six services
offered, the lowest estimated average passenger load factor was recorded for ECHO 3 (46.4%),
although this figure can probably be regarded as acceptable given ECHO Flight’s mandate to serve all
DG ECHO-funded projects within DR Congo. These calculated ‘maximum’ load factors are generally in
line with those of UNHAS services in DR Congo 2015–18, which range from 44% to 58%. In our
opinion, if the passenger load factor were to reduce to less than 40% in future years, then consideration
could be given to cutting capacity (i.e. flight frequency). This would reduce the budgeted cost or
alternatively services could be provided on other routes.
Table 29: ECHO Flight – estimated ‘maximum’ passenger load factors – 2017
Total passengers Total cargo Total Available seats Passenger Load factor
(est)
ECHO 1 4,877 140,658 9,672 50.4%
ECHO 2 13,152 20,532 16,120 81.6%
ECHO 3 1,739 19,937 3,744 46.4%
ECHO 4 2,147 13,244 3,744 57.3%
ECHO 5 2,116 995 2,808 75.4%
ECHO 6 2,549 955 3,744 68.1%
Total 26,580 196,321 39,832 66.7%
Source: DAC Aviation statistics and consultant calculations
We should also point out that the fact that the overall annual passenger (and cargo) traffic levels have
been maintained throughout the evaluation period with no significant increase in cost in real terms
suggests that ECHO Flight is meeting its mandate. However, the evaluators note that almost half the
traffic in 2017 (49.5% on a passenger basis and 46.8% on a passenger-cargo equivalent basis) is flown
on just one of the six aircraft deployed (ECHO 2 in Kenya). This suggests that passengers on the
ECHO 2 flights are probably more frequent users of the service than those in other locations.
3.8 Service quality
The quality of any air transport service may refer to a range of different attributes as perceived by its
users. In this section the evaluators examine three particular aspects of ECHO Flight – the level of in-
flight service and comfort, the level of service availability (including the proportion of flight
185 For each route, this is normally calculated as total passenger-km / available seat-km over all sectors flown. These statistics are not analysed by DAC Aviation or by DG ECHO. For the purposes of this evaluation, the evaluators have estimated the maximum load factor for each service (i.e. ECHO 1, ECHO 2 etc.) by calculating the total passengers and the available seats for each flight (taken as half a rotation) within the flight schedule. As most passengers will be travelling either to or from the initial flight origin or its final destination (rather than just on intermediate sectors), this estimate will be reasonably close to the actual average load factor over all sectors. These load factor calculations do not take account of any aircraft seat capacity restrictions; e.g. due to short runways at some airfields used. In addition, the estimates do not take account of medical evacuation flights, although the effect of these on the overall passenger load factors will be minor
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cancellations/dispatch reliability) and the level of satisfaction/dissatisfaction with the flight booking
system.
The aircraft used by ECHO Flight are older than most used for commercial flights – so the aircraft cabin
interiors and seating are rather worn but are still functional. Passengers on most flights are offered a
soft drink and a snack (e.g. peanuts). The evaluators received no adverse comments on the aircraft
appearance or in-flight service during our interviews with ECHO Flight users. The evaluators did note,
however, feel that the check-in facilities at DAC Aviation’s base at Nairobi Wilson airport could perhaps
be upgraded, including the minibus used for transfers to the main airport terminal.
ECHO Flight services may be cancelled for several reasons; for example, due to a very low number of
passenger bookings on any particular flight,186 a technical fault with the aircraft, weather conditions or
due to security concerns. Data provided by DG ECHO suggests that the overall level of service
availability is reasonably good, ranging between 88.1% and 98.6% in 2017.
Table 30: ECHO Flight – service availability – 2017
Scheduled sectors Sectors cancelled Average service
availability
ECHO 1 837 47 94.4%
ECHO 2 157 3 98.0%
ECHO 3 1044 39 96.3%
ECHO 4 812 11 98.6%
ECHO 5 938 112 88.1%
ECHO 6 602 71 88.2%
Users have a mixed response towards the ECHO Flight booking system and check-in procedures. The
most recent user group survey187 carried out (February 2016) indicated that some 80% of those
surveyed made a positive response in relation to the flight booking system and the check-in
procedures, with 20% giving a negative response. The lowest level of satisfaction was expressed for
the procedures for reconfirming the flight, when users sometimes experienced a delay in receiving their
final confirmation of the booking. In general terms, this is supported by the feedback received during the
interviews with ECHO Flight passengers, which showed that the booking procedures,188 particularly the
uncertainty as to whether a passenger will get a confirmed seat until 48 hours prior to the flight, is the
main area of dissatisfaction with the service. The evaluation team feel that it might be feasible to give a
confirmed seat for a proportion of Priority 1 passengers at the time of the initial booking, although this
would need further appraisal.
Linked to the issue of service quality is the extent of passenger ‘no shows’ or cancellations within 24
hours of the flight. While ‘no shows’ may occur for genuine reasons, there is a small proportion of
passengers who abuse the system by booking flights but not actually travelling. As ECHO Flight is free
for all users, there is no penalty for a ‘no show’. DG ECHO estimates that ‘no shows’ and late
cancellations represent around 10% of all bookings in DR Congo and Kenya and 5-6% in Mali. All ‘no
shows’ and late cancellation passengers are sent a warning letter indicating that if they continued to
186 If a flight is cancelled, all booked passengers are offered a seat on an alternative flight. 187 Based on a survey of just 15 respondents. It is recommended that sample sizes are increased for future surveys (e.g. by using an in-flight questionnaire) 188 These procedures are outlined in Section 3.9 below
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abuse the system, they will be prevented from using ECHO Flight in the future although, in practice, just
one user was banned over the period 2013–17.
3.9 Standard operating procedures/flight booking
ECHO Flight operates on the basis of published regulations known as SOPs.189 These set out the
booking priorities for passengers and cargo – together with booking procedures, check-in and, at
certain destinations, aircraft reception requirements.
ECHO Flight is available to all staff working for or on behalf of EU or international agencies and to
NGOs, based on the following priority categories:
1. Staff and essential relief supplies for humanitarian aid projects financed by the European Commission.
2. Staff and essential relief supplies for humanitarian aid projects financed by EU Member States or international agencies and development projects financed by a European institution.
3. Staff and essential supplies for development projects financed by EU Member States or by other international donors.
All bookings are made online by a ‘focal point’190 for the organisation through the ECHO Flight booking
website191 and are administered by DAC Aviation. A list of organisations and staff approved for ECHO
Flight is maintained within the booking system so that all bookings can be initially sanctioned online.
Once a provisional booking is made, it must be reconfirmed by telephone or email with the DAC
Aviation office no later than 48 hours before the flight. Dependent on their priority level, it is possible
that some passengers (and cargo) will not get their preferred flight and will need to change to a
subsequent flight or make alternative arrangements. In these circumstances, however, it is possible that
an extra aircraft might be deployed, dependent on the number of additional monthly flight available
within the contract with DAC Aviation. The need to reconfirm the booking does, however, add a level of
uncertainty as to whether some NGO staff will get their preferred flight.
In addition to the booking procedures, the SOPs also detail the check-in requirements (passengers
must arrive no later than 30 minutes prior to the flight), the hold baggage allowance (maximum of 20 kg
per passenger) and special procedures for NGOs at remote airstrips for the reception of flights where
there are no DAC Aviation ground staff. The SOPs also show the procedures for operating to those
airfields where there are no DAC Aviation or other contracted ground staff. In such cases, a
representative from an EU-based project should meet the aircraft on arrival. They are responsible for
initially providing advisory information on the weather conditions by telephone to the DAC Aviation’s
Operations Control Centre and they should ensure that the runway is clear prior to landing. These
representatives do not, however, have an air-ground radio to enable them to respond to any emergency
situations such as a runway incursion. It should be noted that there are fully trained DAC Aviation or
other contracted ground staff at most airports and airfields used by ECHO Flight. However, if a
representative from an EU-funded project does meet the flight, the evaluators believe that they should
be fully trained and equipped in order to provide the maximum level of operational safety.
3.10 Aviation safety and security safeguards
DAC Aviation holds a Kenyan AOC (Air Operating Certificate) and all aircrafts have Certificates of
Airworthiness (CoAs) either given or approved by the Kenyan Civil Aviation Authority (CAA). It is also
an approved Aircraft Maintenance Organisation. The Kenyan CAA itself meets the safety oversight
standards required by ICAO. The flying experience (e.g. the number of hours flown) of the flight crew
189 Full details are shown at http://www.echoflight-reservation.eu/doc/SOP.pdf 190 Typically, an individual in the organisation responsible for staff travel 191http://www.echoflight-reservation.eu/kenya/
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can be a relevant safety criterion, as ECHO Flight operations often involved flying through uncontrolled
airspace into challenging airstrips with varying runway surfaces, weather conditions etc. Security
arrangements at some airports and airstrips may be a problem and decisions on whether these are
sufficiently safe to operate ECHO Flight are taken by DG ECHO security experts and by DAC Aviation
on a joint basis. At present, DAC Aviation is audited by and provides technical monitoring data to WFP
Aviation Safety Unit. It also contracts aircraft to them in addition to operating ECHO Flight.
The aircraft accident and incident record for ECHO Flight and for DAC Aviation as a whole would
generally appear to be acceptable for humanitarian relief operations of this type, although there is
inevitably a higher level of safety risk for all humanitarian air services in comparison to commercial air
services in developed countries. DAC Aviation produces a ‘Global Safety Summary’ each year. In 2017,
this indicated that there were some 79 reported safety incidents, although none of these can be
regarded as serious or were reportable to the Kenyan CAA. Of these incidents, some 85% related to
poor runway surface conditions, tyre punctures and weather issues. The only recent major incident
relates to an ECHO Flight on 21 August 2014 at Shamwana in DR Congo. The undercarriage of the
aircraft, a Cessna Caravan, collapsed on landing and the aircraft veered off the runway into the bush.
The aircraft was written off but there were no fatalities or major injuries, just two reported cases of
whiplash. An investigation showed that although the aircraft speed on approach was too high and that
the pilot was unable to execute a ‘go round’ procedure as he was unfamiliar with the use of the power
level due to a modification to the aircraft. The potential kidnapping of the flight crew or passengers also
remains a threat, although no incidents of this type occurred over the period 2013–17.
Although there is some informal sharing of aviation safety and security incidents between the main
humanitarian aviation providers, this could be made a more formal process so that flight crew can learn
the lessons from these incidents. This type of cooperation between the various humanitarian aviation
providers was a key recommendation in an earlier evaluation192 carried out for DG ECHO in 2010.
As indicated in Section 3.9 above, the evaluators recommend that additional training and equipment is
provided to EU-based project staff in instances where they are responsible for meeting the ECHO
Flight. It should also be pointed out that the accident and incident records over the period 2013–17 do
show some inadequacies in these procedures (e.g. in weather reporting).
It is noted that DG ECHO is currently launching a tender to for a study to evaluate the operational
safety risks and due diligence required for ECHO Flight and it is recommended that these issues are
evaluated further in this study.
3.11 Tender and contractual details
The contract for ECHO Flight has been held by DAC Aviation since 2006. It is valid for a 4-year period –
with the most recent contracts covering the period March 2014–April 2018 and May 2018–April 2022.
The contract is administered through an international tender. While in theory this is open to all
tenderers, in practice all bids must be from (or include) an air charter operator with a Kenyan AOC. The
contract price is based on an hourly rate per flight hour for each aircraft plus additional amounts for
each operating base. There may be some minor variation in the price on an annual basis to cover
inflation and other unanticipated costs. A nominal level of minimum guaranteed flight hours is shown for
each aircraft, although this can be varied subject to demand. The overall level of expenditure on ECHO
Flight in 2017 amounted to some €13.8 million (see Table 40 below).
We understand that five air charter operators were short-listed for the new contract starting in May
2018. This included a joint bid by a South African and a Kenyan operator, although this used Let 410
aircraft, which were deemed to be unsuitable. DAC Aviation scored the highest marks in the tender both
192 ‘Review on the Provision of Air Transport in Support of Humanitarian Operations’, Channel Research on behalf of DG ECHO, 2010.
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for technical capability and for price. In practice, there was no significant increase in their prices in 2018
compared to 2017. Although not initially specified in the Terms of Reference for the new contract, DAC
Aviation also agreed to maintain two dedicated aircraft in Nairobi on standby (one DH Dash-8-100 and
one Cessna Caravan).
In parallel with the new 4-year ECHO Flight contract starting in May 2018, there are further back-up
contracts with other air charter operators in Africa that could be utilised if required in emergency
situations. While these back-up contracts provide an extra level of flexibility, the evaluators note that
these are all for fixed wing aircraft. The evaluation team would recommend that these are extended to
include helicopters, which are often more appropriate, particularly in short-term emergency situations.
These open tender procedures provide some assurance that the best ‘value for money’ from the
available contractors is obtained for ECHO Flight and any additional contracts for further emergency
flights.
3.12 Relevance
ECHO Flight can be perceived as highly relevant to the success of many EU-funded (and non-EU-
funded) humanitarian aid projects in the countries where it operates. Many projects are located in
remote regions with limited road access, which may be exacerbated by poor weather or security issues.
As a result, access by air is essential for NGO staff working on these projects and any supporting
supplies. This applies both to those working in the field on a long-term basis and for NGO staff visiting
projects in the field (e.g. for management or monitoring purposes). It should also be noted that ECHO
Flight aircraft are available for occasional ad hoc flights outside the regular flight schedules (e.g. for
special EU missions or other international agencies). Under the current contract, two aircraft (a DH
Dash-8 and a Cessna Caravan) are on standby in Nairobi in the event of technical issues in the field or
for any ad hoc missions.
It might be argued that ECHO Flight would not be required if DG ECHO were to provide additional
funding to UNHAS so that their route network could be expanded to include all areas where EU-funded
projects are based. It has also been suggested that ECHO Flight is restrictive as it prioritises EU-funded
humanitarian projects, rather than development projects or those funded through other donors.
However, due to the unpredictable nature of its overall donor funding structure, it is possible that there
would be no guarantee that UNHAS would provide these additional services, even if further funding was
provided by DG ECHO. If ECHO Flight were to be transferred to UNHAS, all users including those
working on EU-funded humanitarian aid projects would need to pay a fee. Furthermore, ECHO Flight in
its current format can also be used for special EU missions and provides visibility to EU humanitarian
aid as a whole. This might not be possible if the service was transferred to UNHAS. Consideration of
these issues, however, is beyond the scope of this evaluation.
In nearly all destinations served by ECHO Flight there are no safe or reliable commercial air services,
so a special humanitarian air service remains the only option. In theory, ECHO Flight would be replaced
by commercial air services if they exist, provided they are proven to be safe and reliable in the future. It
should be pointed out that Congo Airways does fly some routes that overlap with those flown by ECHO
1 and 3 (e.g., Goma-Lubumbashi and Goma-Bunia) although this airline is on the EU banned airline
list193 and must therefore be considered as unsafe for use by humanitarian aid staff.
Although UNHAS offers services in all countries where ECHO Flight operates except Uganda, there is
little overlap of services both in terms of routes served or in-flight timings. Historically, ECHO Flight has
focused on locations not served by UNHAS and, in the case of DR Congo, a route network has
developed which potentially covers all EU-funded project locations. In addition, there is some
193Technically this a list of airlines banned from operating in the EU as they (or their Regulatory Authority) fails to meet ICAO standards. A list of all banned airlines is available at http://ec.europa.eu/transport/modes/air/safety/air-ban/search_en
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reluctance among some humanitarian aid workers to use the airport facilities in DR Congo used by
UNHAS as these are primarily for military use (e.g. by MONUSCO194).
A further use of ECHO Flight is for medical and security evacuations of EU and humanitarian aid staff.
The medical evacuations require a doctor’s consent and can only be made in non-critical cases. DG
ECHO’s records shows that there were 45 flights over the period 2013–17 for these purposes.
Table 31: ECHO Flight – No of medical and security evacuation flights – 2013–17
DR Congo Kenya Mali Total
Medical evacuations (Medevac) 6 15 11 32
Security evacuations (Secevac) 5 2 6 13
Total 11 17 17 45
3.13 Impact and effectiveness
ECHO Flight clearly has a significant impact on the success of EU and non-EU-funded humanitarian aid
projects in DR Congo, Kenya, Mali and Uganda. It carried an average of some 26,000 passengers and
278,000 kg of relief supplies195 over the period 2013–17 and directly supported over 300 humanitarian
projects in this region, many of which are funded by the EU.
In overall terms, ECHO Flight service is flexible and can be adjusted to suit user demands, thereby
maximising its overall impact and effectiveness. The level of dispatch reliability is good – in 2017, some
88.2% of scheduled flights were operated. Although some aspects of the service need to be improved
(particularly the flight booking system), the level of user satisfaction with ECHO Flight would appear to
be high. While regular user groups are held with the main NGOs using the service, the response rate to
the user satisfaction surveys is very low (just 15 respondents to the survey in 2015), which is not
sufficient to provide the meaningful level of feedback required to ensure the service improves in the
future. ECHO should be considering how to increase the level of feedback.
3.14 Efficiency
The efficiency of ECHO Flight needs to be assessed on a number of factors, including whether the
destinations served and the service frequencies meet user requirements (i.e. could the aircraft be better
deployed), whether the quality of service (including on-time performance) is adequate and whether it is
cost-effective (e.g. measured on a ‘per passenger-km’, or including cargo on a ‘per passenger-cargo
equivalent-km’). These KPIs however need to be put in context as several destinations served by
ECHO Flight are in deep field locations. It is also possible to evaluate, in broad terms, as to whether
ECHO Flight meets user requirements from the customer satisfaction survey completed at user group
meetings and by interviews with users, including the sample of ECHO Flight passengers interviewed
during the field visit to Nairobi.
Fulfilling user needs is, however, just one measure of cost-efficiency. Clearly this cannot be the sole
criterion as it may not be cost-effective to provide air services for all EU-funded project staff to their
closest airfield location, particularly where traffic volumes are low. In these circumstances it may be
better to discontinue flights to these destinations and to ask passengers to fly to an alternative airfield
and transfer by car to the project location, subject to security considerations.
194 The United Nations Organisation Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 195 Total passengers and cargo ticketed (i.e. excludes the use of onward connecting flights).
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In terms of unit operating cost, humanitarian aid flights are more expensive than traditional air charter
flights. The aircraft utilisation is usually relatively low, and the aircraft fuel costs and operational
overheads are high. This is compounded by the relatively high costs of the flight crew despite
comparatively low aircraft utilisation. The high unit costs apply to all humanitarian air operations
including ECHO Flight, UNHAS, MAF, CICR etc. and to ad hoc flight operations by WFP Aviation. In the
case of ECHO Flight, many flight crew are Kenyan-based or are expatriates from South Africa or
Europe, so an accommodation allowance is also payable, increasing the overall cost. Typically, the
hourly operating costs of a DH Dash-8 and a Cessna Caravan are significantly lower in Europe and the
US than the prices charged to DG ECHO, although the latter includes profit retained by DAC Aviation.
Data from the PriJet website196 suggest that a DH Dash-8 aircraft operating in the US with equivalent
total annual flight hours to those used by ECHO Flight has a total hourly cost of some US$2,661
(=€2,274) per hour in comparison to the average figure of €3,334197 charged by DAC Aviation under the
2018 contract.198 In the case of a Cessna 208B Grand Caravan, the average hourly cost in the US is
US$830 (=€709) per hour against DAC Aviation’s average hourly cost of €1,658. It should be noted
that humanitarian air services often require additional flight crew (eg a flight engineer), thereby
increasing the hourly costs. While some costs can be expected to be slightly higher in Africa (e.g. fuel,
surcharges etc.), this does demonstrate the high cost of humanitarian aid operations.
As indicated earlier, the high hourly rates apply to all humanitarian aviation operations, including
UNHAS, and may be attributable to a range of factors including, in our opinion, barriers to market entry,
profit levels and any risk premiums of operating in the humanitarian aid sector. The evaluators believe
that potentially some efficiencies to reduce the hourly rate could be made at DAC Aviation which, like
many African airlines and air charter operators, has a much higher staff to pax ratio than airlines in
Europe and the US199. That said, the evaluators also recognise that, in the case of ECHO Flight, the
hourly rates have been derived from a competitive tender and, as such, it is not clear how a reduced
rate might be achieved200. That said, the same argument could probably be applied to other African
humanitarian air charter operators. The evaluators also recognise that, in the case of ECHO Flight, the
hourly rates have been derived from a competitive tender and, as such, it is not clear how a reduced
rate might be achieved.
Due to a lack of available data,201 it is not possible to directly calculate the average unit cost (e.g. in
terms of total cost of each ECHO Flight aircraft per passenger-kilometre flown). The evaluation team
has, however, made estimates of the average aircraft operating costs per passenger for each aircraft
deployed (i.e. ECHO 1-6) in 2017. These have been benchmarked against UNHAS costs for Dash-8
and Cessna Caravan operations in DR Congo, Central African Republic and Chad and, in the case of
196https://prijet.com/operating_costs/Bombardier%20DeHavilland%20Dash%208-100
https://prijet.com/operating_costs/Cessna%20208B%20Grand%20Caravan 197 Excludes base and other additional charges 198 The Prijet figures include fuel, airport, ATC charges and overnight crew accommodation. There may be certain other surcharges that apply to ECHO Flight. The differences in the figures may be partially explained by the ‘turnkey’ nature of ECHO Flight – see Footnote 353 below.
200 DAC Aviation has 121 staff allocated to ECHO Flight. A standard industry benchmark (the no of pax per employee – 2017) indicates that DAC Aviation’s productivity is lower than most European and other African airlines. DAC Aviation – 219.7 pax/employee, Ethiopian Airlines – 628.3 pax/employee, SAA – 679.2 pax/employee, Lufthansa – 857.6 pax/employee, BA – 1,004.4 pax/employee, Ryanair – 10,023 pax/employee. 201 Although total base costs are available for the ECHO Flight, there is no data available on any additional overhead costs (e.g. those for EU staff in Nairobi, Goma and Brussels). Similarly, data for base and overhead costs have not been provided by UNHAS. In order to provide some type of cost benchmarking analysis of ECHO Flight against UNHAS, the evaluators have compared the average aircraft operating cost per passenger in DR Congo in 2017. This is not a precise like-for-like comparison as the sector lengths flown may be different although the same two aircraft types are used. While the main components of these operating costs are similar between ECHO Flight and UNHAS, there are some minor differences (e.g. the UNHAS figures exclude airport, ATC and any other surcharges, although both include fuel). It should also be noted that the nature of ECHO Flight and UNHAS are different in that ECHO Flight is an inclusive ‘turnkey’ operation in which the operator, DAC Aviation, is responsible for the purchasing of aircraft fuel and the payment of additional charges whereas, in the case of UNHAS, these items are contracted directly by WFP Aviation. The ‘turnkey’ nature of ECHO Flight will tend to increase aircraft hourly fee rates charged as the operator will wish to cover any possible increases in the fuel price and other surcharges over the contract period.
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DR Congo, the evaluators have benchmarked the figures against those provided by WFP Aviation for
UNHAS operations in this country. Full details of these calculations are given in Annex 28.
The ECHO Flight costs in 2017 are given in Table 40 below and, in the case of DR Congo, the
evaluators have benchmarked the figures against those provided by WFP Aviation for UNHAS
operations in this country (see Table 41).
Table 32: ECHO Flight costs – 2017
ECHO Flight
Total Pax Total Cargo
(kg)
Flight
hours
Total cost Operating cost per
pax-cargo (eq)
ECHO 1 4,877 140,658 874.31 €3,087,626 €479.45
ECHO 2 13,152 20,532 969.23 €3,292,313 €246.06
ECHO 3 1,739 19,937 628.12 €907,633 €462.95
ECHO 4 2,147 13,244 708.69 €1,222,608 €532.92
ECHO 5 2,116 995 588.88 €969,296 €455.70
ECHO 6 2,549 955 1030.61 €1,696,384 €662.75
Bases/month – - - €2,609,954 -
Total 26,580 196,321 4799.84 €13,785,815 €479.32
Dash-8-102 18,029 161,190 1843.54 €6,379,939 €321.89
Cessna Caravan 8,551 35,131 2956.30 €4,795,922 €536.38
DRC-Dash-8-102 4,877 140,658 874.31 €3,087,626 €479.45
DRC-Caravan 3,886 33,181 1336.81 €2,130,242 €500.68
Data sources – (1) ECHO Flight invoiced hourly rates and base costs. Flight hours, passengers and cargo by Flight no as given in DAC
Aviation website (2) UNHAS operating costs provided by WFP Aviation assuming €1.00 = US$0.923
(www.irs.gov/individuals/international-taxpayers/yearly-average-currency-exchange-rates)
The benchmarked operating costs of ECHO v UNHAS are given in Table 41 below.
Table 33: ECHO Flight v UNHAS – Operating cost per pax-cargo (equiv) – 2017
ECHO Flight
DRC - Dash-8-102 €479.45
DRC - Cessna Caravan €500.68
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Total - Dash-8-102 €321.89
Total - Cessna Caravan €536.38
UNHAS
DRC - Dash-8-102 €430.10
DRC - Cessna Caravan €466.62
Chad - Dash-8-102 €609.18
Chad - Dash-8-106 €443.96
Chad - Cessna Caravan €281.52
CAR - Dash-8-102 €313.82
CAR - Cessna Caravan €431.04
Data sources – UNHAS data as supplied by WFP Aviation
It is clear from this table that, in terms of a direct comparison of costs in DRC, UNHAS’ operating costs
per pax-cargo (equiv) are around 7-10% lower than those of ECHO Flight for both aircraft types. In the
case of Dash-8-102 operations, ECHO Flight’s average cost across all countries is less than UNHAS in
DRC and Chad, but slightly higher than that in CAR. For Cessna Caravan operations, ECHO Flight’s
average costs across all countries is higher than UNHAS in DRC, Chad and CAR. Given the turnkey
(i.e, total cost-inclusive) nature of ECHO Flight and the exclusion of certain costs in the UNHAS figures,
we believe that ECHO Flight and UNHAS’ average unit operating costs are broadly similar, although the
Cessna Caravan operations appear to be rather more expensive in DR Congo and in the other
countries benchmarked. A further factor is that aviation fuel prices fell significantly in 2017, which is
likely to have benefited UNHAS rather than ECHO Flight, as there is no adjustment for this in the
contract price. Whilst aviation fuel prices can go up as well as down, it could be advantageous for DG
ECHO to pay for fuel directly rather than through the main ECHO Flight contract, although it is
recognised that this may be difficult from an administrative standpoint.
Our analysis suggests that, on an average ‘per passenger’ basis, ECHO Flight Dash-8 operations are
less expensive (€321.89 per ticketed passenger) than those by Cessna Caravan (€536.38 per ticketing
passenger). For certain flights, however, particularly those by the Cessna Caravan aircraft, the
passenger capacity is reduced due to runway length restrictions, which may potentially increase these
average cost figures. There are significant differences in these figures by flight number. ECHO Flight
Dash-8 operations range from an average aircraft operating cost of €246.06 per passenger (in Kenya)
to €479.45 per passenger (in DR Congo), while Cessna Caravan costs range between an average of
€455.70 per passenger (ECHO 5 in Mali) to €662.75 per passenger (ECHO 6 also in Mali). The low
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average Dash-8 ‘per passenger’ operating cost in Kenya in comparison to that in DR Congo can be
partially attributed to higher load factors on the Kenyan service.
Comparison of ECHO Flight average ‘per passenger’ operating costs against UNHAS suggest that
ECHO Flight costs were higher (7-10%) than those for UNHAS in DR Congo in 2017 – with a greater
differential for Dash-8 rather than Cessna Caravan operations. However, it should be pointed out the
average ‘per passenger’ aircraft operating costs of the Dash-8 ECHO 2 service in Kenya were
significantly lower than those for the Dash 8-ECHO 1 service in DR Congo, due in part to the higher
load factors on this service.
It is not possible to compare ECHO Flight and UNHAS’ Kenya operations as the relevant UNHAS data
is combined with that for Somalia. There are a number of caveats to this analysis so caution is required
in drawing conclusions from these figures, except perhaps noting that the ‘turnkey’ nature of the ECHO
Flight may have some impact on the comparative aircraft operating cost. Furthermore, data on base
and overhead costs for UNHAS is not available to give a full picture of the total cost of the service.
It should be noted that efficiency should not only cover cost, but also includes other aspects of ECHO
Flight service, including whether it is successfully meeting appropriate aviation safety standards. As
indicated in Section 3.10, the evaluators recognise that DAC Aviation fulfils the relevant ICAO
operational and aircraft maintenance standards and successfully completes the necessary audits
undertaken by WFP Aviation. Despite this, all humanitarian air services have a higher degree of safety
risk than commercial flights, as is shown in the level of reported safety incidents for ECHO Flight over
the period 2013–17. While this is not necessarily higher than that for other humanitarian air services,
the evaluators believe that more attention could be placed on learning the lessons from these incidents.
In particular, the evaluators note that the major safety incident that arose at Shamwana in DR Congo in
2014 was the result of a combination of pilot error and unfamiliarity with a modification to the aircraft.
Given these circumstances, the evaluators feel that increased attention might be played to flight crew
training. The evaluators also believe that increased training and specialist equipment could be provided
to the ‘focal point’ used when no ground staff are present at the airfield.
To assist in the development of optimal flight schedules and aircraft utilisation, the evaluators believe
that DG ECHO could potentially benefit from external assistance from planning experts from the
commercial aviation sector. In principle, a more detailed planning analysis could be used to optimise
the flight schedule. However, any changes would need to take account of ECHO Flights mandate to
provide an air service for all EU-funded project staff where there are no alternative access options –
rather than just be based purely on cost considerations.
The evaluation has made use of a range of traffic and financial data provided by DG ECHO. However,
there are some limitations with the format of the traffic data, which the evaluation team feel could be
improved. In particular, there is no data collected on the average load factors or on the total or average
aircraft operating cost per passenger-km (or passenger-km equivalent). This makes direct
benchmarking against UNHAS problematic. The evaluators recognise that it is difficult to get fully
comparable data202 although the evaluators believe that it would be in the interests of all humanitarian
air service providers to cooperate on this in a similar way to the airline cost benchmarking analysis
carried out through IATA. Improved traffic and cost data will enable ECHO Flight to deploy the aircraft
and define the flight schedule on the most cost-effective basis. That said, cost should not be the only
criterion used to assess the service, given DG ECHO’s mandate to provide a service for all EU-funded
humanitarian project staff who require it.
3.14 Visibility
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ECHO Flight does add some visibility to the European Commission’s funding of humanitarian aid. The
EU logo is shown on the aircraft livery and information folders are provided in all seat pockets. There is
some general information about the service on the web, although this is relatively limited. There is a
special ECHO Flight website that is used for online bookings as well as some general background
information about the service. This is maintained by DAC Aviation but, in our opinion, needs to be
updated and refreshed. The level of visibility of ECHO Flight could be improved, particularly its website
and its presence on social media.
4 UNHAS
4.1 Background
UNHAS operations started in the 1980s as WFP/Air Services, with the initial flights opening up
humanitarian air corridors in Ethiopia, Somalia, Angola and Sudan. The service has subsequently
expanded and currently provides humanitarian aid flights in some 13 African states, in Yemen and in
Afghanistan. Over the period 2013–17, UNHAS also operated in Nepal, Nigeria, Cameroon and
Uganda.
In 2017, UNHAS transported some 327,934 passengers and 2,708,000 kg of cargo and undertook
some 1,580 medical and security evacuations.203 Across all countries of operation, some 40% of users
were UN personnel, 56% were from NGOs and 4% from donors, diplomats and others.
4.2 Nature of service
UNHAS operates in a similar way to ECHO Flight by chartering dedicated aircraft from a specialist air
charter operator. The extent of the services offered in terms of the aircraft deployed, the range of
destinations served and the flight schedule is dependent on the level of funding available. The services
differ, however, in that ECHO Flight gives priority to staff working on EU-funded humanitarian aid
projects whereas UNHAS provides a common service (i.e. without priority) for all humanitarian aid
workers. A fee is payable by all users, including employees of the UN, which typically varies between
US$100 and US$500 per flight.
An extensive range of fixed wing aircraft and helicopter types are deployed dependent on the traffic
demand and airfield conditions. All UNHAS contracted air charter operators must undergo special
technical audits and monitoring procedures through its Aviation Safety Unit in addition to complying with
ICAO standards as regulated through their national Civil Aviation Authority. The Aviation Safety Unit
does, however, increase overhead costs and it has been proposed that UNHAS should contract an
external body, such as the Flight Safety Foundation rather than use its own staff to do this.
UNHAS operations are managed and funded on an individual country basis, with funds derived
primarily from the major international agencies and national governments, supplemented by cost
recovery from users. DG ECHO is the third largest donor across the service as a whole, after UN
Common Funds and Agencies and the United States.
DG ECHO currently funds UNHAS in 11 of the 14 countries in which it operates. It does not fund the
service in those countries where ECHO Flight also operates, with the exception of some helicopter
services in DR Congo and some prior funding of UNHAS in Mali. As indicated in Section 2.1 (Table 30),
the overall level of DG ECHO funding to UNHAS has been broadly consistent over the period 2013–17,
apart from a slight dip in 2014.
In terms of procedures, UNHAS seeks funding annually from DG ECHO, based on the requirements of
NGOs based in each country. An internal application is made by completing the ‘e-Single’ Form,
203 Figures per WFP Aviation Annual Review – 2017.
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together with other supporting documentation (e.g. logframe, indicative budget etc.). The ‘e-Single’
Form outlines the need for the service, the number of organisations supported, the expected level of
passenger and cargo traffic, the overall annual cost, the requested contribution from DG ECHO and
other key parameters (e.g. user satisfaction survey results, the level of reported safety incidents etc.).
Data from prior years is used to support the funding application. The ‘e-Single’ Form and the proposed
budget may be refined several times in conjunction with WFP Aviation before the application is
considered by DG ECHO through the ‘Dashboard’ system of funding allocations in each country. Where
funding has been granted, the ‘e-Single’ Form is used to provide a post-hoc analysis of the UNHAS
operation in that year (e.g. the actual overall cost, the achieved traffic levels etc.).
4.3 UNHAS operations funded by DG ECHO
The following section provides brief summaries of the latest (2017) DG ECHO funding contributions
made to UNHAS operations.
4.3.1 Cameroon
Cameroon has faced a severe humanitarian crisis for several years due to a range of factors, including
an influx of refugees from Nigeria and the Central African Republic, malnutrition and natural disasters.
Humanitarian relief is particularly required in the far north of the country.
UNHAS started operations in Cameroon in mid-November 2015 using two aircraft – a Beech 1900 and
a DH Dash-8. In 2016, a funding application for €600,000 by DG ECHO was approved to cover
operations in 2017. This represented some 14.7% of the overall approved budget of €4,083,537. There
was some cost recovery based on a user booking fee of US$100 per passenger.
In the event, the budgeted traffic levels (5,400 passengers per annum) and the organisations served
(45) were exceeded. During 2017, the service carried some 7,467 passengers on behalf of some 48
organisations. Of these 66% were NGOs, 30% UN organisations and 4% donors and diplomatic
services. During the year and after consultation with users, the two aircraft were replaced by a single
Embraer 145 jet shared with UNHAS operations in Chad. This provided a 5% cost-saving to the overall
budget and, despite the overall loss of capacity, traffic levels increased during the year.
4.3.2 Central African Republic
Three years of conflict and subsequent displacements have resulted in a major humanitarian crisis in
the Central African Republic (CAR), with some two million people (40% of the population) currently
severely food insecure. UNHAS has been in the country since 2006 providing air services for some 155
organisations providing humanitarian aid. The service complements those of ICRC and MSF and there
is some cooperation between these providers (e.g. information exchanges on airfield security, fuel etc.).
The service uses four chartered aircraft (a DH Dash-8, a Cessna Caravan and two Let 410s). In 2017
DG ECHO provided a contribution of €540,000 (7.8%) out of a total initial budget of €6.9 million for the
period July–December 2017. The service was projected to carry 9,600 passengers over this period and
achieved a total of 9,589. There was a 30% cost recovery through a booking fee. In practice, the final
expenditure for the six-month period was €5.9 million, enabling a carry-over into 2018. A DG ECHO
monitoring mission in May 2017 concluded that the four aircraft met the needs of the service users.
4.3.3 Chad
Chad has major humanitarian requirements due to insecurity, population displacement and malnutrition.
OCHA has estimated that up to 4.3m people across the country are in need of humanitarian aid. In
2017, DG ECHO provided €1,700,000 to support a fleet of four aircraft (two DH Dash-8s and two
Cessna Caravans) offering services to 19 destinations across the country, based on an overall budget
of €14.2 million. However, due to operational cost and funding constraints, the fleet was reduced to
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three aircraft – an Embraer 145 (shared with UNHAS in Cameroon), a DH Dash-8 and a Cessna
Caravan. This reduced the annual budget from €14.2m to €11.5 million. Traffic levels reduced in line
with the budget. Although the overall user satisfaction rate remains high (85%), it is noted that all
services to the north of the country were chargeable to users on a full recovery basis, which was
regarded as unaffordable by aid agencies working in this region.
4.3.4 Ethiopia
In 2017, Ethiopia experienced increasing humanitarian needs due to the influx of refugees from
Somalia and an emerging drought. Many remote areas, where humanitarian aid is most needed, are
inaccessible by commercial air services meeting ICAO standards. In 2017, UNHAS provided internal air
services using two Cessna Caravan aircraft based in Addis Ababa. DG ECHO provided €1.0 million of
funding towards a total cost of €3.3 million for the service over the 12-month period. The service was
projected to carry an average of 840 passengers and 2,500 kg of cargo per month. To date, no
feedback of the services performance during 2017 is available, although the projected passenger levels
(an average of 7.7 passengers per aircraft per calendar day) suggest a low level of aircraft utilisation.
4.3.5 Mali/Mauritania/Niger
The West African region covering Mali, Mauritania and Niger has continued humanitarian relief
requirements with severe malnutrition and food insecurity resulting from internal conflict and population
displacement. In 2017, DG ECHO-funded UNHAS operations in all three countries. There is some
overlap of services with ECHO Flight in Mali, although UNHAS’ main base is in Bamako, where ECHO
Flight does not operate. In Mali, DG ECHO provided a contribution of €700,000 towards an overall
budget of €6.1 million. The total expenditure for the service over the 12-month period was slightly less
than budget (€5.9m). The service used a Beechcraft 1900 and a Dornier 228 aircraft and carried a total
of 10,368 passengers and 37,800 kg of light cargo during the year. UNHAS’ Performance Monitoring
Tool indicated that Mali represented one of the best countries of operation in terms of its effectiveness
and efficiency, with 98.68% service availability and an average ‘per passenger-kilometre’ cost of
US$0.69 (approx. €0.61). In 2017, UNHAS operated a single Beech 1900 aircraft based in Nouakchott
in Mauritania, providing air services to humanitarian aid staff in the east of the country. The total cost of
the service was €2.5 million, of which DG ECHO contributed €400,000. Although the achieved traffic
levels (2,048 passengers and 16,848 kg of light cargo) exceeded budgeted levels, the average cost on
a ‘per passenger’ basis (€1,221) is high. This may partially be attributed to the high overhead costs of a
single aircraft operation. In Niger, UNHAS operated two aircraft (a DH Dash-8 and a Beech 1900D)
during 2017. DG ECHO contributed €1,000,000 towards the total budgeted cost of €7.2 million. Some
12,673 passengers and 24,840 kg of light cargo were flown during the year. The achieved ‘per
passenger-kilometre’ cost of US$0.55 (approx. €0.48) per passenger-kilometre were significantly less
than the UNHAS global average, although may be due to the use of the larger DG Dash-8 aircraft and
longer average sector lengths.
4.3.6 Nigeria
Instability, particularly in the north-east region of Nigeria, has caused an unprecedented humanitarian
crisis in the country. To support the relief programme in 2017, DG ECHO provided some €4.0 million in
funding to cover both UNHAS and logistics (cargo storage and trucking) operations managed through
the Logistics Cluster. Out of the total budget of €20.0 million, €11.6 million related to the direct cost of
UNHAS air services. One fixed wing and four helicopters were deployed during the year. In practice,
the UNHAS operations significantly exceeded their budget target (18,000 passengers and 48,000 kg of
light cargo), achieving a total of 48,849 passengers and 158,460 kg of light cargo over the 12-month
period.
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4.3.7 South Sudan
South Sudan has suffered over 4 years of conflict, threatening the lives of millions of its people. Due to
the poor road infrastructure, humanitarian air services are essential to access remote locations and air
drops are necessary for extensive delivery of relief supplies. The transportation of relief supplies by air,
road or barge is coordinated through the Logistics Cluster. In 2017, some 6,141 metric tonnes
(6,141,000 kg) of relief cargo were distributed by air drops on a free-to-user basis to some 112
destinations. UNHAS provided humanitarian air services to some 72 regular destinations using a fleet
of 10 fixed wing and 4 helicopters based in Juba, Rumbek, Bor and Wau. The achieved traffic levels
(66,000 passengers and 1,579,000 kg of light cargo) exceeded their target value. DG ECHO provided a
contribution of €5 million to cover both UNHAS and Logistics Cluster activities in 2017. Some 65% of
funding is donor-based or through UN pooled funds. The total budgeted cost of the operation was €80.3
million although, due to the curtailing of some services due to a lack of funding and a shortfall in
funding, total expenditure amounted to €62.4 million. In addition to the funding constraints, UNHAS
services in South Sudan face a number of major challenges, including restrictions on security
clearances, poor airfield infrastructure, variable weather conditions and fuel shortages. Nevertheless,
the achieved user satisfaction rate was high and the reported aircraft load factor (75%) was higher than
that of other humanitarian air services in the region.
4.3.8 Sudan
UNHAS operations in Sudan commenced in 2004 due to the conflict in the Darfur region. The
humanitarian crisis has exacerbated in the past 2 years due to an increase in refugees from South
Sudan. In 2017 UNHAS operated a fleet of five aircraft serving 35 destinations in the country. The fleet
structure changed during the year to reflect user needs as identified through user group meetings and
customer satisfaction surveys. DG ECHO provided €1,950,000 of funding for the period April–
December 2017 – representing an increase of the initial contribution requested (€800,000). The total
budgeted cost of the service over the period was €14.7 million, although the actual total expenditure
amounted to €13.0 million. While actual traffic levels (17,731 passengers over the 8-month period)
slightly exceeded their target (16,200 passengers), these were significantly less than the level in 2016
due to a reduction in flight frequencies. The funding by other donors, however, was piecemeal and
there was some uncertainty as to the level of service that could be provided. Although UNHAS
maintained its route network, some destinations were now served by commercial air services. It was
understood that these were now approved for use by UNDSS.204
4.3.9 Yemen
Yemen has the largest humanitarian crisis in the world, with some 70% of its population in need. The
country has no commercial international air services meeting ICAO standards, so relief agencies in the
country rely on UNHAS for access into the country, which is coordinated through the Log Cluster.
UNHAS offers services between Djibouti-Sana’a, Amman-Sana’a and Djibouti-Aden. In addition,
passenger and cargo services are available through a regular shipping service between Djibouti and
Aden. DG ECHO provided funding of €6 million towards the projected €18.0 million cost of these
services over the period June 2017–May 2018. (The budget indicated that some €11.6 million would be
spent on directly on air services). The UNHAS air services were projected to carry about 850
passengers per month using two Embraer 145 aircraft. Operations during the year were particularly
challenging and a number of security evacuations of humanitarian relief personnel were required. In
addition, 34 flights were cancelled in November 2017 by the Yemeni authorities, impacting some 500
humanitarian aid staff.
204 United Nations Dept for Safety and Security. The UNDSS audits commercial airline services and approves them for use by UN staff.
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4.4 Summary
The wide variety of UNHAS operations in terms of the scale and type of air services provided makes it
difficult to draw any firm conclusions on DG ECHO funding in each country. Furthermore, DG ECHO’s
contribution in terms of the proportion of the overall budgeted (and actual) cost is highly variable,
ranging from between 8% and 33% of total costs.
UNHAS humanitarian air services are clearly relevant in the majority of countries where they operate –
although in some e.g. Sudan there are alternative commercial air services meeting ICAO (or UNDSS)
standards. It might also be argued that DG ECHO funding for UNHAS could be less relevant in Mali, as
many EU-funded humanitarian project staff will use ECHO Flight in this country, although this depends
on the location of the project. UNHAS generally seems able to respond to user needs, which can
change rapidly, with coordination usually led through OCHA in most countries. The user satisfaction
rates are mostly acceptable – although the effectiveness of UNHAS’s operations can be limited by the
lack of security clearances, poor airfield infrastructure and fuel shortages (in the latter case, reciprocal
fuel supply arrangements have been established with ECHO Flight in DR Congo). The uncertainty of
donor funding in some countries has led to some budget restrictions, although paradoxically, in South
Sudan (the largest UNHAS operation funded by DG ECHO) traffic levels increased despite a significant
reduction in the overall budget available. As such the overall cost-efficiency of the service increased.
The e-Single Forms and the accompanying budget breakdowns provide some breakdown of aircraft
costs – although only limited data is provided on a ‘per passenger-kilometre’ or similar basis. As such it
is difficult to get a true measure of cost-efficiency in all UNHAS countries funded by DG ECHO,
although there is no obvious example of significant cost inefficiency. This lack of cost indicators is noted
in an external audit report205 conducted on WFP Aviation activities in six countries in 2016.The report
also noted that WFP Aviation had no cases of contract failure with air charter operators in over 12 years
of operation. This is a reflection of the rigorous assessment procedure used by WFP’s Head Office in
Rome.
UNHAS operates regular safety audit programme although, like all humanitarian air services, the level
of safety-related incidents is substantially higher than that for commercial aviation in Europe or the US.
There were no major aircraft accidents in UNHAS operations funded by DG ECHO over the period
2014–17.
In terms of visibility, DG ECHO’s financial contribution to UNHAS has limited impact. UNHAS aircraft
only display the UN and WFP Aviation logos on the exterior of the aircraft although there are posters in
the interior cabin. Some publicity information is provided in folders kept in the seat pockets, where there
are some references to the DG ECHO funding of UNHAS operations.
5 Other DG ECHO funding of humanitarian air services
5.1 WFP Aviation (Log Cluster)
As indicated in Section 2.1, DG ECHO contributed some €6.6 million in the period 2013–17 to WFP
Aviation activities contracted through the Log Cluster. The majority of this (72%) funded activities in
South Sudan. These primarily involved specialist air drops of relief supplies. The funding for WFP
Aviation Log Cluster activities in South Sudan in 2017 are described in Section 4.3.7 above. Other DG
ECHO funding of WFP Aviation Log Cluster activities include contributions of €1.1 million in 2017 as a
result of Hurricane Irma and €0.8 million in Mozambique and Ukraine in 2015 and 2016.
205WFP Report No WFP/EB.A/2-16/6-G/1
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5.2 MAF/PACTEC
DG ECHO has provided funding to Mission Aviation Fellowship (MAF) to operate humanitarian air
services in Afghanistan throughout the period 2013–17. Flights are operated by PACTEC, a subsidiary
company of MAF, using two Quest Kodiak 100 aircraft (typically 9 seats).
Afghanistan has been torn apart by war and a series of natural disasters. The country has a large
number of refugees, many of whom are located in remote regions. Many airstrips can only be used by
small fixed wing aircraft, such as the Quest Kodiak 100 and by helicopters. Although users pay a fee for
the service, there are subsidiaries for NGOs funded under DG ECHO’s FPA and FAFA.
In March 2017, MAF applied for a contribution of €730,000 – representing 70.2% of an overall budget of
€1,039,438.00 for operation of the service over an 8-month period (May–December 2018). These
figures were based on an hourly flight hour cost of €2,500. The service was expected to operate to 38
airfields, of which 34 were in remote locations, including 12 where PACTEC and UNHAS helicopters
were the only humanitarian air services available. The service was projected to serve some 31
organisations and carried some 1,421 passengers and 32,148 kg of cargo. In the event, these
projections were exceeded, although the load factor remained fairly low (34.4% – i.e. approximately
three passengers per flight).
In terms of cost-efficiency, the flight hour costs for the Quest Kodiak 100 aircraft (€2,500 per flight hour)
are slightly higher than those for the Cessna Caravan for ECHO Flight (€1,453–1,734) but are similar
on a per seat basis. These figures exclude the ECHO Flight base costs. However, the low load factors
give rise to a relatively high ‘per passenger’ and ‘per passenger-cargo equivalent’ cost. It should also be
pointed out that the funding contribution from MAF itself is relatively low in comparison to that from DG
ECHO.
5.3 International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
ICRC operates its own humanitarian air service for selected organisations and for medical evacuations.
In 2017 it operated in 11 countries worldwide, including some joint services with MSF and with WFP
Aviation, using a fleet of 21 leased aircraft. In 2017 the service carried some 60,920 passengers on
behalf of ICRC and MSF and some 10,872,000 kg of cargo (including air drops). The service flew to
some 476 destinations and had an overall budget of some US$57 million.
DG ECHO has provided funding for a large number of ICRC projects over the period 2013–17. While
many of these have included a budget for transportation, the majority of this appears to be for logistics
support (e.g. for warehousing, ambulances etc.) and for international staff travel. There is no identifiable
funding for ICRC air services or for air drops.
5.4 Union Civil Protection Mechanism (UCPM)
To provide emergency relief for natural disasters, DG ECHO has a funding mechanism (the Civil
Protection Mechanism), which can be used to cover transport costs (including air transport) for relief
support by EU Member States. Initially envisaged for natural disasters in Europe, the UCPM is largely
used for those in other parts of the world. Participating State governments can apply for grant aid
funding, where they contract the transport provider themselves or, alternatively, DG ECHO can contract
the transport provider through a framework contract with the global logistics company, Kuehne and
Nagel (K&N). The framework contract covers both the provisioning of transport services (air, land and
sea) to meet specific crises and consultancy work to establish the best method of logistical support from
the existing resources. The current K&N contract was signed on 16 December 2016 and has a 48
month duration. The total value of the contract is €20 million, with a maximum of 80 individual
provisioning and consultancy assignments over its duration. The level of expenditure on air transport
within this contract to date has been minimal.
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In 2017, total UCPM funding for transport for natural disasters within Europe amounted to some
€1.6 million. This related mainly to air transport for particular events e.g. forest fires in Portugal. Total
CPM transport funding outside Europe amounted to €5.3 million and related to various natural disasters
including, among others, the Nepal earthquake, Ebola in Sierra Leone, the Haiti hurricane, forest fires in
Chile and yellow fever in DR Congo. The funding mostly involved the contracting of air cargo aircraft for
the transportation of specialist equipment or passenger aircraft for emergency teams. The majority of
the funding related to grant contracts brokered directly by EU Member States, rather than those
brokered through DG ECHO. It is not known whether or how the grant contracts were tendered and it is
not possible to assess their cost-effectiveness based on the information available.
6 Other initiatives
6.1 Participation in international conferences
In addition to its role in managing the funding of humanitarian air services, DG ECHO participates in the
annual Global Humanitarian Aviation Conference and Exhibition. The most recent event was held in
Lisbon in October 2018. This provides an opportunity for donors, air transport providers and national
Civil Aviation Authorities to create dialogue over key issues including aviation safety standards and the
cost-effectiveness of operations. It is possible that other European institutions (e.g. the European
Aviation Safety Authority) could also be involved in such events in the future.
6.2 New technologies for the distribution of relief aid
While humanitarian relief supplies have traditionally be delivered by fixed wing aircraft or helicopters
(either by landing at nearby airports and airstrips or through air drops), there is increasing interest in the
use of drones, particularly for smaller scale items such as medical supplies. There has even been talk
of creating edible drones. A major proposed initiative in this area, the US-based Syrian Airlift Project,
however, failed through a lack of funding. Despite this, further research, possibly sponsored by DG
ECHO or possibly DG Research and Innovation (RTD) could prove valuable in the quest for the efficient
and cost-effective delivery of certain humanitarian relief supplies.
7 Areas for improvement: Conclusions and recommendations
1. Traffic levels and load factors
As the new 4-year contract with DAC Aviation commenced in May 2018, it is likely to be difficult to
make any major changes to ECHO Flight operations in the short-term. At present, the flight schedule,
aircraft types and monthly flight hours seem broadly appropriate.
Traffic levels and load factors should be reviewed on a regular basis using improved data.
2. ECHO Flight facilities need some improvement
The aircraft deployed on the ECHO Flight services are generally appropriate in terms of capacity and
performance. The DH Dash-8 aircraft are old by commercial aviation standards, although it is
recognised that there is no alternative aircraft type of its size available in the African air charter market.
The aircraft seat covers and cabin interiors need to be refreshed on an ongoing basis. The evaluators
also believe that there could be some general ‘smartening up’ of other aspects of the ECHO Flight
service (e.g. the passenger lounge facilities at Nairobi, the minibus used etc.).
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DAC Aviation should make some effort to refresh some aspects of their service
3. Ad hoc helicopter services could usefully be added
In May 2018, DG ECHO launched additional contracts with four Kenyan-based air charter operators for
the provision of ad hoc emergency humanitarian flights in Africa. These will be used on an ‘as-needed’
basis. It noted, however, that the contracts exclude countries outside Africa and do not include
helicopter operations,
DG ECHO should consider launching contracts for fixed wing/helicopter operations outside
Africa and for helicopters in Africa
4. Collection and analysis of traffic and cost data needs improvement
There should be a review of the traffic and cost data for ECHO Flight to improve future strategic
planning including the number of aircraft and flight hours required and flight destinations/frequencies.
This should include monthly passenger and cargo statistics by sector flown and by priority category, the
aircraft load factors and operating cost per passenger and per passenger-km by flight number and by
aircraft type. This could take the form of a quarterly management report showing the latest quarterly
figures and historical trends since the commencement of the contract. Any changes to the flight
schedules should be made in consultation with EU Flight users. Where possible, these statistics should
be benchmarked against UNHAS and other humanitarian aviation providers using similar aircraft types.
DG ECHO should improve its data collection to optimise the utilisation of the aircraft and the
flight schedule dependent on traffic trends, future project locations and whether there are
alternative methods of travel.
5. ECHO Flight user feedback could be improved
Although there are regular user group meetings for ECHO Flight, the evaluators believe that the
feedback from users could be improved.
A passenger satisfaction questionnaire should be completed on board ECHO Flight, with a
minimum response rate of 5% of all ticketed passengers.
6. ECHO Flight booking procedures
Having to wait for flight confirmations until 2 days before the flight was seen as problematic by users. It
may be feasible to give Priority 1 passengers immediate confirmation.
DG ECHO should review flight booking procedures to see if some or all Priority 1 passengers
can be given flight confirmation at the initial booking stage.
7. Specialist expertise from the commercial airline sector
ECHO Flight does not currently have access to specialist expertise from the commercial sector.
DG ECHO should consider using expertise from the commercial aviation sector to improve data
analysis, flight planning, and cost-efficiency, perhaps on a periodic consultancy basis.
8. ECHO Flight operational safety
The evaluation has not assessed operational safety or provided due diligence in relation to legal
liability, insurance requirements or Safety Management Systems used by DAC Aviation for ECHO
Flight. The evaluators understand that a separate has been launched shortly to examine these issues.
DAC Aviation does meet ICAO aviation safety standards through its Kenyan Air Operators Certificate
and also satisfactorily completes an independent safety audit required by all contractors to WFP
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Aviation.206 The evaluators note, however, that there may be some possible safety issues at some
airfields where a project staff member meets the aircraft due to a lack of air-ground radio equipment
and/or formal training.
DG ECHO should consider instituting a process for sharing of information on safety and
security incidents with other humanitarian aviation providers. (This could be assessed further in
the current safety study.)
9. Policy for the allocation of UNHAS and other humanitarian aviation funding
In the case of DG ECHO funding of UNHAS and other humanitarian aviation operations, the evaluators
found no evidence of any formal policy as to which country operations should be supported, the level
and proportion of the funding given and the rationale for this support (e.g. the benefits for EU-funded
projects etc.). Requests for such funding seem to be largely based on historical precedent of previous
donor funding by DG ECHO.
DG ECHO should improve the key performance indicators used in assessing the cost-efficiency
of future UNHAS operations (e.g. through the benchmarking of expected / achieved aircraft hourly
costs, load factors, cost per passenger-km or cost per available tonne km etc.).
10. Sponsorship of future technologies for the delivery of humanitarian aid
Humanitarian air services need to evolve and improve in line with best practice within the aviation
sector. Newer aircraft types (or type modifications) suitable for such operations need to be developed
by manufacturers. As a leading provider and funder of humanitarian air services, the evaluators feel
that DG ECHO, possibly in conjunction with other Commission services, could sponsor or provide
funding for research and development in these areas.
DG ECHO should explore the greater use of drones and other similar technologies for delivering
humanitarian aid.
206 DAC Aviation also undertakes some humanitarian aviation services for UNHAS in addition to the ECHO Flight.
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Table 34: Evaluation assessment against the Evaluation Framework for air transport
Evaluation Criteria/Evaluation question
Sub-questions
Relevance
1. To what extent does the use of air transport contribute towards the delivery of humanitarian aid?
What are the benefits (and disbenefits) of using air transport (rather than other transport modes) for the delivery of humanitarian aid workers and relief supplies?
ECHO Flight has enabled humanitarian project staff and relief supplies reach remote regions where road access is poor and often insecure and no alternative commercial air services are available. In terms of disbenefits, it is more expensive than road transport, with the highest costs for flights to very remote regions with short runways which can only be served by the Cessna Grand Caravan aircraft.
Do alternative forms of transport (e.g. road transport) exist? Are commercial air services available that could be used in preference to special charter services (e.g. ECHO Flight and UNHAS)?
While road access to all humanitarian project locations is theoretically possible, in practice this is often time-consuming due to the road conditions and is often insecure. There are alternative commercial services available for some ECHO Flight routes in DR Congo and South Sudan, although there are concerns over the safety of all airlines in these countries, which are currently on the EU ‘banned airlines’ list.
What is the rationale for establishing ECHO Flight in some countries but not in others?
The development of ECHO Flight is largely historical as in 1994 EU-funded humanitarian aid project staff in DR Congo, Sudan and Somalia were not well served by UNHAS Sudan, which is now better served by UNHAS so ECHO Flight was discontinued there, while ECHO Flight in Somalia has now transferred to DG DEVCO and operates as the EU Flight.
2. How well has ECHO understood
humanitarian organisations needs for
air services?
What are the needs for air services, at the overall
sectoral level and specifically at regional and country
level?
The mandate of ECHO Flight is to provide safe and secure access to all staff
working on EU-funded humanitarian aid projects in the countries covered.
Certain small-scale relief supplies can also be carried. The service is needed
due to poor or insecure road access or the lack of commercial services.
Similar considerations apply for other humanitarian air services funded by
DG ECHO e.g. UNHAS, MAF, WFP Aviation etc. Our evaluation indicates the
DG ECHO does understand user needs – although the evaluators believe
that user feedback could be improved.
Coherence and complementarity
3. Why are both ECHO Flight and UNHAS present in some countries?
What overlap is there between the services provided? There is only minor overlap of some services in DR Congo. In practice, UNHAS focuses primarily on the main hub routes and ECHO Flight on services to the remoter regions
Could the two operations be combined? What would be the advantages / disadvantages of this?
Theoretically the two operations could be combined under UNHAS – but this would need to be funded by DG ECHO. As it stands, there is little overlap and DG ECHO has full control over the nature of the ECHO Flight service. Furthermore, there would be disbenefits from the loss of visibility of ECHO Flight.
Effectiveness
4.To what extent can the use of air transport for the delivery of humanitarian aid be considered as
Are the routes/destinations served by ECHO Flight / UNHAS appropriate in terms of the location of relief operations in each country?
The routes served and the service frequencies are determined in conjunction with users – but are subject to budget constraints. The evaluators found no major issues with the appropriateness of the services offered by both ECHO
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effective and are there any limitations or constraints on its use?
Flight and UNHAS – although the collection and use of user feedback could be improved.
Is the scale of ECHO Flight / UNHAS operations (e.g. the range of destinations served, aircraft capacities, flight frequencies etc) appropriate for the scale of the relief operations in each country?
Are there any specific aircraft or airport/airfield safety or security issues preventing effective ECHO Flight or UNHAS operations in certain countries?
The routes served and the service frequencies are determined in conjunction with users – but are subject to budget constraints. The evaluators found no major issues with the appropriateness of the services offered by both ECHO Flight and UNHAS – although the collection and use of user feedback could be improved.
Efficiency
5. To what extent is ECHO Flight efficient on an operational and cost basis?
Is the number, type and capacity of aircraft deployed by ECHO Flight / UNHAS appropriate for the number of passengers and freight tonnes carried?
In most instances, the number, type and capacity of aircraft deployed meets the traffic demand. There is some flexibility to increase or reduce capacity by changing the number of flight hours flown. There might theoretically be some scope to reduce the number of aircraft used for ECHO Flight from six to five aircraft – although some destinations would need to be dropped and it may not be feasible under the current contract.
Is the cost of the ECHO Flight (as measured in terms of cost per passenger / freight tonne equivalent-km)) comparable to UNHAS and other humanitarian aid operations?
In terms of a direct comparison of costs in DRC, UNHAS’ operating costs per pax-cargo (equiv) are around 7-10% lower than those of ECHO Flight for both aircraft types. In the case of Dash-8-102 operations, ECHO Flight’s average cost across all countries is less than UNHAS in DRC and Chad, but slightly higher than that in CAR. For Cessna Caravan operations, ECHO Flight’s average cost across all countries is higher than UNHAS in DRC, Chad and CAR. Given the turnkey nature of ECHO Flight and the cost exclusions in this analysis, we believe that the ECHO Flight operating costs are reasonable.
How do the aircraft charter costs (per flight hour) compare against other charter operations?
The ‘per flight hour’ operating costs (i.e. prices) for a DH Dash-8 are about 32% lower and for a Cessna Caravan 57% lower than the prices paid by DG ECHO for the aircraft contracted from DAC Aviation. This reflects the higher costs of humanitarian aviation operations due to the nature of humanitarian aviation operations, cost inefficiencies and profit retained by the contractor.
Are there any potential cost-saving measures (e.g. increased utilisation of a smaller number of aircraft, fuel hedging etc.) which could be introduced?
A reduction in the number of aircraft used might theoretically be feasible by combining ECHO 3 and 4 services – although some destinations with low traffic volumes would need to be dropped. Alternatively, the number of monthly flight hours might be reduced. Any changes would however need to be agreed with users and may not be feasible under the current contract.
Does the current booking and passenger priority system for ECHO Flight and UNHAS meet user requirements?
While the current booking and priority booking system is functional, it is the area of most dissatisfaction among ECHO Flight Priority 2 and 3 users about the Priority system who express the view that ‘we are all humanitarian (or development) aid workers so why should EU-funded projects get priority’. UNHAS is a common service for all humanitarian (and development) aid workers although the fares paid are variable, dependent on the level of cost recovery required.
Are appropriate aviation safety, security and insurance provisions in place for the ECHO Flight (and UNHAS)
The evaluation did not cover these areas per se. ECHO Flight and UNHAS meet ICAO and WFP Aviation safety standards – although there are possible areas of improvement, particularly at airfields where project staff meet the
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aircraft in the sharing of aviation safety-related incidents among humanitarian aviation operators. A study on these and other risk-related issues has been launched by DG ECHO
6. How flexible is the ECHO Flight / UNHAS to changing circumstances in the location / scale of relief operations?
The ECHO Flight schedule is kept under review and is adapted after consultation with users and DAC Aviation. UNHAS flight schedules are modified and updated on a similar basis, although this is subject to the level of funding available and a possible time lag if further funding has to be sought.
20. 7. What are the comparative
advantages of different humanitarian
air services receiving financial support
from DG ECHO (ECHO FLIGHT,
UNHAS, MAF, etc.)?
What criteria does ECHO use to allocate funding to UNHAS/MAF in specific countries?
DG ECHO evaluates potential funding for UNHAS, WFP Aviation (Log Cluster) and other humanitarian aviation providers on an annual and individual country basis. While the KPIs for the proposed services are provided with the funding application (as part of the e-Single Form) and are evaluated on a ‘post-hoc’ basis, it is unclear as to the precise criteria for the level of funding given, if any. The evaluators recommend that DG ECHO prepare some policy guidelines on this.
21. To what extent is ECHO considering alternatives to ECHO Flight?
DG ECHO is represented on UNHAS Steering Committee managed by the WFP Country Offices. However, the level of their involvement varies from country to country. The Steering Committee is responsible for key strategic decisions on the service, while operational matters are discussed at the user group meetings.
22. 8. To what extent is ECHO involved in
the key decision-making for UNHAS /
MAF operations e.g. through
participation on the Steering
Committee?
The K&N framework contract has been very little used to date so it is not possible to judge whether the operations contracted are safe and cost-effective.
23. 9. Does the framework contract for air
transport services with Kuehne and
Nagel (K&N) provide adequate
safeguards for aviation safety and cost-
efficiency?
Are the tendering procedures for air charter services within the contract appropriate? Are the timescales adequate? Should there be preclearance of approved air charter operators?
A previous evaluation carried out in 2010 made a number of recommendations. In particular, the study suggested that there should be increased cooperation and coordination with other humanitarian air service providers and with EU governments and other actors in this field. The evaluators feel that this could still be improved. The earlier evaluation also recommended that a special contract is established for helicopter operations to support humanitarian relief throughout the world. This has not been implemented to date and the evaluators reiterate this recommendation in our report.
10. How is the efficiency of air cargo / air drops / drone operations funded by DG ECHO assessed? (This should cover cost-efficiency, delivery timescales and security of transit)
These operations are assessed through key parameters given in the e-Single Form for the funding application. This also shows the key results of these operations on a post-hoc basis
11. Can Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) be established to assess cost efficiencies of air transport for the delivery of relief supplies (and personnel) – e.g. budgeted cost per tonne kilometre transported?
The KPIs currently collated for ECHO Flight could, in our view, be improved. These should include aircraft load factors and the annual cost of operation of each aircraft deployed (e.g. ECHO 1,2,3 etc) on a ‘per passenger’ and ‘per passenger-km’ basis. This would be compatible with UNHAS’ statistics. The KPIs could also be extended to include cargo e.g. operating cost on a ‘per passenger-cargo equivalent’ and a ‘per passenger-cargo equivalent-km’ basis.
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Some of these KPIs are given in the e-Single Forms for UNHAS operations funded by DG ECHO.
12. Are actual (air) transport costs identified on a post-hoc basis and compared against budgeted cost?
Normally ECHO Flight out-turn (actual) expenditure is equivalent to the annual budget. In the case of UNHAS, the out-turn expenditure may be less than the initial budget due to a shortfall in planned funding from other donors (apart from DG ECHO).
13. To what extent are (air transport-related) military assets used for relief purposes and to what extent is this funded by DG ECHO?
What are the advantage(s) and disadvantages of such use? Are there alternative options
Military assets are sometimes used for humanitarian relief but are not normally funded by DG ECHO
14. To what extent have the recommendations made in previous evaluations of the ECHO Flight and UNHAS been put into practice?
A previous evaluation carried out in 2010 made a number of recommendations. The study suggested that there should be increased cooperation and coordination with other humanitarian air service providers and with EU governments and other actors in this field. Many of these recommendations have been implemented. However, the evaluation team feels that this could still be improved, particularly in relation to coordination on aviation safety and security. It was recommended that a fund was created to provide ad hoc air support for humanitarian relief. DG ECHO has created special contracts for fixed wing support, as required. The earlier evaluation also recommended that a special contract is established for helicopter operations to support humanitarian relief throughout the world. Although a pilot project was funded through UNHAS for three years, this proved not to be sustainable. The evaluators recommend that this is re-examined.
EU added value
15. To what extent does the ECHO Flight add visibility to ECHO’s humanitarian relief operations?
There is a high level of awareness and visibility of ECHO Flight in its countries of operation – although less so in other countries. It is also seen by DG ECHO staff themselves as an important and visible EU contribution. Visibility could be improved through improved web presence, including social media.
16. To what extent does ECHO support the development of new initiatives in the use of air transport for the delivery of humanitarian aid?
DG ECHO participates in international conferences relating to humanitarian aviation (e.g. the Global Humanitarian Aviation Conference organised by WFP Aviation). However, DG ECHO does not currently sponsor or financially support research or pilot schemes for new initiatives such as the use of drones in the delivery of humanitarian aid.
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Annex 28 – ECHO flight cost analysis - 2017
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Annex 29 – Evaluation Terms of Reference
(Submission requirements and team specification removed)
Background
1. In a disaster context, it is essential to ensure efficient and effective delivery, so that assistance reaches the people affected by the emergency as rapidly as possible. Dealing with these issues is complex even in a favourable context, but evidently poses much greater challenges in the situations of crisis where DG ECHO operates, due to issues of security, lacking infrastructure, etc. Also when addressing a protracted crisis a strong logistic support is required.
2. Transport and logistics207 range from emergency logistics preparedness, through the assessment of needs to the procurement of aid and its delivery. Both civil protection and humanitarian operations rely on a strong logistics set-up. Due to the costs of transport and logistics, improvements in terms of cost and efficiency can result in significant savings and enhance programme delivery (e.g. increased speed, quality of relief items, goods tracking and Humanitarian Supply Chain performance reporting). Therefore, transport and logistics must be carefully integrated from the onset in the design of each operation, and tailored to the specific needs.
3. Humanitarian and/or relief actors often have to cope with lacking logistical infrastructure in the context where they operate, as e.g. local airlines are not always available and/or reliable, nor do they always fly to areas where humanitarian and/or relief assistance is needed. Furthermore, in many areas where humanitarian organisations operate, insecurity poses an additional layer of operational constraint to already existing poor logistical local infrastructure (poor roads, bridges, multi-modal transport services, etc.), making transportation over land a perilous undertaking. In such cases, efficiently managed, reliable and safe air services become the best way to reach populations and, when needed, evacuate aid workers for medical reasons or due to security threats.
4. Logistics is integrated in the Cluster System of the United Nations. The Logistics Cluster208 is led by the World Food Programme (WFP), and may be activated to respond to a large humanitarian crisis or to a large natural disaster. They provide, together with their logistics partners,209 coordination services to the emergency sector and, if needed, boost logistical infrastructures and provide common services for the humanitarian community. They also actively work on logistics preparedness to provide sustainable solutions that promote local resilience in the event of a crisis
5. Donors need to address210 local-level response capacity issues, which can be decisive in determining the success of a humanitarian and/or a relief operation and reduce operational costs. Local capacity in disaster prevention and preparedness can often be reinforced by working with local actors and National Disaster Management organisations or Local Emergency Management Authorities).
6. The cost of transport and logistics can be as high as 40-60%211 of the overall budget of a humanitarian organisation. When operations involve the provision of food assistance or in the initial phase of an emergency response to a rapid onset disaster, costs can be even higher to potentially amount to 80% of the total costs. Thus, it constitutes a major cost driver that should be closely managed to make sure that the transport and logistics components of each funded operation are as efficient and cost-effective as possible. In addition, in large rapid onset disasters, aid organisations generally set up multiple parallel supply chains which further drive up the supply chain costs, risk decreasing the overall efficiency of the response by clogging the local reception capacity and reduce its effectiveness, as deliveries of urgently needed items can be delayed by other, less relevant supplies.
7. The Grand Bargain discussions have recognised the need to improve the efficiency and cost-effectiveness of programme delivery. Some of the means identified to achieve this are:
• reducing the cost of delivering assistance with technology and innovation;
• reinforcing donor coordination, including between humanitarian and development donors;
• harmonising partnership agreements and sharing partner assessments;
• maximising efficiency in the supply chain for commonly required goods and services; improving the standardisation of these goods to improve the effectiveness of the response;
• reducing large logistics expenses by using local resources and further localising the aid response along with new response models (such as cash transfers);
• encouraging common logistics services as much as reasonably possible to avoid duplication, competition and enhance overall response coordination;
207 ‘Transport and Logistics’ in this ToR refer to the full supply chain, which is the whole process of procuring and distributing commodities. 208 http://www.logcluster.org/ 209 Partners can be INGOs/LNGOs or private sector partners such as foundations, commercial companies, etc., as well as active Logistics Donors such as DG ECHO/ERCC. 210 Donors can contribute by relevant funding and advocacy; implementation is the responsibility of partners. 211 This includes the cost of the commodities.
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• developing sets of commonly accepted key performance indicators (KPIs) tailored to the humanitarian logistics and transport activities to measure the effectiveness of the supply chain and allow logistics management decisions to be made on the basis of solid data.
Transport and Logistics in DG ECHO
The Union Civil Protection Mechanism
Article 3 of Decision No 1313/2013/EU on a Union Civil Protection Mechanism (UCPM) states that the UCPM shall
support, complement and facilitate coordination of Member States' action in order to facilitate rapid and efficient
response in the event of disasters or imminent disasters.
To achieve this objective, DG ECHO manages the Emergency Response Coordination Centre (ERCC), which ensures a
coordinated and quick response to disasters, as well as early warning, analysis and information exchange systems.
Among other resources, the ERCC uses the Common Emergency Communication and Information System (CECIS), an
online application used for real-time exchange of information and communications with civil protection authorities in
Participating States (PS).212
The UCPM foresees cooperation between Participating States in the form of pooling and sharing resources during
emergencies through the joint use of transport assets (i.e. flights, boats, trucks).
The UCPM also co-funds transport of assistance offered by the PS. Co-financing covers 55% to 85% of the eligible
costs. A total of almost EUR 30 million was requested by PS as grants for transport and related logistics between 2014
and 2017, of which more than 93 per cent involved transport outside the EU.
There is also a transport broker contracted by the European Commission to organise transport of in-kind assistance and
provide other logistic support services during emergencies. This is an important resource for facilitating transport and
was particularly effective during the 2015–16 refugee crisis for some PS. However, the resource is generally under-used.
During 2014–16,less than 20 requests were made. Although its use is increasing, growth is slow, since PS work with
their own brokers.
Other DG ECHO interventions include:
• funding logistics response training. This training is designed to enhance the response capabilities of the international community, preparing skilled Logistics Response Teams deployable to provide immediate operational logistics surge capacity during an emergency;
• building capacity at local level through conducting advisory missions to provide support on logistics where necessary;
• funding logistics preparedness actions.
Humanitarian Aid
Article 2(c) of the Humanitarian Aid Regulation 1257/96 includes the following specific objective for EU humanitarian
assistance:
To help finance the transport of aid and efforts to ensure that it is accessible to those for whom it is intended, by all
logistical means available, and by protecting humanitarian goods and personnel, but excluding operations with defence
implications.
Thus, the use of military assets is often being considered only as a last resort. However the definition of ‘last resort’ is not
clear, therefore the practical application of the principle is a sensitive issue. Civil-military cooperation is sometimes an
effective solution; however military involvement in neutral and impartial humanitarian operations, especially in conflict
zones, is questioned by some.213
DG ECHO's activities in the sector of humanitarian transport and logistics consist of:
• Financing logistics as an integral part of each action funded through the Humanitarian Implementation Plans (HIPs).
• Making logistics a priority sector for capacity building investment. This has resulted in, inter alia, the establishment of six regional Humanitarian Response Depots for the prepositioning of relief supplies closer to disaster areas214 and an improved warehouse tracking system for real-time data on aid material availabilities.
212 The Mechanism currently includes all 28 EU Member States in addition to Iceland, Montenegro, Norway, Serbia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Turkey. 213 https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/files/misc/FMA/SIPRI08FMAprelims.pdf 214 See e.g. http://www.ifrc.org/en/what-we-do/logistics/procurement/who-we-are/our-stock/
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• Cooperating with international institutions whose aim is to improve humanitarian transport and logistics, including the World Food Programme (through the Logistics Cluster), the donor community (e.g. the World Bank), academia (e.g. Kuhne Logistics University) and the private sector (e.g. Airbus Group foundation).
• Being an active member of WFP Global Logistics Cluster (GLC) Strategy Advisory Group and participating to GLC meetings and other logistics events of interests (Global Humanitarian Aviation Conference, United Nations Humanitarian Response Depots (UNHRD), Unmanned Air Vehicle Working Group, etc.)
• Directly providing humanitarian regular air services to remote locations via ECHO Flight, for which there is a specific HIP.215 This service currently operates six aircrafts in five African countries: the Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, Uganda, Somalia and Mali. Special ad hoc missions can also be implemented in other neighbouring countries such as happened in the past in the Central African Republic and South Sudan. It transports an average of 26 000 passengers and almost 200 tonnes of cargo per year, at a cost of EUR 13-15 million per year.
• Funding specific logistic actions by the Logistics Cluster and the UN Humanitarian Air Services (UNHAS) through the HIPs. Based on recent figures, the total annual funding done by DG ECHO is in the order of EUR 20 million.
• An Enhanced Response Capacity Funding instrument has been used to boost the logistics of major humanitarian actors – notably the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) and the WFP.
• Funding NGOs specialised in humanitarian transport through the HIPs. For example, in 2016 DG ECHO contributed €730 000 to the Afghanistan operations of Mission Aviation Fellowship (MAF).
• Organising the transport and storage of relief goods, through a framework contract with K&N. Initially foreseen for the transport of passengers and cargo related to civil protection operations (see above), it has also been used to address the humanitarian crisis in the Central African Republic, where repeated airlifts of life-saving items and aid personnel were carried out. K&N was also used during the Ebola crisis, and the Nepal earthquake to transport UNICEF cargo.
• Assessing and recognising organisations interested in becoming Humanitarian Procurement Centres.
An increasing number of humanitarian projects funded by DG ECHO include the distribution of cash and vouchers, and
evidence216 increasingly indicates that it is a cost-effective way of providing aid, particularly when delivering food
assistance as it reduces transportation costs and delivery timeframes.
However, DG ECHO does not cover the full spectrum of activities related to the supply chain management. One
remarkable absence is systematic monitoring and assessment. Likewise, DG ECHO has not produced any operational
guidelines/thematic guidance for the sector of transport and logistics. In other sectors where DG ECHO has produced
this type of guidance, like Food, Protection, Gender, Cash and WASH, this has helped to, inter alia, target efforts more
effectively and efficiently, ensure a coherent and consistent approach towards the sector, and put in place a monitoring
framework. DG ECHO's absence in the above fields seems to go against its aspirations to play the role of a reference,
accountable donor and to honour the Grand Bargains’ commitments.
DG ECHO can – as an engaged donor – potentially play a prominent role in promoting the development of the global
logistics infrastructure through, inter alia, its support to the Global Logistics Cluster. Similarly, it can foster smart join
programming with other donors in the transport and logistics sector (DEVCO/World Bank, etc.). It can also promote
efficiency and cost-effectiveness by working with partners to improve response time and procurement processes. It can
play a leading role in global partnerships in rapid aid delivery, grouping shipping costs among partners, promoting the
use of efficient warehouses and funding prepositioned stocks. Other areas where DG ECHO can potentially play a
leading role include encouraging innovation in Fourth Party Logistics Approaches, making more strategic use of
universities and research centres to propose solutions, supporting partners in IT infrastructure to ensure that real-time
data from needs assessments is fed into the humanitarian supply chain, facilitating – or at least being part – of the
transport and logistics discussions with other like-minded donors, and fostering quality procurement via Humanitarian
Procurement Centres.
Purpose and scope of the evaluation
Purpose
The purpose of this exercise is to provide an external, independent, thematic evaluation of the transport and logistics
activities funded by the European Commission's Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations Directorate-General,
for the period of 2013–17. The results will be used to further raise awareness about the subject to DG ECHO and its
partners, identify points for action and support the future management of activities in the area in accordance with DG
ECHO's mandate.
General scope
The evaluation will examine the relevance, coherence, effectiveness, efficiency and EU added value of DG ECHO’s
activities in the subject area. It will analyse the main emergency logistic opportunities and challenges faced in
215 http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/funding/decisions/2017/HIPs/HIP_DG ECHOFLIGHT.pdf 216 See e.g. the evaluation of the use of different Transfer Modalities in DG ECHO Humanitarian Aid actions (2011 – 2014).
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humanitarian aid response and civil protection deployments. It will assess the comparative advantage of different
humanitarian air services, the added value of prepositioning DG ECHO stocks in existing Humanitarian Response
Depots, and the benefits of developing thematic guidance on transport and logistics.
Evaluation questions
The evaluator must address the following questions:
• Relevance
1. How well were DG ECHO's transport and logistics activities funded, designed and tailored to the needs of its partners and beneficiaries?
2. How well has DG ECHO been able to adapt its transport and logistics activities and funding levels to recent developments and changing needs in the contexts of humanitarian aid and civil protection?
3. To what extent have the types of activities funded been relevant at a strategic, tactical and operational level?
4. What are the current issues to be addressed in the sector, and what role should DG ECHO take in this respect in line with its mandate?
• Coherence and complementarity
5. To what extent are the different activities of DG ECHO's transport and logistics portfolio coherent and complementary to each other? How well has DG ECHO ensured coherence, synergies and complementarity in transport and logistics between civil protection and humanitarian aid operations?
6. What is the level of internal coherence between the different activities carried out in relation with the sector within DG ECHO? To what extent is there scope to exploit potential collaborative synergies between the different DG ECHO directorates, and between DG ECHO Headquarters and DG ECHO Field?
7. To what extent has DG ECHO ensured coherence, synergies and complementarity with other donors and with its partners in the transport and logistics sector?
• Effectiveness
8. To what extent have DG ECHO's transport and logistics activities contributed to the objectives to
a) facilitate rapid and efficient response in the event of disasters or imminent disasters;
b) save lives, alleviate suffering and maintain and protect human dignity; and
c) protect goods and staff;
and what were the major factors influencing the achievement or non-achievement of the objectives?
• Efficiency
9. To what extent are DG ECHO's transport and logistics activities efficient and cost-effective? To what extent are funds appropriately allocated to the overall needs?
10. How well has DG ECHO monitored transport and logistics activities?
11. To what extent was DG ECHO's management of the transport and logistics sector implemented efficiently, in comparison with alternatives?
12. What has DG ECHO done, and how well, to ensure that its partners organise transport and logistics activities in an efficient and cost-effective way?
• EU added value
13. What is the specific EU Added Value of DG ECHO's activities in transport and logistics, and how well is it achieved?
The conclusions of the evaluation will be presented in the report in the form of evidence-based, reasoned answers to
each of the evaluation questions. On the basis of the conclusions, as well as of any other relevant information collected
during the evaluation, the evaluator should provide a maximum of five strategic recommendations, possibly supported
by further, related operational recommendations.
Supplementary tasks
The evaluator should:
1. Identify DG ECHO's portfolio of actions funded during the evaluation period (to be noted is that DG ECHO's HOPE project database has certain limitations in terms of distinguishing the Transport & Logistics component of humanitarian interventions).
2. Pinpoint the main emergency logistic opportunities and challenges faced in humanitarian aid response and deployments under the Union Civil Protection Mechanism.
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3. At a general level, identify what the current needs are in the sector and, taking into account the different approaches that DG ECHO as a donor could possibly take, suggest the role that DG ECHO should play in line with its mandate (this task is directly linked to EQ4).
4. Carry out a mapping of (partly linked to Task 1 above), and comparison between DG ECHO's overall approach to Transport & Logistics and other donor organisations, such as DG DEVCO, the World Bank, DFID, USAid, with the purpose of gathering good practice that could feed into DG ECHO's future approach. Elements to be covered could be:
• Management and implementation models for the supply chain;
• Guidance and standards;
• Monitoring. The tenderer is expected to provide a generic approach to the task in the offer, including a resource allocation, for
further discussion and agreement with the European Commission in the Inception phase.
5. Analyse the comparative advantages and complementarity of different humanitarian air services (ECHO Flight, UNHAS, MAF, etc.), including passenger volume and value of humanitarian projects benefiting from the services.
6. Assess the added value of prepositioning DG ECHO stocks in existing localised warehouses in the context of the implementation of DG ECHO's Emergency Management Policy.
7. Assess the extent to which DG ECHO should consider expanding its thematic guidance to the transport and logistics sector, in view that it has already developed and disseminated guidance on other thematic and cross-cutting sectors such as food, nutrition, shelter, protection, gender, cash and water and sanitation (WASH).
8. At a general level, identify the main factors limiting the success of the projects funded in the sector over the period covered by the evaluation. COMMENT: This relates to an audit recommendation; Success-limiting factors should be identified in order to develop indicators for focused monitoring, with the overall purpose of strengthening the monitoring system.
9. Provide a statement about the validity of the evaluation results, i.e. to what extent it has been possible to provide reliable statements on all essential aspects of the intervention examined. Issues, to be referred to, may include scoping of the evaluation exercise, availability of data, unexpected problems encountered in the evaluation process, proportionality between budget and objectives of the assignment, etc.
10. Make a proposal for the dissemination of the evaluation results. 11. Provide a French translation (in addition to the English version) of the executive summary of the Final Report. 12. Provide an abstract of the evaluation of no more than 200 words (EU Bookshop requirement).
Guidance and requirements
Methodology
• The tenderers must describe the methodological approach they propose in order to address the evaluation questions listed above, as well as the other tasks.
• The methodology should promote the participation in the evaluation exercise of the relevant actors. The main stakeholders are as follows:
o Humanitarian partners – DG ECHO works with over 200 partner organisations to provide humanitarian assistance throughout the world. These include non-governmental organisations (NGOs), international organisations, United Nations agencies, and specialised agencies of EU Members. The relationship between DG ECHO and its non-governmental partners is governed by the NGO Framework Partnership Agreement (FPA);
o The Global Logistic Cluster; o Civil protection authorities of Participating States to the Mechanism; o Civil Protection authorities and authorities of countries benefiting from the activation of the UCPM; o Private companies involved in the humanitarian transport and logistics sector; o Final beneficiaries and/or their representatives; o Other donors (e.g. DFID, USAID, the World Bank, DG DEVCO…); o Other Commission services.
A targeted consultation, using data gathering tools adapted to each group should be carried out.
No Open Public Consultation is planned for this evaluation.
• The evaluator should make use of, as appropriate, existing project-level evaluations of DG ECHO-funded actions (to be further clarified after signature of the evaluation contract).
• The evaluator must carry out field visits. The number and location of field visits will be proposed by the evaluator and agreed with the Commission in the Inception phase of the evaluation. To be noted is that an evaluation of the Commission’s interventions in the Great Lakes region is planned to be contracted simultaneously to this one. The Democratic Republic of Congo, one of the countries in the region, is one of the main users of ECHO Flights. The evaluation of the Great Lakes will include a case study with a field trip to DR Congo, which should – inter alia – look specifically into the use of ECHO Flights and other areas of transport and logistics. The two evaluation teams will be required to cooperate in order to exchange the necessary information about the ECHO Flights case study.
• Five meetings are planned in Brussels between the Contractor and an Inter-service Steering Group (ISG). For these meetings minutes should be drafted by the Contractor, to be agreed among the participants.
Timetable
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The indicative duration of the evaluation is 30 weeks (7 months). The duration of the contract shall be no more than 35
weeks (8 months).
The evaluation starts after the contract has been signed by both parties (represented by ‘T’ in the table below), and no
expenses may be incurred before that. The main part of the existing relevant documents will be provided after the
signature of the contract.
In their offer, the bidders shall provide an indicative schedule based on the table below:
Indicative timing Report Meeting
T+1 week Kick off meeting
T+ 4 weeks Draft Inception Report
T+ 5 weeks Inception meeting
T+10 weeks Desk Report
T+11 weeks Desk Report meeting
T+ 22 weeks Field Report
T+ 23 weeks Field Report meeting
T+ 27 weeks Draft Final Report
T+ 28 weeks Draft Final Report meeting
T+30 weeks Final Report
T+32 Possible presentation of the conclusions and
recommendations to DG ECHO Management
Budget of the contract
The maximum budget of the evaluation contract is 255.000€.
[KR-0
1-1
8-9
84-E
N-N
]
