Eva Gerharz: „The Construction of Identities: The Case of ... · Eva Gerharz Eva Gerharz: „The...

Eva Gerharz

Eva Gerharz: „The Construction of Identities: The Case of the Chitta-gong Hill Tracts in Bangladesh“

Contents

1. Introduction

1.1. The People of the Chittagong Hill Tracts 1.2. Theoretical Presumptions

2. Methodology

2.1. Applied Methods – Expectations and Reality 2.2. The Necessity of Somebody Who Takes Care

3. The Chittagong Hill Tracts and the Nation-State

3.1. British Colonialism and the Pakistan Period 3.2. Bangladesh Becomes Independent

3.2.1. Politics of Nationalism 3.2.1. A Question of Identity – The New State of Bangladesh and the Hill People

4. Economy and Disadvantage - Land as an Essential Need

4.1. The Kaptai Hydroelectric Project and Its Impact on Land Issues 4.2. The Settlement Programme of the Bangladeshi Government 4.3. A Demographic Shift and Its Political Dimension 4.4. The “Tribal Market” in Rangamati 4.5. Economy and Trade 4.6. How the Hill People Perceive Their Economic Position

5. Education

5.1. The State of Education among the Hill People 5.2. The Advanced Position of the Chakma

6. Cultural differences – Cultural Habits and Their Importance

6.1. Dress 6.2. Language 6.3. Religion 6.4. The “Boundary-Markers” as One Aspect of Identity Construction

7. The Peace Accord – A Political Solution 7.1. Development Issues – National NGOs in the Chittagong Hill Tracts

7.2. Another Insurgency? 8. Conclusion References Appendix: Glossary of Foreign Words, List of Abbreviations, Pictures, Maps

Construction of Identities in the Chittagong Hill Tracts

1. Introduction – Bangladesh and Its Minorities

Bangladesh is one of the most homogeneous states as regards ethnic and religious differences.

The vast majority of the population (86.7%) are Muslims, 12.1% Hindus and the rest, 1.2%

are Buddhists, Christians and Animists. Those who are non-Muslims live in different commu-

nities spread all over the country. As the Hindus are chiefly counted as Bengalis, a very little

minority belongs to those entitled as “ethnic communities” (Khaleque 1995, 9) or “tribals”1.

How many groups there actually are, is controversially discussed in the literature and varies

between 12 and 46. According to the 1991 census there are 29 different ethnic groups living

in Bangladesh, but even the census, which is carried out every 10 years, is disputed, as some

groups are mentioned twice with different names while others are left out of the scheme.

Leaving out the clarification of that question, approximately 1.2 Million Bangladeshis belong

to these groups according to the 1991 census (Khaleque 1995).

The different communities vary broadly besides in religious, linguistic and cultural features,

in the grade of acculturation and resistance. The Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) and its inhabi-

tants can considered to be extraordinary in respect to historical developments and present

political affiliations2. The indigenous population of the CHT is estimated at approximately

530,0003, that is 0,45% of the whole population More than 20 years of armed resistance have

led the CHT to get special attention in Bangladesh as well as across its borders in comparison

to the other indigenous groups in Mymensingh, Jamalpur and Sylhet4.

1.1. The People of the Chittagong Hill Tracts

Geographically the Chittagong Hill Tracts are located in the south-east of Bangladesh, next to

the border of Myanmar and the Indian states Tripura and Mizoram. The total land area com-

prises about 12,181 square kilometres and constitutes about 10% of the total area of

Bangladesh (Ahsan, 1989, 961). The landscape of the Chittagong Hill Tracts is amazing, with

its comparatively small hills covered by jungles and jhum5, while the fertile valleys look a

1 This term has been preferably used by the Bangladeshis, for ascription as well as self-ascription. Having in mind the negative connotation of that term related to “tribalism”, I will try to avoid its usage if possible. Pre-ferred comp arable terms are “Hill People”, “indigenous”, “jhumma” or “peoples” 2 Although resistance and rebellion have happened among the Garo for example (Khaleque 1995). It is not my intention to marginalise these, but the CHT case has gained most attention in the recent in national politics as well as regarding international recognition 3 Numbers from the Statistical Pocketbook Bangladesh 98 4 For the spatial distribution of the different indigenous groups see Khaleque (1995, 13). 5 Jhum means shifting cultivation. The term also relates to the fields in which this mode of cultivation is prac-tised

Eva Gerharz

little bit like paradise when they appear in front of someone who reaches the top of a hill. I

have never seen such natural, green and beautiful scenery before.

The Chittagong Hill Tracts are divided into three districts6, Bandarban, Rangamati and

Kagrachari. Rangamati as the biggest district has an area of 6,089 square kilometres and is

divided into nine thanas. Bandarban, the southern district covers about 4,502 square kilome-

tres, subdivided into seven thanas. The smallest district is the northern Kagrachari, covering

2,590 square kilometres and divided into eight thanas (Ullah 1995, 99).

The inhabitants are categorised into 13 different groups7. The major ones are the Chakma,

Marma and Tripura, the minor ones are: Tanchangya, Riyang, Khumi, Murong, Lushai, Kuki,

Bawm, Kheyang, Pankhua and Chak8. Every group has its own language, dress and social

customs, so that one can say that every one has its own culture9. These groups can be roughly

divided into two categories: the valley groups, comprising Marma, Chakma and Tripura, and

the others who live on the ridges of hills.10 There has always been a small minority of Ben-

galis in the area, as well as some non-tribal Hindu communities and non-tribal Buddhists.

Until 1951 the population remained small in numbers; the population census of that year es-

timated a density of 57 inhabitants per square kilometre, which has grown to 190 per square

kilometre until 1991.11

In the following I will give a short description of the main groups which I have selected on

the basis of my experiences in the field.

Chakma:

The Chakma are the biggest group among the Hill Peoples. They belong to the Mongoloid

group and their language originates in the Indo-Aryan group. Their descent is unclear, as they

have, like the other groups, no written history and different theories about their origin. Some

6 See map in appendix 7 Again the number varies. Some authors mention less or more than 13, for example Bernot (1960) mentions 10. My decision to assume there are 13 groups is backed by Mohsin (1997), Shelley (1992) and my Chakma infor-mants in the field 8 In the literature the spelling of the names varies. Shelley (1992, 45) examines these most broadly 9 For the conception of culture which is used in this paper see Chapter 6 10 T.H. Lewin who served as an British administrator in the 19th century in the hills and who has published two basic ethnological books on the Chittagong Hill Tracts named them according to this distinction Khyoungtha and Toungtha which is Burmese-Arakanese and means “children of the river” and “children of the hills” 11 To recognise the immense growth of the CHT is important for several reasons. Until the Pakistan regime the area was an “excluded area” which means that no one could settle in the CHT if he had not got permission from the tribal-chiefs and the deputy commissioner. Later under Bangladesh regime the CHT were used to rehabilitate landless Bengalis from the plains. The influx of these settlers enlarged the density of population immensely, especially the non-tribal portion.


consider the Chakma to be of Muslim origin, other theories, particularly those which are

propagated by the Chakma themselves, tell that they migrated from a place called Cham-

paknagar12 to the Hill Tracts (Mohsin, 1997, 12ff). This unclearness is sometimes utilised for

political discussions, as they are regarded as being a “rootless tribe” by Abedin13 (1997, 58).

The Chakma are Buddhists, whose society shows patriarchal patterns, and they are not just

numerically the dominant group in the CHT. Most of the political leaders who influence the

policies and processes of decision are members of the Chakma, as well as those taking part in

insurgency actions.14 They are concentrated in Rangamati and Kagrachari district. In Ranga-

mati they are the vast majority of the indigenous populations and the Rajbari15 of the Chakma

chief is located there.

Marma:

The Marma, who also belong to the Mongoloid group are Buddhists as well. The Marma

community is divided into two; one mainly lives in and around Bandarban, the other in

Kagrachari.16 Both of these groups came from Arakan in Burma. The word Marma itself de-

rives from the name “Myanmar” for the Burmese nation (Prue, 1994, 1). The southern Marma

came to the Chittagong area in the 17th century, went back to Arakan in 1756 under Moghal

pressure until they finally reached Bandarban in the 19th century. The northern Marma were

refugees driven out of Arakan some time later (Mohsin 1997, 15). As I was told at the Tribal

Cultural Institute in Bandarban, the Marma language and script (which is almost forgotten) is

very similar to Arakanese. Unusual for the CHT groups is the latent bias towards matriarchal

societal structures among the Marma, which is revealed by the literature (Shelley 1992, 53).

My empirical data show that the Marma gender order can considered to be extraordinary in

comparison to the Bengali society17. Norms in respect to the occupation of public spaces for

12 There is no hint to find where the city of Champaknagar was. Some theories maintain that it was located near Malacca, in Tripura, in Bihar or somewhere in Thailand 13 His opinion about the other groups is not better. In the Chapter “CHT: Home of Alien Tribes” he writes: „All the tribes living in the CHT are outsiders and none of them are sons of the soil” (Abedin 1997, 53) 14 The Chakma-dominance among the hill people will be explained and analysed more broadly in the following chapters. This fact is essential for the understanding of the dynamics of ethnicity and identity-construction. 15 The chiefs’ residence 16 Mohsin tells that they had two chiefs, the Bohmang Raja in Bandarban, the Mong Raja in Ramgarh. The community was divided by the Karnafuli river, those living south were headed by the Bohmang chief, those living in the north were ruled by the Mong chief. Of interest here are the southern Marma, since I have been in Bandarban and have very little knowledge about the northern group. As I was told the difference is not of great importance 17 During my field work I observed that the gender order among the Hill People varies to some extent from that of the Bengali society. These differences can be traced back to religion for example and will be examined in Chapter 6 more broadly

Eva Gerharz

example are very different to those of the Bengali community and even to those of the other

Hill People. Smoking in public spaces is not a taboo for them. Receiving guests in a Marma

house is the task of the woman. I have heard several times in the field: “our women are very

active”.

The Hindu18 Tripura are the third largest group. Since they have no chief of their own, the

Tripura live within the jurisdictions of Marma or Chakma rajas. Their origin is considered to

be in the Indian state of Tripura, which borders on the northern part of the CHT. The Tripura

are mainly concentrated in the northern Kagrachari district. The Murong are living predomi-

nantly in Bandarban district. They are Animists and have no religious book. Their cultural

background and their social customs are sometimes regarded as extraordinary19. The Murong

believe that a bull was sent by their god Turai to carry the religious book but had eaten it up

on the way (Mohsin 1997, 18). Informants told that they have special rituals like playing their

pipe in return for baksish. The Chak and Tanchangya are considered as sub-groups of the

Chakma. In general there has been very little knowledge about the smaller groups, since they

lived isolated from the others (Mohsin, 1997, 20).

1.2. Theoretical Presumptions

Theories on identity construction are broad. Among the theories on the construction of ethnic

identity, likewise national identity, two guiding positions can be distinguished. The first com-

prises the idea that ethnicity is a stable, contingent characteristic, tied to social circumstances,

in which individuals are socialised and to which they belong. Contrasting this primordialist

perspective, an instrumentalist perspective, grounded in the work of Frederic Barth (1969),

has been developed, which largely dominates the discourse on ethnicity. The instrumentalist

notion can be supplemented by a third strain, the idea of rational choice (Kößler 1995, 3). The

combination of these two ideas comprises the assumption that ethnicity is seen as a construc-

tion, an invention20, on the one hand, and that ethnicity can be the result of a rational choice, a

strategy, on the other hand. That theorem, guided by an idea of constructivism, comprises

according to Barth (1998, 6) three main features. First, ethnicity is the social organisation of

cultural difference. Second, ethnicity is a matter of self-ascription and ascription by others in

18 According to my field experience there are some Tripura who have converted to Christianity. That fact does not appear in the literature 19 Literature: Schendel 1992a, Shelley 1992, 54. In the Bengali society a visitor will consider various kinds of stereotypes towards the CHT peoples in general.


interaction and therefore constructed by the actors themselves. Third, the boundary-

connectedness of cultural features, implying that the actors themselves develop diacriteria

along which members and non-members are categorised, included or excluded. The key ele-

ment of ethnicity is the stability of boundaries between groups (von Bruinessen 1997, 196).

The cultural features themselves are flexible. According to rational decisions these “markers”

can be constructed: clothing, language, food habits, religion or modes of cultivation gain im-

portance, whenever rational calculation stresses their concern. A common history can be

invented, whenever it is considered to be necessary. Cultural features can become activated,

when pressure from outside for example requires (Kößler 1995, 4). Pressure can have its ori-

gins in political as well as economic processes (Schlee 1996, 20), the resulting inclusion

based on cultural features then affects those processes vice versa. At the same time flexibility

of cultural features can have the establishment of various identities as a consequence: De-

pending on the concern which is considered to be important, different identities are stressed:

in the case of the Hill People three or more different levels can’t be distinguished: the Bang-

ladeshi identity, the Hill People’s identity, the group’s identity and the clan’s identity. Schlee

(1996) defines these as pluritactic constructions.

Starting from this very general theoretical base, after presenting the methodology, I will first

examine the development of nationalism and counter-nationalism in Bangladesh and the Chit-

tagong Hill Tracts. Mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion related to political processes are

explored here. Secondly economic processes are analysed with regard to their importance for

processes of group-formation. Education in Chapter 5 is treated as a kind of excurse. After

analysing three exemplary “markers”, cultural features will be the focus of Chapter 6, embed-

ded into a theoretic conclusion. As a question of current interest the Peace Accord is

examined and an outlook about the development of ethnic relations in the CHT will be given

here. The main aspects will be summarised in a final conclusion.

2. Methodology

“You should always keep in mind three things. First, you are in a tribal area. Second, tribals are shy. Third, they are sensitive”

To investigate identity construction I conducted field work in the Chittagong Hill Tracts. In

the beginning organisational problems hindered my attempt to start, but after two weeks “ac-

climatisation” in Bangladesh I found a NGO with projects in the CHT, namely the Integrated

20 Revealed by Hobsbawm’s notion on the invention of Tradition (Der Spiegel 1999 Nr. 52, pp. 144-148)

Eva Gerharz

Development Foundation (IDF). The field trip consisted of three phases: First I spent eight

days in Rangamati and immediately after one week in the southern district of Bandarban21.

After a break of approximately two weeks I returned to Rangamati for another nine days.

Helpful like all Bangladeshis, in my experience , IDF organised my first journey to Ranga-

mati and a suitable accommodation. Besides my hosts interest in my work they had enough

time to introduce me to different areas of social life in the area of Rangamati in the Hill

Tracts. The host provided me with access to members and leaders of the local elite as well as

to people of lower socio-economic status and villagers around Rangamati. An immense ad-

vantage for the field entry was my hosts’ knowledge of English, which made it possible to do

research without finding an interpreter first. The difficulties of understanding, which are dis-

cussed by Bernard (1995, 145) were not as problematic because even among the villagers a

lot of people know English and if necessary my informants translated. Additionally IDF gave

me the chance to visit development projects in the area and provided an insight into their

work in general. Besides that I was able to use the contacts of the host-family to visit other

NGOs as well as governmental development organisations. Through these contacts my sam-

ple was largely influenced: finding people for interviews presupposes that the researcher

knows somebody who knows someone and so on. The fact that I had, by accident, wonderful

informants differing in age and position, provided me with contact to a broad variety of inter-

viewees. To realise the idea of “theoretical sampling” (Strauss 1994) to a certain extent was

therefore easy, as I was still able to express preferences about whom I would like to meet be-

sides the contacts I got through the family contact in general22. During the first time I spent in

Rangamati I talked to several members of the traditional elite, teachers, people working in

government jobs and international organisations, employees of several NGOs and their mem-

bers, former insurgents, unemployed people, villagers and several members of the political

elite. During the second term at Rangamati I visited additionally the Tribal Cultural Institute

and some other villages; furthermore I intensified some of the former contacts. The sample

consisted exclusively of Chakma apart from contacts I had to a few Bengalis. This is indeed

not a representative sample for investigating an area in which 13 different indigenous groups

are living, besides many Hindu and Muslim Bengalis and smaller non-indigenous and non-

Bengali groups23. But the limitedness of the time-frame as well as the fact that the indigenous

21 My experiences in Bandarban will be described later. The two cases are kept apart as the experiences are quite different 22 It was impossible of course to reach a certain saturation of the sample 23 The Barua mentioned in Chapter 6


population of Rangamati is predominantly Chakma24 turned out to be a structural con-

straint. Contacts to Bengalis were even more difficult as in this conflict-ridden area ethnic

segregation is well practised. Having once access to the Chakma circle, I recognised it as ex-

tremely difficult to establish any connection to Bengali inhabitants, except formal contacts to

shopkeepers for instance.

2.1. Applied Methods - Expectations and Reality

According to Lentz (1992, 320f) qualitative methods are appropriate when the researcher does

not have much knowledge about the field. The close relationship to my host-family was a

good basis for concentrating on participant observation (Bernard 1995, 136ff). Especially dur-

ing the first days I was very curious about everything that I observed, that was different from

my own or the Bengali society. Every detail had to be considered as being important (Bernard

1995, 147). Besides participant observation I made interviews which turned out to be quite

different from what I expected. As my research topic is a very sensitive one, a lot of distrust

and reluctance hampered collecting the data. Using a recorder while interviewing was impos-

sible and formal interview-situations turned out to be counter-productive. Whenever a

“classical interview-situation”25 appeared, the quality of the gained information was reduced

to a non-satisfying level. I got the impression that people became suspicious whenever they

were reminded that I am not just a visitor but a researcher. Informal interviews, talks, conver-

sations while having a drink and sitting together on the other hand were very informative. In

these situations people sometimes chatted among themselves, from time to time somebody

summarised the conversation for me. Whenever I had any questions I could address these

openly. In some situations I became aware that people took me for a donor or some represen-

tative and started to complain about their disadvantaged situation as a minority, which is of

course quite important but limited my possibilities in investigating issues related to every-day

life. When I got an audience from Shantu Larma for example my informant in advance and

Shantu himself during the talk asked me directly to do something for the CHT and support the

24 Although eight different groups are scattered throughout Rangamati district (Ullah 1995, 99), most of them are living in remote villages which I could not reach during the short time I had. The Bengali population is approxi-mately 50% 25 The situation of a researcher addressing serious questions to an interviewee

Eva Gerharz

implementation of the Peace Accord officially. I was merely put into an advocacy-role

(Lachenmann 1995, 6), although I always emphasised that I am not an influential person.

The close relationship to my informants and interviewees turned out to be more problematic

than expected. As Levi-Strauss (1978, 378) notes, a researcher has two possibilities: to repre-

sent the values of one’s own group or to submit oneself totally to the others, which implies

loss of objectivity. In my case it was merely a question of sympathy for either the Hill People

or Bangladesh and the Bengalis. Sometimes I found myself in the position of judging too fast

without considering my situation as a researcher, who is asked to have a merely neutral posi-

tion (Lachenmann 1995, 6). Statements like “these Bengalis are all the same” whenever there

was reason to complain influenced me so, that I had some problems to force myself to take a

neutral position again. Being encapsulated in the field I recognised from time to time as being

an enormous emotional burden. The destiny of some people I was confronted with in the con-

text of 25 years’ armed conflict was sometimes hard to bear. The good understanding and

warm kindness I experienced during my field work26, whilst limiting my objectivity enor-

mously sometimes, gave me at the same time the possibility to get very attached to the field, a

necessity for good participant observation.

2.2. The Necessity of Somebody Who Takes Care

After the first week in Rangamati I spent a further one organised by IDF in Bandarban. The

research situation was quite different as it was only possible to find accommodation in a ho-

tel. The field access was even more difficult because I did not get an informant with the

necessary ability to communicate in English. This was the first time I realised the language

problem mentioned by Bernard (1995, 145f), which hampered the process of gaining informa-

tion immensely and produced a lot of misunderstandings27. Making appointments for instance

was difficult for myself as I had not enough knowledge to find the people, finding someone’s

house was already complicated enough28.To overcome the distance to the field, I recognised

the opportunity to try new methods like formal and expert interviews. Additionally I could

profit from having different informants which opened new fields and situations. This mix of

26 Without the Bengali habit of staring at me wherever I appeared, which got on my nerves quite a lot sometimes when in Bengali dominated areas. A habit which influenced my sympathy immensely, when I recognised the shy behaviour of the Hill People in observing me. Even in the villages people came, as if by accident, to have a look at me from a safe distance 27 In Bandarban I got the impression that there is a visible difference in the state of education in comparison to the Chakma (examined in Chapter 5). Communication was even harder as the diversity of groups is broader and with this the languages 28 As there are no street-names and numbers


different methods and changed perspectives, which are known as triangulation in the

qualitative research methodology (Flick 1995, 250), was an important component of my re-

search process. Besides difficulties concerning the field-entry the police of Bandarban became

suspicious about my work. They realised that I am not just a tourist I had to visit the police

office regularly to report about my activities. Having only a few references to justify my stay

in Bandarban, no direct contact to anyone who could defend me, the situation turned to be

problematic and caused an earlier departure than had been planned. Again, that problem of

being thought a spy must be considered as a danger of certain field work in general (Bernard

1995, 144). It would have been helpful to have an official research permit.

Altogether I interviewed some members of the traditional elite of the Bandarban Marma cir-

cle, employees of various developmental organisations from different departments29, activists

in the JSS office in Bandarban and the political elite, some intellectuals of various occupa-

tions, members of the credit programmes of IDF, employees and students of a residential

school and “normal” families. The interviewees were mainly Marma, a few Tripura and

Murong as well as Bengalis. Although my sample and the information I got satisfied me af-

terwards, the feeling of not getting “real access” to the field was there during my stay in

Bandarban. Without being in close touch with someone, fieldwork can turn out to be prob-

lematic.

3. The Chittagong Hill Tracts and the Nation-State

“To understand the problem of the Chittagong Hill Tracts it is essential to have some knowl-

edge about the history”, said an informant before he started to explain the historical

development of the conflict between the Hill People and Bangladesh. For my research pur-

poses, the analysis of the development of the ethnic segregation and the construction of

identity, investigating history and development of the nation-state is particularly essential.

In this chapter I will roughly describe some major changes in the period of British colonialisa-

tion and the massive ones during the Pakistan period, in which the patterns of life changed

totally especially with the establishment of the nation state and the construction of the Kaptai

dam30. After Bangladesh became independent in 1972, the Bangladesh nationalist movement

created rising insurgency, which lasted until December 1997. A peace treaty between the

29 For example an agriculturist, a health worker and co-ordinators of credit programmes 30 As an very important issue the Kaptai Dam will not just be of interest here but in Chapter 4.1 as well.

Eva Gerharz

Bangladesh government and the Paratya Chattrogram Jana Sanghati Samiti (PCJSS), the po-

litical front of the Chittagong Hill Tracts people, was signed.

3.1. British Colonialism and the Pakistan Period

There is no literature about the CHT before the establishment of British colonial power to be

found. As in many societies with limited access to writing and reading, knowledge about the

past is based on oral history. The first person who wrote about the CHT was Francis Bu-

chanan, who travelled Southeast Bengal in 1798 in search of places for the cultivation of

spices (van Schendel 1992). Later the British administrators Hutchinson (1906) and Lewin

(1869) published the first quasi-ethnologic studies of the area31. They pointed out that the ad-

ministration, the social structure and political system were of a typical tribal character in a

clan-order.

“In the hills the different peoples were basically self-governing small entities without highly formalised political systems, whereas the people in the plain were always subject to an exter-nal power”. (Bangladesh Group Nederland: Roy 1995, 50)

British Colonialism:

The Chittagong Hill Tracts were ceded to the British East India Company by Nawab Mir Qa-

sim Ali Khan, who was the semi-independent governor under the Moghals in 1760. Until

1900 the main objectives by which the British policy was guided were the protection of the

own political, economic and military interests as well as keeping the Hill People segregated

from the Bengalis (Mohsin 1997, 26). In 1860 the area was separated from the district of Chit-

tagong and became the Chittagong Hill Tracts as it remained until today. But the British

colonialists did not establish any administrative structure worth mentioning, as the contacts

were limited to the payment of taxes (Shelley 1992, 28). Their policies included the legal and

judicial system was being simplified so far that the Hill People could retain their traditional

norms and institutions (Ahsan 1989, 962).

According to the Chittagong Hill Tracts Regulation 1900, the district of the CHT was divided

into three circles under supervision of a deputy commissioner. Following the traditional struc-

31 In the Tribal Cultural Institute of Rangamati and Bandarban I was able to have a look into these publications. Unfortunately I could not go into it more deeply because of a lack of copy-machines and time


tures these were the Chakma, Mong and Bohmong32, each of them placed under the

jurisdiction of a tribal chief who collected revenues33 and managed internal affairs. According

to these circles subdivisional officers were responsible to the deputy commissioner. The cir-

cles were subdivided into mouza and para (Ahsan 1090, 962). The mouza, ruled by a

headman, is itself subdivided into paras where karbaris34 represent the chief in all social af-

fairs. The following act, the Chittagong Hill Tracts (Amendment) Regulation of 1920

declared the CHT to be a so-called excluded area. Besides the fact that the British safeguarded

their financial and administrative interests, the exclusive status provided special rights and

privileges for the tribals living in the CHT, especially related to land and settlement. The Hill

People had a self-governmenting system to a considerably large extent. (Shelley 1992, 28;

D’Souza 1995, 161; Löffler 1968).

With the partition of the Indian subcontinent, the Hill People were caught in a difficult situa-

tion. The question to which of the new created states the CHT would belong affected all Hill

People equally, but their interests were not represented properly. The elite of the different

groups was not united itself: the Chakma elite was mainly in favour of union with India, while

the Marma supported Burma (Mey 1988, 40). This explains the fact that the Chakma hoisted

the Indian flag at Rangamati, the Marma the Burmese flag in Bandarban before the CHT be-

came a part of Pakistan on the 16th August 1946, as a part of the Chittagong division, a

decision guided by mainly administrative and strategic reasons: the CHT were exchanged for

Ferozepur in India, where trouble among the local Sikhs was expected if Ferozepur were to

allotted to Pakistan (Mey 1988, 40).

Pakistan Period:

The relationship between the Pakistan Government and the CHT remained difficult during the

whole Pakistan period. Contemporarily with the first Pakistani constitution in 1956 the Regu-

lation of 1900 and the status of an excluded area was retained and the Hill People were given

the right to vote, which had stabilising consequences on the CHT situation. However the re-

gime of Ayub Khan changed the administrative status of the CHT in 1962 from an “excluded

32 The Mong and Bohmong are two different groups which both belong to the Marma group. One of them is concentrated in the north mainly in Kagrachari, the other one that is the Mong have their residence in Bandarban as already stated in Chapter 1.2. 33 Among these taxes the jhum tax was the most important but also most troublesome. Most of the Hill People were attached to jhumming and therefore putting taxes on jhum was one profitable way of making money. An-other reason for the tax was that jhum, as a traditional mode of cultivation, was regarded to be backward. The tax was therefore additionally one way of forcing the Hill People to take up modernised methods of cultivation 34 Karbari is the headman of a village (para). A unit of villages is called mouza

Eva Gerharz

area” to a “tribal area”35. Although the special status was abolished by a constitutional

amendment in 1962, the Regulation of 1900 was kept operative and the Hill People still en-

joyed some privileges. At this time the idea of nation was used to consolidate Pakistani

dominance over East Bengal, including the CHT (Mohsin 1997, 45ff). Alongside administra-

tive and legal changes, Pakistan undertook some measures for economic development and the

utilisation of the two major natural resources of the area, forestry and hydroelectricity. The

consequence was that a paper mill was established in 1950 and the Karnaphuli Multipurpose

Project, beginning in 1957, resulted in the construction of a dam which crossed the Kar-

naphuli river. The project was finished in 1963, established by the Pakistani government and

financed by USAID (Shelley, 1992, 31). Like many other comparable development projects,

none of the projects planners took into account how immense the impact on the inhabitants’

project area would be36. The tribal interests have not been recognised at all. The dam built

over the Karnaphuli next to Kaptai is about 666 metres long and 43 metres high. The product

is an artificial lake which covers an area of about 655 sq. km37 and has swallowed about 125

moujas, including the major portion of Rangamati town (Ullah, 1995, 1). About 100,000 peo-

ple were affected by the flooding. Although the compensation for homes and other belongings

as well as the replacement of farmland that got lost was promised by the government, reports

show that this has never happened. The result was that about 40,000 Chakmas crossed the

border to India as refugees (Ullah, 1995, 21). As 40% of the best cultivable land was flooded,

the land given to the families by rehabilitation programmes was not sufficient for proper cul-

tivation. About 1,500 families were completely left out of the scheme. Altogether the

government only compensated one third of the flooded land (Mohsin, 1997, 114).

Although the Karnaphuli power project was regarded as revolutionising Bangladesh’s indus-

trialisation, the Hill People could not really benefit from it.38 During my stay in the CHT, I

got the impression that the Karnaphuli Hydroelectric Project is the causal factor for most of

the problems in the area. Not only did an immense change of the traditional patterns of life

derive from it, including land problems39 but also difficulties with the relationship to the rul-

ing state in general40. Already at that time some ingenious students started to develop a

35 The consequence was that the area remained distinctive but not excluded any longer 36 A controversially discussed example which is presently discussed is the Narmada dam in India, by which approximately 4 Million people are affected (Chatterjee 1999) 37 Regarding the size of the lake the data differ. Shelley (1992, 31) for example states that the submerged area is about 1036 kilometres. Unlike as in other cases (see Chapter 4.1), no political intention for the differing estima-tions can be seen. The fact that the literature is uniform regarding the estimation of 40% of best cultivable land which was swallowed leads me to the assumption that the differences here are not of great importance. 38 The issue of economic consequences of the Kaptai Hydroelectric Project will be discussed in Chapter 4. 39 In Chapter 4.1 the land issue will be analysed broadly 40 See Chapter 3.2


political campaign against the government and represented “a new wave of Chakma and

Marma political identity and consciousness” (Ahmed 1993, 39). The first conversation I had

with a Chakma when I came to Rangamati ended after five minutes with the following state-

ment: “This dam has caused all our problems we have here in the CHT”. Later he explained to

me: “They could give the tribals free access to electricity or fishery after this dammed lake

has taken all our land, but it had just one intention: to destroy tribals’ life”.

3.2. Bangladesh Becomes Independent

In 1971 Bangladesh became independent after nine months of war. The Liberation War arose

from an effort to free Bengal from the hegemonic system of Pakistan, which defines itself by

religion. The ethnocentric political programme was guided by the idea of the “pureness”41 of

the Islam which included the idea of Urdu being the Islamic language42. The Bengalis were

considered to be a lower Hindu caste although they had actively supported the idea of a Mus-

lim Pakistani state43. The Pakistani hegemony then led the Bengalis to assert their separate

identity, which was now based on distinction through language and culture, instead of relig-

ion. Because of the exclusion from Pakistani Islamic nationalism a new form of nationalism

guided by culture and language arose which became the guiding paradigm for the independent

Bangladesh.

3.2.1. Politics of Nationalism

The history of the Bangladeshi state is determined by two distinct forms of nationalism,

namely the Bengali and the Bangladeshi variant. The first one was developed and practised

under Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, who guided the independent movement and became the first

political leader of Bangladesh. It comprises two dimensions, the cultural and the territorial

one. The cultural dimension is particularly determined by the language movement44 and secu-

larism, both developed in the attempt to demarcate itself from West Pakistan, where Urdu as

state-language and Islam as state-religion were considered as determining features of national-

41 “pak” means pure, “stan” means land (Mohsin 1997, 38) 42 Urdu is written in a Arabic Persian script, while Bengali was sanskritised by the Hindu elites during coloniali-sation (Mohsin 1996, 35) 43 After the Muslim population of Bengal had been dominated by a Hindu aristocracy created by the British colonial policy Hindu as well as Muslim identity which arose after the pre-colonial syncretism (Mohsin 1996, 74) 44 Bangladesh literally translated means “the land of Bangla speaking people” (Mohsin 1997, 54)

Eva Gerharz

ism. The Bengali nationalism was indeed specific about its territorial boundaries45 of East-

Bengal. This concept of Bengali nationalism thus was defined as one of the state principles in

Article 9: “ The unity of the Bengali nation, which deriving its identity from its language and

culture, attained sovereign and independent Bangladesh through a united and determined

struggle in the war of independence, shall be the basis of Bengali nationalism” (cited in:

Mohsin, 1997, 60). Furthermore the ideology was based on a centralist idea of state under

non-capitalist objectives, marked by the total integration of the individual within the commu-

nity (Jahangir 1986, 33). Bangladesh with its uni-cultural, ethnocentristic nationalism

developed the same kind of hegemony the population of East Bengal had to suffer during the

Pakistan period.

When Sheikh Mujib was assassinated in 1975, the BNP with General Ziaur Rahman took over

the political leadership. Their concept of Bangladeshi nationalism, distinct from the Bengali

variant, was determined mainly by religion46. This trend arose already increasingly after Mu-

jib’s secularism. Territoriality became more determining in drawing a line between East and

West Bengal in India and gave the state a new totality (Mohsin 1996, 47ff ). As a conse-

quence this turn towards religion and territoriality had some substantial changes on different

levels. Islamiat was introduced in the education system and furthermore administrative poli-

cies and mass media were induced by religious rituals. Additionally the Constitution was

changed, the word “secularism” replaced by “absolute trust and faith in the Almighty Allah”

(Jahangir 1986, 79f). Bangladesh’s policy became Islamised and as a consequence the citizens

of Bangladesh were defined as Muslims as one unit against non-Muslims.

Under General H.M. Ershad from 1982 onwards Bangladeshi nationalism moved towards

Islamic nationalism. The model of nationhood became even more rigid and totalitarian in its

Islamic orientation. He “raised the slogan of building a mosque-centred society”47 and intro-

duced Islam as the state religion through an amendment to the Constitution (Mohsin 1996,

52).

3.2.2. A Question of Identity – Bangladesh and the Hill People

45 What is reflected by “Amar Sonar Bangla Ami Tomae Bhalobashi” (O my golden Bengal, I love thee) the highly patriotic song written by Rabindranath Tagore as the national anthem. 46 The BNP defined Bangladesh nationalism as follows: “Religious belief and love for religion are a great and imperishable characteristic of the Bangladeshi nation ... the vast majority of out people are followers of Islam. The fact is well reflected and manifest in out stable and liberal national life” (Mohsin 1996, 49) 47 The issue mosque-centredness and its meaning for the Hill People will be part of the Chapter 6.3.


The Hill People and the CHT played a controversial role in the War of Independence.

The former Chakma Raja Tridiv Roy co-operated with Pakistan, but at the same time many

Hill People joined the war in favour of independence. Nevertheless many of them had to face

discrimination by the Bengalis48 (Mohsin 1996, 38). Immediately afterwards, some indige-

nous people were accused of being collaborators and killed. Violence against the Hill People

continued for months. The excuse given by Sheikh Mujib, that such incidents are natural after

a war49 was not accepted at all by the Hill People. Some of them set up an administrative sys-

tem for the villages and resisted the Bengalis50 (Mohsin 1996, 39). The Hill People did not

just demonstrate the failure of the GOB to protect their rights but, more important, this was

the first manifestation of group formation processes among the Hill People in order to “pro-

tect” themselves from Bengalis.

Some Hill People’s representatives met Sheikh Mujibur Rahman to demand four basic ar-

rangements for the CHT, under the leadership of Manabendra Narayan Larma51. These

included four points:

(1) autonomy for the CHT including its own legislature (2) retention of the 1900 manual in the constitution of Bangladesh (3) continuation of tribal chiefs’ offices (4) a constitutional provision restricting the amendment of the 1900 Regulation and imposing

a ban on the influx of non-tribals (Ahsan, 1989, 967)

Sheikh Mujib advised them to get rid of their tribal identities and merge with “Bengali” na-

tionalism. As no special provision for the CHT was made in the 1972 constitution, M.N.

Larma formed the Parbattaya Chattragam Jana Sanghati Samiti (PCJSS/JSS) as an opposi-

tional political platform for the Hill People. Nevertheless in a pre-election meeting in

Rangamati, Sheikh Mujib maintained that all tribal people are Bengalis and nothing else. Ac-

cording to the political programme of the AL and Sheikh Mujib in particular distinct identities

could not be accepted. In his view nationalism based on secularism should include the Hill

People and any differences were denied. The demand to merge with Bengali nationalism was

48 Mohsin emp hasises here that many of the Hill People could not join the forces because their ideological back-ground did not fit in with those of the Awami League which was responsible for recruiting the soldiers. Some Hill People came back from the training camps because of discrimination 49 Stated by Charoo Bikash Chakma, who was the leader of a delegation which met Sheikh Mujib on 29 January 1972 to appraise of the situation cited in Mohsin (1996, 39) 50 The local youth recovered arms left behind by the Pakistan army in the jungles. They were called Shanti Ba-hini, and can be seen as the early beginning of the armed wing of the JSS 51 M.N. Larma was at that time member of the Bangladeshi parliament and functioned, among others, as a politi-cal leader of the Hill People and formed the JSS. He was assassinated on 10 November 1983 by supporters of an opposing political group of the Hill People. His younger brother, Shantu Larma took over his function and is the present leader of the JSS and Chairman of the CHTRC

Eva Gerharz

not seen as a force but as an invitation, therefore the Hill People should be grateful52. The Hill

People already had to face discrimination by Bengalis and their relationship to the ruling state

was due to the Kaptai dam, wholly determined by suspicion and doubt. Under the leadership

of M.N. Larma the representatives of the Hill People’s community expressed their dissatisfac-

tion with the state policies of Bangladesh. As a member of parliament M.N. Larma was able

to articulate the Hill People’s interests directly, but instead he experienced paternalistic rejec-

tion of these. The debate between M.N. Larma and his supporters on the one hand and Sheikh

Mujib on the other hand has given rise to the conflict between the two groups. The nature of

Bengali nationalism with its ethnocentric and hegemonic outcome was categorically rejected

by the Hill People. Bad experiences and the fear of becoming submerged under the majority

of Bengalis has led to their being conscious of their distinctiveness. The absence of any mi-

nority rights in the Constitution and the Bill declaring Bangladesh as a uni-cultural and uni-

lingual nation-state has created a feeling of being oppressed by the majority of the Hill Peo-

ple. M.N. Larma asserted in the Parliament: “Our main worry is that our culture is threatened

with extinction ... we want to live with our separate identity” (Mohsin 1996, 44). The empha-

sis on a separate identity in this context expresses the importance of cultural habits in the

process of identity construction, but at the same time their importance is ultimately developed

in a process of becoming conscious of it. The differentiation of groups itself is not the cause

of conflict. Differences and cultural peculiarities become apparent when pressure and threat

from outside or the dominant group within a nation-state necessitates inclusion for defence.

(Kößler 1995, 4). With the establishment of the nation-state the Hill People started to develop

a unified identity as all groups were equally affected by the threat of the Bengali hegemony53.

The government reacted to the appealing group-consciousness of the Hill People by dividing

the CHT into the three districts: Rangamati, Bandarban and Kagrachari54. The purpose of this

measure was, as a Chakma expressed it in an interview, to cleave the Hill People and reduce

the possibilities of collective resistance.

General Zia’s Bangladeshi nationalism, which emphasised religion as the central feature of

the Bangladeshi society, besides culture and language, alienated the Hill People further.

Changes towards an Islamic orientation in mass media, education, administration and the

Constitution affected the Hill People even more directly. The impact of religion on every-day

52 In his speech at Rangamati in 1973 Sheikh Mujib stated: “From this day onward the tribals are being promoted into Bengalis” (Mohsin 1996, 74) 53 While the Kaptai Dam had mainly touched the Chakma and some groups, but some not at all 54 In March 1989 the parliament passed several Bills which enabled the government to transform the administra-tive system with the resulting partition into the three districts (Mahmud Ali 1993, 162)


life expressed in symbols and rituals confronted the Hill People massively with the

feeling of being different55.

Recognising the rejection of the Hill People’s demands by Zia and the BNP M.N. Larma

started acting in the underground and formed the Shanti Bahini as the armed wing of the JSS

to enforce the demands of JSS in an armed struggle. Later he crossed over to India and started

to launch massive guerrilla action against the Bangladesh authorities56 (Ahmed 1993, 45).

Training camps were established in India, fighters were recruited from the refugee camps and

only a few years later the Shanti Bahini constituted a military and political threat for Bangla-

desh. The GOB reacted by militarising the area57. At the same time Zia tried to win over the

Hill People by drawing special attention to development of the CHT58 and developed a set-

tlement programme for landless Bengalis who should be rehabilitated in the CHT59. His

attempts were regarded as forced assimilation by using strategies of oppression. The settle-

ment programme, although guided by pragmatic and humane intentions, established a

demographic shift60 in the area. The aim was to put the Hill People regionally into a minority

position to reduce the power they gained from of the establishment of identity - based institu-

tions. In other words: the GOB tried to segregate the Hill People in order to prevent group

formation on the basis of identity. The pressure which was put on the Hill People and their

organisations showed effects. The Hill People were forced to decide for or against the Shanti

Bahini forces but whatever side they chose the other one put pressure on them. As my data

show the society is roughly divided along these political lines, which are not directly com-

patible with those of ethnic segregation; meaning some opt for, others against insurgency. But

also on the organisational level processes of separation developed out of the military pressure

exterted. The JSS, formed on the basis of an ideological dispute61, was divided into one fac-

tion led by Preeti Kumar Chakma, one by the Larma brothers. As a consequence M.N. Larma

was assassinated by the opposing group in 1983. His brother Shantu continued Manobendra

Larmas work, whereas Preeti and his supporters surrendered to the GOB in response to an

amnesty which was offered by Ershad in 1985.

55 These cultural differences will be investigated in Chapter 6. 56 India provided active support to the Shanti Bahini by allowing them to establish bases in Tripura and supply-ing military logistics (Ahmed 1993, 49) 57 Zia even tried to give the armed forces unlimited power by proposing the Disturbed Area Bill in 1980, but the bill failed to pass (Ahsan 1989, 969) 58 For that issue see Chapter 4.3 59 See Chapter 4.1 60 The demographic shift will be investigated in Chapter 4.1 too 61 Beside questions of leadership and power the current cause for the dispute was related to the aims of insur-gency action. Preeti opted for a “decisive war” in the CHT to merge with India after secession from Bangladesh while M.N. Larma pleaded for autonomy within Bangladesh

Eva Gerharz

Within the processes of group-formation among the Hill People the JSS acted as a political

platform for the interests of the Hill People and attempted to establish a counter-hegemony to

the Bengali one. On the other hand the JSS as a Chakma dominated organisation started more

and more to represent the interests of the Chakma community instead of the Hill People in

general. As a result the JSS has been rejected by other groups as they considered its policies

as a hegemony of the Chakma over the others (Ahmed 1993, 54). The Marma, Murong and

Tripura became resentful of the dominance of the Chakma in the JSS. which was considered a

hegemony over the others. Especially the Marma opposed the Shanti Bahini after Chabai

Mogh, a prominent Marma JSS leader, who had been imprisoned together with Shantu Larma

from 1976 to 1980, went back to normal life. Subsequently he was killed by the insurgents.

Most of the Marma left the movement and went back to normal life. The Murong also re-

volted against the Chakma-dominated JSS. Between 1983 and 1985 the Murong Bahini

(Murong Force) were set up by the military to resist the Shanti Bahini with a strength of 1,000

(Shelley 1992, 117, Mohsin 1997, 176). As a result Bandarban was almost free from insurgent

actions from 1984 on and was consequently less involved in struggle between the military and

insurgents, as one of my Marma informants stated: “the people in Kagrachari and Rangamati

had to suffer much more then us. Here the situation was very calm”. The effect of this devel-

opment was that 98% of the insurgents were Chakma and the political movement, as Shelley

(1992, 118) states, turned into one of the Chakma section. Besides the literature an expert

interviewee in Dhaka told me about this issue. During my stay in the area I tried to find peo-

ple to confirm this hypothesis but all interviewees and informants asserted that there is no

division of the Hill Peoples with regard to political interests. Nevertheless my data show that

there are cleavages to be found62. One Marma insisted there was a lack of democracy because

political leadership among the Marma is missing. I would trace the reticence I have experi-

enced back to the assumption that people do not want to harp upon internal trouble when they

are talking to a foreigner. At the same time one has to bear in mind that the internal quarrel is

not necessarily a question of entire separation but is dependent on a separate situation63.

4. Economy and Disadvantage – Land as an Essential Need

“We are poor, we have no land. Our land was taken by the lake and by the Bengalis. We don’t know what to do. We had to move to these hills here after the lake swallowed our land. But here is not enough space. We have some land at another place over there but it was cap-tured by the Bengalis.” 62 As the other chapters 5, 6, 7 for example will show 63 This will be examined broadly in Chapter 6.4.


I have heard statements like that several times. Land is the most substantial problem in the

CHT and can be regarded as the present cause of the conflict in the region. There are at least

two main reasons for the problems of land-scarcity in the area. The first one was the devel-

opment undertaking “Kaptai Hydroelectric Project”64. Only a few years later the Bangladesh

government started a settlement project in the Hills to relieve the densely populated plains of

Bangladesh, which is regarded as the second impact on Hill People‘s lives.

4.1. The Kaptai Hydroelectric Project and Its Impact on Land Issues

With the construction of the Kaptai Hydroelectric Project about 40%, that is 54,000 acres, of

the most fertile land has been covered by the lake. Of those having lost their land, about

100,000 families fled to India (see: Roy 1995, 56; Bertocci 1989, 156; Ahsan 1989, 963). Be-

sides the fact that barely one third of the lost lands were replaced, the compensation was

largely paid in cash (Roy, 1995, 56). The Hill People alleged that the affected Bengalis were

the first who got compensation, as the Revenue Compensation office was staffed with Ben-

galis only. Of the total sum of US $51 million, which was set aside by the government for

rehabilitation of the affected population, only US $2.6 million were actually distributed.

(Mohsin, 1997, 104)

The Chakma, who are concentrated in the area, suffered especially. For years many had al-

ready been cultivating the plains and were dependent on their paddy fields. This change had

taken place when the Chakma raja brought Bengali cultivators into the Hill Tracts to train the

Hill People in methods of plain cultivation65 (Ullah, 1995, 14). But especially those still de-

pendent on shifting cultivation could not benefit from the rehabilitation programme at all,

because most of them had no titles to land (Mohsin 1997, 103). Besides the Chakmas, using

plough cultivation, were not familiar with property rights and ownership either. Land has

been recognised as common property66 grounded in customary rights.

The Hill People were forced to change their pattern of life radically. They were used to work-

ing as agriculturists and had, due to land scarcity, to adopt horticulture67. Even before the

construction of the dam the available cultivable land was insufficient for the comparatively

64 Already presented in Chapter 3.1 65 It can be regarded as a consequence of the jhum tax, which had been evied since the 1900 Manual to discour-age the Hill People from continuing jhum cultivation. 66 Or merely the Raja’s property, as Ahmed (1993, 47) writes: “The Chakma Rajas having no right to land, by a mere accident of local custom” treated the persons living on it as private property, thus creating “human talooks” instead of “hereditary zamindarees”, which were sold, subdivided and inherited like landed property” 67 Horticulture means fruit gardening for commercial use which implies several problems like transport and stor-age

Eva Gerharz

sparse population in the CHT 68 (Mohsin, 1997, 114). Some people tried to cultivate in the

jhum again, others settled the fringe land69 around the lake. This land is cultivable but implies

a great risk, because it largely depends on the rise and fall of the lake water and is exposed to

storm and drought (Ullah, 1995, 33ff). The possibilities of Jhum cultivation decreased as well

due to scarcity of land: the jhum cycle needs ten to fifteen years to allow the fields to recover.

Intensive usage reduced the circle to three to five years. The consequences are erosion of soil

and a resulting decline of soil fertility. (Mohsin, 1995, 104; Mey 1988, 36)

4.2. The Settlement Programme of the Bangladeshi Government

The land problem, already acute after the construction of Kaptai dam, was aggravated even

more in the 1970s, when the Bangladeshi government initiated a settlement programme for

landless plainsmen.

Bangladesh, with its agrarian economy, is substantially dependent on land. Densely popu-

lated, the country had 0.29 acres per-capita land in 1992 (Mohsin, 1997, 113). But even 0.5

acres cannot be seen as sufficient for subsistence production and are the absolute minimum

level for existence (Jessen 1997, 59). That brings about immense problems with providing

food for the roughly 120 Million Bangladeshis70 and regular floods make the situation even

worse. In contrast, the CHT are regarded to as sparsely populated71, as 0.75% of Bangladeshs’

population inhabits 9.2% of the land (Siddique 1997, 1).

In 1979 the government72 changed Rule 34 of the 1900 Manual and removed the restrictions

against settlements by non-residents in the CHT. Furthermore the GOB decided to settle about

30,000 Bengalis on government-owned “Khas”73 land. Each family got five acres of land,

some cash and provisions. In August 1980 another settlement phase was initiated, in 1982 a

68 The problems which arose after the construction of Kaptai dam have already bee described. Lots of people did not get any land as compensation, or if they got it was not equivalent to the land they had before 69 Cultivating the fringe land means that during the dry season rice seedling’s are planted and after its harvest the land is filled with weeds. These rot under water when the level goes up again and remain there till the next rice seedlings are planted 70 Meyers Taschenbuchlexikon (1995), Bd. 3, S. 29 71 there are various surveys to examine the actual capacity of land in the CHT. One example is given in the fol-lowing part with the survey of an Canadian Company. Another example of calculating how much available land is in the CHT gives Abedin (1997, 14). He argues that the geo-natural formation has to be analysed, and that instead of 5093 sq. miles the CHT area comprises 11.439.25 sq. miles, if geometrically measured. It has to be said that his book as a whole is written in a conservative, “pro-bengali” manner. This example shows that the availability of land is discussed very controversially. Different actors use it for political purposes 72 At that time under Prime Minister General Zia 73 Khas land is regarded by the Hill People as common land which has been cultivated by them for centuries (Mohsin, 1997a, 99). Officially khas land is government-owned land available for distribution to people (Rashiduzzaman 1998, 659)


third one. (Mohsin, 1997, 112) Altogether it is estimated that about 400,000 Bengalis had

been settled by 1984 (The Guardian 6.3.1984 cited in: Mohsin, 1997, 113). But it seemed that

nobody had taken into consideration that the problem of land or conflict because of land in the

CHT already arose after the construction of the Kaptai dam. Roy (1995, 57) argues by using a

survey made by a Canadian company in 1964 that the state of available land in the CHT was

already very critical before the dam-construction:

- Only 3.2% of the land in the CHT graded as class “A” (suitable for all purpose agricul-ture)

- 2.9% was graded as class “B” (suitable for terraced agriculture and fruit gardening in part)

- class “C” was about 15.5% (suitable for horticulture and partly afforestation)

- class “C-D” accounted for 1.4%, which is suitable for afforestation and horticulture after terracing the slopes

- 77% of the land constituted class “D”, and therefore exceptionally suitable for afforesta-tion

This shows that the vast majority of the land cannot be used for cultivation, except for affore-

station (Roy, 1995, 57). Taking into account that according to the 1974 census about 80,000

to 100,000 families had to share 270,000 acres of suitable land, that is class A, B and half of

the land classified C and C-D which could be used for cultivation. Consequently each family

could have between approximately 3.7 and 4.63 acres, while the government-assessed mini-

mum is 5 acres. (Roy, 1995, 59)

The resettlement projects were carried out without informing the rajas and mouza headmen,

although according to the CHT Manual they should have been involved in the decision proc-

ess. The regulations as well as other traditional rights, conventions and practices of the Hill

People were therefore largely violated. Many of the settlers did not get adequate land and a

large number of encroachments took place. Settlers grabbed land violently and many thou-

sands of the Hill People were uprooted and pushed into the neighbouring countries for a

second time (Roy, 1995, 60). Many Hill People who actually possessed land somewhere have

no chance to get it back because of the militant behaviour of the settlers who had captured it

in the meantime. Several interviewees reported having been affected by these processes. Dur-

ing the days I spent in the Hill Tracts two Hill People were killed in such a dispute74.

These disputes highlighted the conflict between the Hill People and GOB. The settlement

programmes could not be carried out without heavy militarisation, since Shanti Bahini vio-

lently opposed these. The military worked together with the settlers. On the one hand the

military gave them enough power to encroach on the lands of the Hill People by equipping

Eva Gerharz

them with government-provided arms, on the other hand they were used as “human shields”

in battles with Shanti Bahini forces (Lee 1996, 74). Strategically, indigenous villages were

destroyed, Hill People were put into cluster villages75 or had to flee (CHT Commission, 1991,

64ff). At the same time the Shanti Bahini also put enormous pressure on the Hill People by

tax collecting76 and kidnapping for example, in search of eventual collaborators. From 1980

to 1985 Shanti Bahini killed 44 and kidnapped 84 Hill People (CHT Commission 1991, 43f).

4.3. A Demographic Shift and Its Political Dimension

“The people of the Chittagong Hill Tracts want to survive as human beings, nothing else”

There is evidence for the assumption, that the settlement programmes involved an effort to

establish a demographic shift in the CHT for political reasons. The development of the CHT

demography shows that while in 1947 the Hill People constituted about 98% of the popula-

tion, in 1956 already less, that is 91%. The Bengali population rose from 1961 with 12% to

40% in 1981 and as much as 50% in 1991. In Bandarban and Kagrachari districts the Bengalis

account for the majority with 53% and 52% (Mohsin, 1997, 119). “When I was a girl you

could see mainly tribals on the street, now they are a minority” asserted one lady during my

field work.

In the following I will concentrate on the political dimensions of land as well as on the as-

pects of identity construction in relation to land.

The fact that the settlement programmes were considered non-natural or political migration

processes77 gave the Hill People more motives for the feeling of being deprived and disre-

garded. The feeling of being disadvantaged excluded them from Bangladeshi society more

that it had integrated them. The impression of being a minority in their own “country” has

provoked processes of constructing a “counter identity”. The Hill People have been dispos-

sessed of their traditional rights over land78, which is an important issue for an agro-based

society. The possibility to cultivate land is essential to survival in the Hills due to the lack of

74 Interview with a member of the Chakma group. The incidents happened in August 1999. 75 cluster villages are usually located around army camps or close by. They were justified as providing economic development for the tribal people. Army personnel controls movements in and out the settlement. The cluster village programme was actually installed because of Shanti Bahini actions, partly to protect the army camps from Shanti Bahini attacks, partly to control the Hill People so they do not to participate or support the Shanti Bahini 76 Tax collection and kidnapping for ransom was carried out by Shanti Bahini among the Hill People and the Bengalis by force to secure their income 77 These terms were introduced by Mohsin (1997, 112) 78 The “government owned Khas land” was regarded as common property. For further information see Mohsin, 1997a, 99; Roy 1955, Mey 1988, 47


economic infrastructure79. Possessing and cultivating land in such a society determines

the processes of identity construction as it is a part of lifestyle based on tradition. Although

tradition can be understood as a historical construct (Kößler 1995, 7) it is part of a people’s

culture and in the case of the CHT tradition is the feature which integrates the different groups

equally. Though especially the Chakma had largely shifted from jhumming to ploughland cul-

tivation, jhum still or again determines their identification as Hill People. The choice of terms

like “jhumma” for self description or “Jhummaland” (Mohsin 1997, 197) for describing the

CHT in the case of autonomy by the JSS demonstrates and gives evidence for this assump-

tion. Hence besides the fact that the vast majority of the Hill People depend on land,

emphasising the significance of jhum relates to the demarcation from Bengali society, which

is not less agro-based80. For self-identification in demarcation from others is tradition very

important as a historical construction (Kößler 1995, 7).

The term jhumma was ultimately introduced to unify the Hill People against the threat of the

Bengali majority in Bangladesh and can be seen as a political construct81. One has to take into

consideration that there is a difference between the usage of the term jhum for describing a

political project (as in the case of the JSS) and the usage for self-ascription in every day life.

During my field research I have never heard somebody describe himself and those he identi-

fies himself with by using the term jhumma. This term moreover relates to the political

strategy of the JSS and the attempt to unify the Hill People under one designation. But that

does not mean that the Hill People do not feel unified. Likewise they refer to terms like

“tribal” or “pahari” which can be explained from the fact that the invention of jhumma is his-

torically a very recent phenomenon, while “tribal” or “pahari” were used for self-ascription as

well as for ascription by others long before. The term jhumma can therefore be seen as politi-

cally invented, but the actual meaning of the term, the mode of cultivation, presents an

essential part of Hill People’s life and functions as a symbol for unity.

In the next chapter I will argue that not just land issues were affected by settling plainsmen,

but trade and economic infrastructure as well.

4.4. The “Tribal Market” in Rangamati

79 Will be examined in the following chapter 80 and therefore not less depended on land 81 The nomenclature was adopted among other reasons as an assertion of Hill Peoples equality and an attempt to come out of the negativism associated with tribalism, although it originally derives from Chittagonian dialect (Mohsin 1998, 82)

Eva Gerharz

Early in the morning I had to get up to visit the „tribal market“ in Rangamati82. I was told that

it is something special. I was fetched at 7.00 a.m. by a friend to go to the market, which was

about five minutes to walk. Some Chakma ladies were sitting on the side of the main road,

their goods in front of them. They had only a few things, bamboo-shoots, pumpkins, fruit,

spices and herbs which are, I was told, special tribal ones. The women were sitting together

on the ground, two or three of them chatting. A few metres further I saw several male Bengali

vendors with a much broader range on offer: They had fruit and some vegetables as well as

mainly fresh sea fish, dried fish, fish paste, chilli, onions and readymade things like buckets,

pots, and other goods made of plastic. Their way of presenting the goods was fundamentally

different. They had tables and big bowls for their goods. I walked around between the Bengali

vendors with a wide range of goods and the few Chakma women sitting on the floor present-

ing their few goods. After a short while the Chakma ladies started packing. They put their

belongings into the kalong, a basket made of bamboo which is carried on the back with a strap

on the forehead83, to go to the next market. My informant asserted that they try to sell the

goods so that they can change the small amount of money they earn into rice or other neces-

sary things. After that they would take a boat to reach their villages across the lake or walk

home with the kalong on their back.

I was not really attracted by that event and was surprised that this was the much-praised tribal

market. This bazaar was obviously dominated by Bengalis whereas the Chakma ladies

seemed to be something like a rare object being left over from former times. Later I learned

how important this observation was for my research. I saw another tribal market in Bandarban

with nearly the same situation: Marma women selling a few goods, mainly bamboo-shoots,

pumpkins and some sweet-water crabs. I realised that none of the shopkeepers in the whole

town of Bandarban looked like a hill person. Later an interviewee stated that there are some

shopkeepers who look like Hill People, but they would come from Arakan in Burma. Another

obvious feature was that nearly all rikshawalas as well as the babytaxi-drivers were Bengalis.

Even in the tribal areas of Bandarban I saw lots of Bengalis in the shops. These observations

reveal that the Hill People are a minority nowadays among the crowds of Bengalis, but also

the fact that the Hill People are clearly disadvantaged in economic activities and absolutely

dependent on the economic structures established by the Bengali people in the area.

82 This is a description of an observation in Rangamati at 14th August 1999 83 Although I was told that this kind of basket is exclusively used by Chakma, I have observed that the other Hill People in the CHT as well as those in the other parts of Bangladesh, that is the Santals, Garo, etc. use this kind of basket known in Nepal e.g.


4.5. Trade and Economy

The trade relations from the plains into the CHT have a long tradition. Already in the pre-

colonial days the Hill People exchanged their goods for those of the Bengalis at market

places. The Bengalis came by boat from the plains around Chittagong, the Hill People from

their villages (van Schendel 1992, 85; van Schendel 1992a, 114). The colonial policy allowed

the Hill People to trade with the Bengalis although the area was restricted according to the

1900 Manual. The trade between these two groups was based on the exchange of necessary

goods which were not available in the Hills, like dried fish and salt for example and timber

and bamboo which were, in contrast hardly available in the plains (van Schendel 1992a, 115).

But a relatively high level of self-sufficiency remained and left the Hill People living mainly

on subsistence production84. They had not just the staple food which was grown in the jhum,

but also clothes and other goods produced by themselves.

Already between 1930 and 1947 when the restriction on the CHT was loosened, a lot of plains

people entered the area most of them were shopkeepers and tradesmen85. They lived in the

bazaar areas and had little interest in land (Roy 1995, 65). Important for the further argumen-

tation is to recognise that the restriction itself, although the aim was to protect the Hill People,

has isolated them from social changes in the outside world (Ahmed 1993, 34). The Hill Peo-

ple were not prepared for integrating themselves into the mainstream development and

adopting the patterns of market and trade which were established by the newcomers.

The great impact came with the construction of the Kaptai dam, the opening of the Hills and

the influx of Bengali settlers with Zia’s regime in the 1970s. After the Hill People had lost

most of their plain lands used for cultivating the socio-economic structure had to change im-

mensely86. Without land the Hill People had to search for alternatives for surviving and

securing a livelihood. The agro-based society shifted towards a structure more determined by

trade, economy and market. At the same time Bengali people who were familiar with com-

mercial fishing and plough cultivation came from the plains, which the Hill People had to

learn first after being disrupted. They could not go into the trade and market economy since

84 According to the “Bielefelder Verflechtungsansatz” three modes of production can be distinguished: formal production, informal production and subsistence production. Subsistence Production can be seen as a relatively autonomous mode of production. These three modes are entwined with each other, more or less according to the impact of capitalist market economy in a society (Evers 1987) 85 These tradesmen came mainly from the plains around Chittagong to which the Hill People always had a rela-tively good relationship, at least because of the long trading tradition. Chittagong can also be seen as a connecting point with the outside world. It is quite necessary to distinguish between those plainsmen from the area of Chittagong and those coming from other parts of Bangladesh, the crucial feature for distinguishing here is language, I will examine that broader in Chapter 6.1. 86 As already discussed in the previous chapters

Eva Gerharz

market and trade structures had already been occupied by Bengalis as a socio-economic sur-

vey of six Chakma-majority villages by Rahman87 shows:

“about 78 market places and bazars in the district ... are owned, run and controlled by the Bengali population” and the tribal people are “totally dependent on the market for exchange [of their agricultural goods] and the cash income generated ... to purchase the provisions of life” and “[l]eft in the hands of the Bengali traders there is a feeling among the tribal people that they are being exploited” (Bertocci 1989, 153)

Although the Hill People were at large familiar with fishing before the implementation of the

Kaptai dam, none of them had the idea of selling the fish, because it was exclusively for the

family consumption (Ullah 1995, 54). Nowadays more and more people see fishing as one

possible income source88, although it is against their Buddhist faith as an informant asserted.

Some Hill People who had received some cultivable land tried fruit-gardening raising pineap-

ple, mango, jackfruit, lemon or bananas. But the problem here is marketing, transport and

storage. The fruit farmers are forced to sell the goods sometimes below the production costs

because the storage possibilities are very limited. When the Hill People have carried their

goods from their villages down to the markets the middlemen know that they will not take it

back home again if they do not get a reasonable amount of money for it. They are dependent

on selling it for lowest prices because they have no choice. Furthermore the absence of soil-

erosion control89 has led to a diminishing of profits (Ullah 1995, 75; Roy 1995, 85).

The extraction of forest products like timber and bamboo has been dominated by Bengalis

since the times of British rulership as it has largely been in the hands of gangs of wood-cutters

coming from the plains to manage the transport to Chittagong (Bertocci 1989, 151). Having

visited a wood storage place in Rangamati this is obvious even nowadays.

Apart from forest products which are principally not finished in the Hills but transported to

Chittagong, there is very little industrial development in the CHT. Although the Karnaphuli

power project and the Chandraghona Paper Mill have revolutionised industrialisation the Hill

People could hardly benefit from this. Ahsan (1989, 964) argues that “tribal employment in

major industries ... has been less than 1%”90 Further I was told that Rangamati has a dairy

nearby which employs some of the local people91.

87 Rahman, A, (1982): Social Development in a Tribal Society: Socio-economic Profile of the Northern Valleys in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, Dhaka, Institute of Business Administration, University of Dhaka, cited in: Ber-tocci 1989, 153 88 In 1981 about 20-25% of the 3000 registered fishermen were Hill People (Islam 1981, 1217) 89 which is always necessary in a hilly area 90 Ahsan 1989, 964. Unfortunately her argumentation does not give any further information about this number. It is not clear, if she means less than 1% of the tribals are employed in that project or 1% of the employees are tribal. Mohsin’s argumentation relates only to the paper mill project. She writes that it has employed less then


4.5. How the Hill People Perceive Their Economic Position

“That’s, our villagers are very poor and they live from hand to mouth. Most of the villagers have no their own land for cultivation and illiterate. So it is the only income source the day labour of their ... My elder brother is also married now and he is separate from us. He lives by fishing ... My younger sister is too married in the same village one year ago. Her husband does nothing but day labour ... In spite of my having parents they cannot bear my educational expenses as he is old and ignorant.” There is no earning way in our village or town. Even in our village or town day labour is not available ... I’m studying through these suffering and distress.”92

Talking to the villagers I recognised that their most essential problem is land, since their eco-

nomic position is heavily dependent on it. An empirical study conducted by the Bangladesh

Academy for Rural Development (BARD) in 16 mouzas in all three CHT districts in 1995

investigates the occupational structure. According to their data 72% of the respondents are

still jhum cultivators. Besides 15,2% are day-labourers, 9.2% service holders, 2.6% business-

men and 1% housewives (Quddus 1996, 30)93

According to my empirical data the Hill People were predominantly critical about state poli-

tics: “We are a minority in this country, depressed and disadvantaged”. Although the Bengali

settlers are blamed very often, I have heard statements like: “The Bengalis here are not in a

better situation then we are.” Besides land issues administrative and official matters were also

mentioned. Tripura and Marma interviewees in Bandarban asserted: “one problem is how we

are deprived by these people...”. Asking for examples I was told that decision-takers in most

of the institutions like banks or political institutions are Bengalis. They usually prefer Ben-

galis. There are indigenous service holders, but they usually have the junior status and no

rights to take decisions. When people want to get loans from a bank, they have to prove their

landownership. As 80% of the Hill People in Bandarban are landless or can not make sure

they are landowners, they have no chance of getting a credit. Being disadvantaged was like-

wise confirmed with the argument that the Bengalis have the power to control the market

prices.

Economic deprivation, combined with the already discussed land problems and political im-

plications therefore plays a crucial role in the processes of group formation. The Hill People

1% of the local population (Mohsin 1997, 106). I guess that they have used the same reference. Mohsin refers to her own work from 1996 and Ahsan to a publication of Siddharth Chakma’s, but I guess that they both come from the same source 91 Unfortunately I cannot go into this more deeply because of a of lack of available literature 92 A letter received from a boy from the village Vedvedi close to Rangamati on 11.10.1999. I met him when I was invited to the village on 18.09.1999 93 The numbers relate to mouzas which are exclusively inhabited by Hill People

Eva Gerharz

perceive that their possibilities of economic development are immensely hampered by the

dominance of settled plains people and their economic strength, especially after they have

been alienated from their land. The transformation of modes of production due to land scar-

city favours the plainsmen. The lack of the skills required within this economic transition has

left the Hill People “backward”, although they try to compensate for the so-called backward-

ness with alternative skills like, for example, a high level of education. Their chance would

have been to integrate into the given economic structures of the Bengali society, but most of

the attempts failed. Not just “backwardness” in the sense of different structures and modes of

production94 hampers economic development but also being disadvantaged in administrative

structures and decisions which have been, although established by British, continued by Ben-

galis. The fact that administrative and economic structures are mainly determined by the

Bengalis can be seen as strongly related to the role of the state in Bangladesh. The state-

centred paradigm of nationalism in Bangladesh, which by Constitution excludes minorities,

produces advantages for the majority leaving minorities behind. Although economic depriva-

tion need not necessarily be traced back to an explicit aim of state politics, the settlement

programmes would give evidence for that argument95. On the other hand has the CHTDB es-

tablished lots of different development programmes. The foundation of the Development

Board was guided by General Zia’s attention to accelerating the process of economic devel-

opment in the CHT and the aim was to integrate the Hill People “into the mainstream”96

(Ahmed 1993, 57). An informant has illustrated the problem of these development intentions:

“why do they build pavements when the people here do not use it? They have no idea of what

a pavement is used for, they are sitting on it and chatting”. What becomes obvious here is that

development issues were related exclusively to ideas of structural development. Even more

evidence for this argument is given by looking at the streetmap of the CHT: constructing

streets was not for developing the infrastructure, but to provide the military access to the hills.

Nearly all streets are constructed for a strategic military cause (CHT Commission 1992, 83).

The settlers from the plains indeed were those who profited most, as many of their villages

are close to army camps so as to be protected from Shanti Bahini threat. The accusation

94 In Bangladesh jhum cultivation has been considered as backward due to a world-wide paradigm (Torres-Trueba 1986) and is still. Even nowadays this opinion dominates the ideas of rural development in the CHT, as the changes introduced in the Hills, i.e. shift from “food gathering practices to cultivation” and the shift to plough cultivation are seen as revolutions. Even the introduction of the market mechanism by middlemen is considered to be a step forward (Siddique 1997, 3) 95 Which is expressed in the literature for example in Mohsin 1997 and Mey 1988 96 One measure was the introduction of reservation for Hill People in jobs, universities and other educational systems. For education issues see Chapter 5


against the CHTDB does not just relate to a not adjusted structural development but to a

political strategy as well:

“The CHTDB was established in 1976 by late Ziaur Rahman to fight the Shanti Bahini. It is a purely political organisation to bribe the tribals. Loans are given for private purpose, to busi-nessmen and tribal leaders ... Yes, it is mostly a political bribe to tribal leaders to buy them off so that they would not help the Shanti Bahini” (CHT Commission 1992, 84).

One of my informants expressed this similarly when he stated that “development in the CHT

was not more then development of their pockets”97.

The issue of economic disadvantage is therefore a result of processes of identity construction

on the one hand and invigorates these on the other hand. The GOB has marginalised the Hill

People as a group with another identity in order to integrate them into centralised state-

politics by using military forces and development programmes. As a result especially the

plainsmen in the hills have been advantaged by these institutions along the previously existing

ethnic segregation. Instead of supporting the Hill People, the not less poor newly settled

plainsmen are those gaining profit from these steps. This fact in turn created a feeling of being

disadvantaged among the Hill People, alienates them from the Bengali society and strength-

ens the inclusion within the group of Hill People, as all of them are equally affected.

Consequently homogenisation98 processes are the result as well as processes of exclusion in

respect to the advanced Bengalis.

5. Education

The most crucial dilemma among the Chakma is to be educated, eventually even to graduate,

but not to have an adequate job. This can be mainly regarded as a problem of economic infra-

structure and as a consequence of a relatively highly developed educational system in the

CHT. The literacy rate in the CHT is comparatively high for Bangladesh. From 1974 to 1991

the literacy rate in the CHT increased from 18.2% to 27.6%99 (The Independent, Editorial

09.07.1999). This fact has mainly to do with an exceptionally high rate among the Chakma

which is estimated to be 70% in comparison to 28% among the Bengalis living in the CHT

97 He did not mention whose pockets he was thinking of. I guess that he means those who are responsible for the planning of development projects, that are not just Bengalis but Hill People involved in these processes as well, because I have heard accusations against tribal political leaders like those who are a member of parliament as well as those involved in the Ministry of CHT affairs quite often 98 Although I would assume that there is an obvious tendency towards the homogenisation of the Hill People, there is enough evidence to prove the opposite. Indeed there are demonstrable processes of seclusion among the Hill People. One main reason is the advanced position of the Chakma within political and educational issues. See Chapter 5 and 6

Eva Gerharz

and the Marma and Tripura among whom about 20% are literate (Rashiduzzaman 1998, 660).

The educational system in the CHT has a long tradition, which is directly related to the impor-

tance and necessity of scriptural knowledge in Buddhist societies as well as to the rulership of

British authorities. In the following I will try to analyse three questions: What is the state of

tribal education in the CHT? Why are the Chakma more advanced than the Bengalis as well

as to the other Hill Peoples? How does the state of education influence the processes of iden-

tity construction?

5.1. The State of Education among the Hill People

There are different strains of educational systems in the CHT. The most important in fact is

the role of governmental institutions. From the sixties on the government had established a

large number of primary schools, as well as high schools and colleges. The Rangamati college

was set up in 1965 and upgraded into a degree college in 1970. A present there are four gov-

ernment colleges in the CHT. The contribution of the CHTDB plays also a role in the field of

education. It gave Tk 52 lakh as grant bursary to 5,500 students of the CHT until 1990. (The

Independent, Editorial 09.07.1999)

Nevertheless some people consider these steps accomplished by the Government as clearly

advantaging the Bengali population. The schools are mainly in the densely populated valleys

while many of the Hill People live in villages, and reaching the schools is much more difficult

for them (Mohsin 1997, 127). Another problem is the curriculum of the government schools,

where the medium of instruction is Bengali exclusively. A teacher at Rangamati college in-

sisted to me that he would love to teach in English because he is much more familiar with it

and it is easier for him but he is not allowed to100. Since the curriculum is the same as for the

other government schools all over Bangladesh, it is of Bengali character. The cultural and

historical content is Bengali. The governmental educational institutions are therefore an in-

strument for assimilation to the Bengali culture. The Bengali language becomes more familiar

than their own traditional one, in the “hidden curriculum”101 values, trends and ideas are

transmitted which include modes of dresses for example.102 There are two alternatives for the

Hill students: to assimilate themselves to the Bengali mainstream or feel alienated by it and

99 It must be taken into account that the relation tribal - non-tribal changed immensely until 1991, the ratio of population was 51% tribals and 49% non-tribals 100 One has to bear in mind that the educational system was based on the English language until the independ-ence of Bangladesh and especially the older people are more familiar with it. See chapter about language 101 For the notion of hidden curriculum see Hannerz (1987, 554) 102 See Chapter about cultural differences, especially language and dress


express this by protest. This alienation from Bengali society involves a reflection on their

own group and identification with it. In other words: the feeling of being excluded from the

mainstream society has the manifestation of people’s own group as a consequence. Differ-

ences between the two become visible and evident, the immanent conflict is strengthened.

The processes typically involve group formations, in the case of the CHT students the, Pahari

Chattro Parishad which is associated to the JSS.

An alternative for the Hill People to avoid the problems of the government education is to

send the children to a private, non-governmental school. Not just Buddhist institutions103 have

established schools but also Christian initiatives as well as non-religious ones. As a relict

from colonialism the bigger towns have missionary schools, which have their own curriculum

which is often taught in English. Others are CCDB (Christian Council for Development of

Bangladesh) or World Vision. The latter has established in co-operation with Fatima Rani

Catholic Church a residential school combined with an orphanage in Bandarban which I have

visited. The fathers insisted to me that they are not there to convert the mainly Tripura but for

developmental reasons. For the same purpose NGOs like BRAC have recently established

primary schools in Hill People’s villages.

5.2. The Advantaged Position of the Chakma

After the construction of the Kaptai dam many people, principally Chakma were uprooted

from their traditional way of life in an agrarian society104. The socio-economic and cultural

life of the Hill People has been effected enormously as well as the state of education in the

region. Although there had always been a great interest in education105, many people could

not afford to send their children to schools. As a consequence many Buddhist institutions had

set up orphanages to take children of poor families as well as orphans into residential schools.

One example which I have visited is the Monaghor Complex in Rangapai near Rangamati

town. This residential school provides education from primary up to high-school level com-

bined with vocational training in a carpentry for example, and it is the present home of

approximately 2,000 students106. With the support of the French government the possibility of

studying abroad can be offered to some of the scholars, this year for example approximately

103 the importance of Buddhist schools in the educational system will be seen in the following 104 I refer to my argumentation in the Chapters about history and land 105 Every Buddhist village traditionally had its own monastery in which education was held in high regard (CHT Commission, 1991, 103) 106 Informant’s estimation

Eva Gerharz

70 of them could go to France107. Some other institutions with a similar background are the

Bonophul-Complex in Dhaka as well as an orphanage in Calcutta. But there are projects of

this kind which are not exclusively for Buddhists, as the Murong-Complex in Shoalak108, es-

tablished with the help of UNICEF, shows.

The idea of these activities was to give the affected people education to prepare them for get-

ting a paid job and to “fight back”. The motto was “Education is mightier then sword”109.

Some asserted that the high educational level is a reaction on the economic strength of the

Bengalis and the Chakmas’ economical marginalisation. In fact, the Chakma seem to be very

proud of and especially the elite has great interest in education110. Those I met spoke perfect

English111 and supported education actively. Many of them were educated abroad, in India or

Britain. At the same time education relates to how the Chakma are described by others. Once

I talked to the cousin of the Marma Raja Aung Shui Prue Chowdury about the Chakma royal

family and their raja who is a barrister in Dhaka. He declared: “Yes, they are very active, well

educated, they are doing a lot”. The Marma raja is a raja by profession however. Being con-

scious about these differences leads to processes of exclusion, as a Marma who has visited the

Monaghor Complex in Rangamati district said. He told me that he could not participate in an

exchange programme with France because he was not a Chakma.

As the Chakma are those mainly engaging in the representation of the Hill People’s political

interests112, there seems to be a relationship between education and the “political conscious-

ness”. Engagement in political organisations presupposes a manifest identification with the

group which is represented by the organisation as well as the consciousness of the own iden-

tity (in demarcation to others). I would therefore assume that the rise of a “political

consciousness” is strongly tied to the state of education113 an individual has.

The divergence of the state of education among Chakma and the others goes back to the times

of decolonialisation. Already at that time the Chakma had been more educated and took the

leading political role in negotiations and representing Hill People’s interests (Ahmed 1993,

107 Information given by a staff member 108 mouza in Bandarban district dominated by Murong, about 15 kilometres from Bandarban town 109 statement of an informant at Rangamati 110 see also statements of several members of the Chakma elite including Raja Devasish Roy in Ullah (1995, 70f) 111 For somebody who is going to do research in the area it is quite useful, that nearly every man, and the women sometimes too, speaks at least some words of English and communication seems to be much easier then in the plains 112 for the Chakma dominance in the JSS see Chapter 3 113 The term “state of education” does not specifically relate to formal education in the sense of being able to read, write or calculate. It merely describes the knowledge about principal and political rights, as well as the ability to overview one’s own situation in the context of larger organisational social structures. Quoting Hannerz, “Education is a cultural process, an organised way of giving individuals cultural shape” (1987, 553)


34). This gap has, with regard to the push given by the anomic situation the Chakma

were in after Kaptai dam, widened. The representation of interests which is mainly followed

by the JSS as the political elite on the one hand and the traditional elite on the other, is largely

dependent on the engagement of the Chakma114. The Chakma here can be described as a stra-

tegic group (Evers 1988, Elwert 1989). The Chakma dominance within the JSS, although

productive in the creation of resistance against the Bengali majority, has provoked processes

of exclusion among the Hill People115. The policies of the JSS can even be regarded as a new

hegemony of the Chakma over the other Hill People116. Educational differences therefore play

an important role in the differentiation of societies and strengthen already existing cleavages.

6. Cultural Differences – Cultural Habits and Their Importance

To investigate cultural differences the concept of culture which is used in this paper must be

defined. The conception of culture in sociology comprises on a very general level “all that in

human society which is socially rather than biologically transmitted. ... Culture is thus a gen-

eral term for the symbolic and learned aspects of human society” (Marshall 1998, 137).

Although culture can be defined on a very general level, it always involves diversification. As

cultural features determine matters of self-ascription as well as ascription by others in interac-

tion, they are boundary-connected. Members of groups and their actions are evaluated and

judged by the diacriteria which determine membership by others and co-members (Barth

1998, 6).

Above all two cultural models can be distinguished in the case of my research topic: the

South-Asian (represented in the Bengali variant) and the Southeast Asian (in the Bur-

mese/Arakanese variant). The Hill Peoples can considered to comprise a continuum placed in

between these two models, according to the influences imposed on them over time117, the

Tripura on the South-Asian side, the Marma on the Southeast-Asian side118. The Chakma can

be placed linguistically and religiously somewhere in-between (van Schendel 1992, 106f.).

Within that broad frame it can be said that each group can develop an own culture as it distin-

guishes itself from others. Even smallest entities can have their own culture. Whenever a

group is categorised according to its own culture, that does not automatically imply that the

114 see Chapter 3.2.1. 115 for resistance against the Chakma dominated JSS and its political interests: see Chapter 3.2.1. 116 this thesis is proposed by Mohsin (1997) 117 This is of course a very complex system of influences over a long period of time, which cannot be examined at length here. Again, the construction of the basic differentiation is useful as well as necessary for my purpose.

Eva Gerharz

entity has a homogenous conglomerate of cultural features. It does not even mean that it is

particularly coherent (Hannerz 1989, 550).

At the same time it is necessary for my purpose to find categories which can be used to organ-

ise the description and analysis of cultural differences. As revealed by my empirical data,

language, dresses and religion are categories which are used for ascription by the people

themselves and seemed to me obviously clear modes of distinction. These categories are

therefore the most coherent aspects of culture which could be found and are furthermore re-

ferred to in the literature on ethnicity (Schlee 1996, 10). They therefore comprise the main

aspects of differentiating societies in the given context119. Religion in particular is a guiding

cultural system for differentiation as it influences a large number of different matters in every-

day life. Gender order for instance is usually a religiously determined phenomenon (Levi-

Strauss 1978, 404). The same is true for many habits I have observed in the field, in which the

Hill People differ from the Bengali population. A very obvious case for example are differ-

ences in food habits. While Muslims reject the consumption of pork and alcoholic drinks

because of religious norms, the Hill People do not have restrictions which condemn the con-

sumption of these120. Having alcoholic drinks is according to my experience even a very

important part of the Chakmas’ way of life121. The case of consuming pork was quite visible

in Bandarban, where one can easily distinguish the tribal from the non-tribal area by the num-

bers of pigs running around on the streets.

Besides these religiously determined differences I observed a lot of other things distinguish-

ing the Hill People from Bengalis. The usage of the kalong for carrying goods for example or

a characteristic way of constructing houses out of bamboo122. Another feature of distinction

which has been, I surmise, historically developed, are different modes of preparing food. I

could observe for instance that the Chakma boil vegetables instead of frying them which is

what the Bengalis do. Other spices and herbs are used for cooking, the instruments for grind-

118 The Marmas’ closeness to Burma, very obviously visible in the relationship of the term Marma and Myanmar for instance, has been examined in Chapter 1 already 119 I would like to emphasise again that this categorisation evolved out of my experiences in the field, and can be considered to be an axiomatic guiding differentiation which is, in my estimation, necessary for structuring this part of my paper. This is backed by my wish not to examine culture in its theoretical concepts but to analyse identity construction processes in a specific case of ethnic conflict 120 Although Buddhist the norms concerning an ascetic way of life include the rejection of alcoholic drinks and the taking of meat because of the condemnation to kill any living creature, a lot of Buddhist Hill People consume both. I was told by a Thai Buddhist, that these norms do predominantly affect those who “practice” religion, like monks for example, while it is quite common among the “normal” population not to follow these rules strictly. 121 This assumption is revealed in the literature commonly too. See Shelley 1992, 52 for example 122 for the characteristic way of constructing houses see Levi-Strauss 1951 or Mey 1988


ing spices differ from those used by Bengalis as well123. The ways of treating a foreigner are

different in respect to serving snacks or presenting alcohol before having a meal. All these

differing habits of managing everyday life124 contribute to the processes of diversification of

two (or more) groups and should be taken into account especially concerning processes of

identity construction. In the following dress, language and religion are treated in separate sec-

tions and are affiliated again in the last one under a general theoretical hypothesis which

derives from the analysis of the three.

6.1. Dress

“This is our national dress” said a Chakma lady when she entered my room to give me a

khadi in memory of my time in Rangamati. As there are 13 different groups living in the

CHT, every one has its own traditional dress125. Dress is an important characteristic since one

can see at first glance to which group someone belongs. The women are those who usually

still wear the traditional dresses, but that depends on which group they belong to and which

status they have. Some of the women’s dresses are more or less similar, for example the

Chakma and Tanchangya dress like the Tripura dress. It is a hand-woven skirt with stripes, a

blouse and a scarf. Colour and design vary, details are used for distinction in these cases, for

example jewellery. The Marma dress is a skirt of a lungi-type, but not tied in the middle as the

men do but on the side of the hips, mostly in a colourful design. The Murong women tradi-

tionally wear a one-piece cloth which covers neither knees nor breast. Contrarily the male Hill

People I have seen do not wear traditional dresses at all. Most of them are dressed either in

western clothes, or in lungis.

It is a common phenomena in South Asia that women preserve traditions expressed by cloth-

ing, while men’s clothes symbolise modernity (Wichterich 1998, 198). This fact is related to

the occupation of the so-called public space mainly by men while women are found in primar-

ily domestic spheres of social life (Kabeer 1991, 129). In the Islamic Bengali society gender

seclusion is a part of the gender order126. As the public space is increasingly occupied by the

Bengalis, gender seclusion related to public space seems to be transferred.

Nevertheless dresses are connected with a symbolic value as expressions of cultural differ-

ence. Especially women have taken over the part to represent cultural difference by using

123 I was told by a Chakma that they use a mortar made out of clay, while the Bengali variant is to grind spices with the help of a stone roll 124 Where I could add a lot of other features 125 Photographs of Chakma and Tripura dresses are to be found in the Appendix

Eva Gerharz

markers in the Hill Peoples society as well as in the Bengali society (Kabeer 1991, 121). The

clothing matters are a method of defining or representing a group identity on two levels: on

the one hand it demonstrates the affiliation to one’s own group, on the other the dress shows

the demarcation from others (Tarlo 1996, 318). The highly developed diversity of the Hill

People’s dresses demonstrates the exclusiveness of every group. The dual processes of differ-

entiation and identification therefore according to inclusion and exclusion can be understood

as a matter of classification according to horizontal demarcation lines or regarding hierarchies

and rivalry. In respect to the different Hill Peoples the diversity of dresses can be interpreted

as a distinctive mark based on horizontal structures. Some groups, the Kuki or the Murong for

example have been reported to be highly exclusive127 by several authors (van Schendel 1997,

105; Mohsin 1997, 20; Löffler 1986). This relates mainly to those living on the ridges of the

hills128. Limited infrastructure and mobility has left those groups largely isolated. Contact to

strangers could mean threat to the space occupied by the group.

A look at the areas of settlements illustrates this argument129: The different peoples, except

the Marma, are largely concentrated in particular areas, the Tripura for example in the north-

ern part of the CHT, the Murong in the Southwest and the Khumi in the South. On the other

hand there has been a complex structure of exchange between some groups, for example the

Chakma and Tanchangya. Contact among some of the different groups has been quite inten-

sive130, especially when they share one religion (van Schendel 1997, 105; Löffler 1968).

Hence differences in dressing illustrate the isolation of some groups, while similarities can be

regarded as a result of hybridisation processes of the different indigenous societal systems.

The Bengali influence, as well as the British, has furthermore transformed habits of dressing,

particularly in respect to demands of clothing which cover certain parts of the body within

ethic-religious conventions131. The traditional dresses do usually not fulfil these norms. An

informant explained that the traditional dress of the Murong for example has changed so that

it covers the knees and now usually covers the breast. I could observe that some Murong do

not even wear the traditional dress at all but shalwar kameez or sari however. Though this

could be regarded as a sign for Bengalisation or foreign influence in general, nevertheless

more pragmatic aspects have to be taken into account. Dresses as traditions are changeable

126 See the work of Astrid Marxen: “Negotiating gender. Changing Lifestyles of Female Students in Dhaka” 127 An aspect which will be discussed in Chapter Language more broadly 128 For the main distinction of two groups, those living on the hill tops and those living in the valleys see Chapter 1 129 see map in Appendix 130 It would be interesting to examine the origin or meaning of similarities between the dresses of the Hill People and those in other parts of South(east)asia there are obviously similarities


according to needs and circumstances of every-day life (Bausinger 1986 cited in

Kößler 1995, 8). I would assume that especially those having regular contact to Bengalis pre-

fer a sari or a shalwar kameez in order not to attract attention by their clothing. Dresses are an

obviously visible mode of distinction. In respect to militarisation and threat132, one would

assume that assimilation is a strategy for being protected from risks to a certain extent.

I have observed that especially women of higher status do not use the traditional dress any

longer. Better situated Chakma women usually wear a sari or shalwar kameez at least when

going out. One has to take in consideration that some of these women have been educated at

the universities in Chittagong or Dhaka where they had to accommodate to the surrounding,

as a Marma explained: “When we are going to Dhaka or Chittagong, our women cannot wear

these traditional dresses”. Nevertheless it seems contradictory that especially those conscious

about their distinct identity133 do not insist upon traditional dresses. Being aware of the con-

tradiction one Chakma argued that it is more and more difficult to get the traditional dresses

in the shops because of the Bengali cultural impact. But this is indeed, as I have observed, not

the case. There are several shops selling the traditional clothes in Rangamati as well as in

Bandarban134. I would assume that the changes in dressing can merely regarded to be a result

of processes of differentiation according to socio-economic status and therefore according to

hierarchies. The structure of the Chakma society with its system determined by order accord-

ing to clan has been strongly influenced by Hindu elements 135for years and therefore adopted

hierarchical structures (van Schendel 1997, 106). Distinctions can additionally be made be-

tween those having contact to the “mainstream culture”136 and those living more or less upon

traditional values and habits. Among these two groups hierarchical structures are obviously

related to socio-economic status. But the choice of a sari does not necessarily mean an assimi-

lation to Bengali culture; it can merely be seen in respect to the previous argument as related

to the influence of Hindu Culture. My data show that those Hill People, emphasising their

distinctiveness from the Bengalis, try to construct a justification for the transformation of

clothing matters, implying an assimilation to the dominant Bengali culture. One example is

132 the argument here relates to human rights violations and oppression which are examined in some of the other chapters, for example 6.3 133 The assumption that the awareness of the own identity and educational status are related to each other is dis-cussed in Chapter 5 134 There are for example the government installed factories and BCSIC shops or the indigenous NGO Green Hill 135 A typical Hindu tradition I have observed during the field research is to touch the feet of somebody honour-able and elderly people for greeting 136 The meaning of the term mainstream in the context here is indicated in Chapter 4. Mainstream means nothing more then the dominant Bengali society with its structures and content

Eva Gerharz

the explanatory construct for the shalwar kameez categorically given in a reply by a Chakma

to my question why some Chakma women wear it although it is a Bengali dress: “the shalwar

kameez is not a Bengali dress, it comes originally from Pakistan”. I put the same question to

someone in Bandarban concerning lungis, and his answer was: “these lungis we are wearing

are originally from Burma”. Interestingly I could observe a difference between the Chakma

and the Marma in respect to this: while the better situated Chakma women in Rangamati pre-

ferred a sari, I saw in Bandarban even among those belonging to the traditional and political

elite wearing the Marma skirt. Recognising that the Marma dress itself leaves much more

space for variations in style than the Chakma dress, which is relatively fixed in its design, I

would assume that the changes of dresses among the Chakma should not be interpreted as a

more advanced assimilation of the Chakma, but could be merely a matter of fashion or life-

style based on hierarchical structures.

Traditional dresses are a female phenomenon. Its a common occurrence in South Asia, that

women are those for whom the interpretation of tradition intrinsic to communal identity has

restrictive implementations, not just in clothing matters, but in regard to other rituals and

practices as well (Dube 1998, 106). Dresses distinguish according to horizontal and hierarchi-

cal structures of society. The latter is, according to my data and interpretations, not

necessarily related to questions of ethnic identity among the CHT peoples. The assimilation to

Bengali culture in dressing matters does not imply the acceptance of Bengali culture in gen-

eral, but can be traced back to processes of taking over parts of a dominating culture, which

claims for itself to be advanced and modern, while the Hill People are “backward” according

to the paradigm of Bengali nationalism. The process of constructing a nation out of cultural,

linguistic, religious and ethnic attributes are determined as “high” culture which gets the

prominence (Ahmed 1996, 109).The fact that men are attracted by wearing western clothes

gives evidence for this assumption137. By constructing justifications for the use of Bengali

clothes the people demarcate themselves from Bengali culture on the basis of being conscious

of the difference. Dress therefore, as one aspect of a very complex system of cultural bounda-

ries, have to be seen in the context of political structures.

6.2. Language

137 In the case of women western clothes do largely not fulfil the claims determined by religious conventions of the dominant Bengali society


Every one of the different ethnic groups in the Hill has a language of its own. Nowadays

most of the people are at least bilingual as they have to understand Chittagonian138 or Bengali

when they communicate with Bengalis or, in some cases, with Hill People not belonging to

their own group. The different languages are more or less connected to each other. Most of

them belong to the Tibeto-Burmese linguistic family, like Tripura for example. The Marma

language can considered to be a form of the Arakanese language in Burma in the spoken as

well as in its written form (Bernot 1960). A second group is the Kuki-Chin group, to which

the oral languages of the Pankhua, Bawm, Kheyang, Khumi, Lushai and Kuki belong. Inter-

esting about these groups is that the Kuki for example neither learnt other languages nor

allowed others to learn their language; the Khumi even believed that if they learn another lan-

guage they will lose the power to resist evil (Mohsin 1997, 17ff). This characteristic can be

related to the fear of being threatened by others, illustrated by Shelley’s assertion that the

Khumi build their houses on tree-tops on the top of the hills. The villages are protected by a

bamboo wall. Nobody is allowed to enter without their permission (Shelley 1992, 61). The

Lushai were extremely ferocious until they were pacified and Christianised by the British

(Mohsin 1997, 18). Illustrated here is the extreme exclusiveness of the different, especially

the smaller groups. These characteristics show that they had lived very isolated from others

without contact or, as Löffler (1968) shows, in multiethnic communities where their own

identity was greatly emphasised. This is indeed an important issue for identity construction as

the rejection of contact with others is strongly related to a very strong feeling of belonging

together within the group (Elwert 1989, 448).

As my contact during the field research was concentrated mainly on Marma and Chakma, I

would like to emphasise the case of the latter here . Bernot (1960, 145f.) writes: “Very little is

known concerning the ancient Chakma language. Nowadays, men and women of this group

speak Bengali, only or more precisely the Chittagonian Bengali ... their ancient writing was

very near to that of the Burmese – though nowadays they use Bengali writing – ... The

Chakma group appears to be an example of a Mongoloid group giving up its own language to

the benefit of the Indo-European”. According to my own data this is not true. Language was

an issue which interested me a lot, and I asked several times about it. My interview partners

explained that the Chakma language is still used among members of the group besides Chit-

tagonian dialect, which is especially favoured among those who have a close relationship to

Chittagong (because of business for example). Additionally I realised, thanks to my infor-

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mants as well, that a creolisation139 of language has taken place. In a conversational context

language mixing is quite common among the Chakma as well as the Marma. Several times

when I asked in which language people are communicate they replied that “it is everything

together”. The complexity of different groups living on a very limited territory has led the

people to mix the different indigenous languages; only when a small minority of one group is

living with members of another one, they do adopt the language of the other group, it was

explained to me by a Marma. The former British influence means especially the older people

to be more familiar with English then with Bengali. The more educated Chakma I met tend to

mix Chakma with English and Chittagonian in informal conversations. The contradiction

which appears here again can be explained according to Hannerz (1987) not as matters of re-

jection or assimilation, but as processes in which new cultural “systems of meaning” emerge.

These creolisation processes in the case of language occur following the same mechanisms as

has been assumed in the case of dress already.

But to return to Chittagonian, which can be seen as the lingua franca of the area, as those

tradesmen from the plains coming to the CHT were from the area of Chittagong and the dia-

lect developed as the main medium of communication with them. The “new settlers” are

living, according to my experience, relatively isolatedly140. Although Bengali is the medium

of instruction at school, the common language in newspapers and other written media (besides

English), some Chakma let me know that they would never use it in informal conversations.

This rejection of that language must be seen in the political context. Bengali is the language

of the state of Bangladesh141, used by the settlers coming with the settlement programmes to

the Hills, while Chittagonian was known and used already before, as trade relations had made

it necessary for communicating with outsiders and those “naturally migrated” Bengalis who

have lived in the CHT already for a longer time. The Hill People seem to feel more attached

to them than to the “political” settlers. An interviewee maintained: “These Bengalis who are

originally here are becoming like us.” Bengali on the contrary was like a foreign language for

the Hill People. One older informant maintained that he did not even know Bengali when it

was introduced as the state-language.

138 Chittagonian is a dialect spoken in the south-east. According to my information it is a dialect of Bengali, but very different and for people coming from other parts of Bangladesh almost not understandable. I would com-pare it with the relation between Swiss German and German. 139 For the notion of creolisation see Hannerz 1987. Important here is that creolisation implies the formation of something new out of sources which are often originally widely different 140 my data reveal that the settlers live usually in separate villages or at least in separate areas of villages or towns. According to my experience there is no village to be found where Chakma and Muslim settlers are living together. 141 Bangladesh is by constitution a uni-lingual and uni-cultural state, see Chapter 3.


The Bengali language can therefore be seen as a symbol of the hegemony of the Bangladeshi

state, as it is for the Bengalis a symbol for their unity. Thus the so-called jhumma-identity is

based on non-Bengali language (Haque 1998, 132). Language is a good example to illustrate

the complexity of identity construction along cultural differences which must always be ana-

lysed with regard to political issues. The rejection of Muslim religion becomes relativised

when previously accepted language commonalties appear. Categorisation according to the so-

called boundary markers is therefore always tied to political aspects of ethnicity.

6.3. Religion

The variety of different religions is quite broad in the CHT. The Chakma, Marma, Tanchan-

gya, Chak, Kheyang are Buddhists, the Tripura believe in Hinduism and the Murong, Khumi

and the Kuki are Animists. Lushai, Bawm and Pankhua used to be Animists until they had

largely been Christianised by the British. The complex structure of religious beliefs among

the Hill People has its potential for conflicts in itself quite apart from the fact that none of the

groups believe in Islam. Religious differences therefore play a tremendous role in processes

of identity construction on two levels. First I will describe and analyse the conflicts arising

out of the Hill People’s relationship to the Bengali Muslim population, which are, remember-

ing the importance of religion in Bangladeshi nationalism in particular, a constitutive feature

of demarcation and group-formation. The second part will deal with the complexity of relig-

ious differences among the Hill Peoples themselves and the resulting consequences for a

“possible” collective identity.

With the militarisation of the CHT and the move towards an Islamic orientation in Bangla-

desh’s state policies, religion became more and more instrumentalised and politicised within

the armed conflict. 54 Buddhist temples were destroyed within eight months as well as 22

Hindu temples in 1986 (EMAIL 1993, 30f. cited in: Mohsin 1997, 179). Quite common has

also been the prohibition of religious ceremonies, or sacrileges like entering a temple in shoes,

which is a religious taboo for Buddhists (Mohsin, 1997, 32). Some of my interviewees in-

sisted that it is a common practice for Muslims to convert tribal girls by forcing them to

marry. This forced intermarriage was used as an instrument to integrate the Hill People into

Bengali society and to change the demographic relations in the area142. The Report of the

CHT Commission outlines about 30 different cases of women who had been kidnapped, con-

142 A secret memorandum for example encouraged army officers to marry tribal women. I would assume that this was strategy to follow this aim. Although it could be considered as an imputation, it is at least represented by

Eva Gerharz

verted and married (CHT Commission, 1991, 108). With such incidents the Hill People be-

came increasingly aware of the religious difference. A Tripura interviewee complained about

the massive Islamisation of the CHT. From both sides religion was transformed into the dis-

tinctive guiding mark. Besides the threat the Hill People feared, especially under Ershad’s

regime, that a paradigm of a mosque-centred society has been achieved. Although there were

only 40 mosques in the Hill Tracts in 1961, their number had increased by 1974 to 200 and in

1981 there were already 592 mosques (Mohsin 1997, 179). Since then the number has in-

creased manifold (Mohsin 1996, 74). For the Hill People the mosques are a symbol of their

oppression. Once on a walk in the Hills I noticed a colourful mosque in a village. The

Chakma who accompanied me saw my astonishment and maintained bitterly that the mosques

are always built in such a striking way while the Buddhist temples are always modest and

hidden. The noisy loudness of the Muslim prayer five times a day appeared to be disturbing as

well. In regard to these issues directly related to religious symbols and practices, the Hill Peo-

ple develop prejudices against the Bengalis which focus on their Muslim faith. I was told for

example that “the Bengalis know just Allah and women”, or that nearly all Bengalis would

rape their wives.

Besides cases of human rights violations caused by religious differences and those of the us-

age of visible signs for distinction, the Islamisation of state politics has its consequences on

the institutional level as well. Various religiously motivated NGOs and political parties are

highly influential in the CHT. Jammat-i-Islam143 is strongly supported by the Bengali settlers

and works very closely together with the military in the CHT. The same is true for Al-Rabita,

a Saudi government-founded NGO which works as a missionary organisation and is entrusted

with the task of Islamisation backed by the military (Mohsin, 1997, 179). These Islamically

oriented organisations seem to be supported by the officials, as an assertion of one of the

Chakma interviewees shows. He maintained that a tribal association had organised the con-

struction of a new hospital financed by South Korea, but the local government had abandoned

the project, while another hospital financed by Saudi-Arabia was released for construction. It

is obvious that these kinds of actions make people aware of their religious distinctiveness.

Cases of being disadvantaged are directly traced back to religion. By rejecting Islam the Hill

People construct a commonality that crosses their internal religious diversity, viz. not being

some people. See CHT Commission (1991, 108f.). Rape, which was perpetuated in the Hills as well can be con-sidered to have the same background 143 Jammat-i-Islam is a political party which can be categorised as radical from the right-wing spectrum. Already existing in the 1970s, utilised Saudi-Arabian support for political and social welfare work to extend resources to the rural poor population (Feldman 1998)


Muslim. This involves all Hill People equally and the non-tribal Hindus and Barua144 living

in the CHT as well. The we-group feeling (Elwert 1998) which is characterised by an anti-

Islam attitude thus comprises all groups equally regardless of their status as Hill People or

not, and is developed solely out of the exclusion from the dominant Muslim society. It can

therefore be regarded as one of the most universal factors of identity construction.

At the same time a diversification of the Hill People can be observed. These differences relate

mainly to political issues145 and the educational advantage of the Chakma in particular. Fur-

thermore the dominance of Buddhist groups is recognised as well. In the early 1980s an

organisation namely the Buddhist Minority Protection Committee (BMPC) was founded,

which started a communal “hate campaign” against Bangladeshi authorities. The aim of the

organisation was to accuse the GOB of religious intolerance and Islamisation of the CHT. The

non-Buddhist peoples did not support the campaign and the final result was a trend to resent

the Buddhist dominance among some of the other groups (Ahmed 1993, 53). During the field

work I conducted, an expert interviewee at Dhaka inform me that some peoples, the Tripura

in particular, have immense resentments against the Buddhist/Chakma majority in the JSS. In

Bandarban I was told by a Murong that his community is thinking about conversion to Chris-

tianity in order to get more power to resist the Buddhist dominance in the CHT, which is seen

as a problem, especially since the Peace Accord146.

The Muslim majority within Bangladesh and the hegemonial nature of the Islam based state

policies has contributed substantially to the Hill People’s alienation from the Bangladeshi

society. Demarcation through religion is hence directly related to the political interests of the

groups. Whenever one group starts to develop hegemony over others, religious differences

become important for demarcation. In respect to the relationship of the Hill People and the

Bengalis, being Muslim or not is a guiding aspect for constructing identity, which could be

traced back to the immense gap between the majority and minority and the strategic use of

religion by the GOB. On the other hand the Hill People use religious differences for identifi-

cation whenever political disputes and discussions come up. In these cases religiously based

identities become reinterpreted and instrumentalised according to political interests. As pre-

sented above, religion determines a large part of differences in culture, so that its importance

144 Barua is called a non-tribal group which believes in Buddhism and comes from the plains of Chittagong. Very little is found in the literature about them. During my stay I have met some Barua at Rangamati. Their outward appearance is only slightly different to that of the Hill People 145 As I have already presented in Chapter 3 and 5 146 The Peace Accord between the GOB and the JSS has been criticised as being an agreement between the Chakma and the GOB without taking into account the interests of the other groups. See Chapter 7

Eva Gerharz

in keeping groups apart is quite influential. Like dress and language, religion must be seen in

the context of political events, which I will outline in the following part.

6.4. Cultural Habits as One Aspect of Identity Construction

Recognising cultural differences does not necessarily provoke an ethnic conflict. In writing

this chapter my aim was to investigate the complex structure of different causes and factors

which maintain the construction of identities in the conflict context. I assume that these cul-

tural aspects and the attempt to emphasise these by the different groups are heavily inter-

connected with political and economic aspects, which I will illustrate in the following by

choosing several examples, which are appropriated due to the importance of language, culture

and religion for the construction of the nation and a counter-model at the same time.

The cultural features of the different groups are a result of historical processes and diversifica-

tion due to the occupation of different ecological spaces as well as the result of a process of

ascription and self-ascription. According to Barth (1969) ethnic groups are not just a result of

stratification but are seen as a form of social organisation, that is, the usage of categorisations

to define a person for purposes of interaction (Barth 1969, 13f). Further he mentions that “the

features that are taken into account are not the sum of ‘objective’ differences, but only those

which the actors themselves regard as significant ... some cultural features are used by the

actors as signals and emblems of differences, others are ignored” (Barth 1969, 14). Which

features are regarded as important for ascription or demarcation is to a large extent the result

of political processes of constructing147 the unity of a group. At the same time economic and

political developments affect the relevance of cultural habits. Their results provoke an inter-

pretation of political or economic measures according to cultural boundaries.

My Chakma and Marma interviewees explained, that their women would never work in other

people’s households for money and that a Hill Person would never beg, different than the

Bengalis, because the Hill People would be too proud. That rejection is heavily connected to

economic as well as political features of the Hill People’s society as well: as an agro-based

society having lived mainly subsistent, economic independence seems to be a very important

issue for them. Working in other people’s household would reflect dependence on others. Be-

ing independent is obviously a political aim of the Hill People as well.

147 for that assumption see Anderson’s notion of “imagined communities” where he examines the construction of a nation by using different strategies based on commonalties of a group


A basic issue is that of nationalism in Bangladesh. While Bengali nationalism

constructed unity on the basis of language and cultural commonalties, Bangladeshi national-

ism is based on religion. All these features maintain boundaries between the Bengalis and the

Hill People, as none of them can be used for self-ascription by them. The boundaries drawn

between the two groups can be seen as politically constructed. A good example is the forma-

tion of religiously based organisations for interest-representation, like the BMPC, which was

founded during the Islamist regime of Ershad in the 1980s. Illustrative is my observation that

the Hill People rejected the “political settlers” much more than the “original” ones, regardless

their common religion.

The “artificial” emphasis of cultural differences must be seen in the context of the extreme

majority-minority-relationship which is demographically given in Bangladesh. The con-

sciousness was sharpened by the demographic changes in the CHT as the Hill People were

confronted, due to the settlement programme with the majority. In this process they became

aware of their minority status within the hegemonial structures of the state. The relationship

of Bengalis and Hill People in the CHT, as well as all over Bangladesh, turned out not to be

symbiotic, as Barth describes the prerequisite for stability in such systems (Barth 1969, 20).

In such a case the groups choose a strategy for the establishment of change. In our case the

elite has chosen to ground their strategy on the emphasis of their distinct ethnic identity148.

The decision for that strategy must be seen in the context of the Kaptai-impact, the settlement

programme and the hegemonial structure of the state system. Besides these cultural differ-

ences are used for ascription by the people themselves, namely religion (non-Islam), language

(non-Bengali) and culture expressed in modes of cultivation (jhum) and dress for instance.

Besides these, seclusion processes have meant that inter-ethnic relationships are categorically

rejected. A characteristic feature becoming visible in the Hills is the total segregation of vil-

lages and areas of living in the towns. A typical “multi-ethnic” village in Rangamati has one

quarter for the Chakma and another one for the Bengalis (not settlers), Barua, Hindus and

others. There is a school in the middle holding the two areas together and apart in one. Asked

for “real” multi-ethnic villages, the informant replied that I would never find a mixed village

different from those previously described.

As much as the boundary-markers seclude two groups which are per se segregated, they be-

come reinterpreted and instrumentalised according to rational decisions. Common patterns of

148 Barth distinguishes three strategies: becoming incorporated into the pre-established system, accepting the minority status but encapsulating cultural differences in sectors of non-articulation or, as chosen in the CHT case, emphasising ethnic identity and using it to develop new positions and patterns to organise activities in sectors formerly not found in their society (Barth 1969, 33)

Eva Gerharz

distinction lose relevance whenever it is considered to be required, others become the domi-

nant ones. This is illustrated by analysing the dynamics of relationships among the different

groups. As presented above, there are macroscopic cleavages between various groups which

are directly related to the emphasis of cultural boundaries in the context of political events. In

these processes other identities become obvious: when within the indigenous community a

struggle for political power arises, boundaries are drawn on religious lines, like Buddhist and

non-Buddhist, or Chakma and non-Chakma for instance. (Ethnic) Identities are therefore

never stable systems for ascription and self-ascription, but are changeable and fluent or, as

Schlee (1996, 11) argues, multiple configurations149. These taxonomies can be adverse or

overlapping. Whenever various taxonomies are considerable, the agents can emphasise one or

another difference or commonality, whatever the adequate one in a given situation is (Schlee

1996, 15). Within that kind of perspective the actors can switch from one identity to another

an accordance with the context. This is revealed by the famous statement of M.N. Larma

given in 1972 in the parliament:

“I am a Chakma. A Marma can never be a Chakma, a Chakma can never be a Bengali ... I am a Chakma. I am not a Bengali. I am a citizen of Bangladesh – Bangladeshi, You are also Bangladeshis but your national identity is Bengali ... They [Hill People] can never be Ben-galis” (Shelley, 1992, 110; Mohsin 10997, 62).

7. The Peace Accord – A Political Solution “The high priest was asked if he expects that the new government under Sheikh Hasina will do a better job than the former one. The priest answered: If you take a mango and it tastes sour, do you really expect that another one from the same tree will be sweet?”

After several years of negotiations between the GOB and the JSS a peace accord was signed

on 2nd December 1997. The Peace Accord got international recognition and acknowledge-

ment. On the 26th September 1999 Sheikh Hasina received the UNESCO’s Felix Houphonet-

Boigny Peace Award as her reward in establishing peace in the Chittagong Hill Tracts150. Es-

pecially its significance for stability and economic development in the region has been

appreciated, as it ended 27 years of insurgency. The Peace Accord comprises the following

provisions (Mohsin 1998; Rashiduzzaman 1998):

149 Schlee uses the term “Pluritaxis” here 150 see: http://shobak.org/jumma/ and http://thirdculture.com/ipa/


1. The formation of a CHT Regional Council (CHTRC/RC) comprising 22 indirectly elected members151 including the chairman who is elected by the members. The three chairmen of the District Councils are ex-officio members enjoying the right to vote. The RC constitutes as follows: 12 tribal men and 2 female tribal members, 6 Bengali men and 1 Bengali female member.

2. Reformation and renaming of the District Local Government Council into Hill District Council. The Hill District Council is responsible for the recruitment of local police forces up to the sub inspector level.

3. The establishment of a Ministry for Chittagong Hill Tracts Affairs.

4. The withdrawal of all temporary army camps except the BDR and three cantonments.

5. A general amnesty for the Shanti Bahini fighters under the condition that they surrender arms and ammunition and return to normal life. If not, legal action will be taken against them. Every family receives Taka 50.000 for rehabilitation.

6. A land commission headed by a retired judge and constituted with the following mem-bers: the raja and Chairman of the District Council concerned, a Chairman representative of the RC and the Divisional Commissioner. The Commission “shall have full power to annul all rights of ownership on Lands and Hills which have so far been given illegal set-tlements or encroached illegally. No appeal can be made against the verdict of this commission and the decision of this commission will be treated as final. This will be im-plied in case of fringe land” (Independent 12th Dec. 1997).

While the government’s success in the negotiations is still celebrated, the opposition party

BNP utilises the accord for their political aims and competition. On 25.08.1999 the Daily

Star152 reports Khaleda Zia’s demand to rehabilitate the slum dwellers of Dhaka in the

CHT153. In the eyes of the supporters of the Peace Accord this demand looked like a provoca-

tion, but has, besides that, to be seen in the context of BNP’s policies towards India154 on the

one hand and in respect to the process of policy-making in Bangladesh in general155. India has

played an important role and the negotiations finally got the necessary impetus, as India did

not support the Shanti Bahini any longer156 (Rashiduzzaman 1998).

151 The RC members are indirectly elected by the directly elected members of the three Hill District Councils. These District Local Government Councils were established already in 1989 through the passage of a Parliamen-tary Act under Ershad 152 One of the more important Bangladeshi newspapers written in English 153 During that time the government set forth a forced eviction of many slums in Dhaka. The slums were system-atically razed by bulldozers. This event was one of the most discussed political events in Bangladesh during August 1999 and provoked several hartals. The eviction started with several slums along the railway, where the GOB acted in co-operation with the railway company. On the 09.08.1999 The Independent reported about 4,000 razed shanties and 20,000 homeless people 154 BNPs policies are based on the notion of Bangladeshi nationalism, which demarcates the Muslim Bengalis from West-Bengal in India. The programme involves therefore a general rejection of India. Heavily discussed (and opposed by the BNP) was during that time the establishment of a corridor for transhipment to India 155 The state-system in Bangladesh is highly dependent on decision-making by utilising hartals. These strikes which mainly involve transport stops have the aim of influencing and disrupting the economic development and of putting pressure on the government 156 The times before the Shanti Bahini had recruited their fighters, mainly out of the refugee camps in India and had their training camps there

Eva Gerharz

Examining the results of the Peace Accord turned out to be the most problematic question of

my work. Whenever I tried to find something out about continuities and change in relation to

the Peace Accord, the results were frustrating. Only a few people seemed to consider the im-

portance of the treaty to be such as it was celebrated in the international public and the

Bangladeshi party policies. The treaty was merely considered to be something abstract, the

people do not have much to do with. The opinions of my interviewees were very diversified.

Generally three categories can be distinguished: those who are optimistic and who believe in

the unifying character of the event, those who blame especially administrative and democracy

problems and finally those who reject the Peace Accord in general.

It was a striking phenomenon that especially those Hill People in official positions but not

involved in party policies of the JSS expressed a lot of trust related to the peace accord. These

idealists were nearly unreliable in their optimistic attitude. Several interview-partners of that

category stated something like:

“We have to be patient, the Hill People must be unified with the Bengalis and live in peace. Already now the situation here turns back to normal life. Of course, there are some student protests or something, but these are a common phenomenon in Bangladesh. This must not be seen in relation to the Peace Accord”.

Sometimes I had the impression that these interviewees were reluctant to give statements

which are not legitimised by their official position, a thesis which I cannot confirm compre-

hensively.

A lot of people complained that the implementation of the Peace Accord is the most serious

problem. As the land commission has not been installed, the temporary army camps not with-

drawn and the local police force not recruited yet157, a lot of people seemed to be disappointed

and disillusioned. People blame either the GOB for these failures or the RC and the JSS itself.

One interviewee expressed the opinion that the JSS would lose its contact to the base and as

long as Bangladesh did not accept democratic values and realise these in state policies, the

situation would not become better. A great problem according to him is that the Hill People

“are not facing the problem”. A lack of education and their socio-economic status would not

allow them to participate in the political decision-making process. Further administrative rea-

sons were maintained quite often for the problems with the implementation of the Peace

Accord. Those responsible are blamed because they recruited official personnel from the un-

derground, who are not qualified for the administrative work in the RC. Nevertheless the

Peace Accord in general was considered to be a step towards peace and stability in the region.

157 During the time of research in September 1999


Talking to JSS people I realised that they are merely discontented with regard to the imple-

mentation and the role played by the GOB. The not accomplished agreements implied in the

Peace Accord, like the withdrawal of the army and the establishment of the land commission,

which are very sensitive issues in the Hills158, are interpreted as not fulfilled promises and

fraud. That appreciation confirms stereotypes and prejudices the Hill People developed to-

wards Bengalis over years. “They never do what they have promised”159 asserted a Chakma

during my field work.

The third category comprises activists complaining being “sold out” to the government, as

original demands160 of the JSS were not recognised in the negotiations and the treaty (Mohsin

1998). The Pahari Chattro Parishad for example is one important fraction which clearly op-

poses the Peace Accord for, among others, these reasons. The students’ organisation as well

as the Hill Women’s Federation (HWF), both attached to the JSS and the main political forum

of the party largely reject the Peace Accord, as it brings about insecurity, inequality and fur-

ther polarisation (Mohsin 1998, 107). Besides these politically organised groups especially

those having, although highly educated, problems with integrating into the not sufficient so-

cio-economic structure in the Hills, seem to reject the Peace Accord. The belief, that full

autonomy and the withdrawal of the settlers would solve their problems derives from a na-

tionalist attitude, developed out of the counter-nationalism movement propagated by the JSS

over years.

The Bengali settlers in the area oppose the Peace Accord largely, as they see their interests not

properly represented. They see the Peace Accord as a measure to empower the Hill People, as

they are not representatively taken into account in the newly established decision-taking

institutions161.

Considering these diversified opinions and interests, “the CHT today is divided in every

sense of the word” (Mohsin 1998, 107), not just along lines of ethnic segregation. A Chakma

college student has written in a letter:

“But the government shows the reluctance in the field of problems solution. As a result, there organised two groups. Of them one is known as Agreement Supported Group and the other is Agreement Non-Supported group. Among these two groups JSS itself is one, the other is op-posite of JSS ... In exchange of many blood the Peace Accord is out today’s crop. And there too occurred many obstacle in the ... implementation. Still the Chakma refugees ... did not get 158 As one has hopefully recognised after having read my paper: land problems and military threat combined with settlement problems are the most serious difficulties the Hill People had to face. The implementation of these points hamper the trust-building effect of the accord immensely 159 A hint at the Muslim “Inshallah” what means “if God wishes” 160 Like the withdrawal of all Bengali settlers and full autonomy within Bangladesh (see Chapter 3.2.) 161 This relates to the RC as well as to the power the land commission will gain

Eva Gerharz

their rehabilitation. The Land Commission is not in force yet ... The Temporary Army Camps have not been removed yet. These transient forces devastate and do great harm to us. This is the position of our country.”

Although the Hill People appear to be divided along political lines, my data reveal the as-

sumption that most people perceive their every-day life as going as regularly as it was before.

Some interviewees considered the shift from the military regime towards a democratic state

policy as much more important. Interviewees asserted that until 1993 it was impossible for

them to enter the streets after darkness162. One could get the impression that the détente dur-

ing that time had been considered as a much more significant event than the Peace Accord.

Examining the results of my field work in respect to the various opinions and views on the

Peace Accord, I will concentrate in the following on two important questions. The first relates

to development issues in the CHT. Like everywhere in Bangladesh, national and international

NGOs constitute a substantial part of civil society. Therefore NGOs have to be seen as very

important agencies for development. The NGOs are of particular interest, as they provoke,

reflect and are utilised for, often not intentionally, the lines of ethnic segregation. The Chapter

will be ended by looking at questions of stability and sustainability of peace in the CHT.

7.1. Developmental Issues – National NGOs in the Chittagong Hill Tracts

There is not much literature available about NGOs in the CHT as their establishment can be

considered as a recent phenomenon. Nowadays especially the bigger national NGOs in Bang-

ladesh, such as Proshika and BRAC, and international ones like Caritas and World Vision

have established projects in the area. Besides there are several local ones as well, which are

predominantly working for and with Hill People163. Many people try to establish new NGOs

based on specific Hill People’s issues. One example is Green Hill, which claims to be “a de-

velopment organisation for the indigenous community” (Annual Report 1995-97). Besides

various smaller ones are to be found in Rangamati as well as in Bandarban.

162 During that time several measures were taken, such as a pacification programme and rehabilitation for in-digenous families and returnees from India (Shelley 1992, 149ff.). Until that time five amnesties had been taken from 1983 till 1991. Already in 1987 the GOB started negotiating with the JSS (Shelley 1992, 140). The army used another strategy from then on: it has been partly more involved in stimulating and backing organisations of settlers. The democratic movement (Pahari Chattro Parishad and HWF) has been isolated and criminalised. Arens even assumes that Khaleda had negotiated only to satisfy foreign donors. That may be an exp lanation why more than 10 years of negotiation had to necessary for signing a Peace Accord (Arens 1997, 1817) 163 As well as those concentrating on the settlers’ interests, see Chapter 4


The local organisation I worked with, IDF164, has based its work on an integrated

programme and serves both groups, Bengalis as well as Hill People. IDF, although concen-

trated on the Chittagong area and the CHT, is recognised as a national NGO by many Hill

People as it is an Bengali initiative165. Especially among the Chakma a lot of people men-

tioned IDF together with BRAC and Proshika in one breath. Some of my interviewees have

blamed especially these three organisations for preferring the settlers in the Hills. Interview-

ees stated that those NGOs would exploit young indigenous women for field work, as the

hierarchical structure of Bengali organisations would not correspond with the Hill People’s

organisational structure, especially related to the different gender order among the Hill Peo-

ple166. The NGOs would not try to investigate the socio-economic situation of the CHT and

their judgement would therefore be not accurate. As the institutions largely work with micro-

credit programmes167, it was criticised that these would not be suitable for the Hill region, as

people have a lack of knowledge how to invest the money admitted in the micro-credit pro-

grammes. Besides the NGOs have been accused for preferring the settlers in providing loans,

while the Hill People are left out of the scheme. These measures have been interpreted to have

the objective of supporting the settlers so that they overcome the Hill People economically168.

In the case of IDF the monthly statement June 1999 shows that in all Hill Districts the distri-

bution is approximately equal169. The contradiction can be explained in the context of

nationalism and boundary drawing between the two groups. In every way the Hill People try

to distance themselves from national institutions, or those being categorised as such, having

the historical background of development in the CHT in mind. Along the above mentioned

data the dynamic of demarcation from the Bengali society becomes clear again. It could be

assumed that those interviewees recognised the rising “NGO scene” in the Hills as a sign of

further Bengalisation, inasmuch as NGOs play a significant role in the development process

in Bangladesh170 (White 1999, 307). The NGOs therefore are categorised along the bounda-

ries between Bengali and indigenous culture. As a counter-model the Hill People tend to

construct spaces for development based on their traditional way of life. Years ago already the

164 Integrated Development Foundation has its project area concentrated on the three Hill Districts and Chit-tagong District 165 At the same time IDF has a policy of employing Bengali as well as indigenous workers equally. The inter-viewed staff members have never mentioned any problems at the working-place in respect to ethnic differences 166 Here again the problem of gender order in Islamic and Buddhist society becomes obvious, see Chapter 6 167 These micro-credit programmes were first developed by Grameen Bank and gained international recognition as they have been considered to be very effective for rural development in particular. It is a simple procedure: women receive a small amount of money to invest in cattle, a shop, or goods for trading. The rates are paid back weekly over a longer period. If these contributions have been paid back reliably, the member receives a bigger amount of money next time 168 Compare Chapter 4 169 The monthly statement mentions 19662 members in the Hill Districts of whom 8957 are tribal

Eva Gerharz

Chakma Raja Devasish Roy has stated that it was necessary to “modernise jhum technology

to fight back the government propaganda of their backwardness” (Janakantha 13.5., 1994

cited in Mohsin 1997, 119). Green Hill tries to realise these aims by emphasising technologi-

cal development combined with ecological and environmental issues and has the aim to

“innovate sophisticated technology by preserving indigenous traditional system of plantation”

(Annual Report 1995-97). Besides Green Hill stresses the importance of the traditional in-

digenous hand loom, which is sold in a shop attached to the office in Rangamati. Nevertheless

during my field work some people criticised the NGOs in general, regardless if Bengali or

indigenous ones. That can be explained by the fact that the phenomenon NGO in general is

seen as a Bengali one. Self-appointed representatives are no exceptions there, as distrust re-

mains. At the same time the NGO sector was mentioned as a potential provider of jobs which

are badly needed in the area. Again the rational calculation determines the limits of cultural

boundary-markers.

7.2. Another Insurgency?

“If necessary, I will not hesitate to shed blood for full implementation of the accord” said

Shantu Larma at the first anniversary meeting of signing the Peace Accord (The Daily Star

03.12.1998). That intimidation Shantu Larma shares with many Hill People. Two main objec-

tives can be distinguished here. First the Peace Accord does not provide autonomy for the

CHT, as has been wished by many Hill People. An interviewee told me: “You can say that

you are German, that you have a flag, something to be proud of, I can’t say that”. Among the

Hill People there can be found one fraction which proclaims a nationalist view reaching full

autonomy171. For those people the Peace Accord means being sold out to Bangladesh. The

second reason is the problems with the implementation of the Peace Accord, which partly

difficult to achieve and has been mentioned above already. That is what Shantu Larma com-

plains about.

As long as the implementation of the Peace Accord is not pushed forward despair and frustra-

tion remain. Many interviewees complained about the law-and-order situation in the Hill

Tracts. So-called tax-collecting in the villages, which was practised earlier too172, was re-

ported to be a great problem in the remote areas as well as on the streets where transport is

been disrupted by opposing groups. Increasing drug-use and street-crime were also men-

170 Bangladesh is said to be the country with the greatest density of NGOs world-wide 171 Compare to struggle about autonomy between M.N. Larma and Preeti mentioned in Chapter 3.2.1. 172 See Chapter 4


tioned. One interviewee stated: “Before the Peace Accord there was their law and our law,

but now there is no law any longer”. Especially the Pahari Chattro Parishad are blamed for

creating trouble reaching further than within the college at Rangamati. In the regular clashes

between the Pahari Chattro Parishad and the other college parties, shopkeepers173 and police

forces are quite often involved. On the 05.09.1999 at least 30 people were injured in Ranga-

mati in such a incident (Bangladesh Observer 06.09.1999). During my stay in Rangamati

shopkeepers were attacked several times by indigenous opponents of the Peace Accord. Be-

sides, hartals are used for the “disturbance of normality”. Although these hartals are a

national phenomenon, they are utilised in the Hills for the escalation of ethnically determined

incidents, according to my informant’s view. Even when a hartal has a different political

background, the indigenous and the Bengali population blames each other for damage. Men-

tionable are likewise cases in which disputes escalate. An incident which was heavily

discussed during my field work happened in Dighinala174: On the 22.08.1999 the Daily Star

reported that at least 18 people had been injured in a dispute between some Hill People, set-

tlers and the police. The Hill People, repatriated refugee families, sheltered in a school-

building had been attacked by some Bengali people for reasons of revenge for another inci-

dent. The Daily Star (26.06.1999) reports that at least thirteen people were killed and about

hundred kidnappings had happened since the signing of the Accord. On the 17.10.1999 about

60 people were injured in a clash between the police and Peace Accord opponents175. Though

these incidents give no representative picture of the Hill People’s opinions, the increase seems

to be alarming. Ethnic diversity, violence, economic pressure and political difficulties are in-

volved in a process of strengthening each other. Just because a Peace Accord has been signed,

the people do not change their minds overnight. Expectations and hope set upon the Peace

Accord have been belied. That in turn strengthens the demarcation based on ethnic diversity

and the outbreak of violence. The Independent (07.02.1999) reported that local police forces

in Rangamati recovered 107 sharp weapons and 623 persons besides several more in other

areas. Armed opposing groups were formed immediately after the signing of the Accord.

Chakma Interviewees reported a group called Jhumma National Army176 is actively resisting

the accord. Problematic are former Shanti Bahini fighters, are still without work although they

were promised employment in the local police forces of the Hill District Councils, which have

173 As the shopkeepers are mainly Bengalis, they are of special interest for those who want to protest 174 Belonging to Kagrachari district 175 http://www.shobak.org/jumma/ 176 that group is mentioned in Rashiduzzaman (1998, 661) as well. He also reports that besides the Pahari Chattro Parishad, the HWF, the Preeti group (see Chapter 3.2.1.) a faction of the former Shanti Bahini is involved into the armed resistance. The aims are the same as before the Accord: the withdrawal of the Bengali settlers from the CHT

Eva Gerharz

not been forthcoming. As they have not got the necessary skills for other jobs, engagement in

insurgency actions is considered as a possible alternative. As long as the Peace Accord does

not turn into a matter of every-day life of the people living in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, eth-

nic segregation will always provoke violence and bloodshed.

8. Conclusion

Field work in the CHT and in Bangladesh in general was a great experience. It provided an

insight into the methodological issues of social research as well into the reality of social life in

areas of ethno-political conflict. Unfortunately a lot of interesting data had to be left out of the

scheme in this paper, as the issue is a very complex one.

The guiding theoretical question, how identities are constructed, has been investigated in

combination with a very shortened description of historical processes, economic features and

cultural differences. The analysis has shown that ethnic diversity and the resulting conflict are

predominantly bound to historical and economic processes. Policies in the age of the nation-

state are always determined by the attempt to construct entities based on cultural features, as

is the case in Bangladesh. Its independence is based on the idea of establishing one entity

characterised by linguistic, cultural and religious features. Minorities in such a relatively ho-

mogeneous systems are marginalised and devaluated in order to create one people. That in

turn provokes processes in which minorities establish counter movements. Exclusion leads to

inclusion and vice versa. This dynamic permeates all spheres of social life. The economy, as a

highly state determined aspect, is characterised by the relationship between the majority Ben-

gali society and the Hill People as a minority. Land has a key role here, and in addition

economic development shows an interethnic dynamic, characterised by marginalisation, pref-

erence and deprivation. Education has been treated as an exclusively Hill Peoples matter in

this work. Inasmuch as interethnic relationships within the state-system determine social life,

the complexity of interethnic relationships among the 13 different indigenous groups in the

CHT embraces processes of domination and marginalisation. The aspects of political, eco-

nomic and educational life are deeply interwoven with cultural features. As key elements of

ethnic identity construction, they determine and are determined by the various processes.

Summarising the most important processes, the paper is theoretically embedded in the end of

Chapter 6. The last Chapter about the Peace Accord gives an impression of the present situa-

tion in the CHT in respect to questions of what the future of the CHT will look like. The main

thesis here is that peace cannot be established as long as it does not become a matter of every-


day life. Animosities will remain and conflict can break out at any time, whenever ethnic

differences are utilised in the attempt to gain power.

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Reinbek, Rowohlt Taschenbuch Verlag Appendix 1 Glossary of Foreign Words

hartal Bengali word for strike

headman principal of a mouza

jhum shifting cultivation, burn and slash method of cultivation

jhumia those people who are cultivating in the jhum

kalong basket made of bamboo which is carried on the back with the

help of a leather-stripe on the forehead

karbari principal of the para

khadi traditional Chakma dress which is a piece of cloth bounded around the breast

Eva Gerharz

lakh equally with 100.000

lungi kind of skirt which is commonly worn by men in parts of South

Asia

mouza union of several paras

para village

raja clans chief, king

rajbari the kings residence

sari long piece of cloth worn by women in South Asia

shalwar kameez loose trouser shirt

Shanti Bahini armed wing of the JSS, means literally peace force

thana organisational unit according to the responsibility of a police

station

Appendix 2

List of Abbreviations

BCSIC Bangladesh Cottage and Small Industries Co-operation

BDR Bangladesh Rifles, a quasi-military border control

BMPC Buddhist Minority Protection Committee

BNP Bangladesh Nationalist Party

BRAC Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee, biggest NGO in

Bangladesh


CHT Chittagong Hill Tracts

CHTDB Chittagong Hill Tracts Development Board

CHTRC/RC Chittagong Hill Tracts Regional Council

GOB Government of Bangladesh

HWF Hill Women’s Federation, associated to PCJSS

IDF Integrated Development Foundation

NGO Non-governmental Organisation

PCP Pahari Chattro Parishad, Hill Students Federation, associated to

PCJSS

PCJSS/JSS Parbattya Chattragram Jana Samhati Samiti, The United Peoples

Party of the Chittagong Hill Tracts

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