Europeanization Beyond Europe

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Living Reviews in European Governance, Vol. 4, (2009), No. 3http://www.livingreviews.org/lreg-2009-3

(Update o lreg-2007-1)

L I V I N G SR E V I E W

in european governance

Europeanization beyond EuropeFrank Schimmelfennig

ETH Zurich,Center or Comparative and International Studies,

Seilergraben 49,8092 Zurich, Switzerland

email: [email protected]

Accepted on 15 November 2009Published on 17 December 2009

Abstract

This article reviews the literature on Europeanization beyond the group o EU member,quasi-member and applicant states. It uses the analysis o Europeanization in applicantstates as a theoretical starting point to ask i, how and under which conditions we can expectdomestic efects o European integration beyond Europe. Focusing on Europeanization efectsin the areas o regionalism, democracy and human rights, and the literature on the EuropeanNeighborhood Policy in particular, the article collects ndings on the strategies and instru-ments as well as the impact and efectiveness o the EU. The general conclusion to be drawnrom the theoretical and empirical literature reviewed is one o low consistency and impact.

Keywords: democratization, Europeanization, Mediterranean, policy difusion, security/external

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Because a Living Reviews article can evolve over time, we recommend to cite the article as ollows:

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Living Reviews in European Governance, Vol. 4, (2009), No. 3:http://www.livingreviews.org/lreg-2009-3

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17 December 2009: All Sections have been signicantly extended and Table 1 was updated.A new Section 6 about the European Neighborhood policy and democracy promotion was imple-

mented. The list o reerences has been updated and 35 reerences have been added.
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Contents1 Introduction 5

2 Theoretical perspectives 6

3 Goals and contents 9

4 Instruments and strategies 11

5 Impact and Efectiveness 13

5.1 Regionalism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135.2 Human rights and democracy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

6 European Neighborhood Policy 17

6.1 Democracy promotion in the ENP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186.2 External governance beyond democracy promotion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

7 Conclusions 20

8 Acknowledgements 21

Reerences 22

List o Tables

1 Mechanisms o EU impact beyond the member-states . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8


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Europeanization beyond Europe 5

1 IntroductionAt rst, Europeanization beyond Europe seems an improbable candidate or a literature review.The skeptical reader may rst ask: Is there a literature on Europeanization beyond Europe?The study o Europeanization is largely conned to the impact o European integration and gov-ernance on the member states o the European Union (EU) (see the Living Reviews by Goetzand Meyer-Sahling 2008; Ladrech 2009; Treib 2008). A ew studies have expanded the scopeo Europeanization analysis to the quasi-member states, specically Norway and Switzerland(e.g. Fischer, Nicolet, and Sciarini 2002; Lgreid, Steinthorsson, and Thorhallsson 2004; Mach,Hausermann, and Papadopoulos 2003; Sciarini, Fischer, and Nicolet 2004; Sverdrup and Kux2000). Even more recently, the study o Europeanization has begun to include candidate statesor EU membership (see the Living Review by Sedelmeier 2006). But is there any literature on

Europeanization beyond Europe, that is, countries that are not eligible or membership in theoreseeable uture? The editors o a recent compilation o Europeanization research admit, whilepositing that the scope o Europeanization is not conceptually limited to the impact o the EU onits member states, that their own handbook is no exception rom this ocus (Vink and Graziano2007: 9, 12). None o its 25 chapters deal with Europeanization beyond accession countries. Inaddition, a title search in any major literature database combining the keyword Europeanizationwith the names o major countries or continents will yield ew useul results, while those oundare likely to be ull o noise articles and books that are actually about member and candidatestates or those that use Europeanization in a very loose and metaphorical sense with ew, i any,reerences to the Europeanization literature in political science studies o the EU.

Second and more undamentally, the skeptical reader may argue that the available literatureails to mention Europeanization or a good reason and ask: Is there Europeanization beyondEurope? It is certainly plausible to assume that EU organizations, policies and decisions have arelevant domestic impact on member states, quasi-member states that participate in the internalmarket and the candidate states that must adopt the acquis communautaire to qualiy or mem-bership. But can the EU also have a systematic and distinctive inuence o this kind beyondEurope?

This is a legitimate question that has triggered my interest or doing this review. What does theliterature tell us about the EUs goals and instruments in this area? What are the mechanismso Europeanization beyond the group o actual and would-be members? To what extent and underwhich conditions has the EU been efective in Europeanizing countries beyond its membershipregion? A practical comparative starting point or answering these questions is ound in therelated eld o Europeanization o candidate and accession countries (Sedelmeier 2006).

(1) In the case o quasi-members and candidate countries, it is clear that the transer o theacquis communautaire is at the core o Europeanization. Participation in the highly regulated

single market requires the adoption o its rules, and EU enlargement has always been based onthe principle that new members must transpose the entire acquis, albeit with varying transitionperiods. Beyond the EU, the European Economic Area (EEA), and candidate countries, thecontent appears less predetermined. So what is the substance o Europeanization beyond Europe?Which ideas, norms, rules, organizational structures and procedures, behavioral patterns, etc.,spread intentionally or unintentionally beyond integrated Europe?

(2) Whereas the EU uses the incentive o membership as the main and generally efective lever to make applicant countries adopt its rules, at least ormally, this instrument is not applicableto countries currently ineligible or EU membership. Which other instruments and strategies doesthe EU then have at its disposal? And can these instruments and strategies be successul in theabsence o the membership incentive and the accession conditionalities that oten come with it?

(3) Finally, has the EU been able to transer its rules and practices beyond the connes o its

member and candidate countries? While there is no doubt that a massive transer o EU rules and

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6 Frank Schimmelennig

practices is taking place during the accession phase in countries aspiring to become EU members,it is ar rom obvious that countries outside the group o potential member states should be subjectto Europeanization in a similarly pervasive way.

To be sure, there is growth in the amount o literature concerning EU external policies thatare directed towards or likely to afect the domestic political systems, politics and policies o statesbeyond Europe. But Europeanization is rarely mentioned in this literature, let alone eaturedin the titles o books and articles. Rather, this literature examines the EU as an internationalor global actor or as a civilian or normative power; covers the EUs oreign or external policyor policies; or discusses the EUs relations with various regions o the world. In addition, thisliterature ocuses on what the EU is in the international system (actor, presence, or system;civilian, trade or normative power, to name several avored concepts) and what it does inits external relations (policy decisions, content, instruments and strategies) rather than i and

how it afects third countries. Moreover, to the extent that the literature does study the impacto the EU, it concentrates primarily on the impact o the EU on the international system (e.g.its inuence on the balance o power) or on specic international regimes such as internationalclimate or trade policy. What remains is a very small selection o literature studying the domesticimpact o the EU beyond Europe which is the core o the Europeanization research agenda. Thisreview will thereore be based to a large extent on a second reading o this relevant portion oEU external relations literature, ocusing on what we can learn rom these works or the study oEuropeanization.

As a consequence, this review cannot be based on seminal books or articles on Europeanizationbeyond Europe but needs to start rom substantive questions and theoretical perspectives in orderto locate and collect answers scattered across the literature. The main body o the review includesve parts: The rst introduces theoretical perspectives or studying Europeanization beyond Eu-rope. The subsequent parts ollow the three questions arising rom comparing Europeanizationbeyond Europe with Europeanization in the accession states: goals and contents; instrumentsand strategies; efectiveness and impact. Recently, the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) hasattracted more scholarly analysis, which will be the ocus o a separate section. The ENP is aramework or all neighbors o the EU that do not have an explicit membership perspective. Itcomprises Moldova and Ukraine (and potentially Belarus, but not Russia) as well as the NorthernArican and Middle Eastern neighbors o the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. The ENP can beseen as a most-likely case or Europeanization beyond Europe because it deals with close neighbors,covers a broad range o policies, and is based on the explicit commitment o the EU to extend itsacquis beyond membership. In the nal section, I draw a ew general conclusions on the ndingso the literature and the uture research agenda.

This version o the review will ocus on general principles o political order promoted by theEU (regionalism, democracy, and human rights) and on comparative analyses o Europeanization

beyond Europe. Future updates and revisions o this review will include studies ocusing on urtherspecic regions and countries as well as specic EU policies.

2 Theoretical perspectives

In general, the study o Europeanization beyond Europe could benet rom the entire range otheoretical approaches that have been developed and put orward or analyzing Europeanizationin the member states (or a brie overview, see Bulmer 2007). Here, however, I will limit myselto theoretical perspectives that have been used recently to analyze Europeanization beyond theborders o the EU but mainly with regard to accession countries. All o them speciy mechanismso EU impact, and the conditions under which they operate and are efective, as building blocks

or a theory o Europeanization.




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(1) In their analysis o Europeanization in the accession countries o Central and EasternEurope, Frank Schimmelennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier (2004; 2005a) distinguish mechanisms oEuropeanization according to two dimensions; On one hand, Europeanization can be EU-drivenor domestically driven. On the other, it can be driven by institutional logics: the logic o con-sequences or the logic o appropriateness (March and Olsen 1989: 160162). According to thelogic o consequences, Europeanization can be driven by the EU through sanctions and rewardsthat alter the cost-benet calculations o the target state (external incentives model). The impacto external incentives increases with the size o net benets and the clarity and credibility o EUconditionality. According to the logic o appropriateness, Europeanization may be induced by so-cial learning. Target states are persuaded to adopt EU rules i they consider these rules legitimateand identiy with the EU. These mechanisms can be implemented either through intergovernmen-tal interactions (bargaining or persuasion) or through transnational processes via societal actors

within the target state (Schimmelennig and Sedelmeier 2005a: 1112, 18). Finally, according tothe lesson-drawing model, states turn to the EU as a result o dissatisaction with the domesticstatus quo and adopt EU rules i they perceive them as solutions to their problems, either basedon instrumental calculations or the appropriateness o the EU solutions.

(2) In a study on the external dimension o Europeanization in the area o immigration policy,Sandra Lavenex and Emek Ucarer distinguish our modes o EU external governance difering inthe extent to which intentional action o the EU or domestic interest o third countries triggersadaptation (Lavenex and Ucarer 2004: 420421). Unilateral policy emulation occurs when thirdcountries are convinced o the superiority o the EUs rules and adopt them in order to moreeciently solve domestic problems. Negative externalities occurs i non-adaptation would createnet costs. However, the presence o an EU requirement may produce policy transer on the basis oopportune conditionality i the requirement meets the interests o the third country, or inopportuneconditionality i adaptation is not in its interest but is compensated by other incentives.

(3) In their study o the impact o the EU on border conicts, Thomas Diez, Stephan Stetter,and Mathias Albert (2006) construct a two-by-two table to conceptualize our pathways o EU im-pact. They distinguish pathways rst according to whether the impact is generated by concreteEU measures or an efect o integration processes that are not directly inuenced by EU actors(Diez, Stetter, and Albert 2006: 571). In addition, the impact can be on concrete policies orhave wider social implications. The rst pathway is compulsory impact working with concretemeasures, namely carrots and sticks, on concrete policies. The connective impact is establishedthrough concrete (mainly nancial) measures establishing and supporting contact between conict-ing parties. The other pathways unction indirectly. According to the enabling impact, actorsin conict situations strengthen their inuence by linking their political agendas and positions tothe EU. Finally, the constructive impact results in a undamental reconstruction o identities asa result o exposure to European integration (Diez, Stetter, and Albert 2006: 572574).

(4) Michael Bauer, Christoph Knill, and Diana Pitschel (2007) use the trichotomy o EU gov-ernance modes in regulatory policy compliance, competition and communication (Knill andLenschow 2005) to analyze domestic change in Central and Eastern Europe. Compliance is acoercive mechanism triggered by legally binding EU rules that national administrations must im-plement in order to avoid sanctions. Whereas compliance is linked to positive integration, i.e.the ormal harmonization o national rules, competition is related to negative integration, i.e.the abolition o national barriers distorting the common market. In this mode o governance, theimpact o the EU is less direct and works through market pressures rather than institutional sanc-tions. Institutional change is thus stimulated by the need to improve the unctional efectivenesso member states institutional arrangements in comparison to those o other participants withinthe common market. (Bauer, Knill, and Pitschel 2007: 411) Finally, communication is dened asa governance mode that brings about change as a result o voluntary inormation exchange and

mutual learning between national policy-makers in EU-sponsored networks. Rather than direct




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sanctions rom the EU or indirect sanctions rom the market, it is the legitimacy o policy modelsthat drives Europeanization.

Obviously, there is considerable overlap between these conceptualizations. The classications byDiez et al. and Bauer et al. also implicitly distinguish between logics o action; in contrast to Baueret al., Diez et al., Lavenex and Ucarer as well as Schimmelennig and Sedelmeier distinguish betweendirect EU-driven and indirect pathways o Europeanization. Finally, all classications emphasizethe ability o Europeanization to unction through intergovernmental as well as transnationalchannels. Table 1 presents an attempt to map this conceptual overlap. It also shows the vacantelds in the three categorizations or which I suggest additional concepts.

Table 1: Mechanisms o EU impact beyond the member-states

Intergovernmental Transnational

Direct Indirect Direct Indirect

Logic of

conse-

quences

(1) Conditionality

Intergovernmentalincentives

Compulsory impact

Compliance

(2) Externalization

Competition

Negative externality

(3) Transnationalincentives

Connective impact

(4) Transnationalexternalization

Competition

Logic of

appropri-

ateness

(5) Socialization

Intergovernmentalsocial learning

Constructive impact

Communication

(6) Imitation

Lesson-drawing

Enabling impact

Unilateral emulation

(7) Transnationalsocialization

Transnational sociallearning

(8) Societalimitation

Enabling impact

Conditionality and socialization are the two undamental mechanisms o EU impact that arecompared and contrasted in most o the literature (see e.g. Coppieters et al. 2004; Kelley 2004;Kubicek 2003). Conditionality (1) is based on the direct, sanctioning impact o the EU on the targetgovernment and subsumes the intergovernmental channel o external incentives, the compulsoryimpact and the compliance mode o governance. In the conditionality mode the EU provides non-member governments with incentives such as nancial aid, market access or institutional ties onthe condition that they ollow the EUs demands. By contrast, socialization (5) comprises all EUeforts to teach EU policies as well as the ideas and norms behind them to outsiders, topersuade outsiders that these policies are appropriate and, as a consequence, to motivate themto adopt EU policies. Socialization subsumes intergovernmental social learning, constructiveimpact and communication. All other mechanisms o EU impact are best seen as varieties othese two undamental logics varieties that work more indirectly and/or transnationally than

conditionality and socialization.Transnational incentives and socialization (3 and 7): The EUs conditionality and socialization

can be directed at societal actors parties, rms, interest groups, NGOs or even regional adminis-trations rather than central governments. In the transnational incentive or, according to Diez,Stetter, and Albert (2006), connective mode o governance, the EU provides these non-stateactors with incentives to ollow EU rules themselves and/or to put pressure on their governmentsto adopt EU rules. Likewise, in the transnational socialization mode o governance, the EU maytry to persuade these societal actors o its values, norms, or policy ideas. Societal actors will thenwork to disseminate these ideas urther domestically.

Externalization (2 and 4): Conditionality, transnational incentives and transnational social-ization are similar in one respect the EU seeks to directly induce non-member actors to adoptand ollow its rules. There are also, however, indirect modes o EU external governance. In this

view the EU is a presence (Allen and Smith 1990) rather than an actor in its external relations.




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The EUs impact on third countries is a result o its capacity as an important system o regionalgovernance and has an indirect (sometimes even unintended or unanticipated) efect on internalregulations and policies. According to the logic o consequences, internal EU governance mayproduce negative externalities towards third country governments and societal actors. Externalactors adopt and comply with EU rules because ignoring or violating them would generate netcosts. This governance by externalization is most noticeably produced by the EUs internalmarket and competition policies; rms interested in participating in the EU market must ollowthe EUs rules. This is similar to the competition mode o governance described by Bauer, Knill,and Pitschel (2007) and negative externalities (Lavenex and Ucarer 2004). It may afect societalactors, such as rms and business associations, as well as governments that are induced to altertheir own rules and policies in line with those o the EU.

Imitation (6 and 8): The EUs processes and policies may provide a model or other regions,

states and societal actors. Here, the logic o appropriateness is at work. Non-member actorsimitate the EU because they recognize EU rules and policies as appropriate solutions to theirown problems. This is in line with lesson-drawing (Schimmelennig and Sedelmeier 2005a) ordeliberate emulation (Lavenex and Ucarer 2004) by governments as well as non-state actors,and also resembles the enabling impact o the EU, which describes the use o EU policies andsolutions by governmental and societal actors to add external legitimacy to their own politicalagenda (Diez, Stetter, and Albert 2006: 573).

I suggest that these mechanisms could also be efectively used to theorize Europeanization be-yond the EU. The question then remains, under which conditions these mechanisms operate andare efective beyond the EUs member and candidate states. None o the studies reviewed abovegenerate high expectations o impact in this regard. According to the analyses in Schimmelennigand Sedelmeier (2005b), the EUs impact in candidate countries has resulted primarily rom theexternal incentives o accession conditionality rather than social learning or lesson-drawing. Demo-cratic conditionality ahead o accession negotiations has worked best when countries had a crediblepromise o eventual membership and when the domestic power costs o adopting democratic andhuman rights norms were low, i.e. did not threaten regime survival. Acquis conditionality regardingspecic EU rules began to have a major efect only ater accession negotiations commenced.

Diez, Stetter, and Albert (2006) nd that the transormative power o integration in borderconicts is strongest when all parties to the conict are EU members; much weaker when partiesare only associated with the EU; and even negative when the external border o the EU coincideswith the contested border. According to Diez, Stetter, and Albert this is not only because oconditionality. Membership, and association to a lesser extent, also increases the legitimacy o EUpositions (enabling impact), support or common activities (connective impact) and exposure tothe constructive impact (Diez, Stetter, and Albert 2006: 573574, 588).

Finally, Bauer, Knill, and Pitschel (2007) also generally expect the potential impact o the

EU to be higher in states with strong prospects or membership than in unlikely members.Again, this not only applies to the governance mode o compliance (conditionality). Whereas thecompliance mode is expected to have no efect in non-candidate countries, both competition andcommunication are hypothesized to have at least a limited efect in the long term due to the actthat non-candidate countries are subject to market pressures generated by the EU and participatein EU-sponsored policy networks.

3 Goals and contents

What is the substantive content o Europeanization beyond Europe? What kind o intentional orunintentional domestic impact does the EU have on third countries? In general, Europeanization

covers a broad range o political impacts across the triad o polity, politics and policy.




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Perhaps the most accessible general characterization o the literature o Europeanization beyondEurope ollows the thesis o domestic analogy. According to this thesis polities preer to havean international environment that is ordered according to their own principles and procedures.The substantive goals as well as instruments thus mirror the undamental principles o the EUand European integration (Peters and Wagner 2005: 215216); Europeanization consists o theexternal projection o internal solutions (Lavenex 2004: 695).

This general characterization entails various, more specic claims regarding the goals that theEU pursues globally.

First, the EU promotes its model o regionalism to other regions. It proposes regional economicand market integration and the establishment o supranational organizations as pathways to peaceand welare in other parts o the world (Bicchi 2006; Farrell 2007). The regionalist model is alsoevident in the tendency o the EU to design its policies or, and conclude agreements with, regional

groupings o countries rather than with individual states.Second, and perhaps in a more critical perspective, the EU is oten known to propagate a

neoliberal economic model, which reects the EUs internal commitment to market-building andeconomic liberalization (see, e.g., Hurt 2003, 2004). Others point out, however, that the EU doesnot stand or ree-market policies as such but or a multilaterally managed regulatory rameworkor liberal markets according to its own model (Grugel 2004: 616; Woolcock 2005: 396).

Third, the EU promotes constitutional norms such as human rights, the rule o law and democ-racy in its external relations (e.g. Manners 2002: 240241). Mirroring the debate surroundingthe economic model advocated by the EU, Gordon Craword asserts that, in this case, the EUpromotes a rather limited democracy assistance agenda oriented at challenging state power andsustaining economic liberalisation rather than extending popular participation and control, andthus consistent with the maintenance o neo-liberal hegemony (Craword 2005: 594, 596).

In sum, the EU as a regionally integrated system o liberal democracies, regionalism, regulatedtransnational markets and democratic constitutionalism dene the essence o being European.Europeanization then includes promoting regionally integrated liberal democracies beyond itsborders. From a rational perspective, an international environment that mirrors the EU is likely tobe in the best interest o the EU and its member states. It is an environment that they are amiliarwith and know to use to their benet. This reduces adaptation and inormation costs and givesthem an advantage over non-EU actors that are less amiliar with such an environment ( Peters andWagner 2005: 216). Others, however, emphasize shared values and norms as well as establishedroutines and templates o the EU as the source o these goals. Federica Bicchi, or instance, suggeststhat EU external policy can be seen as unreexive behaviour mirroring the deeply engrained beliethat Europes history is a lesson or everybody. Put briey, [it] is inormed, at least partially, bythe idea that our size ts all (Bicchi 2006: 287). Regional economic integration and liberaldemocracy thus represent strong belies and universally valid ideas o an efective political order

that are promoted regardless o calculations o benet and easibility.The ocus on more general principles o political order in Europeanization beyond Europe

may be an artiact o the literature that has indicated a strong interest in the normative contento EU external policies and the EU as a value-driven actor and normative power (e.g. Manners2002; Lucarelli and Manners 2006; Sjursen 2006a,b). It also, however, reects the EUs ocialexternal relations doctrine. In addition, it is in line with the ndings on Europeanization incandidate countries (Schimmelennig and Sedelmeier 2005b): Prior to the accession process proper,the ocus on and impact o the EUs specic acquis rules has been generally weak. Rather, theEUs constitutive political norms are prominent.

Yet the ocus on regional integration and liberal democracy also raises questions. First o all,what is understood as distinctly European in Europeanization? Whereas it may be grantedthat regionalism is a unique eature o EU external relations, democracy, human rights and market

economy are Western principles propagated by non-EU Western countries (such as the United




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States) and other international organizations (e.g. the Council o Europe or the OECD) as well.Moreover, the EU itsel may have been inuenced by broader tendencies and patterns in the in-ternational system. Take, or instance, the neoliberal economic order the EU advocates in itsexternal relations. In this case the EU is not only part o a larger tendency represented by mostother international economic organizations (Hurt 2004); its own internal economic governance haschanged under the impact o neoliberalism as well. By the same token researchers must beextremely careul in attributing liberal democratic domestic change in third countries to Euro-peanization. The general problem o Europeanization research that EU inuences must beanalytically separated rom international non-EU and domestic societal and political inuences is more dicult the less EU-specic the rules in question and the less dense the institutionalrelationship between the EU and a third country are.

Second, the arguments concerning the domestic analogy (Peters and Wagner 2005) or the

ontological quality o the EU as a changer o norms (Manners 2002: 252) clearly ail tosuciently take into account the evolution and changes o the EUs Europeanization goals andstrategies over time. Both arguments suggest that, having been a regional organization o liberaldemocratic countries rom its very beginnings, the EU should also have engaged in promotingits model rom the start. Yet the promotion o regionalism, economic liberalism, human rightsand democracy has only become prominent since the early 1990s (see below). Instead, the globalpolitical changes o the time (the end o the Cold War, the wave o democratization) and theconcomitant institutional enhancement o the EU as an international actor (the Common ForeignSecurity Policy (CFSP) established in the Maastricht Treaty) seem to have spurred the explicitdenition and promotion o the EU model beyond Europe (Farrell 2007: 304).

Third, the ocus on nice and general goals that are ocially propagated and intentionallypursued by the EU may come at the expense o studying more policy-specic, unintended oreven nasty domestic consequences o the EUs presence in the world. As an efect o the EUsmarket power, or instance, producers and legislators in third countries will oten be orced tounilaterally adopt EU product standards. Consequently, we can observe policy- or issue-specicEuropeanization. Moreover, the efects o the protectionist Common Agricultural Policy on thewelare and societal and political development o less developed countries have arguably beenextensive.

Finally, the ocus in the literature on general political principles and constitutional goals shouldnot obscure the act that the EU is predominantly a system o issue-specic, technical internationalrules applied to a great variety o policy areas that make up its acquis communautaire (Magen2007: 364366). To a large extent, the EU propagates these rules directly in order to inuence theagenda and decision-making o international organizations and the policy-making and legislativeactivities o third countries. In addition, however, the sheer weight o the EU market induces thirdcountries to adapt to or adopt EU rules in order to be able to participate in it.

In the remainder o the review I will ocus largely on the general political principles pro-activelyadvocated and pursued by the EU. In the subsequent section the ocus will be placed on how theseprinciples have been pursued. Which instruments, strategies and mechanisms does the literatureidentiy?

4 Instruments and strategies

The literature is in broad agreement that the 1990s have witnessed a major change in EU externalpolicies: the establishment oconditionality, in particular political conditionality, as a core instru-ment. Beore the 1990s EU external relations had been notable or their apolitical content and theprinciple o not interering with the domestic systems o third countries. Since the beginning o

the 1990s, however, democracy, human rights and the rule o law have become essential elements




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in almost all EU agreements with third countries as both an objective and a condition o the in-stitutionalized relationship. In case o violation, the EU may suspend or terminate the agreement(Horng 2003). These goals were complemented later by good governance.

How did this policy change come about? It would be insucient to simply attribute politicalconditionality via domestic analogy to the constitutional values and norms o the EU, which hadexisted beore and did not change at the beginning o the 1990s. Outside the EU the changedexternal political environment ollowing the wave o democratization in 1989/90 was the majorinuence. The wave o democratization not only strengthened the international legitimacy oliberal democracy but also increased the need to support new and edgling democracies. This wascomplemented by the increasing acceptance in development policy circles that economic aid andconditionality were insucient in the absence o political reorm and good governance. Inside theEU the European Parliament was the major driving orce. It could use the assent procedure or

treaties with third countries, which had been introduced by the Single European Act (SEA), topress or political conditionality (Holland 2002: 120; Smith 2001).

EU conditionality is generally described as positive. It uses carrots rather than sticks rewards rather than punishment or assistance (Holland 2002: 132; Schimmelennig 2005; Smith2001; Youngs 2001a: 192). In spite o the essential elements clause, no agreements with thirdcountries have been suspended or terminated. According to Youngs, in practice European policywas in no signicant way based on the use o coercive measures; the EU has shown no notablepropensity to impose punitive action directly in relation to democratic shortalls. Europeanpolicy-makers saw a more positive, incentives-based orm o conditionality as more legitimate andpotentially more efective than the use o sticks (Youngs 2001a: 192). Below the level o treatyrelationships, however, the EU has, in act, used the stick. In several cases nancial aid waswithheld, reduced or suspended, and negotiations were delayed (e.g. Nwobike 2005). However,there is scant evidence o additional assistance to countries where things are improving (Smith2001: 190).

Conditionality is not the only mechanism o Europeanization observed even in the eldo democracy and human rights promotion. In his study o EU democracy promotion in theMediterranean and East Asia, Richard Youngs nds evidence o two rather diferent strategies:civil society support and socialization. In addition, he observes that the prole o EU democracyassistance unding in the two regions suggested a bottom-up approach, oriented overwhelmingly tocivil society support, and in particular human rights NGOs (Youngs 2001a: 192; Youngs 2001b:362). This is also true or Latin America where the EU has little leverage or using politicalconditionality and has sought to develop direct links with civil society actors (Grugel 2004: 612).

On the other hand Youngs claims that in light o the limits to positive and negative materialmeasures, EU strategy was characterized by an aim to develop deeply institutionalized patterns odialogue and co-operation as means o socializing political elites into a positive and consensual ad-

herence to democratic norms (Youngs 2001a: 193). The EU used generally accepted cooperationover technical governance issues in order to indirectly promote good governance and democracy(Youngs 2001a: 195; 2001b: 363). According to Youngs the socialization approach is designed tocreate opportunities or imitation and demonstration efects and starts with very modest ex-pectations o introducing the vocabulary o democracy into domestic discourse and inducing elitesto, at the very least, publicly support democracy (Youngs 2001b: 359). It is these strategies,rather than political conditionality, that bear evidence o a distinctive and innovative Europeanapproach to democracy promotion and have been unduly overlooked ( Youngs 2001a: 192, 195).By contrast, the US approach to democracy promotion has been characterized by more concreteintervention and a more top-down, politicized . . . assistance ocusing on the ormal proceduralelements o democracy (Youngs 2001b: 360, 363364).

In sum, the Europeanization strategies identied by Youngs in the area o human rights and

democracy competition match the most important mechanisms identied in the theoretical litera-




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ture (see section 2 above): conditionality, (intergovernmental) socialization, and direct EU-societylinks (via transnational socialization and domestic empowerment). The next question is whetherthe literature on Europeanization beyond Europe also conrms expectations o weak impact.

5 Impact and Efectiveness

What impact has EU external governance had beyond member and candidate states? How andto what extent has the EU been able to Europeanize non-European countries and regions? Inreviewing the literature I will again ocus on regionalism and democracy/human rights. Thetwo criteria or evaluating EU policy most requently ound in the literature are consistency andefectiveness.

5.1 Regionalism

According to Federica Bicchi the EU has consistently promoted regionalism and ollowed a regionalapproach in its agreements and relations with non-European third countries around the world with the exception o EU-US bilateral relations (Bicchi 2006: 287288). This rather consistentapproach across time and space and in spite o regional divergences strongly indicates that the EUollows an organizational norm rather than unctional considerations. This is particularly evidentwith regard to regional policies addressing regions that have ew objective regional characteristics(such as high density o transactions) and do not perceive themselves as regional communities such as the Mediterranean or the Arican, Caribbean, and Pacic (ACP) countries. Rather, theyconstitute regions mainly according to EU policy (Bicchi 2006: 288).

As Jean Grugel argues in a comparative analysis o EU and US policy vis- a-vis Latin America,

this regionalism is also distinctively European. First, relations are discursively constructed asinter-regional partnerships, based around notions o equity and cooperation that ignores ortranscends the underlying power inequalities (Grugel 2004: 607608). Second, the EU hasdeveloped a conscious political leg to its new regionalism, distinct rom US-sponsored ree-tradeassociations, built around the promotion o its own model o democracy, social welare, andregional integration, understood as subregional integration within Latin America (Grugel 2004:616).

I the EUs promotion o regionalism has been consistent and distinctive, has it been isomorphicas well? That is, have regional arrangements created and supported by the EU been modeled onthe EU example and have they been similar to each other? The great variety o interregionalcooperation arrangements seems to contradict the expectation o isomorphism (or an overview,see Alecu de Flers and Regelsberger 2005). In addition, there appears to be disagreement as ar asthe assessment o specic arrangements is concerned. For instance, whereas Bicchi argues that the

institutional settings and governance regimes o the EU and its Mediterranean policy (EMP) arehighly similar to international governance with regard to its multilateral institutional ramework,the emphasis on economic matters but with a social avour, and the eurocentric transer o theJustice and Home Afairs agenda to the EMP (Bicchi 2006: 295298), Jofe (2001) and Alecu deFlers and Regelsberger (2005: 323) point to the act that the Barcelona process has been modeledon the Conerence on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) rather than the EU.

The region that the EU seems to regard as most promising with regard to isomorphic regionalismis Latin America, particularly its Southern Cone, which is culturally the most similar world regionand has also implemented a common market project (Mercosur) that might develop along Europeanlines (Grugel 2004: 616). Here, the EU seeks to spread its ideas o regional integration and goodgovernance through research unding, seminar programmes, and the creation o a und to provideor the regular exchange o ideas within Latin America, in imitation o its own policies (Grugel

2004: 612).




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Interestingly, however, it is the Arican Union (AU designed in 2000) that mirrors the EUmost closely in institutional terms, with its Parliament, Commission, Executive Council o Minis-ters, Court o Justice and plans or a common currency. The use o the EU template in this caseseems to have been a case o lesson-drawing or imitation rather than EU conditionality or social-ization. However, the apparent supranational set-up o the AU is not matched by supranationalcompetences or these institutions (Farrell 2007: 312).

Unintended efects o the EUs presence rather than efects o intentional promotion o re-gionalism seem to have occurred in other regions and sub-regions as well. Christopher Hill andMichael Smith point out that the need to deal with a rich and powerul EU draws other states intocooperative ventures, especially in their international relations (Hill and Smith 2005: 396, theiritalics) and list the South Arican Development Committee as well as the Asia-Europe Meeting(ASEM) as examples. Although the EU might have unintentionally triggered regional cooperation

in these cases, the cooperation schemes did not ollow the EU model o regionalism.Both Thomas Christiansen, Petto, and Tonra (2000) and Anne Myrjord (2003) reer to the

ambivalent efects o the EU on regional institutions and region-building in adjacent regions. EUneighborhood policies have reduced the divisive efects o enlargement and minimized the impor-tance o the institutional boundary between the Union and its environment ( Myrjord 2003: 251).They represent a turn towards an inclusive orm o conducting EU external policy and give non-member countries a say in EU policy-making (Myrjord 2003: 251; see also Christiansen, Petto,and Tonra 2000: 412). However, the oten bilateral ramework o negotiations between the EU andthird states tends to undermine the model o multilateral regional integration that the EU seeks topromote, and external governance arrangements can only partially ofset the disruptive efects othe EUs diferentiation between members, candidates and non-candidates in neighboring regions(Christiansen, Petto, and Tonra 2000: 407, 412). These ndings are supported in the study by

Diez, Stetter, and Albert (2006), which claims that EU borders that adjoin existing border conictsexacerbate rather than mitigate these conicts.

In addition, an emerging dependence on relatively strong EU nancial instruments carries thepotential o crowding out existing regional initiatives (Myrjord 2003: 252). This efect will, ocourse, depend on the existence and strength o endogenous region-building developments. Whereasthe EU may have had an overall disruptive efect in the Baltic and Nordic regions, where suchregion-building eforts seem to have been relatively well developed, even the limited eforts othe EU to generate multilateralism constitute the main driving orce in an externally directedregion-building efort (Christiansen, Petto, and Tonra 2000: 412) in the Mediterranean.

With regard to Arica, Hurt is equally skeptical: The history o regional integration projectswithin the ACP group, especially in Arica, is one o consistent ailure to achieve meaningul inte-gration and development. Moreover, the six new regions dened in the Cotonou Agreement1 o

2002 are externally imposed and do not in most cases correspond to existing regional organiza-tions (Hurt 2003: 173).

In sum, the promotion o regionalism has indeed been a consistent and distinctive eature o EUexternal relations. The presence o the EU, its success in regional integration and its importanceas an economic actor have served as models and triggered regional cooperation schemes in otherparts o the world. Both conditionality and lesson-drawing/imitation seem to have been at work inthese processes. Yet the scope and design o these schemes are extremely diverse and bear, at best,supercial resemblance to the EU. In addition, the actual policy o the EU toward and in theseregional arrangements seems at times to undermine rather than strengthen regionalism beyond theEU.

1 The Cotonou Agreement replaced the Lome Convention as the general treaty ramework between the EU and

the group o Arican, Caribbean, and Pacifc states. Its ocus is on development policy.




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5.2 Human rights and democracy

Just as Bicchi (2006) in the case o regionalism, Tanja Borzel and Thomas Risse argue that theinstruments used by the EU to promote democracy, human rights, the rule o law, and goodgovernance look surprisingly similar across the globe, indicating that the EU ollows quiteclearly a specic cultural script (Borzel and Risse 2004: 2). The use o political conditionality,political dialogue and capacity-building mechanisms in all world regions demonstrate movementtowards a coherent approach, which did not ollow a grand design but incremental learning bydoing (Borzel and Risse 2004: 2829). However, Borzel and Risse avowedly ail to analyze theimplementation o the EUs approach, as well as its efectiveness on the ground. The picture oconsistency quickly becomes blurred when this is taken into account.

The consistency o EU political conditionality is a central issue addressed in the literature,

and the general conclusion is that it is not consistent. Inconsistency starts with the act thatessential-elements clauses are not included in agreements with China and the ASEAN countries,nor with Australia, Canada, and New Zealand. While this may be attributed to the presence o astable democracy in the latter cases, this justication clearly does not apply to the Asian countries.

Authors generally recognize that the EU treats countries diferently regardless o similaritiesin human rights records. Despite the pervasive political and legal rhetoric o democracy andhuman rights promotion, actual policy seems to match rhetoric only when consistency is cheap;otherwise, it is driven by a host o other geopolitical, economic or security interests. Accordingto Karen Smith, poor, marginal states (oten in Arica) o little importance to the EU or oneo its member states tend to be subjected to negative conditionality; these are the cases whereit is easiest to show that you are doing something about human rights (Smith 2001: 193). Inother cases member states block suspension or termination because this would harm commercialinterests, because the country is strategically or politically too important or because they have

doubts about the efectiveness o negative measures (Smith 2001: 196).Overriding interest in cooperation on energy issues and the war on terror is also cited as the

main reason why democracy promotion was not prioritized in Central Asia, despite the dismalpolitical record o the region (Warkotsch 2006). In a comparative analysis o EU responses toviolations o democratic norms in the post-Soviet area, Alexander Warkotsch urther shows that,while the existence o a democracy clause in EU-third country agreements signicantly increasesthe likelihood o an EU response to anti-democratic policies, it is not signicantly correlated withresponses that go beyond verbal denunciation. By contrast, stronger sanctions are more likelyto be used against geographically proximate states and less likely against resource-rich countries(Warkotsch 2008).

Martin Holland reports that suspensions have mainly hit participants in the Lome Conventionand countries that were economically relatively unimportant to the EU; on the other hand, the

EU spared Asian and economically more relevant countries (Holland 2002: 133). In conclusion heargues that while the link between development and democratic principles o good governmenthas become the accepted and inevitable ace o North-South relations; the degree to which thisconditionality is supervised and sanctioned remains variable, almost idiosyncratic (Holland 2002:135).

Richard Youngs also generally nds that the the overall distribution o EU trade and aidprovisions did not to any signicant extent correlate with democratic criteria and punishment aswell as rewards were adopted on an ad hoc basis and not pursued with any coherence or vigour(Youngs 2001b: 357). He also observes that the EU has reacted more to massive human rightsabuses and dramatic interruptions o the democratic process than to persistently autocraticgovernments. Democratic conditionality has not been systematic. (Youngs 2001b: 356)

In a statistical analysis o the suspension o development cooperation in reaction to human

rights violations, Hadewych Hazelzet comes to more nuanced results. She nds that the level o




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respect or human rights or regime type was not signicant or the granting o EU developmentcooperation and that the EU was less likely to impose sanctions on countries with which it hasinstitutionalised cooperation, which conrm the general picture o inconsistency (Hazelzet 2005:910). But she also nds that ormer French and British colonies were sanctioned less severelythan ormer colonies o other EU member states, indicating the protective inuence o France andBritain (Hazelzet 2005: 10). On the whole, however, her multivariate regression analysis indicatesthat, in the 1990s, overall the level o human rights violations was a more important determinantor EU sanctions than the level o economic or strategic importance o a country ( Hazelzet 2005:11). In the end, Hazelzets ndings reer only to ACP countries. As other authors have pointedout (see above), this group o countries was o relatively minor economic and strategic importanceto the EU and was thus more likely to be treated consistently than Asian countries.

This inconsistency difers markedly rom the airly consistent and meritocratic use o political

conditionality vis-a-vis the accession countries (see, e.g., Schimmelennig 2003: 99108; Vachudova2005). The variation in institutional set-up may be one cause or this discrepancy. In the accessioncases political assessments and decisions are prepared by the Commission in a centralized manner;beyond applicant countries, governments o member state and the various pillars o the EU aremore strongly involved (Smith 2001; Youngs 2001a: 2846). Alternatively, the diference canbe explained by a community efect: when constitutional questions such as membership are atstake, the pressure to act in line with the constitutive community rules increases. Rule adoptionis expedient or outside cooperation partners but indispensable or uture members. Whereasinterest-based considerations are permitted to take the upper hand in relations with external states,the constitutive community rules will prevail in relations with uture insiders (Schimmelennig,Engert, and Knobel 2006: 46).

Beyond Europe, the move toward intergovernmental political conditionality seems thus to havebeen a declaratory rather than practical policy. I the EUs political conditionality approach hasbeen inconsistent in countries and regions beyond Europe, what about its policies o domestic em-powerment and socialization? According to Richard Youngs the EU did not pursue these strategiesconsistently either. As to civil society assistance, the EU did not push hard to gain access orpolitical aid work and was unwilling to risk tension with recipient governments. In its dia-logue and cooperation the EU oten deliberately sought ways o circumventing its own ormalpreconditions, ofering concrete sectoral cooperation without the need or a ormalization o newdemocracy-based discourse (Youngs 2001a: 193; see also Youngs 2001b: 365). It seems thus tobe a general eature o EU democracy promotion that it has been, as several authors have put it,high on rhetoric and low on policy (Craword 2005 on Ghana; Warkotsch 2006 on Central Asia).

Elsewhere, Richard Youngs (2004) uses the case o EU human rights promotion in order to makea general point about the interaction o norms and strategic interests in EU external relations. Heargues that instrumental choices are made within a range o common normative understandings

and, in particular, that security-driven choices [have] been selected within the overarching humanrights ramework (Youngs 2004: 431). In his analysis EU human rights policy has been attuned tothe general promotion o international stability and exhibited a state-oriented capacity-buildingbias (Youngs 2004: 424).

There is broad agreement in the literature not only on the overall inconsistency o EU strategy,but also on the overall low impact o the EU on democracy and human rights in non-candidatethird countries. These ndings hold regardless o the region under study and strategy used. Thecauses o inefectiveness appear rather overdetermined or political conditionality. First, vis-a-visnon-candidate countries, the EU cannot use its most important incentive or compliance theprospect o membership. Second, inconsistency hampers efectiveness: the seemingly variableapplication o conditionality . . . detracts rom the EUs international credibility and inuence(Holland 2002: 135). Third, or the predominantly authoritarian or autocratic governments in

the EUs neighboring regions, compliance with the EUs democratic or human rights standards is




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politically costly. It involves the risks o losing political power that, in the perception o third-country governments, are not ofset by the economic or diplomatic rewards the EU has on ofer. Theindirect strategies were conronted with the same obstacle when the ruling elites in target statesperceived that the good governance agenda was elaborated with increasingly political intent(Youngs 2001a: 195; see also Tanner 2004: 140141).

To conclude, EU democracy promotion and human rights policy beyond Europe has used thethree mechanisms o conditionality, socialization and domestic empowerment. In all o these cases,however, EU policy in third countries and regions has been characterized by low consistency andefectiveness. In the next section I will review the more recent and specialized literature on theEuropean Neighborhood Policy in order to nd i the general ndings hold true there as well.

6 European Neighborhood PolicyThe European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) was introduced by the EU during the time o itsbig bang enlargement o 2004 in order to expand and strengthen its relationship with neigh-boring countries that would not be considered as candidates or membership at least or theoreseeable uture. Originally conceived to encompass the enlarged EUs Eastern European neigh-bors, it was later extended to the Middle Eastern and North Arican partner countries o theEuro-Mediterranean Partnership (Barcelona Process) and urther to the Caucasus. It excludesRussia, however, which insisted on pursuing a separate track o cooperation with the EU (see e.g.Johansson-Nogues 2007 or an overview o the history o ENP).

The ENP can easily be seen as a ramework o Europeanization. It was designed by Commissionocials who had previously been in charge o enlargement and applied previously acquired toolsto their new positions (Kelley 2006). It was originally planned to mirror the EEA by extendingthe EU market and acquis in the absence o ormal membership in EU organizations. In addition,three principles o enlargement policy appeared in the ENP documents: First, the ENP is based onthe EUs commitment to promote core liberal values and norms beyond its borders and, second, itclaims to use political conditionality as the main instrument o norm promotion. Diferentiationis a undamental principle o the ENP. In the absence o the membership incentive, the ENPstrategy documents tie both participation in the ENP as such and the intensity and level ocooperation to the ENP partners adherence to liberal values and norms (Maier and Schimmelennig2007: 4042). Third, the EU uses planning, reporting and assistance procedures similar to thatused or candidate countries (Baracani 2009: 136137).

There are clear diferences to enlargement, however, beyond the obvious act that the ENP isnot designed to guide third countries toward membership. For one, the major incentives designed toinduce Europeanization in ENP countries a liberalized access o goods and persons to the EU is

likely to be undermined by protectionist interest groups in the EU, the exclusion o sectors such asagriculture in which the ENP partners have a competitive edge and ears o crime and uncontrolledimmigration in the EU (Occhipinti 2007; Sedelmeier 2007: 201205; Vachudova 2007).

Second, rather than ull transposition o the acquis, the EUs expectation is or partial andprogressive alignment with EU legal norms in areas where it makes economic sense, suits the devel-opment level and serves the development goals o the neighbours (Noutcheva and Emerson 2007:91). Moreover, the EU puts a much stronger emphasis on sot and participatory mechanismsinvolving the ENP partners (Sedelmeier 2007: 199). Rather than unilaterally imposed by theEU based on its acquis, the Action Plans at the core o ENP programming are negotiated andmonitored between the EU and its partners bilaterally and based on joint ownership.

Joint ownership, a core principle o the socialization mechanism o Europeanization, is con-sidered by many to undermine the efectiveness o conditionality. On one hand, it reduces the

likelihood that bilateral Action Plans reect the EUs objective precisely in relations with those




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countries which are urthest rom conorming to the conditions preerred by the EU (Sedelmeier2007: 200). Governments that do not share the EUs democracy and human rights agenda, orinstance, can and do minimize the role o political conditionality in their Action Plans. On theother, it is at odds with the tough monitoring and reporting by EU institutions that was a precon-dition or reorm-oriented orces to mobilize pressure against reorm-adverse governments in EastCentral European accession governments (ibid.). To summarize, Ulrich Sedelmeier expects thecoexistence o conditionality and socialization in the ENP to undermine their respective potential(Sedelmeier 2007: 201).

By contrast, Gwendolyn Sasse nds merit and opportunities in the ENPs conditionality-lite(Sasse 2008). While she agrees that it is unlikely to produce short-term EU-driven change atthe level o third country governments, ENP conditionality may serve as an external reerencepoint or longer-term domestic political processes. In her view the vagueness o conditions and

incentives makes it easier or traditionally Euro-sceptic actors in ENP countries to approach theEU gradually and selectively (Sasse 2008: 298).

6.1 Democracy promotion in the ENP

The expectation o (at least short-term) inefectiveness is borne out by the preliminary evidencepublished so ar. An analysis o ENP participants democracy and human rights records sincethey established contractual relations with the EU in the mid-1990s shows that the EU has neitherconsistently linked its cooperation agreements with the political situation in these countries, norhave these countries liberalized as a result o EU political conditionality (Maier and Schimmelennig2007: 4548). Comparisons o ENP Action Plans conrm the absence o a coherent democracypromotion policy and the overriding importance o the EUs geostrategic and partner countries

political interests (Bosse 2007; Baracani 2009).Studies o EU democracy promotion in the Mediterranean conrm this overall assessment. TheEUs consistent application o political conditionality in this region is undermined by its eforts tobuild a multilateral partnership in the Southern Mediterranean and to promote peace in the MiddleEast otherwise it would risk losing essential partners or these eforts. At the end o the day, theEU,and particularly its southern member states, preer stable, authoritarian and Western-orientedregimes to the instability and Islamist electoral victories that genuine democratization processes inthis region are likely to produce (Gillespie and Whitehead 2002: 196; Gillespie and Youngs 2002:1213; Youngs 2002: 42; Junemann 2003: 7).

The EUs socialization eforts are limited by the same security and stability concerns. ThoughEU democracy assistance has been institutionally and nancially strengthened, it has remainedmodest in scale. In addition, it has been primarily directed towards secular civil society organi-zations engaged in non-political services that are approved by, and oten connected to, partner

governments (Gillespie and Whitehead 2002: 197; Haddadi 2002, 2003; Junemann 2002; Youngs2002: 5557). These assessments stem rom the pre-ENP period but have been conrmed by morerecent studies (Pace 2009; Pace, Seeberg, and Cavatorta 2009: 45; Youngs 2008).

Given the limits and ailures o top-down political conditionality and bottom-up socialization inthe context o the ENP, Sandra Lavenex, Frank Schimmelennig and their collaborators have begunto examine an alternative model o democracy promotion in the European Neighborhood. Thedemocratic governance model starts with the assumption that the intensiying web o associationrelations between the EU and associated third countries introduces a new orm o democracypromotion through sectoral cooperation. Democratic governance goes beyond good governancein that it includes general attributes o democracy such as horizontal and vertical accountability,transparency and stakeholder and general participation. It difers rom the direct promotion odemocracy in that it does not target the general institutions and processes o the polity, such as

elections, parties, or parliaments, but operates at the level o sectoral policy-making. The EU




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seeks not only to externalize its material acquis rules or regulating public policy in each sectoro political cooperation between the EU and its neighboring countries, but also procedural ruleson how sectoral policies and actors are made transparent, accountable and participatory. Thoughdemocratic governance promotion initially remains at the sectoral level and in the case o success leads to the democratization o sectoral governance, it may spill over into the general polity byinculcating democratic values, norms and habits on societal and bureaucratic actors and creatinga demand or ar-reaching democratization o the entire political system (Freyburg, Skripka, andWetzel 2007; Freyburg et al. 2009a).

In an empirical assessment comparing democratic governance promotion in three sectors (asy-lum, competition and environmental policy) and countries (Moldova, Morocco, and Ukraine), theyshow that the EU is, indeed, capable o inducing neighbouring countries to incorporate policy-specic democratic governance provisions into domestic legislation in the absence o accession

conditionality. This is especially the case when the corresponding EU rules are strongly legalizedand are linked to overarching international norms. The study also shows, however, that the appli-cation o these provisions in administrative practice has remained weak thus ar (Freyburg et al.2009b).

6.2 External governance beyond democracy promotion

Democracy promotion is the most widely studied area o Europeanization in the European Neigh-borhood. Studies ocusing on other EU rules and policies remain relatively scarce. As in democracypromotion, the available evidence points to systematic weaknesses in EU impact. At a general level,Gergana Noutcheva and Michael Emerson show on the basis o World Bank governance scores thatmost o them have regressed rather than progressed on both regulatory quality and rule o law

between 1996 and 2004 (Noutcheva and Emerson 2007: 90), i.e. during the time that the EUestablished institutionalized and at least on paper politically conditioned relations with theneighborhood countries.

In his book on EU external energy policy Stephan Hoer compares EU rule export in Bulgaria,Serbia and Ukraine (Hoer 2008). His general argument combines the imitation and conditionalitymechanisms. For one, successul EU rule transer requires that there be an economic necessityor reorm in the country. In addition, however, the EU needs to apply proactive accession con-ditionality in order to overcome domestic interest group opposition. The absence o this secondcondition explains why EU inuence in Ukraine has been weak in comparison with Bulgaria andSerbia. In this sector, however, inefectiveness may be the result o more than simple reluctance othe EU to provide a membership incentive and active monitoring. As Adam Stulberg and SandraLavenex point out, the policy eld o energy constitutes a rare set o issues o rough parity betweenBrussels and ENP partners with mutual vulnerabilities and complementary interests (Stulberg

and Lavenex 2007: 137) so that the EU would not have the bargaining power to impose its energypolicy rules on ENP countries unilaterally.

EU bargaining power is also highlighted as a crucial condition o efective rule transer in twoother studies. Esther Barbe, Oriol Costa, Anna Herrantz and Michal Natorski (Barbe et al. 2009)ask whose rules the EU and selected neighboring countries (Georgia, Morocco, Russia and Ukraine)choose or negotiations on oreign and security policy cooperation. They show that EU rules are byno means the ocal point o cooperation and are no more prominent than other international rulesor bilaterally negotiated new rules. Only those countries that harbor hopes o eventual accessionare, on the whole, willing to adopt EU rules. This is why they perceive EU rules as legitimate.Otherwise, third countries will only orient themselves to EU rules i interdependence with the EUand EU bargaining power are high. Antoaneta Dimitrova and Rilka Dragneva (2009) emphasizethe limits on the Europeanization o Ukraine imposed by Russia. In a comparison o trade, energy

and oreign policy relations, they show that the efectiveness o EU rule export increases with




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Ukrainian dependence on the EU instead o Russia.In many respects the ENP can be considered the most likely context or Europeanization beyond

the group o member, quasi-member and candidate countries o the EU. It is here that internationalinterdependence with the EU and the EUs eforts to expand its acquis are stronger than in otherregions o the world. Nevertheless, studies o the neighborhood policies overwhelmingly show thatthe ENP is inconsistent both with regard to the expansion o the acquis rules and the use oconditionality and is inefective. Neighborhood countries appear to be willing to adopt EU rulesonly i they hope to be considered or ull membership in the uture and to the extent that theEU possesses superior bargaining power vis-a-vis partner countries and alternative governanceproviders such as Russia. Both conditions are the exception rather than the rule in the EuropeanNeighborhood.

Thereore, in their study o EU external governance in the area o internal security, Sandra

Lavenex and Nicole Wichmann (2009) start with the assumption that socialization through net-work governance, rather than hierarchical policy transer through conditionality, is more likelyto be used and efective in EU-neighborhood relations. Though they nd abundant evidence othe existence o such transgovernmental networks, they also come to the conclusion that the oper-ation and efectiveness o these networks is hampered by incompatible administrative structures,cultures, expertise and lack o trust.

The ndings on the ENP apply a ortiori to the Russian district o Kaliningrad, which hasalso recently been analyzed rom a Europeanization perspective (Ganzle, Muntel, and Vinokurov2008). Although relations between the EU and Kaliningrad are not ormally part o the ENP, as anexclave surrounded by EU territory, Kaliningrad was designed to be a pilot region or enhancedEU-Russia relations. In spite o this particular geographic situation and the interdependence thatcomes with it, Europeanization has remained very weak and selective (Ganzle and Munter 2008).Generally, the low level o regional autonomy, and Russias insistence on saeguarding sovereigntyand being treated as a special partner (Meloni 2008), limit the impact o EU rules. But weakinstitutional capabilities and lack o interest prevent Europeanization even in policy areas withcomparatively high regional autonomy (Ganzle and Munter 2008: 251).

7 Conclusions

In the introductory sections o the review, I proposed to use the literature on Europeanizationin candidate states or membership as a benchmark or the analysis o Europeanization beyondEurope. In general, the ndings reported here suggest that the dividing line b etween candidatestates and other third countries also constitutes a categorical diference or the analysis o theefects o Europeanization.

First, though the acquis communautaire is at the core o Europeanization in the case o quasi-members and candidate countries, the goals and contents o Europeanization beyond Europe at least those analyzed in the majority o the literature are o a more general character.Regionalism may still count as an EU-specic goal, which, i efectively pursued, would resultin a distinctive Europeanization beyond Europe, other core goals such as stability and securityor democracy and human rights are clearly less related to the EUs acquis and less specic to theEUs external relations. However, there is a clear tendency in more recent literature on the ENPto redress the balance in avor o the whole range o EU policies.

Second, even though positive political conditionality became a general eature o EU relationswith third countries in the 1990s, it has been used less consistently than in EU relations withpotential member states. Moreover, other instruments or promoting EU core values and norms such as domestic empowerment o civil society or socialization through transgovernmental co-

operation do not appear to have been consistent and efective substitutes or political accession




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conditionality, even i they were described as unique EU strategies.Third, the Europeanizing impact o these strategies has been weak beyond the group o credible

candidates or EU membership. The causes or weak impact are probably maniold: low incentivesand low consistency o policy on the part o the EU, and serious domestic obstacles to Europeaniza-tion on the part o third countries. In sum, membership, or the prospect or hope o membership,appears to be a crucial condition o Europeanization. With regard to its specic normative andregulatory content and its instruments and its impact, Europeanization beyond Europe is substan-tially weaker than Europeanization in Europe. This, however, need not be the last word on theissue.

1) The literature conveys the picture that Europeanization eforts beyond Europe are inconsis-tent and inefective overall, but this does not mean that there are no cases o consistent policy andefective impact. Searching or such cases and studying their conditions in comparison with similar

cases may generate better knowledge o the diferential efects and the conditions o Europeaniza-tion in non-candidate countries. In general, we need urther careully designed and theory-guidedcomparative studies that directly address and assess the causality question between EU policiesand domestic change.

2) Though most Europeanization literature ocuses very much on policies, policy-making pro-cesses and administrative structures, the literature reviewed here was mainly about polity: regionalintegration and constitutional structure. Studies mirroring the general ocus on policy and politicsrelated to policy-making might well nd a stronger impact o Europe on third countries. Theew studies on the impact o EU external governance in the European Neighborhood mentionedabove conrm this expectation. Even though it is ar rom the common and systematic impact oaccession negotiations on candidate countries, the ENP does produce selective rule export aboveall where EU bargaining power is high and third countries harbor hopes o being considered oraccession in the uture. More work o this kind is needed.

8 Acknowledgements

For their comments on the rst version, I am grateul to Sandra Lavenex, Andrea Lenschow, thetwo anonymous reviewers, and the audience at the 2006 Istanbul conerence o the ECPR StandingGroup on European Politics or helpul comments on previous versions o this review. I also thankGerda Falkner and Patrick Scherhauer or their advice and patience.




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