Evaluating the Effectiveness of Sanctions

7/25/2019 Evaluating the Effectiveness of Sanctions

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FOR ARIE KACOWICZ

International

Relations of theMiddle EastEvaluating the Eectiveness of

SanctionsCase Study Ira!

Jeremy Rees


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Sanctions regi"es since the "id#$%%&s have 'eco"e an increasingly

co""on instru"ent a"ong (olicy#"a)ers as a "eans of aecting the

'ehaviour of other states$* +o,ever- the eectiveness of (revious

sanctions atte"(ts at achieving their stated or desired goals is highly

de'ata'le* .his !uestiona'le eectiveness is highly (ertinent given the

current sanctions regi"e i"(osed on Iran 'y the /nited 0ations Security

Council 1/0SC2- as ,ell as the additional "easures i"(osed 'y the /S and

the E/* .his essay ,ill revie, the sanctions de'ate- using the sanctions

regi"e e"(loyed against Ira! fro" $%%&&4 as a case study* I ,ill then

atte"(t to 5nd lessons learned ,hich can 'e a((lied to future cases such

as the ongoing case of Iran- and suggest under ,hat circu"stances these

sanctions are li)ely to achieve the stated goals of the sender countries3*

.his essay ,ill 'e set out in 6 (hases 1$2 theory 'ehind sanctions

i"(osition7 132 revie, of the data currently availa'le on sanctions

$ In $%8& only 8 countries ,ere su'9ect to econo"ic (ressure- 'y the "id#$%%&s

that nu"'er had risen to :;* 0i)olay Marinov-


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eectiveness- and (otential (ro'le"s or inaccuracies that have 'een

voiced 'y critics of the data7 142 a 'rief history of the sanctions regi"e in

Ira! fro" $%%&&47 1:2 analysis of the sanctions regi"e in Ira! in regard

to its successes and failures7 182 lessons fro" the Ira!i case for future

sanctions regi"es7 162 conclusion on the overall value of the use of

sanctions*

Theoretical Considerations

I de5ne sanctions as non#"ilitary instru"ent used 'y one or "ore states

against another state intended to coerce the latter to change its general

'ehaviour- or a s(eci5c action- or to (unish it for this 'ehaviour or action4*

.he relatively fre!uent use of sanctions can 'e e(lained 'y the high

de"and of (olitical leaders to interfere in other countries aairs

intersecting ,ith the availa'le su((ly- es(ecially for such entities as the

/S or E/ ,hich have large econo"ies and generous aid 'udgets:*

3.hroughout this essay the ter" target ,ill refer to countries ,hich are the su'9ect ofsanctions 'y others* .he ter" sender,ill 'e used to refer to a state or states that are

i"(osing sanctions on another state* In this I follo, the syste" used 'y =aniel W*

=re>ner- e Country ?eaders@- (* 866* I etend "y de5nition of sanctions to

include non#econo"ic (olicy instru"ents that are routinely (art of the sanctions

(ac)age that are (laced target states* In this res(ect I follo, the de5nition of

sanctions e"(loyed 'y Chantal de onge Oudraat-


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Sanctions have traditionally 'een considered a "iddle ground 'et,een

di(lo"atic (rotest and "ilitary force8* .he need to intervene in the aairs

of other states is due to the fact that high levels of interde(endence "ean

states "ust ta)e an interest in activities 'eyond their o,n 'orders* For

coercion to ,or)- the costs to the target of sanctions should out,eigh the

costs of conceding6* For this reason- it is generally sti(ulated that

sanctions can achieve only


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(articularly in con9unction ,ith the ulti"ate threat of "ilitary force if the

target should fail to co"(ly%* +o,ever- this assertion 'egs to !uestion- if

sanctions are considera'ly "ore eective if 'ac)ed u( 'y the threat of

"ilitary force- to ,hat etent can successful cases of co"(ulsion 'e

attri'uted to sanctions as o((osed to "ilitary force@

Sanctions can 'e either unilateral or "ultilateral- the latter not necessarily

re!uiring the a((roval of the /0SC* Elliott esti"ates that- in the case of

unilateral /S sanctions- unilateral sanctions have a (oor record of

success$&* .his vie, has generally 'een considered as self#evident$$*

/nilateral sanctions have 'een referred to as


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these sanctions are co"(rehensively a((lied 'y the international

co""unity* Alternatively- the glo'ali>ation of econo"ic activity "eans

there are li)e,ise "any "ore su((liers of "ost goods and services and

"any "ore (otential "ar)ets for a targets e(orts* .hus- if sender states

should cheat on the sanctions regi"e or refuse to 9oin it in the 5rst (lace-

the sanctions regi"e ,ill lac) the ro'ustness to inNict the necessary

severity on the target- and thus fail to co"(el it to concede to the

senders de"ands$4*Marinov 5nds that sanctions i"(osed 'y institutions-

and thus "ultilateral- are "ore eective than unilateral sanctions- for the

reasons discussed a'ove$:* +o,ever- "ultilateral sanctions are also "ore

dicult to organise and sustain$8* Multilateral sanctions re!uire

coo(eration 'et,een a nu"'er of states* Sanctions "ay fail 'ecause the

(ri"ary sender is una'le to enforce the a((lication of sanctions*

ac)sliding states "ay intentionally fail to enforce sanctions regi"es that

they 5nd costly or contrary to their (erceived interests$6* Moreover-

(rivate rent#see)ing actors 1sanctions 'usters2 "ay 5nd ,ays to

clandestinely overco"e sanctions regi"es* .his is es(ecially the case

,hen the (otential rents are large- and the goods are s"all- high#value-

$4 Ki"'erly Ann Elliott- ner-


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and ho"ogeneous on ,orld "ar)ets- such as oil$;* So"e sanctions

regi"es are 9ust too technical or e(ensive to 'e ade!uately i"(le"ented

'y so"e states$G- (articularly 'y develo(ing countries- ,hich "ay often

neigh'our the target state* Current "ultilateral sanctions regi"es fail to

oer ade!uate co"(ensation to third#(arties that ,ill 'ear the 'runt of

the sanctions- giving the" little incentive to co"(ly ,ith the sanctions

regi"e$%* Kae"(fer and ?o,en'erg 5nd that unilateral sanctions "ay 'e

"ore eective- es(ecially if the sanctioning state has close (olitical-

cultural and econo"ic ties ,ith the target3&* =re>ner 5nds that "ultilateral

sanctions regi"es i"(osed 'y international organisations are "ore li)ely

to 'e eective as they have "echanis"s to (revent countries 'ac)sliding

and can co"'at free#rider (ro'le"s3$*

Sanctions regi"es have changed in character over ti"e* Fro" WWII until

the "id#$%%&s- sanctions ,ere co"(rehensive in sco(e- generally

targeting all facets of a states econo"y33* +o,ever- fro" the "id#$%%&s-

and es(ecially follo,ing the (erceived failures of sanctions i"(osed

$;I'id* (* ;67 Willia" +* Kae"(fer D Anton =* ?o,en'erg-


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against ugoslavia- +aiti- and Ira! in the early $%%&s- a ne, a((roach

)no,n as s"art 1or targeted2 sanctions34develo(ed that has co"e to 'e

the nor" in sanctions regi"es3:* S"art sanctions ,ere develo(ed

follo,ing the realisation that targeting elites in (o,er- and their

su((ortive constituencies- ,ould 'e "ore li)ely to yield results- as elites-

(articularly in autocratic regi"es- ,ere often sheltered fro" the negative

eects of sanctions* Moreover- they ,ere intended to 'e "ore hu"ane-

targeting those 1generally unelected2 (ersons directly res(onsi'le for

violating international standards of 'ehaviour- rather than the target

states civilian (o(ulation38* S"art sanctions include an array of

"echanis"s- "ost i"(ortant of ,hich are ar"s e"'argoes36- 5nancial

34 .hese "ay 'e targeted either at individuals such as "e"'ers of the ruling

elite and their fa"ilies- or against s(eci5c econo"ic activities and co""odities*

eter Wallensteen- Carina Stai'ano- D Mi)ael Eri)sson- Ma(ing )argeted

Sanctions !#ective: *uidelines for Im&lementation of +, Polic% O&tions-

1/((sala /((sala /niversity- 3&&42- (* 6G*

3: Chantal de onge Oudraat-


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sanctions3;- travel restrictions3G- aviation 'ans3%- as ,ell as econo"ic

sanctions or e"'argos on s(eci5c (roducts or industry- or trade ,ith

certain individuals*

=ue to their technical co"(leity s"art sanctions are "ore dicult to

i"(le"ent than co"(rehensive sanctions4&* .hey are "ore de"anding


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"ai"u" i"(act on the target* .hus- ,hilst in theory s"art sanctions are

an attractive o(tion7 in reality they "ay not 'e (ractically feasi'le43*

.he logic 'ehind "ost sanctions is generally a'out creating either (olitical

insta'ility or regi"e change in the target state44* .o this end- Marinov has

conducted a study 'ased on the data of +uf'auer et al* in an atte"(t to

5nd the correlation 'et,een leadershi( change and sanctions* +e 5nds

that sanctions- on average- increase the li)elihood that an incu"'ent ,ill

lose (o,er 'y 3G in a year that sanctions are i"(osed on the

incu"'ents state co"(ared to a nor"al year4:*

So"e states are also "ore li)ely to 'e susce(ti'le to sanctions than

others* Marinov 5nds this to 'e the case ,ith de"ocracies- as o((osed to

autocracies ,hich a((ear 'etter a'le to resist sanctions eorts48* ?i)e,ise-

countries ,ith lo, or no econo"ic gro,th are "ore susce(ti'le to

sanctions- as are s"aller- "ore o(en econo"ies ,here foreign trade

"a)es u( a greater (ercentage of L=- as these countries are less a'le to

a'sor' the i"(act of econo"ic (ressure46* States that are highly

de(endent on another country in ter"s of the (ercentage of their total

43 I'id* (* :&3*

44 Arne .ostensen D eate ull- e Country ?eaders@- (*

8;47 Arne .ostensen D eate ull-


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foreign trade are also "ore susce(ti'le to unilateral sanctions i"(osed 'y

that country4;*

Finally- the issue of the "orality of sanctions has 'een !uestioned-

(articularly in regard to the sanctions i"(osed on Ira!* ?eaders of target

states "ay not value hu"an life in the sa"e ,ay in ,hich sender states

do4G* Co"(rehensive sanctions are essentially function as a for" of

collective (unish"ent 'y the international co""unity* Whereas in ,ar-

states are legally 'ound to follo, the (rinci(les of distinction 'et,een

"ilitary (ersonnel and assets and civilian (o(ulations- and of

(ro(ortionality of res(onse- international hu"anitarian la, does not

currently a((ly to sanctions regi"es- although they 'oth "ight 'e e!ually

as devastating to civilians4%*So"e (eo(le have 9usti5ed sanctions as a

"eans of avoiding ,ar7 ho,ever- others have cited the 9ust as devastating

eects of sanctions:&

- or concluded that sanctions "a)e ,ar even "ore

li)ely:$*

4; I'id*

4G Arne .ostensen D eate ull-


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Current Data: Results & Problems

/nder a((ro(riate circu"stances- sanctions can 'e advocated 'y any

theory of international relations- thus the current divide over the

eectiveness of sanctions a"ongst scholars


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target states ,illingness to co"(ro"ise* Other (ro'le"s also eist* .hese

include selection 'ias- counterfactuals D invisi'le eects- sanctions as

sy"'ols- and co"(arison failure* I ,ill ea"ine each of these in turn*

Selection 'ias ta)es t,o for"s* First- it "ay refer to the de5nition of

success ,hich is used to deter"ine ,hether sanctions have 'een eective

or not* In the ,ords of +uf'auer et al*- the


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in all cases of atte"(ted coercion- this ,ould "ore accurately reNect their

coercive a'ility* +o,ever- rational (olicy "a)ers are (resu"a'ly "ore

li)ely to i"(le"ent sanctions ,hen they thin) there is a reasona'le

chance of success- thus 9ustifying the forgone econo"ic 'ene5ts that

sanctions ,ould lead to* .his then- ,ould (resu"a'ly lead to a 'ias in the

data sho,ing a higher rate of success than ,ould other,ise 'een the

case- ,ere sanctions a((lied in all instances of atte"(ted coercion*

Counterfactuals- as in any case of causal analysis- cause (ro'le"s in

assessing the success of sanctions* .his is 'ecause it is dicult to )no,

the outco"e should a dierent (olicy choice have 'een "ade8&* .he

sanctions data include only instances ,hen sanctions ,ere i"(le"ented-

not ,hen they ,ere "erely threatened* For "ore accurate data- all cases

of threatened- as ,ell as actual coercion- should 'e included* Invisi'le

eects refer to the (ossi'ility of the (otential of sanctions conditioning the

'ehaviour of states* For instance- 'ecause of the negative eects of

sanctions- (otential targets "ay (ursue (olicies congruent ,ith the

senders (references- ,ithout ever crossing the threshold of (ressure even

'eing a((lied and sanctions threatened8$* States )no, that they can act

,ithin certain 'oundaries of action ,ithout 'eing (unished- thus often

they confor" to a certain standard of 'ehaviour- ,ithout even 'eing

as)ed to do so*

8& =avid ald,in- e Country ?eaders@- (*868*

ere"y Rees


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Most literature on the eectiveness of sanctions is 'ased on a

funda"ental assu"(tion- that is- that sanctions are in fact intended to

achieve so"ething vis#U#vis the target state* .here is no reason ,hy this

should necessarily 'e true ho,ever* olicy#"a)ers often have a range of

o'9ectives- of ,hich (ressuring a target state to concede is 'ut one*

Sanctions can (lay a role in achieving other o'9ectives of (olicy#"a)ers-

such as a((easing do"estic audiences or a s(eci5c constituency* .his- of

course- "a)es it far "ore dicult to "easure the eectiveness of

sanctions in co"(elling target states83- as the ai" of the sanctions regi"e

"ay have little to do ,ith the achieve"ent of this goal- and the sender

state "ay 'e ,ell a,are that the sanctions are not going to aect the

target states actions even 'efore they i"(le"ent the sanctions84* A(art

fro" do"estic audiences- sender states "ay ,ish to send a signal a'out

,hat sort of 'ehaviour ,ill not 'e tolerated in future* .hey "ay also ,ish

to signal resolve- es(ecially concerning a ,illingness to use "ilitary force

should the status !uo continue* ?eaders of states fre!uently use

threatening rhetoric against other states- 'ut ,hereas


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"ore intangi'le set of o'9ectives- often dicult to "easure- ,hich develo(

slo,ly over ti"e- "ay 'e (ursued in an atte"(t to aect (eo(les ideas

and e(ectations of ,hat sort of 'ehaviour is acce(ta'le in international

relations* InNuencing international nor"s "ay 'e a 'roader o'9ective

,hen states i"(ose sanctions regi"es88*

Finally- as ald,in notes- (olicy#"a)ers are not only interested in ,hether

sanctions ,or) &er se- they are interested in the ,hether sanctions ,or)

in co"(arison to other (otential for"s of action* Whilst "ilitary force is

often advocated as the "ost eective for" coercion- success rates for

"ilitary force are highly contested- falling in the range of :& to ;386* In

fact- Marinov 5nds to his sur(rise that the use of force actually increases a

leaders hold on oce8;* When the costs of "ilitary versus non#"ilitary

coercion are co"(ared- even if "ilitary coercion is "ore li)ely to achieve

the desired (olicy change in the target state- sanctions are the (refera'le

o(tion if the cost dierential 'et,een the t,o is large enough that there is

88 .his "ay ta)e ti"e to develo(- is dicult to "easure- and is de'ata'le if iteven has any aect- as the continuing de'ate 'et,een realists and

constructivists de"onstrates*

86 I'id* (* %4#%:* ald,in suggests that actual 5gure is (ro'a'ly lo,er*

8; Marinov concludes that force li)ely generates t,o ty(es of eects* First- it

"ay ,ea)en a leader* Second- it "ay generates a


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a higher net gain through sanctions than through "ilitary force8G* ald,in

su"s this (oint u( ,ell


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itself led to considera'le da"age to Ira!i infrastructure* For instance-

Ira!s electricity out(ut ,as reduced to : of its (re#,ar level64*

In A(ril $%%$ the /0SC ado(ted Resolution 6G;- ,hich re#ar"ed the

(revious resolutions and set out in detail the ter"s under ,hich sanctions

,ould 'e lifted6:* It also "odi5ed the (revious resolution in that it allo,ed

Ira! to i"(ort foodstus* As Ira! ,as still not a'le to sell oil ho,ever- this

"odi5cation (roved to 'e of little relevance* It set u( a revie, (rocess-

under ,hich every 6& days the /0SC ,ould deter"ine ,hether to lift or

"odify the sanctions regi"e* Finally- it stated that ece(tions to the oil

e"'argo ,ould 'e a((roved on a case#'y#case 'asis- ,hen it ,as

deter"ined ade!uate 5nancial resources ,ere needed to (rovide for

essential civilian needs68*

In August and Se(te"'er $%%3- /0SC Resolutions ;&6 D ;$3 ,ere (assed

res(ectively- authorising Ira! to e(ort V$*6 'illion /S= of oil over a si#

"onth (eriod- ,ith Ira! set to receive a((roi"ately V$ 'illion 1the rest

'eing ear"ar)ed for the Co"(ensation Fund- to fund /0 o(erations in

Ira!- and to (ay oil transit fees to .ur)ey2 66* All (ay"ents out of this

account ,ere to 'e scrutinised and a((roved 'y the /0 Secretariat* .he

64 I'id* (* 3$&*

6: SHRESH6G; 1$%%$2* Availa'le at htt(HHdaccess#dds#

ny*un*orgHdocHRESO?/.IO0HLE0H0R&H8%6H34HIMLH0R&8%634*(df@O(enEle"ent*

68 /nited 0ations- )he +nited ,ations and the Ira012u-ait Conict3 455614557

10e, or) /0- $%%62- (* 3%#44*

66 A''as Alnasra,i-


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(ur(ose of the resolution ,as to reduce the deteriorating situation of the

civilian (o(ulation7 ho,ever- neither resolution ,as i"(le"ented*

.he oil#for#food regi"e ,as revisited again in A(ril $%%8 under /0SC

Resolution %G6* Essentially- the sa"e as Resolutions ;&6 and ;$3 in

su'stance- this resolution raised the a"ount of oil Ira! ,as a'le to sell to

V3 'illion- ,ith V$*4 'illion going to Ira!* .his a"ount ,as esti"ated to 'e

insigni5cant relative to civilian- and ,as re9ected 'y the Ira!i

govern"ent6;* .he Ira!i leadershi( sa, the (rogra" as the 'asis for the

/0SC "aintaining sanctions on it inde5nitely6G* .hey ho(ed that the

continuing suering of the Ira!i (eo(le ,ould eventually lead to crac)s in

the international consensus6%* Only in anuary $%%6 did the Ira!i

govern"ent enter into negotiations ,ith the /0SC over the

i"(le"entation of the resolution follo,ing a severe 'out of hy(erinNation-

and it ,as not until =ece"'er $%%6 that Ira!i oil 5nally reached the ,orld

"ar)et*

In Fe'ruary $%%G- the /0SC raised the a"ount of (er"issi'le oil sales to

V8*3 'illion every si "onths;&- as it 'eca"e clear that the (revious 5gure

,as too s"all to "eet "ini"u" needs* In =ece"'er $%%%- the ceiling on

oil e(orts ,as a'olished altogether- 'ut all other (arts of the (rogra"

6; A''as Alnasra,i-


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,ere )e(t;$* y uly 3&&&- a total of V43*4 'illion ,orth of Ira!i oil had

'een e(orted- and the govern"ent had received V3&*G 'illion of this

a"ount*

In uly 3&&$- the /S and the /K ta'led a 9oint resolution to "odify

sanctions the co"(rehensive sanctions regi"es against Ira! to a s"art

sanction regi"e* +o,ever- Russia threatened to veto it- so the oil#for#food

(rogra" ,as etended;3* In 3&&3- a tougher "onitoring regi"e ,as

ado(ted- ,hilst the strict ar"s e"'argo re"ained in (lace- 'ut

restrictions on civilian i"(orts ,ere lifted- ece(ting (otential dual#use

ite"s;4*

Anal%sis

A"ong the literature on sanctions there is no scholarly consensus on

,hether the sanctions regi"e against Ira! ,as eective* Elliott counts the

case of Ira! as a success;:- as do Cortright and ?o(e> after revising their

;$ SHRESH$3G: 1$%%%2- section C* Availa'le at

htt(HH,,,*un*orgH=e(tsHunsco"HKeyresolutionsHsres%%#$3G:*ht" *

;3 ar'ara Crossette-


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(urely (unitive- rather than coerciveG8* As Cortright and ?o(e> sho,-

although Ira! did in fact (artially co"(ly ,ith the /0SCs re!uire"ents

regarding its ,ea(ons (rogra"sG6- the /0SC refused- due to (ressure fro"

the /S and the /K- to reci(rocate Ira!s (artial concessions* In 0ove"'er

$%%;- resident ill Clinton re"ar)ed that -


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conditions of Ira!s deteriorating econo"ic (ros(ectsG%* .he oil#for#food

(rogra"- 'y channelling the revenues fro" Ira!i oil sales fro" the /0

straight to the Ira!i govern"ent served to give the govern"ent a

"ono(oly on international trade* 0ot only did this "a)e (eo(le "ore

'eholden to the govern"ent should they ,ant to receive 'ene5ts fro"

this activity- 'ut it re"oved another (otentially (o,erful force in Ira!i

society* .he class of traders- ,ho could accu"ulate ,ealth inde(endent of

the govern"ent and through such resources (ose a threat to the ruling

elites- ,as deci"ated 'y the 'an on foreign transactions* .hus sanctions

not only failed to (roduce the desired change in leadershi( and acted only

to e"(o,er Ira!s dictatorshi(%&- 'ut re"oved a (otential for" of

do"estic o((osition* Moreover- the 'runt of the sanctions ,as not felt 'y

the Ira!i leadershi(%$or the "assive ar"y and internal security a((aratus

it "aintained to hold (o,er- and other (olitical loyalists%3

* Instead- the

regi"e directed the severest suering onto its (olitical o((onents such as

G% A''as Alnasra,i- -


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the "arsh Ara's of southern Ira!%4* Moreover- do"estic Ira!i anger- as

,ell as international 'la"e ,as directed "ore to,ards the /0SC for

i"(osing the sanctions than at the corru(t and autocratic Ira!i leadershi(*

.he /0 struggled to ,in the - -


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ins(ections resu"ed in 3&&3#3&&4 this situation had not changed%G* Much

of Ira!s che"ical ,ea(ons ca(a'ilities ,ere located and destroyed%%- as

,as its 'iological ,ea(ons ca(a'ilities$&&* When the /nited 0ations

Monitoring- Beri5cation and Ins(ection Co""ission 1/0MOBIC2 ins(ectors

entered Ira! in 3&&3- they found no evidence of rene,ed che"ical or

'iological ,ea(ons (rogra"s$&$* Ira!s 'allistic "issile (rogra" ,as also

halted* All 'ut t,o of the G$% 'anned Scud "issiles )no,n to have eisted

(rior to $%%& ,ere accounted for 'y /0SCOM* Although- Ira! had o'tained

so"e dual#use technology and atte"(ted to i"(ort Russian guidance

syste"s- no evidence ,as found that such ,ea(ons had 'een develo(ed

or tested* In 3&&3- /0MOBIC found that Ira!s As#Sa"oud II "issile

eceeded the (er"itted range of $8&)" and eradication of these ,as

under,ay ,hen the 3&&4 invasion 'egan$&3*

%G =avid Cortright- D Leorge A* ?o(e>- -


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0ot only ,ere Ira!s WM= and 'allistic "issile ca(a'ilities eradicated or

reduced through the "onitoring and sanctions regi"e- 'ut the Ira!i

"ilitary ,as left severely ,ea)ened* Follo,ing the Iran#Ira! ,ar- and then

the Lulf War- Ira!s "ilitary had 'een deci"ated* +o,ever- the sanctions

regi"e- 'y denying Ira! the o((ortunity to (urchase ne, ,ea(ons and

e!ui("ent through the ar"s e"'argo- and 'y denying it the a'ility to (ay

for such (urchases or develo( indigenous e!uivalents through the oil

e"'argo- (revented Ira! fro" re'uilding and re(lenishing its "ilitary

ca(acity* .he 5nal revenue 5gures fro" oil sales fro" the oil#for#food

(rogra" totalled V6:*3 'illion- of ,hich the Ira!i govern"ent received

a((roi"ately one third* Although it is esti"ated 'y the /S Leneral

Accounting Oce that Ira! earned V$*8#3*8 'illion (er year fro" oil#

s"uggling and )ic)'ac)s 1such as the AW scandal2- it concluded that

fro" $%%;#3&&3 Ira! earned only V$&*$ 'illion fro" illegal it is esti"ated

that the cost to Ira! of oil revenue denied ,as a((roi"ately V38& 'illion

over the entire (eriod$&4* 0ot only did this severely li"it Ira!s a'ility to

"aintain let alone e(and its oil (roduction$&:- it also severely curtailed

the resources that ,ere availa'le for "ilitary s(ending* In $%G%- Ira!i

"ilitary s(ending and ar"s i"(orts ,ere esti"ated at V$8 'illion*

+o,ever- this 5gure average V$*: 'illion annually throughout the $%%&s-

$&3 =avid Cortright- D Leorge A* ?o(e>-


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a((roi"ately $& of its (revious level$&8* .his left the Ira!i ar"y ,ith

decaying and o'solete ,ea(ons* Sanctions successively de(leted the Ira!i

"ilitarys ca(a'ilities- and thus reduced the (otential for any Ira!i

aggression$&6* .he (arlous state of the Ira!i ar"y ,as de"onstrated 'y

the 3&&4 invasion- ,hich lasted a "ere 4 ,ee)s* Sanctions left -


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for" of genocide$&%* .he Ira!i govern"ent esti"ated 'y =ece"'er 3&&$-

u(,ard of $*6 "illion (eo(le had died as a result of the sanctions

regi"e$$&* Moreover- the long#ter" eects of the sanctions are also

signi5cant* .he infant "ortality rate ,as "ore than tri(le fro" its $%6&

rate at $38 (er $&&&- school attendance fell- leading the literacy rate to

decline fro" G& to 8G- "alnutrition rose severely a"ongst the

(o(ulation- (er ca(ita L= ,as lo,er than in $%8&- and oil (roduction has

only 9ust risen to its (re#$%G& ca(acity$$$* .hese eects ,ill (rove a severe

handica( in the future for those no, atte"(ted to 'uild a sta'le (eaceful

and de"ocracy in Ira!* .he costs in ter"s of hu"an life and econo"ic

develo("ent ,ere severe indeed*

/lti"ately- deciding ho, eective the sanctions in Ira! ,ere de(ends on

,hat goals one chooses to evaluate the data under- at ,hat cost- and the

co"(ared to ,hich alternatives* .he sanctions regi"e (roved co"(letely

ineective- and so"e say even counter#(roductive- at (roducing

leadershi( change* Although not an e(licit o'9ective of the sanctions

regi"e as set out in Resolution 6G;- it ,as certainly an i"(ortant ai" of

$&% 0ote ver'ale dated anuary 3%- $%%6- fro" the er"anent Mission of the

Re(u'lic of Ira! to the /nited 0ations Oce at Leneva addressed to the Centre

for +u"an Rights 1EHC0*:H$%%6H$:&2* Availa'le at

htt(HH,,,*unhchr*chH+uridocdaH+uridoca*nsfH.estFra"eH'f%e8338;4&%:a4fG&386;:c&&838'4d@O(endocu"ent*

$$& Arne .ostensen D eate ull-


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those countries- (articularly the /S and the /K- that ,ere funda"ental in

instituting the sanctions regi"e* ?i)e,ise- the cost in ter"s of hu"an

suering ,as colossal* +o,ever- ,hen these ai"s are co"(ared to the

alternative of the use of force it is de'ata'le ,hether these costs ,ere not

e!ually as high as they ,ould have 'een in the alternative situation* .he

re"oval of Sadda" +ussein fro" (o,er too) t,o ,ars to acco"(lish*

?i)e,ise- the cost in ter"s of civilian deaths follo,ing the 3&&4 invasion-

although a "atter of de'ate- ,as (ro'a'ly lo,er- although the sanctions

regi"e avoided the cost to the coalition in ter"s of "ilitary causalities

fro" the ,ar* Whereas- the sanctions ca"(aign ,as fairly lo, cost- easy

to )ee( in (lace inde5nitely- and eective at denying Ira! "ilitary

hard,are- the 3&&4 invasion ,as costly for the /S and its allies* With

regard to econo"ic cost- certainly fro" the vie, of the /S the sanctions

regi"e ,as far less costly than the use of force- due to the sheer si>e of

cost of the invasion- sta'ilisation 1as yet 'y no "eans assured2 and

reconstruction* 0on#econo"ic costs should also 'e ta)en into account-

such as the di(lo"atic costs to the /S and its coalition (artners- and anti#

Western senti"ent* In ter"s of containing Ira! and denying it advanced-

'allistic and nuclear ,ea(ons- the sanctions regi"e a((ears to have 'een

highly successful- as ,as its a'ility to i"(ose severe costs on Ira! relative

to the costs i"(osed on the sender states* Finally- the "aintenance of

such co"(rehensive sanctions over such a long (eriod of ti"e reNects the

success of the /S in (articular at achieving and sustaining su((ort of its

sanctions regi"e*

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Lessons from Iraq Case Study

.he )ey features to ta)e out of the sanctions regi"e in Ira! is that it ,as

eective at containing Ira!- and li"iting Ira!s access to ,ea(ons-

advanced "ilitary technologies- and WM=* It ,as ineective at regi"e

inducing regi"e change* In ter"s of econo"ic costs- these ,ere relatively

lo, for the sender states- 'ut eceedingly high for Ira!- as ,as the hu"an

cost* Success can 'e contri'uted to the length and co"(rehensiveness of

the general sanctions* ut targeted sanctions a((ear to have failed to

result in (olicy changes fro" the Ira!i leadershi(*

Future usage of sanctions ,ould 'ene5t fro" ac)no,ledging these

lessons- although any future sanctions regi"e should ta)e account of the

(articular factors (ertinent to the s(eci5c case* For instance- the current

sanctions against Iran are unli)ely to yield results if- assu"ing Iran does

intend to develo( nuclear ,ea(ons ca(a'ilities 1,hether (otential or

actual2- it dee"s the ac!uisition of such ,ea(ons as necessary for regi"e

survival- and sanctions as less costly to the regi"e than not attaining such

ca(a'ilities 1given Irans o,n (erceived threats fro" other nuclear states

such as Israel or the /S2* Moreover- sanctions failed to (roduce regi"e

change in Ira! due to the autocratic nature of its govern"ent* Liven Iran

is a "ied#regi"e ty(e- co"'ining 'oth de"ocratic and autocratic

ele"ents- sanctions "ay 'e "ore li)ely to achieve regi"e change than in

Ira!- ho,ever- the (otential of a rally#round#the#Nag eect is a distinct

(ossi'ility*

Conclusion

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.he sanctions literature is generally agreed regarding the e"(irical results

on the eectiveness of sanctions* +o,ever- there is considera'le variation

in the inter(retation of these results* Moreover- various studies have

de"onstrated the nuances variation 'et,een dierent for"s of sanctions-

such as unilateral and "ultilateral sanctions- or co"(rehensive and s"art

sanctions*

.he sanctions regi"e in Ira! a((ears to have 'een a !uali5ed success*

.he regi"e successfully contained Ira!- and denied it ,ea(ons

technology* +o,ever- it failed to achieve regi"e change- and led to

considera'le suering in the targeted state*

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i'liogra(hy

# Alnasra,i- A''as- - ner- =aniel W*-


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Evaluating the Effectiveness of Sanctions

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