European Journal of International Relations 2011 Sandal 3 25

Article

European Journal of International Relations

17(1) 3–25© The Author(s) 2010

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DOI: 10.1177/1354066110364304ejt.sagepub.com

EJ RI

Corresponding author:Nukhet A. Sandal, Watson Institute for International Studies at Brown University, Providence, RI 02912 USA. Email: [email protected]

Religion and International Relations theory: Towards a mutual understanding1

Nukhet A. SandalBrown University, USA

Patrick JamesUniversity of Southern California, USA

AbstractUntil the end of the Cold War, it is not an exaggeration to say that only a few theorists of International Relations (IR) or policy-makers engaged in either substantial investigation or articulation of the links between cultural variables like religion and ethnicity on one hand and international affairs on the other. In our article, we argue that this pattern does not do justice to the nature of mainstream IR theories. Although studies are accumulating, how (or whether) religion as a variable can be integrated into mainstream IR thinking still remains in question. We look at three main traditions in IR theory — classical realism, structural realism and neoliberalism — to see how religion can contribute to our understanding of international affairs within those frameworks. We claim that, without stretching the limits of theories or disturbing their intellectual coherence, possibilities for two-way interactions between the frameworks and identity-related variables like religion can be identified.

Keywords classical realism, neoliberalism, neorealism, religion

IntroductionReligion, like race, ethnicity and gender, stayed on the backburner in the study of International Relations (IR) for a long time (Carment and James, 1997a, 1997b: 195–198). Even the English School, the most friendly theoretical strand, stayed away from religion for several decades. This separation of religion and politics is usually traced back to the Treaty of Westphalia (1648), regarded as the starting point of the contempo-rary state system. The idea of a secular world of politics took hold in the minds of many in the West.2 Due to the World Wars and the Cold War, investigation of religion declined

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4 European Journal of International Relations 17(1)

significantly in the 20th century. These events shifted research on IR even further away from non-material factors. The fading of the post-World War I liberal vision and an increased focus on material capabilities during the Cold War came at the expense of any burgeoning thought of ethics, morality or religion, broadly defined.

We argue that this pattern reflects preferences and hesitations of individual scholars more than the nature of mainstream IR theories. Identity-related variables have been mostly regarded as a component of reflectivist/hermeneutic traditions, especially during and in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War. Scholars from positivist traditions, therefore, have not been open to the incorporation of such variables into their explana-tions, even if these variables had potentially high explanatory power. This mindset can be traced back to the great debate over traditional versus behavioral methods in the 1950s and 1960s: ‘an unintended consequence of the debate was to remove religious argument from the academic mainstream along with secular normative theory and dip-lomatic history, all equally out of place in a positive discipline’ (Jones, 2003: 371). Jones notes in particular the disappearance of religion even from the English School — a per-spective not normally associated with behavioral methods — as a by-product. In par-ticular, ‘Christian terminology slipped out of the vocabulary of debate’, supplanted by ‘international society’ (Jones, 2003: 372). The legacy of Martin Wight, considered as a founder of the English School, is instructive here. While Wight’s emphasis on interna-tional society remains central to the English School, all but forgotten is ‘his willingness to take religious doctrines, cultures and civilizations seriously’ (Thomas, 2001: 906). Questions regarding ‘war and religion, and the formation of religious traditions in inter-national relations, are unfortunately ignored within the English School’s current research programme’ (Thomas, 2001: 926).

Marginalization of religion, in sum, is due to reluctance of IR theory scholars rather than the nature of IR per se. Religion can indeed be employed as a variable in explana-tory IR theory as a part of ostensibly objective accounts of what is going on ‘out there’. Even the most apparently distant and challenging strands of IR theory can accommodate religion in one way or another. Such an accommodation, indeed, is necessary if we want to make more sense of domestic and international politics as well as foreign policy deci-sions in a world that simply refuses to be purely secular.3

Thus we examine ways in which religion could be integrated into IR and how the work on religion in international relations in general can be systematized into looking at religion as a variable in classical realist, neorealist and neoliberal scholarship. Although studies are accumulating, how (or whether) religion as a variable can be integrated (or, has been integrated) into mainstream IR thinking still remains in question.4 This debate is not limited to religion but encompasses identity-related variables in general. Therefore, some aspects of this article’s arguments about treatment of religion in IR theory may also be valid for variables such as gender, race and ethnicity. We prefer, however, to leave the discussion of such a possible overlap to others. Given the limits of space, we focus par-ticularly on realism (classical and structural variants) and neoliberalism, namely, how do these schools of thought potentially accommodate religion?

The study is divided into six main parts. The first shows how and why religion ended up on the backburner of IR. Methodological preferences are identified in the second part to help set the agenda. Third, we review classical realism briefly and ask whether (and how) religion can be integrated into this theory. The fourth part is dedicated to structural realism



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and the fifth discusses neoliberalism in the same vein. If we want to capture religion fully and integrate it into the scholarly investigation of international relations, we must answer these questions: (a) does religion fit into a particular framework? And (b) what are the pos-sible ways of integrating religion into our studies as they relate to widely used frame-works? The sixth and final part summarizes tentative answers to these questions.

Religion on the backburnerAbstention from theoretical and systematic study of the role of religion in politics origi-nally stemmed from belief that the era of faith causing war had ended and deliberate action would be needed to prevent a disaster of such scale from happening again (Laustsen and Waever, 2008). Both scholars and politicians regarded the violence unleashed during the 16th and 17th centuries in Europe as stemming from an irrational obsession with religious ideals, which could be avoided by taking religion out of the picture altogether. Since then, ‘religion’ has been treated as a cause of violence and an aberration in politics, not as a concept that deserves a systematic and in-depth investiga-tion, despite the role it played in establishing the foundations of the contemporary inter-national system (Philpott, 2000). The decision to confine religion to the domestic sphere as embodied in the principle of cujus regio, ejus religio (literally meaning ‘whose region, his religion’) left the decisions regarding religion to officials governing administrative units. The process of privatizing religion took place incrementally after Westphalia and with variation across states as a function of how each entity came into being. One exam-ple of this incrementalism is the shift from Westphalia to a confessional system as opposed to immediate and all-out secularization (Casanova, 1994: 35–39).

Secularization also brought with itself secularism (i.e. secularization is the process of becoming secular whereas secularism means an emotional attachment to secular values). As a result of these shifting allegiances, the state became the unit of investigation. Alternative modes of social grouping, usually by virtue of constituting a threat to the dominant unit, became restricted to the private sphere. After these grand changes in the Western mode of living, religion looked to practitioners like a greatly diminished force in international affairs and became de-emphasized in domestic politics in most parts of the Western world. Although its potential power generally remained underestimated, religion continued to influence decisions and actions in both the private and public spheres.5

Some understood this better than others. A case in point is Herbert Butterfield, a major figure in the English School. Sharp’s exegesis of Butterfield is instructive. Butterfield focused on how Christian ethics might inform diplomacy pursued out of self-interest, wittily summed up as ‘political realism with manners’ (Sharp, 2003). As Sharp points out, there is more to Butterfield’s thinking than that. Emphasis on mutual restraint — a manifestation of the practice of Christian virtue — constitutes strategic advice in pursuit of the best possible outcome across the board (Sharp, 2003: 868). Expressed in secular terms, Butterfield’s arguments on diplomacy sound like reciprocity, but his exposition also has a Christian foundation, that is, the Golden Rule.

As the material concerns of the Cold War receded, religion as a distinct feature of identity on levels ranging from individual to transnational (e.g. civilizational, as repre-sented in Samuel Huntington’s [1993] much debated ‘clash of civilizations’ thesis) started to draw attention. Religion as (1) a force influencing people’s worldviews, (2) an




aspect of identity, (3) a source of legitimacy and (4) a system of values associated with formal political and economic institutions has been taking its place in the political realm whether the academic world acknowledged it or not (Fox and Sandler, 2004: 2).

Widespread unwillingness among academics to take issues of faith into account as an important dimension — due either to distaste regarding cultural variables or hesitation in terms of technical issues like operationalization — makes our academic accounts and investigations incomplete and artificial. This, of course, is not to say that it is an aca-demically healthy choice to tie every single political decision or action to religion. Admittedly, and especially since September 11, there is a tendency to point either to religion as a generic concept or to a particular faith to account for complex interactions and events.6 This is accompanied by limited attempts to look at background conditions, concomitant political waves and the sociological and philosophical history of religion. If we want to employ religion as a variable in our investigations, we need to pay attention to our usage of the word and how we operationalize it. The reason is clear: trying to use religion in every account is no better than not using it at all.

Scholars also should pay utmost attention to how they define ‘religion’ since there is no single definition of the concept. The study of religion itself is seen as a ‘scholarly enterprise without an identity, one that lacks any widely shared understanding of its cen-tral topic, or of the methods appropriate to the study of this topic’ (Griffiths, 2000; also see Asad, 1993). As Buzan and Little (2001) assert, IR thinking should shift from mutu-ally exclusive interpretations to an interlinked set of perspectives that complement each other. Religion indeed should be seen from such an inclusive perspective and the lack of one single definition should not deter the IR scholar who is ready to define carefully the aspect of religion used in an academic investigation.

Religious phenomena should be investigated as an independent (as a cause), interven-ing (as a link between the cause and the resulting observation) and dependent variable (as the ‘product’ of non-religious causes). It is essential to adapt frameworks of analysis toward those ends. However, we also note that even when religion is captured as an inde-pendent variable, it is not assumed (again, at least within the limits of our knowledge of the literature) to be the single cause of any event.

Although not an omnipotent variable, in short, religion needs to be brought back into the study of international politics. IR as a field should not shy away from employing religion as a causal factor. Some scholars even have expressed the need to establish a subfield that focuses exclusively on the complex relationship between theology and poli-tics (Kubalkova, 2000). This may seem to some like a far-fetched possibility, but it indi-cates how much attention religion now attracts and how it is re-emerging as vital to the study of politics.

Methodological preferencesInvestigating possible uses of religion in realist and neoliberal thinking and vice versa (i.e. adoption of certain principles of these strands to understand religion and politics better without paying too much attention to the coherence of the school of thought) is a special priority. Whether one agrees with the substance of these theories or not, consen-sus exists on (a) the persistence of realism as a paradigm in IR theory and (b) its most



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prominent challenger being neoliberalism. Beyond question, realism is also the most challenging school of thought in terms of accommodating non-material variables into its explanations of international affairs. Hence, instead of focusing on schools of thought that are more conducive to the study of identity — gender, religion and ethnicity in inter-national relations — we prefer taking up a challenge and see how much of a moving space we have in the most distant IR perspectives when it comes to religion.

7 Some specific methodological preferences also are implicit in this project: first, the

focus is limited in terms of the number of IR theories here, so we do not claim to give a full account of all possible strands of these schools of thought. Our categorization of classical realism and neorealism may seem crude, especially to scholars who are well versed in IR theory and the history of political realism. However, an attempt to include all possible realisms — neoclassical (Rose, 1998), postclassical (Brooks, 1997), offen-sive (Mearsheimer, 2001) and others — as well as liberalisms — commercial, demo-cratic, regulatory and other variants (Keohane, 1986a; Richardson, 1997) — along with the possibilities of interaction in these accounts, would deflect attention away from reli-gion via too much detail.

Second, some of the suggestions made in the article may remind the reader of con-structivism. We try to stay in the main framework of the theories stated and confine our suggestions and observations to the existing sphere of arguments in the literature. If there are traces of constructivism in some lines of argument, this is because of an implicit assumption that constructivism is a methodological approach rather than a school of thought by itself. Thus it can be employed even in the midst of realist and neoliberal paradigms toward their improvement. Klotz and Lynch (2007) acknowledge that the term ‘constructivism’ means different things to different scholars, but there is an agree-ment that the focus is on ‘capturing processes of mutual constitution’. Barkin (2003: 338) also argues that, unlike realism and liberalism, constructivism is about how to study politics and it is, indeed, ‘compatible (as are other sets of assumptions about how to study politics, such as rationalism) with a variety of paradigms, including realism’. In line with these arguments, we recognize that constructivist epistemology is especially valuable in any discussion of identity-related variables, which are constituted and influ-enced by social structures as well as contextual factors. However, portraying constructiv-ism as a radical alternative to the existing paradigms instead of a complementary research methodology would be unfair not only to realist and liberal IR theory, but also to those who have developed and employed a constructivist research agenda.

Third, during the course of our discussion, we do not exclude the tools of foreign policy analysis if they are relevant to and consistent with the theory treated. For example, in our discussion of classical realism and religion, individual-level analytical tools, like belief systems, are deemed especially relevant. Classical realism, after all, features an intrinsic individual-level focus, be it in the form of variables or background conditions.

Classical realism and religionRealism is not a monolithic school of thought; its various strands include their own assumptions and causal explanations. However, if one needs to come up with a relatively clear distinction in terms of categories, the realist literature can be divided into two main




schools: classical realism and neorealism. Both schools concur that states are the key units of action for policy-making and analysis, they seek power and are rational, in the sense that they have consistent, ordered preferences and they pick the utility-maximizing choice. Although realism allows for a number of independent variables ranging from ‘human nature’ to ‘distribution of capabilities’, many scholars who have written on IR theory have expressed their pessimism about the integration of culture and identity (see, for example, Hobden, 2001: 42–59; Keohane and Nye, 1977; Lapid and Kratochwil, 1996; Schweller, 1988: 20; Zakaria, 1999: 32–35). This view can be attributed either to a relatively restricted interpretation of realism or concerns about the intellectual coher-ence of this line of thought, especially as represented in its neorealist form.

Classical realism, in its 20th-century manifestation, is most clearly represented by the works of scholars like John Herz, Hans J. Morgenthau and Reinhold Niebuhr as a reac-tion to the utopianism that led to World War II.8 These realists reinvigorated the tradition of power politics so that American policy-makers would avoid both ‘passive unwilling-ness to use force’ and ‘destructive and quixotic crusades’ (Keohane, 1986b: 8). The prev-alent concern of the time was the exaggerated use of certain ideologies — including religious ones — rather than a total ignorance of what is human. Classical realism, with its willingness to attain a certain standard for reasoning and avoid ideological rhetoric, had a normative dimension in this sense — it stood against the neglect of interests and an overemphasis on ideological justifications for inaction or overextension.

What made classical realism unique? The answer is its focus on human nature, which can be interpreted as an independent variable or background condition depend-ing on one’s point of departure. Scholarly investigations that have human nature as an independent variable or background condition can accommodate religion in line with the classical realist tradition. Despite attempts to define politics as a science and sub-ject of objective investigation, the dimensions of ethics and morality are taken into account when assessing the challenges faced by states. The psychological emphasis on human nature made it easier for classical realism to account for subsystem-level changes. Since classical realists started with human nature and ended up at the system level, any inter-level explanation (i.e. that links aspects of human nature to society-level phenomena) also is possible — a considerable advantage if one wants to work with religion in this framework. It is possible to discern individual-level–state-level linkages in most of the works representative of the classical realist tradition. Morgenthau, for example, asserted that ‘politics is governed by objective laws which have roots in human nature’ in his first principle of political realism and then takes nation-state as the analytic level in his work. Similarly, Niebuhr, who introduced theoretical perspec-tives on politics based on an Augustinian understanding, employed first- and second-level explanations at the same time (1932: 14): ‘Every group, as every individual, has expansive desires which are rooted in the instinct of survival and soon extend beyond it. The will-to-live becomes the will-to-power.’ Niebuhr saw society in a perpetual state of war. Although he prescribed moral restraint and wrote on the guiding power of the divine, he also recognized that society ‘will never be sufficiently intelligent to bring all power under its control’ and even the most religious men will be living their faith in ‘asocial, individualistic terms, therefore unable to translate the absolute will into worldly affairs’ (Niebuhr, 1932: 46).



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More recently, Jervis (1998: 988) points to the fact that realism emphasizes the reciprocal relationship between identities and conflict, and ‘social psychologists have long known that perceptions — and misperceptions — of what people have in common often grow out of conflicts as internal unity is gained by seeing others as the Other’ (see also Volf, 1996). Through this lens, religion as it plays out in ethnic conflicts, especially as an independent variable (i.e. defining who we are and who the other is) and interven-ing variable (as a tool to bring people together who actually have other grievances), can be situated in a classical realist explanation. Instrumentalism can incorporate religion as an intervening variable but still preserve the assumption of rationality. Moreover, other explanations that connect interests, human nature and conflict with each other can also find a place for religion. The only concern here would be the unit of investigation. Although classical realism is not as steadfast as neorealism when it comes to states as the main actors, still, any account that treats religion without reference to states probably would need to justify that departure. A shift to other mainstream frameworks — such as neoliberalism or the solidarist branch of the English School, the latter of which is not included in this article (see Devlen et al., 2005) — might therefore be considered as an alternative to heavily state-centric paradigms by scholars who do not want to take the ‘state’ as a reference point.

Before any attempt at integration, one should look at the methodological preferences of classical realism to identify the extent to which non-material variables can be employed without disturbing the intellectual coherence of the theory. Morgenthau, considered by many as the father of modern classical realism, joins the positivist school by asserting that ‘political realism believes that politics, like society in general, is governed by objec-tive laws that have their roots in human nature’. However, Morgenthau’s understanding of science represented more of a desire to decrease the centrality of the normative dimen-sion and perceived wishful thinking in policy-making as witnessed in the post-World War I era than an attempt to exclude non-material variables altogether: ‘the ultimate decisions that confront the scientific mind are … not intellectual but moral in nature’ (Morgenthau, 1972: 9; see also Morgenthau, 1946). His understanding of the dynamics of politics had an inextricably human dimension: modern man is ‘suspended between his aspirations, which he cannot fulfil, and his nature, which he cannot escape, [modern man] experiences the contrast between the longings of his mind and his actual condition as his personal, eminently human tragedy’ (Morgenthau, 1972: 10). Reinhold Niebuhr, despite his faith in the overall trajectory of Christianity, linked the rationality and moral-ity of human life by stating that ‘all men cannot be expected to be spiritual anymore than they can be expected to become rational’ (Niebuhr, 1932: 48).

Along with Reinhold Niebuhr, Morgenthau treated ‘human nature’ as an independent variable. In this light, religion, as part of the human imagination, can be treated as an explanatory variable and an aspect of identity with repercussions for the decisions human beings take and the strivings they experience. In his Moral Man and Immoral Society, Niebuhr (1932: xx) asserted that ‘the easy subservience of reasons to prejudice and pas-sion, and the consequent persistence of irrational egoism, particularly in group behavior, make social conflict an inevitability in human history, probably to its very end’. George Kennan (1967: 319) also expressed his pessimism in equally religious terms: ‘I wish I could believe that the human impulses which give rise to the nightmares of totalitarianism




were ones which Providence had allocated only to other peoples and to which the American people had graciously been left immune’. Therefore, any variable stemming from human nature and impulses capable of being translated into politics can be used to explain decisions and political trends within the classical realist tradition. Niebuhr and Kennan focused on the negative aspects of human nature disproportionately, such as its passions, prejudices and weak disposition. These traits permit totalitarian control, where the individual submits to higher ideological aspirations, like the political expressions of a particular religion. Alternatively, one can be encouraged by the liberal use of emotional and cognitive terminology in this line of thought. The ‘whys’ and ‘hows’ of the human dimension, manifested in waves ranging from political Islam to evangelical Protestantism, can be investigated within the boundaries of classical realism.

Use of cognitive variables as related to religion occurred most directly in the so-called ‘behavioral revolution’ of the 1950s and 1960s. During this period, an interest in political psychology allowed for integration of religion as part of socialization and in relation to its effect on the psychology of the decision-maker and decision itself. The difficulties asso-ciated with measurement — as experienced with psychological variables in general — and the ‘inappropriateness’ of inquiring about an individual’s religious faith, marginalized religion in the behavioral literature. Another factor in this avoidance was unwillingness to tilt ‘the Westphalian deferral’ (defined as ‘an attempt to contain and manage difference within the newly erected boundaries of states’) in favor of overarching ideas that had the potential to draw attention away from states and toward transnational movements (Blaney and Inayatullah, 2000: 32). Neither policy-makers nor mainstream academics stood ready to accept movement in that direction.

Such hostility towards any usage of religion in politics already had been expressed by Morgenthau (1956: 234) when he elevated national interest over ‘religious ideals’: ‘Little do they know that they meet under an empty sky from which the gods have departed’. This statement targeted the futility of employing ambiguous ideals in a system in which the key unit (i.e. state) existed independently of these belief systems. Since the state is the central political actor in classical realism, policies cannot be justified on the basis of pure ideology; a state’s interests override any moral or ideological framework. In a Niebuhrian reasoning, despite the individual possibility of attaining the moral ideal, it should not be expected that human collectivities can be close to this ideal. Individuals have beliefs and ideals; states do not. Again, this is not an obstacle to employing religion as a variable. However, in a state-level account in which religion or ideology is the only variable, it becomes appropriate to shift to some alternative school of thought. Using religion as a subunit variable with influence on state behavior is obviously different from explaining state behavior (as a sum) exclusively by an ideology. To give an example, within a classical realist framework, one cannot say that Iran committed an action because it is an Islamic state, but the same framework would allow an explanation about the influence of Ahmedinejad’s religious beliefs and/or pragmatic usage of religious dis-course in determining the direction of Iranian policy.

Although classical realism emphasized power and interest, these concepts are used flexibly enough to permit integration of the kind of cultural variables at issue here. Realism, Morgenthau (1956: 5) argues, ‘does not endow its key concept of interest defined as power with a meaning that is fixed once and for all’ and ‘the kind of interest



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determining political action in a particular period of history depends upon the political and cultural context within which foreign policy is formulated’. Morgenthau’s ‘interest formation’, which depended on a political and cultural context, sounds very much in line with constructivism. Despite Morgenthau’s cautions against the use of ideology at the expense of prudence and self-restraint, if a state, as an institution, relies heavily on reli-gion as an instrument of legitimacy in a period in which religion is influential in terms of bringing people together, then religion may well be tied effectively to interests. Depending on the context, moral arguments can override ‘strategic speculation’ as Loriaux (1992) states in his analysis of Augustinian realism; there is not only one human psychology, but individual psychologies which collectively determine the meaning of interest and power with a consideration of moral perspectives.

Obviously, the role of religion in a theocracy would be different from in a democracy or a secular autocracy. But the flexibility of the concept of interest allows for usage of constructs like ethnicity, race and religion as independent or intervening variables. The same flexibility goes for power as well; its content and the manner of its use are deter-mined by the political and cultural environment. Power may comprise anything that establishes the power of man over man. Thus power covers all social relationships which serve that end, ‘from physical violence to the most subtle psychological ties by which one mind controls another’ (Morgenthau, 1956: 8). Niebuhr (1996: 260) also argues that man can ‘create an endless variety of types and combinations of power, from that of pure reason to that of pure physical force’.

Within this framework, again, ‘influence’ is particularly important. Employment of religion as a ‘source of legitimacy’ (which increases one’s power by increasing one’s control on fellow citizens or even the citizens of another country) is not only permissible, but also inevitable to make sense of things. Some even claim that the legitimacy of gov-ernments cannot be thought of independently of religion (see Geertz, 1977; Gill, 1998; Kokoslakis, 1985). Niebuhr (1932: 36), while optimistic that high religions move ‘toward an interpretation of the divine as benevolent will’, also reminds us about the possibility of employing religion as a tool in which ‘human vice and error may be clothed by reli-gion in garments of divine magnificence’. This suggests that the introduction of mecha-nisms of control over others (alternatively, a mechanism to get rid of control imposed by others) and analyses of such mechanisms would contribute to both to the classical realist framework and the literature on legitimacy.

A key methodological question needs to be answered before we can come up with a convincing inter-level explanation: how can one translate individual-level needs and insecurities (e.g. the need for affiliation and belonging, the need for consistency, etc.) to state-level variables?9 Classical realism actually encourages the study of morality, ethics and religion at the individual level or any subunit level for that matter. However, interest formation at the state level is not that clear-cut. Any investigation that can contribute to our understanding of such a mechanism would be a step forward for classical realism and such a step would systematize this rich tradition without disturbing the core.

In short, Morgenthau’s and Niebuhr’s broad interpretations of power and interest as well as a renewed focus on the Weberian legacy in classical realism is good news for scholars who are interested in using cultural variables in the framework of realism.10 Since the Weberian tradition offers a solid framework when it comes to the belief




system–religion–society triangle (Hamilton, 1995), a line of thought whose intellectual predecessors have been exposed to this tradition would welcome studies on religion and decision-making. Morgenthau’s understanding of politics as captured in classical realism is a ‘moral and political’ project in addition to an analytic device. Niebuhr’s linkage of human nature to state of conflict via will-to-power and the tendency of society to ignore moral considerations also allows classical realist investigations of behavior as well as issues of interpretation of the divine. Therefore, religion can be easily integrated into this strand of realism both as an independent and an intervening variable. The classical real-ists certainly had a distaste for the use of ideology or religion by elites, but Niebuhr’s theorizing, for example, permits an account of ideology and politics if (a) the ideology in focus is used as a tool of legitimacy; (b) the state is actually based on that ideology, which in turn becomes an inherent aspect of the identity of individuals and vice versa; and (c) if the key decision-maker’s worldview is particularly affected by a dimension of their nature and upbringing, including religion.11

Niebuhr is ‘back in business’. One example is a lively debate about which components of his theorizing would have held pride of place regarding the issue of the Iraq War. Opponents of the war might point to the danger of unchecked power, while advocates could call upon the need to act ‘to prevent greater evil’ (Elie, 2007: 86, 88–90, 94, 96). Niebuhr explored at greater length would reveal considerable relevance to US foreign policy, most notably as related to Iraq and the Middle East. Similarly, as Sharp points out, Butterfield’s English School legacy could be applied to Iraq vis-a-vis the practice of ‘self-righteousness in statecraft’ identified as being ‘particularly dangerous’ (Sharp, 2003: 875).

Neorealism and religionNeorealism does not allow for an easy accommodation of religion. Classical realist accounts are looked down upon as ‘reductionist’ and state behavior is explained by look-ing at system-level variables like the distribution of material capabilities. According to neorealists, states strive for survival in an anarchical system. Whatever happens inside the units, it is the distribution of capabilities in the system that defines how a state would behave in a given situation. States are self-interested and are concerned about relative (as opposed to absolute) gains; they are interacting units that exhibit behavioral regularities and form the system. They balance the capabilities of other state(s) by balancing exter-nally (i.e. forming alliances) or internally (i.e. building up military capabilities) in a search for security. Security is defined in strictly military terms, at least in the standard Waltzian framework (Waltz, 1979: 80). Neorealism can be seen as a reaction to the ‘unscientific’ aspects of classical realism.12 Nye (1988: 241) asserts that ‘the significance of Waltz’s work is not in elaborating a new line of theory, but in the systematization of realism’. Keohane (1986b: 164–165) shares the same view and sees neorealism as a ‘progressive problem shift’, but one that preserves the core assumptions of the theory (see also James, 2002).

Without an explicit view of man, Shimko (1992: 299) observes, neorealism cannot have any view of the human condition and therefore becomes philosophically antiseptic. The aloofness of neorealism when it comes to human nature — actually any variable that is not related to the distribution of capabilities — makes it difficult to see it as a



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welcoming host for investigation of transnational phenomena with a human focus. Brooks (1997: 450) argues that neorealists implicitly replace the human aggression in classical realism with fear (also see Waltz, 1959: 16–42). However, despite the existence of fear in neorealism as a key variable, it is not meant to be used on an individual level, which is not highly respected in the Waltzian framework, no matter how generously it is interpreted. This is one of the most criticized assumptions of neorealism; it ‘blackboxes’ the state much more than classical realism and how a state can have fear (and how its choices can be explained without reference to its components) remains a question neorealism must answer. Legro and Moravcsik (1999: 53) state that realism, especially its neorealist vari-ant, suffers from a degeneration in which ‘its conceptual foundations are being stretched beyond all recognition or utility’; it has become a generic commitment to the assumption of rational state behavior. Taken in this sense, it becomes more difficult to place variables like religion, even when they are investigated as a reflection of the exogenous distribution and manipulation of interstate capabilities. This is due more to the intellectual narrowness of ‘minimal realism’— that is defined by ‘anarchy’ and ‘rationality’ only — than the authentic foundations of the paradigm (Legro and Moravcsik, 1999: 6).

Neorealism may not be fully welcoming to cultural variables but their accommoda-tion as complementary accounts is not discouraged, even within the limits of minimal realism. Even Waltz (1959: 238) does not dismiss the importance of the first and second images: ‘The third image described the framework of world politics, but without the first and second images there can be no knowledge of forces that determine policy’ (also see Goddard and Nexon, 2005). However, the emphasis on these images — at least in the absence of any material variable — has been insignificant. Despite the influence of Christianity and Islam in the Middle Ages and the variegated revolutionary ideas of the French, Bolsheviks and Nazis in the modern era, these ‘definitions of foreign policy ends’ hardly meant something worthy of investigation for the neorealists (Smith, 2000). Waltz (1997: 913), in response to Vasquez’s prominent criticism, stated that ‘old realists see causes as running directly from states to the outcomes.… New realists see states forming a structure by their interactions and then being strongly affected by the structure their interactions have formed.’

Such a view, however, did not prevent scholars like Posen from using neorealist con-cepts like the ‘security dilemma’ to account for ethnic conflict. According to Posen (1993), security dilemmas within states are analogous to interstate ones and the collapse of multi-ethnic states leads to an emerging anarchy. This anarchy forces different groups in the state to provide their own security. Posen’s choice of terminology is ideal if one wants to account for religious group dynamics and competition as well. In a similar vein, Kaufman (1996) acknowledges the possibility of such anarchy under certain conditions, such as the lack of effective control of the people by the government and the presence of strong ethnic groups with enough of the attributes of sovereignty. In short, even if neo-realism cannot accommodate ethnicity or religion in its core framework, concepts like security dilemma, balancing and polarity can be employed to account for conflicts that have an identity dimension. In the end, neorealism has a coherent literature and terminol-ogy and whether one agrees with the key assumptions or not, neorealist terms can be adapted to account for intra-state or transnational identity conflicts in a relatively parsi-monious way.




Although it does not seem possible to situate any subsystem variable into the Waltzian framework,13 one can still find a place for religion in neorealism defined broadly to include the scholars who regard themselves as neorealists.14 Buzan’s framework of ‘Classical Security Complex Theory’ (CSCT) is a variant of realism that is open to new variables on different levels; its revised version, which focuses more evenly on military, political, economic, societal and environmental sectors and brings non-state actors into the ‘security complexes’, permits investigation of complex issues like terrorism. The linkage of the societal level with others in this framework makes it a suitable theory for scholars who want to focus on any identity variable, especially if it relates to a certain region in which security concerns of the actors cannot be thought of independently from each other. Admittedly, this is outside of the Waltzian framework and can only serve as a complementary theory of unit behavior in Waltz’s terms. How ‘neorealist’ it is, or is not, is again a debate that can be resolved within the neorealist tradition. In addition, CSCT is not the ideal framework if one wants to look at mechanisms of global governance and transnational ideas in general; the current structure of CSCT is most suitable when look-ing at how a specific factor (like religion, ethnicity or race) plays a role in a certain region.

There are other possibilities for accommodation. Walt’s ‘balance of threat’ theory, due to its implicitly constructivist terminology, can allow the introduction of religion even as an independent variable. What a state sees as a threat in another state (Walt, as Buzan does in his CSCT, treats states as units) may be defined by ideological as well as reli-gious differences, which means that balancing behavior is the dependent variable. In the neorealist framework broadly defined, Zakaria (1999) points out that states seek to maxi-mize influence rather than power. This line of argument, similar to classical realism’s conceptualization of power, opens the way for inclusion of religion as an intervening (i.e. source of legitimacy), if not independent, variable. In a similar vein, religion, like ethnic-ity, might have an influence on the alliance patterns that have direct implications for the distribution of capabilities in the system (Davis et al., 1997).

Neorealism may be conducive to incorporation of moral considerations if these can be linked to the main level and actors. For instance, Telhami (2002) claims that nothing in neorealism precludes a theory linking moral factors and the external behavior of states; if ‘relative power’ is regarded as an instrument for implementing a state’s motives, domestic politics and ideology can be treated again both as independent and intervening variables depending on the expressed interests of a state. Governments engage in conflict over any scarce and valuable good, including political and national ideology and religious identity; the assumption of fixed and uniformly conflictual preferences is more permissive in this sense than it seems (Legro and Moravcsik, 1999: 15). Regarding the presumed realist position about the absence of morality in the realm of politics as a mere theoretical preference that should be replaced in the light of emerging challenges, Telhami takes another progressive step in realist thinking. Waltz states that systems theories (which tell us about the forces the units [i.e. states] experience) explain why different units behave similarly, and despite their variations, produce outcomes that fall within expected ranges. By contrast, theories at the unit level tell us why different units behave differently despite their similar placement in a system (Waltz, 1979: 72). Linking Telhami’s and Waltz’s views on the issue, it is not impossible for scholars of IR to come up with a theory of ideology that is acceptable within the limits of neorealism. Even Waltz



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himself acknowledges that system-level theory has to be accompanied by a unit-level theory in order to get a full account of events (Waltz, 1979: 48–49, 78, 87, 126). A unit-level theory would inevitably take religion into account as part of the worldview of the leader, political culture or bureaucratic system. Saudi Arabia and the United States might assume a similar political position on an issue for very different reasons. A unit-level theory that includes identity-related variables such as religion would provide the system-level theory with insights about the political causal mechanism and, consequently, with the possibility of falsification and the prospect of better theoretical predictions.

Neoliberalism and religionNeoliberalism constitutes the biggest mainstream challenge to neorealism. Neoliberals accept the anarchy assumption of the neorealists but do not share its resulting pessimism. They give considerable weight to non-state actors and their significant influence in the political realm, especially thanks to the leverage of the latter in the economic sphere; multinational firms, banks and other networks are important players and international affairs is not just confined to the ‘military sector’ in Buzan’s terminology. Keohane and Nye (1987: 733) stated that, although states are still important actors, their autonomy is being eroded by transnational forces, and cited ‘interdependence’ as a ‘relatively under-developed and undervalued concept’ with high potential. A set of rules and institutions affects relations among states and pushes the international system toward pluralism and diversity. Neoliberalism holds that transnational contacts and coalitions have trans-formed national interests and attitudes (Tarzi, 2004: 120). Contrary to neorealism’s emphasis on states, neoliberalism portrays an international system that also includes competition and cooperation amongst national groups and transnational institutions (Nye, 1988).15 With their emphasis on multiple channels of connection, absence of hier-archy among issues and the irrelevance of reliance on brute force, neoliberals diverge significantly from neorealists.

Neoliberalism, by stating that ‘transnational actors will pursue their own goals’ and by acknowledging the importance of ‘issue linkage’, makes space for religious organi-zations and groups that would seem to exceed any strand of realism. Reflecting the general view of neoliberalism, Nye (1988: 243) finds the system–unit-level differentia-tion odd; even if one can accept the unit-level character of a theory of foreign policy, it is difficult to see how ‘demographic trends, transnational flows, and military technology that affect many states’ are assigned to the unit level. With its emphasis on international institutions and norms, the liberal tradition is the most appealing framework for scholars who investigate the transnational aspects and influence of religion. To put it more boldly, any neoliberal theory of international relations that is devoid of moral sentiments will not be able to account for crucial dynamics of political economy. Adam Smith linked economics, conscience and morality as early as 1759. He concluded that political and economic structures are outcomes of natural human action rather than conscious plan-ning, the traditional focus for rational choice theorists. Religion, as a mental framework, and usually coupled with political theologies (described below), has a determinative effect on what is acceptable and what is not in human interaction, which has been the basis of commerce and politics.




Political theologies, defined as ‘the set of ideas that a religious body holds about legitimate political authority’, can also be investigated and employed within the neolib-eral paradigm (Philpott, 2007). Due to the absence of a generic definition of religion, how religious communities relate their beliefs to their public and political life gains spe-cial meaning when it comes to conflict and cooperation. According to Philpott, the dif-ference in political theologies as well as the institutional relationship differentiation has the potential to explain the political ambivalence of religion.

Axelrod’s (1984) ‘evolution of cooperation’, which draws attention to the development of social conventions and effective rules in the expectation of repeated interaction, is also a useful framework in which to investigate the possibilities of inter-faith dialogue and its permissibility in the political theologies described above. Its emphasis on reciprocity lead-ing to cooperation puts Axelrod’s intuitively plausible and prominent framework within the mainstream of neoliberal concept formation. Works by Appleby (2000) and Gopin (2002), which focus on the issue of religion and conflict resolution, fall under this rubric of the evolution of cooperation. A state’s religion can potentially be a tool to legitimate, support or destroy a ‘regime’, which is, again, a key variable in neoliberalism.16 Planned changes in regimes require the destruction of existing institutions and the coordination of expectations around new focal points (Young, 1982: 280). Viewed in that light, neoliberalism has the potential to become a platform for the scholars whose area of interest is terrorist organiza-tions that employ religious rhetoric.17 In that sense, religion can be accommodated both as a dependent and an independent variable. This is not to say that political actors have unlim-ited power over the interpretation of religion or to deny that religious traditions have a life of their own dependent on the audience in addition to political entrepreneurs.18 However, in any given scholarly account, it is not quite possible to capture all dimensions of religion and an attempt to achieve such a daunting task might distort the picture altogether. Therefore, it is up to the individual scholar to distinguish the role(s) played by religion as an indepen-dent, dependent or intervening factor in a political event.

Along the same lines, the public choice literature as exemplified by the works of Arrow (1970), Olson (1965) and Buchanan and Tullock (1962) should be considered seriously since it has the potential to shed light on the role of religion in the relationship between collective choices and institutional arrangements. Public choice assumes that individuals are guided by their perceived self-interest; they make choices in light of these interests and collective arrangements result from bargaining among actors — including politicians — with diverse preferences. Public choice literature would be helpful in modeling and under-standing the tension between the political theologies and political institutions among many other issues. An example could be the preference for a secular public sphere over a religious one (or vice versa) due to political power concerns of the governing elite more than belief in the inherent value of the secular or religious order for everyone.

McCloskey’s (2006) treatment of the intimate ties between political psychology in the framework of ‘virtues’ (prudence, justice, temperance, courage, love, faith and hope) and economic structures also provides a basis for investigation of religion and modes of coop-eration. Similarly, van Staveren (2001) develops an Aristotelian conception of economics that requires a closer look at psychology. For a viable economic life, actors need to develop certain capabilities (emotions, deliberation, commitment and human interaction) within three main domains (freedom, justice and care). Van Staveren’s model allows for



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integration of a religion variable into neoliberal theory. Such an integration can account for the patterns of distribution, conflict and cooperation that cannot be explained by mod-els that employ a stricter rationality assumption inspired by neoclassical economics. For those who prefer a two-way interaction model of religion and social structures, Jones’ (2006) study provides a valuable point of departure. Jones states that culture — defined as patterns of beliefs, habits, values, ideals and preferences shared by groups of people — is slow to change but it is still fluid and responsive to economic, political and social forces. It affects economics and politics but then is transformed itself in return.

Among the scholars who have investigated religion (especially as a dependent vari-able) using a similar kind of neoliberal line of argumentation is Iannaccone, who looks at religion within a market approach. The combined actions of religious consumers and religious producers are the part of a religious market that tends toward an equilibrium; the ‘free market’ has made religion more attractive to the ‘consumers’ (Iannaccone, 1995; Warner, 1993). Modernity is not necessarily an engine for secularization but it pluralizes beliefs and preferences by creating a market for religion. Religious institutions become voluntary organizations that regulate social, political and economic behavior. One can also take the actions of religious organizations as an attempt to correct ‘political market failures’ as Keohane (1984: 85) suggests in his explanation of regimes and as a desire to become a ‘status maximizer’, competing with the alternatives in the interna-tional system in terms of political and economic status (Mishan, 1982).

Religion’s influence in both domestic and transnational politics also can be investi-gated by employing other concepts rooted in neoliberal tradition. ‘Soft power’, defined as the ability to shape the preferences of others by non-military means, can be easily adapted to non-state actors (Nye, 2004). Soft power of an entity entails three resources: culture, political values and its policy resting on legitimacy and moral authority (Nye, 2004: 11). This concept, when systematically employed as a tool, can help to explain why certain religious groups (including terrorist groups in any religion) have so much influence on their adherents. By facilitating investigation of how groups interact with institutions and what the effects are on foreign policy behavior, such a framework also can accommodate the influence of religion in ethnic conflicts (see Fox, 1999, 2000; Henderson, 1997). In a similar vein, with the changing scope of governance thanks to the advance of technology, religious actors also take part in global civil society, transcending the distinction between the domestic and the international (Bartelson, 2006). Individuals who share the same religious conviction around the world come together to challenge the premises of the traditional state structure. Religious institutions connect with each other to realize their local and transnational objectives. Although it is too early to say that these movements are mature enough to provide an alternative mode of governance, they are too strong and widespread to exclude from theories of international relations.

Other culture- and norm-based explanations regarding religion also can be investi-gated by using the constructivist-oriented tools of liberalism. The concept of ‘just war’, for example, is the result of an implicit cooperative agreement among states to maximize their long-term absolute gains. This concept has its origins in theological justification for war (Walzer, 1977). Investigation of such conceptual links, which can shed light on the mechanisms of interest formation and behavioral change, would enrich both the neolib-eral theory itself and the literature on identities, including religion.




Conclusion: Connecting IR theory with religion

Religion, a relatively new variable in the study of international relations, not only can be integrated into IR theory, but even benefit from the insights of established traditions when there is a need to explain complex interactions. We have argued that religion is a part of the world ‘out there’ and it should be treated accordingly. This is not to say that religion can be added superficially to all accounts; scholars should pay utmost attention to its definition and operationalization in their work, regardless of paradigm.

Due to limited space, we have looked at only three traditions to see how religion can contribute to our understanding of international affairs within those frameworks. We claim that, without stretching the limits of theories or disturbing their intellectual coher-ence, it is quite possible to see possibilities for two-way interactions between the frame-works and identity-related variables like religion. Obviously, for a concept like religion, which has local, national and transnational dimensions at the same time, the distinction among these dimensions may not always be very clear and such a distinction should not be pre-imposed on a research agenda. The researcher should make choices in line with the object of investigation, warning of any dimension that might have been underempha-sized at the expense of other factors. Given the diverse interests of scholars of interna-tional relations, such choices and their integration into different IR theory strands should be regarded as complementary, rather than essentially conflicting.

Classical realism is most suitable for sub-state accounts of religion. The focus on human nature, the flexible definition of rationality, interest and power as well as the widely used terminology of emotions and cognition allow for integration of studies of belief systems and worldviews, over which religion has significant influence. The way the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) defined citizenship, national interest and foreign pol-icy in India, relying on the concept of Hindutva, had significant local and international consequences, including a change in alliance patterns. Evangelical Christianity, with its emphasis on emotions and self-realization, has spread all over the world, influencing political agendas and the official discourses of many countries, most notably the United States. Another possible research avenue at the intersection of classical realism and religion would be the analysis of politicians’ personalities and how they reflect their perceptions in the public arena. Ian Paisley and the impact of the Free Presbyterian Church on the politics of Northern Ireland can fruitfully be explored in the framework of classical realism. Religion as a tool of legitimacy also can be studied under this framework, given the definition of power with a focus on influence. The role of the Dutch Reformed Church in the introduction and also the demise of apartheid in South Africa testifies to the importance of religious institutions in (de)legitimizing political systems. The only limitation in this school of thought is its final level. Accounts of transnational phenomena would not fit neatly under this framework, which takes state interactions as the focus.

Structural realism is unquestionably the most challenging framework within which to work. There is always the possibility of coming up with a ‘complementary’ model of foreign policy that includes religion as a variable. Still, such a model would have to accept its conceptual subordination to the system-level theory. In terms of interactions, one can see that neorealist terminology is borrowed to explain sub- or trans-system



Sandal and James 19

entities and events, especially the conflicts. Admittedly, it is the identity-defining aspect of religion that one can fit into the framework rather than legitimacy or worldview func-tions of it. Political leaders ranging from Mahmoud Ahmedinejad of Iran to Jiang Zemin of China have employed religion as part of an official discourse when balancing with other states. Analysis of the impact of such an identity creation and consolidation on alliance patterns and balancing behavior could be conducted within the neorealist per-spective. The relative inability of neorealism to accommodate religion may imply the inadequacy of the tools in the strand that are needed to account for the phenomena we are facing in politics today. Still, the bridging of religion with structural realism, even in a relatively limited framework, has important research implications. Sunni–Shi’a rivalry in the Middle East, led by Iran and Saudi Arabia, can best be explained by ‘balance of threat’ and threat perceptions emanating from a religious source. The foreign policy and balancing behavior of the state of Israel cannot be investigated without due reference to its Jewish identity. The ethnic conflicts in the Balkans, Northern Ireland and South Asia, with their strong religious overtones, are clear examples of the ‘security dilemma’ and it would be difficult to explain any ethno-religious conflict without borrowing from struc-tural realist terminology.

If one wants to look at religious organizations/institutions and related transnational phenomena, neoliberalism looks like the most suitable framework for such investiga-tions in mainstream IR theory. With its emphasis on norms and regimes as well as its focus on a plurality of issues and definitions of power, neoliberalism is conducive to studies of legitimacy (which take religion as an intervening variable) and transnational identity formation (taking religion both as a dependent and an independent variable). Among the transnational religious organizations that impact upon local and international politics are the Catholic Church, the Organization of the Islamic Conference, religious NGOs that operate in parts of the developing world and the lobbies of ethno-religious groups that operate in major powers in the system. At the other end of the scale, the ways in which fundamentalist groups (including but not restricted to terrorist ones) such as Al-Qaeda change the terms of politics can also be accommodated by a neoliberal frame-work. Such a linkage would facilitate the analytical investigations of many other violent strands by emphasizing the competition and cooperation among the groups in terms of catering to the physical and spiritual needs of individuals. With whom do these groups cooperate? What do they deliver that the other groups ‘in the market’ cannot? These questions, asked within the framework of neoliberalism, have the potential to shed addi-tional light on the dynamics of transnational power and relationships.

Admittedly, this review is quite limited both in terms of its coverage of IR theory and its assessment of the religion–politics literature. The aim of the article is to encour-age thinking about religion without abandoning the widely used frameworks in IR theory. What we have intended to show is that it is quite possible to link these areas of literature to each other and that such a move would actually be enriching for both the frameworks mentioned and for the study of religion in international affairs. If, as stu-dents of IR, we would hope to integrate nuanced variables such as religion into our theorizing, a discussion of the extent to which theories in the field accommodate the existing accounts and phenomena is a crucial exercise that needs to be extended to as many strands of thought as possible.




Notes

1. An earlier draft of the article was presented at the 2009 Annual Convention of the International Studies Association. The authors would like to thank Laurie Brand, Robert English, Jonathan Fox, Deniz Kuru, Steven Lamy, Yosef Lapid, Neophytos Loizides and the anonymous review-ers for their valuable comments and suggestions.

2. For an introduction to the near-hegemonic tradition of modernization and secularization in sociological theory, see Wilson (1982) and Hamilton (2001); on secularism’s long-standing dominance in IR theory, consult Hurd (2004).

3. On the resurgence of religion in IR, see Thomas (2000) and Rubin (1994). For detailed accounts of the intensity of religious beliefs and capacity for violence, see Appleby (2000), Juergensmeyer (2003), Almond et al. (2003) and Carlson and Owens (2003). For treatments of the more positive role religion may play in faith-based diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-building, see Cox and Philpott (2003), Johnston (2003), Sampson (1997) and Coward and Smith (2004).

4. For substantive treatments of how religion can be integrated into the study of international affairs on a number of different levels, see Fox and Sandler (2004), Petito and Hatzopoulos (2003), Rubin (1994), Johnston (2003), Miles (2004), Juergensmeyer (2005) and James (2010). Other works that deal with issues relevant to IR, but not strictly IR itself, include Appleby (2000), Almond et al. (2003), Fox (2004) and Norris and Inglehart (2004).

5. For a detailed account of modernity and secularization, see Juergensmeyer (1993) and Inglehart and Welzel (2005).

6. Religious identity manifested in particular faiths and inter-religious conflict needs to be dif-ferentiated from other factors of religion as causal variables. For example, whether one reli-gion or another is inherently more violence-prone is beyond the scope of this exposition.

7. An impressive example in an area of IR theory more conducive to contact with religion, namely, the English School, appears in Thomas (2005).

8. One can trace political realism back to ancient Greece, 16th-century Italian city-states or 17th-century England and this is indeed possible without disturbing the intellectual coherence of realist thinking. See Thucydides (1972 [c. 400 BC]), Machiavelli (1985 [1513]) and Hobbes (1988 [1651]). For a discussion of the contributions of Thucydides and Machiavelli to classical realism literature, see Forde (1992).

9. See Lincoln (2003: 2, 5–7). While embarking on this journey, it is important to bear in mind the evolution of concept formation about religion. As Lincoln demonstrates, it cannot be sepa-rated from culture, occupies multiple domains and must be addressed in a ‘polytheic and flexible’ manner.

10. For a broader treatment of realism and the Weberian tradition, see Williams (2005), Barkawi (1998) and Pichler (1998).

11. However, this line of thought, despite its flexibility, is not the most suitable for a study of transnational religious phenomena, networks (including terrorist groups) and governance sys-tems due to its focus on states as the basic units of analysis.

12. For a broader treatment of the differences between classical realism and neorealism, see Brooks (1997), Gilpin (1984) and Schweller and Priess (1997).

13. See Elman (1996) for an argument to the contrary.14. See Buzan (1993) and Walt (1987).



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15. For a sociological treatment of the religious movements, see also Eisenstadt (2000). In this work, Eisenstadt states that religiously inspired movements constitute another path of ‘moder-nity’; hence they can be situated in existing sociological frameworks that draw attention to transnational aspects of ideologies.

16. For regime theory, see Young (1982), Krasner (1983), Ruggie (1983), Keohane (1984) and Haggard and Simmons (1987).

17. Some prominent investigations of such terrorist organizations include Stern (2004), Almond et al. (2003), Hoffman (1995) and Rapaport (1984).

18. Hasenclever and Rittberger (2000) differentiate among the primordialist, instrumentalist and moderate constructivist accounts, claiming that only the moderate constructivist accounts recognize the unique trajectory that religion follows.

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Biographical notes

Nukhet A. Sandal is a visiting fellow at the Watson Institute for International Studiesat Brown University. Her research interests include religion and international affairs, politics of divided societies and international relations theory.

Patrick James works at the University of Southern California, USA and is the author or editor of 17 books and over one hundred other academic publications. He served a five-year term as editor of International Studies Quarterly. James has been honored by the International Studies Association as Distinguished Scholar in Foreign Policy Analysis (2006–07) and Ethnicity, Nationalism and Migration (2009–10).



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