CHECKLIST POLICY OPTIONS

EU POLICY CHALLENGES 2009-2019 A report to the President

DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR INTERNAL POLICIES/ D IRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR EXTERNAL POLICIES

POLICY DEPARTMENTS

EU Policy Challenges 2009-2019 DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR INTERNAL POLICIES (DG IPOL) PART I: POLICY DEPARTMENT A ECONOMIC AND SCIENTIFIC POLICY - "Key Policy Issues in the area of Economic and Scientific Policy"

98 pages PART II: POLICY DEPARTMENT B POLITIQUES STRUCTURELLES ET DE COHESION - "L’EUROPE 2009-2019: L'avenir des politiques structurelles et de cohesion "

75 pages PART III: POLICY DEPARTMENT C CITIZENS' RIGHTS AND CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS - "Key Policy Issues in the area of Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs"

65 pages PART IV: POLICY DEPARTMENT D BUDGETARY AFFAIRS - "Europe 2009 - 2019: Analysis of forward looking trends in the area of budgets and budget control and choices which may flow from them over the next two legislative terms"

24 pages DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR EXTERNAL POLICIES OF THE UNION (DG EXPO) PART V: DIRECTORATE B POLICY DEPARTMENT - "Forward-looking policy papers on "Europe 2009-2019"

125 pages

DIRECTORATE GENERAL FOR INTERNAL POLICIES

POLICY DEPARTMENT A: ECONOMIC AND SCIENTIFIC POLICY

Key Policy Issues in the area

of Economic and Scientific Policy

June 2009

EN/FR

Table of Contents

Introduction ...................................................................................... 3

Part 1: Economic and Monetary Affairs.................................................11

1.1 Financial Services .....................................................................12

1.2 Sustainable Macroeconomic Governance in the EU.........................17

Part 2: Employment and Social Affairs .................................................24

2.1 Employment 2009-2019 ............................................................25

2.2 Social Affairs ............................................................................31

Part 3: Environment, Public Health and Food Safety...............................37

3.1 Environment ............................................................................38

3.2 Food Safety .............................................................................41

3.3 Public Health............................................................................44

3.4 Climate Change ........................................................................51

Part 4: Industry, Research and Energy.................................................57

4.1 ICT and Information Society Policies............................................58

4.2 Energy ....................................................................................66

Part 5: Internal Market and Consumer Protection ..................................74

5.1 Internal Market ........................................................................75

5.2 Consumer Protection .................................................................81

Part 6: Science and Technology Options Assessment (STOA)...................85

6.1 Improvements in growth and sustainability though technology and interdisciplinary EP incentives ..........................................................86

6.2 EU RTD policy and the associated development of highly qualified human resources ...........................................................................92

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Introduction

To the best of our present knowledge, the world and the European Union (EU) in particular will continue to be confronted with the following crucial challenges over the next decade:

1) Assuming a near end to the current financial and economic crisis (which is by no means a certainty), the new economic order that will prevail as a result of the crisis.

2) The demographic problem related to the progressive ageing of the population of developed countries, with the dramatic implications that this has for the labour market and for social security and pension systems.

3) The potentially catastrophic consequences of climate change and environmental degradation, with the associated depletion of natural resources and biodiversity loss.

4) The problems related with ensuring a sufficient and secure supply of the energy required to create and/or sustain growth (security of supply, energy efficiency, renewable energy sources, nuclear energy, greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, infrastructure investments).

The above issues are closely interconnected and one of the major challenges will be to devise the cross-cutting policies that will achieve combined goals. These interconnections will be stressed in the listing of individual policy areas below.

The EU will have to respond and in some cases claim a leading role in the world, through policies, which can be roughly grouped as follows:

Lisbon Strategy, research and innovation

The Lisbon Strategy has guided EU policy since 2000, but, even in its revised form since 2005, it will not attain its stated goals (including the 3% of GDP research investment target) by 2010. The crucial question is therefore what will guide EU policy in the post-2010 decade and beyond. Given the manifest lack of political will amongst Member States to implement key commitments of the current strategy, are new or revised goals necessary or are completely new instruments and types of commitments called for? Europe will have to find ways of optimising the production of (scientific) knowledge (better coordination of research efforts, which goes beyond established intergovernmental and Community instruments and is coupled with an enhanced capacity to assess the achievement of policy goals) and improving the human uptake of knowledge (boosting innovation and entrepreneurship, via appropriate industrial, financial and intellectual property policies, and better utilisation of the EU's human capital, via appropriate education, training and social policies).

Above all, the EU will have to devise a strategy and flank it with policies, which will tackle its problems in an original, unique way, rather than continue to identify and take over (and adapt) ideas underlying its competitors' advantages. Devising such a strategy calls for a broad dialogue among European Institutions, experts, citizens and stakeholders. The European Parliament (EP), which has been monitoring the implementation of the Lisbon Strategy and pronouncing itself at crucial junctions, can take the lead in this respect (see also 'Employment policy' below).

S&T-based decision-making: The importance of science and technology (S&T) for society and their expected impact on economic development call for a coordinated approach to S&T-based political decision-making. The practice of analysing, on behalf of parliaments, the policy implications of new technologies is known as Parliamentary Technology Assessment (PTA). The EP and many European national and regional parliaments have committees and offices entrusted with carrying out PTA. European PTA entities coordinate their activities within the European PTA (EPTA) network. Based on the positive experience of the meeting of European PTA entities in September 2008 in Paris, such a meeting could be organised by each EU Presidency.

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The Treaty of Lisbon, once in force, will offer a legal basis for a much better involvement of national parliaments in the European decision-making process, thus creating a propitious environment for PTA coordination meetings of this kind. EPTA can be further used as a framework for carrying out genuine Pan-European PTA projects pooling the resources of several parliaments and reflecting the realities, perceptions and interests of many European countries. To enhance the interaction between science and politics and the impact of S&T on parliamentary decision-making, the EP could further take the initiative to organise special events (e.g. annual Science & Politics Week).

Economic and financial policy

The economic and financial crisis is far from over, hitting an ever increasing range of institutions (banks, insurance companies, pension funds). Even if the acute symptoms of the crisis disappear on a 10-year horizon, its consequences will perceptibly mark the coming decades. With a Commission too technocratic to drive the political agenda and a Council compromised by conflicting national interests, the EP has a unique opportunity to make its voice heard, after its position on supervision, repeatedly expressed in reports over the past ten years, was not heeded until the crisis broke out. The failure of the present system of supervision to see the crisis coming - when industry knew it since the 1990's - calls for fast, radical change, if more, potentially fatal shocks are to be prevented.

The emerging global economic order is more likely to be about international governance, and less about markets, an attempt at an 'international mixed economy'. In fact, the economic and financial crisis stands in a broader context involving environmental challenges and climate change. The present economic system depends on the concept of enhancing/maximising GDP growth. Growth is, however, largely based on increasing material resource and energy consumption. While maintaining growth as a driving force for enhancing productivity and innovation and sustaining economic activity, economic governance will have to pay much more attention to the quality and not only to the quantity of growth, decoupling it from material resource and energy consumption. In this context, policy-makers will have to consider extending the quantitative definition of growth on the basis of GDP to include qualitative elements, taking into account the evident limits of growth as currently perceived. The new elements could plausibly include human welfare and (economic, social and environmental) sustainability. Developing and institutionalising a new perception of growth will be a non-trivial enterprise, as, in the absence of absolute decoupling, it will challenge well-established views concerning economic governance at national, Eurozone and wider international level. Moreover, achieving a consensus on the best indicators for 'measuring' welfare or sustainability will require a great deal at technical and political acumen and good will. Nevertheless, the size, depth and pervasiveness of the current crisis call for ideas and policies that go beyond the established framework.

Social policy

Over the next decade the social security systems distinctive of the European Social Model will be confronted with the challenges posed by an ageing population. A ten-year period is exactly the time frame that the European Commission (EC) estimates is available for reacting to the ageing population. With progressively low fertility and mortality rates, increased life expectancy and the baby-boomers generation beginning to retire, the ratio of dependent people over 65 to working-age persons will rise sharply to 1:2 in the next twenty years and will put pension systems under extreme pressure. Social security's long-term sustainability will also be challenged by the decreasing workforce and changing work patterns (atypical contractual arrangements, discontinued careers, etc.).

Growing income inequality threatens social cohesion in the EU. Social protection systems have failed to grant equal opportunities to all and access to basic rights still largely depends on economic and personal conditions. Poverty continues to affect many millions of Europeans, including notably children and a significant minority of those employed.

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An important challenge will be for Member States to decide on the desired degree of convergence in social protection. Having opted for preserving national competence on the most sensitive social issues, they have been cooperating since 2000 via an Open Method of Cooperation (OMC) process as part of the Lisbon Strategy. With the 'social OMC' likely to be confirmed as the framework for cooperation over the next ten years, it remains to be seen if the choice of the non-binding OMC will open the way towards more stringent tools or how the 'social OMC' can be better integrated with the growth and jobs strategy.

Despite limited legislative power, the EP is making its voice heard on social policy. It will continue to be part of its role to exercise control over the EC and the Council, insisting on a transparent process based on comparable data and measurable targets. Moreover, parliamentary debate could give EU cooperation in the social sector the visibility that the OMC process currently lacks. The EP can also make use of its role as one of the two arms of the budgetary authority to enhance social cohesion through sufficient financial resources. It can further insist on integrating attention to possible social consequences in EC law-making.

Employment policy

The following factors are expected to be crucial for the Lisbon Strategy post 2010 in the field of employment:

1) Green jobs: Investment in green technologies would be a possible response to the current recession, which will help create new jobs (from highly skilled research tasks through technical to low-skilled ones) and, at the same time, enhance Europe's energy security, boost the European industry's competitiveness and contribute to combating climate change.

2) Demographic challenges: The ongoing demographic development will have an impact on the composition of the EU labour force. Thus, between 2007 and 2020, the employment rate in the EU will increase from 65.5% to 69% (women: 58.4% - 63.4%; older workers: 44.9% - 54.5%). Keeping older workers in employment requires more than a formal extension in retirement age: lifelong learning, provisions for a smooth transition to pension, occupational health and safety measures adapted to older workers. To compensate the cost of these measures, older workers bring performance and accumulated know-how. The sustainability of pensions depends, however, on labour market performance and is endangered by the incomplete contribution records observed in some Member States, especially regarding women threatened by old-age poverty. The labour force shortfall will be compensated by increased immigration, maintaining Europe as a major destination of international migrants and exacerbating integration problems.

3) External dimension of the Lisbon Strategy: Although integration through trade may well increase overall welfare in the long term, persistent imbalances in the workings of the global economy mitigate any positive effects on employment. Some attribute this to the consistent predominance of market-opening measures and financial and economic considerations over social ones. They therefore argue that the EU should push for a social dimension in trade policy and include basic labour standards in negotiations for bilateral agreements, while promoting a debate on how to design rules that would allow a majority of the world's population to enjoy globalisation's benefits.

A major challenge will be to decide on how to carry forward the Lisbon Strategy. The EP has a limited role in the development and scrutiny of the Strategy, but enhancing the standing of the Lisbon Coordination Group might offer a way forward. The EP could seize the opportunity and lead the debate on how the Lisbon Agenda can be linked to other strategies (sustainable development, energy policy, ageing population).

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Environmental policy

The deterioration of the environment, biodiversity loss and the depletion of natural resources, and, more dramatically, climate change, its underlying causes and potential consequences have a de facto global dimension and call for global solutions. The coming decade will be crucial for reversing the ominous trends through resolute action or looking on as the catastrophic forecasts become reality. The EU and the EP in particular can play a key role in this process.

The 6th Environment Action Programme (6EAP; 2002-2012) offers sufficient elements for better designing future environmental policy. This will require new concepts and measures and a new way of thinking at EU level. A key element will be the ability to develop priority visions based on the four priority areas of 6EAP (mainstreaming climate policy on a life-cycle basis in all EU-level policies; halting biodiversity decline via existing EU legislation, while integrating biodiversity conservation in a wider set of policy areas; ensuring the full consideration of the impact of environmental pollution - notably in air, water, soil and the urban environment - on health and consumers; ensuring the optimal use of natural resources on a life-cycle basis, thus contributing to the decoupling between economic growth and resource consumption) and substitute cross-reinforcing actions (e.g. on land use) for the often lacking in ambition and content 6EAP thematic strategies. Implementation, enforcement and market-based instruments (environmental taxation, harmful subsidies) will play a crucial role.

Climate change and biodiversity

Climate change is a complex, multi-faceted, long-term issue with an impact on most of the policy areas addressed in this note. The respective policy responses will inevitably have the same long-term, cross-cutting character. There is a political consensus in the EU on the strategic objective of limiting the average global temperature increase to 2ºC above preindustrial levels. Nevertheless, the measures taken by EU Member States so far will not suffice for fulfilling the Kyoto commitment of an 8% reduction in EU GHG emissions compared to 1990 levels by 2012. At the same time, with CO2 prices at around €10/tonne, the carbon market set up via the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) is not creating an incentive in favour of a low-carbon economy. The effect of economic developments and the auctioning of allowances from 2013 onwards remains to be seen. A carbon tax is discussed as a more direct, fast, reliable and transparent option than emissions trading and will probably compete with the inclusion of more economic sectors in ETS at the forthcoming negotiations in Copenhagen.

The EU has committed itself to a 20% reduction in GHG emissions, a 20% improvement in energy efficiency and a 20% share of renewable energy in its energy mix ('20-20-20 target') by 2020. The implementation of the 'climate package' will have to be flanked with measures in all policy areas with an impact on climate change. The challenges in the next decade will be to:

1) reach the 20-20-20 target by 2020 and maintain the long-term objective of a low-carbon economy in the wake of the economic and financial crisis;

2) reconcile climate change & energy policies with an economic recovery plan into a 'New Green Deal' (economic growth, green technologies, new jobs);

3) use an agreement in Copenhagen to provide a stimulus for the 'New Green Deal' and establish an effective global carbon market;

4) consolidate the achievements of Natura 2000 and take an initiative at global level to halt biodiversity loss, e.g. by proposing an Intergovernmental Panel on Biodiversity Loss to monitor and coordinate national actions.

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Energy

The transformation to a sustainable and efficient energy system - involving huge infrastructures, dependence on third countries, market dominance by vertically integrated companies and numerous technological and economic barriers - will be a long process - even on a ten-year scale. Nonetheless, the looming challenges, notably climate change, call for immediate action. To tackle them the EU will have to devise a more ambitious and coherent policy for managing energy resources.

The main challenges the EU will face over the next ten years will be to:

1) adjust fiscal and market instruments to stimulate the development of sustainable energy systems: in particular attention should be paid to designing emissions trading and tax systems so as to ensure investments leading not only efficiently, but also effectively to emission reductions and not to a financial 'carbon bubble';

2) limit and manage the growing energy dependence on fossil fuels through diversified routes and energy sources; challenges include: preparing for and managing the consequences of high oil prices; adopting a common approach to Russia's influence on the gas market; reinforcing relations with the South Mediterranean (solar, gas); stimulating investments in new (renewables) and upgraded energy infrastructure (Europe-wide smart supergrid);

3) back the restructuring of the industrial system (buildings, transport, manufacturing) with reinforced innovation to improve energy efficiency; this can include: implementing and strengthening existing measures; continuing policy of public intervention, as in the case of public-private partnerships and Joint Technology Initiatives; increasing financial resources for eco-innovation in Community programmes (7th & 8th Research Framework Programme, Competitiveness and Innovation Framework Programme, Structural Funds); improving synergies between these for the realisation of longer-term projects;

4) provide all actors involved with the means necessary for their participation in the transformation: instruments for involving the citizens include information, labelling, reduced taxation, guarantees of consumer protection and energy market transparency; local communities could be supported to implement local-based autonomous and energy-efficient solutions through improved access to funding, administrative simplification, guarantees of grid access and exchange of best-practices.

Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) and Information Society

Technological developments will remain rapid and dramatic (often unpredictable) in this area. They will offer unique opportunities for new services and business models, but will also amplify current conflicts. The pervasiveness of ICT makes such developments also relevant for other areas, such as the fight against climate change (e.g. intelligent energy use) and enhancing citizen participation (e.g. e-voting, facilitation of citizens' initiatives). Future policy challenges include the choice between sector-specific regulation and integration in other regulatory areas, and achieving a balance between: (i) privacy and inclusion/security, (ii) competition and investment incentives, and (iii) national interests and a growing need for pan-European and global action.

A crucial issue in the coming decade will be the management of Internet and the choice between specific rules for Internet activities and reliance on general criminal and competition law in order to tackle Internet-related issues. The establishment of a true Internet internal market will depend on the adequate handling of Intellectual Property issues at EU and Member State level.

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A crucial choice will have to be made as to the level of coordination needed for tackling Internet security issues (full-scale cyber attacks, but also infringements on individual users' privacy). Developments in the coming years will crucially depend on how the issue of Internet governance will be resolved at global level (current management via US-based ICANN1 vs. multilateral accountability).

The EU and the EP will also have to make a choice between letting market forces shape new emerging markets and adopting a regulatory approach, e.g. to lower barriers for newcomers and weaker actors (SMEs). The same dilemma will oppose (e.g. at the time of adoption of the 8th Research Framework Programme 2014-2020) horizontal research support to targeted funding of selected, promising innovative (but less certain in terms of outcome) research areas.

Crucial in all this will be to ensure transparency, openness and reliability in the exchange of information, as a prerequisite for enhancing consumer confidence and bolstering free competition and a functioning Internal Market. The EP may be best placed among the EU Institutions for addressing this complex task.

Food safety

Food policy cannot be seen as an exclusively EU issue. Moreover, it is intricately connected with other policies, including agricultural policy and, more recently, energy policy. EU food policy will have to evolve in order to take into account important developments both within the EU and globally. The former (developmemts) require a shift from a policy driven by life style to one driven by confidence and trust (consumer confidence and education; adequate and transparent labelling; communication of up-to-date scientific information; targeted risk communication; public dialogue), while the latter render increasingly necessary the reconciliation of Community interests (stable food production; protection of original food production; counterfeit food products; risk of fraud along the food chain) with globalisation forces (new or re-emerging risks, e.g. avian flu; competition between food and energy sources for land use; assessing the risks of innovative technologies, e.g. nanotechnology). Both kinds of challenges offer at the same time a unique opportunity to the EU and, through its proximity to citizens, the EP for reinforcing their role as key actors in food policy.

Health

The major challenge for the EU and the EP over the coming ten years will be to ensure the follow-up (including impact assessment and periodic implementation verification and reporting to the EP by the EC and/or competent agencies) of adopted EU policy, with special attention to the following areas:

AIDS/HIV: Efforts to be focused on surveillance, promotion of and support for prevention, treatment and counselling programmes and cooperation with neighbouring countries.

Communicable diseases: The outbreak of a pandemic (e.g. swine flu) will put EU preparedness to the test, including the systems in place for surveillance, early warning and cooperation between Member States.

Cancer: It will continue to be a health issue over the next decade. The focus of EU action will be on prevention, data collection, research, information, education and training.

Blood, tissues, cells, transplants: Organ availability and the quality and safety of transplants will continue to challenge health systems. Research in stem cells will become less controversial with the use of reprogrammed adult cells and will hopefully realise its promise.

Antibiotic resistance of pathogens and hospital-acquired infections represent a growing problem and call for surveillance, prevention, research and new product development.

Nutrition and physical activity: Overweight and obesity will continue to plague society and will require appropriate commitments by industry and other stakeholders (food labelling, nutritional claims, advertising).

1 Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers

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Alcohol: The EU could envisage further effective measures, such as introducing compulsory systems preventing intoxicated drivers from starting or driving motor vehicles.

Tobacco: The EU could go beyond current measures and assess cigarettes as any other consumer product leading naturally to their exclusion from the market.

Health professionals: Health professions will be challenged by the ageing population, cross-border health services and the need for education/training in new technologies. The EU could lead in using public money to assess homeopathy and other alternative therapies.

Internal Market

Significant progress has been made in the past decades towards creating a Single Market, where goods, services, capital and persons move freely, but the pace of integration has slowed down in recent years. There is a need to rethink the aptness of current policy tools, expand and deepen the integration of markets and seize the opportunity to create a Single Market with a strong social and environmental dimension.

The key issues that will have a major influence on policy choices in the field of the Single Market over the next ten years are:

1) Globalisation: Outsourcing of services and production processes (within the EU and globally) is likely to increase; as a result of the economic and financial crisis: scarcity of capital, decrease in investment and trade, protectionism.

2) Demography: Population ageing will affect the composition and size of the indigenous labour force, bring about a shift to less labour-intensive goods and services, and increase reliance on immigration; it will also modify the demand for particular goods and services, with an increase for health services.

3) Future EU and Eurozone enlargements: The increase in size and diversity of the EU poses a challenge. Euro adoption by most Member States in coming years should have a positive impact on the Internal Market.

4) ICT: Technology plays an important role in facilitating outsourcing and offshoring activities and increasing the tradability of goods and services. ICT also offers the possibility of teleworking and contributes to the dematerialisation of products and the development of new services (e.g. eHealth, online auctions, price comparison sites).

5) Environmental policies might disrupt trade patterns and location decisions by some industries. On the other hand, introducing ambitious environmental objectives also offers opportunities for European companies investing in the development of green technologies, with all the benefits of the Single Market.

Elements of possible EU policy responses:

1) Short term:

a) Removing existing barriers in the Single Market for goods;

b) Improving transposition, implementation and enforcement of Single Market legislation;

c) Taking stock of the implementation of the Services Directive in 4-5 years;

d) Specific actions (greater harmonisation, liberalisation, legislation) in important service sectors;

e) Facilitating SME access to Internal Market/reducing administrative burden;

f) Opening up public procurement.

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2) Long term:

a) Deployment of new policy tools, such as competition policy, removal of subsidies and restrictive national standards, improving consumer confidence, increasing consumer protection to enhance cross-border shopping, removing unjustified obstacles to cross-border buying;

b) Deepening the Single Market by action in specific markets, building on the euro adoption and the coordination of tax policy;

c) Extending the Single Market via enlargement and opening up the markets for countries outside the EU.

Consumer protection

Consumer behaviour reflects the current social, demographic and economic situation in a context of economic globalisation and geopolitical fragmentation. The trends in consumer behaviour over the next decade will depend on the direction globalisation will take, under the influence of the major challenges posed by the economic and financial crisis, security of energy supply, depletion of natural resources and climate change. The crucial choice will be between, on the one hand, unrestricted exploitation of new technologies and pursuit of growth based on material resource and energy consumption, and, on the other, a global strategy guided by the protection of present and future life and the environment and the conservation of natural resources. These scenarios (and all intermediate ones) map into distinct patterns of consumer behaviour.

Various trends will have an impact on consumers in the coming decade:

1) a demographic shift towards an ageing, albeit more autonomous population;

2) ICT employed in an increasing range of human activities (digital world);

3) a cultural move to a leisure society;

4) various lifestyle trends;

5) increased attention to the safety of products and services, and

6) growing consumption of services and technology.

The greatest challenge will be to ensure an organised evolution, as current chaotic developments contribute to instability. The EP could stand as a strategic partner by promoting an inclusive, effectively horizontal approach within the EU, ensuring that policy-making is directed at increasing the welfare of citizens and freeing the full potential of the Internal Market. While further insisting on the adequate transposition, implementation and enforcement of consumer legislation, the EP could decide to look beyond legislation and turn its attention to the monitoring of markets with a low consumer satisfaction rate, in particular fixed and mobile telephony, Internet and transport, energy, financial, banking, insurance and postal services. The EP, drawing upon its democratic premises, can further be innovative and utilise the full toolbox of citizen participation processes to promote public scrutiny via an advanced type of democratic dialogue.

Theo Karapiperis Head of Unit

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Part 1: Economic and Monetary Affairs

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Part 1.1 Financial Services

Introduction Financial markets have been profoundly changed by the financial crisis. The crisis has caused all stakeholders to rethink their roles and rights. The overriding priority is for policy makers and governments to stabilise financial markets by stopping the downward spiral of asset prices, which in turn creates panic and leads to ever-increasing losses in the bank sector spreading uncertainty and unrest.2 The IMF's latest global stability report3 does not alleviate the causes for global concern on the markets, as total write downs will be around USD 4,400 billion, of which European assets are USD 1,193 billion. This staggering figure shows the challenge posed to governments and institutions. So far, governments have provided up to USD 8,900 billion in financing for banks but this is less than a third of their financial needs. Should banks continue to be bailed out? Discussion has centred on the debate of systemically important institutions and cross border banks, common wisdom has decided that they are too big too fail, but how far can governments provide bail out funds as some groups have turnovers larger than some country's GDP. Diagnoses of the crisis still vary widely; politically accountable institutions should focus on the causes as well as the remedies in order to avoid lurching from one crisis to another.

Regulate and be damned?

It is perhaps not so urgent to write new rules for the financial markets as the current standstill and fear it has generated, makes it unlikely that we will see a return to the boom phase over the next few years. However, the next 10 years are crucial for ushering in a new era of financial services; brought about by new technology that has obliterated barriers and created a global market, which is impossible to manage on the old regulatory order. Globalisation has a huge impact on all parts of the citizens' lives, including the ability to buy a house, to access credit, to the expectation of an adequate pension and safety of savings deposits. The European Parliament standing as the only truly EU-wide political institution is ideally placed to take a leading role as watchdog and protector in the coming years. Moreover, the EU is currently the only region far enough advanced to have an internal market with rules and supervision that could serve as a role model and learn from the lessons4.

The lack of supervisory control on systemic banking issues and the effect on capital thereof has more to do with the current crisis than the sale of complex, structured products to unsuspecting consumers or poor risk management in financial institutions.

The Basel rules5 as translated into CRD exacerbated this by regimenting all risk management in the same direction and incentivising banks to diversify into riskier assets as the search for capital rewarding assets won over true risk analysis. Excessive risk taking caused by loopholes in the system, inadequate capital requirements which did not take into account the equilibrating nature of well functioning markets and a lack of transparency in financial products pushed onto sometime incautious end-holders using the originate rate and distribute model, were all used in the race for innovation.

The warning signs were there since the inception of the single market. The European Parliament already in the 1999 legislature produced several reports6, which warned about systemic risk, unregulated shadow markets and cross-border issues.

3IMF Global Financial Stability Report May 2009. 4 See Communication from the Commission for the Spring European council COM (2009)114 final. 5See the BIS 78th annual report 2007/2008, for a full report on the application of Basel II rules on capital and its effect on the market. 6 COD/2001/0095 Financial Markets and Institutions; stability and Prudential Regulation. INI/2002/2061 Prudential supervision in the EU. INI/2008/2148 Lamfalussy Follow-up-the future structure of supervision.

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The themes are therefore not new; however, the way forward can either be innovative and groundbreaking or carry on along the same path with worrisome results for the real economy7.Especially worrisome is that so far the real economy has seen no positive signs as the interest rate cuts by the ECB do not filter through into the economy. In fact, the first quarter 2009 results of banks show why; banks have not passed on the benefits of lower rates to customers through lower lending rates.

The Future The current system has a precarious balance and there are no simple 'hansaplast' solutions. We have only seen the tip of the iceberg and there is a wealth of potential toxicity in other products such as credit cards, and the state of bank lending books. Unfortunately, the globalism of the financial services makes this a recipe for disaster. There are three key words that will reflect attitudes for all stakeholders in the coming 10 years: Protect Control and Stimulate. If we analyze the main issues at heart in this crisis, we can put them in one of the three mentioned categories.

Protection is probably the most difficult; as today's world is so interlinked, it is difficult to isolate sectors in financial services. New technology has been one of the causes of crises such as with credit derivatives becoming global. Banks rely on new technology to calculate their market value which in accounting standards is used to reflect fair value; however in illiquid market conditions no realistic price exists. If you couple this together with a lack of transparency for OTC derivatives, i.e. those that are not quoted on official exchanges you have the beginning of a crisis. The setting up of a central clearing system8 will drive down margins by at least a third9 and this will again push banks to question where to get their remuneration. It could be that we will see some financial institutions no longer being quoted on the stock exchanges or using a partnership structure (hedge funds, investment banks etc) in order to maximise through personal responsibility a better governance on risk without the pressure for better and ever-increasing quarterly results.

We are already seeing that with the advent of sovereign wealth funds (some of which have financial clout in excess of the GDP of a small country) that these will take on an increasingly powerful role as new shareholders. Future measures to protect banks, investors and consumers need to address these issues, which will also deal with the sector in financial markets known as the shadow banking sector.

This sector is composed of hedge funds and private-equity funds. The attitude before the crisis had been to allow mainly self-regulation, but in the 1990's these institutions showed what effect they could and did have on the markets10. They were not however the cause of this crisis and it perhaps would be more prudent to regulate banks' selling streams and hence their contact with hedge funds, rather than the hedge funds themselves. These funds, (if regulation follows more the path of distribution canals) will then carry clear warning signals that they should be used by sophisticated investors only. Their function in the market could act as countercyclical and this could add to market diversification. Clearly, across all selling streams, the issue of investor knowledge is extremely important and has been a massive failure as the un- or under informed investors bought extremely sophisticated products.

A potential problem for the future is that of the role of pension funds and the viability of pension schemes. The European Commission has not yet examined this.11 It is estimated that the crisis has destroyed USD 5.4 trillion in global pension value, which is 1/5th of the total assets, by end 2008.

7 Prof Avinash Persaud 9 October 2008, Vox EU: What is to be done? Study Eatwell, Persaud, Alexander for the EP on Financial Supervision and Crisis management in the EU(IP/A/ECON/IC/ 2007-069) 8 http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/financial-markets/docs/clearing/ecofin/20081103_ecofin_en.pdf 9 In 2005 trading data for bonds came online and available for anyone with an internet connection through the system TRACE in the US, it reduced the difference in prices that banks charge to buy and sell bonds by half (source Bloomberg report May 14, 2009) 10 LTCM crisis of 1997, the Asian crisis of 1998 and the Dotcom crisis in 2001 11 OECD report "Private Pensions and Policy responses to the crisis" 2009

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This clearly shows that pension funds in their role of investors need to be cautioned and supervised to make sure that future volatility and crises cannot destroy value to this extent. This could have a potentially devastating effect for governments (and of course citizens, as the beneficiaries) that will need to intervene to bring pension benefits to sustainable levels. Policy makers will need to see to changing pension fund risk management and governance mechanisms. Pension funds could in the future play a much larger role in the financial markets as drivers of change and also in influencing markets. The EU institutions will need to devote thought to devising a sustainable and safe pension regulatory environment in the coming years12.

Increasing sophistication in risk management due to new technology13 is something which will never be entirely controlled. However instead of laying down rules and regulations on products, (which are out of date even before they hit the paper) perhaps it might be more suitable to protect stakeholders in financial services by drawing up rules for business lines such as wholesale and retail and subdivide into categories such as selling procedures, risk etc. This could be done at global level as even now and this will continue into the future, there is a global marketplace and banks can and will sell across borders. It will also help to alleviate issues such as regulatory mismatches on accounting issues as e.g. in the differences between US GAAP and IFRS standards14 and a growing convergence in accounting standards.

The role of the IMF and the Global Stability Board15 should be clarified and strengthened not only by providing them with funding but also to give them a role as arbitrator in cross border issues across continents. The EU can have a role in this context as a precursor in the arena of financial regulation across a geographically and temperamentally very diverse area. Clearly, the development of the single market in financial services could serve as a basis both for reflecting on the positive aspects and the more difficult aspects16.

The positive note can be developed on the balance, which is struck in Europe between markets and protection of stakeholders. The more difficult aspect lies in the slowness of procedures and the eternal tension between national and supranational interests. The De la Rosiere report17 clearly shows these tensions. This comes through in the supervisory structure based on Colleges of Supervisors acting too consensually without giving undue influence to the Home supervisor in the case of cross border groups18.

Moving on to the Control part, here clear lines will develop in the next 10 years as across the whole political spectrum it is becoming clear that within the single market financial services is a case apart and one where if the system fails this has dire consequences on the real economy. It has been calculated by the IMF that intervention in the financial markets is the equivalent of 37 years aid to developing countries19. We have also have heard much in the press about banks too big to fail and their impact on countries and regions.

12 Report from the Commission on a possible review of the IORP Directive 2003/41/EC 13 On governance to manage outsourcing risk-Business Trend Quarterly 2006 14http://www.smartbrief.com/news/ifrs/storyDetails.jsp?issueid=B7C9D3D2-67BD-4A54-BB83-B54827C0E22E&copyid=0D94218C-3DE3-4670-BCD3-5F3747A92D5A&brief=ifrs&sb_code=rss&&campaign=rss 15 The Financial Stability Forum was renamed in March 2009.This is already being done for the Financial Stability Board in which the Commission will also now have a say (speech Mario Draghi; http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_090402.pdf) 16 The New (dated 27 May 2009) Communication from the Commission on Financial Supervision COM (2009)252 and its impact assessment proposes to follow up on the de La Rosière report. In the Impact Assessment the analysis of the different steps that could be taken, lead to a compromise step of ameliorating the colleges of supervisors and communication between macro and micro supervisors. it will remain an issue in the coming years to see haw fast the changes can be. 17 http://ec.europa.eu/ireland/press_office/news_of_the_day/pdf_files/global_report_-_final.pdf 18 IP/A/ECON/NT/2008-10, is a note analyzing the assets and influences in Member States of cross border groups in the EU 19 IMF report on Regional Economic outlook:Europe; Addressing the crisis, May 2009.

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Two issues are important for the next decade; will the current banking model of the universal bank continue to develop and hence keep growing into the huge mammoths that we have now?20Should the model of incorporating into one bank the 'originate, rate and distribute' functions be kept? Arguably the control mechanisms on deposit taking banks ought to be far more severe than on other institutions, as deposits are the only instruments in the financial markets which are obligatorily repaid at 100%! The globalising and high technological advances have pushed banks evermore in a race for remuneration as the carry difference between deposit intakes and the on lending was decreasing. This caused for example Landesbanken21 to turn to buy for their books complex instruments and pushed other commercial banks into overleveraging and expanding balance sheets in order to recoup by sheer size the mismatch in carry difference. Some banks are bigger than their countries GDP, what to do if a failure should occur, should the state intervene or will we see the creation of a European or supranational fund which can intervene. If this is so then issue of sovereignty will have to be dealt with and this may even necessitate changing the treaties. Failures will need to be avoided as much as possible through two mechanisms; one will be incentivising supervisors and financial institutions to behave in more responsible manner. Corporate governance will dominate this discussion with new rules set up in institutions on remuneration, and board responsibilities.

The role of the large shareholders versus small investors, and shareholder activism will become extremely important22. Supervisors will need to adopt a more hands on approach and proactively seek to address weaknesses rather than tick boxes. The communication between supervisors and the relationships of supervisors within the level 3 committees23will be set up taking both the European and international context into account. The De la Rosiere report24 sought to cover up the deficit of supervisors in estimating systemic risk by advising on the creation of a European Systemic Risk Council which will seek to control the liquidity and pro cyclicality of the markets25.What will be extremely important is the link between this institution and micro supervision in the European System of Financial Supervisors Colleges of Supervisors, if we are to create a proper functioning crisis management system.

As was stated in the introduction, we should not rush into creating instruments unless they have been thought out within global context and taken into account all the implications on national sovereignty. One of the current failings of the market and its supervision, has been the constraints imposes on legislation due to national interests. Clearly, this issue will need to be addressed in the coming years. Perhaps the answer lies in multispeed Europe for financial services, where the euro zone could act in a closer context than the rest of the EU. this would have the benefit of creating a zone where for example the idea which is floating round of creating a true EURO bond market could interact with the credit markets to stimulate which brings us to the this point namely of stimulation.

Policymakers will need in the coming years to intervene more actively in the financial markets whether it is on a regulatory basis or more on careful monitoring through activity reports and discussions to fine-tune the way markets go and have a quicker reaction time to address eventual potential time bombs. The role of a future crisis mechanism and the link between macro and micro supervision will need to be reinforced through accountability to EU institutions on a regular basis.

20 see IP/A/ECON/NT/2008-10 note on cross border groups 21 article in Bloomberg October 2008 (http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601170&refer=special_report&sid=aPxfNBXGvA4g) 22 INI/2003/2082 the future of hedge funds and derivatives; INI/2007/2238, Hedge funds and private Equity 23 The Lamfalussy Process in financial services was developed in 2001 named after Alexandre Lamfalussy. It is composed of 4 levels each focussing on a specific stage of implementing legislation. The level 3 committees are composed of the national supervisors dealing in securities, banking and insurance 24http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finances/docs/de_larosiere_report_en.pdf 25 EP Study by Eatwell, Persaud and Alexander, Financial Supervision and Crises Management in the EUl and Central Bank of Spain on counter cyclicality (http://www.bde.es/informes/be/docs/dt0531e.pdf)

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The Commission Communication on Financial Supervision26goes some way by having the European Systemic Risk Council, appear before the European Parliament on a regular basis. However further thought will need to be given to the accountability of European Supervision structures and their impact on the stakeholders and the real economy. Education of stakeholders and supervisors will be paramount and will need to be carefully overseen and stimulated to ensure that that even if we will continue to see developments in financial services becoming evermore sophisticated, supervisors and stakeholders will have the knowledge to understand and deal with them.

Technology will continue to be a driver in these markets reducing margins for financial institutions, which will necessitate a different approach to business. It might mean a further development where basic products such as consumer credit and deposits will be tightly regulated but which will be able to be sold by a variety of actors who can through their selling stream achieve economies of scale. In case of complex products these will need to be subjected to closer supervision on systemic and liquidity risks. The role of the future European Systemic risk Council as proposed by the de La Rosiere report27will play a crucial role as will global supranational institutions such as the Financial Stability Board28.

It will be essential to view supervision and control of the financial markets more on a proactive forward basis rather than retroactive as these markets are fast moving and very dynamic. This will in turn have to lead to a much more interactive role of regulation and supervision with a much shorter timeframe for moving to legislate and apply rules

Josina KAMERLING

26 COM (2009)252 27 http://ec.europa.eu/ireland/press_office/news_of_the_day/pdf_files/global_report_-_final.pdf 28Financial Stability Board remarks on procyclicality April 2009(reporthttp://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_0904a.pdf)

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Part 1.2 Sustainable Macroeconomic Governance in the EU

Executive Summary The present crisis has been a vivid reminder of the fact that in a globalized world, problems in one part of the world quickly reverberate elsewhere. Therefore, coordination and cooperation are vital and increasingly needed not only on European, but on global level. In this spirit, this note briefly presents possible trends in economic policy in the following 5-10 years. The following projections are made:

• Economic policy in general, and fiscal and industrial policy in particular, will have to become significantly more coordinated in the EU. A level playing field ensured by common and respected competition (and state aid) rules is crucial.

• Imbalances in current accounts, real exchange rates and business cycles may well deteriorate in the EU as a result of diverging developments across Member States. In order to ensure EMU survival, the fiscal arm of EMU will have to be much more pronounced and reactive.

• The euro will continue to be a beacon of stability and several more countries will adopt the euro.

• The EU will have to implement more effective financial surveillance mechanisms. In this, the ECB will gain powers in systemic financial supervision, which have to come about with an increased accountability and an adaptation of some of its objectives.

• In areas where national governance fails in the face of global markets, the world at large will have to develop global governance mechanisms at the level of the UN, IMF and the World Bank (or new institutions that emerge out of them). In other areas where governance structures cannot adequately follow markets, the markets may need to become local, regional and national again.

• Economic policy should become much more intertwined with other policy areas such as external policy and environmental policy (incl. climate change). The renewed Lisbon Strategy should have a stronger environmental sustainability arm in addition to its focus on growth, innovation and employment.

• GDP growth in its present form has considerable deficits and is not sustainable. The EU will have to advance in moving 'beyond GDP' in developing public policy objectives and in decoupling the content of GDP from material resource consumption. The current contradictory stance between economic policy objectives and environmental policy requirements regarding the dependence on GDP growth will need to be weakened.

Sustained European economic prosperity will not come at zero cost and by small adaptations, but the sacrifices will be extensive in nature. It is evident that all of the above require much more substantial coordination and governance than is currently the case on the EU level, not to mention the global level. A new 'international mixed economy', a free market supported by effective government, may therefore be necessary on the international arena. However, markets have an almost unlimited capacity to reinvent themselves, and should ultimately emerge stronger out of the present crisis. It is merely important to strengthen their frameworks.

The European Parliament (EP) has managed to pave the way successfully for many future EU policies. It has acted as a visionary in climate change, in financial supervision and in sustainable development, usually before the Council or Commission have seriously tabled any proposals in these areas. In operational terms, the EP currently unfortunately has little legislative power in most policies analyzed here. However, by encouraging discussions, prompting governments and other institutions to act, the EP remains well equipped to show the way forward in many areas.

An International Mixed Economy The completion and the proper functioning of the free EU single market has been one of the main rationales behind the EU from the very beginning. As a balance to the free market, the

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Union has defined minimum common standards in social and environmental policies as well as planted redistributive and cohesive elements in its budget to facilitate solidarity among its members. Consequently, the EU is the only 'transnational' attempt in the world to generate anything close to a 'mixed economy', i.e. a combination of free markets and effective state interventions.

In the last few decades, increased global competition brought on by globalization and technological progress, helped to maintain a favourable climate of low inflation coupled with relatively high productivity growth in the entire industrialized world. The abundant liquidity in the financial markets, fuelled by deregulation of the sector in the 80s and 90s and accompanied by a helpful monetary policy, accelerated this development.

Ironically, perhaps globalization could be crucial to understand why the present system has broken down.29 In the last decades, markets globalized but the supporting governance mechanisms did not follow, despite some 'light-touch' exceptions. After the financial collapse, the balance between markets and their supporting institutions on the global arena may now need to be reworked.

Concretely, in some issues this may mean that an existing institution will have to extend its scope outward from the national (or even European) dimension. Issues where this sort of globalization of structures may be needed include e.g. a possible EU/IMF role in financial supervision, more effective climate and environmental regimes and stronger macroeconomic policy coordination. This latter point could involve a 'Bretton Woods'-style agreement to manage extreme exchange rate fluctuations and other international financial imbalances (such as extreme carry-trading of currencies)30.

In other areas, where it is established that the institutional control mechanisms cannot adequately follow the markets onto the international arena, this might mean limiting the scope of markets to narrower borders (regional, national, European). The return to more restricted finance, or narrow banking31, or the encouragement of more local and regional economic objectives for well-being in the 'glocal economy' combining a globalized world with more local and sustainable development objectives, are examples of policy areas that may belong to this group.

In any event, the European Union is a unique mediating device between national and global rules and should develop its potential to the fullest. Consequently, in concrete terms the external policy dimension of the EU economic policies and that of the euro will only increase. Moreover, as is explained in section 5 below, environmental policy will be a major input factor in the design of European and global economic governance. In the future, the EP role should be expected to be enhanced in this endeavour to actively defend the priorities and preferences of European citizens.

29 See also Rodrik (2009): Capitalism 3.0, Project Syndicate, February 2009. 30 See e.g. Ronald McKinnon (2009): A New Bretton Woods, Eurointelligence. 31 A term coined by Paul de Grauwe (2008) The Return to Narrow Banking, CEPS Commentary Nov 2008, 'The solution is to restrict banks to traditional, narrow banking with traditional oversight and guarantees while requiring financial firms involved in financial markets to more closely match the average maturities of their assets and liabilities'.

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The Economic and Monetary Union In the current crisis, the common currency has clearly proven to be a 'beacon of stability', as even otherwise structurally weaker Eurozone members have been saved from capital flight and currency crises, contrary to many New Member States (NMS) not yet having adopted the euro. The net benefit of the euro can be therefore clearly judged positive. Moreover, without the common currency, the further integration of the single market seems a close to impossible endeavour.32

In the mid- and long-term, however, the stability of the common currency should not be taken for granted. A Member State debt-default is no longer just a theoretical threat and imbalances in the euro area current accounts, unit labour costs, real exchange rates and business cycles may widen. The real test may well lay ahead still.

The long-standing challenge, or incongruence, in Europe since 1999 has been the combination of the common monetary policy together with the fragmented, however loosely coordinated, nature of fiscal and tax policy. During the run-up to the euro, especially in the 1990s, there was much debate on the fiscal policy implications of a monetary union, and many argued that the loss of independent monetary policy would have to be compensated with a more pronounced fiscal element in EMU, such as a larger budget or a sophisticated fiscal insurance scheme which could play the role of a demand stabiliser in face of asymmetric shocks.33 With the successful birth and the subsequent favourable conditions, this difficult debate was initially muted.

However, the crisis has revealed grave deficiencies in fiscal management both on national and on EU level. During the crisis, spreads on government bonds have been widening between Member States34. This may be a bad sign as the probability of default is seen as high for some countries. On the other hand, widening spreads may also be good as they show that market mechanisms are working and imprudent governments are being disciplined. Both arguments offer an explanation for the current divergences in spreads, but they are fundamentally different in terms of the responses they require.

In the coming 5-10 years, EMU stands before the challenges of deeper integration of the single market, and/or a stronger fiscal arm to EMU. The three following scenarios emerge:

1) Nothing substantial needs to be done as the market mechanisms work and governments are disciplined through the public debt markets;

2) Tax policies and tax legislation/practices in Member States are further harmonized, especially in direct taxation. This allows for a smoother functioning of the single market, thus providing implicit insurance against asymmetric shocks and crises;

3) More sophisticated 'fiscal coordination mechanisms' are put in place. The 'fiscal coordination mechanisms' need not be an EU wide tax or massive common budget, but it may well mean a Eurozone bond (i.e. a common euro zone-wide public debt market), or a large European financial stability fund35, or, at the very minimum further ownership and harmonization of Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) procedures and budgeting rules.

While option 1) might not work sufficiently, option 2) is desirable but has not been realistic until now. It remains to be seen whether the crisis presents a lasting opportunity for more harmonization in direct taxation legislation, such as the Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB), which the EP has been actively calling for.

At the moment, scenario 3), ideally implemented together with 2), seems most plausible, although also cumbersome. The problem with common fiscal and tax policies is that decisions in the EU are taken on unanimity basis and the EP has little legislative role.

32 Wyplosz, Charles (2009): Euro or Not? Early Lessons from the Crisis, European Parliament, ECON. 33 See e.g. Hughes-Hallett et al (1999): Fiscal Aspects of Monetary Integration, Cambridge University Press 34 See e.g. Darvas and Pisany-Ferry (2009): The looming divide within Europe, Bruegel Policy Briefing. 35 Proposed by Daniel Gros and Stefano Micossi, from CEPS.

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Moreover, the economic externalities of fiscal policies are very high across the entire Union. In a closely connected EU, the benefits of an expenditure of one country will accrue to others almost all the same, and this effectively represents a major stumbling block in the way of fiscal harmonization.

The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), having suffered much under the crisis, is not (yet) dead, but unless it is yet again reformed and widened to include issues of relevance for state aid and competition rules to ensure a level playing field between Member States (preventing an industrial subsidy race in the midst of crisis), it may be on its way to becoming a shallow 'pact' with no real impact.

However, in the aftermath of the crisis there might be some hope for increased coordination as the threat of Member State bankruptcies has become a realistic scenario.36 A de facto bankrupt country staying inside the euro area would literally force the rest of the Member States to provide assistance (in the spirit of Article 100(2) TEU). Indeed, the no-bailout clause in Article 103 TEU – according to which neither the European Central Bank, the EU, nor national governments “shall […] be liable for or assume the commitments” for other national governments – may probably be void of credibility as leading politicians and treasury officials throughout Europe have proclaimed their intention to stand by any failing government. The reason for this is that the political and economic costs of letting a fellow member government fail are simply too high in a closely interconnected EMU.

Returning to the positive scenario of the euro area continuing to be a 'beacon of stability': What about countries still outside the euro area? How flexible will the accession criteria be?

Four NMS have adopted the euro (Slovenia, Malta, Cyprus, Slovakia) by 2009. One application, that of Lithuania for entry in January 2008, was rejected using the notion of 'sustainability' of the inflation criterion, as Lithuania was about 0,1%-points in breach of the benchmark. Sustainability as a criterion has always been on hollow ground, and it is even more questionable since the Slovakian entry into the euro area in 2009. While the main concern of the ECB in 2008 prior to the crisis was the sustainability of the Slovakian inflation rate, the crisis has shown that inflation expectations are anything but sustainable and can be reversed in weeks and months, notably also downwards. In consequence, in the future, a literal fulfilment of the criteria could be enough for future entrants to the euro.

Although many countries would wish to join the euro as soon as possible, it is unlikely that the convergence criteria will be modified, even in the face of the current crisis. Among other criteria, an applicant needs to be in the ERM-II exchange rate mechanism for at least 2 years prior to adopting the euro. Out of the non-Eurozone members, presently only the Baltic States are in ERM-II. In a recessionary environment, no country is likely to join the ERM-II-mechanism before the downturn has bottomed out. This has a clear economic rationale: for catching up economies, the exchange rate pressure within ERM-II is much better placed towards appreciation rather than depreciation (which would currently be the case). Joining now, in mid-2009, would endanger the stability of the exchange rate at which the country joins ERM-II.

Consequently, the earliest imaginable entries could be for the Baltic States as of 2011, Poland and Hungary in 2013. Therefore, in 5 years time, with the possible exceptions of Romania, Bulgaria and the Czech Republic all NMS should be in the euro area.37 In 10 years time, all these countries should be members. Sweden, Denmark and UK (+possibly Iceland) are rather different cases, but it is not unthinkable that they all have adopted the euro in 10 years from now. In this process, the EP should continue to remain a fierce defender of Eurozone enlargement to the entire EU.

36 The different scenarios for the theoretical case of Eurozone break up or countries leaving it have been well laid out in Eurintelligence (2009): Eurozone Meltdown, Briefing Note No 1, 3 April 2009. 37 Note that for the Czech Republic, this may be the case due to lack of internal positive assessment and willingness rather than due to failing the criteria for euro adoption.

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Monetary Policy, the ECB and its Accountability The financial and economic crisis could mean some degree of change in the monetary policy consensus of the last 20 years or so. The role of central banks as promoters of deregulation and 'cheap money' is also yet to be analyzed, and the appropriate conclusions for the EU and ECB need to be drawn in time.

In the coming 5-10 years, the world at large should see a considerable deleveraging in the quantity of (broad) money (e.g. M3) circulating in the economy and thereby in the size of the financial sector as the money supply becomes more controlled and restricted. However, the EU or other countries will most probably not experience the end of the modern monetary system (based on fiat-money38), and consequently neither a return to gold or other standards, nor forms of private money.

In the last two decades, the capability of (independent) central banks to manage and steer inflation (either directly or through means of money supply) was working reasonably well. After the crisis, the central banks capacity to influence inflation is probably somewhat damaged. Some have even called this the end of inflation targeting, a monetary policy strategy practiced in many modern central banks such as the Swedish Riksbank or the Bank of England. The ECB does not officially subscribe to direct inflation targeting, but uses a mixture of monetary and economic indicators to control inflation.

While the operating terrain for central banks gets more difficult in the aftermath of the crisis, it is a well educated guess that central banks will gain additional powers, at least in systemic financial stability supervision.

In the EU, the revisiting process of the role of central banking needs to be much more pronounced, and it needs to cover at least three areas: 1) the objectives and strategy of the ECB, 2) the additional roles and powers given to the ECB after the crisis and 3) the adequate degree of accountability in this new environment.

1) The financial crisis has shown that price stability, while crucially important, may not be enough as a sole primary objective of a central bank. There can be times when the pursuit of price stability may come at the cost of financial stability. The ECB may need to adopt a second primary objective next to price stability: financial stability.39

2) If the recommendations of the De Larosière Group40 of the European Commission are turned into reality, the EU will have inter alia a European Systemic Risk Council (ESRC), chaired by the ECB. The ECB may also see its powers increase as a supervisor of large systematically important cross-border financial institutions. At the same time, the need to adequately reform and design the decision-making in an enlarged ECB Governing Council, including rotation systems in membership and providing for the needs of non-Eurozone members, remains.

3) The above points call for a revisited democratic accountability of the central bank. It is difficult to conceive the same level of independence for the ECB in an environment of increased responsibilities. As the operating environment becomes more difficult and less-rules-based, so should the democratic accountability of central banks be enhanced. The European Parliament has a clear role to play in this regard in developing its accountability relationship with the ECB. For example, establishing an own Sub-Committee for Relations with the ECB, rather than just holding the 'Monetary Dialogue' within ECON Committee meetings, may be a viable option.

38 In a fiat-money system the government (through the central bank) simply declares the currency to be legal tender, backed by little else but trust. 39 Gros and de Grauwe (2009), Accountability and Transparency in Central Banking, European Parliament. 40 European Commission: The High Level Group on Financial Supervision in the EU, Report, 25 February 2009.

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Beyond GDP - Macroeconomic Governance for Sustainability While in the preceding analysis the predicted scenarios were more 'business as usual', this final section introduces a rather more fundamental change. The global economy is currently facing an economic downturn, but at the same time the world at large is subject to increasing environmental degradation, biodiversity loss and accelerating climate change. In some ways, this crisis is a unique opportunity to tackle both challenges at once by targeting investment and fiscal stimulus towards low-carbon infrastructure. In any case, the needs of the 'industrial age economy' and the 'environment' are currently clashing. The economic policy design of the next 5-10 years will have no other chance than to irreversibly integrate issues around environmental and social sustainability in its very core objectives.

In order to be able to keep the institutional status-quo set out in earlier sections of this paper largely unchanged, a new macroeconomic paradigm will have to be developed where resource constraints, ecological capital as well as social capital are better worked out as a factor of productivity next to financial, physical and human capital. Only by changing the 'content' (explained below), can the present framework of economic governance (as presented earlier in this note) survive in the long term.

In practical policy terms this requires bold moves towards indicators of well-being 'beyond GDP'. GDP growth is enshrined in all economic policies and objectives both on EU level as well as on national and regional levels. However, GDP is a questionable measure of our well-being, for several reasons, including most notably that GDP does not properly account for social and environmental costs and benefits.41 Measuring the quality of economic performance and well-being by GDP resembles a firm that never looks at its assets and liabilities, but merely at maximizing its turnover. However, this should not be understood as a call to get rid of GDP. GDP growth effectively determines levels of employment, tax revenues and subsidies paid even to the greenest of technologies. Our economies and our welfare systems are heavily dependent on GDP growth.

GDP growth, through consumption and investment, bears positive feedback mechanisms that make more of it always necessary. However, while not getting rid of GDP, it would certainly be desirable to reduce some of this dependency on it. The problem with the opposite of growth, de-growth, is that it is most likely unstable. Declining consumption would certainly lead to rising unemployment, falling competitiveness and a spiral of recession. This turns out to be a real dilemma - modern economies are simply driven towards growth, as less of it is unstable, but more of it is increasingly unsustainable.42

Dealing with this dilemma involves two related issues: decoupling GDP growth from material resource consumption and paying more attention to the 'quality of the growth'.

1) Decoupling: The main problem with GDP is that it is heavily correlated with material resource consumption. To this, wide-ranging (but not complete) 'decoupling' of GDP growth from the related energy and material consumption is the solution.43 Despite some successes in lowering the energy-intensity of growth, currently, too much energy and material consumption still contribute to too much growth. Even if some attempts to achieve this form of 'relative decoupling' have been successful in most EU and OECD-economies, the world resource consumption has been constantly growing and there are no signs of 'absolute decoupling' (see Figure 2 below). In emerging markets such as China and India, decoupling is even less existent. Any solution to this problem needs to be global, an EU-wide solution will simply not be effective.

41 For an excellent review of the pros and cons of GDP, see e.g. European Parliament (2007): Alternative Progress Indicators to GDP as a Means to Sustainable Development, Study. 42 See e.g. Booth, Douglas (2004) Hooked on Growth – economic addictions and the environment. New York: Rowman and Littlefield. 43 Of course complete and 100% decoupling is neither desirable nor possible, as prosperity inevitably has material consequences, such as food and shelter. But the evidence is mounting that this correlation between material consumption and prosperity is 'lexicographic', meaning it disappears above a certain threshold of GDP.

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Figure 2: Trends in World Fossil Fuel Consumption and Related CO2: 1980-2007 - Source: Energy Information Administration (EIA), Redefining Prosperity Report p. 50

2) Quality of growth: As getting rid of growth is not a viable option, it should at least be channelled to work for true sustainable well-being. Apart from environmental considerations, spending pressures such as ageing populations present a remarkable challenge to public budgets and, ultimately, growth. Moreover, freedom of innovation and education should be maximized to increase future potential growth.

There are existing initiatives in this field, but much more needs to happen. At a global level, the Green Economy Initiative (October 2008), brought forward by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), is an initiative of switching direction and concentrating on 'green growth'. The EU Sustainable Development Strategy (SDS), endorsed by the European Parliament in 2006, aims to reconcile economic development, social cohesion and protection of the environment. In addition to the SDS, the EU has also proclaimed its goal in the Lisbon Strategy of boosting innovation, jobs and growth while ensuring greater environmental sustainability. The European Commission roadmap in moving beyond GDP is expected in the course of 2009. Currently, at least three Member States have seriously started to tackle the problem of unsustainable GDP growth by establishing scientific councils to aid governmental decision-making, as in Austria44, the UK45, and most recently and most prominently the Stiglitz-Sen-Fitoussi-Commission in France46.

In conclusion, more needs to happen beyond the established frameworks both globally, nationally as well as regionally. Moving 'beyond GDP' involves many economic policy areas, such as international climate policy, external policy, tax incentives, state aid rules as well as statistics in order to raise awareness, just to name a few. Numerous public opinion polls in the EU testify that virtually all EU citizens care intensively for their well-being, the environment and for financial stability, sometimes to a higher degree than their governments do, or are capable to do. The European Parliament is therefore well placed to be the best defender of these interests on the European and global scales. Arttu MÄKIPÄÄ

44 Austrian Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, Environment and Water Management in cooperation with SERI, 'What kind of growth is sustainable?' report published in 2009. 45 UK Government Sustainable Development Commission, report on 'Redefining Prosperity', published 2009. 46 See temporary conclusions at http://www.stiglitz-sen-fitoussi.fr/en/index.htm.

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Part 2: Employment and Social Affairs

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2.1 Employment 2009-2019

Improving employment policy and tackling unemployment are one of the main goals of the Lisbon strategy. Although Member States have the sole competence for employment policy, they have committed themselves to co-ordinate their employment policies at Community level and to establish a set of common objectives and targets. The European Employment Strategy with Employment Guidelines and programmes, as ESF, PROGRESS and EURES, are designed to contribute to growth and jobs.

Facing the financial and economic crisis it can be expected that the current recession will have an impact on the discussion and finally on the design of the EU employment strategy within the Lisbon Strategy post-2010. After the period of net job creation in recent years, unemployment rates are currently clearly on rise due to the crisis and should reach 11.5% in 2010. "This could lead us to a substantive debate on the correct articulation of our economic and social model. We are in the middle of an economic and financial crisis, and we are moving towards a social crisis as there will be an employment crisis", as Mr. Juncker stated in April 2009.

The policy paper starts by examining in detail three key factors which are considered to be crucial for the Lisbon Strategy post 2010 in the field of employment, as green jobs, demographic challenges with its impact on pensions, labour market and immigration, and the external dimension of the Lisbon Strategy. Some thoughts are added regarding flexicurity and new emerging risks in the field of health and safety at work.

1. Employment in the Lisbon Strategy Post 2010

1.1. Environment, climate change and job creation

Cohen-Tanugi stipulated in his study47 "Lisbonne Plus doit s’appuyer sur des mesures économiques, sociales et environnementales centrées sur la promotion de l’innovation".

In the next decades, climate change, adaptation to it and efforts to arrest it by reducing emissions will have far-reaching implications for economic and social development, for production and consumption patterns and therefore for employment, incomes and poverty reduction. The range of profiles of green jobs stretches from highly skilled research and development or management functions through technical and skilled levels, to the relatively low skilled. The largest numbers of already existing and future green jobs is concentrated in sectors directly linked to the use of energy and the recovery of raw materials: improvements in energy efficiency, particularly in the building sector and renovation, but also industry and transport; renewable energy; mobility (mass transportation); recycling and reuse; sustainable use of natural resources (agriculture, forestry and fisheries); environmental services48.

In its resolution on 'European Economic Recovery Plan'49, the EP sees an opportunity amid the crisis in investment in green technologies to boost jobs and combat negative impact on climate change. Environmental policy is expected to have positive impact on the number of people in work50. Jobs are likely to be generated in renewable energies and by energy saving/building insulation; investing in clean cars helps protect the planet and will give Europe's companies a leading edge in a highly competitive market. The European Parliament supports the reinforcement of synergies between the Lisbon strategy and climate and energy agenda51. Promoting investment in low carbon technologies and energy efficiency measures will at the same time support Europe's competitiveness, Europe's energy security and climate change agenda and job creation.

1.2. Impact of demographic changes on labour markets

47 "Une stratégie européenne pour la mondialisation", Laurent Cohen-Tanugi (2008) 48 Source: ILO, 'Global challenges for sustainable development: Strategies for green jobs', background note 2008 49 EP Resolution on 'European Economic Recovery Plan' (P6_TA (2009)0123) 50 OECD Environment and Employment: an assessment 17 May 2004 51 European Commission, 'A European Economic Recovery Plan', COM(2008)800

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Demographic change is transforming the EU with longer lives, low fertility and inward migration as its key aspects. In many Member States, population ageing will dramatically change old-age-dependency rates. This will imply high costs for medical and social care and will have a significant impact on finances and on the composition of the workforce. Far-reaching reforms of social security systems, labour markets and education systems will be necessary to modify these trends, or at least to cope with their consequences. Increasing participation among older people and women, as the prime sources of labour force growth in the future, and immigration is becoming reality.

It must be pointed out that demographic processes are characterised by long, or even very long, time-lags between the policy actions and their effects. That is why the origins of current ageing of the European population lie in the demographic performance of the last few decades, and that is also the reason why any policy measure taken now will only be effective in changing the demographic characteristics of the European population some decades from now.

According to the "2009 Ageing report"52, the extent and speed of population ageing depend on future trends in aforementioned factors. The population of the EU as a whole would be slightly larger in 2060 than today, but much older. The population would increase from 495.4 million in 2008 to 520.1 million in 2035. Subsequently, due to a steady decline, the population would shrink by nearly 3% to 505.7 million in 2060.

The working age population aged between 15 and 64 years would start to decline as of 2010 and drop by 15% until 2060. Only seven MS (BE, IE, FR, CY, LU, SE, UK) would see their working-age population expand, mostly due to migration, except FR and IE where the fertility rate is relatively high. The number of children would decline gradually from 2020 onwards. The number of elderly people will double from 85 million in 2008 to 151 million in 2060 in the EU; the number of oldest-old (aged 80 years and above) will triple from 22 million in 2008 to 61 million in 2060. The largest increase of old-age dependency ration is expected in the period of 2015-35: the ratio 4 persons of working-age for every person aged over 65 will move to 2:1.

According to the projection, the labour force in the EU would increase by roughly 8.6 million people (3.7%) between 2007 and 2020 (in a majority of MS), mainly due to the rise of labour supply of women; however, it will shrink in 11 (mainly newer MS and DK, NL, FI) until 2020. After 2020, the overall labour force is expected to decrease by to around 33 million people (13.6%) almost exclusively to negative demographic developments, except in CY, LU, IE, UK, FR and SE.

For the EU as a whole, the participation rate of people aged 15 to 64 is projected to increase by 3.5 percentage points, from 70.6% in 2007 to 74.1% in 2060. Almost all of the increase is projected to materialise before 2020. The biggest increase in participation is projected for older workers, aged between 55 and 64. The gap between male and female participation rates would gradually narrow, especially in countries where it is currently wide.

Without incorporating the potential negative impact of the current economic and employment crisis, the unemployment rate would be reduced slightly. The employment rate in the EU would increase from 65.5% in 2007 to 66.6% in 2010, 69% in 2020, and almost 70% in 2060. The employment rate of women is assumed to rise from 58.4% in 2007 to 63.4% in 2020 and to 65.1% in 2060. The increase in the employment rate will be even larger for older workers (55-64), from 44.9% in 2007 to 54.5% in 2020 and further to 59.8% in 2060.

52 2009 Ageing Report: Economic and budgetary projections for EU-27 Member States (2008-2060), European Commission (DG ECFIN)

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Challenges of the demographic change have an impact on the sustainability of social security schemes and pensions. Labour market performance and sustainability of pensions are closely related to the labour participation of all groups (young entrance, older, women and migrants) and interdependent, as conditions affecting the pension benefit originate in the labour market: for example, the overall labour income of a person over her lifetime, the income profile of an individual over her life-cycle in the labour market, continuity and discontinuity of labour market participation (gaps between spells of work), labour market demand. Old-age poverty is increasing in some MS, in particular for women, as a gender-specific phenomenon as a result of incomplete contribution records due to gender pay gap, break in working career because of child and elderly care responsibilities. As not everybody can acquire adequate pension through access to the labour market, the role of minimum pension and coverage of care and disability will continue to be discussed at EU level in order to avoid or reduce poor pensioners. In general, pension systems should cover all forms of employment (temporary, contractual work and self employment).

Another issue to be addressed is how to keep older workforce longer in employment. The extension of the statutory retirement age is an option but on its own might not be sufficient enough to have a real impact on effective raise of pension age. In order to effectively rise the retirement age, a flexible policy mix needs to be considered by combining lifelong learning, smooth transition from active working life to pension, by applying creative and innovative ways and models. Employers and workers will need to adapt their approach and to change their attitude towards lifelong learning and life-cycle approach; care facilities (child and elderly care, in particular long-term care) need to be ensured, and occupational health and safety measures adapted to old-age workers to enable people to stay longer in work.

It is commonly believed that, for companies, older workers are more expensive than younger workers, because of higher remuneration, fringe benefits and social contributions. While it is true that wages and fringe benefits often rise with age, ILO does believe that performance and accumulated know how of older workers does not compensate for the higher cost; and earnings do not necessarily continue to rise until the end of the working life53.

Furthermore, in order to curb the accelerating growing population ageing process, a younger and more economically active population is necessary. This implies higher specific birth rates, but even with very high figures, their effect will be small and will take time to enter into effect. It is possible to forecast that Europe not only is, but will increasingly be in the future, one of the major destinations for immigration as a result of the sequential process of ageing, labour shortage and depopulation, with all the social and political problems involved. Modern liberal societies, however, find themselves in a dilemma: on the one hand they need more immigrants in the future; on the other hand the integration of immigrants is a problem. More efforts are necessary to improve the Member States' understanding how they would profit from regulated immigration and how they could better tackle the economic and demographic challenges. To regulate the access to the labour market, immigration policies and procedures should be better coordinated at EU level in the future.

In this context, a paradigm shift is needed in the way brain drain is perceived. The idea is to move away from the negative concept of brain drain to brain circulation or brain gain where sending and receiving countries alike to benefit from the specialised experience of expatriate professionals and not just from their remittances. According to the World Bank it is important that developed and developing nations improve their cooperation on the issue, especially so that developing nations are not unnecessarily hurt by a brain drain of skilled workers who then go underappreciated in the developed world. The same phenomenon can be observed between newer and older Member States.

53 "Ageing of Labour Force in OECD Countries: Economic and Social Consequences"; ILO 2000

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In knowledge based societies, priorities will continue to be to encourage companies to adopt learning organisations; shaping the appropriate learning mode for each target group; spreading new learning solutions to low-skilled workers; develop a dynamic guidance system over the life-course. Youth (un-)employment will still depend on their skills and the rate of job growth. In a knowledge-based economy, it is essential that the trend towards better education, initial vocational training and training on workplace continues.

In many countries, the pursuit of early retirement policies up to now has enabled to ignore the problem of maintaining, updating and extending the skills of the people concerned. Training of older workers should become much more part of a process of lifelong learning in order to reduce difficulties older workers face.

1.3. External dimension of the Lisbon Strategy

As international trade intensifies and new players are entering the scene, the world seems to have reached a new stage of economic integration. Globalisation is the process of increased interdependency of national economies: markets for goods and services, but also markets for labour and capital are integrated on an international scale. Whereas economists argue that this integration through trade will lead to an overall increase in welfare in the long term, policy makers and citizens are concerned about short-term negative effects and about those losing out from intensified competition on integrated world markets.

Faced with increased globalisation, over the last ten years the EU has made greater efforts to link its foreign and domestic policies. Core labour standards have been promoted by the EU and the Charter of Fundamental Rights will become part of the Lisbon Treaty54 as soon as it enters into force. Steps have been taken in recent years to strengthen the external dimension of the Lisbon Strategy by reviving bilateral and regional EU trade agreements. Such agreements could include trade, economic growth, energy, social and sustainable development elements55. Labour standards are not part of ongoing World Trade Organisation negotiations, the EU, however, encourages private companies to get involved in the development of social standards through corporate social responsibility. The World Commission on social dimension of globalisation (established by ILO in 2002) published a critical report56 in 2004 arguing that high global unemployment is the result of persistent imbalances in the current workings of the global economy which are both "ethically unacceptable and politically unsustainable." The failure of policies is due to the fact that market-opening measures and financial and economic considerations have consistently predominated over social ones.

54 Lisbon Treaty: The Charter of Fundamental Rights will become legally binding by respecting the principle of subsidiarity according to general provisions of Title VII of the Charter and contribute to strengthen employment and social policies. The social clause in the draft Lisbon Treaty (Article 5(a)) will contribute to strengthening the employment policy as it states 'In defining and implementing its policies and activities, the Union shall take into account requirements linked to the promotion of a high level of employment, the guarantee of adequate social protection, the fight against social exclusion, and a high level of education, training and protection of human health.' 55 "The Lisbon Strategy and social Europe: two closely linked destinies" by Janine Goetschy in the book "Europe, Globalisation and the Lisbon agenda", 2009 56 "A fair globalisation - Creating opportunities for all", ILO World Commission, 2004

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Cohen-Tanugi report57 for the French government suggested that an external dimension to the Lisbon Strategy should be put in place and distinguishes between a community-led external dimension and a MS-led internal dimension. Iain Begg58 questions the distinction because there are also aspects of intra-EU structural policy for which an EU dimension will remain vital (cohesion policy, development of cross-border infrastructure, etc). Rodrigues59 goes even further by raising questions about "The Strategy as crucial part of a global role of the EU? What are its implications on employment and labour standards? How can the EU this lead to a race to the top and not a race to the bottom concerning social and environmental dimensions in the transition to a knowledge intensive economy?". Accordingly she suggests that the EU should develop a social dimension in trade policy and regrets that basic labour standards were not included in the Generalised System of Preferences, but could be included in the negotiations of bilateral agreements. She pleads for the development and diffusion of a new development agenda where multinational institutions should take stronger initiatives. The debate should comprise how to design rules in order to enable the population throughout the world to benefit from globalisation. These rules need to be clarified, enforced and better coordinated in different policy fields, such as finance, environment, intellectual property and labour. She also reflected about the added value to apply the open method of coordination at global level.

1.4. The European Parliament's role in the Lisbon Strategy

A broad discussion has already started on how to carry forward the Lisbon Strategy post- 2010. The success of the Lisbon Strategy as a whole is questioned by some stakeholders and academics due its mixed results, depending on country and objective60. The criticism relates to the open method of coordination applied to coordinate employment policy at EU level that was agreed between Member States but leaves too much scope for bureaucracy and relies mainly on good will of Member States as it is a non-binding instrument. On the other hand, the Lisbon Agenda has proved to be flexible in terms of agenda and governance modalities responding rapidly to changes inside and outside the EU.

The European Parliament has only a limited role in the development and scrutiny of the Lisbon Strategy, partly because its committee structure is not aligned with the widened scope of the Strategy. According to a study carried out on behalf of the European Parliament on the Implementation of the Integrated Guidelines61 enhancing the standing of the Lisbon Co-ordination Group may offer a way forward.

It will be important for the European Parliament to articulate its priorities for the Integrated Guidelines early and to engage in dialogue not only with the other institutions, but also with wider interests. The Parliament is encouraged to seize the opportunity to lead the debate on how the Lisbon Agenda should be linked to other major strategies and imperatives at European level, including sustainable development, energy policy and coping with ageing.

Related to the policy content Parliament62 stressed that the Lisbon Strategy is not delivering for all European citizens as it may have delivered more jobs but not always better jobs ('working poor') as well as increasing poverty and child poverty. In its view, the social dimension of the Lisbon Strategy and the quality of employment need to be strengthened.

57 "Une stratégie européenne pour la mondialisation", Laurent Cohen-Tanugi (2008): La Stratégie EuroMonde 2015 doit, d’autre part, reposer sur des politiques extérieures communes permettant à l’Union européenne de contribuer à façonner la mondialisation. 58 "The Lisbon Strategy post-2010", Iain Begg (2009) 59 "The external Dimension of the Lisbon Agenda: key issues for policy-making" by Maria Joao Rodrigues in the book "Europe, Globalisation and the Lisbon agenda", 2009 60 Laurent Cohen-Tanugi, EuroMonde 2015; Une stratégie europénne pour la mondialisation (2008) 61 "Implementation of the Integrated Guidelines during the 2006/2007 cycle", study carried out by CEPS on behalf of the European Parliament (2007) 62 EP resolution on Employment guidelines 2008-2010, 2008 (rapporteur Van Lancker)

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2. Modernising labour law - Flexicurity

Although the issue of flexibility has been on the EU's agenda since Delors' White Paper on Growth, Competitiveness and Employment in 1993, it gained again momentum with the discussion on flexicurity as of 2004. To achieve a good balance between flexibility and security flexicurity is based on flexible work arrangements; effective active labour market measures enabling workers to cope with change (rapid transition to a new job after a period of unemployment); sound lifelong learning systems and modern social security systems which guarantee income and also facilitate mobility.

Academics see the role of the EU strengthened in the future by promoting values and principles (such as provision of social rights as a safety net, promotion of lifelong learning, conciliation of work and family life) and by providing minimal social rights through ad hoc directives to soften negative social developments.

3. Occupational safety and health at work (OSH)

Working environments are significantly changing with the introduction of new technologies, materials and work processes. Changes in work design, organisation and management can produce new risk areas that can result in increased stress levels and may finally lead to a serious deterioration of mental and physical health. Emerging OSH risks do not arise in a vacuum but are driven by technological, economic, demographic, or other social developments. Emerging risks are seldom solely OSH risks. Often they go hand in hand with public health or environmental risks. The consequences of, for instance, endocrine disruptors and nanotechnology are typical examples of emerging public health and environmental risks. They are associated with economic issues within Europe, with differences among EU regions in the demand for labour, prices for labour, and social security regulations, resulting in a partly temporary migration of workers within the EU, as well as across EU borders.

The risks posed by ‘nanoparticles and ultrafine particles’ are among the ‘top ten’ of emerging risks agreed by the experts. Applications of nanotechnology are mainly found in information and communication technologies; environmental and energy technologies; transport, aviation and space; agriculture and nutrition; medical applications; cosmetics; military technologies. The nanotechnology industry is expected to grow rapidly into a global, multi-billion euro market and to employ 10 million workers worldwide by 2014. Many research institutes and R&D departments are researching and exploring the possibilities of nanoparticles leading to a rapid increase in new products and production processes. However, very little research has been performed on the health and safety effects of nanoparticles. The EP did not agree with the Commission's conclusion that current legislation covers in principle the relevant risks relating to nanomaterials because any nano-specific provisions are absent in Community law.

Globalisation, rapid technological change and increased competition through globalisation have fundamentally changed European labour markets and brought about more dynamic labour markets which have had an impact on employment, contractual arrangements, working conditions and health and safety at work. European Parliament's role as representative of European citizens will be to find the right balance to enable business to react quickly to sustain competitive and productive and to protect and help workers to adapt themselves to these changes, too, at European and global level.

Christa KAMMERHOFER-SCHLEGEL

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2.2. Social Affairs

2009-2019: social protection systems in the European social model

European countries have developed comprehensive welfare systems to protect vulnerable individuals and families from economic deprivation, foster equal participation in society for all and enhance social cohesion; these sets of benefits and services will typically have to evolve to respond to new needs brought about by demographic and societal developments.

In the European Union Member States have preserved national competence concerning the organisation of social protection, but common objectives have been identified and soft law mechanisms have been designed to promote policy coordination.

The current economic crisis has revived the belief that European social protection systems can have a productive function and help counter recession in times of low demand; together with a renewed awareness that no European country alone can face global challenges, this could contribute to setting a favourable background for re-launching EU cooperation over the next decade and enhancing the role of social issues in the post-Lisbon strategy.

Emerging challenges Sharing a trend that is common to all industrialised countries, determinants of EU Member States' demographics are showing steady patterns based on low fertility and mortality rates, with increased life expectancy. The average age of Europeans is now over 40 and population pyramid charts are considerably widening at the top. Different projections diverge as to whether and when the European workforce and total population will begin to decrease and what the impact of migration on global prospects might be; there are, however, highly predictable developments that, unless major catastrophes occur, could only be marginally affected by any future events.

The consequences of ageing on social security are already starting to materialise as the first large cohorts of baby-boomers born in the 1950s and 1960s begin to retire. The dependency ratio (working-age people for every person aged over 65) in the EU is expected to shift from 4:1 to 2:1 by 2060, endangering the long-term financial sustainability of public pensions systems. With a view to preventing budgetary imbalances, some EU Member States have already introduced important reforms, which often result in reduced benefits from the public-funded schemes for future retirees and, in parallel, favour the development of occupational and supplementary pensions. On the other side, many existing pension funds have proved extremely vulnerable to the present financial crisis, thus underlining that the legal framework within which these services operate still needs to be improved.

Pressure on the sustainability and adequacy of social security is expected to grow not only as a consequence of an ageing population and a decreasing workforce, but also due to changing work patterns, as atypical forms of contractual arrangements account for a growing proportion of newly created jobs: discontinued, more mobile careers do not make it possible for workers to contribute regularly to pensions schemes and to secure for themselves sufficient income in old age.

The appropriate mix between the basic universal protection offered by public pension systems and other forms of pensions, improvements in the regulatory environment for privately-owned pensions schemes, the adaptation of traditional pension systems to adjust to new career paths and a fair and sustainable sharing of the burden for financing social security between employees, consumers, businesses and capital are core issues currently debated by policy-makers and social partners, as well as by academics and researchers, in all EU Member States and other industrialised countries.

The implications of ageing on European citizens' future health-care needs have not yet been fully comprehended and integrated into the planning of health systems . It is normally taken for granted that, as the population grows older, demand for health-care can be expected to explode and to lead to an uncontrolled increase in spending in most EU Member States.

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However, most age-related expenditure projections and forecasts on the future financial sustainability of health-care systems only deliver a partial picture of the issue, as they do not take into consideration the impact of the qualitative and organisational changes required.

Chronic diseases, often associated with disability, affect a large proportion of the elderly and will represent a major burden on health systems in the foreseeable future. This trend also suggests that it will be necessary to integrate and coordinate care across different service providers and between health and long-term care. On the other side, recent evidence shows that in industrialised countries people do not only enjoy longer life expectancy, but they are also experiencing better health conditions in old age due to both healthier lifestyles and more effective pharmaceuticals allowing people with chronic diseases to control the adverse effects of illness; these observations highlight that enhancing the stress on prevention in health-care systems can minimize future costs, making it possible to prevent or postpone physical or mental impairment through primary care, and call for timely policy initiative to introduce the necessary adaptations or innovations in health-care provision.

These issues are still being explored in most EU Member States, as it is in many cases extremely complex to reach a consensus among both health professionals and decision-makers on how health systems could shift focus from an acute care approach to a chronic care approach and be best geared up to meet the demands of an older population, how health-care can be better integrated with other services, in particular long-term care, to match the needs of a larger group of elderly, but also how the design of health-care financing can help to secure the sustainability of health systems.

Income inequality can still seriously threaten social cohesion in the EU. Although general living conditions have improved considerably in the last decades, it is undeniable that social protection systems have failed to grant equal opportunities for all. The persistence of huge differences in life expectancy and health between and within the EU Member States is there to confirm that access to basic rights is still very much dependent on economic and personal conditions. Poverty affects about 79 million people and, even more worryingly, it now concerns new groups once relieved from such danger. Contrary to the assumption that having a job is the most effective way to secure oneself against the risk of poverty, a significant minority of the employed population of the EU, around 8%, live in a household whose income is situated below the national poverty line.

Family patterns have also been considerably evolving, with a trend leading to increased fragmentation and vulnerability of households. This affects particularly children, who face greater difficulties than the rest of the population in most European countries; minors living with a lone parent experience the highest risk of poverty as compared to any other group. Low income in old age also appears to be a resurgent problem, which concerns especially women.

New ways for ensuring the balance between the sustainability and adequacy of social protection expenditure and the coverage of social risks will have to be identified urgently to safeguard the core of the European social models. What is more, welfare systems will not only have to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of their traditional pillars such as health-care services, social security and social assistance, but they will also be increasingly required to offer comprehensive responses to comply with new, demanding tasks.

Employment and social policies seem to be evolving towards an ever tighter interrelation: if, on the one hand, higher employment rates and longer professional lives appear to be a pre-condition for ensuring the long-term sustainability of welfare systems, on the other side a strategy aimed at supporting the productivity and competitiveness of the European economy through flexible and inclusive labour markets will have to be accompanied by active labour market measures and a suitable social security net based on modernised benefit schemes, as well as by improved care services for dependent family members to help individuals and households better balance work and personal life.

The role of employment in preventing poverty and social exclusion is being universally emphasised in social policies. This approach, however, could be misleading in that it might entail an underestimation of the danger of in-work poverty and of the difficulties experienced by the most disadvantaged groups, who need targeted additional measures.

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Discussions on how securing for all a decent living standard guaranteeing participation in society and access to basic goods and services without creating additional barriers to employment have been high on the political agenda in many EU Member States for several years.

Lifelong learning will also have to play an important role in upgrading and updating workers' skills, keeping older workers longer in employment and helping compensate for the reduced number of future workers through higher individual productivity; in addition, as education has been confirmed as the best tool to prevent the intergenerational transmission of poverty, a huge potential for strengthening policies against marginalisation for groups traditionally furthest from the labour market may be exploited through improved access to education and training for all.

Although immigration continues to be a very sensitive and debated issue, its potential key role in mitigating some of the consequences of present demographic trends and keeping the total workforce up to a sufficient size has been thoroughly analysed at national and EU level, leading to growing awareness that integration policies should be improved and reinforced to ensure that the social costs of the process are minimised for both immigrant workers and host societies.

Enhancing EU cooperation Although EU Member States may see different ways ahead depending on their current situation, they are all striving to identify the most suitable solutions to be able to cope with the accelerating pace of change while trying to keep public expenditure under control.

With the Amsterdam Treaty proper social protection and the combating of exclusion were officially recognised among the common objectives of the Community and the Member States (Article 136 of the EC Treaty). While precluding any harmonisation, Article 137 awards the Community the competence to support and complement the activities of the Member States in a number of fields including social security and social protection of workers, the integration of persons excluded from the labour market, the combating of social exclusion and the modernisation of social protection systems. Article 137 also provides for the possibility to adopt directives establishing minimum requirements in most of the sectors covered, with the exception of the fight against social exclusion and the modernisation of social protection systems.

Since 2000, based on a decision by the Heads of State and Government to make a decisive impact on the eradication of poverty by 2010 and to modernise social protection as part of the Lisbon strategy, the European Union and the Member States have been cooperating through the open method of coordination in the areas of health and long-term care, pensions and social inclusion (OMC on social protection and social inclusion, or “social OMC”); as a whole, the results achieved through this process are generally considered as insufficient by most stakeholders. The process is based on general common objectives, national reports and joint EU reports drafted by the Council and the Commission, with the financial support of the EU-funded programme "Progress"; unlike the cooperation mechanism designed in the employment sector, no quantitative targets have been set and no clear common guidelines exist.

Social protection is to come high on the post-Lisbon EU agenda for the next decade, as this is roughly the estimated time frame available to react effectively to the problems generated by population ageing: recent projections forecast a ten year span during which labour forces will continue to increase before starting to stagnate or decrease (European Commission, Dealing with the impact of an ageing population in the EU - 2009 Ageing Report). At the same time 2010 will be celebrated as the European year dedicated to combating poverty and social exclusion: on such an occasion the EU and the Member States are expected to renew their commitment to achieving the objectives set by the Treaty.

If the European Union is to embody an ambitious political project, it shall not refrain from proposing to the Member States, despite their fluctuating commitment to the common goals pursued through the social OMC process and while respecting subsidiarity and national specificities, an improved framework for reinforced cooperation.

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Discussions on the desirable degree of convergence of social protection between the Member States have long been accompanying progress in European economic integration. Council Recommendation 92/442/EEC on "the convergence of social protection objectives and policies" acknowledged that comparable trends were leading to common problems and challenges and that, although a single market could be created while maintaining the diversity of national arrangements, welfare systems were to “progress in harmony with one another towards the fundamental objectives of the Community”. In parallel, Council Recommendation 92/441/EEC on "common criteria concerning sufficient resources and social assistance in social protection systems" set some basic principles to be implemented by the Member States in the fight against poverty and social exclusion.

Throughout the years, political consensus on common values was registered for other aspects of social protection, contributing to the European Union's “social acquis” now reflected in the objectives of the three strands of the social OMC: access for all to the resources, rights and services needed for participation in society, active social inclusion for all and mainstreamed social inclusion policies involving all relevant stakeholders; adequate, sustainable, fair and transparent pension systems adapted to the requirements of modern society; accessible, high-quality, affordable and sustainable health and long-term care.

In November 2008, following a commitment to further formalising convergence of views on the subjects that are part of the social OMC through non-binding legal instruments, the European Commission adopted a “Recommendation on the active inclusion of people excluded from the labour market”, updating Council Recommendation 92/441/EEC on "Common criteria concerning sufficient resources and social assistance in social protection systems".

If developed further, this choice may mark a very important step towards designing a shared EU strategy on social protection and social inclusion, although it is worth underlining that this first attempt was accomplished in a very prudent manner, by choosing an area already covered by a formerly existing legal instrument and where the EC Treaty currently provides for the possibility to adopt by co-decision a directive setting minimum requirements.

The challenge for the future will further consist in translating common values and objectives into operational strategies responding to current needs, continuously adapting them to new developments and endowing the European Union with effective power to support their implementation by the Member States. To this purpose, an improved organisational setting for EU cooperation on social protection and social inclusion will have to be designed.

There seems to be common understanding between the EU Institutions that a better balance and integration of the economic, social and employment pillars will have to be fostered in the post-Lisbon agenda. The practical arrangements for achieving this goal will soon start to be discussed. Possible solutions could include maintaining the current structure and separation of the Growth and Jobs Strategy from the social OMC while strengthening their interrelations (the so-called “feeding-in” and feeding-out” mechanisms), establishing overarching goals and principles to be implemented in each policy area or setting up an institutionalised procedure or body to ensure the integration of the two processes into a comprehensive, better coordinated strategy.

In July 2008, together with the Renewed social agenda [COM(2008) 412], the European Commission published a Communication with a series of proposals directed to strengthening the social OMC process within the current cycle 2008-2010 [COM(2008) 418]. This document is based on an accompanying impact assessment [SEC(2008) 2169] of three main policy options: the status quo, with slight changes introduced through incremental additions; a complete overhauling of the OMC, with the process extended to embrace all dimensions of EU social policies and turned into a sort of “social Lisbon”; an ambitious strengthening of the OMC, with a number of substantial improvements. The Commission assesses the impact and the feasibility of each available option and then concludes that the third scenario is the one that satisfactorily combines the two requirements. Two other options are merely mentioned: the abandonment of the social OMC, which appears unreasonable since there seems to be overall agreement on the method, and its full integration into the Strategy for Growth and Jobs, which could only be envisaged for the post-2010 phase.

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This seems to suggest that the OMC is likely to be confirmed by the EU and the Member States as the framework for cooperation for at least the next decade; some options among those dismissed by the Commission in the 2008 exercise may, however, be worth discussing more openly and thoroughly in preparation of the post-Lisbon strategy.

The European Parliament's role Parliament’s lack of institutionalised role in the social OMC is commonly regarded as one of the weaknesses of the process. As the European Commission has already announced proposals aimed at palliating this problem, a solution could be introduced through a new Inter-institutional Agreement opening ways for the EP to contribute more directly to EU cooperation in the sector.

Following the recent European Commission’s initiative to start defining common principles through recommendations, Parliament may take the initiative by identifying other basic issues to be covered and trying to have a greater influence on the content of additional legal acts. Whenever allowed by the Treaty, the opportunity to propose the adoption of directives setting minimum requirements could also be discussed.

Parliament has already insisted in the past that the transparency of the social OMC process should be improved through the collection of comparable data and the adoption of measurable targets, which would also be a way to facilitate the performance of the EP's supervision duty over the European Commission and the Council.

Parliament’s political influence can display its effects at all levels, from choices on major issues made by the Member States in the European Council to the daily working of the EU. Through own-initiative reports, in particular, the EP has many possibilities to discuss subjects of interest and present its views; dialogue with stakeholders is also within Parliament’s possibilities to promote wider debate and support the development of a European public democratic space. Thanks to parliamentary works, moreover, EU cooperation in the social sector could acquire the visibility that it is currently lacking.

As one of the arms of the budgetary authority and a co-legislator deciding on EU-funded programmes covering social matters, such as the European Social Fund, the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund and Progress, the European Parliament will be in a position to make sure that, whatever developments occur in the financial framework of the EU, sufficient resources are reserved for pursuing the ambitious social objectives established by the EC Treaty.

The EP will also be able to contribute to shaping the European social model and stress its relevance to European integration while taking part in EC law-making in several fields other than social policy. Various domains where the EU has legislative competence are indeed very strongly interrelated with areas of national competence in the social sphere. This is the case for EC internal market and competition law, which can interplay with fundamental social rights and national socially-oriented provisions in many ways. The EP has always kept a consistent position maintaining that fundamental social values embodied in national legislation cannot be undermined by Community law pursuing economic interests.

The procedure for the adoption of the so-called "services directive" (Directive 2006/123/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 on services in the internal market) and its follow-up offer a clear example of Parliament’s approach and its potential significance for European welfare systems. The EP proposed excluding social services of general interest (SSGI) as a whole from the area of application of the directive and suggested covering this issue separately. As such requests were only partially met in the final compromise text, the EP has ever since repeatedly taken the view that these essential social services are now in a situation of legal uncertainty that should be resolved urgently and has called on the European Commission to present appropriate legal initiatives to specify how EC legislation respects the special mission of this kind of service. The services directive will soon start to fully display its market liberalising effects, as transposition is due to be completed by the Member States by 28 December 2009; the implementation of this central piece of legislation will be carefully monitored at EU level and it may turn out to be very important that the European Parliament succeeds in integrating into this exercise a special attention to SSGI.

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In the event of the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the so-called “social clause” in Article 9 will provide for social goals to be taken into account in the elaboration and implementation of all EU policies, which will emphasize the decision-makers’ responsibility for striking a balance, on the basis of a political evaluation, between divergent interests.

As the debate on the ratification of the Constitutional Treaty and the Lisbon Treaty in some Member States highlighted, citizens' support for the European integration project will very much depend on the EU's capability to prove willing to defend its high social standards from the perceived threat of globalisation and increased international competition. Opponents of further advances in European integration often condemn the internal market as intrinsically incompatible with the pursuit of social objectives: responding convincingly to such criticism would not only be a pre-condition for guaranteeing wider democratic support for the European Union, but also a preventive move against the danger of resurging protectionism.

Moira ANDREANELLI

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Part 3: Environment, Public Health and Food Safety

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Part 3.1 Environment

"Europe 2009-2019: an environmental vision of the future" Background

Environmental policy is at the centre of the European Union’s mission to bring prosperity and security to Europe's citizens within a framework of social solidarity.

At the beginning of '90s, the environmental policy applied a more vertical and sector approach; years later, the 6th Environmental Action Programme (6EAP) set out the framework for environmental policy-making in the Union for the period 2002-2012. Aligned on four priority areas and seven thematic strategies, the 6EAP establishes strategic approaches to meet environmental goals and sets objectives and priority actions on international issues.

Key challenges for the future - European Parliament thinking ahead

It is undeniable that the Commission's set up of the 6EAP leaves margin for criticism and allows for a different 'way of thinking ahead for the future environmental policy'. Thematic strategies for the protection of the marine environment and soil have been proposed but are unlikely to produce concrete results in terms of environmental improvement by 2012. Other thematic strategies, like the urban strategy, lack clear objectives and/or, like the strategy of natural resources, were mainly an 'empty box' and useless to reach European goals in the respective sectors.

In thinking ahead, the environmental policy could still be aligned on several cross-reinforcing actions instead of the seven thematic strategies. In cross-reinforcing actions all aspects are strengthened by their proximity to one another. One example could be the setting up of the cross-reinforcing action on land use, which would balance the limited availability of land with the different elements of internal and external factors impacting land uses such as water management and desertification, the protection of soil, the criteria of productivity and last but not least how to reach the goal of the low carbon economy at global scale.

The four priority areas set up at the current 6AEP could be maintained; however the new four priority visions for the future environmental approach could be set as follows:

1. Climate for life

While the EU achieved its international political objective of entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol and made significant progress in the development of policies and measures designed to contribute to meeting its Kyoto commitments for the period 2008-2012, the most recent assessment of rapidly changing climatic conditions estimates that these commitments can only be met if climate policy is taken up as for life cycle into all other policies at EU level.

2. Sustainable bio-differences

Progress to date is insufficient to achieve the overall objective of halting biodiversity decline by 2010. Serious efforts are being made to protect habitats and species on the ground through implementation of existing EU legislation. Sustainable bio-differences must be the line of approach such as the integration of environmental concerns in the CAP63 and CFP64, as well as the operational integration of biodiversity conservation into a wider set of policy areas.

63 Common Agriculture Policy. 64 Common Fishery Policy.

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3. Environmental impacts on health and consumers

New EU chemicals legislation (REACH), though considerably delayed, represents significant progress but falls short of the ambitious objectives laid down in the 6EAP. Separate measures to reduce the environmental impacts of pollutants on health and consumers should be the correct approach for future EU legislation by Parliament and Council. The more limited objectives in the area of water quality have generally been met, but a lot still hinges on the full implementation of the Water Framework Directive whose timeframe extends beyond 2012. The measures taken and proposed to improve air quality and urban environmental quality and further reduce noise pollution are far from sufficient to achieve the health and environmental protection objectives of the 6EAP. That's why a full revision of the line of approach must take into consideration the overall impact on human health and consumers behaviours.

4. Resources: from scarcity to efficiency

In the past, environmental industries were not focused on tackling the scarcity of natural resources but managing the harmful by-products from industrial processes. Today, we must address the scarcity of natural resources. The end goal must be the effective use and the efficiency use of resources, in all policy areas. As an example, waste management should not be seen as something that is done downstream as part of rubbish collection, but upstream in the choice of materials and the design of products and services.

The Thematic Strategies on waste and natural resources have watered down the 6EAP objectives. The measures proposed to promote more sustainable use of natural resources are clearly insufficient to achieve the objective of breaking the link between economic growth and resource consumption but merely provide a framework for further long-term policy development. New concepts and new measures must be proposed as well as a new way of thinking at EU level.

Possible challenges

The efforts of the institutions to attain the ‘priority objectives set out’ – to quote the terms of Article 175(3) of the EU Treaty – are quite deficient in many areas of environmental policy and the state of implementation of the current programme does not indicate that most of these objectives are likely to be effectively fulfilled before 2012.

A new set of several cross-reinforcing actions is needed. This new procedural tool would create additional opportunities for stakeholder involvement and a more strategic approach to EU legislative policy. The new four priority visions credibility depends on their ability to deliver objectives which respond to the major environmental challenges facing Europe and the world at the beginning of this new century.

It is indisputable that implementation and enforcement of existing legislation will play a crucial role. While political discourse on 'better regulation' stresses the need to ensure proper implementation of existing law, the evidence shows that the Commission lacks a coherent strategy and sufficient resources for adequate monitoring and enforcement efforts responding to the needs and concerns of citizens. It has, however, made valuable proposals to strengthen enforcement at the national level through improved access to justice and harmonised use of criminal law, but these have yet to be adopted by Parliament and Council.

Lastly, the environmental taxation and harmful subsidies will be a fundamental point of discussion. The Commission has only very recently published a green paper on the subject of market based instruments and is inviting further debate before envisaging any initiatives. Despite the growth in the number of environmental taxes at Member State level, the share of these taxes in total tax revenues remains relatively small and has even declined in recent years. Despite the commitments made in the 6EAP, no concrete steps towards the reform of environmentally harmful subsidies are expected before 2009.

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In December 2009 the European Council will undertake its second review of implementation of the EU Sustainable Development Strategy (SDS) and decide on a roadmap on priority actions, based on a Commission progress report. By 2011, the European Council is also expected to decide when the next comprehensive review of the SDS should be launched. The SDS mandates the Commission 'to elaborate a concrete and realistic vision of the EU on its way to sustainable development over the next 50 years'; however no work seems to have been undertaken pursuant to this mandate as yet.

The next cycle of the Lisbon Strategy will be launched at the spring European Council in 2010. In 2009, the Commission will start to reflect on how to adapt the Lisbon Strategy in the post-2010 period and formulate proposals for the form of a post-2010 strategy. This raises the issue of the relationship between the Lisbon Strategy and the SDS. Since sustainable development is presented as the overarching objective of the EU, should the economic and social objectives of the Lisbon Strategy be framed to take into account the overall sustainable development objectives of the SDS?

Build trust: credible information is the key of success. Any environmental communication strategy needs to work on the basis of transparency and accountability. The European Parliament should involve the general public adopting the mantra "always practice what you preach".

Gian Paolo Meneghini

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Part 3.2 Food Safety "Europe 2009-2019: food for market or food for life?"

Background

European food safety policy central goal is to ensure a high level of protection of human health and consumers' interests in relation to food, taking into account diversity, including traditional products, whilst ensuring the effective functioning of the internal market. The EU's guiding principle is to apply an integrated approach from farm to table covering all sectors of the food chain, stressing the fact that there can be no food security without food safety and being mindful of the impact of agricultural practices on the environment and of ensuring the sustainability of food production systems.

Key challenges for the future - European Parliament thinking ahead

It is beyond doubt the European Parliament will have a central role in the decision-making system on food policy and related areas. Its central position will be affected by two major axes of priorities: a horizontal axe which will move substantially from 'life style' to a 'confidence and trust' approach and a vertical axe which will move from a 'community interests' towards a 'globalisation forces' approach.

The central role of the European Parliament as a decision-maker will be certainly boosted by the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty which will automatically imply the co decision power in respect to the agricultural policy. Other policies, such as the consumer protection, food educational and behaviour, urban and land planning as combination of food vs. renewable energies production, will increase the influence of the European Parliament decision towards food safety aspects.

Finally the synergic combination of the two axes will allow the European Parliament to take into account the following criteria of demand and supply. As demand it is intended, in particular, the individual choices of consumers, their food knowledge, their shopping attitude and the practical incomes availability; as supply, it is intended, in particular, the food production, food processing and retail distribution within the EU, prices availability, food quality and diversity and lastly, the safety measures applied to food crisis and the EU capacity to deal with it.

Horizontal axe: life style - confidence and trust

Societies are evolving. Changes associated with social-demographic structure and consumers' behaviour will impact on European decisions. Changes in policies and regulatory framework will have implications for European priorities. New food needs are demanding but essential principles such as good labelling and transparency have arisen as essential values in gaining consumers confidence in food, creating extra requests on both business and public authorities to guarantee food quality availability.

EP decision-

Globalisation forces

Community interests

Confidence and trust Life style

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Life style choices such as eating habits or the consumption of alcohol, tobacco, and other drugs can each have consequences for our health. Together, life style food and confidence and trust are centred on the food trade. When we do our daily shopping in the supermarkets, we see full shelves and therefore often forget that good food is not industrially manufactured but made by highly skilled craftsmen on the basis of sophisticated know-how. What are decisive are not only the selected quality of specialities offered but also the pure taste and elaborate method of production.

The certainty of consumers should strongly be discussed in the EU legislation. Whenever one part in the chain of food supply breaks, consumers need answers to their broken confidence. Which strategies can be developed dealing with the public relations and consumers' education in the food sector in order to create a dialogue of confidence among market partners is an open issue for the European Parliament. Recent facts show that the dimension of the consumer uncertainty is influenced by different aspects: the loss of esteem, estrangement, recognition of knowledge about food and the different perception of risk. Strategies for a targeted risk communication are relevant topics which should be developed in cooperation with the EU institutions, consumer representatives and food industry.

Vertical axe: community interests - globalisation forces

The EU is operating in an ever-increasing globalised context. Globalisation has today, and will continue in future, a dominant influence on the context in which the European Parliament create and implement its policy on food and related areas.

The increasingly strong interconnections between community interests and the global food policy make the European Parliament a leading decision-maker and full responsible actor in future choices.

Major community interests are related to: stable food production at the high possible quality level, safeguard and protection original production, avoid counterfeit of illegal food products coming from external countries, independency of energy production vs. food land uses, food diseases imported in the EU from third world countries and increase the risk of fraud along the food chain.

Globalisation increases the likelihood of new or re-emerging risks to the European food supply (i.e. avian flu, H1N1 novel influenza BSE, G.M.O.s); moreover, the European Union will be faced with innovative technologies, such as nanotechnologies applied on food, and evolving risk assessment practices. Are we in Europe able to accept the full impact of external food production and importation at the expense of a more balanced combination of community interests?

These community interests should be balanced with global decisions which represent major opportunities for the EU to reinforce its position as one of the key actors in the world, building on its leading role in areas such as food safety, animal health and welfare or plant health. At the international level, EU global presence in food health and consumer policies could be reinforced by working closely with relevant international organizations (i.e. WHO, FAO, OIE and OECD).

Possible challenges

The overall process should imply a better management of major cross-cutting issues (e.g. climate change, sustainable lifestyles, healthy ageing, tackling inequalities, healthy environments, integrating the food sustainability and climate change challenges into EU food strategy).

EU institutions should provide clear communication grounded in the most up-to-date scientific information and knowledge which take into consideration consumer concerns and perceptions. A structured and open dialogue could be a useful tool for sharing knowledge on citizens' risks perceptions, knowing how to communicate uncertainties; discussing risk uncertainties and other legitimate factors in the risk management process.

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Consumer and food-related behaviours could be integrated into EU policies by mapping the main motivations and determinants behind consumer/food behaviour and proposing and using concrete tools to positively influence behaviours in the different policies.

Time, Method and Content: these are the three pillars of effective communication. The actions of the EU would need to fully reflect this methodology. The EP should identify those elements in forthcoming legislation and ensure that Member States implement these as a food market has no barriers. The nature of the Internal Market demands avoidance of alarmist statements which compromise the market, consumer confidence and ultimately negatively colour the public perception of the EU:

Global society is now at a crossroads: focus on the quantity of products to the detriment of environment or focus on the quality of products for the benefit of land and life?

Gian Paolo Meneghini

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Part 3.3 Public Health “EUROPE'S HEALTH 2009-2019”

Introduction

Health is paramount for every human being for a happy, creative and satisfactory life. Naturally, families search for the safest and healthiest possible environment in which to live and raise their children. As an extension of this simple, human logic, citizens entrust their political representatives and democratic institutions with the necessary powers and means to work in favour of a healthy society. The institutions and administrations bare specific levels of responsibility concerning health, from the local bodies, all the way up to that of international organisations. Nevertheless, each and every human being retains responsibility for his own health.

There is a direct correlation between the level of economic development and the conditions that make for healthier societies, based on the quality of the urban and rural living environments, access to clean water and food, proper sanitation, avoidance of pollution, working conditions, safe transportation and recreation. In addition, the availability and universal access to good quality medical services, has contributed to extending life expectancy, diminishing illness and alleviating suffering.

Although the health of every person is the result of a complex combination of hereditary and environmental factors, it is also strongly influenced by the life style of the individual and innumerable decision for which he is the sole responsible one, such as smoking or not smoking. It is in the interest of both the individual and the society to reach and maintain health. In economic terms, health means wealth. Healthy citizens can be active economic actors, creative and productive, for themselves and for the society.

If health is the perfect state of physical, psychological and social well-being, and not only the absence of disease, as stated in the famous definition of the World Health Organization, it is naturally an endless goal, that can be pursued but never reached. In that sense the mere creation of the European Union, and its quest for a peaceful and fruitful association of nations and peoples in search of an increased share of prosperity and well-being, points right towards a healthier future for all. Under this light, all actions and policies developed by the EU in its 50 plus years of existence have contributed directly or indirectly to a healthier life. In addition, and since the Maastrich Treaty the explicit mentioning of public health as an area of competence of the Union has reinforced the trend. Since then, the institutions have worked hard to try to incorporate the health dimension or parameter in all Community policies. There is a long way to go, but the right framework is in place. The achievement of an ever healthier society in the European Union plus work through international partnerships and organisations, as well as the development policies, are Europe’s contribution to a healthier world.

The health-illness continuum

Health is the natural state of living for a human being. If the appropriate conditions are in place, health happens. Right genes, shelter, clean environment, proper nutrition and water, balance between work, physical activity and rest, a life with a minimum of fear and anxieties, plus many other factors, some known and others still unknown to science, will lead to a healthy life. For ages man has appreciated enjoying good health, and even in times and periods of history outside the western history of medicine, such as ancient Egypt, India, China, etc, a great deal of attention was given to the maintenance of good health and the avoidance of diseases. Some of the Eastern therapeutic traditions have developed since millennia an “ecological” view of man’s health within a given ambient and lifestyle. Modern medicine also adheres to the common wisdom that it is much worth to prevent diseases than to cure them. When the causal factors of diseases are well know and removed from contact with the individual, primary prevention happens. When diseases are incubating or on their way, the early detection and treatment is necessary.

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Finally, when the person if frankly ill, or has suffered injury, appropriate treatment and rehabilitation is required. In fact, all preventive and therapeutic measures point at facilitating the conditions under which the body, in use of it in-built intelligence, can repair and restore its normal functioning in the shortest period of time.

Mapping out the health domain

The way in which the European Commission presents the information related to the different areas of public health and gives account of the community actions and others in this area, are sketched in the figure below.

PEOPLE AND HEALTH Babies and Children Young People Women Men Elderly People with Disabilities

LIFESTYLE Nutrition Alcohol Drugs Tobacco Travel Sports and Leisure Sex

ENVIRONMENT At Home At Work Social Environment Environmental Health Consumer Safety Physical Risks Biological Risks Chemical Risks Road Safety Bioterrorism Food Safety

HEALTH PROBLEMS HIV/AIDS Influenza Other Infectious Diseases Mental Health Cancer Rare Diseases Cardiovascular Diseases Other Non- Communicable Diseases

CARE Patient Safety Mobility in Europe Quality Assurance Long-term Care Medicines and Treatment Vaccinations eHealth Insurance Carers

HEALTH IN THE EU Policies Programmes Research Prevention and Promotion EC Health Indicators Statistics

Source EC Health Portal: http://ec.europa.eu/health-eu/index_en.htm Selected health topics highlights

AIDS–HIV - The Community action focuses on surveillance, promotion and support for prevention, treatment and counselling programmes and cooperation with neighbouring countries. The HIV/AIDS Think Tank and the Civil Society Forum were established to facilitate exchange of good practice between member states and involvement of civic society in HIV/AIDS programmes. There is containing support for HIV/AIDS research from the research programmes.

Alcohol - The EU Strategy to support Member States in reducing alcohol related harm was adopted in 2006. The EU Alcohol and Health forum was established to encourage industry and other stakeholders make voluntary commitments. The health damages related to alcohol and driving could be reduced by introducing compulsory systems in motor vehicles to impede that an intoxicated driver could start or drive the vehicle.

Antibiotic resistance - To address the growing problem of microbial resistance by pathogenic agents including drug resistant TB and bacteria responsible for hospital acquired infections the Community Strategy against antimicrobial resistance and the Council recommendations on prudent use of antibiotics were adopted. The Community action included surveillance, prevention and support for research and new product development.

Blood, Tissues, Cells, Transplants - The legislation sets the safety and quality requirements for human biological substances as well as systems for traceability and reporting of adverse effect and protection of donors. In order to ensure high quality of human biological substances the EU policy is based on voluntary unpaid donation. The Action Plan on Organ Donation and Transplantation aims at increased organ availability and efficiency of

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transplant systems and improve quality and safety. The EU is taking a leading role in research on stem cells and their potential for human health; there is much room for expanding the present efforts, creating a better climate for these scientific efforts to be pursued. The society will harvest the fruits of this work in the mid term and in the long term.

Cancer - This major killer continues to affect people of all ages, in particular in the third age ranks due to the prolongation of the lifespan. The Community action focuses on data collection, early detection and screening, research, information and health education and training for high quality healthcare. The Council recommendations on cancer screening programmes set standards that will contribute to reach a more homogenous situation across regions.

Communicable diseases - The Community action focuses on surveillance, early warning and cooperation between Member States in the case of epidemics. The Council decision and subordinated Commission decisions define the scope of surveillance systems and procedures and actions in the case of epidemics. The challenges of the present swine flu pandemic will put the EU capabilities at the test.

Drugs - The EU Drug Strategy, Drug Action Plan and the Council recommendation provided a policy framework to address the problem of illicit drug use through prevention of drug dependence and reduction of drug-related health damage. The European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction assists in the implementation of the Action Plan.

Health professionals - The Commission has launched a discussion on the healthcare workforce to identify possible Community action to address challenges EU health professionals face, including aging of the population and of the health workforce, mobility and the lack of health professionals in certain regions, and the future needs for education and training to benefit from innovative health technology. In a broader sense the conditions under which health professionals can offer their services to people who need them in the EU should be addressed. At present there is a complete mix of situations where certain types of treatments, particularly outside the official medical establishment, are banned in some places, tolerated in others and accepted and their costs reimbursed in other locations. This would affect practices such as homeopathy, acupuncture, naturopathy, etc. A far reached inquiry into the potential of the so called alternative therapies could be a matter of relevance for Europeans in the coming decade. Moreover, as the scientific research agenda is strongly conditioned by the interests of industry, the EU could play a leading role in financing with public moneys trials to assess alternative therapies. This would set a world premier.

Health security - Supported by the Commission and the ECDC Member States coordinate their preparedness activities for generic and specific health threats such as influenza with the aim to ensure interoperability and cooperation. The liaison and command structure at the EU level was created including the Health Emergency Operations Facility, the Early Warning and Rapid Alert system, the Health Emergency and Disease Information System, and the general European rapid alert system ARGUS.

Medicines and medical devices - A comprehensive system for authorisation, classification and labelling of medicinal products is in place to ensure both safety and efficacy of products and devices and allow free movement of these products in the internal market. Specific legislation on advance therapy, paediatric medicinal products and orphan drugs was adopted. The directive on clinical trials specifies the requirements for investigations in humans for the purpose of authorisation procedure for new drugs. The European Medicines Agency was established to provide scientific input in the area of evaluation of the quality, safety and efficacy of medicinal products. A body of EC legislation was adopted to specify the essential requirements medical devices have to fulfil in order to be placed on the market and the procedure for assessment of conformity with these requirements, conditions for clinical investigation and packaging and labelling of medical products.

Nutrition and physical activity - The Strategy on Nutrition, Overweight and Obesity was adopted in 2007. The EU Platform on Diet, Physical Activity and Health encourages voluntary commitments by industry and other stakeholders. Legislation pertinent to healthy diet included food labelling and nutritional claim legislation, Common Market Organisation for fruit and milk establishing school fruit and milk schemes and the Audiovisual Media Services directive limiting advertisement of sugary food to children.

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Rare diseases - The fact that certain diseases are defined on the basis of their low incidence in the general population should not lead us to overlook the burden of suffering they imply for the affected ones and their families. In addition, as the markets for treating the conditions are not profitable, industry does not invest per se in developing treatments. The Community actions range from definition and classification of rare diseases to collection of epidemiological data to improve accessibility of “orphan” drugs to treat rare diseases to creation of European reference networks for Rare Diseases. The Council Recommendation is being discussed in the Council that would encourage establishing of national plans and identification of regional centres of expertise. Rich and evolved societies like the countries in the European Union should be at the world lead in reducing the number of people affected by rare diseases who are not given treatment or relief from their conditions or their consequences. It is an imperative for mature and compassionated nations.

Patient mobility - cross-border healthcare - In future it will be easier for patients to seek healthcare abroad and be properly reimbursed for its cost. Patients will also be properly informed about their rights when treated outside their home Member States. This will be the resulting scenario when the new legislation is approved. The future situation will imply a simplified system of prior authorisation for hospital treatments, reimbursement of costs will be made easier, and their will be increased facilities and exceptions for patients with rare diseases or disabilities. Citizens will also have better information about their rights and a way to complain to a European Patients Ombudsman.

Tobacco - Smoking cigarettes is a major health threat all around the world. The accumulated evidence linking smoking with lung cancer, cardiovascular diseases and many other conditions of ill health, have been corroborated with recent statistics from countries such as China that have experienced a boom in the percentage of smokers, showing parallel increases in the incidence of the above diseases. In the EU The latest directive on tobacco products limits nicotine, tar and carbon monoxide yields of cigarettes, imposing warnings on cigarette packaging and forbidding oral tobacco products. The Audiovisual Media Service directive introduces ban on audiovisual advertising and product placement and the directive on advertising and sponsorship of tobacco products limits advertising in other media and bans cross-border sponsorships. The EU-wide communication campaign was carried out in 2004-2008. The Community and most Member States became parties of the UN Framework Convention on Tobacco Control. The USA played an important role in the struggle against tobacco with one major exception: cigarettes are outside the competency of the Food and Drug Administration. The EU can go beyond and assess cigarettes as any other consumer product, leading naturally to the exclusion from the market of a product that is not only a proved killer, but a carefully engineered mix of chemicals (800 plus), to ensure addiction of its users.

Strategic Overview

Below are listed the main health related topics on which the EU has taken decisions of a legislative nature or given important recommendations, adopted in the course of the past two legislatures, and that will require a follow-up in various forms, i.e. impact assessment studies, periodic implementation verification, reporting to the Parliament by Commission representatives or by agencies of different types sat up for specific policy areas, etc. Notice that only the type of measure, the subject and the year of launching is indicated, for the sake of clarity and brevity of exposition.

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Depending on the type of measure and according to the competencies established in the treaties in force at the moment of adoption the measure it may concern a Commission decision, a decision by the Council alone, a co-decision by Council and European Parliament, or a recommendation by any of the above listed institutions. The exact reference can be easily found at: www.europa.eu

Health Information

− Community statistics on public health and health and safety at work – 2008

Tobacco

− Approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States relating to the advertising and sponsorship of tobacco products

− Approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning the manufacture, presentation and sale of tobacco products

Drugs

− Council Recommendation on the prevention and reduction of health-related harm associated with drug dependence – 2003

Cancer

− Council Recommendation on cancer screening – 2003

Communicable Diseases

− Regulation establishing a European centre for disease prevention and control – 2004

− Decision on early warning and response system for the prevention and control of communicable diseases – 1999

− Decision setting up a network for the epidemiological surveillance and control of communicable diseases in the Community - 1998

Antimicrobial Resistance

− Recommendation on the prudent use of antimicrobial agents in human medicine – 2002

Electromagnetic Fields

− Recommendation on the limitation of exposure of the general public to electromagnetic fields (0 Hz to 300 GHz) – 1999

Injury

− Recommendation on the prevention of injury and the promotion of safety – 2007

Blood, Tissue, Cell and Organ Donation and Transplantation

− Community standards and specifications relating to a quality system for blood establishment - 2005

− Traceability requirements and notification of serious adverse reactions and events - 2005

− Technical requirements for blood and blood components – 2004

− Standards of quality and safety for the collection, testing, processing, storage and distribution of human blood and blood components - 2002

− Traceability requirements, notification of serious adverse reactions and events and certain technical requirements for the coding, processing, preservation, storage and distribution of human tissues and cells – 2006

− Technical requirements for the donation, procurement and testing of human tissues and cells - 2006

− Setting standards of quality and safety for the donation, procurement, testing, processing, presentation, storage and distribution of human tissues and cells - 2004

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Community Programme

− Decision establishing a 2nd programme of Community action in the field of health (2008-2013) - 2007

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Bibliography

1. EP Policy Department Economy & Science – Welcome Package for the New Members – Health. Commissioned by the EP to Milieu Ltd. Authors: Catherine Ganzeleben, Iva Misigova, Sophie Vancauwenbergh, Rachel Irwin. Brussels, 2009 (under publication).

2. The 2009 Ageing Report: economic and budgetary projections for the EU-27 Member States (2008-2060), DG Economic and Financial Affairs and the Economic Policy Committee, European Economy 2, April 2009

3. Future challenges paper : 2009-2014. DG Health and Consumer Protection 2008 Comments to the Future challenges paper Future challenges for EU Health and Consumer Policies. DG Health and Consumer Protection 2008

4. Protecting health in Europe: Our vision for the future. ECDC targets and strategies 2007–2013. ECDC. 2008

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7. European papers on the new welfare the counter-ageing society. No. 9, February 2008. The Turin Conference on the new welfare. See the chapter on Health and Ageing

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10.Projecting OECD health and long-term care expenditures: what are the main drivers? Economics Department Working Papers, no. 477. OECD, 2006

11.Alternative Scenarios for Health, Life Expectancy and Social Expenditure: The Influence of Living Longer in Better Health on Health Care and Pension Expenditures and Government Finances in the EU. Frank Pellikaan and Ed Westerhout, Center for European Policy Studies, 2005

12.Health status and living conditions in an enlarged Europe. European Observatory on the Social Situation, May 2005

13.AHEAD - Ageing, Health Status and Determinants of Health Expenditure. 14.Presentations from the conference "The Future of Primary Care in Europe", 15-

17 October 2008 15.Mental health policy and practice across Europe : the future direction of mental

health care / edited by Martin Knapp ... [et al.], Maidenhead : Open University Press, 2007, 452 p.

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17.Making progress in global health : the need for new paradigms. Solomon R. Benatar, Stephen Gill, and Isabella Bakker. International Affairs 85: 2 (2009), p. 347–371

18.The ageing populations of Europe : implications for health systems and patients' rights. Elisabeth Rynning. European Journal of Health Law 15 (2008), p. 297-306

Marcelo SOSA

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Part 3.4 Climate Change

Tackling Climate change and biodiversity loss

Looking at the current trends of globalisation, we can see quite clearly upcoming challenges that Europe will have to face over the next ten years: ageing population; acceleration of urbanisation; stronger external immigration pressure; increasing energy prices; global warming leading to violent natural disasters and pressure on natural resources.

All these factors of change will have a strong impact on Europe territory. It is therefore essential that European decision makers, at various levels, are aware of the driving forces which will shape the future in order to anticipate these evolutions and improve their long term policies.

Climate change is one of the most complex and multi-faced challenge of our time. Its impacts are wide ranging; various sectors and policies are affected by global warming.

General trends on Climate change

In the future, the emission of greenhouse gases is expected to continue to grow if no action at international level is taken. Their dissolution in the atmosphere takes several decades65. Global warming is therefore a long-term trend, which in the foreseeable future can be mitigated but not really stopped. It is now commonly admitted that most of the warming of the past 50 years is due to human activities66.

Without emission reduction policies, global temperature could increase by 1.1 to 6.4 °C in 2100 compared to 1990, with important regional variations in heat waves or precipitations67

. The impact will become increasingly noticeable in certain arid or wetland areas in Africa and Asia, but also in the Arctic and small islands.

In Europe, temperatures are expected to rise between 0.1 °C and 0.4 °C by decade. Peripheral regions in the EU are likely to suffer the most acute variations of temperatures. Precipitations is expected to decrease in the Southern Europe (-1% per decade, -5% in summer), but to increase elsewhere (1-2% per decade)68.

Most of Europe could suffer from some degree of water stress. Droughts, heat waves and water scarcity may cause shifts in agricultural production, may affect the health of populations and also impact on infrastructures, in particular electricity networks. The main risk to health is expected to come from air pollution, mainly due to industry and transport. Rapid changes in climate will impact the composition of ecosystems and so affect European biodiversity.

As regards extreme impacts for the EU in the future, climate change could lead to acceleration of natural disasters, pressure on land use and food distribution but also climate refugees flow.

A strategic objective: to keep below 2°C the global average temperature increase

There is a political consensus in the EU on the vital importance of achieving the strategic objective of limiting the global average temperature increase to 2°C above preindustrial levels. This objective must drive the EU integrated policy on climate change.

65 Approximately 100 years for carbon dioxide (CO2) and nitrous oxide (N2O), 10 years for methane (CH4) but 1000 years for per fluorocarbon compounds (CFC). 66 IPCC Fourth Assessment report 2007 67 Working Group 1 IPCC AR4 Report (2007). 68 Impact of Europe's Changing Climate, European Environment Agency Report 2/2004

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As the EU is an Annex 1 Party of the Kyoto Protocol, it is thus bound to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions to 8% below its 1990 ceiling by 2012. To reach this target, the EU has opted for an Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) to trade carbon credits on the international market. However, the measures that have been taken appear insufficient according to the Commission69 : "CO2 emissions should increase significantly, exceeding the 1990 level by 3% in 2010 and by 5% in 2030." Thus, the EU must prepare new policies to tackle climate change and biodiversity loss.

A strong EU climate policy as an example for global climate governance

While the EU works toward the 2020 deadline for its 20/20/20 targets, it also faces the challenge of achieving a global climate agreement in Copenhagen in December 2009: the EU wants industrialized countries to commit on 30% emissions reduction in 2020 and at least 80% by 2050, compared to 1990.

Ensuring that the EU meets its climate targets of 2020

The EU policy must ensure it meets its climate target: 20% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions, 20% improvement in energy efficiency, and 20% renewable in the EU energy mix. To meet those targets, a climate energy package was adopted last December 2008, with four texts to implement:

• A revised directive on EU Emission Trading System

• An effort sharing decision which set binding national targets for CO2 reduction

• A directive for pilot projects on carbon storage

• A directive on renewable energy in electricity generation, transport, heating and cooling.

Aside the package, Parliament also adopted a long-term reduction target of CO2 emissions from new cars and asked for environmentally and socially sustainable biofuels.

In the first and second ETS trading periods (2005-2012) the great majority of allowances are allocated free of charge : the revised ETS directive provides allowances to be auctioned for 2013-2020 period. The scheme covers over 10,000 energy and industrial installations, which collectively account for almost half of the EU's total CO2 emissions and for 40% of its total greenhouse gazes emissions (the remaining 60% is covered by a "non-ETS" effort-sharing decision).

The aviation sector will be brought into the system from 2012, as agreed between the European Parliament and Council in July 2008.

In the next decade, the EU should consider to extend the ETS's scope to other toxic GHG from industrial pollution emissions. Through a revised IPPC directive for example, a future ETS on SO2 and NOx could be created.

For now, the EU is the only region in the world that currently has a functioning emissions trading system which has put a price on carbon and which is committed to a 20% unilateral reduction in CO2 emissions.

69 Progress towards achieving the Community's Kyoto Target, COM (2005) 655 final; and A European Strategy for Sustainable, Competitive and Secure Energy. What is at stake?, COM (2006)105 final.

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A European strategy for a Green Growth

However, implementing this package only will probably not be sufficient. The EU should initiate a transition to tackle global warming in all policies area (energy, transport, agriculture and fisheries)70. Indeed, climate change represents a challenge and also an opportunity for developing new technologies, creating new jobs and move toward a Green Growth71.

There is an evolving political consensus at EU level that a switch to a low-carbon economy is required both to combat climate change and for European industries to remain competitive in the long term72. But the current challenge is to maintain that long term objective in the face of short term difficulties. At the wake of the financial crisis and the economic slowdown, the short term needs of the industry, most notably the automotives, have indeed overrun certain environmental policy objectives.

The question today is how to finance the agreed-upon transformation to a low-carbon economy; how can policy responses in the field of climate and energy and an economic recovery plan can be reconciled into a New Green Deal?

First, a long term budget will be essential. The share of the EU in global costs for mitigation of climate change is estimated to be at around 60 billion Euros annually, and reaches up to 194 billion Euros in the high-cost scenarios73. This amount can be reached by earmarking existing funds for climate change and creating a dedicated budget line. Allocation of support could be based on energy efficiency criteria or targeted to "climate proof" investments.

This implies the creation of new indicators to evaluate the impact of economic activities on the environment such as carbon footprint because GDP is often incomplete to assess sustainable development.

The EU also needs to ensure that within the post 2012 climate regime its competitiveness does not suffer too much. The best tool to assure this is not protectionism, but international cooperation as stated in the Commission's communication "Towards a comprehensive climate change agreement in Copenhagen"74. This Communication represents a road map strategy for adapting to climate change by 2013:

• Targets by developed countries and appropriate actions by developing countries;

• The need to address the financing of actions by developing countries (both to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions and adapt to climate change);

• The need to build an effective global carbon market.

70 2050: The future begins today - Recommendations for the EU's future integrated policy on climate change 04/02/2009. Florenz report INI/2008/2105 71 Lord Stern of Brentford, author of the eponymous review in 2006 argues for example that by spending about a fifth ($400bn) on green technologies the world could begin a path towards sustainable growth, Financial Times of January 28 2009 : "Stern calls for 'green' global stimulus" by Andrew Bounds, Manchester. 72 Europe's contribution to a low carbon economy, Stavros Dimas SPEECH/09/21 of 26/01/2009, Press conference at the launch event of the McKinsey Report, Brussels. 73 Does the EU have sufficient resources to meets its objectives on energy policy and climate change? Centre for European Policy studies. January 2008. Study ordered by the Policy department on budgetary affairs, Directorate D, European Parliament. 74 Towards a comprehensive climate change agreement in Copenhagen COM (2009) 39, 28/01/2009.

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Keeping the lead toward an international climate agreement

With its ETS, the EU is the first region in the world to set such far-reaching and legally binding targets for all sectors of the economy. The EU has also undertaken to go further and cut greenhouse gas emissions by 30%, provided an ambitious international agreement is reached in Copenhagen by the end of 2009.

The post climate framework, to replace the Kyoto protocol which expires in 2012, is one of the biggest challenges for international governance. It's also an opportunity for the EU to build a green diplomacy and pave the way for a more sustainable globalisation75. An agreement in Copenhagen could indeed provide the necessary stimulus for such a New Green Deal boosting economic growth, promoting green technologies and securing these new jobs in the EU and in developing countries. Thus, a real North-South dialogue on climate change should be issued in order to reach an equitable post 2012 Kyoto agreement.

• With the North, the priority will be to get a political commitment on binding reduction targets from developed countries. Contrary to the current Kyoto period where the USA is not a signatory, it will be then decisive to have them into the next commitment. The new US administration have recently shown positive signals on that way and simultaneously, a Climate change and clean energy Bill is in preparation at the US Congress which set a reduction target of 17 % from 2005 levels by 2020 and 83 % by 2050 through a cap-and-trade program76.

Then, a global carbon market will be one hotspot of the negotiations. A domestic cap and trade systems in all developed countries can be a major source of financing at least cost the global emission cuts that are required.

But several experts already expressed their concern to that system which could be abused and lead to a carbon subprime crise if sophisticated financial products totally disconnected with the first goal of pollution reduction are launched. To avoid this financial risk, a more stable price for carbon must be guarantee by putting caps on compensation mechanisms (CDM/JI, Carbon capture storage) and by progressively forbidding free allocation for most polluter sectors.

The perennial "carbon tax vs. cap-and-trade" debate is still going on in some Member States. A tax gives certainty about prices but uncertainty about emission reductions; with a cap it's the inverse. So it remains a political question and in the short-term, complementary policies such as new targets and standards for energy efficiency, renewable energy, low-carbon fuel and public funding will boost the most action.

As for major emerging countries such as Brazil, India or China, a first step would be to implement national low carbon strategies setting out mitigation actions for each key emitting sector. A sectors based approach represents indeed a practical way for highly competitive and polluting sectors to enter progressively the grid.

• With the South, the main challenge will be to define the future cooperation with developing countries on technology transfer and adequate financing to fight deforestation. Parliament recently calls on the EU to place climate change at the core of its development cooperation policy77 and considers that the collective contribution towards developing country mitigation efforts and adaptation needs from the EU should not be below EUR 30 000 million/year by 2020, a figure that may increase along with new knowledge on the severity of climate change and the scale of its costs78.

75 Visions of a better climate, Stavros Dimas SPEECH/09/219 of 7/05/2009, Breakfast Policy Briefing at the European Policy Centre, Brussels. 76 http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/05/22/house-climate-bill-what-i_n_206808.html 77 EP Resolution on Building a Global Climate Change Alliance between the European Union and poor developing countries most vulnerable to climate change. INI/2008/2131. 21/10/2008 78 EP Resolution on an EU strategy for a comprehensive climate change agreement in Copenhagen and the adequate provision of financing for climate change policy RSP/2009/2548 11/03/2009

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For a shakeup in EU biodiversity policy

Europe has a target date of 2010 for halting biodiversity loss in the EU, and while some progress has been made, this target is unlikely to be met.

At the Commission conference on biodiversity in Athens last April 2009, Stavros Dimas Commissioner calls for a shakeup in EU biodiversity policy and said that "biodiversity loss poses a threat every bit worrying as climate change" and that "biodiversity needs to become a universal political priority."

General trends on biodiversity

The EU's Biodiversity Action Plan mid term report, issued in December 2008, has provided an assessment of the state of biodiversity in the EU : some 50% of species and up to 80% of habitats protected in the EU are threatened or vulnerable, and it concerns also over 40% of European bird species.

Still, the decline of farmland bird is stabilizing and populations of some mammals are recovering: this is mainly thanks to Natura 2000 network which covers more than 25 000 conservation sites on 17% of the European territory. However one weakness of the network is that it's over focus on some species instead of dealing with biodiversity as a whole.

At a global level, half of nature has disappeared since the beginning of the twentieth century and it decrease at the rhythm of 1% per year. If progresses have been done, biodiversity loss is now reaching a crisis point. Expanding demand for agricultural land for food, crops and animal grazing has put more pressure on natural habitats. Forests, wetlands and coral reefs are under threat. Tropical forests are disappearing at a rate of some 13 million hectares per year. If that trend continues, 11% of the natural world will be lost by 2050.

Priorities for action

• In the next decade, the EU must insure a fully functioning network of protected areas, with the consolidation of Natural 2000 on the territorial part and by completing the marine part soon after 2010. The financial instrument LIFE + will allocate nearly 2 billion Euros for the period 2007-2013 to nature protection in the EU (LIFE + funding will also be open to EFTA states, candidates and the Balkans countries).

Other possible funding opportunities to protect biodiversity could be taken under the CAP, the CFP, the Cohesion and Structural Funds, and the seventh framework program; this implies the implementation of a coherent European integrated policy for halting biodiversity.

More research must be done to understand better how the ecosystems work and more funding should be allocated to increase public awareness on why biodiversity matters. Lastly, the EU and Member States should develop a clear post 2010 target regarding biodiversity.

• At a global level, the EU has taken a leading role in tackling biodiversity loss by ruling on endangered species, illegal logging or deforestation. However the impact of European consumption on global biodiversity is an issue that must be integrated more effectively into all EU's policies that affect the nature79.

One priority will be to stop global deforestation through active support of the process of Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation (REDD). The measures adopted should combine climate mitigation with biodiversity conservation and the interests of indigenous people and local communities.

79 Commission calls for a shakeup in EU biodiversity policy IP/09/649 Rapid Press Releases.

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On the model of IPCC, the science policy interface should be reinforced by supporting the establishment of an Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES), in order to monitor and coordinate every national action and progress taken.

Contrary to climate change where impacts are visible and sizeable through temperatures rise and CO2 concentration in the atmosphere, there is no simple indicator or crucial threshold to assess biodiversity loss.

Still, some recent phenomena have started to question public awareness like the fish stock collapse or mass mortality of the bees. Thus, one main challenge for the next decade will be to define better an Ecological footprint indicator to value human demand with planet Earth's ecological capacity to regenerate.

Catherine LAURANSON

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Part 4: Industry, Research and Energy

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4.1. ICT and Information Society Policies

Background/Context Ten years in the field of Information Communication Technologies and Information Society (in the following ICT&IS) is a very long time. 10 years ago few would have predicted that EU mobile penetration would average 119%; that over a billion would be on the net; that internet traffic would grow annually at 60%80, and that China would become the country with the most internet users81. Apart from the conflict lines we see today many future political challenges will only arise and be defined in the course of those years, as technologies continue to develop.

The next ten years will offer opportunities for the ICT sector and EU regulators to build on past successes. Whilst the current financial crisis may change the likely developments the ICT&IS sector is not the hardest hit by the crisis although effects are visible such as a decline in the Internet growth rate, and a reduction in level of infrastructure investment. Also, more time but less money is being spent in the virtual worlds82. The fall out from the 2001 .dot com crisis has meant reorganisation and better preparedness in the sector.

The EU recently made a major commitment to securing future investments by dedicating part of the Recovery Package to broadband development83. The sector is recognised as key to future growth and global competitiveness. On the regulatory side there is however a risk for increased focus on national issues perhaps leading to less coherent implementation. There is also a risk for decreasing investments in research, development and innovation (R&D&I), which is vital in this fast moving sector. The long term effect may primarily be a slow-down in developments, but perhaps also a greater emphasis on social aspects.

Broadly it may be expected that the field be further integrated into all aspects of everyday life and products, i.e. an increased pervasiveness and convergence. This again is likely to cause development in two directions: (a) ICT & IS disappearing as an independent field as it is integrated into all areas of life and industries; and (b) increased complexity in tackling the related issues and policy questions.

Political Dichotomies – policy challenges of the future Future policy decisions will be about managing ICT&IS developments for the greatest benefit of the EU rather than questioning the developments per se. Below a number of dichotomies are outlined to emphasis areas where a political discussion is likely to take place, and where it is most likely that European politicians will be faced with trying to find a balance between opposing interests.

Sector Specific vs. General Regulation From the liberalisation phase in the late 90s, telecom regulation was seen as a 'temporary thing', to establish competition to such point that general competition rules would suffice. From the ongoing telecom revision it is apparent that a roll back of regulation remains on the political agenda but a likely future scenario will see not a roll back of telecom regulation as such, but a need to develop further mechanisms to lighten heavy regulation of individual areas (along the lines of the Art. 7 toolbox of today). Competition rules will certainly have a role to play, as the recent €1bn fine for Intel illustrates84.

80 Internet of the future: Europe must be a key player, Reding speech, 2.2.2009. 81 Overtaking the US, but still representing less than a quarter of the country's population. 82 Did the credit crunch hit the web? New Scientist 02.05.2009; OECD Information Technology Outlook 2008, 18.02.2009. 83 See recovery package, Stavreva report, 06.05.09. 84 EU fines US chip-maker Intel historic €1.06bn, euobserver, 13.05.09.

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But this cannot operate alone, as it is mainly an ex post means of tackling issues, whilst the general electronic communication regulation tackles ex ante problems in markets that may otherwise not be prone to competition or likely to develop bottlenecks and market entry barriers due to high infrastructure investment costs.

Another area where this dichotomy occurs is the management of internet activities. Having developed free of conventional regulation the spread of Internet services has emphasised the issues of whether there should be specific rules for internet activities or if these should be subject to more general rules (e.g. competition and criminal laws). The recent French 'three strikes' law (that affected telecom negotiations) illustrates this85. The law creates a government agency (Hadopi) and a system of strikes leading to ultimate blocking of internet access for users violating copyrights. Apart from some critics claiming this may interfere with rights to access & privacy, the legislation may be extremely difficult to manage in practise. At EU level similar legislation would also dive into stormy regulatory waters, as it crosses between the telecom field under co-decision and sensitive third pillar matters - where some Member States (MS) even have reserves (though the distinction would disappear with the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty). Hence, illegal activities and competition problems on the net may best be dealt with through general regulation, provided of course that these are up-dated.

The underlying issue is that of intellectual property rights (IPR) and management. The conflict line in this area illustrates both the dichotomy and the need for updated general regulation. Also the recent court case of the Pirate Bay86 show that current general IPR rules struggle to cope with net-related rights issues, stemming from the global nature of the internet and the new business models based on user created content (Web2.0) and new own-and-share approaches87. A future viable content creation will depend on proper licensing regimes and piracy measures. New technologies offer new opportunities for infringements; hence, a challenge for the future will be to ensure a new regulatory regime is sufficiently future proof. A balance has to be found where due credit is given, but where the creative innovation is not hampered. Both the Commission and OECD are working to address the issue88, and the indications are that some exceptions may be put in place for new content types, however, this would be part of a necessary general overhaul of the sensitive rights issues in MS, which is more than likely to take years to complete.

Finally, the recent cases also point to the lack of a coherent single digital market. On-line users encounter geographically based rights and management limitations when shopping for music, films and books89. A Commission survey has shown that whilst 1/3 of EU citizens would like to capitalize on lower prices via shopping over the net in neighbouring countries, only 7% actually do so. A true internal market will need to disassemble rights, ownership and licensing systems, at EU level (at least). It will be important to get the ICT&IS element right in the proposed cross-sectoral Consumer Rights Directive90, if a single market is to materialise, however, negotiations must be expected to be long and difficult.

85 France defies EU parliament on internet law, euobserver, 13.05.09; OECD Information Technology Outlook 2008, 18.02.2009. 86 E.g. Svensk dom speeder italiensk Pirate Bay-sag op, Computerworld, 01.05.09, Tackling Digital Piracy, Internetnews.com, 11.05.09. 87 COM (2008)594; COM(2008)466. 88See chapter 3.4 of Green Paper on Copyright in the Knowledge Economy (COM(2008)466/3; Participative Web and User-Created Content, OECD 2007; The ongoing discussions on the telecom package includes an information on copy right in the USO directive article 21(4). 89 The recently launched eYouGuide looks to ensure consistent users rights of users across the whole of the EU, IP/09/702, 05.05.09. 90 COM(2008)614, of 08.10.08

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Broad vs. Narrow Policy Focus - Infrastructure, Research & Investment

Infrastructure vs. service based competition On the infrastructure side the choice will be to which extent the EU should support competition efforts through ensuring different types of access - this goes both for telecom and for the Internet. However, fostering competitive infrastructures means investments will be made in several competing infrastructures, likely to result in spare capacity. Given that electronic communication infrastructures are quite expensive the broader approach implies high initial costs to be borne by consumers. On the other hand a single access type in each region may limit competition in the different parts of the infrastructure, also leading to higher consumer prices. The question of charged access- and termination- prices by network operators increases the complexity of infrastructure policy.

Foster investment vs. regulate new markets Another line of conflict will be the extent to which new emerging markets should be left alone to stimulate free market development and investment or should be tackled in the regulatory framework, inter alia to ensure low barriers for new comers/SMEs. This was previously seen as regards the regulation of data roaming charges, and is currently subject to debate as regards Next Generation Network (NGN). Future discussions along this line are likely to evolve around mobile internet and identification technologies. The key issue with NGN is to ensure access to different networks and passive infrastructure. The NGN separates network layers91, allowing for competition and innovation at each horizontal level, however, it also gives commercial incentives for operators to target vertical integration92. Hence, it will be important for policy makers to monitor future deployment and if necessary regulate to ensure a competitive market structure and prevent new bottlenecks.

Target efforts vs. neutrality Over the last few years a consensus has grown that the EU should prioritise ICT&IS in research93. Traditionally large industries carry out most research, and Commissioner Reding has called on the need to build EU areas of strengths94. The future challenges for the EU will be to consider more specifically if traditional research ('add-on' oriented) will suffice to keep the EU on the competitive edge or if more risky funding priorities should focus on truly innovative research (disruptive innovation95), and hence smaller, new companies.

Future research programmes (like FP8 after 2013) will need to make this choice. The FP8 is likely to adopt a cross-sectoral approach in line with increased convergence, but will still need to find ways of prioritising efforts after 2013. Overall R&D&I policies at EU-level must in future years become better coordinated, to exploit synergies and obtain maximum impact.

Traditionally the ICT&IS regulatory approach is technology neutral - letting the market choose the winners (despite some advocating GSM as a prime example of picking winners, and Commissioner Reding recently ventured into promoting HDTV & DDBH), and most agree it remains a basic principle. Hence, setting framework conditions will be key. Strengthened efforts to ensure open networks & developments of standards, may ensure a level playing field so that entry barriers are kept low, and so that new services and products are interoperable96. Standards endorsed at EU level may develop into international standards, giving a competitive advantage to European companies.

91 The core network level provides the application and switching layer for different services, whilst the access level (NGA) facilitates delivery of new services. Also, access to passive infrastructure (rights of way, ducts and poles) will be increasingly important, as a large share of the fibre network costs lies in the civil works. 92 COM(2009)140, 24.03.09; and OECD policy guidance on convergence and next generation networks, 2008. 93 E.g. the Commission recently called for increased ICT investments, and raised the ICT high-risk research budget by 70% to €170bn/year by 2013, Science beyond fiction, Press Release IP/09/608, 21.04.09. €680m was further allocated for broadband rollout in the recovery package Commission pushes internet investment, EuopeanVoice, 30.04.09. Also recovery package (overall rural envelope of €1bn, with 2/3 to broadband, Stavreva report, 06.05.09. 94 Reding speech 08/645. 95 E.g. Skype. 96 i2010 midterm review; White Paper on future policy options for standardisation in the ICT sector is planned.

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A different aspect of neutrality discussions of growing political importance is the need to balance encouragement of network investment and ensuring innovation & free choice for consumers. Operators increasingly have incentives to use network management to create a vertical integration that binds customers by abandoning network neutrality. Deep packet inspection is used to shape traffic. Some argue a future need for a certain network management, whilst others argue that the deployed technologies may both interfere with privacy and open competition. The future regulatory options rank from the soft tools of ensuring transparency for consumers, over an opt-out model (with a minimum net-neutral product); opt-in solutions (with an active consumer acceptance of a certain service package that leaves net neutrality behind) to the recent Norwegian model of directly forbidding traffic shaping97. The internet co-inventor Vinton Cerf has spoken strongly for network neutrality, saying "Allowing broadband carriers to control what people see and do online would fundamentally undermine the principles that have made the Internet such a success"98. If not monitored, operators are likely to limit consumer options, hence potentially slowing innovation. Ultimately this may hamper EU competitiveness. The key objective will be to ensure openness so we avoid bottlenecks occurring in the long value chains of the future.

Big Brother vs. Privacy

Infrastructure security The greater reliance on technologies means greater vulnerability, in particular for the Internet. It has become a critical infrastructure, which is vulnerable to both accidents and 'cyber attacks'. An example of the first is several breaks on main Mediterranean under sea cables in 200899. An example of the latter is when Estonia in April 2007 became the first EU member State to suffer a full scale cyber-attack. False internet traffic disabled the country's central websites and briefly shut down vital public services and private services such as online banking100. The attack highlighted the fragility of the ICT&IS infrastructure. The scale and sophistication level of internet security threats has risen, and it is estimated that there is a 10-20% probability that telecom networks will be hit by a major breakdown within the next 10 years at a potential global economic cost of €193bn101.

Already a central channel for information, commerce and entertainment, the Internet has further become a stage for political activity - ranging from interactive participation over state control & censorship to a means of citizens' political protest, as currently displayed in post election conflicts in Iran. States are making strategic plans vis-á-vis the use and protection of the net and the concept of 'cyberwar' has taken hold. China recently has announced mandatory 'Green Dam' filtering software as of 1 July102. In the U.S. President Obama published in May a cyber defence strategy, and a new body to defend military networks, and is likely to debate the theme in his visit in Russia on 6-8 July, with the U.S. promoting legal enforcement cooperation and Russia an international treaty. In November also the UN General Assembly will discuss internet security103.

To shape future policies and preventive measures, more clarity of the financial impact of attacks will be needed. An important element will be to enhance information sharing on attacks etc., increase trust level across the EU (e.g. Sweden has good experiences with annual cyber-warfare exercise). It would be a likely choice to build on the existing CERT (computer emergency response team) system; however, not all MS have set up CERTs. Also, the EU security agency, ENISA, despite criticism had its mandate extended till 2012104. In the context of a further renewal or replacement of ENISA, it would be natural to have a broader debate of what security issues should be tackled at EU level.

97 Norwegian pt web-page. 98 See statement from Senate hearing, 06.02.06. 99 Why the Mediterranean is the Achilles heel of the web, New Scientist, 12.01.09. 100 Batten down the hatches to keep out the hackers. European Voice 7.05.09; Cyber attacks on Estonia 2007. 101 COM(2009)149, 30.03.09. 102 EUobserver, 26.06.09. 103 Guardian 25.06.09., See also The New York Times Cyberwar article series, 04-06.09. 104 Regulation (EC) No 1007/2008.

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As in the area of energy, the recent events of breakdowns and cyber-attacks are likely to make MS more amenable to coordinated efforts and the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty could open the way for a broader mandate for an EU level body. Regulatory issues for future years will therefore be to establish sufficient coordination, encourage spread of innovative defences and decide if a coherent EU regulatory framework should be established (e.g. with rules for use of data protection techniques, identity, piracy, spare capacity & efficiency etc.).

Content, data & privacy Europe is moving towards a knowledge society, with many intensive and information-rich activities. 56% of adult EU citizens currently use the internet regularly105. Today's technologies allow rapid content creation, data collection, collation, management and processing and not least dissemination. It offers opportunities for new developments in research, health, education, social and cultural services and the users may interact increasingly. But with these opportunities comes also new challenges. In this regard policy makers will face challenges to overcome different digital divides - namely regional disparities, and divides along lines of income, education, age etc. The aging population in Europe only underscores these challenges. The deployment of NGN may create new access asymmetries if not all geographical areas are ensured high-speed broadband106. It is difficult to know, if higher speeds will truly be needed. However, if advances as cloud computing take off, demand for capacity may become very high indeed.

Another policy challenge will be to ensure that consumers' data is secure and that consumers trust the net so that they utilise available opportunities. The prospect of Internet of Things (IoT) leads to additional security issues107. As devices like radio frequency identifiers (RFIDs) become more sophisticated, more data will be captured, processed and stored in more dispersed places, making security issues more complex. Last year 2.2 million RFIDs were sold world wide, with 1/3 sold in Europe. A quintupling of the market over the next 10 years is predicted, with estimated economic market prospects of €30bn by 2016 for the RFID enabled applications segment alone108. Businesses and governments increasingly rely on large databases in their work. This also means a potential for loss of privacy. One step towards increased security is to ensure notification of personal data breach109. The challenge posed by such technology developments and changed ways of business is one of trust and of security. Today, only 12% of the EU's internet users feel safe to shop via the net110. To ensure trust there will be a need to raise awareness of safe net behaviour, but perhaps also a need to require certain security standards in individual devices.

For new opportunities to materialise, all must have the necessary access and skills. Governments increasingly rely on eGovernance in their communication with citizens, emphasising the need to ensure a sufficient digital literacy in the citizens to ensure broad inclusion in the knowledge society. A precondition for a fully functional knowledge society will be that the right framework conditions are established. One element (apart from infrastructure) will be to ensure sufficient educational efforts for all social groups and for all ages. These policy choices should feature prominently in the i2010 follow-up.

Reliance on the internet, leads to a discussion of whether broadband internet access should be a right. The ongoing revision of the telecom regulation touches upon the universal service obligations (USO), and quietly opens a door for a possibility for MS to extend the USO to include broadband111.

105 Eurostat, 2008, information society statistics. 106 See COM(2009)140 of 24.03.2009, for current status. The recovery package has addressed investments in broadband roll out and the Commission has also launched a consultation (19.05.09-22.06.09) on state aid rules. 107 SEC(2008)2516, of 29.09.08. 108 Reding speech 09/231. 109 See telecom package (ePrivacy directive) on an obligation to notify of data breaches. Recital 45b, hints at a future extension to other areas are indicated with the statement that explicit, mandatory notification requirements applicable to all sectors should be introduced as a matter of priority. 110 Source: Commission/EPSO, whilst 39% have strong doubts about security and a whole 42% avoid shopping over the net all together. 111 Recital 3a of the USO Directive (as it stands after EP 2nd reading) talks of flexibility for MS to insure a functional internet access capable of supporting satisfactory data rates, taking due account of specific circumstances in national markets, for instance the prevailing bandwidth used by the majority of subscribers in that MS.

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However, a separate review is planned for 2010 and will need to assess if broadband access (fixed or mobile) should be a mandatory part of the USO and if USO funding mechanisms are fit for a future of converging networks and services112.

Privacy and content related issues will need to be handled as they arise. It is perhaps not too far-fetched to speculate that these challenges could be addressed through a digital or internet ombudsman of the future (e.g. to function as a central EU contact point, to collect & disseminate best practise, even produce guidelines on transparency, rights to correct own information etc.). Commissioner Reding has already called for a "mister cyber security"113 - whilst her proposal addresses the infrastructure side, the concept could be complemented by an ombudsman to tackle the content & social dimension including privacy issues, e-commerce, IPR and access114 (supplementing the EDPS).

National/Local vs. EU/Global

Internet Governance In the future the vast majority of internet users will be outside the EU - this places strong requirements for global governance, partnerships and cooperation. The Internet is in its nature global and grew autonomously without common regulatory frames. This caused repeated discussions with some wanting to subject it to a regulatory regime similar to telecoms. That debate eased, however, internet governance increases in importance as use and dependency increases. ICANN is responsible for rules and decisions on key internet governance issues, such as the creation of TLDs (e.g. .com and .eu) and managing the internet address system. ICANN has since 1998 been a non-profit, Californian registered organisation, but its quasi independent status based on an agreement with the US Commerce Department has been subject to criticism for years by Europe and countries around the world. Their current agreement ends in September 2009115, sparking renewed debate of how to achieve greater multilateral accountability (inter alia in the frame of IGF) in the future. Commissioner Reding recently called for a full privatisation, setting up a judicial international forum ("G12 for Internet Governance").However it is unlikely that the US will be enthused at the perspective of surrendering its influence. The coming months will be vital for finding a model solution that renders all sufficiently satisfied - and the model chosen will have consequences for years to come. The EU will have opportunities for becoming further involved in the governance, but may only have sufficient leverage if acting as one.

A theme linked is the transit to IPv6. There is an impending depletion of the current IPv4 protocol, and it will be a policy challenge to ensure a smooth transition to IPv6.The continued growth of the Internet is dependent of availability of sufficient address space, and innovative services will increase demand. In the field of internet security the issue is of course also global in its nature and international cooperation is already well underway116.

Spectrum management With more mobile devices and the development of IoT demand on the limited available spectrum is growing. The switch to digital television will provide the famous spectrum dividend, freeing up valuable resources. In this context the EU debates increased coordination at EU level. Traditionally, the MS have been reluctant to extend EU coordination (in an area of MS competence), preferring to coordinate directly within ITU.

112 OECD policy guidance on convergence and next generation networks, 2008. 113 EU Commissioner Reding calls for preventive action to make the EU resilient against cyber attacks, MEMO/09/199, 27.04.09; EU vil have ét samlet marked for digitalt indhold, Computerworld 07.05.09. 114 In this vein, it could be noted that U.S. President Obama has appointed two Chief Technology Officers to tackle government technology internally but also in regards of eHealth reform and innovation (arstechnia.com, 20.04.2009). 115 Who controls the internet, New Scientist 30.04.09; Internet Governance: EU Commissioner Reding calls for full privatisation and full accountability of ICANN, IP/09/696; EU wants 'Internet G12' to govern cyberspace, euobserver, 05.05.09; ICANN heading to a fork in the Road, Kenneth Corbin, 08.05.09. 116 Examples of international policy developments are the G8 principles on critical infrastructure protection (CIIP); the UN General Assembly Resolution 58/199 on Creation of a global culture of cyber security and the protection of critical information infrastructures; and the OECD Recommendation on the Protection of Critical Information Infrastructures.

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However, in the negotiations on the telecom package, agreement has been reached, that legislative multiannual radio spectrum policy programmes will be presented in order to set out policy orientations and objectives for the strategic planning and harmonisation of the use of radio spectrum at EU-level. Also a certain increased flexibility/easing of access is foreseen, covering to some extent also IoT devices. The mobile market is very dynamic. Some predict that mobile internet will be the 'next big thing', with new technologies (as WiGig) allowing better and faster connections117. Currently mobile internet services account for 3% of industry turnover118, however a strong limitation manifests itself in the limited spectrum resources.

Green IT The global challenges ahead of us include serious environmental, energy and climate concerns. ICTs have an important role to play in reducing the energy intensity and increasing the energy efficiency of the economy. However, energy use by ICT equipment and services currently also accounts for about 8% of electrical power consumption in the EU and about 2% of carbon emissions119 (though ICTs also may cause indirect savings in other areas, e.g. reducing travels etc.). The challenges for the sector are therefore multiple: reducing the footprint of the sector itself and enable ICT to reduce the footprint of other sectors.

ICTs are already offering a range of possibilities to help the environment, e.g.: reducing mobility through teleworking; dematerialising products through digital equivalents; and intelligent optimisation. Much can be gained by using ICT to help control and monitor energy consumption (intelligent energy, e.g. smart meters, intelligent buildings & infrastructure etc.). Likewise, global information systems help us monitor the state of the environment, and partially bio-degradable ICT products are beginning to appear on the market120. Apart from energy efficiency gains, ICTs can help address efficient materials, waste generation, waste treatment, hazardous substances. The current EU regulatory framework (Eco-design Directive, the RoHs directive, and the WEE directive121), have despite years of implementation not produced desired res 122ults. Proposed revisions of the directives will need

CT equipment in all areas of life (for instance buildings) will be central to reaping benefits123.

t incentives; and national issues with a growing need for pan-European and global action.

to be negotiated in the coming parliamentary legislature.

Policy challenges of the future include ensuring continued, forefront research and innovation in ICT-based systems and sensor networks that may improve energy efficiency, reduce emissions and ensure early response systems. Also the application of I

Conclusion - trends for the future The next ten years are certain to offer continued and increased convergence on services, networks, terminals and markets. This will bring about changes in the way ICT&IS affects all aspects of our lives, future business models, and social relations. The trends and conflict lines may not be entirely new, but they will be amplified and as important as ever. Problems will be deeper (more specific), and more complex as ICT&IS issues cut across other areas - from a regulatory angle this is not easily handled. The policy choices made in the coming years along the dichotomies outlined in this paper will have consequences for many years to come. In specific areas choices will have to be made between a sector specific regulation and an integration of ICT&IS issues in other regulation. Policy efforts will have to balance privacy with considerations for inclusion & security, balance competition against investmen

117 WiGig see 'Ny trådløs teknologi 10 gange hurtigere end WiFi', Computerworld, 11.05.09 118 14th implementation report COM(2009)140, 24.03.09. 119 See e.g. Is the net hurting the environment?, New Scientist, 06.05.09. 120 New Generation - the next technological revolution, will be led by eco-innovation, Timo Makela, Parliament magazine, 20.02.2006. 121 Eco-Desing directive 2005/32/EC, RoHS Directive 2002/95/EC & WEEE Directive 2002/96/EC. 122 Proposal on RoHS, COM(2008) 810 and proposal for a revised WEE directive COM(2008)809, both of 3.12.2009. in Parliament Florenz was appointed rapporteur on WEE proposal, and Evans rapporteur on RoHS. 123 See e.g. OECD Shaping Policies for the Future of the Internet economy, June 2008. + Soul Declaration for the Future of the internet Economy.

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ICT&IS developments will be a driving force in the EU. The once stated ICT industry goal of anywhere, anytime and on any device, has been translated into actual trends of convergence, pervasiveness and ubiquitous access to information. We will be challenged to ensure this is well managed and becomes true for all, on a competitive and open basis. This will also be vital for future competitiveness in a global context.

The most evident policy option running through these questions is the need to ensure transparency and open exchange of reliable information and communication (from ensuring RFID tags, over limits in access, to security breaches etc.) – this is a prerequisite for enhancing consumer trust, and ensuring open competition and a functioning internal market. With increasing complexity, transparency will be followed by a need to decide on new ways of coordinating policies. Increasingly, ICT&IS policy development must encompass many sectors and Parliament may become the best placed EU institution to address this challenging task.

Karin HYLDELUND

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4.2 Energy Introduction

La transformation radicale de notre système énergétique en un système plus durable et plus efficace ne se fera pas du jour au lendemain, ni en une décennie. L’inertie du système énergétique, basé sur de grandes infrastructures, une forte dépendance d’approvisionnement envers des pays tiers, la domination du marché par de grandes entreprises verticalement intégrées, des barrières technologiques et économiques à la mise sur le marché de solutions innovantes, la demande soutenue du mode de consommation occidental, la réticence au changement sont parmi les facteurs qui font que le processus de transformation de notre économie en une économie basée sur un système énergétique durable ne pourra être rapide et radical.

Mais les actions qui doivent amorcer les changements nécessaires pour répondre aux défis globaux des prochaines décennies, notamment en matière de lutte contre le réchauffement climatique, ne peuvent se faire attendre. Malgré les bonnes intentions affichées par la plupart des leaders mondiaux, et l‘adoption par l‘UE de politiques encourageantes, les efforts entrepris ne sont souvent pas suffisants et entretiennent le statu quo124. Pour transformer son économie, l‘UE devra se doter d‘une politique interne plus ambitieuse et cohérente en matière de gestion des ressources et de l‘énergie.

Si un meilleur investissement dans des efforts d’efficacité énergétique et d’énergies renouvelables contribuerait à améliorer le bilan climatique de l’Europe, la compétition pour les ressources ne s’arrêterait pas pour autant. L’émergence des pays BRIICS125 et leur demande croissante en énergie, notre dépendance en matière d’approvisionnement sur des régions instables (conflit géorgien, instabilités en Afrique, Océan Indien, Moyen-Orient) ainsi que les conséquences globales du changement climatique doivent maintenir un niveau d’alerte élevé au niveau international.

Dans le contexte mondial des 40 prochaines années, la question des ressources sera centrale, tant sur le plan énergétique qu’environnemental (eau, sols, nourriture) ou industriel (métaux126) et financier (investisseurs, banques et mondialisation). Les mutations en cours présagent des décennies de transformations profondes tant dans les systèmes de gouvernance mondiale qu’au niveau des tissus socio-économiques locaux. La capacité de l’Europe à être un acteur actif de ces transformations et à en tirer profit, pour se doter d’un système énergétique plus autonome et plus durable, sera fonction de sa volonté politique et de sa cohérence. Les principaux défis auxquels l’UE devra faire face dans les 10 prochaines années, tant dans son rôle de puissance mondiale que dans celui de garant d’un projet citoyen européen sont les suivants : • développer au niveau mondial, un système économique garantissant le financement d’une

économie durable; • limiter et gérer la dépendance énergétique, et augmenter la diversification des sources en

vue d’une plus grande autonomie et durabilité; • accompagner la restructuration des systèmes énergétiques et industriels vers des

systèmes de production plus efficaces en termes de consommation d’énergie et ressources matérielles, par le renforcement des politiques de l’innovation;

• donner des moyens aux acteurs locaux et citoyens européens, conscients des défis actuels, de participer au changement.

La question de la mobilisation des financements privés et publics sera centrale dans les domaines de l’infrastructure, l’innovation et la recherche. La question de la production et de la consommation d’énergie étant vaste et complexe, seulement un certain nombre de défis sont développés dans les chapitres suivants. L'UE devra faire attention non seulement à l'efficience des mesures choisies mais surtout à leur effectivité.

124 La proposition des ministres de l'industrie européens de réexaminer la politique environnementale affectant les secteurs industriels et les mettre entre parenthèses illustre bien ce propos. 125 Brésil, Russie, Indonésie, Inde, Chine, Afrique du Sud. 126 Notamment le cuivre, nickel, bauxite, indium - Source: Etude sur l' Eco-innovation PE 416.218

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Les défis de l’UE

En février 2007, l’UE s'est posé comme objectifs pour 2020: la réalisation de 20% d’économies d’énergie, la réduction de 20 à 30% des émissions des gaz à effet de serre (en fonction de l’accord obtenu à Copenhague en décembre 2009) et l'accroissement à 20% de la contribution des énergies renouvelables. Malgré le succès de l’adoption des paquets "Climat et énergie" à la fin de la 6ème législature du Parlement européen, beaucoup reste encore à faire. En effet, la mise en place des mesures prises prendra du temps, les Etats membres étant encore défaillants quant à la mise en place du second paquet énergie et la réalisation des objectifs de Kyoto.

1. Instruments économiques

Les modèles économiques qui pourraient soutenir au niveau mondial une transformation des modes de consommation d’énergie et de ressources ne sont pas encore en place. La création du marché du carbone par l’adoption de la directive sur les échanges de quotas d'émissions127 est perçue comme la panacée mais n’en est qu’à ses balbutiements. Le prix du carbone à été divisé par deux en un an (autour des 15€/tonne) tandis que les émissions de CO2 diminuent pour des raisons structurelles liées à la crise économique, et que diminuent aussi les investissements dans les nouvelles technologies. La distribution trop large de quotas d’émission a pour conséquence, à l’heure actuelle, que les entreprises vendent leurs quotas pour se procurer des liquidités, tandis que les experts de la finance inventent déjà les algorithmes pour tirer le meilleur profit du marché, indépendamment de son but final128. Dans ces conditions, le système en développement ne semble pas armé pour tirer les leçons de la crise financière et il pourrait ne pas atteindre ses objectifs climatiques.

Alors que certains prônent des mesures pour renforcer le marché du carbone – notamment par la mise aux enchères des crédits d’émission, l’adoption de prix planchers, l’abaissement du plafond d’émission, l’intégration d’autres secteurs comme le transport ou une approche plus sectorielle aux objectif de réduction des émissions - d'autres préparent une politique visant à soutenir les industries qui sont à risque de délocalisation vers des pays sans contraintes d'émissions (acier, aluminium, raffinage, verre, ciment), en leur promettant la gratuité d’allocation de permis d’émission pour la période 2013-2020.129 Si la question de la compétitivité des entreprises européennes et de ce qu'on appelle les « fuites de carbone » vers des pays moins engagés dans la lutte contre les changements climatiques est un problème réel, les solutions envisagées devront éviter de rendre le système inefficace.

Les questions liées à l’interdépendance entre le prix du carbone et celui de l’énergie, à leur volatilité130, les interactions entre le marché des droits à polluer et celui des certificats en énergie renouvelable et les liens entre les différents marchés d’émission au niveau international, seront des défis qui devront très probablement être affrontés au niveau de l’UE dans les prochaines années.

Parallèlement, l’idée de création d’une taxe carbone sur les combustibles fossiles, ou sur le contenu de carbone, refait surface. Elle apparait comme une option plus sûre, rapide, directe et transparente que les marchés d’émissions131. L’avantage d’un système de marché d'émissions est la possibilité de mettre un plafond d’émission strict tandis que la taxe carbone marche avec un signal de prix, sans plafond d’émission. Mais une taxe carbone progressive sur les différents combustibles fossiles pourrait permettre une meilleure régulation en jouant aussi un rôle tampon sur le prix du pétrole et serait une incitation plus forte à réduire la dépendance énergétique. De plus, une taxe carbone empêcherait les entreprises de reporter leurs efforts d’efficacité énergétique (ce qui peut arriver dans un système de marché d'émissions quand les entreprises ont reçu trop de permis de polluer) et ne désavantagerait pas les nouveaux entrants sur le marché.

127 Directive 2003/87/EC amendée en décembre 2008. 128 Conversation personnelle avec un "asset manager" d’une grande banque européenne 129 Fuite de carbone : la révolte gronde contre les projets de la Commission Source: Euractiv 26/05/2009 130 Interdépendance des marchés du carbone et de l’énergie : l’exemple de la volatilité, M. Mansanet-Bataller Mission Climat de la Caisse des Dépôts, Mars 2009. 131 Carbon Taxes vs. Emissions Trading, Global Policy forum

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Le choix entre la création de la taxe carbone ou l’insertion d’autres secteurs économiques dans le système d’émission, ou une combinaison des deux, sera très probablement en discussion dans la prochaine négociation à Copenhague en 2009 ainsi que dans les prochaines années à venir.132 Les effets négatifs et positifs de ces choix devront être évalués de près pour développer un système plus solide et plus cohérent.

2. Limiter la dépendance énergétique, en particulier des combustibles fossiles et augmenter la diversification des sources

Malgré les efforts de réduction de l'intensité énergétique de notre économie, la demande énergétique de l’UE a continué de croître jusqu’en 2008, l’AIE prévoyant pour 2030 une expansion de 45% de la demande mondiale, la part de l’EU restant à 15%.

La dépendance énergétique est aujourd'hui aux alentours de 54%,133 les projections indiquant pour 2020 un accroissement jusqu'à 80% selon le rapport de Agence Internationale de l’Energie134 et de 70% selon celui de la Commission européenne. La politique en cours visant à assurer une plus grande sécurité énergétique par la limitation de la dépendance et la diversification des sources sera donc encore plus d'actualité pendant les 10 prochaines années.

Combustibles fossiles

Le mix énergétique est aujourd'hui principalement dominé par les combustibles fossiles et ceci restera très probablement le cas d'ici 2020.135 Le pourcentage des combustible fossiles dans la consommation primaire pourrait rester stable ou même diminuer de 75% jusqu’à 55% en fonction du succès de la mise en place de la nouvelle politique énergétique proposée par la Commission, du développement des énergies alternatives et du prix du pétrole.136 En effet, un prix du pétrole bas (60$/bbl) est un frein aux investissements dans les technologies d'efficacité énergétique ou renouvelables et ne fait pas non plus baisser la demande. Un prix de l'énergie fossile plus élevé (100$/bbl) étant plus propice à des améliorations de l'efficacité énergétique.

La baisse actuelle de la demande a contraint les pays producteurs à baisser leur production de pétrole. Au moment de la reprise économique, un manque d'offre engendrerait une nouvelle hausse des prix. Pour garantir une stabilité du marché et un approvisionnement continu, et éviter une flambée des prix, les ministres de l'énergie du G8 ont appelé à la poursuite des investissements en matière de production.137 Mais au vu de la raréfaction des sources facilement accessibles, de la saturation des capacités de transport et de la croissance de la demande mondiale, il est certain que le temps des hydrocarbures abondants et bon marché est bientôt terminé.

Un prix du pétrole élevé est aussi une incitation à l'exploitation de gisements plus profonds et difficiles d'accès, ou l'exploitation de sources plus polluantes comme les sables bitumineux: une nouvelle course à l’or noir dans les régions arctiques pourrait bien devenir réalité dans quelques décennies. Le prix élevé de l’énergie n’étant donc pas la garantie d’une approche plus durable, les politiques devront continuer à inciter le recours à des investissements dans des technologies plus durables et efficaces, et à l’internalisation des coûts environnementaux, pour se préparer à une sortie du pétrole qui sera inévitable dans quelques décennies.

132 http://www.actu-environnement.com/ae/news/taxe_carbone_quotas_emissions_CO2_6969.php4 133 Le pétrole représentant 60%, le gaz 26% et d’autres combustibles solides 13% des importations. Source : Commission staff working document accompanying the Second Strategic Energy Review (Nov. 2008) 134 IEA – World Energy Outlook 2008 135 Mix énergétique (consommation primaire) de l’UE: 37% de pétrole, 24% de gaz naturel, 18% de combustibles, 14% de nucléaire et 7% d’énergies renouvelables, avec une grande variété d’un Etat Membre à l’autre en fonction de leur production domestique. Source : Eurostat 2006 136 idem 11 137 G8 des ministres de l'énergie

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La position de l’Europe dans le domaine de l’approvisionnement du gaz naturel est délicate et va continuer à poser des défis tant pour sa politique étrangère et de voisinage que pour celle du marché intérieur et de ses principes de solidarité. L’UE reste encore confrontée dans ce domaine à la difficulté de parler « d’une seule voix » et à mener une politique unitaire et solidaire, les Etats membres agissant principalement pour leurs intérêts nationaux et ceux de leurs grandes entreprises énergétiques. Ceci s’illustre notamment par le refus, au Conseil, de la séparation patrimoniale effective lors de l’adoption du 3ème paquet de libéralisation de l’énergie. L’amendement adopté sur la « clause Gazprom » visant à établir une réciprocité pour les investissements étrangers, mais qui finalement laisse le choix aux Etats membres de laisser entrer ou non sur son marché des investisseurs étrangers et le soutien des Etats membres à des projets de gazoducs concurrents à ceux soutenus officiellement par l’UE, témoignent des réticences nationales envers une politique énergétique européenne cohérente.

La Russie, qui a encore une fois affirmé ne pas avoir l’intention de ratifier le Traité de L’Energie proposé par l’EU, continue et continuera à prendre de l’importance dans le domaine du marché gazier, surtout par la réalisation des projets de gazoducs South Stream138 et North Stream139, qui sont en concurrence avec le projet Nabucco soutenu par l’UE. La capacité de l’UE à être indépendante de la Russie est entre autres mise à mal par l’intention de l’Azerbaïdjan de faire transiter son gaz par la Russie, par les investissements de Gazprom dans des projets offshore de ce pays et par le rachat, parfois hostile, d’entreprises européennes par des sociétés russes140. Le problème majeur réside dans le fait que l’approche des entreprises russes n’est actuellement pas compatible avec le marché intérieur européen et ses règles de concurrence. Une question fondamentale de choix politique va certainement se poser entre une approche stricte aux règles de concurrence et du marché intérieur ou une politique plus réaliste qui tient compte de questions stratégiques liées à la situation géopolitique mondiale.

Le charbon reste et restera pendant longtemps une source d’énergie majeure dans le monde pour la production d'électricité et les applications industrielles. Sa production ne cesse d’augmenter (particulièrement en Chine, en Inde et aux Etats-Unis), tandis que les réserves mondiales sont énormes. La combustion du charbon produit plus de CO2 par unité d’énergie que le pétrole raffiné ou le gaz naturel. Le développement et la mise sur le marché de technologies propres seront donc essentiels, en particulier dans les pays émergents. Le captage et stockage du carbone, soutenu par l'UE, est considéré comme une technologie incontournable pour diminuer les émissions de CO2 des installations à charbon. Malgré le soutien financier aux projets de démonstration141, plusieurs questions techniques et économiques resteront à régler avant que cette technologie ne soit pleinement commercialisable, notamment le choix des sites de stockage, les risques de fuites, la perte d'efficacité et l'augmentation des coûts de production. Cette technologie pourrait nécessiter encore 15-20 ans avant d'être complètement mûre et le public est actuellement encore sceptique quant au choix d’investissements prioritaires dans ce domaine.142 Dans un contexte de financements se faisant plus rares, des investissements dans le renouvellement des centrale à charbon avec des technologies éprouvées économiquement et écologiquement (par exemple le remplacement des installations à charbon par de la cogénération avec la biomasse143) serait une solution plus durable.

138 Signature entre ENI et Gazprom d’un accord pour doubler la capacité du South Stream d’ici 2015) 139 Prévue en 2010 et dont Gazprom détient 51% 140 Reprise d’une partie de MOL (géant Hongrois de l’énergie) par Surgutneft 141 recovery package 142 http://sequestration.mit.edu/pdf/GHGT8_Reiner.pdf 143 http://www.3dterritoires.org/en-lorraine/en-lorraine/biomasse-metz.html

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Promotion des renouvelables et décentralisation des systèmes énergétiques

Le potentiel des énergies renouvelables en Europe (éolienne, biomasse, solaire thermique, photovoltaïque, géothermie, marémotrice) est encore sous-exploité dans plusieurs pays européens. Les pays qui ont opté pour les énergies renouvelables, sans attendre la mise en place d’objectifs au niveau européen, ont pris de l'avance dans ce domaine. Par exemple, la loi sur les renouvelables entrée en vigueur en Allemagne en 2004 a permis d'économiser 45mto de CO2 et de générer 125.000 des 214.000 emplois créés dans le secteur des renouvelables. La garantie d'accès au réseau, les taux de rémunération fixes et l'absence de plafonnement ont permis à des exploitants indépendants d'acquérir une autonomie d'investissements.144 La mise en place de la directive sur les énergies renouvelables sera déterminante dans les 10 prochaines années pour l’exploitation du potentiel de l’UE dans ce domaine, ainsi que pour la création d’emplois locaux.

Pour assurer une diversification des sources, l’UE devra aussi s'atteler à porter à terme des projets énergétiques avec notamment les pays de l'Union pour la Méditerranée. La mise en place du Plan Solaire Méditerranéen145 devrait être bénéfique tant pour l'Europe que pour les pays méditerranéens et permettre une diversification des sources, de l'efficacité énergétique et la création d'emplois à haute valeur ajoutée. Les difficultés à surmonter seront: la mise en place d'un cadre légal, institutionnel et organisationnel adéquat pour permettre le déploiement de l'énergie solaire; la création de mécanismes de promotion du développement d'interconnections des réseaux électriques avec ceux de l'UE pour permettre le commerce d'énergie verte. L'engagement de financements privés sera aussi déterminant pour le succès de ces projets.

En matière d’électricité, la création d’un grand réseau européen intelligent permettrait par exemple aux pays du Nord de l’Europe d’exporter les surplus d’énergie éolienne mais aussi à l’EU d’importer d’autres énergies des pays avoisinants. L’investissement dans de nouveaux réseaux et interconnexions, le maintien de la stabilité et de la sûreté du réseau, l’atténuation des fluctuations de la demande d’électricité et l’organisation de la solidarité entre les partenaires en cas de défaillances seront des défis essentiels à relever dans les années à venir pour permettre une plus grande décentralisation de la production d’électricité (renouvelables, cogénération). Ici aussi, la question des investissements et des garanties d’accès seront centrales, surtout dans les zones géographiquement les plus reculées.

Le développent des biocombustibles est encore controversé. Si les biocarburants de deuxième génération sur base de déchets de biomasse sont plus efficaces au niveau énergétique et écologique, ils ne sont pas encore présents sur le marché.146 Les biocarburants de première génération, qui font appel aux matières premières dérivées des cultures à vocation alimentaire, mettent en compétition les besoins alimentaires avec les besoins d’énergie et paraissent comme une aberration pour beaucoup d’experts, notamment ceux en aide au développement. Un récent rapport interne de la Banque Mondiale estimait que l’augmentation des prix des matières premières agricoles peuvent être attribuées à 75% au développement des biocarburants et 15% aux prix de l’énergie et des fertilisants.147 L’utilisation de la biomasse, notamment dans le cadre de la cogénération tant à petite qu’à plus grande échelle, représente par contre un potentiel d’efficacité énergétique très élevé.

Energie nucléaire

L’énergie nucléaire joue un rôle important dans le mix énergétique de plusieurs pays de l’UE et est considérée comme une technologie à faibles émissions de carbone et qui pourrait contribuer à atteindre les objectifs de réduction des émissions. On assiste actuellement à certaine « renaissance » du nucléaire, même si en 2020 la partie du nucléaire dans le mix énergétique devrait diminuer en vue de l’arrivée en fin de vie de plusieurs installations en Europe. Les points importants d’ici 10 ans seront les questions liées au démantèlement des centrales en fin de vie et, à plus long terme, les questions liées à la compétition dans

144 http://www.bmu.de/files/pdfs/allgemein/application/pdf/erfahrungsbericht_eeg_2007_zf_en.pdf 145 http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/euromed/index_en.htm 146 http://www.fao.org/bioenergy/52182/fr/ 147 http://image.guardian.co.uk/sys-files/Environment/documents/2008/07/10/Biofuels.PDF

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l’approvisionnement de l’uranium. Les questions liées à la sécurité et à la gestion des déchets resteront inévitables à court et long terme.

3. Soutenir l’innovation dans les différents secteurs économiques pour réduire la demande énergétique et augmenter l'efficacité énergétique

L'adoption d’innovations existantes dans bon nombre de secteurs économiques peuvent contribuer à l’amélioration significative de l’efficacité de conversion, d'approvisionnement et d’utilisation de l’énergie. Ces améliorations d’efficacité énergétique représentent le plus grand et le moins coûteux potentiel d’économies d’énergie. Assurer la mise en place des mesures entreprises par l'UE pour soutenir le développement et la commercialisation des nouvelles technologies sera essentiel pour progresser dans ce sens, mais des mesures supplémentaires seront nécessaires pour permettre des innovations plus significatives. Ces mesures pourront être réglementaires (standards minimums), financières (soutien à l'éco-innovation), mais aussi informatives (labels), éducatives et sociales (par exemple, la dissémination d'outils d'évaluation, la formation continue et des mesures d'aide à la reconversion).

Approches sectorielles

Le secteur des bâtiments, représentant 40% des besoins d’énergie, offre le plus grand potentiel d’efficacité énergétique. Les émissions des habitations pourraient être réduites de 60% d’ici 2050, à condition que des actions immédiates soient entreprises pour transformer le secteur.148 Des entreprises sont en train de développer des matériaux, systèmes et technologies qui peuvent radicalement améliorer l’efficacité énergétique. 149 La mise en place de la directive sur l’efficacité énergétique des bâtiments150 sera un pas vers la diminution d'émissions, mais les progrès technologiques pourraient contribuer à la construction de bâtiments avec une efficacité énergétique beaucoup plus élevée et dépassant les normes posées aujourd’hui au niveau européen. Des exemples de développements urbains qui sont de bonnes pratiques du point de vue de l’efficacité énergétique, de l’aménagement du territoire et de l’organisation sociale existent en Europe. 151 La durabilité de ces projets est le fruit d’une combinaison de politiques locales, de planification et de technologies qui vont au- delà des mesures traditionnelles de sauvegarde de l’énergie et dont il serait intéressant de tirer des leçons au niveau de l'UE.

Les émissions du secteur du transport ont augmenté d’environ ¼ depuis 1990, le transport routier représentant plus d’¼ de la consommation de l’énergie de l’UE152. Le potentiel d’économie d’énergie des véhicules est substantiel, mais les efforts actuels sur les véhicules sont insuffisants pour pallier à l’augmentation du volume des passagers. L’approche des politiques envers l’industrie automobile touchée par la crise pourrait retarder encore plus une amélioration de l’efficacité énergétique dans ce secteur. Les efforts entamés en matière de rendements énergétiques des véhicules, ainsi que ceux promouvant le développement plus durable de systèmes de transports urbains et de marchandises, devront être soutenus si l'UE est sérieuse quant à ses objectifs climatiques. L’inclusion du transport routier dans le système d’échanges d’émissions est une alternative en cours d'évaluation, mais pose encore des questions techniques quant aux impacts des différents mécanismes sur les différents acteurs (constructeurs, pétroliers ou conducteurs) et de l'effectivité de la mesure.

Dans le cadre de la politique sur les produits, la prise en compte de l’éco-design pour des produits non électriques au niveau de l'UE a été reportée jusqu’en 2012153. Des progrès sont donc encore à réaliser pour amener sur le marché des produits plus performants et mieux conçus. Pour cela, le soutien aux entreprises pour intégrer l'éco-conception dans leurs activités, ainsi que la prise en compte de standards minimums resteront essentiels du côté de l'offre. Du côté de la demande, le renforcement d'un mix de mesures incluant labels, réductions de TVA, achats publics écologiques et autres incitations à la consommation verte, sera à considérer au niveau européen.

148 Source : http://www.wbcsd.org/includes/getTarget.asp?type=DocDee t&id=MzQyMDY 149 https://buildingsolutions.honeywell.com/Cultures/en-US/. 150 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&language=EN&reference=P6-TA-2009-0278 151 Vaubanexternal development in Freiburg, Germany, and the BedZED development in the south of London. 152 Commission staff working document accompanying the Second Strategic Energy Review (Nov. 2008) 153 Directive Eco-design

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Financement de l’innovation et de la recherche

Les processus d’innovation dans le domaine de l’énergie, de la conception à la mise sur le marché, souffrent de faiblesses et de barrières: temps longs, investissements coûteux, inertie des systèmes existants, acteurs dominants, prix plafonds, compétition des combustibles fossiles pour lequel le prix environnemental n’est pas internalisé, barrières légales, administratives, sociales, etc. Ce fossé entre la demande et l’offre est souvent qualifié de « vallée de la mort » pour les technologies propres. La croyance que les gouvernements devraient mettre en place des cadres pour encourager l’innovation et ne pas s’allier avec les meilleures entreprises sur le marché commence à faiblir.154 Tout d’abord, les ressources étant limitées, le risque est de les « saupoudrer » sur trop de projets. Ensuite, le marché du carbone doit encore faire ses preuves et même un prix du carbone élevé pourrait ne pas être suffisant pour développer des technologies qui ne sont pas encore commercialisables. L’intervention publique pour mener des technologies propres sur le marché serait donc justifiée. 155

Cette approche est déjà présente dans les politiques de recherche et innovation de l’UE par la création de Plate-formes Technologiques156 joignant les communautés de chercheurs scientifiques et industriels. L’objectif est de soutenir le développement et le déploiement de nouvelles technologies par l’adoption d’agendas stratégiques communs et la mobilisation des ressources nationales, publiques et privées. La création de partenariats publics-privés découlant de ces plate-formes (Initiatives Technologiques Conjointes) sont l’étape suivante de cette démarche. Mais dans la mise en place de ces structures, dirigées principalement par les groupes industriels menés par les leaders mondiaux du marché, il sera important pour le niveau politique de garantir et exercer un droit de scrutin sur les objectifs posés et l’évaluation des résultats et assurer la participation des instituts de recherche et des PME157. Le risque est que les investissements soient dirigés principalement vers la mise sur le marché de technologies qui ne sont ni nouvelles ni propres, mais pour lesquelles les industries ont déjà investi par le passé et voudraient voir un retour rapide sur leurs investissements. Depuis octobre 2008, une Alliance Européenne de Recherche en Energie à été créée pour optimiser et renforcer les capacités de recherche principalement en énergie éolienne, solaire, biocarburants de deuxième génération, réseaux intelligents (smart grids) et le captage et stockage du carbone.

Le septième programme cadre (FP7)158 pour la recherche et le développement, ainsi que les programmes pour la compétitivité et l’innovation159 (CIP), sont actuellement les sources principales de financement de projets d’innovation technologique dans l'UE. Lors de la révision des perspectives financières 2007-2013 et l’adoption des nouvelles perspectives pour 2013-2020, la mobilisation de ressources ultérieures sera nécessaire pour financer des approches innovantes, tant dans les traditionnels domaines industriels et technologiques que dans les autres domaines (agriculture, etc...). L’essentiel sera d’examiner les différentes voies pour attirer les investissements privés ainsi qu’améliorer la coordination des ressources à disposition. Notamment l’exploitation de synergies entre programmes cadres (FP, CIP) et les fonds structurels, pour la mise en place de projets pouvant se développer à plus long terme, est essentielle160. Le financement de l’éco-innovation se faisant principalement par les entreprises, des mécanismes innovants de soutien public, stimulant l’engagement des investissements privés, devront être envisagés (ex: fonds de garantie), dans un cadre légal intégré et aux faibles barrières administratives161.

Sur la scène internationale, la demande d’énergie des pays émergents est en croissance. Le transfert de savoir-faire pour des technologies à basses émissions de carbone, est une nécessité pour assurer un approvisionnement d’énergie durable pour ces pays. Certains experts nous mettent néanmoins en garde sur l’équilibre qui doit être trouvé entre les 154 Setting priorities in Energy Innovation Policy: lessons for the UK (J. Watson - Cambridge, Mass. 2008). 155 COM(2007)723 SET-Plan EC Communication "Towards a low carbon future". 156 Notamment dans le domaine de l’éolien, le réseau électriques du futur, l’hydrogène et les cellules photovoltaïques, les biocarburants 157 EP Hydrogen Joint Technology Initiative Workshop PE 408.543 158 Décision No 1982/2006/EC 159 Décision No 1639/2006/EC 160 Synergies between the EU FP7, CIP and the Structural Funds, A.Reid, 2007, PE 385.645 161 Funding Eco-innovation, B. Eggl, 2008, PE 416.218

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politiques de transfert de technologies et les politiques de droits de propriété intellectuelle.162 Par exemple, après 10 années passées à absorber la connaissance étrangère, les entreprises chinoises sont de plus en plus aptes à délivrer des produits de qualité et sont performantes sur le marché d’exportation.163 L’UE pourrait décider de protéger son savoir-faire en tant que bien d’échange pour satisfaire les besoins commerciaux et environnementaux de la Chine.

4. Participation des citoyens et acteurs locaux

Selon l’Eurobaromètre, le citoyen européen considère les changements climatiques164 comme un des deux problèmes les plus importants du monde à côté de la pauvreté, le manque de nourriture et d'eau potable. Une majorité des citoyens pense aussi que les industriels (76%), les Etats membres (67%), et l’UE (58%) n’en font pas assez. Mais si les citoyens pensent ne pas non plus en faire assez eux-mêmes, ils se montrent aussi beaucoup plus conscientisés et prêts que par le passé à prendre des mesures comportementales en faveur de l’efficacité énergétique, même si des questions financières et un manque d’information restent pour certains une barrière au changement de comportement. Le citoyen européen se dit aussi en faveur de plus de moyens légaux et financiers pour soutenir ces changements.165 Des mesures conséquentes au niveau de l’UE pour une meilleure information (labels, indicateurs), pour la promotion de l’utilisation de primes et incitations fiscales (taux réduits de TVA), mais aussi pour une plus forte garantie de protection des consommateurs, pour l’amélioration de la transparence et la régulation du marché de l’énergie et pour la promotion de l’utilisation des services énergétiques, seront déterminants dans le changement de comportement.

Plusieurs villes européennes se sont fixé comme objectif l'autonomie énergétique ou l'ont déjà atteinte par le développement de systèmes énergétique locaux basés notamment sur les énergies renouvelables166. L'autonomie de décision des villes et des municipalités peut expliquer les succès des projets entrepris. Le rôle de l’UE sera de stimuler ces types de projets ancrés dans les réalités géographiques et socio-économiques locales par le soutien de stratégies urbaines et de mobilité durables et une politique régionale soutenant un développent socio-économique prenant en compte l’efficacité énergétique et la protection de l’environnement. La Convention des Maires est une initiative positive dans cette voie et il sera important d’assurer son financement lors des années à venir. De manière plus générale, une simplification administrative dans l’accès aux financements et projets de recherche, pour aider les universités, PME et autorités locales à s’investir dans ce type de projets, sera importante, ainsi que la garantie d’accès et le développement des réseaux énergétiques.

Aspects institutionnels dans le secteur de l'énergie

Dans le cadre légal actuel, des politiques sensibles pour la gestion du marché intérieur et la protection de l’environnement ont étés menées au niveau européen avec un certain succès, comme le démontre notamment l’adoption du paquet énergie et climat de mars 2009. L’adoption du Traité de Lisbonne serait une opportunité pour l’UE de se doter d’une politique énergétique plus unifiée grâce à l'insertion d'un chapitre distinct pour l'énergie. Ceci lui donnerait une nouvelle légitimité pour mener une politique plus ambitieuse, notamment par l’adoption d’objectifs quantifiés. Mais la question énergétique étant d’importance primordiale pour les Etats membres et le choix du mix énergétique restant de leur compétence, cette nouvelle base légale pourrait ne pas représenter un pas significatif et le choix d’une politique européenne énergétique restera fort dépendant de la volonté et des priorités stratégiques de chaque pays. Une prise de position européenne, ambitieuse et cohérente de la part du Parlement européen sera d’autant plus importante pour que l’Europe puisse relever les défis de l’énergie et des changements climatiques, tant au niveau de l’UE qu’à niveau international et global.

Camilla BURSI

162 China's energy policy, J. Holslag, 2007, PE 393.501 163 Development of China's Solar Cell Industry Annual Report 2006-2007, FriedlNet and Partners, April 2007. Hug, Rolf and Schachinger, Martin (2006), Chinese solar modules penetrating the German market, 164 http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_00_full_fr.pdf 165 http://www.angus-reid.com/uppdf/EU_GW.pdf 166 Par exemple Dardesheim

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Part 5: Internal Market and Consumer Protection

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5.1 Internal Market

Introduction

Significant progress has been made in the past decades to create a Single Market, where goods, services, capital and persons move freely. The pace of integration has however slowed down in recent years and gaps in implementation of internal market legislation still remain. Globalisation and enlargement of the EU presents a further challenge and at the same time provides an incentive to reap the untapped benefits stemming from creating an integrated market. There is a need to rethink the aptness of current policy tools, to expand and deepen integration of markets and seize the opportunity to create a Single Market with a strong social and environmental dimension.

The aim of this paper is to analyse forward trends affecting the Single Market and identify some of the key policy choices in the period 2009-2019. The paper focuses on the free movement of goods and services. The analysis of sectoral policies and an assessment of the free movement of capital, labour and knowledge is outside the scope of this note.

The idea of the Single Market was enshrined in the Treaty of Rome which had amongst its goal the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital. Customs union was achieved by 1 July 1968, non-tariff barriers however remained and it became increasingly apparent that further action is needed in order to remove these barriers. The Single European Act of 1986 paved the way to the creation of the Single Market which was formally launched 1 January 1993. Consumers benefited from increased competition, greater choice167, lower prices and higher quality. The advantage for businesses has been the potential access to a large home market. Following the recent adoption of the Services Directive and the Goods Package, most of the necessary legislation governing the free movement of goods and services is now in place. Large parts of the Single Market legislation however is still to be implemented by Member States and the proper application of rules remains a challenge.

This paper is structured as follows. Chapter 2 offers an overview of the main factors having an effect on policy decisions related to the Single Market in the coming decade, Chapter 3 outlines possible policy options and Chapter 4 concludes.

Challenges and opportunities influencing Single Market policies

Below an overview of some of the key issues that will have a major influence on policy choices in the field of the Single Market.

Globalisation

In the next decade we anticipate an increased movement of goods and services within the EU. It is expected that trade with third countries will increase even more. In 2007 the value of trade in commercial services increased at a faster rate (18 per cent) than trade in goods (15 per cent) for the first time in five years. This trend of increasing importance of services is likely to continue, with China and India becoming major exporters168.

The USA has traditionally been the EU’s most important trading partner but its relative significance has declined in recent years, in particular in imports. EU trade with China on the other hand has more than quadrupled since 1999 and China currently ranks first among EU import suppliers169..

167 It has to be noted that according to some researchers, choice overload has a significant downside and comes at a large social cost due to more time spent choosing the products or services and the increased frustration and stress of consumers. For an excellent review see Barry Schwartz: The Paradox of Choice: Why More is Less, HarperCollins Publishers, 2005 168 WTO: International Trade Statistic 2008 169 External and intra-European Union trade 2009 edition, data 2002–07

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Value chains are becoming increasingly interconnected and economic interdependence between the principal poles of the world and between these poles and their peripheries is growing170. Instead of moving complete production processes, companies resort more and more to outsourcing individual tasks171.

In the short run, as a result of the financial crisis, a temporary decrease in trade is expected as demand for import products decreases and protectionist policies (state aid, public procurement geared toward national companies) proliferate. In the long run trade is expected to pick up again.

Demographics, migration, societal changes

Between 2005 and 2020 the median age of the European population will increase from 38,9 to 42,7 years and the share of population aged 65+ will grow from 15,9% to 19%172. Population ageing will affect the composition and size of the indigenous labour force and might bring about a shift to less labour-intensive goods and services, and increased reliance on immigration. It will also modify the demand for particular goods and services, with an increase for health services for example. We can also expect changes in consumer culture, possibly helped by consumer protection legislation whereby consumers shop more and more cross-border, are better informed about the availability of products and about their rights, and are increasingly ready to resort to redress.

Enlargement of the EU and the euro area

With 27 Member States the European Union has become increasingly divergent, which makes hard to agree on one-size-fits all legislation. Also transposition and implementation has become more difficult and complex. With possible further enlargement the situation will become even more daunting.

Although the euro is not a necessary or sufficient condition for a properly functioning Single Market, it is certainly true that a fully integrated Single Market works better with a single currency173. In the next decade we can expect most EU countries to join the euro area.

Advances in information and communications technology

Technology plays an important role in facilitating outsourcing and offshoring activities and increasing the tradability of goods and services. Improved information and communication technology (ICT) increases efficiency, makes outsourcing easier and thus the place of production becomes less important. ICT also offers the possibility of teleworking and contributes to the dematerialisation of products and the development of new services (e.g. eHealth, online auctions, price comparison sites etc.). Internet will become an important sales channel for a number of products and services174.

Environmental policy

More stringent environmental policies can be expected to come into force in the next decade which will have an effect on polluting industries and with the possible taxation of transportation (air transport in particular) might disrupt existing trade patterns and location decisions of some industries. As a consequence we might experience less intra-EU trade and more domestic transactions or more imports from outside the EU as companies relocate to countries with more lax environmental standards.

170 European Commission: The World in 2025, Internal reflection note 10 February 2009 171 Hildegunn Kyvik Nordås: International Production Sharing: A Case for a Coherent Policy Framework, WTO Discussion Paper No 11, 2007 172 Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat, World Population Prospects: The 2008 Revision, http://esa.un.org/unpp 173 Charles Wyplosz: Euro or Not? Early Lessons from the Crisis 174 Internet is already the second most commonly used retail channel with 51% of the retailers making sales via e-commerce: Commission Staff Working Document, Report on cross-border e-commerce in the EU, SEC (2009) 283.

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On the other hand introducing ambitious environmental objectives also offers opportunities for European companies investing in the development of green technologies. Through the Single Market these companies have access to a large consumer base and can benefit from economies of scale which is particularly important in industries requiring heavy investments in R&D.

Policy responses175

Policy context of the Single Market

Single Market policy interacts with a large number of other policies at the EU and the national level; it therefore cannot and should not be looked at in isolation from other policies. These policies sometimes complement and strengthen each other, but they can also be at stark contrast to each other. Single Market policies, if not properly designed and implemented can have a disruptive effect on the environment and the social system. As two recent court cases show176, freedom of establishment and freedom to provide services can clash with national social systems and workers’ right. The provision of cross-border health services raises questions as to the financing of national health systems.

It is of paramount importance to identify what we strive to achieve by creating an integrated Single Market. Is it economic growth, employment, innovation, social protection, environmental protection or a high level of consumer protection that we would like to attain? These objectives can sometimes be conflicting and ways need to be found to reconcile them and to better integrate the different policies.

Short term actions

Removing existing barriers in the Single Market for goods

Most barriers to the trade of goods have been brought down in the early 1990's following the launch of the Single Market Programme. Despite the advances certain restrictions still remain177 and we can see a "home bias"178, Europeans continue to shop locally. The adoption of the Goods Package is an important step towards facilitating cross-border trade, but new instruments need to be embraced to give a fresh impetus to Single Market in goods. Competition policy, facilitating market entry and the diffusion of innovation should become more pronounced objectives. Fighting protectionism remains a crucial, - and in the light of the financial crisis - an even more prominent issue. Strengthening and improving administrative cooperation between Member State authorities responsible for the Single Market will also be of major importance in the coming years.

Improving transposition, implementation and enforcement

Despite significant progress in the recent years, the failure to correctly transpose, implement and enforce internal market legislation by Member States is one of the main reasons for the shortcomings in the functioning of the Single Market179. A number of different actions could be taken to improve transposing, implementing and enforcing legislation starting with better

175 Concurrently with the publication of this paper the European Commission came out with a Recommendation on 'Measures to improve the functioning of the Single Market' C (2009) 4728/4 176 Viking C-438/05 and Laval C-341/05 177 Even on the basis of comparable, highly tradable goods and after controlling for distance and city-specific characteristics, the dispersion of prices in the European Union remains on average around 20 to 25 per cent higher across borders than within countries. See: de Serres, A., P. Hoeller and C. de la Maisonneuve, 2001. The Width of the Intra-European Economic Borders. OECD Economics Department Working paper #304. OECD, Paris. 178 Juan Delgado: Single Market trails home bias, Bruegel Policy Brief Issue 2006/05 October 2006 179 See e.g. Steps towards a deeper economic integration: the Internal Market in the 21st century, European Commission Economic Papers, January 2007 or The Single Market: Wallflower or Dancing Partner, House of Lords report, February 2008

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legislative drafting through the provision of assistance and guidance to Member States, through improved monitoring and enforcement and better cooperation180.

Implementation of the Services Directive

Services is the most important sector in the EU economy, accounting for almost 70% of the EU GDP and employment. The Services Directive will have a significant impact and will largely facilitate the cross-border provision of services. While the deadline for transposing the directive is 28 December 2009, it is expected that a number of countries will not be able to transpose it in a timely manner. Questions around the interpretation of certain provisions are also bound to arise in the coming years, given that this is a large and complex piece of legislation. It is not clear for example whether Member States will be required to remove restrictions and barriers that are merely discriminatory or if they need to go further and also remove non-discriminatory restrictions which impede market access. The scope of the Directive and the extent of the limitations might also require further clarification181.

Specific actions in important service sectors

Given the specific nature of some service sectors, they have been exempted from the scope of the Services Directive. In some service markets where there exists a de facto internal market this has lead to a legal uncertainty. Services of general economic interest, health services or gambling are a few cases in point. There is certainly a need to clarify ambiguities and possibly draft sector specific legislation that takes into account the specificities of these sectors and minimises the negative impact to national systems, e.g. national health policies, national budgets, etc.

Some other services (in particular financial services, energy, telecommunications, and transportation) need particular attention as they act as lubricants to the rest of the economy, being an important input to other products and services. Increasing the competitiveness of the services sector could also lead to a more competitive manufacturing sector182. There seems to be a need to continue the liberalisation and interconnection of network industries183. Greater harmonisation may be necessary in certain areas, in particular in retail financial services.

Facilitating SME access the Single Market and reducing administrative burden

SMEs employ almost 70% of the EU work force and generate nearly 60% of the EU GDP184, they are thus important players in the EU economy. SMEs are particularly active in services markets185, therefore once implemented, the Services Directive will become a key tool in facilitating SME access to the Single Market. The European Private Company Statute and steps to reduce administrative burden will also ease making business in another country, a number of obstacles however still remain. The variety of legal and tax systems in the different Member States makes it time consuming and expensive for SMEs to expand beyond their home country. The provision of information is crucial in this respect. It is also of paramount importance to create one-stop shops for setting up new businesses and to reduce time and costs for starting up a company. Other (longer term) options to facilitate SME access to the Single Market could include the introduction of taxation based on a common consolidated corporate tax base or the instauration of "home state taxation", where SMEs would be taxed only in their home country independently of where the income was earned.

180 For a comprehensive overview on possible actions to improve transposition, implementation and enforcement of EU legislation see Balázs Mellár: Transposition, implementation and enforcement of consumer law, 2009 181 Catherine Barnard : Unravelling the Services Directive, Common Market Law review 45 323-394, 2008 182 www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200506/ldselect/ldeucom/23/23.pdf http:// p. 17 183 For a review of the advantages of liberalisation see Copenhagen Economics: The potential economic gains from full market opening in network industries, January 2007 184 Eurostat: Enterprises by size class - overview of SMEs in the EU, Statistic in Focus 31/2008 185 ibid

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Opening up public procurement

The total value of public procurement in the EU is estimated at about 16% of the Union’s GDP or €1500 billion in 2002. The opening up of public procurement within the Internal Market has increased cross-border competition and decreased prices paid by public authorities. There remains however potential for significant further competition in procurement markets since direct cross-border procurement remains low, accounting for just 3% of the total number of bids186. The large number of infringement procedures in this area also shows that transposition, implementation and enforcement of legislation is not functioning properly187. Facilitating access by SMEs to public procurement contracts should be encouraged in particular as these companies face the biggest constraints due to the size of public procurement contracts and the large administrative burden.

Long term actions

New policy tools at work for the Single Market

As outlined already in Chapter 3.1., when designing future Single Market policies it is important to note the links to other policies and to be aware of the goals that are to be achieved.

A decision needs to be taken as to what approach is used to achieve harmonisation, whether we opt for minimum or maximum harmonisation, the country of origin principle, mutual recognition or Directives based on the New Approach188. An identification of key sectors and main elements to focus on might also be necessary.

In order to make the Single Market a reality there seems to be a need to move beyond legislation and harmonisation of rules and apply a wider range of policy tools. These include competition policy, the removal of subsidies and restrictive national standards, focusing on implementation and enforcement, investigating breaches of EU law, raising awareness of and increasing effectiveness of problem solving networks such as SOLVIT, improving consumer confidence, increasing consumer protection to enhance cross-border shopping, removing unjustified obstacles to cross-border buying189, providing stronger contractual rights to consumers and making redress more accessible.

Deepening the Single Market

The Single Market seems to work better in some areas than in others: network industries, some service sectors and online retail are probably among the worst performers. There is a need to analyse in-depth individual markets, identify the extent and the sources of problems and to develop a tailored mix of policies to remedy shortcomings.

Given the likely positive effect of a single currency on the functioning of the Single Market we need to investigate whether euro entry should be encouraged. Should countries with an implicit or explicit opt-out be allowed to remain outside the euro area for an indefinite period? Should entry for new countries be eased by overlooking some of the Maastricht criteria or by changing the criteria?

A more ambitious project would be the coordination of tax policy (currently Member State competence), the harmonisation of the corporate tax base and possibly also the corporate tax level, VAT and excise duty. While full tax harmonisation is probably not necessary, tax 186 European Commission: A report on the functioning of public procurement markets in the EU: benefits from the application of EU directives and challenges for the future 187 25th annual report on monitoring the application of Community law, COM (2008) 777 188 European Commission: Guide to the implementation of directives based on the New Approach and the Global Approach 189 Obstacles are most evident in sales of goods and services over the internet. For an excellent overview of the motives of e-commerce businesses to engage in territorial differentiation see: Dr. Natali Helberger: "Refusal to Serve Consumers because of their Nationality or Residence - Distortions in the Internal Market for E-commerce Transactions?"

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coordination would enable countries to pursue social objectives while respecting the rules of the Single Market190.

Extending the Single Market

Further enlargements might take place in the coming decade which would automatically lead to the extension of the Single Market. These enlargements will pose a challenge, but also provide opportunities to reinvigorate the Single Market.

A policy option to consider could be to open the Single Market to countries outside the EU. An agreement with the European Economic Area (EEA) countries allows them participation in the EU internal market (they need to transpose internal market legislation and also contribute financially to the Single Market)191, a similar arrangement with Eastern or Mediterranean countries could have numerous benefits: the home market for businesses would increase, energy dependence could decrease and foreign policy objectives could also be reached via this way.

In this context it is important to mention the possibility of developing the transatlantic Single Market. Progress is already being made via the Transatlantic Economic Council192 and regulatory cooperation with the US.

Conclusions

Due to the ever changing environment and to cultural and practical factors that make cross-border shopping and trade less appealing, the Single Market can never be fully completed. There are however large untapped opportunities to decrease the gap between the potential and the reality of the Single Market. Fully reaping the benefits is only possible by involving stakeholders and national governments.

Particular care needs to be taken that the Single Market does not become a goal in itself and social, environmental and consumer protection concerns are taken into account. New policy initiatives should always be driven by an analysis of the impact they have on specific markets, economic sectors, the environment and in the social sphere.

A well-functioning Single Market constitutes a competitive advantage for Europe in the face of globalisation, leads to increased competition, lower prices for consumers and access to a large market for businesses.

Balázs MELLÁR

190 Mario Monti: “No taxation without coordination” in the Forum issue 1, 14 May 2009 191 European Economic Area agreement 192 1st Transatlantic Economic Council (TEC) Meeting, November 9, Washington, DC - Joint Statement

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5.2 Consumer Protection OPEN A WINDOW AND CUSTOMISE YOUR WORLD Consumer behaviour is a reflex of the current social, demographic and economic situation in a context of economic globalisation and geopolitical fragmentation. Consumption reflects citizens' worries: about the future of our jobs and our children's; about our purchasing power; about our personal savings, loans and pensions; about climate change and affordable energy; about food scares and expensive groceries; about the safety of the goods and services that we buy for ourselves and our children. Indeed, family and social welfare are citizens' main concerns. This note lists a series of trends that will impact on consumers in the forthcoming decade and identifies some of the topics for future reflection regarding the consumer challenges that Europe will likely face in the next ten years.

TRENDS 1. An ageing albeit more autonomous population. The European population is ageing and birth rates continue to fall, in some Member States below replacement level193.

Being elderly will decreasingly equate with being a pensioner, nor with financial dependency, due to medical developments which allow for a further increase in life expectancy and better treat a variety of chronic diseases. Although the elderly will need long-term, expensive medical services, they will keep an independent life longer than today. In the end, the myth of a frail old age crippled with disabilities will be destroyed.

Marketing specifically targeted towards the elderly (instead of the young) will develop. Elderly will increasingly enjoy travelling, practice sports, study, use the internet and will spend heavily on food and cosmetics that promise to improve health or slow down ageing. On the other hand, some of the elderly population may still be frail and ailing, and will be vulnerable to scams and hard selling. Finally, policy-making specifically directed towards the elderly is likely to emerge, as they become the majority of the European population. Political parties advocating elderly interests are likely to emerge.

2. Leisure society. The growing category of autonomous elderly will reinforce the move by Western societies from a working society to a leisure society. Focus is on well-being, quality of life, stress reduction, and personal development. Leisure and well-being industries are therefore likely to develop further and bundle with health services and tourism. Home services will explode as the elderly will live longer at home. Consumers will likely be more mobile, fickle, less faithful to brands, and increasingly looking for both real life and online emotional experiences.

3. Lifestyle trends. Consumer behaviour emulates specific lifestyle values. In a complex world, various, paradoxical trends are likely to develop. The trends mentioned below are not isolated, as consumers may drive a SUV and yet buy organic products.

The Barbie world lifestyle model is based on consumerism and over indebtedness. Consumers experience happiness by accumulating goods, in particular technological goods. Emphasis is on the immediate sensation: happiness is transitory and requires the constant replacement by newer, upgraded goods. The good citizen's model is one of thrift and frugality, waste reduction, environmentally friendly behaviour, sustainable development, simplicity, acquisition of durable goods and organic products. Consumers are seen as agents for change. Emphasis is on responsibility: consumers control their urge to purchase goods or services, reduce energy consumption, and make sustainable consumer choices. It is to be noted that some of the lifestyle choices mentioned require consumers to have the additional revenue needed to finance them, e.g., to pay for efficient insulation in order to save energy, or to buy organic goods. This may be more difficult during a recession. An increasingly higher number of persons will live in cities194 or in nearby suburbs. More time is likely to be devoted to transport from suburbia to the metropolis, during which people will

193 Eurostat news release of 26 August 2008; United Nations World Fertility Patterns 2007; United Nations World Population Ageing 2007.

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listen to music, learn online, connect with others, and shop. Public transport stations such as airports and train stations will increasingly resemble shopping centres, assorted with supermarkets, spas, restaurants, dry cleaning services.

4. Is it safe? The current economic model is based on subcontracting industrial manufacturing and outsourcing back office activities such as call centres, accounting and payroll services. The increasing difficulty of government control over the economy is accompanied by a transnationalisation of production, investment and consumption. This contrasts with the national basis of taxation and budget systems. Goods consumers buy and use in Europe must be safe, regardless of the country of production. Safety is an important driver of consumer choice. Recurrent food scares and toy recalls decrease consumer confidence. Safety also concerns services, including the liability of professional services such as financial services, those provided by lawyers and accountants, and hotel accommodation.

5. Consumers of services. Services represent a large share of EU GDP. Certain services markets which have been recently liberalised are not working properly195. Following liberalisation, monopolies were replaced by oligopolies, but there was no clear increase of competition to the benefit of consumers.

6. Consumers of technology. Europeans are early adopters of technology and avid users of the internet. Younger generations are likely to use the internet more and increasingly ignore the TV as communication media. E-commerce is the second most commonly used retail channel196. More focused web marketing techniques using users' individual profiles, blogs and online social networks (Twitter, Facebook, MySpace, Hi5, LinkedIn, Habbo, PatientsLikeMe, Plaxo, Xiaonei) are likely to develop while the right to control one's identity (and the persons one shares it with) will be tested due to data protection concerns.

a. Connectivity. Miniaturisation of portable devices such as the mobile phone, the PDA and the MP3 player is likely to increase. Portable devices will be used everywhere, in particular during the longer transportation times as a result of growing urbanisation. Connectivity is likely to develop further among devices since existing technology such as Wi-Fi and radio-frequency identification197 allow shoppers to know a person's recently downloaded music, the pages recently browsed in the mobile phone, or the places recently visited; home devices monitor health parameters like glycaemia, blood pressure, and coagulation rate, avoiding trips to laboratories or hospitals; geographical location is used for advertising purposes.

b. Addiction and abuse. Not being part of the digital world is something most young people cannot conceive. The risk of dependence through the pervasive use of messaging, social networks, online games and gambling is likely to increase. Identity theft and cyber bullying198 will also spread.

c. Information overload. Being constantly bombarded by more information that one can readily assimilate hinders decision-making and judgment by causing stress, confusion, uncertainty and distraction. A likely trend will be the development of personalised, peer- searches. Users' profiles as regards browsing, shopping and social communities will be crucial for a more tailored marketing and advertising.

OPPORTUNITIES FOR EU ACTION Crises bring challenges and the opportunity to think out of the box and out of the fence. It is a chance to think creatively about new solutions. The greatest question is how to ensure organised evolution, as current chaotic developments contribute to instability.

194 United Nations, World Urbanization Prospects: The 2005 Revision. 195 Commission Communication 'Monitoring consumer outcomes in the Single Market: the Consumer Market Scoreboard', COM(2008)31 and accompanying Staff Working Document SEC (2008) 87. 196 Commission Staff Working Document, Report on cross-border e-commerce in the EU, SEC (2009) 283. 197 European Parliament, RFID and Identity Management in Everyday Life (2006). 198 Eurobarometer, Towards a safer use of the Internet for children in the EU – a parents’ perspective, 2008.

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The European Parliament could stand as a strategic partner in a changing world by providing an inclusive, effectively horizontal approach within the EU ensuring that policy-making is directed at increasing the welfare of citizens, and at freeing the full potential of the internal market.

1. Transnational governance. The global economy in general, and international financial markets in particular, are now so integrated that only stronger global governance and more concerted action will do.

Product safety is also trade and customs-related. Ensuring security, safety and trade facilitation throughout the supply chain is necessary to ensure consumer confidence in goods and to expand economic growth. Consider further cooperation with China and other emerging economic players in order to secure smart and secure trade lanes with the European Community which include global consumer product traceability.

2. Prescription: Buy Something. The success of internal market is based on millions of citizens consuming. Through successive enlargements, the number of consumers with a potential of increasing purchasing power grew exponentially.

Consumer spending drives the overall European economy. It helps the economy to get back on track after a recession and is essential to sustain it during expansion. Support the European economy by helping the consumer to buy during recession, to shop cross-border, and by preventing abuses in markets not performing well. Evaluate how facilitating conclusion of (consumer) contracts and strengthening consumer rights when buying goods and services, helps build consumer confidence. Ponder over guaranteeing access to transparent and affordable financial services, including, inter alia, access to basic services such as bank accounts and micro-insurance.

3. The many faces of consumer policy. Consumer policy is increasingly interlinked with antitrust policy, financial services, telecommunications, energy and transport. At the same time, companies, as drivers of growth and job creation, should not be burdened with excessive red tape in order to do business without barriers.

Regulation exists to simplify a multifarious world, and to introduce protective measures where there are risks affecting certain groups. EU legislation is increasingly complex; recent legislative packages on cross-cutting issues cover the remit of several parliamentary committees, of several Directorate-Generals within the European Commission, and of several Councils (Competitiveness, Justice, Ecofin). On another perspective, lawmaking will require reconciling different, often conflicting goals, in a complex and interdependent world. The need for coherent transposition and correct implementation of EC legislation by Member States will remain crucial in order to avoid fragmentation of the internal market. Consumer satisfaction is the main driver for the functioning of the internal market. Effective enforcement is essential for markets to function well, as consumers who feel adequately protected by legislation are more confident. On the contrary, consumers who encounter difficulties when trying to solve a problem, or when seeking redress, will be more mistrustful. Unhappy consumers are also alienated voters. Assess the internal market effects of current fragmentation of national laws regulating consumer transactions. Weigh the desirability of compensation of consumers who have suffered damages caused by the same trader by way of mass claim cases (collective redress). Look at electronic small claims courts and mediation services (e-justice) as a way of obtaining cheap and quick redress.

4. Technology survival kit. Technology poses huge consumer challenges. Consider whether consumers can fully benefit from the development of new technologies by way of more choice and lower prices. Balance reconciling reduction of red tape with an effective protection of consumers against faulty digital products.

Ponder how to balance the unconstrained development of innovative online activities and services with sufficient data protection when using inter alia search engines, social platforms and payment systems. Evaluate how to cater both for the proper functioning of the internal market and ensuring the protection of vulnerable groups.

5. Monitoring markets. Monitoring markets, particularly those which are not performing well, will increase market efficiency. Consider whether the European Parliament could play a role in

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monitoring certain markets which are not working in order to promote competition to the benefit of consumers and to improve transparency of offers and prices available in the market. This includes markets such as financial services, retail banking services (e.g. fees), insurances, gas, electricity, fixed telephony, and transport (urban and suburban). It is therefore suggested to consider reinforcing Parliament's role in the following tasks: TIME = Transposition, Implementation, Monitoring, and Enforcement.

In order to do so, consider how to reach out to social networks, as a way of connecting policy with civil society and associations, and of increasing Parliament's legitimacy as the house of citizens. Testing new models for citizen participation may be a helpful tool to assess the impact of policies and to pursue an evidence-based policy. Contemplate whether it would be useful for the European Parliament to develop its own forecasting resources so as to anticipate trends instead of being determined by them.

Patricia SILVEIRA

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Part 6: Science and Technology Options Assessment (STOA)

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6.1 Improvements in growth and sustainability though technology and interdisciplinary EP incentives

Improvements in growth and sustainability though technology and interdisciplinary EP incentives

This paper picks out a few cross- and interdisciplinary challenges, touching upon areas, such as food production, health, environment and transport, where improvements could be achieved.

Introduction Most of the problems of economics arise out of the use of resources to satisfy human desires. All economies are faced with the problem of scarcity.199 The scarcity issue is especially pronounced in the period of financial and environmental crisis that the EU is facing. The EU or any other government would have an uneasy task of making a choice, because resources are scarce when dealing with unlimited human wants.

Classical economic theory holds the efficient use of land, labour, and capital as the key elements of economic success. Here they are sketched, together with the Planet's malaise 'diagnosis':

Classical economic theory Current concerns

Land Free gifts of nature such as land, forests, minerals, natural resources.

Water, land, resources needed for energy production, etc.

Labour All human resources; mental and physical.

Population structure - proportional to active labour vis-à-vis inactive.

Capital All man-made aids to further production, such as tools, machinery, equipment, including everything man-made which is not consumed for its own sake but which is used up in the process of making other goods.

Physical capital: tools, machinery, infrastructure, etc.

Human Capital: quality of labour force

Intellectual Capital: knowledge that can be exploited for a useful purpose.

Social Capital: mutual trust, norms and networks that can improve the efficiency of facilitating coordinated actions.200

Financial capital is simply a means of acquiring the above. With financial capital, the allocation of scarce resources is possible.

Technology, according to some economists there is another element to be added to those factors mentioned above. With effective and sustainable technology, the scarcity of land, labour capital can be by-passed. Technology advances can also ensure that increased productivity / increased economic growth does not necessary lead to increased pollution. Overexploitation of natural resources could be curtailed. One example from USA demonstrates that the level of CO2 emissions relative to its GDP has halved since 1960s. Despite the fact that the CO2 emissions level per US inhabitant still remains relatively high. Similarly, in Germany, the level of CO2 emissions per capita has decreased since 1970s, although Germany's GDP has grown since that.201

199 Lipsey R. G. - An introduction to Positive Economics; 1965 200 Chloupková J., Bjørnskov Ch. - Could Social capital help Czech agriculture?, Agricultural Economics, 48 (6): 245 - 249; 2002 201 World Bank - World Development Indicators 2009

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Science and technology could be used as powerful tools. What should be their priorities and the role of the EP?

The following chapters pick up a few interdisciplinary challenges where the EU can have a constructive influential role.

Challenges/issues at stake Feeding the population

Despite a relative decrease in the developed world's population, the population continues to increase in the developing world. The rise in population also implies pressure on natural resources.

In the EU, the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) is the tool to regulate food production and distribution. The purpose of this note is to point to some, not yet well-integrated, interdisciplinary challenges, which must be addressed in a better policy design.

Worldwide food production is responsible for 31% of total Green House Gases (GHG). The global livestock industry emits more GHG than all forms of transport202 - already Albert Einstein warned about this trap.

Crucial to mention is an enormous amount of food is being wasted daily, for banal reasons - bad logistics and/or a careless attitude.

Meat

Average consumption of meat world-wide is 39 kg/head/year. There are regional differences: Europe 80 kg/head/year, North America 120 kg/head/year, developing countries 25kg/head/year, least developed countries 9 kg/head/year.

Given the fact that 25-33 kg/head/year could be considered as safe meat consumption (above this level, there is an increased risk of heart disease, cancer, diabetes and obesity), the scientific consensus strongly indicates that the developed world abuses meat consumption203, while, currently, developing countries are fine.

An alarming future challenge will be the income increase and urbanisation leading to raise per capita demand for meat in the developing world. Levels of meat consumption in the developed world are expected to remain stable. The increase in meat consumption in the developing world is further multiplied due to the projected population increase. Due to Western consumption patterns spreading, global meat demand would more than double by 2050 (563 mil tonnes).

GHG emissions from meat production would more than double and an increase of cancer and cardiovascular diseases and the health costs are to be expected. Transport associated with a livestock/meat production chain is another factor that is adding to further emissions which are not counted in the previous figures.

Land

Assuming production methods and yield trends remain stable, production of the quantity of meat that would be required to feed the global population and would correspond to the Western eating patterns; 33% of global arable land would be required only to produce the feed for the animal sector; 58% of the world's surface would have to be sacrificed as pastureland and about 18% of oil production would be required as an input in the animal husbandry. To illustrate, 7-10 kg of cereal feed is required to produce a single kilogram of beef.

Water

202 The Norwegian Board of Technology website, 12 August 2008 203 Implication of Global Trends in Eating Habits for Climate Change, Health and Natural Resources - STOA Project IP/A/STOA/IC/2008-180, European Parliament, April 2009

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Consumption of fresh water is expected to increase considerably throughout the developing world and the risks of floods, consequence of global warming, are therefore increased.204 If the current trends continue, 47% of the world's population will live in water scarcity areas by 2030.

Agriculture, especially the livestock sector, is a major user of fresh water: 7 tonnes of water are needed to create the feed required for 1 kg of meat. Water requirements for livestock production are considerably higher, including drinking water for the animal - 15,000 litres to produce 1kg of beef.205

Options for policies design • Taxing externalities - costs associated with environmental and health damage need to be

passed on to meat producers/consumers.

• One Meat-free day a week would achieve more in terms climate change improvement than cutting down on transport. The EP will off-set its increased GHG emissions incurred by its frequent moves to Strasbourg. To the World, the EP would set an example worth following.

• Using ICT applications, improved infrastructures and/or common sense to mitigate the enormous wastes that happen along the food chain, catering and water management.

• Food policies, hygiene and sanitary standards should not contradict common sense and the global challenges.

• The integration of policies, e.g. environment, agriculture, health in view of geopolitical sensitivity due to the resource scarcity.

Transport, Energy, Environment and Health

The global environment is expected to further deteriorate. Given the complexity of ecosystems and the multitude of inter-related factors that impact them, future developments and consequences are difficult to forecast. World-wide emissions of GHG are expected to continue to grow. Temperatures are expected to rise worldwide.

Technology options should be harnessed. A wide range of non oil-based technical improvements and options for road and air transport have been developed in the last decade. Some technologies are already commercialised. Difficult to predict is which technologies will emerge as the front-runners for Europe. Often, available technologies are left unimplemented because of a lack of regulation and harmonisation of European standards.206

Savings could be achieved by a combination of improved vehicle technology; low carbon fuels, modal shift and strong demand management could improve mobility. At stake is how to deliver a good accessibility of transport - efficient, cost-effective, and affordable - reducing oil consumption and CO2 emissions. Transportation accounts for about 20% of total GHG emissions worldwide, about 30% in most industrialised countries. Road transport accounts for most of the GHG transport emissions.

204 A European Economic Recovery Plan - Communication for the Commission to the European Council; Commission

of the European Communities, 26 November 2008 205 Implication of Global Trends in Eating Habits for Climate Change, Health and Natural Resources - STOA Project IP/A/STOA/IC/2008-180, European Parliament, April 2009 206The Future of European long-distance transport: Scenario Report - STOA Project IP/A/STOA/FWC-2005-28/SC27

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Of special concern is the intensive energy consumption by air-conditions (A/C) and insufficient isolation of buildings: estimations are that 30% of the energy inputs associated with running buildings are used for air-conditionings, while 20 % is for heating.207 Evidence shows that air-conditioning has adverse health consequences (e.g. legionella, sinusitis, respiratory and muscular problems).

Options policies design • Savings:

o Thoughtful architecture, appropriate clothing: Ancients Greeks were able to construct buildings that kept cool in summer, without using A/C;

o Having a choice to switch off A/C.

o Redesigning buildings ventilated by the opening of windows, as opposed to by complicated and energy consuming A/C;

o Investment in rail infrastructure to encourage modal shift;

o Integrating air and rail;

o Attention should be given to ports for large containers, construction of tunnels in mountainous areas, upgrading inland waterlines, e.g. Rhine-Main-Danube.

o Maintenance and modernisation of existing technologies.

o Improving cities infrastructures and safety, for population to opt for public transport, bicycles or walking.

• Technology:

o ICT applications to optimise travel flow and travel volumes.

o Satellite technologies and applications for precise and real life information regarding positioning, timing, etc.

o Integration of successful new technologies into practice.

o An effective policy design to encourage technological discoveries must also cater

for the possible unexpected societal reactions and legal implications regarding personal data protection and potential misuse/leakage of information, etc.

Biotechnology

Near-future discoveries in biotechnology could help develop new vaccines, bio-artificial organs and personalised medicine thanks to the use of biomarkers. Interdisciplinary applications of metagenomics could lead to advances in human health, agriculture, energy, environmental remediation and the carbon cycle.

Green biotechnology would offer another possibility of feeding the world and/or dealing with environmental issues. Next decade green biotechnology development might see a range of applications: energy plants, plants for nutritionally enhanced properties or for producing pharmaceutically active substances, crops with several enhanced agricultural traits, e.g. drought and insect resistance in one crop variety, technology known as 'stacking of genes'.

207 Buildings Energy Data Book; US Department of Energy; 2008

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Apart from technological novelties, changed framework conditions continue to challenge established practices and aims. Adoption of green biotechnology in the EU is hindered by regulatory systems not fully prepared to meet all existing and foreseeable future challenges (viz. recent WTO conflict). Despite the positive scientific opinions, GMO cultivations remain minimal due to political positions in many MS.208

Options for policies design:

• Improve understanding at several levels: subsidiarity (regions/MS/EU/World), democracy, cost-effectiveness in a broader sense (e.g. under which conditions it makes sense to grow a certain GM variety), asymmetry in accountability and ethics (sharing profits vis-à-vis being accountable should any future damage take place).

• Achieve consensus of EU and international GM regulations and approaches to risk assessment must be resolved whilst the manifested resistance of European citizens towards GMO's should be taken on-board.

• Creating platforms where citizens and scientists could share their concerns and possible solutions.

Recommendations for a framework policy design Involve society in ethical questions, the evolving research and societal realities. The questions: "What are the EU’s fundamental ethical principles" and "How to deal with divergent research-related ethical MS positions" must be answered. To that end:

1. “Ethical advisory group” on research questions, or multidisciplinary “inquiry commission” should be created by the EP. It should consist of MEP's, experts (natural and interdisciplinary scientists, economists, historians, lawyers, philosophers, ethicists, theologians) proposed by the different political groups. Composition could be half MEP's and half experts.

2. Visitor groups representing the EU citizens should be encouraged to participate in the EP's science-related activities to tighten the citizen-scientist-politician divergence.

3. Following the success of 'The STOA Experience' in June 2007 Plenary session, the EP could annually organise an EP Science Week, as in September 1985, to propose and exhibit options to EU challenges.

Future S & T discoveries will play a role in finding remedies and will remain a function of public and private investment, and quality and availability of education. Universities must rethink their role in reaching a broader public.

208 European Parliamentary Technology Assessment, Genetically modified plants and foods: Challenges and future

issues in Europe, Final Report, April 2009

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Conclusions Production is inefficient when it is merely possible to re-allocate resources and to produce more of at least one type of goods without simultaneously producing less of any other type. An analogous situation applies to distribution amongst these in need.

Appropriate, interdisciplinary, flexible and target-oriented policies must aid the challenges:

Portfolio of savings in energy, land, water, air, climate, financial expenditures, and human health can be easily achieved with appropriate policies. Changes of behaviour patterns and infrastructure are also instrumental.

Economic development and the labour market are directly interlinked. There is a window of opportunity, before the baby-boom generation retires, to redesign and implement policies that address these challenges.209 Sending people into early retirement is not a solution this time. In an aging society an increased and efficient contribution to the labour market is essential. Societies have to deal with increased expenditures of pensions, health, adjusted infrastructure, etc. EU-wide measures to safeguard the sufficient proportion in the labour market are crucial.

Human capital could be improved through education and training. Employing social capital often creates additional social and economic benefits external to the original investment210, by lowering transaction costs via informal self-enforcement of contracts, without third party enforcement.211 Measures encouraging the creation of social capital should be encouraged. Similarly, measures protecting intellectual property rights will encourage the growth of the intellectual capitals.

Technology, if effective and used in a sustainable manner, has the potential to overcome the scarcity issue of the three factors named above. It is essential to further scientific and technology developments that will serve humanity. There is an untapped potential in interdisciplinary and cross disciplinary research. The EU’s R&D policy should be a tool encouraging competition, while respecting fundamental principles, such as cost-effectiveness, sustainability, democracy, subsidiarity, accountability, transparency ethics and morality.

It is vital for democracy that the EP pacesetter acts in more policy areas. EU coordinated R&D must harmonise with the political priorities of EU to find remedies for the challenges.

Jarka CHLOUPKOVÁ

209 Vladimír Špidla, Commissioner for Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities, 29 April 2009 210 Chloupková J., Bjørnskov Ch. - Counting in Social Capital When Easing Agricultural Credit Constraints; Journal of Microfinance, Volume 4, Number 1; 2002 211 Chloupková J., Svendsen G.L.H., Svendsen G.T. - Building and destroying social capital: The case of cooperative movements in Denmark and Poland; Agriculture and Human Value 20: 241 - 252; 2003

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6.2 EU RTD policy and the associated development of highly qualified human resources

Introduction

EU policy thinking is largely defined by the Lisbon process. In this the paradigm of a 'knowledge based economy' constitutes a reference point.

Nevertheless, what is meant, or can be meant by a 'knowledge based economy' ?

In the first instance is obviously a working population that enters employment with high (or extremely high) skills. These employees are as such capable to handle high level technologies.

We should also observe, that in this context the definition of 'skills' is rather limited, being largely restricted to new entrants. The approach above also opens another box of Pandora: that of the 'high level technologies'.

The Lisbon process

It is obvious that the EU will fail to attain the goals proclaimed in 2000 (and revised in 2005): it will not become the most attractive knowledge based economy in the world by 2010. Also the goal of 3% GDP investment in RTD will not be reached. Even the GDP investment structure (1/3 public funds, 2/3 private funds) is a questionable goal.

It is also obvious that the process was counterbalanced in certain regions of the world. The goals proclaimed are comparative to the facts in the US, but the general conditions in the EU are not of the same nature (the 'technology gap' coined at the end of the 1960's is still existing !). The EU is also facing the significant increase in potential of China and India to retain their knowledge workers and to divert important knowledge based work (both research and high-tech based industry) from the EU.

Therefore, until 2019, the policy question is: what about 'after Lisbon' ? 'Lisbon revisited' ? Is there any need to change goals, revise them or create a new set of goals ?

Consequently, the most important possible policy action will be to put something in place of the 'Lisbon Strategy'. Actually, one deficiency of the Lisbon process may be considered to be its direct impact upon the individual citizen: the citizen is not aware neither of what, how, why his personal contribution, nor of what his personal gain may be. Items in the analysis presented below may form parts of such a new strategy.

The socio-political situation

The EU is a structure which in its present form is a competitor in the globalized world. The EU is a competitor in itself, but also its parts are competitors. The EU community is based on certain facts:

1. the EU is a community which shares similar cultural attitudes, both related to education and work; in spite of language differences (which can not be neglected) otherwise structural base is similar (structure of educational system, work conditions, etc.)

2. Member States are grouped around a close historical economic development

3. Member States face similar challenges in terms of socio-economic development

4. Member States face also similar challenges in the global competition

Which are the challenges?

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Challenges of socio-economic nature and those which derivate from global competition can not be completely separated. These may be summarized as:

• an aging population (beyond the high-tech infrastructure needed to serve it, including health care and social support, modalities and technologies to counterbalance the process are also included - i.e. 'service technologies'),

• restructuring of industrial sites (dismantling old industries and replacing them with new ones - which are knowledge intensive, while transcending from a 'consumer' to a 'consumer and producer' society - to avoid the total drift of industrial production to countries with lower wages),

• continue to address environmental issues,

• the complex matter of energy (security of supply, efficiency and environmental impact)

• the 'technology gap' towards the main competitors (the traditional ones, US and Japan, as well as the new ones, countries from Asia)

Policies concerned

Challenges (above) constitute also fields for policy areas in RTD, however, currently the most promising solutions are attributed to nanotechnologies and nanomaterials. Although for a while the public discourse heralds the convergence of certain technologies at nano level, until now this has been envisaged only for ICT, bio- and cogno sciences. A strengthened gradual penetration of the 'nano' based approach in answering the challenges (above) will require policy actions to:

• address safety issues involved,

• replace obsolete technologies (a more careful and comprehensive analysis of the real comparative values of different technologies will have to be reflected),

• restructure the workforce,

• optimise use of natural resources (available from internal sources or from outside the EU),

• increase environmental efficiency of working and living conditions.

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Usually, are considered only positive aspects of 'nano', when the goal is 'to boost' the industry associated, or only safety issue associated with health impacts, when regulation is cried for. Comprehensive approaches are lacking. 'Nano' already entered certain industries (e.g. ICT) and ICT and 'bio' (genetics) are already examples of how many levels of control are implied when it comes to human usage (from security to data retrieval, handling and understanding the processes). To my best knowledge, although as technological solutions associated with 'nano' are extremely promising, policy actions were limited to 'control developments made anyhow' instead of 'to boost a controlled development of technologies' (e.g. we have a problem in the efficient storage of energy, as currently oil has the highest energy stored per volume unit - apart of nuclear; 'nano' may have a solution for that, but we need a development programme for that with regulatory aspects, too).

The principle of 'controlled development of technologies' may be considered for any other field, too.

The human base

As already stated, the 'knowledge based economy' requires also a specifically trained workforce. The most important internal resource the EU can count on in the near future will continue to be the human capital. Currently, this is also the real competitive edge the EU has. Nevertheless, human capital improvement also constitutes a significant strand in EU aid programmes towards the underdeveloped world. EU human capital policies will have to reconcile these antagonist ends. Ascending economies (mostly in Asia) also show a significant improvement in human capital (i.e. in aggregation of human knowledge).

Primary knowledge will come from science and we will face an increased turnover of science based technologies (the associated turnover of human capital had to be considered, too).

First, RTD policies will have to optimise the production of (scientific) knowledge in the EU. It is expected that the notion of 'value for money' will gain importance in policies concerning investment in research. This implies:

• better coordination of research policies (in order to avoid non-efficient EU internal competition); this is already a goal since 1974, with little achievements until now,

• increase verification of the achievement of established policy goals with the increase of amount of allocated resources,

• the base for RTD policy control should be strengthened; this is given by a legal framework that defines the next hierarchy levels of political control,

• scientific knowledge creation to become more efficient (policies to monitor investment vs. output and its social benefit),

• increase the speed of turnover of scientific knowledge (the US currently has a technology development policy still largely based on the 1945 paper of Vannevar Bush 'Science Endless Frontier': first development of technologies for military use and their rapid conversion into mass products, with a continuous renewal; the approach seems to be taken over by certain developing economies being associated also with low cost of human resources, as a competitive edge; in other cases, where no military background exists, the strategy seems to be that certain prospective key technologies are identified, and there is a complete mobilisation in order to obtain a breakthrough in the area - currently the EU has no similar strategy or policy, which may insure a competitive turnover of scientific knowledge),

• secure the competitive advantage of knowledge produced in the EU (scientific publication is free, to the benefit of the mankind, but this again has to be reconciled with the fact that as the most powerful resource the EU has, is also de facto the single competitive edge the EU has; IPR is part of the problem),

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• decrease significant regional disparities which exist within the EU (both in knowledge production and its transfer);

• strengthen the institutional base of scientific knowledge production management (EU wide RTD is concentrated in 'intergovernmental organisations' and 'EU funding', the later one being almost solely DG RTD and the FP; certain other institutions may be also added to these (e.g. ESF or more recently ERC, EIT, or the JTIs).

These are also prerequisites of a 'large-scale' i.e. 'massified' EU RTD effort.

Secondly, policies will have to address the improvement of human up-take of knowledge. This implies education and training (development of human capital), as well as the 'knowledgeable users'.

Obviously, high-tech products can be produced by highly trained individuals. Currently, developed economies can only expand training beyond secondary level. Tertiary level education is expanding, but the respective policy goal in the EU was also to catch-up with the US (again !). The idea materialized as the 'Bologna process' and its policy. This policy was not very well received within the higher education sector and some argue that it also failed. Still, the goal of producing graduates with 'useable knowledge' in a cost-effective way within the conditions of a 'massified' higher level education and training will persist. Policy will have to address this as a prerequisite of knowledge production and up-take.

Nevertheless, in a 'massified' RTD environment, this is not enough. An increased turnover of scientific knowledge also requires increased human capital capable to contribute to this on a 'post higher education' level (i.e. Ph.D.). Increased knowledge turnover, also implies that individuals will have to be retrained more often. In both cases, appropriate (more efficient than those existing) policies will have to be put in place. However, one should observe that 'massification' of RTD requires in both cases a kind of 'scientific' approach from individuals: a data collection based analysis and synthesis mental process, for which the individual has to be prepared and be conscious that this is a competitive advantage.

As mentioned, the Bologna process is another try to close the gap with the US. However, as in the case of the 'technology gap' it looks like the approach is wrong. Without neglecting the importance of examining the procedures and results of competitors, the EU wide innovator effort is missing. The EU lacks a strategy (and corresponding policy) in designing an original unique way to tackle problems and policy thinking usually stops in identifying the strength of the others, take them over in the specific condition of the EU. This is certainly taking into account the diversity of the EU (with which no competitor is faced, because what ever factor is examined all competitors act in the framework of the 'national state').

An easily convertible knowledge, as may be the output of the Bologna process, also increases the danger of brain-drain. One should not forget that while the process has been put in place because of the apparent training efficiency of the US research university, in practice RTD effort in the US is much less based on human capital produced in the US. On the contrary, the US has a high 'retention' power (a similar goal was intended in the Lisbon process, too). This retention power appears to originate in a much wider set of socio-economic factors, and interestingly countries like China and India develop also such power, in spite of apparently lower income conditions (as one may think to be 'the' major factor). Consequently, EU policies must address 'retention' power.

Science based policy advice, its development and strengthening

One major factor in the overall next decade strategy building may be rethinking the base of political decision making. We face currently a process based on a complicated enforcement of interests, in which 'scientific' points of view find their way with difficulty. We can also see a variety of 'ideological' approaches (in political decision

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making), not really the case for any competitor (e.g. China is politically a 'monolith' and even the US seems to be the same when looked at as a 'global market player').

Neither 'ideology', nor 'interests' are compatible with scientific evidence, and with the implied competitive advantage of 'capital stocked in human brains' (otherwise: high level of human capital accumulation). Although it would be naive to consider the complete elimination of 'ideology' and 'interests' from political decision making, a reconciliation of these antagonist ends is needed, with the depletion of the balance in the favour of 'science' (and implicitly 'knowledge') as the most important resources the EU has.

Science based policy advice developed on the US model of OTA (Office of Technology Assessment). Although OTA was dismantled in 1995, the activity seems to be continuous in the US in different other forms. In Europe this was taken over under the term of Parliamentary Technology Assessment (PTA). PTA in principle makes analysis mostly of the policy consequences of new technologies. In a 'massified' RTD environment (as appears in the first part of this paper), however, its role will probably increase.

It also appears, however, that in Europe TA has a limited approach: little is done to give impulses to policy in order to highlight and define prospective technology areas, where aggregated investment can offer a significant (and increased) competitive edge for the EU (industry). Certain STOA projects were instrumental in offering such an insight ('Nanotechnologies in Chemical Substitution', in which the technological potential of a new technology was explored in order to replace obsolete ones, or 'Policy Options for the Improvement of the European Patent System' which highlighted other problems and ways of action beyond the commonly discussed and for decades not resolved Community Patent issue).

Therefore further development and strengthening of PTA is needed. A new dimension for PTA may be the direct identification of technology areas in which economic and political investment flatter with the promise of a significant competitive advantage (certainly highlighting the measures, including financial and legislative ones, which should be taken in order to achieve the goal).

Thus the discussions in Europe around PTA in recent times have highlighted that TA in Europe has reached a level at which it is necessary to think about its reinforcement and new perspectives.

First, the framework of joint programming, aimed at bringing closer the Member States' national research programmes, should be developed. It is obvious that, to make progress at a European level, actions have to be taken in collaboration with all partners and stakeholders concerned.

Although PTA is rather underdeveloped in almost half of the EU Member States, we should not consider development of PTA in these Member States as the single goal in the reinforcement of PTA in Europe. The current importance of science and technology for society and their expected impact upon the economic development in Europe call for a coordinated approach to science and technology-backed political decision-making across the whole of Europe.

Roadmap for action to reinforce PTA in Europe

1. EU Presidency and PTA

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Based on the positive experience of the meeting of European PTA Committees and Offices in Paris on 22 September 2008, such a meeting should be organised by each EU Presidency. These meetings may be a first step in developing an open method of coordination in PTA. The Treaty of Lisbon, once in force, will offer a legal basis for a much better involvement of national parliaments in the European decision-making process, thus creating a propitious environment for PTA coordination meetings and for holding meetings of this kind. Such meetings will have a strategic, highly political character and should not necessarily substitute for the current annual EPTA Council meeting and Conference - the particular structure should still be defined. The coupling of these activities will help consolidate the parliamentary dimension of EPTA.

2. The situation of PTA in Europe

There is a need to map out how PTA is carried out across Europe. It is clear that there is a variety of approaches. EPTA has been a wonderful forum for sharing expertise among TA practitioners, including the political level. This has to be further and better exploited in the future.

3. Capacity building in PTA

An immediate task is helping the development of TA Offices in parliaments. Strategically, this should be backed by research, education and culture measures. Constant support for research in TA tasks will be necessary. This has to be complemented by education of TA experts.

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4. PTA as democratic culture of governance

PTA has to develop public participation. PTA, and through it parliamentary decision-making, will have to be involved in the future in exchanges with the world of science (and technology), through instruments such as the EuroScience Open Forum (ESOF) or the M(E)P-Scientist Pairing Scheme.

5. The role of the European Commission

Former contributions of the European Commission (EC) to the development of TA in Europe include the ETAN (European Technology Assessment Network) Programme in FP4, as well as the TAMI (TA Methods and Impacts) project. EPTA may be the EC partner in defining areas of research and capacity building through research, as well as in the dissemination and implementation of an appropriate work programme for PTA within the Research Framework Programme.

6. EPTA as a common platform for PTA in Europe

PTA should meet the need s of the policy-making process, i.e. the information provided must be comprehensible and timely in relation to the legislative work of the relevant committees. EPTA may become in this respect a common platform and resource for improving the delivery of expertise both at national and European level. Some EPTA initiatives (e.g. joint projects) have pointed towards a European approach. However, joint EPTA projects have so far not relied on a committed political backing. EPTA can be used as the proper framework for carrying out genuine Pan-European projects pooling the resources of several national parliaments and reflecting the realities, perceptions and interests of many European countries.

Miklos GYÖRFFI

DIRECTION GENERALE DES POLITIQUES

INTERNES DE L’UNION

DEPARTEMENT THEMATIQUE B: POLITIQUES STRUCTURELLES ET DE COHESION

L’EUROPE 2009-2019:

L’AVENIR DES POLITIQUES STRUCTURELLES

ET DE COHESION

NOTE

IP/B/COMM/NT/2009_02 Juin 2009 PE 419.098 EN/FR

Ce document a été demandé par le Secrétaire général du Parlement européen. COORDINATION Beatriz OLIVEIRA-GOUMAS AUTEURS Albert MASSOT MARTI (Agriculture)

Gonçalo MACEDO (Culture)

Jesús IBORRA MARTÍN (Pêche)

Ivana KATSAROVA (Politique régionale)

Nils DANKLEFSEN (Transport)

Piero SOAVE (Tourisme) Direction des Politiques structurelles et de Cohésion Parlement européen E-mail: poldep-cohesion@europarl.europa.eu VERSIONS LINGUISTIQUES Original: EN, FR. À PROPOS DE L’ÉDITEUR Pour contacter le département thématique ou s’abonner à sa lettre d’information mensuelle, veuillez écrire à l’adresse suivante: poldep-cohesion@europarl.europa.eu Manuscrit complété en juin 2009. Bruxelles, © Parlement européen, 2009 CLAUSE DE NON RESPONSABILITÉ Les opinions exprimées sont celles de l’auteur et ne reflètent pas nécessairement la position officielle du Parlement européen. Reproduction et traduction autorisées, sauf à des fins commerciales, moyennant mention de la source, information préalable de l’éditeur et transmission d’un exemplaire à celui-ci.

L’avenir des politiques structurelles et de cohésion ____________________________________________________________________________________________

TABLE DES MATIERES

1. INTRODUCTION 9 1.1. Contexte et défis 9 1.2. Enjeux et perspectives 9 1.3. Propositions d'action 10

Tableau 1: Les politiques structurelles et de cohésion - budget 2009 13

Tableau 2: Tableau synoptique des politiques structurelles et de cohésion 2009-2019 15

2. DE LA CRISE DE LA PAC À LA PAC DE LA CRISE: LE GREEN DEAL 19 2.1. Objectifs de la note 19 2.2. Le contexte 2009/2019: axes stratégiques 19 2.3. Le défi institutionnel: réussir le traité de Lisbonne 20 2.4. Le défi agricole: la refondation de la PAC dans le cadre des nouvelles

perspectives financières (PAC 2020) 24 2.5. Le défi de la mondialisation agricole: réussir le Cycle de Doha et adopter un

nouvel accord agricole dans l'OMC 29 2.6. Le défi de la relance économique: de la crise de la PAC vers la PAC de la crise 30

3. CULTURE AND EDUCATION 35 3.1. The Post-2013 Multiannual Financial Framework 35 3.2. Education 35 3.3. Audiovisual, Cultural and Language Policies 37 3.4. Communication Policy 40 3.5. Youth Policy 40 3.6. Sport Policy 41

4. FISHERIES 43 4.1. Background 43 4.2. Prospects for the Seventh Parliamentary Term 44 4.3. Other Elements 48 4.4. Conclusion 48

5. COHESION POLICY 51 5.1. The Broader Context of Cohesion Policy 51 5.2. Global Challenges Impacting On Cohesion Policy 52 5.3. The Architecture of Future Cohesion Policy 54

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6.1. Introduction 59 6.2. Paramount challenges: Current economic downturn and weak environmental

performance 60 6.3. Financing of TEN-T infrastructure 62 6.4. Mobility in urban areas 63 6.5. Transposition and implementation of existing legislation 64 6.6. The new debate on the future of transport 64 6.7. Conclusion 66

7. PERSPECTIVES DE LA POLITIQUE EUROPEENNE DU TOURISME 69 7.1. Cadre juridique 69 7.2. Introduction et background 69 7.3. Possible évolution à moyen terme 70 7.4. Statistiques et sondages 70 7.5. Les défis et les facteurs variables de la prochaine décennie 71 7.6. Stratégie et options 72 7.7. Thèmes de réflexion et décisions possibles 72 7.8. Budget 73 7.9. Contrôle de l'application 73 7.10. Perspectives à long terme 74 7.11. L'avenir du tourisme européen 74 7.12. Conclusion 74

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ABREVIATIONS

ACFA Advisory Committee on Fisheries and Aquaculture

AVMS Audiovisual Media Services

CES Comité Economique et Social

CFP Common Fisheries Policy

CO2 Carbon dioxide

COM Common Organisation of the Market

COMAGRI Commission de l'agriculture et du développement rural

COPA-COGECA Confédération des organisations professionnelles et de

coopératives agricoles

CST Compte Satellite du Tourisme

CULT Committee on Culture and Education

DT Département Thématique

EASA European Aviation Safety Agency

ECTS European Credit Transfer System

EEA European Environment Agency

EEZs Exclusive Economic Zones

EFF European Fisheries Fund

EHEA European Higher Education Area

EMSA European Maritime Safety Agency

EQF European Qualifications Framework

ERA European Railway Agency

ERTMS European Railway Traffic Management System

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Département thématique B: Politiques structurelles et de Cohésion ____________________________________________________________________________________________

ESA Agence Spatiale Européenne

ETS Emission Trading Scheme

FPAs Fishery Partnership Agreements

GHG Greenhouse gas

HGV Heavy goods vehicle

HOP! project Macro-economic impact of High Oil Prices co-financé par la

Commission européenne dans le cadre du VI Programme-cadre

ICES International Council for the Exploration of the Sea

ICT Information and Communication Technologies

IMP Integrated Maritime Policy

INTA Commission du Commerce International

ISPs Internet Service Providers

ISS International Space Station

ITS Intelligent Transport Systems

LLL Lifelong Learning

MFF Multiannual Financial Framework

MFF Multiannual financial framework

MSS Mécanisme de sauvegarde spéciale

MST Maths, Science and Technology

MSY Maximum Sustainable Yield

NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration

OMC Organisation Mondiale du Commerce

OMC Open Method of Coordination

OMT Organisation mondiale du Tourisme (WTO)

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PAC Politique agricole commune

POs Producers' Organisations

PSBs Public Service Broadcasters

Qunet Quantum networks utilisable par les futurs computers

quantiques

RACs Regional Advisory Councils

RFMOs Regional Fisheries Management Organisations

RTD Research and technological development

SUTP Sustainable urban transport plans

TAC Total Allowable Catch

TEN-T Trans-European Transport Network

TEN-T EA Trans-European Transport Network Executive Agency

TFUE Traité sur le fonctionnement de l'Union européenne

TRAN Committee on Transport and Tourism

TUE Traité sur l'Union européenne

UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural

Organization

WTO World Trade Organization

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1. INTRODUCTION

1.1. Contexte et défis

La prochaine décennie sera décisive pour l’avenir des politiques structurelles et de cohésion au sein de l’Union européenne (UE). Les instances politiques européennes devront prendre des décisions cruciales pour le futur de l’Union tant sur le plan budgétaire qu’institutionnel. Le nouveau Parlement, dès le départ, et sur fond de crise économique et financière mondiale, sera amené à se positionner sur la stratégie économique et budgétaire de l’UE, notamment en vue de la révision des actuelles perspectives financières (2007-2013). Il devra anticiper et relever des défis de dimension mondiale, tels que la globalisation de l’économie, le changement climatique, l’évolution démographique, la sécurité énergétique, la révolution des nouvelles technologies et, en particulier, des technologies de l’information. Dans ce contexte, pendant les deux prochaines législatures, le Parlement européen (PE) devra participer activement à la réforme et éventuellement à la refonte de la politique de cohésion, de la politique agricole commune (PAC), de la politique commune de la pêche (PCP), de la politique commune des transports, et à l’attribution de leur dotation budgétaire adéquate.

1.2. Enjeux et perspectives

Définition des orientations stratégiques

Suite aux différents élargissements, des adaptations successives ont été effectuées, mais nous n’avons pas assisté à de véritables réformes des politiques structurelles. Il semble qu’à présent, le moment est venu de faire de vraies réformes qui permettent de tenir compte des nouvelles donnes internes et des engagements externes de l’UE. Dans un contexte récessif, où l’on peut difficilement s’attendre à une augmentation des ressources propres de l’UE, l'enjeu majeur de la prochaine décennie sera la nouvelle répartition des ressources budgétaires parmi les différentes politiques. Le PE aura un rôle primordial à jouer dans l’adoption de nouvelles stratégies politiques intégrées pour faire face à la nouvelle crise financière. En ce sens, et en tenant compte du poids budgétaire des politiques structurelles qui, en 2009, représentent plus de 78% du budget communautaire initial1, le PE devra mettre en valeur l'importance des politiques structurelles en tant que moteur de développement et de croissance. Les politiques structurelles et les aides d’Etat à finalité régionale devront être considérées comme des leviers destinés à valoriser les potentiels existants dans chaque territoire communautaire et non plus comme de simples politiques redistributives de solidarité. Le PE pourra jouer un rôle actif sur la méthode à définir concernant l’attribution des fonds ainsi que sur la mise au point des indicateurs qui permettront de mieux comprendre la dynamique du développement, de mieux évaluer les différentes politiques et suivre l’impact de leur mise en œuvre.

1 Voir: Tableau 1 "Les Politiques structurelles et de cohésion dans le budget 2009", page 13.

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Département thématique B: Politiques structurelles et de Cohésion ____________________________________________________________________________________________ Renforcement du pouvoir du PE

Si le Traité de Lisbonne est adopté, le PE verra son pouvoir législatif considérablement renforcé par l’extension de la codécision, notamment aux politiques communes de l’agriculture et de la pêche, à la cohésion économique, sociale et territoriale, et au tourisme. Pendant les deux prochaines législatures, le PE jouera un rôle primordial dans la définition de nouvelles stratégies politiques, ainsi que dans l’exercice de son pouvoir de suivi et de contrôle de l’exécution des politiques structurelles et de cohésion. Dans l’exercice de son rôle de législateur, il sera indispensable que le PE effectue, de façon indépendante et autonome, des évaluations systématiques des «impacts assessments» réalisés par la Commission européenne. Le PE devra assumer le leadership dans le processus de coopération avec les parlements nationaux, afin de répondre au mieux aux besoins des citoyens européens, en appliquant le principe de la subsidiarité.

Communication efficace envers les citoyens européens

Le PE devra veiller à l’efficacité des fonds alloués aux politiques structurelles et de cohésion et à sa perception en tant que telle par les citoyens. Dans ce but, il devra rendre les informations sur les politiques structurelles et de cohésion plus accessibles et compréhensibles. Les citoyens pourront alors s’apercevoir que les décisions sont prises dans leur intérêt pour améliorer leur qualité de vie. Par exemple, tel pourrait être le cas, parmi d’autres, de décisions qui concernent les domaines de l’aménagement du territoire, des transports, de la mobilité urbaine, de la qualité et de la sécurité alimentaire, de la protection de la biodiversité, du développement durable, de l’éducation et de la diversité culturelle.

1.3. Propositions d'action

Le PE devra négocier un nouvel accord interinstitutionnel et adapter en conséquence son mode de fonctionnement interne à l’exercice de ses nouveaux pouvoirs de co-législateur, notamment dans les domaines des politiques communes de l’agriculture, de la pêche, de la cohésion économique, sociale et territoriale, et dans le domaine du tourisme. Il devra se concentrer, en priorité, sur :

• La définition des orientations stratégiques,

• la répartition des ressources financières et, notamment, concernant les politiques structurelles et de cohésion,

• le contrôle et l’évaluation de la mise en œuvre des politiques, et

• l’amélioration de la communication envers les citoyens.

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L’avenir des politiques structurelles et de cohésion ____________________________________________________________________________________________

Dans ce contexte, les Départements thématiques, en collaboration avec les secrétariats de commission, devront fournir une assistance aux organes parlementaires, notamment en effectuant des évaluations des analyses d’impact conduites par la Commission européenne. De plus, il sera indispensable de renforcer leur capacité d'expertise interne afin d'élaborer régulièrement des analyses prospectives qui alimenteront la réflexion parlementaire. Il serait également utile de constituer des «project teams», dans des cas complexes comme celui des réformes des politiques structurelles et de cohésion. Cela permettrait d’optimiser l'utilisation des ressources disponibles, en créant des synergies entre les services et les acteurs concernés. Les propositions exposées ci-dessus découlent des analyses prospectives effectuées par les spécialistes du Département thématique pour chacune des politiques structurelles et de cohésion. Par ailleurs, pour permettre au lecteur d'avoir une vision d'ensemble, nous avons élaboré un tableau synoptique qui reprend les échéances principales pour les politiques structurelles et de cohésion au cours de la prochaine décennie.

Beatriz OLIVEIRA-GOUMAS

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Tableau 1: LES POLITIQUES STRUCTURELLES ET DE COHÉSION - BUDGET 2009

BUDGET INITIAL 2009

Engagements (millions d'euros)

% Total

Agriculture et Développement Rural 54.680,2 43,6%

Politique Régionale 37.900,6 30,2%

Transport 2.364,0 1,9%

Education et Culture2 1.714,1 1,4%

Pêche et Affaires Maritimes 984,6 0,8%

Politiques Structurelles et de Cohésion 97.643,5 77,9%

Total 130.997,8 Les politiques structurelles et de cohésion représentent 78% du budget 2009 de l'Union européenne. Les deux politiques qui ont une plus grande incidence budgétaire sont l'agriculture (44%) et la politique régionale (30%), lesquelles absorbent 74% du budget total.

2 Inclut le chapitre 15 (Éducation et Culture), le 16 (Communication) et la rubrique i2010 (Politique audiovisuelle

et programme Media).

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Tableau 2: TABLEAU SYNOPTIQUE DES POLITIQUES STRUCTURELLES ET DE COHÉSION 2009-2019

GEN AGRI CULT PECH REGI TRAN TOUR

Constitution du nouveau PE

Déneutralisation de la commission de la pêche. Possible révision de ses compétences?

2009

Négociation du nouvel Accord-cadre Interinstitutionnel (ACII) avec la nouvelle Commission européenne. Développement des modalités de mise en œuvre de la Codécision? Conférence des Nations Unies sur le changement climatique à Copenhague (Cop 15)

Livre Blanc sur le Budget Réaction de la Commission européenne - DG AGRI Rapports d'initiative COMAGRI

Présentation par la Commission du nouveau cadre pour la politique de la jeunesse

1er programme pluriannuel pour la collecte, la gestion et l’utilisation de données (2009-2010). Adoption d'indicateurs pour la mise en œuvre de l'approche écosystémique. Livre vert sur la réforme de la PCP et stratégie pour le développement de l'aquaculture. Possible proposition de règlement spécifique sur l'écolabelling dans le cadre du règlement horizontal. Proposition de règlement pour la réforme de l'OCM.

Début des discussions sur la nouvelle architecture de la future Politique de cohésion Livre blanc sur la Cohésion territoriale

Plan d'action sur la mobilité urbaine Début du débat sur l'avenir du transport

Début de la discussion sur le programme pluriannuel 2010-2012

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GEN AGRI CULT PECH REGI TRAN TOUR Possible entrée en vigueur du Traité de Lisbonne (TL)

TL Codécision deviendra la procédure ordinaire Accords Interinstitutionnels de coopération législative

TL Nouvelle compétence communautaire pour le sport. Vote à la majorité qualifiée au lieu de l'unanimité dans la politique culturelle Nouvelle compétence de la politique de la jeunesse concernant la participation civique. Le PE a davantage de pouvoirs concernant la politique commerciale.

TL Codécision procédure ordinaire Avis conforme en accords internationaux

TL Codécision sur le vote du Règlement général pour les Fonds Structurels

TL Pas de changements majeurs Possibilité de proposition d'un nouveau Livre Blanc "Transport"

TL Codécision procédure ordinaire

2010 Début des discussions sur les nouvelles perspectives financières (NPF).

Propositions législatives sur les perspectives financières et sur la nouvelle PAC

Nouvelle politique de la jeunesse Nouveau cadre concernant la politique de l'éducation + formation Maintenir, modifier les points de référence actuels ?

Publication des résultats de la consultation publique sur le livre vert (Réforme PCP)

NPF Début des discussions sur le financement de la Politique de cohésion

Possibilité de proposition de la CE pour la révision des lignes directrices TEN-T . Fin de la période couverte par l'actuel Livre blanc. Délai pour l'ouverture du marché des services des trains internationaux de passagers. Possibilité de proposition de la CE pour un nouveau plan d'action pour la sécurité routière.

Sous Présidence espagnole, lancement du programme pluriannuel 2010-2012

L’avenir des politiques structurelles et de cohésion ____________________________________________________________________________________________

GEN AGRI CULT PECH REGI TRAN TOUR

Possibles élargissements avec la Croatie (HR) et l'Islande (ISL)

Impact sur le budget (HR) Blocage: accès de la Slovénie aux eaux internationales. (ISL) Application acquis PCP (accès aux ressources).

Impact sur la politique de cohésion

Evaluation de l'ensemble de l'action pour le tourisme durable sur la base de l'Agenda 21 pour le tourisme.

Possible conclusion du Cycle de Doha de l'OMC

Nouvel accord agricole OMC Début de l'implémentation des nouveaux accords multilatéraux

Possible impact sur quelques aides, accords internationaux ou protection tarifaire

2011

Début des négociations sur la nouvelle PAC Conférence sur la nouvelle PAC à organiser par le PE Nouveau plan de relance économique? (volet agricole)

Proposition et adoption des règlements sur la réforme de la PCP.

2012

2012/2013: Accord sur la nouvelle PAC

Possibilité de proposition pour MARCO POLO III

Fin du programme pluriannuel

Nouvelles perspectives financières (NPF).

2013: nouvelle rubrique agricole

NPF Est-ce que le budget concernant la mobilité (ERASMUS+LEONARDO) sera augmenté, maintenu ou baissé ?

NPF Adaptation règlement de base PCP.

NPF Nouvel encadrement financier basé sur la concentration des ressources

2013

Déploiement complet de Galileo

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Département thématique B: Politiques structurelles et de Cohésion ____________________________________________________________________________________________

18

GEN AGRI CULT PECH REGI TRAN TOUR

2014

Élections européennes Accord-cadre Interinstitutionnel avec nouvelle Commission (ACII)

2014 /2020: Implémentation progressive de la nouvelle PAC 2014/2020: Implémentation progressive du nouvel accord agricole OMC

Entrée en vigueur des nouveaux programmes, Lifelong Learning, MEDIA etc

ACII Il devra s'adapter aux nouvelles perspectives financières (NPF).

Début de la phase de déploiement du Système européen de nouvelle génération pour la gestion du trafic aérien (SESAR)

Actions pilotes en matière de tourisme en démocratie à l'occasion du centenaire de la grande guerre

2015

Réflexion sur le nouvel ordre économique après la crise (volet agricole)

Engagement des États membres auprès des Nations-Unies pour appliquer la Production Maximale Équilibrée (PME/MSY) aux pêcheries.

2016

Possible initiative de l'UE en faveur du tourisme spatial

2018

Fin de la période couverte par la Stratégie pour le Transport Maritime 2018.

2020

Délai établi par la directive-cadre "Stratégie pour le milieu marin" pour que les États membres parviennent à un bon état écologique. Application de l'approche écosystémique.

L’avenir des politiques structurelles et de cohésion ____________________________________________________________________________________________

2. DE LA CRISE DE LA PAC À LA PAC DE LA CRISE: LE GREEN DEAL

2.1. Objectifs de la note

• déceler les axes stratégiques dans le domaine de l’agriculture (PAC) pour les deux prochaines législatures parlementaires (2009/2014 et 2014/2019) et dans le cadre des perspectives financières pour la période 2014/2020;

• définir les priorités ou défis du Parlement européen et, en particulier, de la

commission de l’agriculture et du développement rural (COMAGRI) dans la prochaine décennie;

• proposer des actions spécifiques en vue d’atteindre les objectifs stratégiques définis

et de renforcer la capacité législative des services parlementaires dans le domaine agricole, notamment du secrétariat de la COMAGRI ainsi que des départements thématiques, des Tabling Office et des unités de documentation et d’information concernés.

2.2. Le contexte 2009/2019: axes stratégiques

La période à analyser (2009/2019) couvre deux législatures ainsi que la négociation et l’implémentation des prochaines perspectives financières (2014/2020). Quelques facteurs institutionnels nouveaux interviendront durant cette période avec un impact non négligeable sur l’avenir de la PAC:

• l’entrée en vigueur du traité de Lisbonne (du moins nous l’espérons), qui impliquera, parmi d’autres, l’introduction de la nouvelle procédure de codécision agricole et, sur cette base, la signature des accords interinstitutionnels qui permettront sa mise en œuvre sans préjudice des compétences du PE;

• les résultats du réexamen en cours du budget pour une Union européenne du XXIème siècle; ces travaux ont débuté le 12 novembre 2008, lors de la conférence «Réformer le budget, changer l’Europe» qui a eu lieu à Bruxelles après la consultation publique lancée en septembre 2007; en principe, la Commission compte présenter en automne 2009 une Communication (ou Livre Blanc) sur les options à suivre pour la réforme budgétaire en vue de répondre aux nouveaux défis de l’Union; les propositions législatives arriveront en 2011;

• la PAC, première politique de dépense de l’Union, subira un profond remaniement avec le nouveau cadre financier pluriannuel 2014/2020, d'ailleurs très conditionné par l’évolution de la crise économique et financière; si le cadre financier n'est pas reporté jusqu'au 2015/16, on peut s’attendre d'ores et déjà à une réforme radicale de la PAC pour l’après 2013 (PAC 2020); un exercice que les Institutions européennes n’ont pas osé entamer pendant la dernière réforme de cette politique, dite le «bilan de santé» («Health Check»), adoptée fin 2008; on parle même déjà d’une refondation de la PAC, qui concernerait ses objectifs, ses principes et ses mécanismes principaux;

• la négociation et implémentation du nouveau protocole sur le changement climatique, en remplacement de celui de Kyoto; la Convention des Nations Unies qui se tiendra à Copenhague à la fin 2009 devrait en principe formaliser ce nouveau cadre multilatéral (précédé par plusieurs "forums des économies

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Département thématique B: Politiques structurelles et de Cohésion ____________________________________________________________________________________________

majeures sur l'énergie et le climat", le prochain étant prévu pour juillet 2009, en Italie); étant donné les liens croissants entre l’agriculture, l’énergie et le climat, la PAC devra faire face à un vrai green deal, à définir pendant sa réforme de 2012/2013;

• la clôture du Cycle de Doha et la signature d’un nouvel accord multilatéral sur l’agriculture auront probablement lieu en 2010; les négociations du «paquet de décembre 2008» sur les «modalités de la négociation concernant l’agriculture» ont échoué et on s'attend à un rapide démarrage une fois terminées les élections indiennes du printemps 2009; le nouvel accord de l’OMC sur l’agriculture aura des effets majeurs sur la PAC d’après 2013;

• l'intégration complète des derniers élargissements à finaliser, mise à l'épreuve par la crise économique et financière; et, de plus, le déroulement des négociations de nouvelles adhésions; en octobre 2009, la Commission présentera une Communication sur l’état des lieux des négociations avec la Croatie, la Turquie, l’ancienne République yougoslave de Macédoine, l’Albanie, la Bosnie et l’Herzégovine, le Monténégro, la Serbie et le Kosovo; l’adhésion de l’Islande pourrait d’ailleurs s’ajouter dans les années qui suivent;

• l’adaptation de la stratégie de Lisbonne pour la croissance et l’emploi de l’après-2010 dans le contexte de la crise actuelle ainsi que d’une évolution erratique des cours agricoles et des coûts du système agroalimentaire européen et mondial dans son ensemble;

• les résultats des travaux entamés par le groupe de réflexion sur l’avenir de l’Europe, présidé par M. Felipe González.

À la lumière de ce scénario, le PE a quatre défis stratégiques à relever dans le domaine agricole: réussir le Traité de Lisbonne (infra, §2.3); refonder la PAC d’après 2013 (infra, §2.4); clôturer le Cycle de Doha (infra, p. §2.5); et mettre sur pied une PAC de la crise capable d’accompagner la relance de l’économie européenne (infra, §2.6). A la fin de chaque chapitre, des encadrés (BOX) sont insérés qui résument les propositions opérationnelles à court terme, à mi-terme et, même, à long terme. 2.3. Le défi institutionnel: réussir le traité de Lisbonne

Le nouveau TFUE représente un vrai tournant dans le domaine agricole à la veille d’une réforme fondamentale de la PAC prévue pour 2012/13 (voir infra §4). Il implique des changements majeurs, aux niveaux législatif, budgétaire et d'exécution. Ces changements élargissent en principe l´éventail des compétences du PE d'une politique commune caractérisée jusqu'à aujourd'hui par son poids législatif et budgétaire. Cependant, les dispositions de portée agricole du TFUE présentent encore plusieurs enjeux à résoudre et mettent en cause l'actuelle structure administrative du PE. L'enjeu législatif

Le TFUE reconnaît la codécision comme la «procédure législative ordinaire» de la PAC en remplacement de la procédure de simple consultation en vigueur. Cependant, cette codécision agricole suscite des problèmes d’interprétation importants dans la mesure où des exceptions à la procédure ordinaire en faveur du Conseil sont introduites, notamment en ce qui concerne les «mesures relatives à la fixation des prix, des prélèvements, des aides et des limitations quantitatives» (Article 43.3 TFUE) ainsi que le cadre des règles de la concurrence (Article 42.2, deuxième alinéa TFUE).

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L’avenir des politiques structurelles et de cohésion ____________________________________________________________________________________________

Faute d’une claire délimitation des compétences législatives du Parlement européen et du Conseil, des problèmes politiques et juridiques peuvent survenir, même si une longue jurisprudence confirme une interprétation restrictive des exceptions. Il est impensable que le PE accepte des réserves générales d’exécution en faveur du Conseil qui pourraient conditionner, voire vider de sens, les pouvoirs de codécision acquis avec le nouveau traité, et en particulier dans le cadre des réformes fondamentales de la PAC où la fixation des aides et des prix constitueraient des éléments essentiels. D'ailleurs, le TFUE reconnaît une compétence partagée entre l'Union et les Etats membres dans le domaine agricole dans son ensemble (Article 4.2.d). Sur cette base, le principe de subsidiarité sera d'application sur le travail législatif agricole et les Parlements nationaux veilleront à son respect (procédures du "carton jaune" et "carton rouge") (Article 12.b TUE; et Protocole sur le rôle des Parlements nationaux dans l'Union européenne). Un accord interinstitutionnel de coopération législative s’avère donc nécessaire en vue de clarifier la structure et les niveaux décisionnels des actes agricoles (Articles 42-43 TFUE) et, de façon complémentaire, de dessiner la portée de la procédure de contrôle de la subsidiarité par les Parlements nationaux. Sans cet accord interinstitutionnel, le PE devra se tenir prêt à introduire un recours auprès de la Cour de Justice de Luxembourg pour faire valoir ses compétences en cas de conflit. L'enjeu budgétaire

Le traité de Lisbonne contient aussi des changements significatifs au niveau financier. D’abord, il a créé une procédure législative spéciale pour l’adoption du budget annuel entre le PE et le Conseil où les deux lectures actuelles seront remplacées par une lecture unique avec trois votes parlementaires (Article 314 TFUE). En deuxième lieu, en éliminant la distinction entre «dépenses obligatoires» et «dépenses non obligatoires», désormais, les deux branches de l’autorité budgétaire décideront conjointement de l’ensemble des dépenses agricoles. En dernier lieu, le cadre financier pluriannuel, qui inclut implicitement le principe de discipline budgétaire dans le domaine agricole, devient un acte législatif nécessitant l'approbation du PE. Dans ce contexte, le budget agricole deviendra un sujet majeur des débats financiers à l’avenir. Cinq domaines sont à suivre par le Parlement en général et par la COMAGRI en particulier dans les mois qui suivront l'entrée en vigueur du traité de Lisbonne:

• la révision du Règlement financier (Règlement CE 1605/2002) (Article 322.1 TFUE);

• la modification du Règlement 1290/2005 sur le financement de la PAC;

• la révision de l'accord interinstitutionnel sur la discipline budgétaire et la bonne gestion financière de 2006. Conformément à l'article 17.1 TUE, la Commission prendra l'initiative pour parvenir à un nouvel accord interinstitutionnel. En outre, il faudra définir la procédure spéciale pour le règlement fixant le cadre financier pluriannuel;

• Il faudra aussi de nouveaux accords interinstitutionnels sur la procédure de conciliation. En principe, rien ne s'oppose à inclure ces nouvelles règles dans l'accord interinstitutionnel sur la discipline budgétaire. Mais il paraît convenable de parier sur un nouvel accord spécifique et autonome sur ce point.

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Département thématique B: Politiques structurelles et de Cohésion ____________________________________________________________________________________________ Etant donné le poids budgétaire de la PAC, il va de soi que la COMAGRI devrait jouer un rôle actif au sein de ce nouveau cadre financier. En particulier, sur base des Rapports Corbett, il faudrait garantir son pouvoir de négociation dans l'adoption du budget annuel avec une représentation adéquate dans la délégation parlementaire du comité de conciliation. L'enjeu de l'exécution des actes agricoles

Le TFUE introduit des nouveaux actes juridiques, délégués et exécutifs (Articles 290-291). Dans ce contexte, le Conseil pourrait utiliser les nouveaux actes délégués pour contourner les règles de la codécision. D’ailleurs, les règles de la comitologie (Décisions 1999/468/CE et 2006/512/CE) devront être révisées (en spécifiant les pouvoirs de délégation et les conditions de retour au niveau exécutif). L'enjeu administratif interne du PE

Les changements apportés par le traité de Lisbonne au niveau agricole auront des conséquences importantes pour le fonctionnement des unités du PE, notamment le secrétariat de la COMAGRI et le Département Thématique B. Il faut prévoir une révision des pratiques et des procédures législatives et budgétaires établies dans le règlement du PE ainsi que la modification de sa structure administrative. Les propositions du Groupe de travail Roth-Bherendt et des Rapports Corbett (REG/2009/2029 et REG/2007/2016, 2124, 2137, 2170 et 2272) dessinent déjà le cadre général. Mais il faudra y ajouter quelques remaniements spécifiques concernant l'agriculture. Au niveau de l'organigramme du PE, il faudra renforcer les services parlementaires législatifs et de recherche sur base d'une approche fonctionnelle. A notre avis, il ne suffit pas de créer de nouveaux postes d'administrateurs dans les unités affectées: une solution trop facile et, d'ailleurs, insuffisante. Il semble convenable de mieux intégrer les travaux des unités concernées par les procédures agricoles (COMAGRI, DT, unités des spécialistes documentaires de la Bibliothèque, Tabling Office). Au niveau des administrateurs, une logique de spécialisation accrue s'impose en vue de convertir le PE en interlocuteur fiable et performant du processus législatif agricole, avec une capacité réelle de négocier les textes législatifs au côté de la Commission et du Conseil (au sein des trilogues, des comités de conciliation et, éventuellement, de la comitologie). Dans ce contexte, la formation de spécialistes/chercheurs agricoles du PE deviendra un facteur stratégique. Des épingles du jeu à terme: la procédure simplifiée de réforme du TFUE et les coopérations renforcées

L'article 48 du TUE introduit une nouvelle procédure de révision simplifiée du TFUE à l'initiative de tout État membre, la Commission ou le Parlement européen. Sur cette base, il serait possible d'entamer une réforme du chapitre agricole du traité dans les années à venir en vue de son actualisation.

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L’avenir des politiques structurelles et de cohésion ____________________________________________________________________________________________

BOX 1. RÉSUMÉ DES PROPOSITIONS EN VUE DE LA RÉUSSITE DU TRAITÉ DE LISBONNE

À COURT TERME (2009/2010)

• Négociation d’un accord interinstitutionnel de coopération législative qui interprète la procédure de codécision agricole en préservant les prérogatives législatives du PE. Faute d'un tel accord, le PE devra être prêt à défendre ses compétences dans la Cour de Justice.

• Dans le cadre des auditions aux nouveaux commissaires, engagement du nouveau responsable de l'agriculture en faveur d'une interprétation large des prérogatives du PE dans la codécision agricole; élaboration du questionnaire pertinent pour l´audition.

• Participation dans la négociation interinstitutionnelle du nouveau cadre budgétaire assorti du traité de Lisbonne (règlements financiers et accords interinstitutionnels).

• Dans le cadre des travaux du Groupe de travail Roth-Bherendt et des Rapports Corbett, modification du règlement du Parlement européen et, notamment, des procédures concernant la PAC et le budget.

• Renforcer les liens entre le secrétariat de la COMAGRI, le DT B – Agriculture et la Bibliothèque du PE avec les services homonymes des Parlements nationaux.

• Au niveau administratif, renforcer la capacité législative, de soutien et de recherche des services parlementaires dans le cadre de la nouvelle procédure de codécision agricole:

Nouvelle approche en vue d’une meilleure intégration des travaux des services parlementaires concernés par la codécision agricole (secrétariat COMAGRI ; Département Thématique B – Agriculture; unités des spécialistes de la Bibliothèque; Tabling Office).

Renforcer la spécialisation des administrateurs concernés par l'agriculture et programmer des cours de formation spécifiques dans les domaines de la PAC.

Renforcement des services de contrôle de la qualité législative.

Rédaction d'un briefing note par le Département Thématique sur les enjeux de la procédure de codécision agricole à présenter aux nouveaux MEPs à son arrivée.

À LONG TERME (2015/2019)

• Une fois consolidée la PAC d'après 2013, le PE pourrait prendre l'initiative de réformer et d'actualiser le Chapitre agricole du TFUE (Arts. 32-38) dans le cadre de la procédure simplifiée de la révision des Traités (Article 48 TUE). Il pourrait également explorer l'utilisation des coopérations renforcées (Article 20 TUE) en fonction des résultats de la réforme de la PAC de 2011/2012.

• Suivi attentif des négociations d’adhésion et de son impact sur la PAC.

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Département thématique B: Politiques structurelles et de Cohésion ____________________________________________________________________________________________ Il faut remarquer que ce chapitre agricole reste inchangé depuis le traité de Rome. S'inspirant des principes productivistes, aujourd'hui obsolètes, il n'a jamais modifié les objectifs de la PAC établis en 1957. Il n'a pas non plus intégré des notions clés de la nouvelle PAC comme la multifonctionnalité agricole, le développement des zones rurales, la qualité et la sécurité alimentaire (food safety), le développement durable, la santé publique et la lutte contre l'obésité, le bien-être animal, l'aménagement des territoires, la protection des ressources naturelles et de la biodiversité, le développement des énergies renouvelables d'origine agricole, ou, enfin, la discipline financière. D'ailleurs, les dispositions sur les coopérations renforcées (Article 20 TUE) ouvrent une voie à explorer à long terme en vue du futur développement de la PAC, en fonction des résultats de la PAC d'après 2013 et des processus d'adhésion en cours (p.e sur la gestion des risques ou le développement des interprofessionnelles au niveau européen).

2.4. Le défi agricole: la refondation de la PAC dans le cadre des nouvelles perspectives financières (PAC 2020)

Background

La PAC telle que nous la connaissons aujourd'hui est le fruit d'un processus historique et d'accumulation de mesures prises en réponse aux problèmes apparus au fil des ans. L'incohérence, la complexité et l'inefficacité du système face aux nouvelles demandes sociétales et internationales sur l'agriculture sont les conséquences inévitables de la succession de compromis politiques établis. Le moment d'un nouveau départ est venu, voire de la refondation des objectifs, des principes et des mécanismes de la PAC. Il s'agit donc d'évaluer les instruments actuels, de dessiner un projet d'une vision à long terme, de repenser les contours de la nouvelle PAC 2020 et, finalement, de négocier les propositions de la Commission dans le cadre de la codécision. Ce processus de réflexion en vue de la refondation de la PAC deviendra sans doute l'épicentre de la prochaine législature au niveau agricole. Le PE peut (et doit) devenir le leader de cette phase de changement des paradigmes de la politique agricole. D'ailleurs, la codécision agricole permettra au PE d'influencer le cours des prochaines négociations de manière décisive et, de plus, elle accordera une plus grande légitimité à la nouvelle PAC. La dernière réforme de la PAC, dite «bilan de santé» («Health Check»), adoptée au début 2009, a été un simple exercice d’adaptation de la boîte à outils existants. Elle n’a donc pas changé la donne à long terme. Le compromis du Conseil de la fin 2008 n’a pas fixé les grandes lignes de la PAC pour l’après 2013. Tout au plus une déclaration a-t-elle été ajoutée prévoyant la possibilité d’examiner l’évolution du système de paiements en vigueur et notamment les différences de niveaux des montants entre Etats membres dans le cadre des discussions sur la PAC d’après 2013.

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L’avenir des politiques structurelles et de cohésion ____________________________________________________________________________________________

Cependant, sous la présidence française du Conseil, des travaux de réflexion sur la nouvelle PAC ont été déjà entamés en parallèle aux débats sur les propositions du bilan de santé (Conseil informel d’Annecy de septembre 2008). La présidence tchèque a fait de même au Conseil informel de Brno de juin 2009. Les présidences suédoise (deuxième semestre 2009) et espagnole (premier semestre 2010) vont continuer sans doute la réflexion. Quant à lui, le Parlement a joué un rôle d'incitation à la réflexion sur l'après 2013 face à l'immobilisme constaté de la Commission: la plupart des documents de référence publiés jusqu'à aujourd'hui à ce sujet ont été menés par la COMAGRI et le DT B.

Cadre de référence

La réforme de la PAC de 2012/2013 sera encadrée (voire contaminée) par le débat sur les perspectives financières 2014/2020 dans un contexte récessif où l'on peut difficilement s'attendre à une augmentation des ressources propres de l'Union. En principe elle sera appliquée de manière progressive pendant la période 2014/2020 (PAC 2020). En outre, elle devra intégrer plusieurs éléments nouveaux:

• l'implémentation du nouvel accord de l'OMC sur l'agriculture (voir infra §2.5);

• l'implémentation du paquet "énergie-climat" lancé en 2009, suivi par le nouveau protocole sur le changement climatique à signer à Copenhague à la fin 2009;

• les résultats des clauses de révision à mi-parcours prévues pour les quotas laitiers (avant le 31 décembre 2010 et le 31 décembre 2012) ainsi que le rapport sur le niveau du découplage des aides appliqué par les Etats membres à présenter par la Commission avant le 31 décembre 2012;

• les conclusions des travaux sur la politique de qualité des produits agricoles entamés depuis 2008 (voir Communication (2009) 234 du 28.5.2009);

• les résultats des plans engagés par les Etats membres à partir de la Directive-cadre sur l'eau pour la période 2010/2012 (Directive 2000/60/CE);

• le nouveau classement des zones agricoles défavorisées à adopter durant le deuxième semestre 2009, particulièrement important dans le cadre d'une PAC de plus en plus territorialisée;

• les résultats des actions prévues en faveur de la biodiversité à l'horizon 2010 (Règlement CE 870/2004);

• les conclusions des rapports de la Commission sur la coexistence des cultures génétiquement modifiées, les cultures conventionnelles et l'agriculture biologique;

• les travaux entamés sur la simplification de la PAC.

• et, enfin, l'évolution de la discipline financière pendant la période 2010/2012; il est fort probable qu'avant la fin des actuelles perspectives financières, les aides agricoles soient réduites pour respecter les plafonds du premier pilier de la PAC.

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Département thématique B: Politiques structurelles et de Cohésion ____________________________________________________________________________________________ Objectifs et principes directeurs de la réforme de 2012/2013 (PAC 2020)

Cette note n'a pas comme objectif d'expliquer les lignes directrices de la nouvelle PAC. Une briefing note du DT B à ce sujet est en train d'être rédigée pour la présentation aux nouveaux élus, en septembre 2009. De plus, une étude externe sur le nouveau modèle agricole de soutien après 2013 sera disponible en janvier 2010. Cependant, on peut déjà avancer quelques idées sur les objectifs et les principes de base à débattre par les Institutions européennes le moment venu:

• L'objectif majeur de la réforme est l'approfondissement dans les principes de la réforme de la PAC de 2003: consolider une agriculture plus orientée vers les marchés, avec un soutien plus simple et légitime, qui réponde aux attentes des citoyens à l'égard de l'activité primaire (en matière de la qualité et de la sécurité alimentaire, de l'environnement, de l'aménagement des espaces, du bien-être des animaux, de l'énergie et/ou du développement durable des communautés rurales). A la limite, la PAC du Marché Commun doit être remplacée par une politique agro-rurale multifonctionnelle, capable de faire face aux défis d'une UE élargie et de la mondialisation.

• Concernant les modalités de l'intervention communautaire, quelques principes se dégagent des réflexions en cours: valeur ajoutée européenne reconnue; cofinancement des paiements directs; réponse aux principales défaillances du marché (telles que les externalités négatives, les risques, ou la fourniture des biens publics); remplacement des mesures d'assistanat par des incitations et des mesures de soutien conditionnées à des objectifs (ciblage); sélectivité accrue des bénéficiaires; coresponsabilité des filières; et, enfin, extension du principe de subsidiarité.

• En dernier lieu, concernant les mécanismes, nous assisterons au passage du "decoupling" au "targeting" et au "tailoring". La phase du découplage des aides agricoles en faveur d'un soutien générique aux revenus entamée depuis 2003 doit passer le relai à une phase de définition des instruments ciblés sur des objectifs clairs. Parmi ces objectifs opérationnels à soutenir: les biens et les services d'intérêt publique joints à la production agricole qui sont fournis à la société sans que le marché les rémunère suffisamment (services environnementaux, d'aménagement du territoire, de la préservation du paysage, etc.); la compensation des surcoûts dus aux handicaps naturels et les exigences du modèle social européen (bien être des animaux, traçabilité, protection des ressources naturelles, etc.); la compétitivité et l'innovation dans des marchés mondialisés; et, enfin, la stabilité du marché intérieur face aux risques climatiques et épidémiologiques ainsi que face à la volatilité accrue des prix dans des marchés de plus en plus ouverts et interdépendants.

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L’avenir des politiques structurelles et de cohésion ____________________________________________________________________________________________

Feuille de route des travaux parlementaires

La Commission compte présenter une Communication sur les options à suivre pour la réforme budgétaire en automne 2009 et des propositions sur le nouveau cadre financier pluriannuel avant le mois de juillet 2011 (peut être déjà en 2010). Sauf dans le cas où les perspectives financières en vigueur seraient prolongées jusqu'à 2015/2016 pour faciliter la transition à un cadre quinquennal, on risque de redéfinir le budget avant que les objectifs et les besoins de la nouvelle PAC soient établis, surtout si la Commission (DG AGRI) persiste à ne pas faire bouger les choses avant 2011. A notre avis, le processus de refondation de la PAC devrait débuter dans les meilleurs délais, avant la clôture du réexamen budgétaire en cours, sous l’initiative du PE s’il est nécessaire, en démontrant au Conseil et au secteur sa volonté politique de jouer sur le terrain des idées et du renouvellement et pas de la défense du statu quo. Sur cette base, on pourrait déjà dessiner une feuille de route des travaux à suivre par la COMAGRI (BOX 2):

• Négociation avec la Commission pour la présentation d'une Communication sur la nouvelle PAC pour le premier semestre 2010, après la publication du Livre Blanc sur la réforme budgétaire d'automne 2009; le président Parish l'a déjà proposée dans le dernier Conseil informel de Brno de fin mai 2009.

• Création d'un Project Team sur la réforme de la PAC et élaboration d'un rapport d'initiative sur le sujet;

• Soutien aux travaux des présidences du Conseil sur l'avenir de la PAC (conseils informels, événements conjoints à organiser); le Parlement doit devenir un interlocuteur fiable et (éventuellement) l'instigateur d'une réflexion approfondie.

• Organisation d'un grand événement (Conférence) au sein du PE en vue de catalyser la réflexion sur la nouvelle PAC (début 2011 au plus tard);

• Suivi et participation active de la COMAGRI dans la définition des paramètres agricoles, commerciaux, environnementaux et budgétaires préalables à la réforme;

• Négociation de la réforme dans le cadre de la codécision agricole.

• Suivi attentif de la phase de transition pour l'implémentation progressive de la nouvelle PAC durant la période des perspectives financières 2014/2020.

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Département thématique B: Politiques structurelles et de Cohésion ____________________________________________________________________________________________

BOX 2. RÉSUMÉ DES PROPOSITIONS EN VUE DE LA REFONDATION DE LA PAC (PAC 2020)

À COURT TERME (2009/2010)

• Pousser à la présentation d’une Communication sur la PAC des nouvelles perspectives financières par la Commission (DG AGRI) pour le premier semestre 2010, après la présentation du Livre Blanc de la Commission sur le réexamen budgétaire (automne 2009). Rédaction du questionnaire pour l'audition du nouveau Commissaire en vue d'atteindre des engagements précis sur le calendrier, la procédure et la portée de la nouvelle PAC.

• Élaboration d’un rapport d’initiative sur la PAC au-delà de 2013 par la COMAGRI. Nomination immédiate de deux rapporteurs pour la réforme de la PAC de 2011/2012. Soutien aux travaux de réflexion des prochaines présidences du Conseil sur l'avenir de la PAC.

• Renforcer la capacité législative de la COMAGRI face à cette réforme, moyennant:

la création d’un Project Team sur la nouvelle PAC avec la participation des membres de la COMAGRI, des groupes politiques, du secrétariat de la COMAGRI et du Département Thématique B - Agriculture.

l'organisation des auditions et des ateliers (Workshops) sur la nouvelle PAC.

la présentation aux nouveaux MEPs de la COMAGRI d’une briefing note sur les défis de la nouvelle PAC au-delà de 2013, à rédiger par le DT (été 2009), ainsi que d'une étude externe sur le nouveau modèle de soutien à l’agriculture au-delà de 2013 (prévue pour janvier 2010).

• Suivi et participation active dans la définition des paramètres préalables à la réforme: sur le réexamen budgétaire, les négociations du Cycle de Doha, la discipline financière, l'énergie et le climat, l'eau, la biodiversité, les OGM, la qualité alimentaire, le classement des zones agricoles défavorisées, les clauses de révision de la PAC déjà prévues, et la simplification.

À MI-TERME (2011/2013)

• Début 2011 au plus tard: Organisation d’une Conférence sur la PAC du XXIème siècle avec des experts externes et des représentants du CES, des Parlements nationaux et des organisations agricoles (COPA-COGECA).

• Participation active de la COMAGRI dans la négociation du nouveau cadre financier 2014/2020 ainsi que dans la préparation du nouvel AI de discipline financière.

• Elaboration des rapports législatifs sur les propositions de la nouvelle PAC dans le cadre de la procédure de la codécision.

À LONG TERME (2014/2020)

• Période de transition pour l'implémentation de la nouvelle PAC 2020: suivi des propositions législatives de la Commission; codécision des nouveaux actes à mettre sur pied de manière progressive; éventuellement, élaboration des rapports d'initiative par la COMAGRI.

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L’avenir des politiques structurelles et de cohésion ____________________________________________________________________________________________

2.5. Le défi de la mondialisation agricole: réussir le Cycle de Doha

et adopter un nouvel accord agricole dans l'OMC

Background

La Quatrième Conférence ministérielle de l'OMC, tenue à Doha en novembre 2001, a lancé un nouveau cycle des négociations multilatérales. Un nouvel accord sur l'agriculture est prévu à l'intérieur de "Programme de Doha pour le développement". Cependant, les échéances convenues n'ont guère été respectées. Le dernier paquet sur les modalités des engagements a été distribué par le Président du Groupe de négociations sur l'agriculture, M. Crawford Falconer, en décembre 2008. Après quelques jours de négociations, le Directeur général de l'OMC, Pascal Lamy, a confirmé l'échec des pourparlers sur les projets de textes présentés. L'agriculture reste donc (une fois de plus) un obstacle majeur pour le succès des négociations de l'OMC. Même s'il y a eu convergence des positions sur la plupart des points, les divergences sur le mécanisme de sauvegarde spéciale (MSS) en faveur des pays en développement (qui eux permettraient de neutraliser une poussée des importations des produits alimentaires) n'ont pas pu être surmontées. En gros, la divergence oppose ceux (notamment, les Etats-Unis) qui voulaient un seuil de déclenchement élevé afin d'éviter que la sauvegarde ne soit activée par une croissance normale des échanges, et ceux (l'Inde et la Chine en particulier) qui voulaient un seuil de déclenchement plus bas. Outre la MSS, d'autres points restaient à clôturer au moment de la suspension des négociations: le coton (produit stratégique pour quelques pays exportateurs de l'Afrique); les questions relatives aux indications géographiques et aux brevets se rapportant au matériel génétique et aux savoirs traditionnels dans le domaine de la propriété intellectuelle; et la banane (en principe à régler via un accord séparé impliquant l'UE, les pays ACP et les fournisseurs latino-américains). Les négociations pour surmonter l'impasse devraient en principe se poursuivre en 2009, après la fin des rendez-vous électoraux en Inde. Un impact majeur sur la nouvelle PAC d'après 2013

Le paquet des modalités des engagements de décembre 2008 prévoit des changements majeurs sur le soutien interne (prix et aides) à l'agriculture, sur l'accès aux marchés (tarifs) et sur la concurrence à l'exportation. Les dernières propositions européennes ont accepté une réduction moyenne des tarifs de 60% dans le cadre de l'accès aux marchés, sans doute le sujet le plus sensible pour la PAC. Mais l'UE a conditionné son offre à des clarifications d'autres pays développés sur l'élimination de diverses formes de soutiens aux exportations. D'ailleurs, l'UE a également réaffirmé sa volonté d'équilibre dans la poursuite de la réforme du système international d'échanges agricoles, en assurant des engagements spécifiques en faveur de quelques produits dits "sensibles" de l'agriculture européenne ainsi qu'une prise en compte effective des considérations d'ordre non commerciale (concernant l'environnement, le développement rural, le bien-être des animaux et la protection des appellations d'origine).

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Département thématique B: Politiques structurelles et de Cohésion ____________________________________________________________________________________________ Le PE a toujours soutenu les efforts des représentants européens pour faire progresser le Cycle de Doha et aboutir à un accord équilibré. Quoi que soit le résultat des négociations, le nouvel accord multilatéral sur l'agriculture devra faire partie de la réforme de la PAC de 2012/2013 (voir supra §2.4). Une coopération renforcée entre la COMAGRI et l'INTA serait souhaitable en vue du suivi des négociations. Il faudra également faire attention aux règles sur la comitologie dans le domaine commercial à définir après l'entrée en vigueur du traité de Lisbonne (voir supra §2.3) (BOX 3).

BOX 3. RÉSUMÉ DES PROPOSITIONS POUR LE CYCLE DE DOHA

À COURT TERME (2009/2011)

• Renforcer le rôle du Parlement européen dans les négociations du Cycle de Doha.

Dans le cadre du nouveau traité de Lisbonne, établir de nouvelles règles de coopération interinstitutionnelle en vue d’une meilleure représentation du PE dans les négociations multilatérales.

Dans le cadre de la révision des règles de la comitologie, défendre les prérogatives du Parlement européen au niveau commercial.

• Élaboration d’un rapport d’initiative par la COMAGRI sur les négociations agricoles du Cycle de Doha en coopération étroite avec les travaux de la commission INTA.

Organisation des auditions et des ateliers (Workshops) conjoints COMAGRI-INTA sur les négociations agricoles en cours.

Présentation aux membres de la COMAGRI d'une étude externe sur les négociations agricoles multilatérales (prévu pour septembre 2009).

À MI-TERME (2012/2013)

• Intégrer le nouvel accord sur l'agriculture dans la refondation de la PAC (PAC 2020).

À LONG TERME (2014/2020)

• Implémentation progressive du nouvel accord agricole de l'OMC. Éventuellement, introduction des réformes sectorielles d'adaptation dans la PAC en fonction de l'évolution des prix et des revenus agricoles.

2.6. Le défi de la relance économique: de la crise de la PAC vers la PAC de la crise

Background

L'éclat de la bulle immobilière américaine entre 2007 et 2008 marque le début d'une crise financière très profonde et répandue au niveau global, qui a débouché sur une récession de l'économie mondiale. À l'heure actuelle, il est déjà confirmé que la détérioration du cadre macro-économique international connaît une ampleur et une durée inédites depuis 1929. Sur cette base, la crise économique et financière actuelle bouleverse plusieurs paramètres de la Politique Agricole Commune (PAC):

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L’avenir des politiques structurelles et de cohésion ____________________________________________________________________________________________

• D'abord, il faut tenir compte de l'impact de la récession sur l'évolution des marchés

des matières premières agricoles et notamment sur la demande mondiale de denrées alimentaires. Dans ce contexte, on peut déjà constater que la crise a mis fin à la bulle des matières premières enregistrée pendant la période 2006/2008. Depuis juin 2008, les cours internationaux des produits agricoles et alimentaires sont retombés aux niveaux d'avant 2006 (TABLEAU 1). Mais en 2009, quelques incidents ont suffi pour que les marchés agricoles rebondissent à nouveau: la sécheresse en Amérique du Sud, la détermination de l'administration Obama à développer les programmes éthanol et, enfin, des prévisions de recul de la production mondiale de grains en 2009/2010. Il est utile de constater qu'en mai 2009 le prix du pétrole a lui aussi augmenté (de 15 $, jusqu'atteindre les 66,3 $). Les hedge funds, les fonds souverains, les investisseurs internationaux et les fonds de pensions ont donc découvert de nouveau les marchés des matières premières. À ce stade, quelques conclusions peuvent être tirées. En premier lieu, la volatilité systémique des prix agricoles est confirmée. La probable réduction des tarifs douaniers, prévue pour le Cycle de Doha, la renforcera à l'avenir. Par ailleurs, les analyses sur le changement climatique suggèrent que les conditions climatiques inhabituelles vont probablement s'accentuer, ce qui pourrait rendre la production, très concentrée dans quelques régions de la planète, encore plus volatile en raison de déficits de production récurrents. En deuxième lieu, une nouvelle bulle des matières premières est peut-être en train de se préparer suite à la relance économique. Dans ce contexte, des mesures de régulation et de stabilisation des marchés agricoles devront être mises sur pied au sein des politiques publiques (la PAC d'après 2013 inclue) et dans le cadre multilatéral en cours de négociation dans l'OMC (voir supra §2.5). A côté, des mesures poussées de contrôle des marchés des commodities à terme devraient s'appliquer (tout d'abord en reformant la CFTC - Commodity Futures Trading Commission -, responsable de la régulation des marchés de Chicago).

TABLEAU 1. Évolution des matières premières alimentaires 2008/2009

(A prix constants 2000/2004 = 100)

Source: FAO (Food Price Indices). June 2009 (http://www.fao.org/worldfoodsituation/FoodPricesIndex/en/)

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Département thématique B: Politiques structurelles et de Cohésion ____________________________________________________________________________________________

• Il existe aussi un impact (asymétrique mais global) sur les finances publiques, soit sur le budget communautaire (au niveau des ressources propres et des dépenses), soit sur les budgets nationaux. Cet impact peut même conditionner lourdement la négociation du prochain cadre financier pluriannuel de l'Union. Étant donné le poids de la PAC sur le budget communautaire, on peut s'attendre également à des effets importants au niveau des dépenses allouées à l'agriculture.

• En dernier lieu, la crise a également des effets sur les revenus des agriculteurs, sur les coûts de production et sur l'utilisation des facteurs de production. Il ressort de l'expérience du passé que les récessions provoquent aussi des restructurations des filières. À ce stade, il est difficile de quantifier ces effets qui, sans doute, seront très divers selon les secteurs, les capacités productives et financières des exploitations, et leurs niveaux d'endettement. Du point de vue des produits transformés, on peut déjà constater un accroissement de la demande des produits blancs par les consommateurs. Les processus de concentration des exploitations et des coopératives vont s'accélérer également. D'ailleurs, la récession revalorise le rôle stabilisateur des aides de la PAC (à hauteur de 40 milliards d'Euros annuels), surtout dans un contexte de manque des liquidités et de restriction du crédit. Les aides agricoles, annuelles, garanties et gratuites, sont donc un soutien financier de premier ordre pour les exploitations. En outre, il faut compter sur le fait que les aides nationales allouées jusqu'à aujourd'hui dans les nouveaux Etats membres comme complément des aides communautaires vont chuter de façon drastique suite à la lourde crise des finances publiques subie par plusieurs pays qui restaient en dehors de la zone Euro.

De la crise de la PAC à la PAC de la crise

Il faut réinventer le modèle européen de l'après crise. Franklin Roosevelt, en 1933, a dit: "ne gâchez jamais une bonne crise". Le Parlement européen avec ses pouvoirs législatifs et budgétaires renforcés par le traité de Lisbonne ne peut pas rester indifférent à cet enjeu majeur. Au-delà des plans de relance intergouvernementaux ou du rôle crucial de la BCE en faveur de la stabilité monétaire, il manque une réponse européenne face à la crise globale qui utilise les politiques communes (la PAC inclue) et le budget communautaire comme des catalyseurs de la relance économique. La PAC a déjà fait preuve de générosité avec le plan de relance de l'économie européenne (European Recovery Plan) approuvé par le Conseil européen en décembre 2008. Des crédits agricoles à hauteur de 5 milliards d'Euros ont été alloués en faveur des infrastructures énergétiques, l'internet à haut débit dans les zones rurales et les mesures de développement rural. Mais nous sommes encore loin de parvenir à un vrai plan de relance économique européenne par rapport aux plans nationaux. Un deuxième plan de relance européen plus ambitieux nous attend dans les mois à venir. En outre, la révision de la stratégie de Lisbonne pour la croissance et l’emploi pour l’après-2010 offre une opportunité nouvelle aux Institutions européennes à ne pas rater. Les nouvelles perspectives financières 2014/2020 pourraient éventuellement encadrer des mesures spécifiques pour lutter contre la crise et ses effets (chômage, restructuration industrielle, développement de nouveaux créneaux, relance d'une économie verte, etc.).

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L’avenir des politiques structurelles et de cohésion ____________________________________________________________________________________________

Cependant, étant donné qu'il est plus que probable que les finances publiques des États membres connaitront des difficultés (en raison des déficits budgétaires, de l'endettement public, du coût du chômage, des engagements déjà pris dans les plans nationaux de relance, etc.), il y a fort à parier que la négociation du nouveau cadre pluriannuel de l'Union deviendra très difficile (d'autant que rien ne dit que la crise soit terminée à ce moment-là). On peut même s'attendre à ce que la contraction du PIB communautaire conduise à une forte réduction des montants alloués à la PAC, tout en préservant un pourcentage du PIB identique ou similaire à celui prévu pour 2013 (0,39%). D'autre part, ce gap financier ne pourra jamais être couvert si les Etats rejettent toute mesure de cofinancement de la PAC à cause de l'affaiblissement de leur capacité fiscale. Concernant spécifiquement l'agriculture, le "bilan de santé" ("Health Check") a assoupli les régimes de régulation et de contrôle de l'offre en vigueur. L'intervention publique reste désormais un filet de sécurité pour les principales productions communautaires. Parallèlement, de nouveaux outils sont mis en place à titre facultatif pour la gestion des risques individuels, notamment les assurances récolte et les fonds de mutualisation sanitaire. Mais le succès de ces nouveaux mécanismes de gestion des risques sera très conditionné par la détérioration de la capacité de cofinancement des Etats membres. D'ailleurs, le bilan de santé n'a pas vraiment renforcé le pouvoir économique des agriculteurs au sein des filières. Finalement, il faut constater que, malgré la disparition de l'intervention publique comme débouché en soi, les marchés à terme en Europe, qui pourraient la remplacer, restent encore dans une phase très embryonnaire. Dans ce contexte, la réforme de la PAC de 2012/2013 (voir supra §2.4) devra se pencher sur les réponses à donner face à l'instabilité systémique des marchés agricoles. A l'heure actuelle, un large consensus dans les analyses se dégage sur la persistance des fluctuations des prix à l'avenir. Elles sont dues à l'ouverture et à la mondialisation des marchés, au changement climatique qui va accroître la fréquence et l'amplitude des aléas naturels et à la recrudescence des crises sanitaires. En outre, le nouvel accord agricole de l'OMC (voir supra §2.5) devra encadrer des mesures de stabilisation des marchés mondiaux. Il faudra également dessiner à terme un volet agricole en faveur d'un nouveau modèle de croissance après la crise, à axer sur l'économie verte. Sur cette base, l'ensemble des politiques européennes (et notamment la PAC) ont face à elles un vrai green deal à surmonter (sur base des technologies durables, de la thermochimie et de la chimie verte, des biocarburants, des nanoaliments, de la gestion climatique, des biomatériels, etc.). Une cellule de prospective s'avère nécessaire au sein du PE pour faciliter la réflexion sur l'avenir économique et technologique.

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Département thématique B: Politiques structurelles et de Cohésion ____________________________________________________________________________________________

BOX 4. RÉSUMÉ DES PROPOSITIONS POUR FAIRE FACE À LA CRISE ÉCONOMIQUE

À COURT TERME (2010/2013)

• Préparation de nouveaux plans de relance économique au niveau communautaire ou mixtes (volet agricole).

• Adaptation de la stratégie de Lisbonne pour la croissance et l'emploi pour l'après 2010 (volet agricole).

• Introduction des mesures face à la crise dans le cadre financier pluriannuel 2014/2020 (volet agricole).

• Réexamen des mesures de régulation et de stabilisation des marchés dans le cadre de la réforme de la PAC prévue pour 2012/2013.

• Mise sur pied du nouvel accord agricole de l'OMC avec des mesures spécifiques pour faire face à une volatilité accrue des cours agricoles au niveau global.

• Création d'une cellule de prospective au sein du Parlement européen sur les politiques européennes d'après la crise (the European Green Deal).

À MI-TERME ET A LONG TERME (2014/2020)

• Propositions du PE sur le nouvel ordre économique européen de l'après crise sur base des travaux de la cellule de prospective. Propositions spécifiques sur son volet agricole en faveur d'une nouvelle "économie verte".

• Développement progressif de nouvelles mesures de gestion des risques au sein de la nouvelle PAC: marchés européens à terme; assurances; interprofessionnelles intereuropéennes, etc. Pourraient être éventuellement utilisés les nouveaux mécanismes des coopérations renforcées introduits par le traité de Lisbonne (voir supra §3).

Albert MASSOT MARTI

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L’avenir des politiques structurelles et de cohésion ____________________________________________________________________________________________

3. CULTURE AND EDUCATION The text below focuses on the areas of responsibility of the Committee on Culture and Education (CULT), as defined in the EP's Rules of Procedure. However, it deals with fairly broad themes for which CULT may not always be the lead committee.

3.1. The Post-2013 Multiannual Financial Framework

The EU's budgetary influence on the fields for which CULT is responsible is not very significant. Spending on the education, culture, youth, audiovisual and citizenship programmes totals around 1.9 billion EUR per year which only represents about 1.5% of annual spending under the 2007-13 multiannual financial framework (MFF).

However, some EU existing programmes, notably the integrated programme for Lifelong Learning (LLL) - which is by far the largest3 - have significant practical effects on the mobility of learners and teachers. In 2006, the EU directly contributed to the mobility of about 500,000 individuals through its various programmes4. About two-thirds of LLL funds go to the Erasmus and Leonardo sub-programmes, providing grants for university and vocational students respectively.

If the EU is to meet its objective of significantly increasing mobility for education and training purposes in coming years (see below), then the budget of the LLL programme will either have to be increased or national/regional authorities will have to provide more funding. Seen in such a light, negotiations on the next MFF, which should reach fruition in late 2011 or early 2012, will have an important impact on the EU's ability to directly contribute to mobility through its own budget. That same is true for other domains, such as youth or audiovisual policies, for instance, where the EU uses its programmes to back up its policies, in particular their international dimension, although the budgets are modest.

In any case, the likely scenario is that spending on the LLL programme will be at least maintained at current levels after 2013, for two reasons. The first is that it is closely associated with the Lisbon Strategy, with its emphasis on modernizing education and training systems. Whatever problems exist in the implementation of the Lisbon Strategy, the EU is highly unlikely to abandon it after 2010. The second reason is that programmes like Erasmus or Comenius are relatively well-known and popular with the public, with positive effects for the EU's 'image'. The EP is likely to call for an increased LLL budget.

3.2. Education

As recently stressed by Commissioner Figel', the EU has made considerable progress in the education field (compared, say, to culture) in recent years. The guiding rationale behind Community education policies has been to make mobility of learners and teachers easier and to promote 'Lifelong Learning'5. The EU has tried to create better overall conditions for mobility by making comparisons and interaction (compatibility) between national education systems easier.

3 The LLL programme has a budget of 6, 970 million EUR in the 2007-13 period. The next largest programmes

(excluding Erasmus Mundus) - Youth in Action and Media 2007 - have budgets of 885 and 755 million EUR respectively.

4 Pierre Mairesse, "L'impact du livre blanc sur les politiques de jeunesse en Europe", Forum21: European Journal on Child and Youth Research N° 9 (2007). See:

http://www.coe.int/t/dg4/youth/Source/Resources/Forum21/Issue_No9/N9_White_Paper_fr.pdf 5 Meaning the need to improve skills and knowledge over one's life in a formal/informal manner.

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Département thématique B: Politiques structurelles et de Cohésion ____________________________________________________________________________________________ An example is the European Credit Transfer System (ECTS), which breaks down courses into academic 'credits', making it easier for students to change courses and for higher education institutions to compare each other's programmes. The EU has also developed quality control mechanisms, so that countries can have confidence in each other's academic standards. Another practical contribution is the European Qualifications Framework (EQF), which is a system for comparing qualifications issued in different countries. As already mentioned, the EU also directly boosts mobility by providing grants to individuals, notably via the education sub-programmes and Youth in Action. Outlook in 2009-19

The likelihood is that these policies will be continued, or even intensified, in the 2009-19 period. Why? In part, for the simple reason that they are only halfway to being implemented, being largely voluntary and long-term in nature. Another reason is that political ambitions remain high. For example: the 46 participating countries in the 'Bologna Process' decided in April 2009 to set the target that in 2020, at least 20% of graduates in the European Higher Education Area (EHEA) should benefit from a study or training period abroad. That represents a steep increase from the current status quo: in 2004, in the vast majority of European countries, less than 3% than students spent time abroad6. On the whole, it would make sense for the EU to strengthen links between its programmes and the Bologna Process over the next decade. Why has the EU placed so much emphasis since 2000 on increasing mobility, notably in the university sector, as a strategic objective? A specific reason is probably the desire to increase competition between teaching establishments, in order to stimulate them to improve the quality of courses, which in its turn paves the way for having a better qualified workforce, improving economic competitiveness. In short, it is the Lisbon Strategy. A broader objective is probably to develop a sense of EU citizenship among (mostly younger) people who pursue their studies, carry out voluntary work etc outside their home country. Another important element of the EU's educational vision is the idea of increasing learning opportunities for all, in an enlarged geographical area, with consequences for personal fulfilment, as well for professional life and the economy. These strategic objectives are very likely to remain broadly unchanged. They are not very controversial, although the Bologna Process has been subject to criticism, for ushering in higher education 'privatization', imposing unnecessary uniformity and perhaps limiting mobility. More recently, the Commission has begun to underline the need for more mobility outside the university sector, for instance for apprentices. The idea that Community policies also need to help groups that have been less favoured up to now may well become more important in the next decade. The challenge for MEPs, like for most observers, is to assess how well ideas and reforms which sound highly credible 'on paper' are actually being implemented. A difficulty for the EP is that a lot of EU level work on improving the quality of education is carried out by the Commission and the Member States, via the 'open method of coordination'(OMC), whose objective is to set common goals, exchange ideas and track 6 See: http://eacea.ec.europa.eu/ressources/eurydice/pdf/088EN/088EN_013_C09.pdf.

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L’avenir des politiques structurelles et de cohésion ____________________________________________________________________________________________

progress. By definition, it is difficult for a Parliament to play a full part in long-term reform efforts which do not primarily involve lawmaking. In any case, the EP has no formal role in the OMC. Nevertheless, the EP will wish to influence the new 'framework' and 'action plan' for European cooperation in education and training after 2010. In so doing, it should note that the EU has failed to achieve its targets for 4 out of the 5 'benchmarks' in the current action plan. In particular, the attempt to reduce the proportion of low achievers in reading literacy has been a failure. For the other targets, the overall EU performance has been brighter, in particular in educating more maths, science and technology (MST) graduates. It is worth noting that the Council has already asked the Commission to consider new benchmarks for the 2010-20 period, covering mobility, employability and language learning. These appear to be highly relevant.

3.3. Audiovisual, Cultural and Language Policies

Introduction

The EU and EP discourse on the cultural and audiovisual sectors contains a paradox. On the one hand, a lot of emphasis is placed on 'cultural diversity'; on the other, importance is accorded to developing the cultural and creative sectors for the health of the EU economy. If these two principles collide, the strategic objective for the EU seems in practice to be to preserve cultural diversity - in other words to protect national or EU cultural sectors - which often involves limiting the role of market forces. This priority seems to be politically consensual. An obvious example comes in the cinema sector, where most EU countries still provide a lot of public money for film-making, which is allowed under Community State aid rules. In essence, countries want to preserve their capacity to make programming in their own language, following national traditions and tastes. Audiovisual Policies

Community legislation - notably the 'Audiovisual Media Services' (AVMS) Directive and its predecessors - have since the late 1980s protected the EU's audiovisual sector from the full force of US competition. That is in line with the EU objective of preserving cultural diversity. Community rules require broadcasters to devote the majority of their transmission time to European works and at least 10% to independent European producers. These rules - taken together with various national public subsidies for cinema - have allowed many Member States to preserve a significant audiovisual sector. The collective EU position in the World Trade Organization (WTO) has been to refuse full liberalization of the audiovisual market. That is also the spirit in which the 2005 UNESCO Convention on cultural diversity7 was approved, with enthusiastic EU support. At the same time, the AVMS Directive and its 'Television without Frontiers' predecessor have allowed the EU to create a functioning common market in television services. The European Commission intends to ask for greater scrutiny of investments made by public service broadcasters (PSBs), notably in 'new media' sectors, under the revised 'Broadcasting Communication', due to be published later in 20098.

7 The full title is 'Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions'. 8 In the EP, the Legal Affairs Committee (JURI) will be primarily responsible for this dossier.

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Département thématique B: Politiques structurelles et de Cohésion ____________________________________________________________________________________________ Outlook in 2009-19

In this context one must unavoidably mention 'digitization', which has far-reaching consequences in all areas covered by CULT. The practical result of digitization is an explosion in the number of audiovisual products available, on different 'platforms' (terrestrial broadcasting, satellite, Internet etc) and a complete blurring of the formerly clear borders between electronic media (the Internet) and broadcasting (television). What this implies is that the citizen or consumer not only has access to a much increased offer of content, but he or she can decide when or where to watch it. Whilst reports of the death of traditional television viewing habits are often exaggerated - most people still prefer to watch scheduled programmes - trends do indicate that consumers are increasingly interacting with 'non-linear' (on-demand) programming on different platforms, especially the Internet. Such huge changes will slowly render protective quota systems like those of the AVMS Directive less effective. The Directive, as revised in 2008, does not impose quotas on non-linear services, since by definition these are unworkable. The big question for the EP in coming years is whether the huge increase in choice for consumers effectively means that cultural diversity is automatically ensured. There is very little agreement on the answer. Overall, it currently seems that the national/EU protective stance towards the cultural sector in the name of 'cultural diversity' is being weakened, with market forces becoming stronger. That is true for the October 2005 Recommendation on music online9 which has effectively undermined the role of smaller national collecting societies in the music sector, at the expense of the larger ones and 'major' music companies. However, the Commission defends its policy on the grounds that it is laying the basis for a pan-European market in music, which is healthy for the sector's competitiveness. National subsidies for the audiovisual/cultural sector are likely to be maintained over coming years, with EU blessing, but they will be more contested. The debate on the revised Broadcasting Communication raises similar questions. Some question if public broadcasters should invest in 'new media' services when these are vibrant and cater to very different tastes anyway; others counter that the same ethos applied to public television in the post-war period needs to be replicated on the Internet. Culture

Digitization also raises difficult issues related to piracy and the protection of copyright. The challenge here is how to ensure that artists/creators are properly rewarded for their work, something that is far more difficult than before in the digital age. The EU's role is more to establish common principles than to legislate: in practice Member States will seek specific legal solutions to these rather complex problems. The current controversy surrounding the compatibility of 'telecoms package' and the French loi Création et Internet, which allows internet service providers (ISPs) as a last resort to cut off access to the Web to people who repeatedly carry out illegal downloads, is probably a political accident. Countries have adopted different approaches to piracy and have different legal traditions concerning author's rights (the Anglo-American copyright tradition is different from the continental European approach). The Commission is expected to issue a Recommendation on 'Creative Content Online' later this year which will lay out broad principles for tackling these issues.

9 See: Recommendation on collective cross-border management of copyright and related rights for legitimate online

music services.

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Outlook in 2009-19

In coming years, pressure may increase in favour of arriving at common EU solutions to these problems, for the sake of developing the Single Market. However, in the cultural domain, market forces are much weaker than in others, mainly for linguistic reasons. Therefore the importance of the common EU market in the cultural field should not be exaggerated. To take an example, the proportion of non-national European films seen in each country has remained modest. Outside the audiovisual sphere, the main task facing EU cultural policy in the next decade is probably to breathe more life into the already existing Treaty articles. These state that the Community should support and supplement national policies that improve knowledge on 'the culture and history of the European peoples' and on conserving 'cultural heritage of European significance'. Whilst many actions of the Culture Programme undoubtedly do precisely that, there is little public consciousness of an EU role. The exception is the relatively well-known 'European Capital of Culture' initiative. An important initiative in the next EP term may be the creation of a 'European Heritage Label', which will aim to develop a common sense of European history in certain specific sites - for example the Gdansk shipyards which saw the birth of the 'Solidarity' trade union. Another important project, in this case already in existence, is 'Europeana' or the European Digital Library. Making such initiatives well-known and useful is important for demonstrating that the UE is playing its part in making the diversity of European culture accessible to the public. The notion of safeguarding variety and respecting cultures is one of the EU's most recognizable ideas in the cultural sphere and it plays an important role in distinguishing the 'European project' from other integrationist processes in history (such as the formation of European nation-states), which were based on eliminating or downgrading regional languages and identity, in order to forge a more uniform collective identity. EU cultural policy does therefore provide a political vision for the EU, although that is perhaps not widely understood. It is therefore problematic that the EU has never attempted to consistently apply Article 151(4) of the Treaty, which is supposed to ensure that respect for cultural diversity is taken into account in drawing up policies in all other domains. The entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty would replace unanimity with majority voting in the Council for cultural policy. That will probably make little difference, since Member States tend to take decisions by consensus in this field, due to its political sensitivity. On the external level, the EP and the EU as a whole will face the challenge of turning the UNESCO Convention into an instrument with practical consequences. Given that the EU's 'Agenda for Culture' places a new importance on cultural relations with non-EU countries, including trade agreements, and that the EP would receive more powers over trade policy under the Lisbon Treaty, there may well be scope for a greater parliamentary role in this field10. Language Policy (Multilingualism)

The EU only lays down common principles (and an 'Action Plan') on language policy, since it is up to each Member State to organize its education curriculum. The centrepiece of the EU approach is the idea that schoolchildren should learn their mother tongue and another two languages. This 'mother tongue+2' policy is already being followed in the majority of Member States, and it is difficult to envisage major changes in the next decade.

10 That would require more joint work by CULT and the Committee on International Trade (INTA).

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Département thématique B: Politiques structurelles et de Cohésion ____________________________________________________________________________________________ 3.4. Communication Policy

The EP has argued for many years that communication policy should have a specific legal base in the Treaty, but that has not happened. In practice, the three main Community institutions and the Member States have each established their own communication policies, although the latter are often seen as not doing enough to explain the EU's workings and policies to their citizens. Since the overwhelming majority of EU citizens perceive the EU as one entity without distinguishing between the institutions, there is a strong argument for creating a more uniform EU communications policy. Council, Commission and Parliament have made a start on that by signing a 'joint declaration' in 2008 on 'Communicating Europe in Partnership'. The three institutions pledged to identify a limited number of communications priorities on an annual basis, as a way of better focusing media coverage of the EU's work. The outlook for 2009-19 can only be that communication policy will become more important, in line with current trends, as a reaction to increased hostility or apathy towards the EU among European citizens. 3.5. Youth Policy

The debate on modifying the EU's Youth Policy is currently underway, after the publication of the Commission's 'An EU Strategy for Youth' Communication in April 2009 and it will occupy the rest of the year, leading to an adoption of a revised approach for the next decade or so. Up until the present, the policy has concentrated on goals such as promoting exchanges and volunteering opportunities; improving the EU-level information available and increasing the civic participation of young people (the latter would receive a concrete legal base in the Lisbon Treaty). It has also provided financial support for 'structured dialogue' - meetings between youth representatives and political decision makers, at the national and EU level, of which the culmination is the 'European Youth Week'. The main instruments of EU Youth Policy are an OMC and the Youth in Action programme. The Commission's more recent rationale is to shift the focus towards integrating specific youth concerns in other EU policies, such as education/training, employment or social inclusion, rather than pursuing a self-contained youth policy. That is in line with what the EP11 and others have requested in recent years. Whilst such a shift makes sense, it also contains risks, as the policy will require much more coordination and objectives will multiply. In terms of the 2009-19 challenges, as stated above for education, the fact that a lot of the EU level work on youth policy is undertaken in an OMC makes EP participation difficult, although it can use the adoption of initiative reports and other instruments to makes its views known. The EP has a specific need to carve out a clearer role for itself in the 'structured dialogue'. The Parliament already represents young people (alongside other age groups!), as an elected body, but it would benefit from more contact with youth associations. The Commission's proposed shift of emphasis is provoked by recognition of the fact that young people face specific socio-economic problems. In 2008, before the start of the current recession, unemployment for 15-24 year olds in the EU-27 averaged 15.5%; for 25-74 year olds it was 5.9%12.

11 See the Written Declaration 'on devoting more attention to youth empowerment in EU policies' 12 The data are taken from Eurostat's Labour Force Survey.

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3.6. Sport Policy

Sport is the only example in the present note of a domain where the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty would make a decisive difference - in terms of the instruments available - over the next decade. The Treaty would make sport an explicit EU competence for the first time. That is significant because Treaty articles related to free movement, 'undertakings' etc - as interpreted in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) - have had considerable impact on professional sport, which is an economic activity of course. The consequences have sometimes been controversial, and have led some to call for the creation of an EU sports policy which is approved using the Community method, rather than the resulting from jurisprudence. The creation of a specific legal basis for sport would thus allow the EU to devise a broader policy, taking into account of the educational and social functions of sport. The new Treaty article mentions two specific objectives: (1) the promotion of fairness in sporting competitions and (2) protecting the physical and moral integrity of sports practitioners. The Commission is also expected to propose a fully-fledged programme for sport if the new Treaty enters into force. Assuming that it does so, the main challenge in the next two terms will be to tackle the above objectives - both of which are likely to provoke huge debate. In terms of 'promoting fairness', for example, actors from the world of football have called on the EU to intervene in order to mitigate the consequences of the increased commercialization of the game, resulting in the buying of promising players from outside Europe who are barely teenagers or in the domination of a shrinking number of clubs. However, the idea that it is the EU's responsibility to deal with such problems is far from consensual. The sports movement has historically enjoyed legal autonomy and been left to organize itself; while commercial sport for some should be treated like any other business. For the EP, getting involved in such debates holds great attractions and some dangers. The attraction is that these are issues that millions of sports fans really care about; they would therefore generate a lot of publicity. The danger is that EU policies will turn out to be misunderstood and unpopular.

Gonçalo MACEDO

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4. FISHERIES

4.1. Background

In 2006, the total production worldwide of the fisheries and aquaculture sector was 144 million tonnes, of which aquaculture accounted for 36%. China is by far the biggest producer, with 51.5 million tonnes, 67% being supplied by aquaculture. The EU 27 accounted for only 6.7 million tonnes, with aquaculture's share standing at 19%. The total catch of the EU 27 has fallen by 27% over the last decade, although aquaculture production has risen by 4%. Over the same period, total world catch diminished by 2%, while world aquaculture production increased by 94%. Catch levels have declined at a much faster rate in Europe than in the world as a whole, and European aquaculture production is static. The EU's supplies of fisheries products are therefore now ever more dependent on imports, which already account for over half the Union's consumption. World demand for fisheries products is still on the rise. Growth rates in the emerging countries are extremely high, and in absolute terms that group of countries now accounts for the majority of fisheries products consumed in the world. Thus, China absorbs 31% of the world's fisheries products, as opposed to Europe's 14%. Nonetheless, China still manages to maintain a growing surplus enhancing its position as net exporter. In the medium term, the prospects for satisfying demand in Europe will depend on the development of aquaculture and the opportunities for access to fisheries resources. From the strategic viewpoint, a broad spectrum is opening up, with the two ends occupied by the objectives, measures and actions of, respectively, the Commission's DG MARE and the Chinese State Ocean Administration. The Common fisheries policy (CFP) follows ten-year cycles. 2002 was a crucial year for fisheries and aquaculture in the EU. That year saw the adoption of the regulations for the reform of the common fisheries policy (CFP) and the publication by the Commission of its communication on a strategy for the sustainable development of European aquaculture. The 2002 reform of the CFP introduced substantial changes. In the area of the conservation and management of fish stocks, the aim was to strive for a more long-term perspective, employing multiannual recovery and management plans. A new element in those multiannual plans was the regulation of the fishing effort. The majority of the recovery and management plans have had only scant results, thanks to an insufficient reduction in the fishing effort, insufficient controls or interferences with the adoption system for Total Allowable Catch (TAC). Behind all these factors is the excess in fisheries capacity, which, following the 2002 reform, has not only not been reduced but has actually increased, and must thus be considered as both the cause and the effect of overfishing. Concerning fleet management, 2002 saw the elimination of aids for the construction of new vessels. The mandatory capacity reduction objectives were replaced by national limits on power and tonnage levels, but no such limits were placed on fishery capacity. In most Member States, the reductions in power and tonnage levels arising from the withdrawal of smaller vessels were offset by using higher-capacity boats. In addition, technological innovation further boosted capacity. Two other components of the 2002 reform were the creation of new advisory bodies in the shape of the Regional Advisory Councils (RACs),

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Département thématique B: Politiques structurelles et de Cohésion ____________________________________________________________________________________________ and the conversion of the fisheries agreements with third countries into Fishery Partnership Agreements (FPAs). The results of the 2002 CFP reform have been disappointing, be it environmentally, economically or socially. There has been no real progress over fish stocks. There has been a fall in catch while the fleet's fishing capacity has increased and the sector's economic fragility has grown. The sector has also been hit by increased imports, volatile fuel prices and the financial crisis. Also in 2002, the Commission adopted the strategy for the sustainable development of European aquaculture. Its objectives were ambitious: to create 8000 to 10 000 jobs; to boost the growth rate of aquaculture production in the EU to 4% per annum; to resolve the space-related conflicts which are impeding the development of aquaculture; to promote market development; and to improve governance in the aquaculture sector. Not one of those objectives has been achieved. Production has stagnated, almost no jobs have been created, the use of space continues to be an obstacle, the market in seabream and sea-bass has been hit by a severe crisis, and there has been no improvement in the legislative and administrative environment. In 2008, the fisheries sector absorbed just under 0.8% of the EU budget. About 60% of that amount went on structural actions under the European Fisheries Fund (EFF), 18% on fishing in international waters and the law of the sea, 6% on controls, 5% on stock conservation and management, 4% on administrative expenses and 3% on the common organisation of the markets.

4.2. Prospects for the Seventh Parliamentary Term

In April 2009 the Commission submitted the Green Paper on the reform of the common fisheries policy and the communication 'Building a sustainable future for aquaculture: A new impetus for the Strategy for the Sustainable Development of European Aquaculture'. These two texts will be the basis for Parliament's work on fisheries in the seventh legislative term. The Green Paper on the reform of the CFP marks the opening of public consultations, with an analysis of the situation and evolution of the fisheries sector and fish stocks. It also proposes a number of possible orientations for the new CFP, and raises a series of questions on the key aspects. The consultations will close on 31 December 2009, and the results will be presented in the first half of 2010. The legislative proposals will be submitted with a view to adoption of the regulations during the year 2011. An assessment of the reform will be initiated in 2019. The reform of the CFP will have to satisfy three time-related requirements. Regulation (EC) No 2371/2002 states that the Council will decide on he arrangements governing access to waters in the 12-mile zone no later than 31 December 2012. In addition, one of the objectives laid down for fisheries management by the World Sustainable Development Summit held in Johannesburg in 2002 is the restoration of fish populations to the level of Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY) in 2015; and the framework directive on the marine strategy obliges Member States to achieve 'good environmental status' by 2020, thus making it necessary to apply an ecosystemic approach.

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The future will witness the ever-closer integration of fisheries and aquaculture into the context of the Integrated Maritime Policy (IMP). In this connection, the Committee on Fisheries, in May 2007, asked for an extension of its competences via the modification of Annex VI to Parliament's Rules of Procedure. Concerning stock conservation, it called for the integration of objectives for ensuring the sustainable development of sea and ocean activities, monitoring activities impacting on marine biodiversity, and carrying out maritime research and applied research in the fisheries sector. On structural aspects, it proposed including the processing of fishery products. It also called for changes to the external chapter of the 2002 CFP reform, involving the replacement of the term international fisheries agreements by reference to partnership agreements in the fisheries sector with third countries, regional fisheries organisations and international bodies and organs. This request was not approved by the Conference of Presidents, but the matter is likely to be raised again in the seventh legislative term. 4.2.1. The reform of the common fisheries policy

In its Green Paper, the Commission identifies five factors underlying the CFP's shortcomings. These are: excess fleet capacity, failure to define political objectives, short-term decision-making, an insufficient culture of responsibility in the sector, and regulatory deficiencies. In order to correct these shortcomings, the Commission advocates a radical reform. The Commission proposes creating a hierarchy of objectives for the CFP, with ecological sustainability having priority over the economic and social objectives. It further proposes establishing a hierarchy of norms, thus separating fundamental principles from technical execution. The Council and Parliament would be co-legislators for the principles, while the implementing decisions would be delegated to the Member States and the Council or would be the subject of self-regulation by the sector. Where appropriate, technical execution would be delegated to the Commission by the commitology route. While recognising fisheries policy to be an exclusive competence of the Community, the Commission suggests regional management, with certain execution decisions being delegated to the Member States. This would require a redefinition of the role of the consultative bodies such as the Advisory Committee on Fisheries and Aquaculture (ACFA) and the Regional Advisory Councils (RACs). If the Treaty of Lisbon is ratified, codecision will become the ordinary legislative procedure for the CFP, replacing the consultation procedure now in force. Nonetheless, the treaty text raises certain problems of interpretation, since it introduces exceptions to the ordinary procedure, especially with regard to 'measures on fixing prices, levies, aid and quantitative limitations and on the fixing and allocation of fishing opportunities' (Article 43(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union).

The case-law tends towards a restrictive interpretation of exceptions, but the absence of a clear delimitation of the legislative powers of Parliament and the Council in the field of fisheries could lead to political and legal problems. For instance, it would be difficult for Parliament to accept a system of general reservations as regards execution in favour of the Council which would extend the interpretation of the 'fixing and allocation of fishing opportunities' to the regulation of the fishing effort or the adoption of technical measures. Broad-brush interpretations of this nature could have the effect of undermining Parliament's powers of codecision in the context of the CFP reform as such or of the measures needed for the achievement of its objectives.

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Département thématique B: Politiques structurelles et de Cohésion ____________________________________________________________________________________________ The Commission has repeatedly expressed the view that Parliament should be divested of responsibility for excessively technical matters with a view to avoiding blockage or delays in the legislative procedures. This would entail more delegation of legislative powers. Such delegation would only be acceptable for elements that are not central to the legislative act. Consequently, a delegation of powers cannot apply to either the general orientations of a legislative act or to general principles. In the final part-session of the sixth legislative term, the EP adopted a resolution on the proposal for a regulation concerning technical measures. Nonetheless and taking account of the excessive recourse to commitology, the Council has for the moment 'frozen' the procedure. In order to avoid the deterioration of Parliament's institutional role as co-legislator and the erosion of its legislative powers, it will be necessary to clarify the structure and decision-making levels of the rules on fisheries from the start of the seventh legislative term. In particular and for each section of the CFP, it will be necessary to identify the essential elements which cannot be the object of delegation of execution, and distinguish them from those which are non-essential. Among the non-essential elements, it will be important to differentiate those that can de delegated in order to modify or complement them from those which could be better specified or clarified (but not modified or complemented) by means of executive procedures. The Green Paper raises the possibility of establishing differentiated management regimes. One of these would concern the deep-sea fleets (capacity adjustment and economic efficiency); another would be for small-scale fleets and would centre on social objectives. The Commission here opens a debate on maintaining the principle of relative stability. It refers to certain negative effects such as reduction of fishing fleets' adaptation capacity, inflationary pressure on TACs, and the encouragement of discards. It is suggested that it be replaced by a system of allocation of transferable fishing rights, as an efficient and inexpensive means of reducing excess capacity and a tool for increasing responsibility in the sector. Should the principle of relative stability be retained, it would be necessary to address its shortcomings and adjust the national quotas to fleets' real needs. The proposal for a regulation revising the common organisation of the market (COM) will be submitted at the end of 2010. It is expected to be adopted before the proposals for reforming the CFP are submitted. Nonetheless, the revision of the COM has an important place in the Green Paper, which stresses the need to strengthen the producers' organisations (POs) and give them new functions in documenting catch or managing quotas and fishing effort. In order to satisfy the requirements of the Integrated Maritime Policy (IMP), the Green Paper emphasises the need to apply the ecosystemic approach, reducing catch below the MSY level and taking account of the impact of climate change. This will call for an increased research effort. It also stresses the need to integrate fisheries and aquaculture into maritime spatial planning, which would mean incorporating agriculture into the CFP. Other aspects of the IMP might necessitate the redesign of the structural actions under the EFF. With regard to the Fisheries Partnership Agreements, the Green Paper suggests that they could be used to develop scientific research in third-country waters in order to contribute to those countries' food security or to regional cooperation; aquaculture too could be included here. To apply this approach would necessitate delimiting the frontier between fisheries policy and development policy. The Treaty of Lisbon requires the assent of Parliament for the conclusion of international agreements having significant budgetary implications for the Union or concerning areas to which the ordinary legislative

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procedure applies. It follows that agreements in the framework of the Regional Fisheries Management Organisations (RFMOs) and FPAs with third countries would require the prior assent of Parliament. This is an important point, given that in the sixth legislative term FPAs accounted for 28% of the reports adopted by the Committee on Fisheries. Nonetheless, Parliamentt would have only a limited margin as regards applying the assent procedure to FPAs, given that the agreement would already have been negotiated and that agreements of this kind generally reach Parliament just before they are to come into force. Parliament would therefore only be able to exercise a political role, bearing on the negotiating mandate and the monitoring of the negotiations up to their conclusion. This possibility is referred to in Article 19 of the framework agreement on relations between Parliament and the Commission, as in force at the end of the sixth legislative term. In addition, the Treaty of Lisbon states that Parliament is to be kept fully and promptly informed at all stages of the procedure. This is particularly important in view of Parliament's demands concerning transparency and rapidity in the forwarding of information on negotiations. Parliament has also called for the participation of its representatives in the Community coordination meetings and in those of the regional fisheries organisations and of the joint committees set up under the bilateral agreements.

4.2.2. Strategy for the sustainable development of aquaculture

The communication entitled 'Building a sustainable future for aquaculture - A new impetus for the Strategy for the Sustainable Development of European Aquaculture' lacks ambition, failing as it does to announce any legislative steps to stimulate aquaculture production while not abandoning the objectives announced in 2002. It offers no solutions for dealing with the obstacles existing as regards spatial use, supplies of raw materials for feeding or the availability of vaccinations and medicines. Nor does it propose any measures to tackle the complexity of the legislative environment, the dispersal of competences between five Commission DGs, or the accumulation of red tape. The Commission takes the view that the purpose of this communication is to raise awareness on the part of policy-makers and public bodies of the importance of aquaculture in the EU. On most of the points, it simply asks for Member States' cooperation. Three points require stressing here. With regard to the capacity to respond to the expectations of the market, the possibility is raised of modifying the rules governing producers' organisations, interbranch organisations, consumer information and marketing instruments, as part of the revision of the CMO which will be launched at the end of 2010. Also announced is a proposal for the labelling of food products of marine origin. There is, however, no reference to how this would mesh with the horizontal regulation on the Community eco-labelling system. In order to ensure monitoring of the aquaculture sector, a new regulation on statistics is announced, (even though that currently in force was adopted in 2008), together with the introduction of a new framework for data collection. The communication introduces an innovation as regards the external dimension. The Commission says it will examine the possibility of promoting the development of agriculture in third countries and boosting EU aquaculture firms' negotiating clout in the context of the FPAs. Such a 'relocation' of aquaculture does not appear to be consistent with job creation objectives. Furthermore, it will do nothing to reduce dependency as regards supplying the EU market with marine products. Parliament's reaction to this communication will be crucial for the future of aquaculture in Europe.

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Département thématique B: Politiques structurelles et de Cohésion ____________________________________________________________________________________________ 4.3. Other Elements

With regard to possible further enlargements of the EU, the most immediate prospect is the accession of Croatia, which now only needs certain adaptations to the acquis communautaire and the lifting of Slovenian opposition to accession. The accession of Turkey would have major effects on aquaculture. It appears that Turkey has adopted export subsidies for fishery products (on 19 March 2008) and production subsidies for the same products (on 15 April 2008). This could give rise to a complaint against Turkey in the coming months. The accession of Iceland would necessitate application of the entire acquis communautaire, the CFP included. A few years ago this would have been unthinkable, given Iceland's traditional posture since the 'cod wars'. Nonetheless, acceptance of the CFP acquis could be facilitated by a number of factors. Among these are the impact of the financial crisis and the loss of relative importance of fishery product exports in the wake of the development of the aluminium industry. In addition, the social importance of fisheries is now lower, following the concentration of activity in a small number of firms as a result of the acceptance of transferable fishery rights on the stock market. Although the fisheries sector accounts for only a small proportion of the EU budget, there are certain factors which need to be borne in mind. The new financial perspective or the multiannual financial framework could necessitate a revision of the CFP. In addition, the conclusion of the WTO's Doha Round, should it happen, could impact on certain aspects of the CFP which could be held to be subsidies. There could also be repercussions for EU tariff protection in the case of certain fishery products. 4.4. Conclusion

Demand for marine products will continue to grow over the next decade. Nonetheless, there will be a continued fall in catches for purposes of direct consumption or for feeding aquaculture. To this should be added the uncertainty over the impact of climate change on fisheries resources. The EU's dependency on imports is becoming greater, and countries such as China are entrenching their dominance of the world market in marine products. In the medium term, the EU's position will depend on the decisions adopted to reform the CFP and release the productive potential of European aquaculture. There is a broad consensus as regards the diagnosis of the failings of the existing CFP and the need to correct them. Nonetheless, the Commission's guidelines for reform are unlikely to obtain unanimity in Council, and the actual proposals for regulations could look very different from the objectives and content of the reform Green Paper. Parliament must look with all care at the reform proposals, in terms of their content and also of the need to avert any erosion of the institutional role in fisheries matters which it will acquire under the Treaty of Lisbon. The communication on the development of aquaculture does not suggest any lines of action which might set free Europe's productive potential. The issues of use of space and the availability of raw materials call for a much more far-reaching, long-term vision. Following the end of the seventh legislative term and until the revision of the CFP which will begin in 2019, it will be necessary to tackle environmental problems and ensure both the survival of coastal communities and the supply of fishery products at reasonable prices. This will necessitate a considerable research effort, as well as advancing with the integrated maritime policy, accompanied by the strengthening, to the extent necessary, of the

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Community policies concerned. In view of strategic policy options the European Parliament inter alia could:

• Scope of the policy: Choice between Fisheries Policy and Integrated Maritime Policy. Consequences on the hearings of new Commissioners and on the structure and competences of EP committees.

• Lisbon Treaty: Negotiation of the new Interinstitutional Framework Agreement with new Commission in order to prevent the erosion of new EP competences with regard to delegated acts. EP role on the mandate of third countries agreement negotiation.

• Impact Assessment: Negotiation of a new Interinstitutional Agreement on Impact Assessment. Choice of methodology, modalities and EP structures. (In-house IA, IA board, ...)

• CFP External dimension: Long term agreements. Infrastructure instead of money.

• CFP reform: Strengthening of resources conservation and fleet management policies as well as of Common Market Organisation and European Fisheries Fund.

• Aquaculture: New measures to increase production. Enhanced integration in CMO and CFP. Legal basis shift from Directives to Regulation.

Jesús IBORRA MARTÍN

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5. COHESION POLICY

5.1. The Broader Context of Cohesion Policy

Economic and social cohesion, as defined by the European Communities Treaty focuses on "overall harmonious development" and requires a reduction of the "disparities between the levels of development of the various regions". The Lisbon Treaty enhanced the cohesion dimension by adding a third complementary and mutually reinforcing component: territorial cohesion. Territorial balance and harmony thus appear as basic values within the European Union (EU). The European territory however is currently undergoing a series of mutations prompted by various factors, many of which are exogenous in nature, such as globalisation, climate change and rising energy prices, while others are more indigenous in nature, such as demographic decline. Prospective analysis from the European Commission13 suggests that these challenges will most likely generate a substantial asymmetric impact on European territories. Such an impact will further exacerbate existing disparities. Regional development strategies are mainly focused on long-term evolutions. The transformation of a territory is slow to happen, unlike economic and social fluctuations which can be related to short and medium term events. Efficient long-term policy choices therefore rely on the capacity to 'consider the foreseeable future' as an essential pre-condition for identifying the most significant challenges likely to emerge. However, the development of a region is closely interlinked with other key variables such as the economy, demography, accessibility, technology and energy, which makes future trends particularly difficult to predict. Therefore, the aim of this note is not to elaborate predictions, but, instead, to raise awareness among European Parliament (EP) decision-makers and provide them with a better understanding of the driving forces which will shape regional development in the years to come. Efficient policy should thus go beyond goals and generate conditions for enhanced cohesion. In this context, the first challenge for the EP will be to create mechanisms for translating these goals into concrete policy measures. The second one will be to make all three dimensions of cohesion – economic, social and territorial - work together, creating synergies and reinforcing each other. In recent years, a Europe-wide debate has opposed the promoters of stronger global competitiveness to those promoting greater internal cohesion. Two scenarios14 thus emerged focusing, on the one hand, on an internal orientation towards more economic, social and territorial cohesion at the European level and, on the other, towards greater extra-European competitiveness in a global context. These two scenarios present two very different visions of the EU and finally come down to the basic question: What kind of Europe do we want for ourselves and for future generations? The modest volume of this note does not allow embarking on an in-depth analysis of all issues facing Cohesion Policy in the decade to come. Its aim is instead to briefly identify major challenges and single out key policy orientations which may flow from them over the next two parliamentary terms, namely the period running from now to 2019. Hence, the horizon envisaged in this note coincides with the end of the next programming period of the Structural Funds (2014-2020). Indeed, in 2020 we will be able to start seeing the first 13 European Commission, Regions 2020: An Assessment of Future Challenges for EU Regions, Brussels,

November 2008, (SEC) 2008. See also below, Global Changes Impacting on Cohesion Policy. 14 ESPON, Scenarios on the Territorial Future of Europe, May 2007

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Département thématique B: Politiques structurelles et de Cohésion ____________________________________________________________________________________________ economic and social impacts of the next generation of programmes. The real question for the EP today is therefore what sort of policy is needed to address the problems of tomorrow. The reflection process on the future of Cohesion Policy has already started and it takes place in the context of budget review. This paper will therefore attempt to sketch out the policy challenges which could have a significant impact on where the Union directs its efforts and how it makes its choices on future spending priorities. A distinction will be made between two types of challenges:

• external challenges flowing from the position of the EU as a 'region of the world';

• those inherent to the architecture of the future Cohesion Policy.

5.2. Global Challenges Impacting On Cohesion Policy

As pointed out by ESPON15 "Internal and external policies are generally considered as independent parts of the political agenda of the EU." However, in the future, the EP will have to consider deeper the global context and examine the position of EU regions as part of a world-wide complex reality. The following challenges appear of particular relevance to EU regions. Some of them are immediate (such as the financial crisis); others are of a long-term nature (globalisation, demographic decline, climate change and energy security16). The identification of these challenges is most relevant for the political discussion on future Cohesion Policy priorities: should the EP choose an issues-based approach (as opposed to a place-based approach), the priorities can be derived from global trends or specific challenges faced by the EU.

Financial crisis

The financial crisis and the economic downturn have thrown into sharp relief the central place of the EU in securing the economic and social well-being of Europeans. In this context, Parliament and Commission have joined efforts to help limit the negative effect on growth and employment. It is worth noting though that Structural Funds are not a crisis instrument and can only contribute to a policy response. Indeed, the policy is making a powerful contribution to the European Economic Recovery Plan (accelerating implementation of the Funds, 'smart investments' etc). However, the causes and effects of the crisis vary greatly; some Member States have created national or regional recovery packages, others have needed support from the International Monetary Fund and have national budgets under pressure. In this context, the EP needs to retain its focus on addressing long-term structural weaknesses and promoting growth and competitiveness. One thing is clear at present: the current economic crisis only amplifies many of the world's major long-term challenges which the EP will need to monitor closely.

Globalisation

Globalisation is making the European dimension ever more important and tangible. The opening up of huge new markets creates vast new opportunities for European regions, but at the same time tests the EU's capacity to further adjust to structural change and manage its social consequences. Many regions are looking these days at new ways and means of adapting to rapid global changes and avoiding the risk of falling behind, especially in Southern and Eastern Europe. The EP has a major role to play in accompanying this transformation: by anticipating today, as a post-crisis challenge, the regional reconversion

15 ESPON, Europe in the World, December 2007. 16 Ibid, 1.

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processes linked to economic and social restructuring but also, by continuing to take resolute action against unjustified company relocations.

Demographic change

Demographic decline and ageing form a complex system of interactions involving economic, social, political and environmental aspects and it is therefore impossible to take a sectoral approach to the problem. Failing any further enlargement, EU population is likely to remain fairly stable at around 500 million, whereby several European countries, including Germany, Italy and all the new Member States apart from Cyprus and Malta, will probably witness a decline in population17. These trends will obviously impact on regional development. From this viewpoint the concept of territorial cohesion constitutes the most relevant tool for developing an integrated approach to demographic challenges for it specifically includes the territorial dimension associated with these phenomena and proposes a strategic vision for regional development that takes account of the compound effects of each of the sectoral policies being pursued. It is therefore the entire range of internal policies on economic, social and territorial cohesion that will be affected by contemporary demographic transformation. Stemming from that, the question of public services, for example, will come very high on the EP agenda. The question here will be to know whether policies at national and regional level aiming at providing facilities, should give priority to economic efficiency or rather should seek protecting social equity and sustainable development.

Climate Change

Climate change will have a strong impact on European regions. Its direct and indirect effects should therefore be taken into account by the EP when defining future EU Cohesion Policy. Most of the sectors that are potentially important sources of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions are also traditional sectors of intervention of EU Cohesion Policy (transport, construction, services, SMEs, agriculture and waste management) and the main beneficiaries of EU Cohesion Policy are also the most important emitters of GHG (Spain, Portugal, Greece, and Ireland have witnessed the greatest increases in GHG emissions in the whole EU)18. Cohesion Policy can contribute both to mitigation and adaptation. However, the key issue for the EP is how to help achieve these objectives without losing sight of the policy's core goals. This would be possible for instance by rethinking competitiveness measures to take into account the constraints and opportunities of a low carbon economy and climate change proofing of infrastructure investments. In addition, more balanced allocation of Structural Funds for transport should be considered: less funding for roads and more for public transport and railways.

Energy Security

Secure, sustainable and competitive energy represents one of EU's main challenges. Europe’s energy future is characterised by a dependence on external energy resources, which will climb to 70%19 - a figure due to a deficiency of internal alternative energy resources - and by a collective responsibility in the face of climate change. Energy is generally a key element in the economic development of a region. It is an integral part of industry, transport, housing, technological development, and infrastructure. It is therefore essential for the EP to focus on this specific challenge from a Cohesion Policy perspective, notably by giving increased and broadened support for energy efficiency and renewable 17 UMS RIATE et al., Shrinking Regions: a Paradigm Shift in Demography and Territorial Development, study

commissioned by the European Parliament, June 2008. 18 CSIL, Regional Policy and Climate Change, study commissioned by the European Parliament, June 2009.

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Département thématique B: Politiques structurelles et de Cohésion ____________________________________________________________________________________________ energy. Apart from direct funding for energy efficiency and renewable sources, it is equally important to ensure that these activities are, as a horizontal priority, integrated as much as possible into all other investments. For example, any investments of EU funds in buildings should be conditional on ambitious energy-saving standards and systematic integration of renewable energy technologies. Specific energy criteria and requirements going beyond the minimum legal norms should be included in all project stages. In order to address all these issues and ensure a sustainable long-term development of European regions, the EP should consider options to support the aims of the EU in developing a more balanced and harmonious territory, including a clear integration of the challenges described above and their probable economic, social and ecological impacts on different types of territories. 5.3. The Architecture of Future Cohesion Policy

It is essential to delve into the architecture of the future Cohesion Policy 2014-2020, since this highly topical issue will be the main focus of political debate among national and European decision-makers for the next 3-4 years to come. The EP will express its position on the General Regulation of Structural Funds under the co-decision procedure20, should the Treaty of Lisbon be successfully ratified. Therefore this newly reinforced position will provide the Parliament with additional weight and room for manoeuvre. Unsurprisingly, the budget review and the subsequent negotiations on the financial perspectives 2014-2020, will determine the schedule and strongly influence the outcome of the debate on the future Cohesion Policy. The biggest challenge for the EP will undoubtedly consist of reaching a consensus on the highly controversial question of how much money should be spent on Cohesion Policy, since the Multiannual Financial Framework has to be agreed on unanimously by the Council21. However, the two processes evolve under different timeframes. The discussion on Cohesion Policy budget will start in 200922 and will move into its decisive phase in 2010/2011. The debate on the architecture of post-2013 Cohesion Policy is already under way23 but will enter into more concrete terms only when the draft budget is sketched out. It is therefore essential for the EP to avoid a partisan discussion and provide instead a much-needed conceptual input to the architecture of the future Cohesion Policy. Another issue which is bound to have a major impact on the outcome of the political debate is the possible accession of one or more candidate countries during the timeframe examined. Accession negotiations with Croatia and Turkey were opened in October 2005. The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) was granted candidate status in December 2005. The GDP per head of these countries is below 75% of the EU average,

19 Gruppo Soges, Eurofocus, Erac, Using Sustainable and Renewable Energies in the Context of Structural Policy,

study commission by the European Parliament, June 2007 20 Currently, the co-decision procedure applies only to the implementing measures of the General Regulation on

Structural Funds. 21 After adoption by the Parliament (by the majority of its component Members). Note that the Treaty of Lisbon

will modify substantially the budgetary procedure. The modifications derive mainly from the elimination of the distinction between Compulsory and Non-Compulsory Expenses, which allows for the treatment of all the expenditure under the same procedure. The Treaty of Lisbon will also institutionalize the Multiannual Financial Framework (article 312 of TFEU). This article stipulates in addition that, throughout the whole procedure, the institutions "shall take any measure necessary to facilitate its adoption", which reinforces the role of the EP in relation to traditional assent procedures and enhances the possibility of a final agreement.

22 The Commission is expected to present a White Paper in mid-June 2009. 23 The main stages of the debate are summed up on the website of DG REGIO:

http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/policy/future/index_en.htm

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hence should they join the EU all of them would be eligible under the current Convergence Objective, which will entail a certain budgetary implication.24 Croatia is expected to reach the final phase of accession negotiations by the end of 200925. Further reforms in the FYROM will bring the country closer to the EU. The pace of accession negotiations with Turkey reflects the pace of reform. The European Commission considers that Turkey still needs to enhance its political reform effort.

The government of Iceland is expected to submit a request for accession to the EU before the end of the year26. Provided candidate status is granted and given the relative level of development of this country (already a member of the European Economic Area) and its small size (320 000 inhabitants), it could be expected that Iceland moves up the accession path quite rapidly27. Under these circumstances, and given the substantial amount of uncertainty as far as future enlargement(s) are concerned, it would be reasonable to focus on issues on which consensus can be achieved and use the available space to clarify some priorities and challenges.

Policy Rationale and Fundamental Principles

Although the objective of cohesion is enshrined in the Treaty, the role of Cohesion Policy is sometimes disputed. It is therefore important for the EP to highlight in clear terms why the policy exists before discussing how it should be implemented and funded. One thing is clear: Cohesion Policy is not about financial redistribution. "It is a policy for the exogenous promotion of development through public goods and services in all places where inefficiency or social exclusion traps exist."28 It is both the most visible sign of Community solidarity and the most effective instrument for creating integration policy compromises. This explains its complex architecture. Hence, both continuity and reform in policy delivery should be advocated by the EP. On the continuity side, the multiannual programming, financial additionality, shared management, the solidarity and partnership principles represent a great European value that should be preserved. However, there is also a need for change to strike a better balance between the demands for improved financial management and control and the tasks of achieving good results and good implementation of the policy. There is no doubt that a simpler, more efficient and more effective implementing mechanism should be put in place and the administrative complexity and burden should be reduced. Therefore, what should be Cohesion Policy's operating mechanisms and budgetary implications, lends itself to discussion.

24 The budgetary impact upon accession of Croatia and the FYROM is expected to be low due to their small size:

4,4 and 2 millions of inhabitants respectively. The same is not true for Turkey, however, it is unlikely that Turkey joins the EU during the timeframe examined in this note.

25 Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2008-2009, COM (2008) 674 final. Currently though accession negotiations are in a deadlock due to a border dispute between Croatia and Slovenia. At this stage, the EU presidency still hopes to be able to break the stalemate in Croatia's accession talks.

26 Source: Agence Europe, online edition of 23 June 2009. 27 Uncertainty however remains as to the outcome of the national referendum foreseen, once accession talks are

complete. 28 Fabrizio Barca, An Agenda for a for a Reformed Cohesion Policy, April 2009. This report appears as the most

far-reaching document to date, designed to help shape the political debate on the future Cohesion Policy.

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Département thématique B: Politiques structurelles et de Cohésion ____________________________________________________________________________________________ Budget

The tension prompted by the growing demands on the Structural Funds (resulting from the recent accession of 12 new Member States) and the increasing reluctance of net payers to provide additional funding cannot be resolved. Undoubtedly, the current economic and financial crisis will further exacerbate this conflict. In this context, a carefully considered political justification for Cohesion Policy needs to be provided by the EP together with a small number of well targeted core priorities. Strategic political agreement would also be required for the share of Cohesion Policy resources to be allocated to the agreed priorities. Sadly, once the agreement has been struck by the European Council, the threat of upsetting the fragile equilibrium that has been reached leaves little room for manoeuvre in the discussion for the European Parliament but nevertheless should be exploited to the maximum.

Cohesion vs. Competitiveness

The discussion on 'Lisbonisation' raises fundamental questions about the aim and purpose of Cohesion Policy and its underlying rationale: should it concentrate on regions lagging behind or should it instead focus on promoting growth-poles? It is clear, that the political challenge for the EP lays in finding the optimum balance between the two. Current political consensus points towards the option allowing all regions to benefit from EU funding with varying levels of intensity. The most significant help should obviously go to the new accession countries. This makes sense economically in the current context, and is an essential precondition for strengthening the competitive advantage of the whole EU on a global scale. But it also makes sense politically, to avoid any feeling among the new Member States that they are considered as 'second-rate' partners. Economic downturn, though, does not concern only poorer regions, but also regions from the old Member States which face competition from lower-wage regions. Targeted support on a thematic basis should therefore be advocated by the EP for these areas. In addition, there should be a gradual progression away from reliance on support for lagging regions and towards thematic support.

Zoning and Objectives

Cohesion Policy is the only available instrument to address a number of key EU priorities in an integrated way. However, there is a risk of overloading it with fragmented objectives. The EP should therefore push for a very few (three-four) narrowly defined core priorities29 which, in turn, would allow the achievement of a critical mass that can make an effective and visible difference. The definition of priorities should be done in both short-term (intensive support) and medium term perspectives (maintaining the results) and accompanied, if necessary, by intensification of support. There is also a need for greater flexibility when delineating the territories in which Cohesion Policy programmes are designed and implemented. It is, therefore, important for territories to be meaningful to people; one of the disadvantages of using NUTS II for policy implementation is that it sometimes creates administrative capacity for regions which citizens cannot identify with.

29 The Barca Report suggests the following: innovation and climate change, with a largely economic (efficiency)

objective; migration and children, with a predominantly social (social inclusion) objective and skills and ageing, where the two objectives are of similar importance. For most of these, the EU has already developed a body of knowledge and expertise for setting the institutional principles and the indicators for policy implementation.

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Programming Periods

The policy timeframe must meet the actual development challenges and needs of the regions. The seven-year programming period seems to offer limited possibilities for revision. Indeed, the Operational Programmes (OPs) are drawn before the start of the funding period on the basis of figures which are already outdated at the time of implementation30. A new approach should be put forward by the EP to include a continuous loop to scan regional development and the outcomes of the OPs in order to readjust the targets and their implementation iteratively.

Implementation

There is widespread discontent with the current implementation system since it is difficult to accommodate the different institutional arrangements of 27 Member States within a single set of rules. While it is clear that simplification is needed, it is arguable whether radical reform would improve the situation. Every set of changes causes implementation adjustments and delays for those administering the policy on the ground. Hence, continuity appears as a wiser option to be supported by the EP. A different relationship between the Commission and Member States is though needed. The Commission should develop the competence and expertise to take on more of an advisory role and promote experimentation and learning.

Indicators

For each priority a limited group of core indicators, benchmarks and targets should be set against which progress could be measured. In addition, a methodological system to ensure their quality, timely updating and broad diffusion should be put in place. Particular relevance should be given to impact assessment.

The shortcomings of GDP as an index for measuring socio-economic development, has been the focus of public debate for many years. The EP should seize the opportunity during the discussion of future Cohesion Policy and push for reform of the current system of indicators.

Territorial Cohesion

The EP should be firm in demanding the publication of a White Paper on Territorial Cohesion, following the end of the Commission's consultation process31. This will pave the way for translating 'territorial cohesion' into concrete provisions, which should be introduced in the next legislative package on the Structural Funds for the post-2013 programming period. The potential for new geographies should therefore be exploited in responding to new challenges and by focusing on 'functional regions'.

Multi-level Governance and Division of Powers

Multi-level governance32 should bring about added value and avoid the appearance of different decision-making centres fighting each other in the programme management. It should evolve towards a tripartite system where all actors concerned are involved in the process of reaching the most effective outcome. A key idea here should be the increased interaction between the different decision levels and, in particular, an enhanced scope for the local and regional level to influence the preparation of Community initiatives. It is of

30 The current economic and financial crisis offers an additional argument in this sense. 31 June 2009. 32 On this particular issue, see also: OÏR Managementdienste GmbH, Governance and Partnership in Regional

Policy, study commissioned by the European Parliament, January 2008.

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Département thématique B: Politiques structurelles et de Cohésion ____________________________________________________________________________________________ particular political importance for the EP to develop a model for dialogue that is used on a more regular basis than is the case today.

Integration of the Rural Development Pillar into Cohesion Policy

Rural development is a key element of competitiveness. In this context, separating programming and implementation seems to be an inefficient way of enhancing regional development. The EP should give all the necessary attention to this issue and call for bringing the two funds together also from the perspective of territorial cohesion. This would minimize the existing overlaps in the administration of the Funds and would help enhance the use of limited funding.

Relationship between Cohesion Policy and Other Community Policies

To achieve enhanced synergies, the General Regulations for the Structural Funds should be complementary to other policies' regulations. Complementarity should be guaranteed already at the preparatory stage. Here, the challenge is for territorial cohesion "to be taken into account upfront when designing policies, and not to be seen as a tool to repair the damage once it has been done"33. The EP as a legislator has a major role to play in this process to avoid overlaps and duplication, and also to guarantee good coordination between the policies.

Communicating Cohesion Policy

The European Cohesion Policy is still not sufficiently well known: an incisive action of information, promotion and communication using a simple and easily understandable language is urgently required.34 Being particularly visible to the wider public, through the concrete projects it supports, Cohesion Policy helps enhance the legitimacy of the EU integration process, much more than any nation-based promotional campaign would do. However, the successes of Cohesion Policy are not only reflected in numbers35. Among other things they concern equity, social progress, the transfer of know-how, the expansion of a culture of evaluation and partnership. Structural Policy thus promotes a sense of European identity and appears as the most visible instrument allowing citizens to experience the EU as a beneficial factor. In the context of skyrocketing rates of voter abstention, the EP should exploit this potential in a more constructive way to prepare the next European elections.

Tackling territorial problems requires territorial solutions. But it also requires combining the lessons from the past with the challenges of the future. The main task of the EP during the next decade would thus be to find effective policy responses tailored to specific contexts and to foster integrated development approaches to address global challenges, since they are specific to different territories. Future work of the EP should therefore focus on 'place based policies'. Indeed, the place-based model appears as the only tool available at this stage to the EU, to fulfil the development mission required by its own treaties.

Ivana KATSAROVA

33 Speech delivered by Commissioner Danuta Hübner, 24 March 2009, EP, Strasbourg. 34 The European Parliament has expressed this concern on various occasions but sufficient action has still not

been taken and further efforts should be pursued in that direction. 35 More specifically on the spill-over effects of Cohesion Policy see: GEFRA, The Economic Return of Cohesion

expenditure for Member States, study commissioned by the European Parliament, June 2009.

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6. EUROPEAN TRANSPORT POLICY

6.1. Introduction

European transport policy has made important progress since the 2001 White Paper and its 2006 mid-term review36. Many important policy initiatives and a lot of essential and often very controversial pieces of legislation have been adopted37. As co-legislator, the European Parliament contributed significantly to this exercise by successfully modifying a wide range of Commission proposals and by putting forward detailed ideas for the shaping of European transport policy. However, despite this progress, in particular with regard to the almost completed internal transport market, a lot of work remains to be done. Transport's objective of 'sustainable mobility' is far from being achieved. So far, the overall goal of ensuring affordable and efficient mobility for people and goods as the backbone of a competitive EU internal market and as the basis for the free movement of people and social cohesion has not yet been reconciled with the ever increasing environmental concerns resulting from transport. Trans-European Transport networks (TEN-T) are still facing substantial financial constraints and delays. In addition, the social dimension of transport, in terms of employment and working conditions, but also related to passenger rights, transport safety and security, still needs to be further developed. Above all, the different dimensions and objectives of European transport policy need to be embedded in a coherent policy framework of complementary measures. In the next 10 years EU transport policy will not only continue the work of the White Paper but will also have to meet pressing challenges, namely the economic downturn and the fight against climate change. Furthermore, the course for the transport system to 2050 is to be set. The present note aims to discuss the main challenges and choices for European transport policy within the next 10 years. It will focus exclusively on key horizontal issues relevant to more than one transport sector. Therefore, a broad range of dossiers in progress such as the Single European Sky and SESAR for air transport, the maritime transport strategy 2018 and the setting up of the European Railway Traffic Management System (ERTMS) - although of utmost importance - are deemed to be beyond the scope of this note.

36 COM (2001) 370; COM (2006) 314. 37 Inter alia: the revitalisation of the railways through the first, second and third railway packages, which deal

above all with market opening, but also with safety questions, interoperability and passenger rights, traffic shifting programmes such as, initially, ‘Marco Polo’ and the current ‘Marco Polo II’, the new ‘Eurovignette’ directive, with a further revision already in progress, three maritime safety packages, the Single European Sky initiative, a new legal framework for public transport, the incorporation of aviation into the EU’s emissions trading scheme, the setting up of the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), the European Railway Agency (ERA), the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) and the Trans-European Transport Network Executive Agency (TEN-T EA), the launch of three ambitious technological projects: Galileo, ERTMS and the SESAR programme, etc.

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Département thématique B: Politiques structurelles et de Cohésion ____________________________________________________________________________________________ 6.2. Paramount challenges: Current economic downturn and weak

environmental performance

Two paramount challenges will play a crucial role and are very likely to dominate forthcoming debates on EU transport policy. The EU's transport system has become a very important factor of the Union's economy38. It is also highly sensitive to, and dependent on, economic developments in other sectors. The current economic downturn is significantly weakening transport demand. Europe’s freight transport sector, from shipping companies and airlines to freight forwarders and the rail sector, is already particularly badly affected. In terms of passenger transport, the air travel sector, is also suffering. Future income losses might contribute to a further reduction in mobility demand, in particular for tourism and leisure purposes. The transport sector is expected to suffer further if the crisis persists. This would increase the pressure on EU policy makers to implement adaption measures in order to save jobs and to help the respective transport sectors mitigate negative economic impacts. This might also lead to a shift of priorities which then, for example, might weaken transport's sustainability objectives or lead to distortion between transport sectors. The way EU transport policy reacts to the economic crisis will contribute to the success or failure of dealing with the second paramount challenge: the weak environmental performance of the European transport system, in particular with regard to climate change. In its latest report39, the European Environment Agency (EEA) points out that ‘trends in transport are pointing in the wrong direction’. The figures and trends presented in this report are alarming and underline the need for immediate and far-reaching measures, particularly as far as tackling transport’s greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions40 is concerned. Although some recent steps have been taken such as the inclusion of aviation in the Emission Trading Scheme (ETS), the transport sector is still far from making a telling contribution to the EU's climate goals of reducing CO2 emissions by 2020 by at least 20%, below 1990 levels - on the contrary: the increasing GHG-emissions from the transport sector are thwarting efforts in all other sectors. Without this converse trend, EU-27 GHG emissions would have fallen between 1990 and 2005 by 14%, instead of 7.9%. Growing transport demand is seen as a past and future key driver regardless of the temporary weakening of transport demand due to the economic crisis. Although vehicle technology has become more energy efficient, it is far from the level required to offset the impact of the general growth in transport. Therefore, the EEA has called for addressing the problem of transport growth more properly in the future - for example through demand management. The economic crisis might have further severe impacts on Europe’s economy and society (including the transport sector), but it is broadly considered to be of a temporary nature. In

38 The provision of transport services accounts for 4.3% of total value added in the EU, not including own-

account transport, construction or maintenance of transport infrastructure and transport means. The share of the European logistics industry is estimated at roughly 14% of GDP. In 2005, around 8.8 million people were employed in the transport sector.

39 EEA Report No 3/2009, Transport at a crossroads. TERM 2008: indicators tracking transport and environment in the European Union, Copenhagen 2009.

40 Transport represents about one-third of final energy consumption in the 27 EU Member States and is now the largest consumer of final energy. Road transport accounts for 74% of the total, aviation 15%, maritime transport 7.8%, rail 2.2% and inland navigation 1.0%. Transport accounts for nearly a quarter of all EU-27 GHG-emissions. Between 1990 and 2005 GHG emissions from transport included in the Kyoto Protocol increased by 27%. Together with the significant increases in emissions from maritime transport (+58%) and international aviation (+98%), the estimated total increase in emissions from EU transport amounts to 36% from 1990 to 2006.

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contrast, there is no longer any scientific doubt that climate change - if not tackled now, resolutely and simultaneously in all sectors - will have irreversible and catastrophic consequences. In its resolution of 4 February 2009 ‘2050: The future begins today – recommendations for the EU’s future integrated policy on climate change’, the European Parliament therefore stressed ‘the need to face up to climate change and its effects by means of political and educational measures based on a long-term perspective and by implementing decisions in a coherent way, not subordinating them to short-term political goals’. In the same resolution, Parliament recalled that the transport sector must also comply with the EU's climate goals. The EEA does not consider the measures which are already adopted or are planned41 to be sufficient to meet these goals. An important option for the legislator to consider could be to define specific GHG reduction targets for individual transport sectors in order to tailor further GHG reduction measures - to be developed in a second step - better to the relevant specific circumstances. The 'Greening Transport' Package

In the meantime, much depends on how Parliament, Council and Commission deal with the 'Greening Transport' package42 which includes also the revision of the 'Eurovignette' directive43. The European Parliament adopted its first reading on this directive in March 2009. In principle, it supported the Commission’s approach. Therefore, Parliament recognised the feasibility of external costs calculation methods for heavy goods vehicles (HGV), as well as the need to internalise these costs. In future, Member States would be entitled to charge HGVs over 3.5t not only for infrastructure costs but also, in part, for the air and noise pollution they produce as well as for congestion. The second reading and the negotiations with Council, are expected to be difficult in view of the contrasting perspectives on this dossier, in particular between transit countries and periphery countries. There seems to be a broad scientific consensus that the transport system can only be economically efficient if transport prices reflect all costs. Therefore, the shift from voluntary to mandatory charging schemes in all Member States - beginning with the road freight sector as it poses the biggest environmental challenges - could be a future option. Allowing the full integration of external costs in the road freight sector is widely considered to be by far the most important first step. Furthermore, on 11 March 2009 Parliament adopted a resolution on the 'Greening Transport' package criticising the Commission for the lack of an overall strategy. Parliament urged the Commission to submit an integrated plan for the greening of transport in all sectors, together with specific legislative proposals. Nevertheless, the 'Greening Transport' package can be considered as a first important step in dealing seriously with the problem of external costs in all transport sectors. This is widely seen as one of the most challenging, essential and controversial issues that European transport policy will have to address in the coming years. A lot, however, will depend on how Parliament deals with further concrete legislative proposals announced in this package.

41 such as the possible inclusion of the maritime sector in the ETS 42 The ‘Greening Transport’ package (COM(2008) 433) was inter alia intended to help the EU meet its climate

and energy goals. Consisting of a number of Communications, it describes the actions already taken by EU regarding more sustainable transport; it sets out new initiatives the Commission intents to present by the end of 2009 as well as a strategy to internalise external costs. Furthermore, a proposal for the revision of the 'Eurovignette' directive was presented, dealing in particular with the internalisation of the external costs of the road freight transport.

43 COM(2008) 436

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Département thématique B: Politiques structurelles et de Cohésion ____________________________________________________________________________________________ 6.3. Financing of TEN-T infrastructure

An efficient, well maintained and fully integrated Trans-european Transport Network (TEN-T) is an essential component of a sustainable transport system. In February 2009, the Commission presented a Green Paper on the future TEN-T policy44, summarising its current reflections and announcing proposals for a fundamental review. Several problems, challenges and options for the future TEN-T Policy are outlined in the Paper. Financial constraints

Despite all financial and also organisational45 efforts at Member State and EU level, there are still considerable delays in the completion of many projects: according to the Commission this is, in particular, due to a lack of financial resources in relation to a set of priorities which are too broad. The remaining investment required to complete and modernise the TEN-T network in the enlarged EU amounts to approximately € 500 billion from 2007 to 2020, out of which € 270 billion is allocated towards the priority axes and projects. In comparison to these amounts, the EU's overall contribution46 of € 52 billion between 2007 and 2013 appears to be relatively small. Member States therefore play a crucial role in realising the TEN-T network. However, their investment efforts are predominantly driven by national objectives rather than contributing to an overall Community objective. Shaping the future multimodal network and ensuring its timely completion is likely to become even more difficult against the background of severe financial constraints in the Members States' budgets due to the current economic crisis. It might lead to potential difficulties at EU level in the context of the preparation of the mid-term review47 of the current multiannual financial framework (MFF) and the preparation of its follow-up which will run from 2014 onwards. Revision of the TEN-T guidelines

In order to make sure that: a) TEN-T planning takes better account of European objectives outside individual Member States' perspectives, that it b) corresponds to future mobility needs in line with EU priorities and c) at the same time contributes to the EU's climate change objectives, the Commission suggested several potential changes. The integration of the network should be strengthened to facilitate co-modal services. This should be achieved by a combination of modes, by improvements in interconnections and by the integration of intelligent transport systems. Furthermore, the effectiveness of the funding should be increased by placing a stronger focus on 'European added value' as well as by a more effective combination of Community grant instruments, and a better stimulation of public-private partnerships. In addition, three conceptual options for further TEN-T development planning are proposed. Within these options it is proposed to move the disconnected priority projects towards a priority 'core' network and to add a "conceptual pillar" to reflect the need for more flexibility to respond to short and medium term needs. In its resolution on this Green Paper in April 2009, Parliament agreed in principle with the Commission's approach and opted for a dual layer structure with a comprehensive network (as in the current TEN-T guidelines) and a core network. The latter would be subject to concentrated community financial support and Member States would have greater responsibility for the rest of the network. In addition, Parliament noted that investing in transport infrastructure is one key way of tackling the current economic and financial crisis 44 Green Paper - TEN-T: A policy review - Towards a better integrated Trans-European transport network at the

service of the common transport policy (COM(2009) 44). 45 Such as the setting up of the Trans-European Transport Network Executive Agency (TEN-T EA) or the

designation of 8 European Coordinators for key priority projects. 46 € 8 billion directly from the TEN-T Programme, as well as € 34,8 billion from the cohesion fund, € 9,4 billion

from ERDF, not including € 53 billion loans and guarantees from the EIB. 47 2009-2010

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and it expected more coherence from the Council in relation to requests for TEN-T projects and decisions on TEN-T budgets. Investment in the right transport infrastructures can - in theory - contribute to meeting both of the above mentioned paramount challenges: overcoming the economic downturn and developing a more sustainable transport system. The above mentioned 'European added value' for infrastructure could focus on various aspects such as cohesion, trade flows, efficiency or sustainability. Further increasing the importance of the latter, which means further concentrating investment on infrastructure for less polluting transport modes, will remain an important option for the future. Furthermore, and complementary to the new infrastructure, making better use of currently underused infrastructure and a better geographical distribution of important transport hubs (e.g. to use available port capacities in the Mediterranean) would also be an option that could lead to more sustainability. Further options for TEN-T development include focussing on hinterland connections for EU seaports (in particular railways), in order to strengthen the potential of the motorways of the sea and to facilitate trade flows with third countries. The EU will also have to build stronger transport connections with both Mediterranean and East European countries, above all with Russia and Turkey but also with North Africa. Prioritisation of parts of the network for either freight or passenger transport, as well as the funding of standardised ITS applications, might contribute to significant efficiency gains. Sufficient financial means and political commitment would be key factors for such a TEN-T development. Taking into account the past controversial debates between the Council and the European Parliament during the negotiations on the MFFF

48 as well as the difficult negotiations on the last TEN-T revision in 2004, the future of the TEN-T programme is uncertain. The question of whether the different infrastructure priorities of old and new Member States can be converged will play an important role. Above all, it will depend largely on proper funding (in particular the budget line for the TEN-T programme) and therefore on the next MFF. It is worth mentioning that, concerning the TEN-T, the administrative conditions required to ensure successful investments are largely fulfilled, in contrast to other policy areas. New sources for TEN-T funding such as revenues from road pricing and external cost internalisation could be explored as an alternative option and might facilitate the development of the TEN-T network. 6.4. Mobility in urban areas

Urban and metropolitan areas are considered to be some of the most critical parts of the transport system where policy intervention and significant changes of transport organisation and mobility patterns are urgently needed. Therefore, dealing with urban transport is increasingly becoming a top priority on the European transport agenda. More than 72% of Europe's population live in urban areas, and this is expected to increase. Urban traffic is responsible for 40% of CO2 emissions and 70% of emissions of other pollutants arising from road transport. Hence, in urban areas there is high potential for more energy efficiency and emissions reduction in transport. Promoting the shift towards sustainable transport will not only result in GHG reduction but also in relief for congested and polluted cities. The Green Paper on urban mobility

In 2007 the European Commission presented a Green Paper on urban mobility49. It addressed the question of how to create a new urban mobility culture in order to reconcile the economic development of towns and cities and the related mobility needs with quality of life and environmental protection. An action plan on urban transport, announced by the

48 Council insisted on a drastic reduction of the budget line for the TEN-T programme (from EUR 20 350 million

down to EUR 8 013 million. 49 Green Paper: towards a new culture for urban mobility - COM (2007)0551.

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Département thématique B: Politiques structurelles et de Cohésion ____________________________________________________________________________________________ Commission, is still pending. The European Parliament has already adopted 2 resolutions since the presentation of the Green Paper50. Future options

One of the key questions is how much the European Union should be involved in defining and implementing urban mobility policies which are so far mainly prepared at local/regional level and which fall to a great extent under the principle of subsidiarity. The EU's role could be limited to complementary support in the form of research and best practice programmes, as well as to financial support. However, as cities all over Europe face similar transport problems and challenges, and as the success of EU policies for example on air quality, social issues or on climate change, at least partly depends on actions taken by regional and local authorities, there are also good reasons for strengthening the EU's role in this policy field. Sustainable urban transport plans (SUTP) could be an interesting policy option for a greater involvement of the European Union in this area. These plans could be tailored to the respective needs of each urban area and also integrate the surrounding areas. They could define and set mid and long-term objectives and deadlines for switching to more sustainable forms of urban transport. They could also encourage the development of mobility management systems as well as integrated land use and transport planning in order to reduce urban sprawl. The EU could contribute through the development of guidelines for SUTPs. As a possible option, the adoption of SUTPs at a decentralised regional/local level as well as measuring CO2 emissions on a regular basis could be made obligatory by the EU in all major urban areas. 6.5. Transposition and implementation of existing legislation

The TRAN Committee has been one of the busiest committees when it comes to dealing with co-decision. Many central pieces of EU transport legislation were adopted in the last few years. Experience shows, however, that proper transposition or implementation of existing Community legislation has not always been to the required level in all Member States. In future, in addition to reports on new legislation, monitoring the application of existing Community law will therefore become increasingly important for the TRAN Committee. 6.6. The new debate on the future of transport

The European Commission has recently launched a debate on the future of transport in the long term (20 to 40 years) and has presented a Communication51. outlining some of the possible trends, transport challenges ahead and policy options. The time horizon of the current White Paper expires in 2010 and there is a need for a follow-up embracing not only the next ten years but also taking into account the decades beyond that. The challenges ahead

According to this communication and its related documents, the EU will become part of a more globalised and further integrated world economy with strong relationships with its neighbouring countries. In particular, freight transport demand will increase further but also long distance passenger transport. Europe will be populated by an ageing and more multicultural society. A significant part will live in dense and more widespread urban areas, 50 Parliament’s recommendations include the introduction and general application of sustainable urban transport plans in conurbations with over 100 000 inhabitants, the launch of a programme for improving statistics and databases on urban mobility at Eurostat and the setting up an urban mobility observatory. Parliament also stressed the need for stronger EU financial support. 51 'A sustainable future for transport: Towards an integrated, technology-led and user friendly system' COM(2009) 279/4

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of which some will have a tendency to become 'mega city regions'. Together with the trend towards mobile jobs, migration flows and a more integrated economy and society this will result in growing but also changing mobility needs and travel patterns. More pressure will be put on existing infrastructures with more congestion as a possible consequence. More frequent extreme weather events resulting from climate change may strongly affect the performance of the transport system and its infrastructure. A rise in fossil fuel prices is predicted due to their increasing scarcity. However, energy from renewable resources might become cheaper. Breakthroughs in energy, transport and communication technologies will transform people’s lives in ways that are likely to be positive. But they might also have potential negative impacts. The preparation of a long term vision

EU transport policy will have to address these challenges with new policy initiatives. Although the content of the Commission Communication does not seem to be very ambitious and regardless of many uncertainties concerning the future of transport, it is widely acknowledged that EU transport policy has arrived at a point of transition towards a new transport system. In this sense, there seems to be a broad consensus that the European Union needs a clear medium and long-term vision of a desirable European transport system which is integrated, accessible and affordable to everyone, and above all environmentally, economically and socially sustainable. This vision should include long term objectives and inter alia revolve around the following questions:

• How to move towards an integrated transport system with better efficiency and improved environmental performance?

• How to achieve individual mobility that is independent of conventional energy sources?

• What future transport infrastructure is needed and how to design the required appropriate financial instruments?

• What feasible and promising technological options are to be used for a new generation of transport systems and propulsion systems which are independent from fossil fuels? How much funding for their development is needed? How to ensure that European companies lead the field in these areas? How to reduce the risks for investment in new transport technologies? How to set up common international standards? How shall the transition periods towards these new technologies be organised?

• How to understand and manage the drivers of transport demand? How to foster behavioural change towards more sustainable forms of transport in combination with the provision of valid transport alternatives?

• What form should liveable cities take and what does it mean for a new culture for urban mobility?

• What role shall information technologies play in the more efficient use and integration of transport networks?

• What should be the medium and long-term research and technological development (RTD) priorities for transport and what should be their adequate funding?

• How to encourage further technological development (e.g. through higher transport prices, regulatory approaches or research programmes)?

• How to fully internalise the external costs of transport in respective sectors?

• What options are there for regulating, opening and organising current and future transport markets as well as for ensuring fair competition inside and between the sectors?

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• How to maintain and improve the EU's competitiveness in increasingly globalised transport markets? How to ensure that the EU as an actor is best represented on the international stage?

• How to contribute to employment and decent working conditions as well as how to promote appropriate training and education in all transport sectors?

• How to further increase safety and security in all transport sectors? Much of the above policy issues have been already dealt with before at EU-level in various legislative and non-legislative reports. However, thus far, the picture seems to be quite fragmented and incoherent. Only with well defined mid and long-term objectives can coherent sector specific strategies with well designed implementation times and clear priorities and milestones be realised. The same goes for the definition and development of instruments tailored to the needs of the various sectors. In so doing un-coordinated and opposing approaches could be avoided. A sophisticated policy mix, combining mutually supportive policies, as suggested by various recent studies, would be possible. This mix would revolve around boosting technological development, organisational innovation, the provision of adequate infrastructure, behavioural change and regulatory intervention. Already adopted, as well as future action plans52, will have to be reviewed and made coherent. Further research and data collection is indispensable. Whatever approaches are chosen, all of them should be science based. There is still a regrettable lack of data in all transport sectors (e.g. regarding social and working conditions), as has been outlined very often in studies carried out for the TRAN Committee. Policy makers need to get a better understanding of the very complex interaction between the various economic, environmental, social, political and technical aspects as well as of the external drivers which impact on transport. 6.7. Conclusion

In future EU transport will have to change drastically and the course for this change is likely to be set within the next 10 years. The choices to be made will impact on EU and its citizens for a very long time. Therefore, the future changes have to be properly anticipated and managed. It is why EU needs long-term visions and strategies for transport to provide assurance for the different actors in the transport market and to foster long-term investments. Mobility, as a central tenet of the European Union, must remain accessible and affordable for everyone. Safeguarding fairly priced and efficient mobility for people and goods as the backbone of a competitive EU internal market and as the basis for the free movement of people is crucial. Today, an efficient transport system is one of EU's biggest economic and social strengths. But this will be jeopardized if transport policy does not make a greater effort to come to terms with traffic growth and minimise its environmental and social consequences. Furthermore, in view of international competitiveness and new business opportunities, it seems to be indispensable that EU transport industry remains at the forefront of transport services and technologies.

52 Such as the action plans on inland waterway transport (NAIADES), on logistics, on the maritime transport

strategy 2018 and the announced action plan on urban transport.

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In view of strategic policy options the European Parliament inter alia could:

• Attach significant importance, efforts and resources to the current debate on the future of transport, in order to contribute to long term objectives and to influence in the early stage the future strategic concept towards coherent and sustainable transport policies.

• Continue to push for the internalisation of external costs and for developing the right price signals in order to establish by 2020 harmonised (and possibly mandatory) charging systems in all transport sectors.

• Explore further options for GHG reductions and press for specific GHG reduction targets for individual transport sectors to enable the transport sector finally to make a telling contribution to the fight against climate change.

• Press for a significant increase of EU funding for the TEN-T network (in particular for the TEN-T budget line) during the preparation of the next MFF as well as to consider the next revision of the TEN-T guidelines as one of the key dossiers for transport policy. In terms of the 'European added value' of the TEN-T projects, their contribution to sustainability will be crucial.

• Insist on a more active role of the EU concerning urban mobility matters because of similar significant problems across Europe and their clear visibility for the citizen.

• Push for more investment in R&D for the development of intelligent transport systems and new low carbon vehicle propulsion systems. Setting the international standards for future transport technologies would result in new business opportunities for European industries.

• Press for further improvements regarding the collection of transport data, the definition of more meaningful indicators and the development and harmonisation of more detailed transport statistics. To this end, in all co-decision procedures, a strong focus should be put on improving the reporting obligations of the Member States.

• Urge the Commission to report on a regular basis and in detail on the economic and social developments in each transport sector.

• Closely monitor transposition and implementation of existing legislation. In its resolution on the 2001 White Paper on transport, Parliament already noted: 'The concept of sustainability must be the basis and yardstick for European transport policy'. It seems to be time for a long term vision which takes this statement finally and fully into account. Therefore, the next 10 years are likely to become even more decisive for transport policy than the last decade has been.

Nils DANKLEFSEN

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7. PERSPECTIVES DE LA POLITIQUE EUROPEENNE DU TOURISME

7.1. Cadre juridique

Depuis le Traité de Maastricht (art.3 lettre u) le tourisme rentre dans les activités de l'Union en tant qu'instrument d'autres politiques. Toutefois, n'ayant pas acquis par les Traités suivants le rang de politique commune, le tourisme, au sein du Parlement, demeure intégré aux compétences de la commission des transports. En effet, le tourisme ne dispose pas encore d'une base juridique propre dans le Traité de l'Union53. Cette situation évoluera avec l'entrée en vigueur du Traité de Lisbonne, qui attribuera à l'Union des compétences d'appui dans le tourisme. Le nouvel article 195 du TFUE, en renouvelant le lien entre tourisme et compétitivité des entreprises, contribuera probablement à affranchir ce secteur-ci des autres politiques par l'exercice du pouvoir législatif ordinaire de codécision entre Parlement et Conseil, celui-ci statuant à la majorité qualifiée.

7.2. Introduction et background

Le tourisme est reconnu comme un vecteur de citoyenneté, de démocratie et de promotion de l'individu. Dans le contexte européen il a été un puissant et constant moteur d'intégration, à la fois terrain d'expérimentation et camp bénéficiaire d'importantes étapes de la construction européenne, comme la liberté de circulation des personnes et des services et l'union économique et monétaire. Les touristes des Pays d'Euroland, même si provenant d'outre-Atlantique, contribuent directement à la diffusion du succès de la monnaie unique. De plus, les touristes européens peuvent surveiller personnellement le fonctionnement du marché unique et activer auprès de la Commission et du Parlement, grâce à leurs plaintes ou pétitions, les mécanismes de contrôle de l'application du droit communautaire54. Malgré son inépuisable vitalité, bien mise en évidence dans le logo "Europe-a never-ending journey" du nouveau portail de la Commission sur les destinations touristiques en Europe (de 39 Pays)55, les étapes de la politique du tourisme demeurent liées à certaines initiatives majeures. Il s'agit d'initiatives parfois réussies, comme l'année européenne du tourisme en 1990 qui a produit "le plan d'action d'assistance au tourisme" en 1992 et le livre vert en 1995 ; parfois avortées, comme le 1er programme pluriannuel 1997-2000 "Philoxenia", qui n'a pas pu être adopté faute d'unanimité au Conseil. Ou d'autres encore en gestation, telle que l'Agenda 21 pour le tourisme européen, sous forme d’une communication56, qui a indiqué l'option du développement soutenable comme moyen pour garantir la compétitivité à long terme des secteurs touristiques. Le Parlement, au milieu de sa 6e législature, s'est intéressé particulièrement à l'avenir du tourisme européen et a invité la Commission à prendre des initiatives sur des sujets bien

53 L'Union peut seulement adopter des mesures spécifiques pour le tourisme sur la base de l'art.308 du Traité. 54 La Cour de Justice est régulièrement saisie des litiges ou des questions préjudicielles relatives à l’industrie du

tourisme. Une harmonisation du droit du tourisme est ainsi en train de progresser. See i.e.: C.J.C.E. 26.2.92 Elisabeth Hacker c. Eurorelais GmbH, 280/90, Rec. 1992; C.J.C.E. 26.2.91 , Commission européenne c. République italienne, 180/89, Rec. 1991; C.J.C.E. 29.05.01, Commission européenne c. République italienne, 263/99, Rec. 2001. Source: "Le droit européen du tourisme" du Journal de droit européen, Avril 2008, 101-111.

55 Tourism Portal : www.visiteurope.com 56 Communication de la Commission du 19 octobre 2007 intitulée «Agenda pour un tourisme européen

compétitif et durable» [COM(2007) 621 final).

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Département thématique B: Politiques structurelles et de Cohésion ____________________________________________________________________________________________ ciblés d'actualité pour le tourisme européen57. Allant du développement du tourisme de santé, des facilités pour les touristes à mobilité réduite, une "carte transport jeunes" pour les Européens bénéficiaires des bourses Erasmus, jusqu'à un programme "Ulysse" sur le tourisme de basse saison pour les personnes retraitées et un parcours cycliste de la mémoire sur le tracé de l'ancien rideau de fer. Dans ce contexte, le Parlement a remarqué que "il n'a pas été possible de mettre au point une approche trans-sectorielle cohérente du tourisme au niveau de l'Union, ce qui a entraîné des problèmes et un développement insuffisant de ce secteur, tout en augmentant le risque de voir l'Europe y perdre sa part de marché". Bien au-delà des effets produits par la récente crise financière et économique, la résolution du PE mettait en exergue que "la situation se détériore dans certaines destinations touristiques européennes très prisées et que des incidents séditieux et violents se produisent parfois dans ces destinations, ce qui les rend moins attrayantes". 7.3. Possible évolution à moyen terme

Maintenant, compte tenu de la nouvelle conjoncture due à la crise internationale, les années 2009-2010 devront être une période charnière pour aboutir à une feuille de route incluant un certain nombre d’initiatives à mettre en place pour le développement du secteur au cours de la prochaine décennie. Et cela à partir de deux événements prévisibles et/ou souhaitables pour l'avenir à court ou moyen terme du tourisme européen l'entrée en vigueur du traité de Lisbonne, avec une base juridique propre pour le secteur et le lancement par la Commission - sous la Présidence espagnole - d'un programme pluriannuel 2010-2012, destiné à être repris et financé à partir de 2013 dans le cadre de la renégociation des perspectives financières. En règle générale, la politique européenne de tourisme ne peut qu'être complémentaire de celle des Etats membres. D'une part une approche globale est à envisager pour faire face aux grands défis du siècle en matière économique, énergétique et environnementale, d'autre part les institutions européennes doivent maintenir et développer le partenariat autant avec les autorités nationales, régionales et locales que les opérateurs économiques et les organismes privés ou publiques dans le secteur du tourisme. 7.4. Statistiques et sondages

Les industriels du tourisme au sens strict comprennent: voyagistes, guides, agences de voyage, prestataires de loisirs et divertissement, restaurateurs, transporteurs et services d’hébergement. Dans l’ensemble, ils produisent plus de 4% du PIB de l’Union et engendrent 4% d’emplois dans l’UE. Il s’agit d’un des secteurs les plus dynamiques qui pourra progresser en 2016 jusqu’à 12% et 13% respectivement du PIB et de l’emploi. L’Europe est la destination touristique n° 1 dans le monde58. Un objectif fondamental de la future politique de tourisme est de garder la "préférence communautaire" des touristes-vacanciers européens, qui pourra inclure la Turquie et la région balkanique restante dans les 10 ans à venir.

57 Résolution du Parlement européen du 29 novembre 2007 sur une nouvelle politique européenne du tourisme:

renforcer le partenariat pour le tourisme en Europe (2006/2129(INI). 58 UNWTO expects international tourism to decline 2-3% in 2009 in face of the global economic crisis.

www.traveldailynews.com. See for more details: European Tourism 2009 - Trends & Prospects Q1/2009 by ETC. European tourism accounts for 2/3 of global tourism and is expected to double by the year 2025. The Mediterranean is the World’s number one tourist destination and is generating 1/3 of global tourist revenues http://www.biodiversity.ru/coastlearn/tourism-eng/introduction.html

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La dernière enquête flash d'Eurobaromètre (n.258 March 2009) en dit long sur les tendances d'une part de cette vaste catégorie de clientèle en temps de crise. Parmi ceux qui avaient déjà choisi leurs destinations en 2009, 48 % préfèrent rester dans leur propre pays (contre 43% en 2008); alors que ceux, qui savent qu'ils voyageront dans un autre pays de l'Union, sont moins nombreux (24% contre 31% en 2008). Les destinations hors de l'Union, en revanche, augmentent un peu (28% contre 26% en 2008), probablement grâce au taux de change de l'euro encore plus favorable. On apprend également que, pour des raisons plutôt culturelles que de recréation, les européens sont enclins à dépasser les frontières nationales. En général - d'après l'enquête - les destinations préférées sont assez stables: l'Espagne, l'Italie et la France, suivies par l'Allemagne, la Pologne et la Grèce. Les Etats Unis, la Turquie et la Croatie, hors de l'Union, demeurent les destinations touristiques plus prisées59. 7.5. Les défis et les facteurs variables de la prochaine décennie

En faisant abstraction des facteurs technologiques les plus prévisibles, comme le rythme accru des communications sur le réseau et l'accès immédiat aux facilités de différents moyens de transports, poussés par la standardisation des modes vacancières (avec moindres de différences entre l'Ouest et l'Est du continent), l'impact sur le transport des passagers des nouvelles flambées des prix de pétrole ne sera pas négligeable, et cela se répercutera également sur le tourisme. A cet égard, certaines projections (HOP! research project)60 font état d'une perte de 20%, entre 2014 et 2020, de la demande du marché passagers de l'aviation, en partie compensée par un gain significatif de la même tranche-passagers par le marché ferroviaire. Enfin la vulnérabilité du secteur vis à vis de certains événements de force majeure, tels que les attaques terroristes, les conflits régionaux ou les pandémies peut nuire à la reprise du tourisme, spécialement en cas d'effets cumulatifs avec les répercussions sur le secteur de la crise économique. Cependant d'autres facteurs comme l'expansion et l'amélioration des modes de transports unies à la baisse des coûts de voyages, ou la croissance des standards de vie accompagnée d'une majeure diffusion des activités du temps libre devraient contrecarrer cette influence. C'est la raison pourquoi l'OMT, même après le 11 septembre 2001, avait maintenu inchangées ses prévisions de croissance moyenne de 4,1% des flux touristiques mondiaux, de 1995 jusqu'à 202061. Le terme tourisme regroupe tous les phénomènes, les activités et les relations des gens qui voyagent, selon l'OMT, pour les loisirs aussi bien que pour les affaires. Indépendamment des causes économiques, l'évolution démographique et la structure sociale auront un impact majeur sur le secteur. D'un côté le vieillissement de la population, de l'autre le pouvoir d'achat et le niveau de santé accrus des personnes âgées encourageront les voyages en enrichissant leurs finalités, pas seulement par davantage de besoin de culture et nature mais aussi par la recherche du bien-être et de la santé. D'autres facteurs susceptibles de peser sur la demande de services touristiques résulteront du taux des divorces, des mariages tardifs, des familles mono -parentales et de la diffusion d'une sensibilité sociale à l’égard de l'environnement, notamment sur les changements

59 According the last European Tourism 2009-Trends & Prospects Q1/2009: visits to/arrival in European

destinations will decline by 3,8% this year.The reccovery will be modest, with an increase of just 1.7ù forecast for 2010-implying a two-year recovery period to get back to 2008 levels.This assumes that the swine flu epidemic does not have a severe and prolonged impact on world tourisme www.etc-corporate.org.

60 "The Impact of Oil Price Fluctuations on Transport and its Related Sectors", étude élaborée pour le Parlement européen, Mar 2009, page 73.

61 WTO Long-term Forecast Tourism 2020 Vision: "The total tourist arrivals expected by 2020 are: 1.56 billion (Europe 717 million)= 3,4 %. For Europe there will be a decline from 60% in 1995 to 47% in 2020, Asian, Africa, Pacific Areas and Americas will gain more percentages".

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Département thématique B: Politiques structurelles et de Cohésion ____________________________________________________________________________________________ climatiques. En effet, les activités du tourisme dépendent beaucoup de la météorologie et de l'évolution du climat sur le long terme. Et, faute de réduction des gaz à effet de serre, les recettes du tourisme en seront affectées. De plus, le succès du tourisme exigera des contrôles sanitaires plus stricts pour endiguer la propagation du Virus HIV, comme démontré par une récente enquête internationale dans 17 Pays du notre continent62. Last but not least, les différentes formes de tourisme responsable ou éthique, visant autant l'environnement que la population locale dans les destinations touristiques des Pays du tiers monde ou des PVD, offrent pour l'avenir des opportunités d'actions solidaires et durables de la part des touristes. Ce qui pourrait déterminer l'évolution du tourisme massif des périodes d'après guerre ("50-"90) vers des flux touristiques plus rationnels et participatifs, en concomitance avec les nouvelles contraintes économiques, environnementales et sécuritaires d'ici à l'an 2020. Dans ce contexte la promotion d'un tourisme européen durable contribuerait ultérieurement au succès de la Stratégie de Lisbonne et de celle renouvelée pour le développement soutenable63. 7.6. Stratégie et options

Les institutions les plus stratégiques au niveau national pour programmer et développer en mode durable le tourisme et en même temps promouvoir la compétitivité des destinations européennes sont les Régions. Elles sont parfois centre de pouvoir législatif autonome, mais plus souvent pivot de la gestion et distribution des fonds structurels. Le Parlement doit veiller à ce que la stratégie proposée par la Commission "pour un tourisme européen durable et compétitif" implique les acteurs socioprofessionnels dans le dialogue social et dynamise le niveau régional de concertation. Cela passe par la création d'un réseau fonctionnant comme plateforme d'échange de bonnes pratiques et de noyau pour la production et la coordination des projets, concernant par exemple la protection du patrimoine culturel et du paysage ou l'efficacité énergétique et la réduction des émissions nuisibles. Dans ce contexte plus participatif et fondé sur la proximité, il semble mieux possible de garantir la cohérence et une approche graduelle aux thèmes cruciaux pour le tourisme durable et compétitif, tels que: responsabilité sociale et environnementale, qualité de vie des résidents, dessaisonalisation, protection des identités, transport et mobilité. A cet effet une évaluation des progrès de l’ensemble des politiques de tourisme durable sera faite en 2011, sur la base de la communication de l'Exécutif du 19 octobre 200764.

7.7. Thèmes de réflexion et décisions possibles

Par ailleurs, tout comme au début de sa sixième législature65, le nouveau Parlement devrait se pencher sur des thèmes de grande envergure. Ainsi le PE se penchera sur les relations entre tourisme et la démocratie, les droits des hommes et les actes de piraterie, ou le rôle du tourisme pour l’amélioration de la santé mondiale et contre les fléaux viraux, ainsi que pour la transmission aux populations locales du patrimoine culturel et technologique européen ou encore comme prévention des abus sexuels ou de la spéculation immobilière. D'autres thèmes incontournables devraient être ceux des

62 "Tracing the HIV-1 subtype B mobility in Europe: a phylogeographic approach" by Dimitrios Paraskevis and

others, in Retrovirology 20 May 2009. 63 Art.3 " Le tourisme, facteur de développement durable" du code mondial éthique du tourisme, adopté par

l’Assemblée générale des NU en décembre 2001. 64 See footnote 4. See also: "Natural Resources Forum" 27(2003) 212-222, "A new approach to sustainable

tourism: moving beyond environmental protection". The author, F.Neto, is in favour to give more emphasis to a ‘pro-poor tourism’ approach at both national and international levels.

65 Le rapport d’initiative, de L.Queiro sur "Perspectives et défis du tourisme européen durable" du 15.7.05 et la résolution du 8.9.05 sur Tourisme et développement.

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L’avenir des politiques structurelles et de cohésion ____________________________________________________________________________________________

futures Journées mondiales du tourisme66, qui en 2009 seront consacrées à la diversité et l'authenticité du tourisme dans un monde globalisé. L'Union même devrait pouvoir lancer en vue du centenaire de la Grande guerre, le thème de l'ouverture des portes aux ennemis passés, via le tourisme à l'intérieur des anciennes frontières, thème qui est propre à l'histoire et à la nouvelle géopolitique européenne et fait partie des legs du XXème siècle pour les générations futures. A l'occasion, l'Allemagne et la Pologne joueraient le rôle des Pays hôtes. Et "tourisme en démocratie" pourrait être le titre d'une nouvelle action communautaire, prônant la découverte des lieux de Mémoire via des facilitations touristiques (Auschwitz, vestiges du mur de Berlin, du rideau de fer, cimetières de guerre, Conseil de l'Europe, maisons de R. Schuman à Scy-Chazelle, de J. Monnet à Yvelines et Maison commune de l'Histoire, encore à ouvrir à Bruxelles, d'ici à 2014). 7.8. Budget

A l'heure actuelle, la Commission est en train de gérer des actions préparatoires du programme pluriannuel67 par une modeste enveloppe financière, qui devrait atteindre un montant de 5-7 millions d'euro, une fois opérationnel le programme. Suite à l'entrée en vigueur du traité de Lisbonne, le Parlement devrait encourager une meilleure utilisation des instruments financiers disponibles en parvenant à les concentrer afin d'améliorer l'efficacité de la gestion et de rendre les contrôles plus performants. En 2010-2011, il serait souhaitable de parvenir à un recadrage financier des initiatives en matière de tourisme en profitant de la révision à mi-terme des perspectives financières, dont le délai va probablement être rééchelonné jusqu'à 2016 pour éviter un télescopage des échéances entre législature et perspectives financières. 7.9. Contrôle de l'application

Un des aspects les plus négligés des politiques européennes est le monitorage de son application. La Commission veille à l'application des mesures adoptées par les institutions (art.17TUE), mais le Parlement exerce le droit de contrôle politique. Dans le domaine des transports des passagers, le règlement 261/04 pour la protection des passagers aériens est en vigueur depuis 2005; ce qui inclut l'information des passagers sur la liste noire des compagnies à haut risque. Une communication contemporaine, sous le titre de "renforcer les droits de passagers dans l'UE" a placé les usagers au cœur des tous les modes des transports. Une protection analogue des passagers ferroviaires sera en vigueur fin 2009 et des chartes pour les passagers en mer et navigation intérieure autant que pour ceux internationaux d'autocar/d'autobus sont déjà en chantier, depuis décembre 2008. Le Parlement devra ainsi tester dans les prochains 5 ans si le statut du passager européen est entré dans les mœurs contractuelles aussi bien que les formulaires de réservation des billets on line. En revanche, il faudra attendre au moins dix ans avant que l'écolabel "services d'hébergements touristiques", avec son joli logo à fleur distinctif du tourisme écologique68, soit autant connu et à la mode que les pavillons bleus sur les plages. 66 27th of September; this year marks the 30th celebration of World Tourism Day, which will be hosted in

Ghana. China will be the following host, during 2010, on the theme "tourism and biodiversity. 67 Eden (20 destinations européennes d’excellence)- Tourisme social (seniors, handicapés, familles indigentes)-

Iron Curtain Trail (pistes cyclables sur le rideau de fer). 68 ECOLABEL crée par décision de la Commission européen n° 2003/287/CE de 14 avril 2003; voir aussi décision

2005/338/CE du 14 avril 2005, pour les hébergements en plein air

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Département thématique B: Politiques structurelles et de Cohésion ____________________________________________________________________________________________ 7.10. Perspectives à long terme

Dans une autre optique de tourisme, davantage associé aux élites, mais également aux développements de la recherche et de la technologie spatiale (la NASA à partir de 2015 fera démarrer son programme « Constellation » d’exploration lunaire par des vaisseaux spatiales « Orion »), le Parlement pourra promouvoir le lancement d’initiatives conjointes avec l’ESA et en partenariat avec des investisseurs ou des fondations privées pour élargir la sphère des usagers de l’espace69. Ainsi l’Union européenne dans le cadre de la nouvelle politique spatiale européenne du Traité de Lisbonne (art.189 TFUE), pourra envoyer des touristes européens sur des vols suborbitaux ou à bord des engins spatiaux en orbite terrestre, or de navettes vers la station spatiale internationale (ISS), qui restera opérationnelle probablement jusqu'à 202070. Le tourisme spatial ne serait qu’un petit bond en avant pour l’Europe si on le compare aux nouvelles perspectives ouvertes par le télé-transport q (quantique) des photons, atomes et molécules.71 Il paraît en effet que par le biais de computers quantiques (via le Qnet qui devrait être opérationnel en 2020) on parviendra à créer avant la fin du siècle des modes artificiels de déplacement pour satisfaire les besoins touristiques des futures générations, qui pourront alors devenir émules des protagonistes de Star Trek.72 7.11. L'avenir du tourisme européen

L'avenir d'une politique sectorielle comme celle européenne du tourisme ne peut que profiter d'une reprise économique qui s'accompagne avec une nouvelle conscience environnementale des usagers des services de tourisme, celle-ci déjà présente dans les volets du tourisme durable, responsable ou éthique. Il faut cependant reconnaître que le PE n'a ni la compétence législative ni les outils financiers adaptés à faire évoluer les meilleures pratiques dans ce domaine sectoriel. Toutefois, le tourisme pourrait servir de ballon d'essai pour voir si les gens dans l'emploi de leur temps libre, même hors de chez eux, s'impliquent vraiment pour aider à rendre meilleures les perspectives de survie sur la seule planète habitée qu'ils connaissent. 7.12. Conclusion

L’acronyme du titre idéal pour le présent document: un tourisme labélisé en EE (économique et environnemental) servirait à mettre en exergue sa fonction de secteur stratégique où l’Union peut réussir à conjuguer l’essor économique avec une nouvelle sensibilité collective à l’égard de l’environnement. Les Européens peuvent prendre les devants en reliant leurs destinations touristiques d’excellence aux économies

69 Actuellement Virgin Galactic et Astrium (EADS) préparent des avions-fusées pour 2012 et ss sur la base du

légendaire Spaceshipone (Juin 2004)et les navettes russes Soyuz embarquent les pionniers du tourisme spatial, par ex. Anousheh@Anoushehansari.com , première femme à voler sur l’ISS en 2006.

70 See, at this regard, European Parliament Resolution on the European space policy: how to bring space down to earth adopted on 20th of November 2008, calling on the Commission to produce a study on the impact of space tourism and its necessary relevant safety, security and regulatory framework.

71 Téléportation Source Wikipedia: "C'est la seule téléportation qui ait été expérimentalement mise en oeuvre. En 2009, des chercheurs américains ont transféré de manière instantanée l'État quantique d'un atome deytterbium vers un autre situé à 1 m de lui." S.Olmschenk et al. Science, 323, 486, 2009

2004 “The deterministic quantum teleportation of atoms qubits”, or “Quantum physic: push buttom teleportation”, in Nature 429.

72 See Teleportation: the impossible leap, by David Darling, publié par John Wiley and Sons, 2005. For more information see: www.research.ibm.com/quantuminfo/teleportation

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L’avenir des politiques structurelles et de cohésion ____________________________________________________________________________________________

75

d’énergie programmées, qui devraient, par exemple, être de l’ordre du 20 % d’ici à l’an 2020. Il s'agit bien d'un objectif que dans le tourisme pourrait être atteint par le biais des systèmes durables dans les transports et d'une programmation des vacances "intelligentes" pendant l'année, qui valorise et sauvegarde en même temps les ressources du vaste patrimoine naturel et culturel européen. Cependant, toute prévision à long terme en politique doit se soumettre aux lois de Statistiques73 et, s'agissant de l'Europe aux feux de tireurs eurosceptiques. Le Parlement par ailleurs doit tirer les leçons des résultats des élections européennes tous les 5 ans. La planification est cependant un instrument assez bien vu en Europe, depuis le succès du Livre blanc de Delors pour le marché intérieur. A l'aube du millénaire, elle s'est traduite dans la stratégie de Lisbonne visant à faire de l'Union européenne l'économie la plus compétitive dans le monde et à atteindre le plein emploi en 10 ans. Aujourd'hui, pourtant, une crise globale de l'économie et de la finance est survenue pour redimensionner les objectifs et les moyens de Lisbonne. La situation est tellement compromise qu'on peut supposer que face à une crise de telle portée, un changement radical de cap a plus de chance de réussir qu'une stratégie décennale. Toutefois, le travail d'un parlementaire européen se déroule dans des domaines souvent techniques, peu gratifiants en termes de notoriété et de célérité des résultats. C'est bien le message lancé sur un blog par un MEP sortant de la 6ème législature74: "le tempo européen est lent: il s'écoule parfois dix ans entre une initiative communautaire et sa mise en œuvre dans le quotidien des électeurs". Il s'agit d'un paramètre temporel applicable même dans un domaine restreint - comme celui du tourisme - ne fusse que pour le monitorage du champ effectif d'application du statut européen des passagers des transports aériens, ferroviaires, etc. Cette réflexion finale semble également vraisemblable pour la plupart des thèmes abordés dans le présent document.

Piero SOAVE

73 A ce sujet, les "Comptes satellites du tourisme"(CST) sont financés depuis 2002 par la Commission en vue

d'avoir à terme 27 CST pour présenter le 1er Compte satellite européen. 74 Publié à page 2 de Le Monde du vendredi 15 Mai. http://europeennes.blog.lemonde.fr/2009/05/13/

DIRECTORATE GENERAL FOR INTERNAL POLICIES

POLICY DEPARTMENT C: CITIZENS' RIGHTS AND CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS

Key Policy Issues in the area

of Citizens' Rights and

Constitutional Affairs

June 2009

EN/FR

Introduction ........................................................................... 3

Part 1: Constitutional Affairs..................................................... 7

Part 2: Justice, Freedom and Security ...................................... 14

2.1. Fundamental rights ...................................................... 14

2.2. Asylum....................................................................... 19

2.3. Legal migration, illegal immigration, external borders ....... 23

2.4. Police & Judicial cooperation in criminal matters and Data

protection.................................................................... 33

Part 3: Droits des femmes et égalité des genres........................ 42

Part 4: Legal and Parliamentary Affairs .................................... 47

4.1. Justice civile................................................................ 47

4.2. Droits des societés ....................................................... 53

4.3. Droit de la propriété industrielle et intellectuelle............... 56

4.4. Droit parlementaire...................................................... 58

Part 5: Participation des citoyens ........................................... 59

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Remarques liminaires: - entre crochets, et selon la suggestion faite par le cabinet du Secrétaire Général, les passages qui peuvent être considérés comme hasardeux. - pour ne pas alourdir le document, le langage courant a été privilégié le plus souvent, au détriment de la précision des références (par exemple "Rome III" au lieu de "proprosition de Réglement...relatif..."): il va de soi que celle-ci pourra être apportée dès que nécessaire.

Introduction Les défis qui marqueront le travail du Parlement tout au long des deux prochaines législatures, ne sont en rien spécifiques, ni aux domaines politiques regroupés sous l'expression "droits des citoyens et affaires constitutionnelles", ni au Parlement Européen, ni même à l'Europe. Nul besoin d'une boule de cristal en effet pour prévoir que le réchauffement climatique, les rapports de forces démographiques, le climat de crise économique mondiale (pertinent au moins pour le court et moyen terme de la période considérée) et le développement continu des technologies de l'information constitueront la toile de fond des deux prochaines législatures Ces défis mondiaux majeurs trouvent chacun une dimension européenne propre, qui se dégage tout à la fois des caractéristiques originales de la construction européenne (Union de peuples et d'états), des éléments essentiels de l'identité européenne (attachement aux droits de l'homme), de l'état de son économie (ouverture, haut niveau de développement -bien que très hétérogène-, déclin technologique relatif, vieillissement de la population...). .1 Ces éléments -défis planétaires et problématiques proprement européennes- se retrouvent inévitablement, avec des accents différents suivant les auteurs, dans tout effort de prospective, qu'il s'agisse des contributions de think tanks externes, de communications stratégiques de la Commission, de conclusions de Conseils européens, etc. Dans ces conditions, le premier défi, transversal, pour le Parlement européen sera, face aux défis qu'aura à affronter l'Union Européenne, d'éviter de n'être perçu que comme un élément du tout indistinct formé par "Bruxelles". Le Parlement devra trouver une voix -et une voie- propre spécifiquement parlementaire, alors même que la défiance montante vis-à-vis de la démocratie représentative l'affecte autant sinon plus que les parlements nationaux. Ainsi sa capacité à accueillir l'expression directe des citoyens pourrait

1 A ce stade, il n'a pas été envisagé de "chapeau" commun aux contributions des différents Départements thématiques. S'il devait en être rédigé un, ces deux premiers paragraphes pourraient en constituer la base, car ils ne sont pas spécifiques aux matières traitées par le Département thématique C.

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bien dans la décennie qui vient constituer la condition du renforcement de son rôle représentatif. Deux axes de réflexion à cet égard: - il est évident que le PE doit apporter sa pierre à la réponse de l'UE aux défis mondiaux. Mais les tendances y sont lourdes, les choix restreints, les pouvoirs du PE parfois limités (politique étrangère): sur ces questions, c'est relativement moins à travers la substance des réponses qui seront formulées, qu'à travers la manière avec laquelle le Parlement en traitera qu'il pourra, ou échouera à, s'imposer. - il pourrait y avoir autant sinon plus de bénéfice politique à retirer, pour le Parlement Européen d'un travail d'approfondissement de l'Union. Il est frappant de constater que les nombreux ouvrages de prospective qui paraissent n'envisagent l'Union Européenne pratiquement que par rapport au monde extérieur (l'Europe puissance, l'Europe de la défense, l'Europe dans la mondialisation, l'Europe face au changement climatique etc), et le rôle propre du PE, parmi les différentes institutions, pas du tout. Selon ces ouvrages, on pourrait croire que l'Europe, intrinsèquement, n'est plus à construire, que la méthode "des petits pas" l'a menée au bout du chemin. Est-ce l'impression du citoyen? Les notes rassemblées ici dans la contribution du Département thématique C visent donc à la fois à identifier l'impact spécifique des défis mondiaux dans les différentes matières qu'il couvre 2 et les chantiers prioritaires pour y répondre, mais aussi à identifier l'espace que le Parlement Européen pourrait se ménager dans les matières moins affectées par le contexte mondial, qui pour autant peuvent être très sensibles pour le citoyen. Contribuer à la réponse aux défis tranversaux Démographie A cet égard, la conjugaison des mouvements de population rendus inévitables par le réchauffement climatique et le vieillissement de la population européenne donneront une importance particulière à la question du traitement politique de l'immigration. Actuellement, priorité a été donnée à l'asile, qui occupera largement le devant de la scène en début de législature. Il reste que la politique européenne de l'immigration, actuellement en panne, revêt une toute autre dimension. Au delà des questions évidentes (quel degré d'ouverture? quel comportement vis-à-vis de l'immigration illégale?), il faut souligner le poids essentiel qu'aura la question du "partage du fardeau"3: à ce jour, et bien que la base juridique soit présente depuis l'entrée en vigueur du Traité d'Amsterdam, rien, ou presque, n'a été entrepris.

2 Pour mémoire: affaires constitutionnelles, affaires juridiques et parlmentaires, égalité des genres, espace de liberté sécurité et justice et pétitions. 3 sur lequel le Département thématique a pris l'initiative de lancer une réflexion prospective de grande envergure (étude externe confiée à Matrix)'

4

Les mêmes phénomènes démographiques vont influer fortement sur la vie des femmes européennes, chez qui peut encore se trouver une main d'oeuvre de réservequalifiée: encore faudra-t-il pouvoir inventer des réponses nouvelles (télétravail?) ou supplémentaires (accueil de la petite enfance) à l'éternelle question de la conciliation de la vie familiale et de la vie professionnelle, et du partage des tâches. Développement technologique Dans la mesure où d'une part le XXIème siècle voit l'émergence de formes d'insécurité spécifiques (terrorisme), et où d'autre part les technologies de l'information prennent une importance essentielle dans la compétition économique mondiale, les questions relatives à la protection des données vont prendre une importance particulière du fait des conflits possibles avec la protection de certains droits fondamentaux (protection de la vie privée), dans une Europe de plus en plus hétérogène où ceux ci sont affichés comme un élément identitaire essentiel. La compétition mondiale autour de ces évolutions technologiques impliquera également que des progrès soient faits dans le domaine de la protection intellectuelle au niveau européen (brevet européen) et qu'un équilibre se dégage entre la nécessaire protection des auteurs et l'exigence populaire du libre accès des consommateurs aux contenus. Récession économique Rien de plus illusoire que d'espérer que les plus techniques des matières juridiques échapperaient à l'impact de la récession économique. Au contraire: les questions relatives au Droit des sociétés, en particulier, avec ce qu'elles impliquent d'exigences pour la fiabilité des comptes par exemple, ainsi que les efforts de simplification du cadre réglementaire dans lequel agissent les entreprises en prendront d'autant plus d'importance. Trouver un espace d'expression politique original à travers la construction européenne interne Place du Parlement européen dans le système institutionnel Un élément essentiel du contexte dans lequel les défis du présent devront être affrontés au niveau européen, s'il souffre encore une part d'incertitude, devrait être très rapidement clarifié: le cadre institutionnel. L'entrée en vigueur du Traité de Lisbonne reste à ce jour l'hypothèse la plus probable. En même temps, une fois cette entrée en vigueur laborieusement acquise, et contrairement à ce qui a été le cas au cours des cinq législatures précédentes (1989-2009), on peut s'attendre à ce que ce cadre institutionnel tel qu'il ressort des Traités reste stable pour au moins les deux prochaines législatures. Une certaine adaptation des institutions et des relations interinstitutionnelles ne sera pas exclue: mais les évolutions envisageables devront plutôt se jouer à travers la mise en oeuvre des

5

dispositions du Traité de Lisbonne, plutôt par voie d'accords interinstitutionnel (plus favorable pour le PE). Le Parlement Européen, s'il a conquis des pouvoirs institutionnels propres à toute institution parlementaire que sont la décision législative et budgétaire, ainsi que le pouvoir de contrôle de l'exécutif, n'a pas conquis LE pouvoir. Loin de travailler dans un désert de représentation, le Parlement devra "négocier" son espace politique: - par rapport, notamment, aux Parlements nationaux: - mais aussi dans une moindre mesure avec la société civile et les instances représentatives infra-étatiques (régions); - par rapport au couple Commission/Conseil [le PE pourrait gagner -surtout si les élections 2009 le favorisent- à accepter d'être le lieu public de confrontation d'intérêts nationaux qui ne peuvent se résoudre au Conseil] Développement de la citoyenneté européenne La décennie 2009-2019 pourrait être celle de l'invention d'une citoyenneté européenne civile, si l'on considère les besoins de renforcement de la sécurité juridique en matière de droit des personnes (divorce, tutelle, successions etc), à condition que les conditions d'une "alliance parlementaire" avec les Parlements nationaux se concrétisent. Indépendamment cependant du travail à mener avec ceux ci pour la mise en compatibilité des systèmes juridiques nationaux, le Parlement européen pourrait vouloir approfondir l'hypothèse d'un "28ème régime", optionnel. Le Parlement européen renforcera d'autant plus son rôle représentatif qu'il saura faire place à la "participation des citoyens" dans ses travaux. C'est là tout l'enjeu, en particulier, de la définition des modalités de son association à la mise en oeuvre du mécanisme d'initiative populaire prévu à l'article 11 TUE. Danièle RÉCHARD Head of Unit

6

Part 1: Constitutional Affairs

The European Parliament 2009 to 2019: do institutional reforms still matter? 1.1. Background: democracy in 2009 For almost ten years Europe has been engaged in an institutional debate without practical results. Hence political leaders and observers of the European Union are growing tired of institutional reform. After so many defeats in referenda or Intergovernmental Conferences (IGCs) it is certainly tempting to look for alternative ways of reinvigorating the European project. Yet without institutional modernisation the EU will not become a political structure able to act swiftly and with determination. Some time ago, a weekly newspaper not known to be enthusiastic about the EU observed: "European countries could settle their differences but they fail to do so because of dysfunctional institutions."4 Although worst-case scenarios were averted over the past two years the management of the 2008/2009 economic and diplomatic crises have underscored this assessment. Quite paradoxically, representative democracy appears today, in theory, as the only legitimate model to organise a political entity and, in reality, as a system of government coming under increasing scrutiny from many of its citizens. A large-scale examination of the political situation of the EU found a "mistrust of democracy"5, for which three factors could account: the exclusion of the least well-off; the lack of interest shown by the most educated in parliamentary democracy; and the disenchantment of all with the failure of European demo-cracies to find solutions to pressing problems. Since many citizens feel that deals are all too often cut out of their sight they want better democratic scrutiny. Direct or "participative" democracy is very much in fashion as one remedy for this sort of disenchantment. Most advanced democracies around the world are currently immersed in a debate about how to maintain an equilibrium between the power of the regulating state and the freedom of private enterprise. For three decades this debate has been rather lop-sided, characterised across the political spectrum by an almost automatic and universal preference for deregulation and a "leaner" public sector. However, a combination of long-term evolutions and recent events have led to a clearer perception of some weaknesses of the deregulatory model. In fields such as environmental and climate protection policy, or financial regulation, it has become obvious that market participants left to their own devices are unwilling to define, let alone respect the long-term interests of the communities around them 4 The Economist, 10 December 2005 5 Dominique Strauss-Kahn, Building a Political Europe: 50 proposals for tomorrow’s Europe; Round Table “A sustainable project for tomorrow’s Europe”, April 2004, p. 16.

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or of future generations. The necessity for public powers to intervene in such areas is less disputed today than a few years ago. While it is too early to say that we will see a return to a more self-assertive role for policy-makers and public authorities it is quite safe to anticipate a thorough and ongoing examination of such eminently political questions over the next ten years. If Europe wants to play a role in this debate it has to become more political, too. 1.2. Political Europe ? The European Union has long been held to prefer deregulatory policies, in some member states more than in others. Still, the EU institutions are an integral part of the public sector and, as such, an element of representative democracy. Because of the general perceptions concerning democracy outlined above there is a growing tension between the liberalising influence of the EU's four freedoms and the Commission's competition and trade policies, on the one hand, and the EU's ambition to become an increasingly important part of European policy-making, at a par with member state governments and other levels of the public sector. The classic community method has never been the only policy-making mode at the EU's disposal but it symbolises the uniqueness of the Union's supranational character. Any changes to its functioning would menace the good management of the single market and other common policies. Moreover, they would be highly indicative of the general political climate with respect to a "Europeanisation" of policies. With all due respect for preferences resulting from a particular political agenda it must be said that the Barroso Commission has often been very careful to probe sentiments in major member states before proposing new legislation or programmes. The content of such proposals also shows in many cases that the Commission hesitates to give a strong role to EU bodies, be they new or already existing.6 From a Parliament perspective, this evolution of the inter-institutional triangle has a positive and a negative side. The positive side is its great increase of powers vis-à-vis the Council in legislation, particularly in co-decision and the future "ordinary legislative procedure". The price to pay for this is a weakened impetus for EU law-making (particularly from the Commission) and a lack of policy coordination. In addition, important questions concerning the external impact of the Union in the world are left unanswered (for instance, representation and role of the Euro member states in the international financial institutions). In a long-term perspective, this leaves the difficult choice whether the Union should extend it's influence to new political areas or limit itself to better regulate the policies already under its sway. According to a consistent body of research the lack of interest in EU matters shown by many voters is a realistic response: many

6 In its proposals for new European financial markets regulation of 27 May 2009, for example, the Commission, although proposing new European Supervisory Authorities, underlines at the same time the importance of „a robust network of national supervisors” (Communication on Financial Supervision in Europe COM(2009) 252 final).

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decisions affecting citizens' daily lives remain under national control, especially what is often called the big questions of "tax and spending". The (largely national) bail-out programmes following the financial crisis have illustrated this again. On the other hand, according to the European Council's 2001 Laeken declaration "...citizens are calling for a clear, open, effective, democratically controlled Community approach, [...] an approach that provides concrete results in terms of more jobs, better quality of life, less crime, decent education and better health care." The European Convention following the Laeken declaration had been opened by its President in 2002 with the observation that nobody wanted an extension of EU powers. It would probably be wishful thinking to expect a tide change in this respect over the next ten years. If there is a way forward it has to be a slow transformation of the way national and European political leaders are chosen, interact and cooperate. The Parliament as the elected institution is well placed to take initiatives in this field. 1.3. Challenges for the European Parliament Over its 6th term the European Parliament passed more than 1000 legislative acts. In several instances it was the essential player for arriving at a final deal by helping the Council to find a solution acceptable for all member states. The Parliament successfully integrated new MEPs from twelve accession countries. Citizens petition the Parliament and the European Ombudsman on many issues, some with material significance for individual citizens, some with more general grievances concerning European policies in fields such as the environment. While this enhances Parliament's visibility (see contribution by Claire GENTA) a recent report drawn up by MEP Alain Lamassoure, at the request of President Sarkozy, still documents the many obstacles to free movement that continue to exist to this day and draws up a long list of measures the EU could implement rapidly to improve the daily life of European citizens.7 Parliament has of course become an indispensable actor in the past and present constitutional reforms of the Union, not least through its active participation in the European Convention. The Constitutional Affairs Committee tabled a whole series of reports on the subject matters underlying the debates in the Convention and held regular exchanges of views with its President. It similarly accompanied the preparation and signature of the Lisbon Treaty, which should be ratified after a second referendum in Ireland in autumn 2009. 8 In view of the next term, and beyond, the following issues will require particular attention from the Committee. (The integration of the Charter of Fundamental Rights is dealt with by Jean-Louis ANTOINE-GRÉGOIRE.) Implementation of the Institutional Changes introduced by the Lisbon Treaty

7 Alain Lamassoure, Le citoyen et l'application du droit communautaire; rapport au Président de la République, juin 2008. 8 See doc. PE423.766v01 (AFCO Balance sheet of the 6th term 2004-2009).

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The European Parliament and national parliaments: The policies for which the ordinary legislative procedure (co-decision) applies would be considerably expanded and become the dominant rule. The EP would get a say in all international agreements that the EU concludes (under the so-called ‘assent procedure’). The treaty would also enhance the role of national parliaments in the EU member states. They would obtain an increased right of information on EU legislation and policies in the making. In addition, if 1/3 of national parliaments decide that a legislative proposal is not in agreement with the principle of subsidiarity they can request the Commission to review it. The Commission then has to give its ‘reasoned opinion’ as to why it is proposing the law. The European Council and the Council of Ministers: The European Council would receive a full-time president to be elected by a qualified majority of the Heads of State and government for 2 ½ years (renewable once). The Foreign Affairs Council will in future focus exclusively on foreign policy questions and be chaired by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, a newly created position that merges the current function of the High Representative for CFSP with the position of the Commissioner for External Relations. This person will supervise a new European External Action Service, bringing together Commission and Council officials and diplomats from the EU member states. For the remaining Council formations a strengthening of the system of ‘team presidencies’ is envisaged, according to which three subsequent presidencies work closely together in their programming to ensure consistency of the Council’s work, a system which has already become operational in practice. According to the new double majority system a majority in the Council will be obtained if at least 55% of member states that represent at least 65% of the EU’s population are in favour of a proposal, from 2014 onwards. Until 2017 each member state can request to apply the current rules instead of the double-majority system. Qualified majority voting (QMV) will be extended to 40 new policies (177 instead of 137), with a particular emphasis on immigration, justice and home affairs. The scope of the ordinary legislative procedure has also been substantially expanded to some 50 new legal bases (bringing the total to 86), including important new fields such as agriculture or structural funds and, again, justice and home affairs. European Commission: The candidate to become President of the European Commission shall in future be proposed according to the results of the European elections. As to the reduction of the number of Commission members the European Council announced in December 2008 that it would take a unanimous decision enabling each member state to nominate a Commissioner. The Parliament has already prepared to adapt its Rules of Procedures for the implementation of these changes rapidly. At the end of the 6th term it has also expressed its views on the general impact of the Lisbon treaty (Leinen and Dehaene reports) and other important issues, such as cooperation with national parliaments (Brok report). The impact of the treaty changes on the evolution of the Union will depend on the personalities chosen for the new offices, daily practice and regular stock-taking of experiences made. A particular challenge will

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be to scrutinise the creation, organisation and practical work of the External Action Service. Parliament will also have to carry on with the further implementation of the European Parliamentary System in order to help national parliaments to cope with their new tasks and to develop a mutual understanding of the different situations they are in (e.g., the impact, or absence, of a government-opposition confrontation). One important goal for the next elections will be to insist on the presentation of competing candidates for the Commission presidency from the major European parties. Other innovations introduced by the Lisbon Treaty The treaty includes a number of important provisions concerning the interplay between the institutions. The Parliament will obtain the right to decide with the Council on the general provisions regulating the Commissions implementing powers (comitology). Many drawn-out battles of the past on how to organise the follow-up on new legislation and how to ascertain its effective implementation could in future be replaced by a regular review of delegated acts, with Parliament on an equal footing with the Council. Although it is to be hoped and expected that the Lisbon treaty will remain a stable constitutional framework for the next decade the Parliament should be aware, in view of future treaty changes, that it can insist to convene a new convention for any such change if it considers that other means such as IGCs or European Council decisions are inappropriate. The Lisbon treaty offers a much increased number of possibilities to revise the two basic treaties without resorting to IGCs. If the political will exists in member state governments the European Council can decide unanimously for many policies to switch from unanimity to QMV, or from special legislative procedures to the ordinary legislative procedure. Enhanced cooperation between a group of member states will also be easier but will require Parliament's consent. Parliament will of course have to examine and possibly support such initiatives in close cooperation with the Commission. Finally, the new system of budgetary decision-making could become a framework for a renewed debate on the origin and dimensions of the different components of the EU's own resources. The increasing share of resources coming directly from national budgets is not a sufficiently stable basis for independent European policy-making. In cooperation with the Budgets Committee the Constitutional Affairs Committee could address this problem in the course of the next parlia-mentary term. A European political debate In the run-up to the European elections much ink has been spilled to deplore the lack of voters' interest for this ballot, as well as the lack of participation from media and national political leaders. It has been noted above that this is in part a

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natural result of a lack of European powers in policies which impinge directly on citizens material situation and perspectives (tax and spending, pensions, education, health services). Despite the continuous increase of Parliament's legislative influence there still are many areas where it is absent from citizens' daily life. However, the Union provides many crucial services and has achieved numerous success stories, such as the Euro or the abolition of border controls. It is regrettable that these successes are often inadequately echoed in national political debates. For some time there has been a tacit evolution among national political representatives to see the Europeanisation of policy-making as a rather unwelcome competition. This becomes particularly evident when considering the interaction between national and European political parties. The creation of European political parties and foundations a few years ago is a success story in itself but has not yet changed the total control of national political parties of the selection of MEP candidates. It is also well known that national parties spend less of their funds for European elections than for national elections and view any significant acquisition of spending power of their European siblings with some measure of suspicion. On the other hand, the German federal constitutional court has observed in its landmark decision on the Lisbon Treaty of 30 June 20099 that the European Parliament "cannot support a parliamentary government and organise itself with regard to party politics in the system of government and opposition in such a way that a decision on political direction taken by the European electorate could have a politically decisive effect." This observation should prompt MEPs and European parties in future to increase their field of action and to strive for a Europeanised parliamentary system. A second problem is the lack of Europeanisation of the electoral rules applying for the European elections.10 This goes from widely different models of the organisation of constituencies to extreme differences in voting systems and candidate selection and presentation. While some degree of subsidiarity is certainly commendable in such a historically and culturally loaded subject a fresh start to look at some ideas for reform seems an essential element for Parliament's agenda over the next term, and beyond. Could transnational lists for 10-15% of MEPs be a way forward to familiarise voters with candidates from other member states and raise their interest for political debates in other countries? Could an EU authority responsible for the verification of electoral results symbolise the particular nature of European elections and render the procedure more efficient? Could the general opening of European parties for individual citizens be a first step to create a more equitable balance of powers between European and national political parties? A quick glance at the pre-electoral commentary of European media leads to the conclusion that there is a huge gap between the professional output of high-level

9 Press release no. 72/2009 of 30 June 2009 10 See "The European Elections: EU Legislation, National Provisions and Civic Participation"; internal study of Policy Department C, March 2009, doc. PE410.672.

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print and audio-visual media and the ignorance or apathy of many tabloids and commercial TV stations. While the first group makes great efforts to inform and scrutinise, the situation in other sectors is quite deplorable. Could focused political and financial support for quality media be essential for portraying the EU's activities in a correct and intelligent way? Should Parliament's recent efforts to run a non-party electoral information campaign be put on a permanent basis?

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1.4. Conclusion As is shown by many Eurobarometer polls, citizens' expectations of the Union are today clearly political: economic prosperity, through completion of the internal market; progress in social matters (through the social agenda) and on the environment (with the strategy of sustainable development); European management of immigration and internal security; a stronger role in diplomacy and defence (with a more European foreign and security policy). Hence, the essential question that remains to be answered over the next ten years is this: should the Union propose itself as no more than a framework for ever-closer cooperation between independent states? Would this be sufficient to salvage a weakened Euro, to react to a violent crisis in the Middle East or Central Asia, or to combat newly virulent protectionism? Perhaps the Union should rather make use of Monnet's political vision of the 1950s,11 not as a political programme but as a leitmotiv. Practical policy steps together with continuing institutional innovation, hopefully on the basis of the new treaties, should make European democracy more robust and more inspiring for its citizens. Last but not least, the question of new Union powers, for instance in macroeconomic policies, could present itself in more clarity towards the end of the next decade. Wilhelm LEHMANN

11 Wolfgang Wessels, Jean Monnet – Mensch und Methode Überschätzt und überholt? Political Science Series No. 74, Institute for Advanced Studies, Vienna (May 2001).

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Part 2: Justice, Freedom and Security

2.1. Fundamental rights

Les droits fondamentaux se trouvent au cœur même de la construction européenne et sont consacrés comme tels dans le cadre du Traité UE12. Ils prennent une part croissante au sein de nombreuses politiques. Ceci vaut non seulement pour le domaine Justice, Liberté et Sécurité (JLS) mais également dans de nombreux autres secteurs. La présente contribution part de l'hypothèse que la Charte des droits fondamentaux de l'UE va recevoir une pleine consécration au plan juridique et que la volonté politique de promouvoir les droits fondamentaux restera une constante, au niveau de l'UE, dans la prochaine décennie. Un renforcement de la prise en compte et de la promotion des droits fondamentaux pourrait s'imaginer par une série de mesures à prendre à trois niveaux différents: au niveau institutionnel de l'UE; au niveau interne au Parlement européen; au niveau de l'Agence des droits fondamentaux. 2.1.1. Inscrire les droits fondamentaux dans l'architecture

institutionnelle de l'UE A titre de comparaison, il est intéressant d'examiner la situation telle qu'elle se présente au sein du Conseil de l'Europe. Nous y trouvons un Commissaire aux droits de l'homme dont la mission est de favoriser le respect des droits de l'homme et d'assister les Etats membres dans la mise en œuvre et l'observation des droits et des standards définis par le Conseil de l'Europe. Le Commissaire aux droits de l'homme effectue des visites de contact et d'évaluation dans les Etats membres et produit des rapports sur la situation des droits dans ces Etats. Il produit également des rapports ponctuels sur des questions spécifiques. Au niveau de son administration, le Conseil de l'Europe dispose d'une Direction générale des droits de l'homme et des affaires juridiques. En ce qui concerne la Commission européenne, la dénomination "droits de l'homme" ou "droits fondamentaux" n'apparait ni au niveau du collège des Commissaires, ni au niveau des services (organigramme des Directions générales). Actuellement, les droits fondamentaux se trouvent inclus, parmi d'autres thèmes, au sein du domaine "Justice, Liberté et Sécurité"13 Un moyen d'accorder une plus grande visibilité et une plus haute priorité politique aux droits fondamentaux pourrait être la création d'un portefeuille de Commissaire. Ce portefeuille pourrait se limiter aux droits fondamentaux ou, plus largement, y inclure le domaine de la justice. Selon le degré de priorité politique à

12 Voir Article 6 TUE 13Formellement, un groupe de Commissaires "Droits fondamentaux, lutte contre la discrimination et égalité des chances" regroupe le Président et 8 Commissaires. Il existe à la DG JLS, une Direction "Droits fondamentaux et citoyenneté".

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y accorder, le titulaire de ce portefeuille pourrait être, par exemple, le 1er Vice-président de la Commission. Cette nouvelle configuration aurait pour avantage de ne plus confier à un même Commissaire des responsabilités dans des domaines antinomiques et qui appartiennent, dans les Etats membres de l'UE, à des responsables politiques distincts, les ministres de la justice, d'une part, les ministres de l'intérieur, d'autre part. Au niveau du Parlement européen, il n'existe également - au moins en ce qui concerne les droits fondamentaux au sein de l'UE14 - aucun organe politique clairement identifié concernant la défense et la promotion des droits fondamentaux ni, par exemple, au niveau de l'ensemble des vice-présidents ni en ce qui concerne les commissions parlementaires. La prise en compte des droits fondamentaux se trouve incluse parmi d'autres compétences et domaines d'activités et dispersée entre plusieurs commissions parlementaires, même si la commission des libertés civiles, justice et affaires intérieures (LIBE) a un rôle clairement prééminent en la matière. Le Parlement européen pourrait marquer son engagement en faveur des droits fondamentaux en créant un organe spécifique, au niveau parlementaire, qui y serait consacré. Cela pourrait être une commission parlementaire consacrée soit aux seuls droits fondamentaux soit à la justice et aux droits fondamentaux. Cela pourrait être une sous-commission. On pourrait aussi imaginer qu'un(e) Vice-président(e) du Parlement européen soit en charge des droits fondamentaux et puisse, le cas échéant, cumuler cette fonction avec celle de président(e) de la commission parlementaire spécialisée. Une telle innovation sur le plan pratique devrait s'accompagner, au niveau de l'administration, par la création d'un service spécifique. 2.1.2. Renforcer la fonction de contrôle démocratique exercée par le

Parlement européen Le contrôle ex ante: la nécessité d'un contrôle interne systématique du respect des droits fondamentaux au cours de la phase d'élaboration et d'adoption de propositions législatives: Le Parlement européen s'est constamment affirmé comme le gardien du respect des droits fondamentaux. Cette fonction revêt une importance particulière lors de la phase d'élaboration de propositions législatives notamment du fait que le Parlement européen se trouve co-législateur et donc co-responsable. Le Parlement européen a réaffirmé l'importance de cette fonction notamment dans une résolution du 15.3.200715. La Commission, consciente de l'importance de cette question, a défini une méthodologie spécifique et souligné, à cette occasion, la difficulté de ce type

14 La situation est assez paradoxale puisqu'en ce qui concerne les droits fondamentaux hors de l'UE, il existe une sous-commission Droits de l'homme. 15 Résolution sur le respect de la Charte des droits fondamentaux dans les propositions législatives de la Commission: méthodologie pour un contrôle systématique et rigoureux.

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d'exercice qui tient largement à la constatation que "les questions liées aux droits fondamentaux pouvaient se poser dans les domaines les plus divers"16. Ainsi la Commission cite les exemples suivants pour illustrer la diversité des cas rencontrés: - le règlement REACH, où une obligation de partage des informations entre déclarants posait des problèmes de droit de propriété17; - en matière de politique agricole, l'obligation faite aux Etats membres de publier une liste de bénéficiaires des financements a soulevé la question de la protection des données; - dans le domaine des douanes, il a été considéré que le droit pour les opérateurs d'être entendus par les autorités douanières découlait de la Charte des droits fondamentaux de l'UE; Plus récemment, à propos de l'adoption, dans le cadre du "paquet télécom" de la directive modifiant les directives 2002/21 relative à un cadre réglementaire commun pour les réseaux et services de communications électroniques, 2002/19 relative à l'accès aux réseaux de communications électronique et aux ressources associées, ainsi qu'à leur interconnexion et 2002/20 relative à l'autorisation des réseaux et services de communications électroniques, s'est développée une controverse sur le thème de l'accès à internet en tant que droit fondamental. Ainsi, l'amendement suivant a été adopté: (3 bis) Reconnaissant que l'internet est essentiel pour l'éducation et pour l'exercice pratique de la liberté d'expression et l'accès à l'information, toute restriction imposée à l'exercice de ces droits fondamentaux devrait être conforme à la convention européenne de sauvegarde des droits de l'homme et des libertés fondamentales (....)18. Dans ce dernier cas, il convient de constater que cette question liée à la possible violation d'un droit fondamental est apparue, dans le cours de la procédure d'examen des projets de textes législatifs, et a été traitée sans faire l'objet d'un examen plus approfondi notamment de la part de l'organe généralement compétent en cette matière, la commission des libertés civiles, de la justice et des affaires intérieures (LIBE).

Ceci pose le problème de l'effectivité d'un contrôle global et horizontal, prenant en compte l'ensemble des travaux du Parlement européen - au sein de ses différentes commissions parlementaires - et aux différents stades de la procédure, depuis les premiers échanges de vues dans les commissions parlementaires jusqu'aux derniers débats en sessions plénières. Le Parlement européen pourrait - pour faire face à ce type de situations où une question liée à la mise en œuvre d'un droit fondamental se pose au cours d'une procédure - instaurer un mécanisme de consultation automatique de son organe parlementaire chargé des droits fondamentaux afin de procéder à une évaluation plus approfondie de toutes les implications juridiques et pratiques envisageables.

16 COM (2009) 20005 final, rapport sur le fonctionnement concrêt de la méthodologie pour un contrôle systématique et rigoureux du respect de la Charte des droits fondamentaux. 17 Règlement 1907/2006, 18.2.2006 18 Résolution du 6 mai 2009

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Le contrôle ex-post: pour un contrôle renforcé de l'état des droits fondamentaux

dans l'UE: Le Parlement européen organise, depuis longtemps maintenant, un débat annuel sur l'état des droits fondamentaux dans l'UE sur la base d'un rapport de sa commission parlementaire compétente (LIBE). Cependant, cet exercice a été interrompu entre 2004 et 200819, à la suite, notamment, de la non adoption du rapport annuel pour 200320

Le contrôle des droits fondamentaux devrait prendre une importance accrue à l'avenir. Le rapport annuel et le débat annuel du Parlement européen devrait en être un élément essentiel. A cette égard, le Parlement a souligné "que le système général de contrôle des droits fondamentaux doit prévoir un débat annuel associant les trois institutions et les Parlements nationaux, notamment lorsque le Parlement européen fait état des progrès réalisés et des problèmes rencontrés dans le développement de l'UE en tant qu'espace de liberté, de sécurité et de justice"21 L'idée d'y associer les Parlements nationaux mérite réflexion, que se soit dans le cadre de l'élaboration du rapport du Parlement européen ou dans le cadre d'une audition préalable au débat du Parlement et qui permettrait d'apporter des données et des points de vue complémentaires. Ainsi que cela se pratique dans le cadre du Conseil de l'Europe22, il conviendrait d'explorer la possibilité d'instaurer des visites d'évaluation dans les Etats membres. Ceci permettrait à la fois de mieux appréhender certaines réalités et certains problèmes mais aussi de susciter et développer, à l'occasion de ces visites, des débats au niveau politique mais également au sein de la société civile. Il convient de souligner que la commission LIBE a pris l'initiative de développer ce type de visites en ce qui concerne les conditions d'accueil des refugiés dans les Etats membres. Onze Etats membres ont été successivement visités. Une résolution a été adoptée par le Parlement européen sur la base du rapport de synthèse de ces délégations23. 2.1.3. Mieux utiliser l'expertise développée par l'Agence des droits

fondamentaux de l'UE L'Agence des Droits fondamentaux, qui fait suite à l'Observatoire européen des phénomènes racistes et xénophobes, est opérationnelle depuis 2007. Dotée pour 2009, d'un budget de 17 millions d'euro, l'Agence est en phase de développement. Elle produit un rapport annuel et des rapports ponctuels élaborés dans le cadre d'un programme de travail pluriannuel de 5 ans. Le Parlement européen participe à la définition de ce programme de travail ainsi qu'au

19 En janvier 2009, une résolution couvrant la période 2004-2008 a été adoptée. Le débat a eu lieu en décembre 2008, Résolution du 14.1.2009 20 Voir PV de séance du 1.4.2004 21 Résolution sur le respect de la Charte des droits fondamentaux, déjà citée, considérant N. 22 Voir plus haut, point 1 23 Résolution du 5.2.2009

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processus de nomination de son directeur. Le Parlement européen bénéficie d'ores et déjà du contenu de ses publications. Cependant l'expertise acquise par l'Agence devrait encore mieux nourrir les travaux du Parlement européen. Les rapports produits par l'Agence ne reflètent en effet qu'une partie de l'ensemble des ressources documentaires qui sont recueillies, au jour le jour, par l'Agence. De même, son réseau de coopération notamment avec la société civile constitue un instrument précieux pour la connaissance des problèmes spécifiques et des situations que peuvent rencontrer certains Etats membres. Une coopération entre les services de l'Agence et les services du Parlement européen pourrait permettre d'enrichir les travaux du Parlement notamment lors de l'exercice de préparation du rapport annuel sur l'état des droits fondamentaux dans l'UE. De la même façon qu'il existe actuellement des échanges et une présence de représentants des Parlement nationaux au sein du Parlement européen, des modalités de coopération pourraient être développées avec les services de l'Agence. 2.1.4. Conclusion Il n'apparait pas possible de développer des considérations relatives à la substance des droits fondamentaux eux-mêmes. Il apparait cependant que les thèmes relatifs à la libre circulation, à la lutte contre les discriminations ainsi qu'à la question des minorités continueront à être essentiels. La question de la portée des droits reconnus dans la Charte des droits fondamentaux, notamment suite aux développements futurs de la jurisprudence, mériterait aussi réflexion. Les suggestions présentées ci-dessus ont pour objectif à la fois de mieux prendre en compte les droits fondamentaux au sein de l'UE et de renforcer le rôle du Parlement européen tout en améliorant l'efficacité de ses travaux. Excepte la valeur juridique de la Charte des droits fondamentaux de l'UE, elles n'appellent aucune nouvelle modification des traités. Jean-Louis ANTOINE-GRÉGOIRE

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2.2. Asylum

La politique de l'UE en matière d'asile se trouve actuellement en pleine phase d'évolution et de mutation, confrontée, en outre, à l'éventualité de l'entrée en vigueur d'un nouveau traité - le traité de Lisbonne - qui comporte certaines innovations importantes: la politique de l'asile devient une politique commune de l'UE (nouvel article 78), la Charte des droits fondamentaux de l'UE deviendrait juridiquement contraignante avec son article 18 Droit d'asile qui précise que le droit d'asile est garanti dans le respect des règles de la Convention de Genève et du protocole de 1967 et conformément au traité instituant la Communauté européenne. 2.2.1. Le contexte actuel: la mise en place de la "deuxième phase" des

instruments liés à l'asile au plus tard en 2012: Le début de la décennie 2000 avait vu la mise en place d'une série d'instruments juridiques destinés, dans une première phase et à court terme, essentiellement à définir un ensemble de normes minimales et à procéder à un rapprochement limité entre les différentes règles nationales concernant les 3 volets principaux de toute politique en matière d'asile: les modalités d'accueil des réfugiés, les procédures de traitement des demandes d'asile, les conditions de reconnaissance et le contenu du statut de refugié. A cela s'est ajoutée la définition d'une méthode de désignation de l'Etat membre chargé de l'instruction d'une demande, un système de recensement des demandeurs d'asile (EURODAC) et la création d'un Fonds européen pour les réfugiés. La seconde phase vise actuellement à mettre en place une procédure d'asile unique et un statut uniforme. L'objectif, avec la mise en œuvre de cette seconde phase, est de parvenir à l'établissement d'un régime d'asile européen commun. Cet objectif énoncé notamment dans le cadre du programme de la Haye (2004) a été réitéré dans le Pacte européen sur l'immigration et l'asile adopté par le Conseil européen le 16.10.2008. Le Parlement européen, en sa qualité de co-législateur, devra participer à la définition de ces différents instruments juridiques. Nous nous trouvons actuellement pratiquement au milieu de la mise en place de cette seconde phase: la Commission a présenté, dans un premier paquet asile, fin 2008 - début 2009, 4 propositions - concernant l'accueil des réfugiés, la détermination de l'Etat membre chargé de l'instruction d'une demande, Eurodac et le Bureau d'appui européen - et le Parlement européen s'est prononcé en première lecture sur ces propositions en tant que co-législateur, le 7 mai dernier24. La Commission doit, pour sa part, encore présenter ses propositions concernant deux aspects essentiels de la politique d'asile: les procédures de traitement des demandes et les conditions de reconnaissance et le contenu du statut de refugié.

24 Séance plénière du 7.5.2009

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Il est bien évidement prématuré, à ce stade, de tirer des conclusions sur un exercice encore très largement inachevé.

Deux observations peuvent cependant être faites sur la base des propositions déjà connues: ce nouvel exercice, comme le précédent, vise en fait à accroitre le degré d'harmonisation entre les législations nationales mais il ne cherche pas - et il n'aboutira pas - à instaurer un vrai régime européen commun. Au mieux, aboutira-t-il à des systèmes nationaux plus homogènes avec un ensemble de règles communes qui s'écarteront du plus petit dénominateur commun.

La gestion du droit d'asile continuera à être une addition des politiques nationales harmonisées. La nouveauté la plus intéressante, parmi les nouvelles propositions, concerne la création d'un Bureau européen d'appui en matière d'asile. 2.2.2. Le Bureau européen d'appui en matière d'asile La création d'un Bureau d'appui a pour but de fournir l'assistance d'experts nécessaire pour contribuer à la mise en œuvre d'une politique européenne cohérente et de qualité. Il fournira une coopération pratique aux différentes administrations nationales en favorisant notamment l'échange d'informations et la connaissance des bonnes pratiques. Il pourra fournir des équipes d'appui aux Etats membres soumis à des pressions particulières. La création de ce Bureau d'appui - qui prendra la forme institutionnelle d'une agence européenne, et sera donc soumis, à ce titre au contrôle du Parlement européen - est importante, plus peut-être pour ses potentialités d'évolution que pour les fonctions - cependant pas négligeables - qui lui sont assignées dès à présent.

En l'état actuel des choses, le Bureau d'appui n'a aucune compétence claire et directe pour aider à remédier aux divergences d'interprétation des textes par les différentes administrations nationales. Il n'a également pas de compétences pour se substituer à l'appréciation des éléments de fait qui conduisent aux décisions prises par ces administrations nationales. Ces divergences d'appréciation aboutissent, dans les faits, à des taux de reconnaissance très variables selon les Etats membres25. Cependant, dans la perspective du développement d'une politique commune de l'asile, le Bureau d'appui peut constituer un organe communautaire susceptible d'évoluer dans ses compétences et dans ses missions. 2.2.3. Le débat annuel au sein du Conseil européen sur l'immigration et

l'asile à partir de 2010 Le Pacte européen sur l'immigration et l'asile prévoit que sa mise en œuvre fera l'objet d'un débat annuel à compter du Conseil européen de juin 2010. Le Pacte, qui comporte une partie intitulée "Bâtir une Europe de l'asile", fait référence à l'ensemble des principaux aspects touchant à la politique de l'asile et,

25 Les Irakiens, par exemple, se voient reconnaître un statut de protection à 70% des cas dans tel Etat membre et à 0% dans tel autre.

21

notamment, rappelle la nécessité d'achever la mise en place du régime d'asile européen commun. Ce débat annuel devrait constituer un nouveau rendez-vous important. Le Parlement européen - auquel il n'est pas fait référence à cet égard - pourrait saisir cette occasion pour exprimer son point de vue sur les différents développements internes en matière d'asile et mettre à profit ce rendez-vous annuel pour exercer et faire valoir son rôle de contrôle démocratique. 2.2.4. La mise en œuvre de la Directive "Retour" La directive "Retour"26, adoptée en décembre 2008, devrait faire l'objet d'une transposition, au plus tard, en décembre 2010. Cette directive qui s'applique à tous les ressortissants de pays tiers qui ne remplissent pas ou ne remplissent plus les conditions d'entrée, de séjour ou de résidence dans un Etat membre, s'applique aux demandeurs d'asile déboutés ou à ceux dont le régime de protection est arrivé à échéance. Elle complète les différents instruments juridiques concernant l'asile alors que, jusqu'à présent la problématique "retour" n'avait pas fait l'objet d'une réglementation au niveau européen. L'adoption de cette directive a suscité de nombreuses réactions - principalement critiques - de la part de certains pays tiers. Une bonne mise en œuvre des dispositions de cette directive devrait passer par une coopération accrue avec les Etats tiers. L'ensemble de la question des relations à développer avec les Etats tiers, notamment ce qui concerne cet aspect particulier, devrait faire l'objet d'une attention accrue et de nouvelles modalités d'information et de coopération. C'est là notamment une des missions futures du Bureau européen d'appui. 2.2.5. Vers une politique commune en matière d'asile La mise en place du régime d'asile européen commune, prévue d'ici 2012 au plus tard, s'effectue, d'après les propositions déjà présentées, selon un schéma classique d'harmonisation plus poussée des différentes législations des Etats membres. Tout ce travail d'harmonisation, par le biais de la présentation de nouveaux instruments juridiques, s'effectue - ainsi que le souligne le Pacte européen sur l'immigration et l'asile - "en rappelant que l'octroi de la protection et notamment du statut de refugié relève de la responsabilité de chaque Etat membre". La disposition du traité de Lisbonne qui précise que l'Union développe une politique commune en matière d'asile pose la question de la répartition future des compétences entre les Etats membres et l'UE dans la définition et la mise en œuvre de cette future politique commune. Au terme de la mise en place du régime d'asile européen commun - qui ne devrait pas être réellement commun - et après avoir pris un recul suffisant pour

26 Directive 2008/115 relative aux normes et procédures communes applicables dans les Etats membres au retour des ressortissants de pays tiers en séjour irrégulier, JOL 348, 24.12.2008

22

effectuer une évaluation globale et approfondie des effets de ce régime, il se posera vraisemblablement la question de savoir comment passer de ce régime européen commun à une politique commune et de s'interroger sur les différents contenus possible à donner à ce terme. Le Parlement européen aura à jouer pleinement son rôle à ces deux niveaux, de contrôle et de proposition. Conclusion La mise en place du régime d'asile européen commun va continuer à constituer la première priorité, en matière d'asile, dans les prochaines années. L'expérience tirée de l'apport que pourra fournir le nouveau Bureau européen d'appui, si elle s'avère positive, pourrait amener des infléchissements vers une communautarisation croissante de la gestion de la politique de l'asile. Dans la mesure où la politique de l'asile deviendrait une politique commune de l'UE, cette tendance à une communautarisation accrue semblerait constituer une évolution assez logique. Jean-Louis ANTOINE-GRÉGOIRE

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2.3. Legal migration, illegal immigration, external borders

Context

Most developed countries world-wide are experiencing declines in population growth rates and an expansion of their elderly populations.

The median age in the developed world, according to UNDP will rise 38.6 today to 43.1 in 2025, whilst worldwide; it will increase from 28.1 today to 32.8. Important differences also prevail in the varying fertility rates. Developed world countries, particularly concerned by population shrinking and ageing will need to compete for skilled workforce from abroad.

Over the past decades Europe has witnessed fundamental changes of its population dynamics and population structure.27 A low fertility rate means retirement age workers are not entirely replaced by younger workers joining the workforce. The EU faces a potential future dominated by an ever-increasing population of retired citizens, without enough younger workers to fund (via taxes) retirement programs or other state welfare agendas, including an increased demand of health care for the elderly.

The European Union would have a clear advantage of elaborating robust, medium term policies (next 25 years) that take into account global population ageing and migration to offset its declining population and workforce. These changes may both increase global competition for labour migrants and cause growing migration pressures in the coming decades. So far, national and supranational policies of the EU have slowly started to include migration in development cooperation considerations. Much less has however been done in concrete terms to link immigration policies to global population ageing issues.

28

series of measures towards a more roactive immigration policy for the EU:30

29 Two new EU rules have been proposed so far, one of which has just been adopted, as part of ap

27 As of 1 January 2009, the population of the EU was about 499.7 million people. Many

9 and 2060 the population of the EU-27 aged 65 and over is projected to

the field of legal migration.

countries are expected to experience a decline in population over the coming decades. Birth rates in the EU are low with the average woman having 1.5 children. 28 Between 200increase by 66.9 million and the "very old" (80+) will be the fastest growing segment of the population. 29 see also Gnesotto, N. and G. Grevi (2006): The New Global Puzzle: What World in2025?, Institute for Security Studies, Paris, pages 19-20 30 see the next section for what has already been achieved inAs for family reunification, a wide consultation in the form of a Green Paper will be launched to assess whether the current regime is adequate.

24

• the rights of highly-skilled workers from outside the EU (EU blue card scheme) 31

simplified entry procedures and rights for all non-EU migrant workers.

n

red methodologies and policy instruments. This is

ion the above objectives: how to

anagement in the European Union, proposed ew tools that would form an integrated part of the European border

•

However, other measures are needed too to open up migration to other sectors of the labour market.32

Controlled immigration and incentives for qualified foreign human capital will become increasingly important to relieve the strained Europealabour markets. However, to ensure the effectiveness of EU migration policies, a sound integration framework to ensure societal cohesion is crucial.33

The shortcomings of the increasingly restrictive and one-sided control policies have opened up such avenues to explore anew the linkages between migration and development. Since migration control policies and development cooperation have had fundamentally different objectives (combating irregular migration vs. poverty reduction), the starting point must be to identify shared interests and then to develop shaa challenge the EU will face in the years to come in order to address its demographic situation.

With the increasing mobility of persons, the European Union faces a further challenge which may appear in contradictenable fluent border crossings and facilitate the entry of bona fide persons while enhancing security? This challenge will require further development of the integrated Border Management Strategy of the European Union, particularly considering the current and possible future changes of the length and significance of borders in the EU during the successive enlargement phases, including the supposed future enlargement by the Western Balkans countries (EU32).34 Preparing the next steps in border mnmanagement of the future, include:

• proposals for the introduction of an entry/exit system, allowing the electronic recording of the dates of entry and exit of third country nationals into and out of the Schengen area;

• proposals to facilitate border crossing for bona fide travellers, through the introduction of automated border crossing facilities for EU citizens and certain categories of third country nationals;

31 Council Directive 2009/50/EC on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purposes of highly qualified employment OJ L 155/17 of 18.6.2009 32 The Commission aims to propose further measures in the second half of 2009 dealing with seasonal workers, intra-corporate transferees and remunerated trainees. 33 Integration policy will be discussed to some extent in the further sections of this paper, however this is dealt in much greater depth in the work of Policy Departments A & B who deal more specifically with this matter. 34 Out of the almost 30000 km European land borders more than 16500, more than 50 percent, is now in the Enlargement Area. The land borders of the EU15 increased by 76% to EU25 and it increased further by 13% to EU27 and will increase by 37% to EU32. There are 1792 designated EU external border crossing points with controls (665 air borders, 871 sea borders and 246 land borders).

25

• parameters for the possible introduction of an Electronic Travel Authorisation System.

The European Parliament (EP), following the entry into force of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, on the basis of Article 79.2 TFEU, would enjoy full co-decision powers also in the field of regular migration. Article 79.2 TFEU would also extend qualified majority voting QMV) to all matters under Article 63 TEC. Since the Treaty of Nice, the EP lready enjoyed co-decision in the field of irregular migration and borders.

A Common and Global Migration Policy for the EU 2009-2014

) What is the ' principal acquis' (non-exhaustive) on migration, borders and integration at the end of the 6th Legislature?

the field of Legal immigration

third-country nationals for the purposes of studies, pupil

2005/71/EC of 12 October 2005 on a specific procedure for

/50/EC on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purposes of highly qualified employment OJ L

er 2008 on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning irregularly staying third-country nationals OJ L 348 24.12.2008,

)

(a 2.3.1.

a

Most important achievements so far in- Council Directive 2003/86/EC of 22 September 2003 on the right to family

reunification, OJ L 251/12, 3.10.2003. - Council Directive 2003/109/EC of 25 November 2003 concerning the status of

third-country nationals who are long-term residents, OJ L 16/44, 23.1.2004. - Council Directive 2004/114/EC of 13 December 2004 on the conditions of

admission ofexchange, unremunerated training or voluntary service, OJ L 375, 23.12.2004.

- Council Directiveadmitting third-country nationals for the purposes of scientific research, OJ L 289, of 3.11.2005.

- Council Directive 2009

155/17 of 18.6.2009. Most important achievement so far in the field of Irregular immigration - Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of

16 Decemb

p. 0098.35

Most important achievement so far in the field of External Border Management

- Regulation 856/2008 amending Regulation 1683/95 on common visa format (OJ 2008 L 235/1

35 Return remains a cornerstone of EU migration policy. An effective return policy is key in ensuring public support for elements such as legal migration and asylum. The objective of this Directive is to provide for clear, transparent and fair common rules concerning return, removal, use of coercive measures, temporary custody and re-entry while taking into full account the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms of the persons concerned. Return remains a cornerstone of EU migration policy. An effective return policy is key in ensuring public support for elements such as legal migration and asylum. This directive is further complemented by various readmission agreements.

26

- Regulation 1932/2006 amending regulation 539/2001 establishing visa list (OJ 2006 L 405/23).

49/1).

Decision establishing European Borders Fund (OJ 2007 L 144). (adopted March 2009; not published yet).

d Immigration: 1 – Clear rules and a level playing field; 2

mmigration: 4 – Transparency, trust and cooperation; 5

t; 9 – Step up fight against illegal immigration and Zero tolerance for trafficking in human beings; 10

) . A very demanding agenda for the 7th legislature set by the European

t five years. In rn these five years will set the scene for what follows still after in future

n Area of Freedom Security and Justice (AFSJ).

Immigration Policy for Europe: Principles, actions and tools37 has

- Regulation 2007/2004 establishing External Borders Agency (FRONTEX) (OJ 2004 L 3

- Regulation 2133/2004 on biometric features in EU passports (OJ 2004 L 369/5).

- Regulation 562/2006, borders code: OJ 2006 L 105/1 (applies from 13.10.2006)

- Regulation 81/2009, regarding use of the VIS (OJ 2009 L 35/56) - adopted Nov. 2008.

- - Regulation on biometric visas The ten common principles36 These ten principles cover the broad spectrum of the immigration and border policies and are grouped under the headings of:

• Prosperity an– Matching skills and needs; 3 – Integration is the key to successful immigration.

• Solidarity and I– Effective and coherent use of available means; 6 – Partnership with third-countries.

• Security and Immigration: 7 –A visa policy that serves the interests of Europe; 8 – Integrated border managemen

– Sustainable and effective return policies.

bParliament

The Stockholm Programme, which will be negotiated during the upcoming Swedish Presidency, will provide the policy priorities for the nextuprogrammes on a

The European Parliament, in its Resolution of 22 April 2009 on a Common

36 Communication From The Commission To The European Parliament, The Council, The European Economic And Social Committee And The Committee Of The Regions: A Common Immigration Policy for Europe: Principles, actions and tools, Brussels, 17.6.2008 COM(2008) 359 final. The ten common principles build on the 1999 Tampere European Council's milestones, the 2004 Hague Programme and the Global Approach to Migration, launched in 2005. 37 Resolution of 22 April 2009 on a Common Immigration Policy for Europe: Principles, actions and tools. P6_TA(2009)0257. The European Parliament is proposing a blue-print for a common policy on European immigration. The report recognises the importance of legal immigration, in the face of Europe's ageing population and declining workforce, but also urges Member States to jointly tackle the problems caused by illegal immigration. They also propose to reinforce migrant's rights, by allowing them to vote in local elections.

27

described immigration as "one of the foremost challenges that Europe is currently facing", and believes that it will remain a significant challenge for the coming decades. Furthermore, the Parliament feels that a common approach to immigration is vital as shared European borders mean that "action or inaction by

ration policy. In this respect, 4 dilemmas for e EU need to be addressed:

in the measures it develops;

security of its citizens while developing a more proactive migration policy.

e ommission's communication,39 in view of possible future policy developments:

f these profiles, while avoiding the brain drain in countries of

access to health, education, language training and employment.

one Member State has a direct impact on others and on the EU as a whole."

In its response to the Commission's communication,38 the Parliament reiterated that the management of migration flows must be based on a coordinated approach, taking into account the demographic and economic situation of the EU and its Member States. It therefore regrets that, so far, too little has been done to establish a common legal immigth 1) how can the EU become more attractive to high-skilled migrants; 2) how not to undermine fundamental rights3) how can brain-drain be minimised; and, 4) how to ensure im

The Parliament notes that immigration into the EU is not the solution to overcome the challenges faced by developing countries. Therefore, Parliament made the following points on each of three sections of thC (1) Prosperity and immigration:

• legal migration: whilst legal migration continues to be necessary in order to address Europe's demographic, labour market and skills needs, the Parliament notes that regular migration must be the alternative to irregular immigration. The Parliament supports the development of national "Immigration Profiles", with labour market needs being a central aspect oorigin.

• integration as well as for other measures to combat discrimination and to promote the integration of immigrant women into the host society. According to the Parliament, integration should be based on social inclusion, anti-discrimination and equal opportunities, namely through the possibility of

(2) Security and immigration:

• integrated border management: The Parliament calls for a comprehensive master plan setting out the overall objectives and architecture of the EU's border management strategy which includes an assessment of effectiveness of existing border management systems

The European Parliament also adopted an own-initiative report drafted by Simon Busuttil (EPP-ED, MT) on 22 April 2009, by 485 votes in favour, 110 against and 19 abstentions. 38 ibid., 17.6.2008 COM(2008) 359 final. 39 ibid., 17.6.2008 COM(2008) 359 final.

28

and the feasibility of the integrated four-tier approach, whereby checks would be carried out systematically at each stage when immigrants travel to the EU. Parliament proposes, in particular, the replacement of current national Schengen visas with uniform European Schengen visas,

NTEX. The

genuine European dimension in return policy through the mutual recognition of return decisions. Moreover, it calls for the

Laissez Passer” issued to illegally residing

ion:

allowing for equal treatment of all visa applicants. It also calls on the Council to adopt arrangements based on solidarity among Member States with a view to sharing the burdens40 arising from border policing and to coordinate the Member States’ national policies;

• irregular migration: The Parliament calls for effective combating of irregular immigration and emphasises the need for urgent action to stop this human tragedy at sea. The Parliament calls cooperation agreements with the countries of origin. It also calls for the reinforcement of the mandate and resources of FROParliament supports, in particular, the establishment of specialised FRONTEX offices to better assess the specific situations at maritime borders to the South. It also calls for further developments on the concept of a European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR);

• returns: the Parliament considers that migrants who are staying irregularly on the territory of the Member States have to be required to leave the territory of the European Union with due regard to the law and the dignity of the persons involved, giving due preference to voluntary return. It also calls for a system of Return Counselling Services as well as for monitoring and support for social and professional reintegration mechanisms for returned migrants. The Parliament also calls for a

establishing of a European “third-country nationals with a view to facilitating readmission to third countries.

(3) Solidarity and immigrat

• coordination between Member States: the Parliament calls for an urgent review of the Framework Programme on Solidarity and Management of Migration Flows for the period 2007-2013 and its four financial instruments.

• cooperation with third-countries: lastly, the Parliament regrets that cooperation with third countries has not achieved sufficient results.41 The Parliament calls for an improved co-ordination of the Union’s immigration and development policies, taking fully into account strategic objectives such as the Millennium Development Goals. It stresses the importance of establishing Migration Information and Management Centres, as the one

40 A major study has been launched in January 2009 by the Policy Department C on What system of 'burden sharing' between Member States for the reception of asylum seekers" ? This study should make it possible, at the end of 2009, to have a precise inventory of the state of application of the legal instruments and costs in the Member States and of continuing problems. Proposals for remedial action should also be made. 41 Spain’s co-operation with third countries, such as Senegal and other countries in sub-Saharan and North Africa has been however considered successful.

29

inaugurated in Mali in October 2008, which can contribute significantly to tackling migration problems by addressing the concerns of the potential migrants. Moreover, it stresses that all agreements with countries of origin and transit should include chapters on co-operation on immigration and calls for an ambitious policy with third countries on police and judicial

aged in human trafficking. 42

nscends national borders; ith increasing mobility of third country nationals across the EU, a common

cial exclusion and that intergenerational solidarity is a reality will require

r non-specialised migration. Also, a better understanding of ‘illegal migration’ is called for:

values (and national identity) in the context of immigration law on immigrants for enabling them to have access to EU

co-operation to combat international criminal organisations eng

2.3.2. Future policy considerations for the next 10 years to come: ➤ the transnationalisation of migration in a changing legislative, economic and social context which traWmigration policy is necessary. The changing significance of the nation state and its relation to regional governance at EU level is also a major factor influencing the effectiveness of migration policies. 43

• Policies on social exclusion also have to take into account that migrants will be ageing. Ensuring that the elderly do not fall into so

complex social strategies. The principle of fair treatment and equality for resident third-country nationals (TCNs) with EU citizens agreed at the Tampere Summit in 1999 should continue to guide EU law and policy.

• The dual challenges of the demographic transformation of the EU

that point to a contracting market (through the reduction of fertility and the extended life expectancy in Europe) requires a dramatic re-thinking of EU policies towards third-country nationals as their work will help enhance Europe's economy. As stated earlier, Europe needs provisions, not only for highly skilled migrants but also fo

as not always as a single event or status in a migrant’s life, but as a process of negotiating changing statuses, different degrees of documentation and compliance with national legislation.

• Mandatory, civic integration programmes on ‘national and European

values’ raise questions regarding fundamental rights and non-discrimination. Imposing

rights and freedoms gives rise to various contradictions. The application and the further development of EU wide application of integration indicators is important.44

42 Further, the EU expects to conclude more mobility partnerships with third countries following the models of those already agreed with Moldova and Cape Verde. 43 see also Elspeth Guild, Sergio Carrera and Alejandro Eggenschwiler (2009): Informing the Immigration Debate, CEPS, Brussels. 44 The European Parliament has also published in 2007 an important study in the field of integration: "Setting up a system of Benchmarking Success of Integration Policies in Europe".

30

• To what extent is there a deficit in the delivery of fundamental

rights in the EU, particularly to third country nationals? How could such a deficit be closed? What could constitute a framework of equality to ensure that the people of Europe have full access to fundamental rights?

the changing meaning of borders, often no longer simply defined by

A European Parliament's own evaluation of FRONTEX and member

th EU law and the Charter of Fundamental Rights, and to monitor the conditions under which

y’ and their legal and ethical implications should be carried out. Equally, the questions of adequacy and

potential migrants, creating a global labour market and demand for labour, whilst

tion’ of the labour market and of migration.

How can fundamental rights and the protection of the individual (EU nationals or TCNs) be placed at the heart of EU immigration and integration policy, as recognised by the EU Charter?

➤geographical boundaries, but increasingly by the implementation of immigration controls within national borders, applied differently according to the citizenship and rights of migrants;45

• states’ activities in light of the rule of law and fundamental rights could be useful especially in view of striking the right balance between efficiency and transparency.46

• The post of an EU border supervisor (similar to the post of the

European Data Protection Supervisor) could be created or, such a role could be extended to the remit of the Fundamental Rights Agency. This would ensure that EU border controls, are consistent wi

expulsions of irregular immigrants take place, in compliance with the Directive on common standards and procedures in member states for returning illegally staying TCNs (the Returns Directive).

• An in-depth assessment of large-scale IT systems as regards not

only their ‘efficienc

proportionality of the flow of information need to be addressed [to avoid the idea that maximum technology is by definition the solution for better security].47

➤ the feminisation of migration, both in the realities observed in the labour market and in the development of migration studies;48 Migration is taking place within a rapidly changing global labour market. Globalisation has impacted on the economic and social lives of migrants and

causing the loss of employment in many of the world’s poorest economies. This has contributed to the ‘feminisa

45 see also Elspeth Guild, Sergio Carrera and Alejandro Eggenschwiler (2009): Informing the Borders Debate, CEPS, Brussels. 46 For example:. evaluation reports of the joint operations, risk analyses and feasibility

nals (TCNs) on the ways in which

avoli 8 see also Part 3 by Hélène Calers on Gender Equality

studies ,information to citizens and third country natiothe EU border is being managed and the implications of security technologies and new border management proposals over their rights and liberties. 47 see also section 2.6 on Data Protection by Alessandro D4

31

Research49 has found that often the first jobs to be lost as national economies restructure in a financial crisis, are those of women workers, who then become more vulnerable to exploitation and the need to migrate to seek work in the global economy. At the same time, an increasing proportion of the world’s households are headed by women. Their absence from the household has effects

and labour market needs of the EU and the true cale of migration in Europe.

obility partnerships between the European

tries of origin in terms of skills ansfer and mitigating the impact of brain drain.

curity of ermanent) residence and the social inclusion of TCNs within the Union.

on the lives of children and the elderly. The gender perspective is particularly important, not just as a result of the need to understand the ‘feminisation’ of migration, but also in order to inform and educate the general population and policy-makers about the reality of migrants’ experiences, the demographics ➤increased focus and means to foster positive synergies between migration and development: circular migration, one of the emerging EU policy themes, identified in the 2007 Commission’s Communication ‘Circular migration and mUnion and third countries’; The Immigration and Asylum Pact includes a policy aim to support circular migration flows, as a tool to prevent brain drain. The idea behind this is that migrants are less likely to emigrate permanently if they are able to return to their country of origin without jeopardising their chances of return to the EU. In order to initiate a mobility partnership, third countries are expected to commit themselves to fighting illegal migration through measures such as improving border control and management and combating migrant smuggling and human trafficking. In turn, EU Member States are requested to facilitate the migration of nationals of the third country concerned. In addition, the EU is looking at ways to facilitate circular migration that will help EU Member States to address their labour needs while promoting the potential positive impacts of migration on development and responding to the needs of countr The EU should ensure that mobility partnerships with third countries comply with a common immigration policy, fostering a rights-based and fair treatment approach. The temporary nature of migration policies (circular migration) might conflict with guaranteeing, and further ensuring, the se(p The Spanish Presidency of the EU (in the first half of 2010) expects to play a major role in the formalisation of the EU Framework on Integration into a proper Open Method of Coordination (OMC), which is an EU mechanism for reaching common approaches to a policy area without actually harmonising the law. Finally, on the basis of the European Pact on Immigration and Asylum and the 2008 Communication on a Common Immigration Policy, it can be expected that the debate on establishing an OMC on the wider aspects of immigration policy will

ojects have been funded to address issues of women and migration. nd networks are: FEMAGE, FEMICIT, FEMIPOL and QUING (6th FP), as

ell as GEMMA and GEMIC (7th Framework Programme).

49 A number of prRelevant projects aw

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be also addressed in the next phases of European integration processes affecting migration and integration.

oanna APAP

im J

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2.4. Police & Judicial cooperation in criminal matters and

Data protection

Preliminary remarks on the institutional and political challenges

The aim of this policy paper is to identify forward policy challenges and choices for the EU over the coming decade (which corresponds to the next two EP parliamentary terms) in the fields of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters and data protection. These are an important component of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ). Four preliminary remarks on the institutional and political challenges can be made before focussing on seven priority areas, which will be proposed in this policy paper: 1) The Lisbon Treaty, if and when it enters into force, will introduce more

effectiveness, accountability and legitimacy in the AFSJ, especially in the field of "Police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters". It will generalize (with a few exceptions) the Community method, which will henceforth include co-decision with the Parliament (becoming the ordinary legislative procedure, instead of the current simple consultation) and majority voting in the Council. The current pillar structure would then disappear, whereby the current third pillar would be transferred into the Community sphere. This could lead to an increased workload of the LIBE Committee and the Policy Department C in the future.

2) A new multi-annual programme in the area of freedom, security and

justice for the period 2010-2014 will be approved at the end of 2009 and will be known as the Stockholm Programme. The European Commission has presented on 10 June 2009 a first proposal of the new programme, which will be discussed by the Council and then endorsed by the European Council in December. This programme will replace the current Hague Programme, covering the period 2005-2009. The European Parliament will be consulted on the Commission draft and in the coming months it will have the chance to express its views on these sensitive issues.

3) The European Union must be able to provide a rapid and effective response to

tackle security deficits caused by the abolition of border controls within the Schengen area, when facing especially new global threats. The European Parliament has always insisted on the need to keep a balanced approach between enhancing security, protecting privacy and safeguarding fundamental rights, particularly given the fact that the EU Charter of fundamental rights becomes binding with the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. Therefore, the Parliament will have an important role to play in the development of a European model of balancing security and privacy.

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4) The European Parliament could try to obtain more information (and documents) from the Presidency, especially taking into account that it is excluded from the Council working groups (where the European Commission is represented) dealing with security, criminal justice and data protection. The Parliament could offer adequate guarantees concerning confidentiality on the information received.

Last but not least, it should be stressed that, given the very complex scenario concerning the challenges ahead in the field of security, the policy areas identified in this note, although presented in a way that immediately refers to the forthcoming legislature, will have to be dealt with also after 2019. Seven priority areas in the field of "Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters and Data Protection" are hereby proposed. They will be presented in the following pages: 1) Towards an EU Internal Security Architecture 2) Future Development of EUROPOL and EUROJUST 3) Strengthening the European Crime Prevention Network 4) Exchanging information and fighting terrorism together with the United

States 5) The future of the EU "black lists" in the fight against terrorism 6) Enhancing public private dialogue in security research and innovation 7) Striking the right balance between security and data protection

*************** Forward policy challenges and choices for the EU over the coming decade 2.4.1. Towards an EU Internal Security Architecture Building on the Conclusions "on the principle of convergence and the structuring of internal security", adopted by the JHA Council in October 2008, the European Parliament could propose the development of an "EU internal security architecture", a concept which does not exist currently at EU level. At the moment there is a wide agreement on the growing interdependence between internal and external security. This is also recognised in the Report ("Providing Security in a Changing World") adopted by the European Council in December 2008 on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy (from December 2003). The report outlines global challenges, key threats,

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strategic objectives and policy implications for a secure Europe in a better world. Among the threats and challenges to our security interests, the European Council has identified the following issues: Terrorism and Organised Crime, Cyber security, Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Energy Security, Climate change, Piracy, Small Arms and Light Weapons, Cluster Munitions and Landmines, as well as several regional conflicts. The European Parliament could, as a first step, prepare a report on the principle of convergence (which is to promote closer operational cooperation among law enforcement authorities of the MS) and the structuring of internal security. In this context, the EP could stress the importance of defining strategic and operational objectives more clearly and having them approved at political level. Another aspect, which deserves to be analysed, is the definition of a methodology for intelligence-led law enforcement, with an emphasis on the collection and analysis of information and intelligence. Intelligence-led operation and cooperation is not being developed at the moment, due to a lack of trust among law enforcement authorities, reluctant to share information with each other. The Parliament could hold a debate and prepare a report on the Organised Crime Threat Assessment (OCTA), which are adopted by Europol on a yearly basis since 2006. An OCTA is a threat assessment of current and expected trends in organised crime across the EU, drawn up to enable decision-makers to take appropriate action to counter any anticipated threats. The Council adopts Conclusions setting EU priorities for the fight against organised crime based on the OCTAs (the latest Conclusions were adopted, by the JHA Council on 4-5 June 2009). The EP is informed of the Council Conclusions, but has not expressed any opinion on the OCTAs so far. Last but not least, the Parliament could try to be get involved in the work of the "Committee on Internal Security" (known as "COSI", from the French acronym, "Comité pour la sécurité intérieure"), foreseen by the Lisbon Treaty "in order to ensure that operational cooperation on internal security is promoted and strengthened within the Union". The new Committee on Internal Security would have an operational rather than legislative role, unlike the current Article 36 Committee (CATS), which is in charge of the preparation of Council activities in JHA matters. The Lisbon Treaty states that "the European Parliament and national Parliaments shall be kept informed of the proceedings" of COSI. 2.4.2. Future Development of EUROPOL and EUROJUST Europol is the EU law enforcement organisation that handles criminal intelligence. Its aim is to improve the effectiveness and cooperation between the competent authorities of the EU MS in preventing and combating international organised crime and terrorism. Its mandate has been progressively extended, most recently in April 2009 with a new Council Decision, which has replaced the Europol Convention of 1995. Europol will become a Community agency as from

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January 2010. This change of status will significantly improve the operational and administrative functioning of this body. An important change is the fact that Europol will be financed from the Community budget (from 1 January 2010 onwards). This will simplify the procedures for managing Europol's budget and staff. The role of the European Parliament in the control of Europol will also increase and democratic supervision over Europol at European level will be enhanced. According to the Lisbon Treaty, "the European Parliament and the Council, by means of regulations adopted in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, shall determine Europol's structure, operation, field of action and tasks". These regulations "shall also lay down the procedures for scrutiny of Europol's activities by the European Parliament, together with the national Parliaments". These are important elements, which deserve full attention in the EP, both at political and administrative level. The two main "outputs" of Europol are the European Organised Crime Threat Assessments (OCTA) and EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Reports (TE-SAT). The EP could prepare reports on the OCTA and TE-SAT and hold parliamentary debates on them.

Europol does not have any powers to arrest people or take other coercive measures. This lack of operational powers is one of its main problems. However, criticism has been expressed concerning excessive powers that Europol could accumulate in the future, turning it into a European FBI.

Europol should in the future improve its cooperation and working arrangements with Eurojust, also through the Joint Investigation Teams. Eurojust is a European Union body established in 2002. It stimulates and improves the co-ordination of investigations and prosecutions between competent authorities in the MS, in particular by facilitating the provision of international mutual legal assistance and implementation of extradition requests and European Arrest Warrants. Eurojust hosts meetings, providing translation facilities, between investigators and prosecutors from different states, dealing with individual cases and specific types of criminality, also at a strategic level. It assists Member States' authorities in overcoming obstacles in cross border investigations and prosecutions, which arise from different legal systems and languages. Eurojust works closely with the European Judicial Network in criminal matters to improve judicial cooperation between EU Member States, particularly to combat organised crime, corruption, drug trafficking and terrorism. The EJN is made up of judicial contact points in each EU Member State. The Secretariat of the EJN forms part of the Eurojust Secretariat, functioning as a separate and autonomous unit. The Council Decisions establishing Eurojust and the European Judicial Network have been amended in December 2008, following a consultation of the European Parliament, in order to strengthen the two entities and reinforce the fight against serious crime.

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If the Lisbon Treaty enters into force, the European Parliament will have a new role in determining "Eurojust's structure, operation, field of action and tasks", together with the Council, under the ordinary legislative procedure. The Lisbon Treaty also foresees that "In order to combat crimes affecting the financial interests of the Union, the Council, by means of regulations adopted in accordance with a special legislative procedure, may establish a European Public Prosecutor's Office from Eurojust". In this case, the Council "shall act unanimously after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament". The Lisbon Treaty foresees also the possibility "to extend the powers of the European Public Prosecutor's Office to include serious crime having a cross-border dimension". The Lisbon Treaty also foresees the involvement of the European Parliament and national Parliaments in the evaluation of Eurojust's activities. 2.4.3. Strengthening the European Crime Prevention Network The European Crime Prevention Network (EUCPN) was created with a Council Decision in May 2001. The role of the EUCPN is recognised by the Hague Programme, which states that the Network “should provide expertise and knowledge to the Council and the Commission in developing effective crime prevention policies”, while also acknowledging that the EUCPN “should be professionalized and strengthened”. The Council is currently reviewing the future organisation and tasks of the EUCPN, following an external evaluation. The EUCPN consists of a Board of National Representatives, supported by a Secretariat (provided by the Commission), a Website Management Team and two Standing Committees: a Programme Committee and a Research and Validation Committee. The objective of the EUCPN is to identify good practices in crime prevention and share knowledge and experience between MS. It promotes crime prevention activities by organising meetings, seminars and conferences. EUCPN activities focus on the prevention of general crime, especially in the fields of juvenile, urban and drug-related crime. According to the EUCPN Council Decision, the EUCPN Annual Reports are submitted to the Council for approval and then forwarded to the European Parliament. So far, there has been no discussion within the Parliament on the EUCPN Annual Reports. This situation could be rectified, with the EP drawing up reports on the EUCPN activities and on crime prevention policies at EU level in the future. 2.4.4 Exchanging information and fighting terrorism together with the USA "We reject as false the choice between our safety and our ideals". President Obama has pronounced these words in his inaugural address on 20th January 2009. He also announced his intention to close the Guantanamo Bay Detention Centre and order a review of detention, trial, transfer and interrogation policies in the fight against terrorism. The European Parliament has adopted resolutions on the alleged use of European countries by the CIA for the transportation and illegal detention of prisoners (TDIP Temporary Committee, February 2007) and also on the return and resettlement of the Guantanamo detention facility inmates (February 2009).

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In February 2009, President Pöttering wrote to the Chairpersons of the national parliaments asking for information about the follow-up to the EP resolution of 14 February 2007 on TDIP; the (few) replies received did not provide much information. The new EP could raise again this important issue with national parliaments. On 4-5 June 2009, the JHA Council approved Conclusions on an EU-coordinated approach regarding the reception of former Guantanamo detainees following the recent US Government request to assist it in finding accommodation for those persons who will be released and who for compelling reasons cannot return to their countries of origin. Given the possibility to move freely within the entire Schengen area, Schengen countries will have to be involved in the information sharing mechanism. On 15 June 2009 the EU and the United States adopted a "joint statement on the closure of the Guantanamo Bay detention facility and future counterterrorism cooperation, based on shared values, international law, and respect for the rule of law and human rights". In September 2006 the EP adopted a recommendation to the Council on the negotiations for an agreement with the United States on the use of passenger name records (PNR) data to prevent and combat terrorism and transnational crime. In February 2007, it adopted a resolution on SWIFT, the PNR agreement and the transatlantic dialogue on these issues, stressing that during the last few years several agreements prompted by the US were adopted without the involvement of the Parliament. The Lisbon Treaty will rectify this situation, since the Parliament will have an active role in the conclusion of international agreements through the assent procedure. Under these new favourable circumstances the EP could seek a renewed transatlantic cooperation in the field of information sharing and fight against terrorism. One possibility could be to involve the European Parliament and US Congress in the activities of the so-called High Level Contact Group on Data Protection Principles (set up in November 2006), which consists of senior EU and US officials (the EP has already expressed its concerns regarding the exclusion of a parliamentary component in this "dialogue"). The Parliament could refer to the agreement reached in Ljubljana in June 2008, during the EU-US summit, to conclude an international framework agreement on exchange of information and data protection. Despite initial enthusiasm no progress has been made since then. The EP could hold a parliamentary debate on this matter. In its future contact with the new US administration, the EP should insist on the necessity to always adopt counter-terrorism measures that are necessary, proportionate and legitimate, and to maintain the very highest levels of respect for fundamental rights and freedoms, as also recognised in the EU-US Joint Statement of 15 June 2009. In this context, it will be necessary to take into account the provisions of the Council Framework Decision (of November 2008) on the protection of personal data processed in the framework of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters.

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2.4.5. The future of the EU "black lists" in the fight against terrorism

The EU first adopted restrictive measures against persons and entities involved in terrorist acts in December 2001, in the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks. There are two systems of the so-called "black lists" in the EU: a system implementing the restrictive measures of the UN and one which is an autonomous EU regime. Both systems impose targeted financial sanctions, specific restrictive measures, including freezing of funds, against persons and entities associated with Usama Bin Laden, the Al-Qaida network, the Taliban and other individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with them. These lists are regularly updated, more or less every six months. In this context there are various EU legal instruments: Council Decisions, Council Common Positions, Council and Commission Regulations. This system has been criticized for lack of adequate guarantees for the persons and entities included in the "black lists". The Council has recently modified the "de-listing procedure". Nonetheless, the European Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance have recently annulled several Council Decisions and Regulations, on the grounds that the Council had not properly observed the right of defence, in particular the right to be heard and the right to judicial review. In order to comply with the recent judgements, the Council and the European Commission have started communicating to the parties concerned the reasons for listing and giving them the possibility to express their comments on the matter. In April 2009 (last month), the European Commission has tabled a proposal for amending a Council Regulation of 2002 in order to address the issues which have been raised by the European judicature (ECJ and CFI). The European Parliament will be consulted on this proposal.

Two observations can me made concerning the EU black lists: 1) If the Lisbon Treaty enters into force and the EU adheres to the European Convention of Human Rights, will it be possible to bring a case before the European Court of Human Rights instead of the European Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance? What will be the relations between the EU and the Council of Europe judicial systems? 2) Under the Lisbon Treaty, the EP will have new powers, since it will have the possibility - by means of regulations in adopted with the ordinary legislative procedure - to "define a framework for administrative measures with regard to capital movements and payments, such as the freezing of funds, financial assets or economic gains belonging to, or owned or held by, natural or legal persons, groups or non-State entities". 2.4.6. Enhancing public private dialogue in security research and

innovation

Public-private dialogue in the field of security research is important to increase the security of infrastructures, fight organised crime and terrorism, help restore

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security in a crisis, analyse political, social and human issues related to security research and improve surveillance and border control. Taking into account possible human rights implications of new technologies is also part of what public and private stakeholders need to do in partnership. The EU has responded to the need for more security research with two seven-year Framework Programmes, with a total funding of € 2.135 billion over the 2007-2013 period: the 7th Research Framework Programme, which includes a security theme and the Framework Programme "Security and Safeguarding Liberties" (managed by DG JLS).

The "European Security Research and Innovation Forum" (ESRIF) is a European strategy group, established in September 2007. Its main objective is to develop a strategy for civil security research and innovation through public private dialogue.

In this context, the European Parliament could in the future:

1) play an active role in the scrutiny of the security-related components of the EU funding instruments, especially within the review of the financial perspectives;

2) ensure an adequate representation and involvement in the European Security Research and Innovation Forum, where it has in principle an observer status. 2.4.7. Striking the right balance between security and data protection

The effectiveness of cooperation between law enforcement authorities in combating crime and terrorism depends to a large extent on their ability to obtain and exchange information and intelligence in good time. In today’s world the right to privacy has come under immense pressure. Given the enormous capabilities of modern technology, electronic data on our personal lives are gathered, stored, and shared on a scale unimaginable even a decade ago. The imperatives of national security have led governments across the world to call for more personal data to be collected by public authorities for law enforcement purposes or by private corporations for their business. The PNR and SWIFT examples (on which the EP adopted resolutions) give a clear indication of possible implications on privacy arising from the collection of personal data. Another example is the Prüm Council Decision, which contains provisions concerning the establishment of national DNA analysis files and the transfer of dactyloscopic data (fingerprints). The Parliament has also voiced its concern (with a recommendation to the Council in April 2009) about profiling, especially on the basis of ethnicity and race, in counterterrorism, law enforcement, immigration, customs and border control. The situation is even more complicated as there is no EU definition for profiling, risk assessment or data mining, taking also into account the growing reliance on biometrics. Therefore, adequate guarantees are needed to ensure respect for privacy and data protection. A person must freely give specific consent and be informed before his/her personal information is processed. The European Data Protection Supervisor has been providing valuable advice to the EP on these matters.

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The situation is complicated due to the current pillar structure, with different legislative instruments, such as EU Directives in the first pillar (Directive 95/46 on data protection, Directive 2002/58 on e-privacy, Directive 2006/24 on data retention, as well as Regulation 45/2001 on processing of personal data by Community institutions), Council Framework Decision (of November 2008) for data protection in the third pillar, Council of Europe Convention of 1981 (on Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data), as well as the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (Art. 8) and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (Art. 7 and 8). The pillar structure will disappear with the Lisbon Treaty, which will provide a stronger basis for the development of a clearer and more effective data protection system, while also foreseeing new powers for the European Parliament on this matter. The European Parliament will have a chance to express its views over the coming years on the following sensitive issues: review of the 95/46 Directive on Data Protection (the Commission is expected to adopt a proposal for amending it shortly); amendment of the Council Framework Decision for data protection on the third pillar after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty; drawing up of an opinion on the Commission proposal for a Council Framework Decision on the use of Passenger Name Record (PNR data) for law enforcement purposes in the EU; possible definition of new rules on privacy protection online (behavioural advertising, access to the internet, radio frequency identification tags (smart tags), search engines, social networks especially with profiles of minors) ); consultation on the European Commission proposal of 24 June 2009 on the setting up of an Agency for the operational management of large-scale IT systems: Schengen Information System (SIS II), Visa Information System (VIS) and Eurodac.

Alessandro DAVOLI

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Part 3: Droits des femmes et égalité des genres L'égalité entre hommes et femmes au sein de l'Union européenne n'est pas encore atteinte. Dans de nombreux domaines, les femmes sont défavorisées par rapport aux hommes. Cependant, de nombreux progrès ont été faits dans les dernières années et les dix prochaines années pourraient donner l'occasion de les amplifier. 3.1. Le contexte Dans les prochaines années, l'Union européenne devra faire face, notamment, à la crise économique actuelle, à la poursuite de l'évolution technologique, au vieillissement de sa population et à une probable augmentation de l'immigration. Ces phénomènes vont avoir d'importantes conséquences en matière d'égalité des genres. 3.1.1. Le vieillissement de la population européenne La tendance qui aura probablement le plus d'influence sur le domaine de l'égalité des genres dans les dix prochaines années est le vieillissement de la population européenne, c'est-à-dire l'augmentation de la proportion de personnes âgées dans la population. A l'heure actuelle, le taux de fécondité dans l'Union européenne est très bas (1.53 en 2006) et ne permet pas le renouvellement des générations. D'après les projections d'Eurostat50, d'ici 2015, le nombre de décès dépassera celui des naissances. Ces phénomènes, combinés à l'allongement de l'espérance de vie et au fait que la génération des 'baby-boomers' va atteindre l'âge de la retraite, vont changer l'équilibre actuel entre les personnes qui travaillent et celles qui sont inactives, augmentant les difficultés en matière de financement des retraites mais également des soins de santé. Une possibilité face au vieillissement de la population et à ses conséquences à long terme serait d'inciter les femmes à avoir plus d'enfants. A l'heure actuelle, les projections indiquent que la fécondité n'augmentera que faiblement dans l'Union européenne dans les prochaines années. Il n'est certes pas possible d'agir directement sur la fécondité mais certains facteurs peuvent indirectement l'influencer. Ainsi, il est prouvé que les pays avec de forts taux d'emploi des femmes et un haut niveau de disponibilité de services de garde d'enfants sont aussi ceux où les taux de fécondité sont les plus élevés51. Une étude de l'OCDE considère également que la participation accrue des

50 Eurostat News Release, "Population projections 2008-2060", STAT/08/119, 26 August 2008 51 Commission Staff Working Document, "Demography Report 2008 - Meeting Social Needs in an Ageing Society - Executive Summary, SEC(2008)2911, p. 8

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hommes dans les tâches ménagères et plus généralement l'égalité hommes-femmes au quotidien augmente la propension des femmes à avoir des enfants52. 3.1.2. Les femmes et le marché du travail Une autre réponse au vieillissement de la population et au risque de diminution de la population active serait d'inciter les femmes à entrer plus massivement sur le marché du travail. D'après les projections de la Commission, le taux d'emploi des femmes (59.1% en 2008) devrait atteindre 65% d'ici 202553. Ceci pourrait être facilité par les évolutions en matière de demande de main d'œuvre. Les prochaines années devraient voir à la fois une augmentation de la demande de main d'œuvre très qualifiée et peu qualifiée, ainsi qu'une augmentation de la demande dans le domaine des services (par exemple dans le domaine des services aux entreprises, de la santé ou dans l'hôtellerie)54. Les femmes étant de plus en plus nombreuses à faire des études supérieures, elles pourront constituer une ressource de main d'œuvre hautement qualifiée. Les femmes n'ayant pas fait d'études pourraient également trouver des emplois dans les domaines les moins qualifiés. De plus, une demande plus importante de main d'œuvre existera dans des domaines où les femmes sont déjà très présentes comme par exemple la santé et les services à la personne. Cependant, il faudra voir si la crise économique aura une influence conséquente sur ces projections et s'il ne sera pas plus difficile pour les femmes de trouver un emploi. Si les femmes entrent massivement sur le marché du travail, cela risque de rendre les questions d'égalité au travail d'autant plus d'actualité, notamment la question de l'écart de rémunération entre les femmes et les hommes (gender pay gap), la surreprésentation des femmes parmi les emplois précaires, qui risque d'être encore accentuée par la crise, ou encore l'absence des femmes dans les processus de décision. 3.1.3. Conciliation vie professionnelle et vie familiale Chacune de ces évolutions (et encore plus les deux combinées) vont rendre encore plus pressantes les questions de conciliation entre la vie familiale et professionnelle pour les femmes. En effet, si les femmes travaillent plus ou/et ont plus d'enfants, la problématique de la garde des enfants va s'accroître et pourrait empêcher ou réduire ces phénomènes. Une conséquence positive pourrait être une augmentation des possibilités d'emploi dans ce domaine.

52 OECD, "The Future of the Family to 2030 - A scoping report", 2008, p. 12 53 Commission Staff working document accompanying the Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Council Directive 92/85/EEC on the introduction of measures to encourage improvements in the safety and health at work of pregnant workers and workers who have recently given birth or are breastfeeding, SEC(2008)2526/2, p. 25 54 Communication de la Commission au Parlement Européen, au Conseil, au Comité Économique et Social Européen et au Comité des Régions, Des compétences nouvelles pour des emplois nouveaux - Anticiper et faire coïncider les compétences requises et les besoins du marché du travail, SEC(2008)3058

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De plus, une augmentation substantielle du nombre de parents isolés (qui sont majoritairement des femmes) est prévue dans les prochaines décennies55. Or les parents isolés sont particulièrement dépendants de la disponibilité des services de garde d'enfants pour accéder au marché du travail. Enfin, le vieillissement de la population et l'augmentation du nombre de personnes âgées va également poser la question des soins à ces personnes. Ainsi, à l'heure actuelle, trois quarts des personnes s'occupant en premier lieu des personnes âgées sont des femmes56, souvent l'épouse ou la fille ou belle-fille. Cela pourrait représenter un obstacle à l'entrée ou au maintien de certaines femmes sur le marché du travail. 3.1.4. Femmes et migration Selon une étude de l'OCDE57, les mouvements migratoires vers les pays développés vont continuer au moins à leur niveau actuel, voire augmenter dans les décennies à venir. Ce phénomène permettrait de contrer le vieillissement de la population et la diminution de la population active à long terme. De plus, il est probable que dans les années à venir on assiste à une féminisation des mouvements migratoires (voir partie 2.3). Ainsi, cela risque de mettre la question des femmes migrantes au premier plan, et notamment la question de leur intégration à la fois sur le marché du travail et dans la société. En effet, à l'heure actuelle, les femmes non ressortissantes de l'Union européenne sont victimes d'une double discrimination dans leur accès au marché du travail: elles souffrent du désavantage d'être femmes et d'être étrangères. Leur taux d'emploi est en moyenne dans l'Union européenne inférieure à celui des ressortissantes communautaires. 3.2. Les échéances politiques à court terme 2010 sera une année clé dans le domaine de l'égalité des genres. En effet, trois programmes ayant des implications pour les femmes arrivent à échéance: - la stratégie de Lisbonne - les objectifs de Barcelone - la feuille de route de la Commission C'est également le quinzième anniversaire de la Plate-forme de Pékin. La Stratégie de Lisbonne, lancée au Conseil européen de mars 2000, avait comme objectif, notamment, un taux d'emploi des femmes de 60% en 2010. Cet objectif est quasiment atteint: en effet, d'après les données Eurostat, le taux d'emploi des femmes dans l'Union européenne en 2008 était de 59.1%. La principale question est de savoir comment cette stratégie sera modifiée pour les prochaines années, notamment en ce qui concerne la situation des femmes: les Etats membres vont-ils se fixer un objectif plus ambitieux en matière de taux d'emploi des femmes ou se concentrer sur d'autres questions?

55 OECD, "The Future of the Family to 2030 - A scoping report", 2008, p. 22 56 ibid., p. 23 57 ibid., p. 15

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La Commission devrait lancer à l'automne 2009 une consultation en vue de la révision de la Stratégie de Lisbonne, avant de faire des propositions fin 2009 - début 2010, en vue d'une adoption pendant la présidence espagnole au 1er semestre 2010. Le Parlement européen n'aura pas de rôle formel dans la révision de cette stratégie mais peut communiquer aux Etats membres ses priorités. 2010 est également l'échéance fixée par les objectifs de Barcelone, adoptés en 2002, en matière de garde d'enfants. Les Etats membres étaient invités à "s'efforcer de mettre en place, d'ici 2010, des structures d'accueil pour 90% au moins des enfants ayant entre trois ans et l'âge de la scolarité obligatoire et pour au moins 33% des enfants âgés de moins de trois ans". Cependant, d'après le rapport de la Commission sur cette question, il semblerait que ces objectifs soient loin d'être atteints. Ainsi, il apparaît que, en 2006, seuls huit Etats membres ont rempli le premier objectif et cinq Etats membres le second. La question qui se posera pour les Etats membres sera de savoir s'ils prolongent ou mettent à jour ces objectifs, en les renforçant ou non. Le Parlement européen n'aura pas non plus de rôle formel dans la révision de ces objectifs mais peut tenter d'influencer la décision des Etats membres. Enfin, l'année 2010 sera la dernière année de la feuille de route pour l'égalité entre les femmes et les hommes58, dans laquelle la Commission avait indiqué ses priorités d'action dans ce domaine pour la période 2006-2010. 2010 verra donc la révision et la prolongation ou non de ses objectifs. Le Parlement européen aura donc l'occasion d'exprimer également quelles sont ses priorités générales pour les années à venir dans le domaine de l'égalité des genres. Sur le plan international, 2010 est également le quinzième anniversaire de la Déclaration et de la Plateforme d'action de Pékin, adoptées au cours de la quatrième conférence mondiale sur les femmes en septembre 1995 et qui mettaient l'accent sur douze domaines d'action prioritaires. Tous les cinq ans a lieu une évaluation des progrès accomplis, dans le cadre de la Commission sur le statut des femmes des Nations Unies. Une nouvelle évaluation est prévue lors de la prochaine session de cette commission, du 1er au 12 mars 2010. 3.3. Les grandes orientations futures Dans le contexte actuel de crise économique, une alternative va se présenter: soit de considérer l'égalité hommes-femmes comme une priorité fondamentale et de prendre les mesures nécessaires afin de la renforcer, notamment en ce qui concerne l'égalité salariale, la garde des enfants et la participation des femmes au processus de décision; soit l'égalité des genres est considérée comme une priorité moins importante au vu des autres conséquences de la crise et de la pression sur

58 Communication de la Commission au Conseil, au Parlement européen, au Comité économique et social européen et au Comité des régions, "Une feuille de route pour l'égalité entre les femmes et les hommes - 2006-2010", SEC(2006)275

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les finances publiques, ce qui risque d'entraîner des réductions de budget pour les politiques de conciliation entre vie familiale et professionnelle, voire à une réduction de l'emploi des femmes dû aux "coûts" (risque de maternité, etc) qu'impliquent l'emploi des femmes. Si la première option est choisie, le niveau européen pourrait servir d'impulsion à une telle évolution, notamment par la révision de certaines directives, comme celle sur le congé maternité59 ou celle sur l'écart de rémunération entre les femmes et les hommes60. Une des grandes problématiques actuelles et qui devrait s'accentuer encore dans les prochaines années est la conciliation entre vie familiale et professionnelle. Une piste possible afin de la faciliter pourrait être le développement du télétravail. D'après l'OCDE61, les possibilités de développement du télétravail sont considérables et les évolutions technologiques dans les prochaines années pourraient le faciliter. Ceci pourrait contribuer à la lutte contre le changement climatique en limitant les déplacements, mais aussi permettre aux parents et notamment aux femmes de mieux concilier leur emploi et leur vie familiale. Si l'égalité entre les hommes et les femmes n'est pas encore atteinte dans l'Union européenne, la situation des femmes dans le reste du monde et notamment dans les pays en voie de développement est bien plus préoccupante. L'accès limité des femmes à l'éducation, la féminisation des victimes du VIH/SIDA, la traite des femmes ou l'élimination des filles dans des pays comme l'Inde ou la Chine sont autant d'exemples de sujets d'inquiétude pour l'avenir des femmes dans le monde. Les dix prochaines années pourraient apporter des évolutions positives et l'Union européenne pourrait y contribuer, notamment par la place accordée à l'égalité hommes-femmes dans ses programmes de développement. Hélène CALERS

59 La directive 92/85/CEE du Conseil concernant la mise en œuvre de mesures visant à promouvoir l’amélioration de la sécurité et de la santé des travailleuses enceintes, accouchées ou allaitantes au travail, dont la Commission a proposé une révision en 2008 60 Directive 2006/54/CE du Parlement européen et du Conseil du 5 juillet 2006 relative à la mise en œuvre du principe de l'égalité des chances et de l'égalité de traitement entre hommes et femmes en matière d'emploi et de travail, dont le Parlement a demandé la révision dans une résolution du 18 novembre 2008. 61 OECD, "The Future of the Family to 2030 - A scoping report", 2008, p. 23

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Part 4: Legal and Parliamentary Affairs

4.1. Justice civile Le domaine de la coopération judiciaire civile échappe dans une certaine mesure aux tendances lourdes rappelées dans l'introduction générale. En revanche, un facteur s'avère particulièrement incisif dans ce secteur, à savoir la croissante mobilité intracommunautaire des citoyens européens62. Il est dès lors essentiel que les relations contractuelles, commerciales et familiales transfrontières, puissent bénéficier d'un degré de sécurité juridique aussi élevé que celui garanti par les droits nationaux pour les situations qui ne comprennent pas d'élément d'extranéité. Le Parlement européen, en tant que représentant directement élu des citoyens européens et garant de leurs droits, aurait ainsi l’occasion d’exercer pleinement son rôle de législateur au service du citoyen. L'entrée en vigueur du Traité de Lisbonne, toutefois, ne facilitera pas la tâche du Parlement européen, en tout cas dans le domaine du droit de la famille: dans ce domaine, non seulement l'unanimité au Conseil reste la règle, mais de plus tout parlement national se voit reconnaître un droit de veto à l’activation de la clause passerelle, qui envisage le passage de l’unanimité à la majorité qualifiée au sein du Conseil. L'instauration d'un dialogue approfondi entre le Parlement européen et les parlements nationaux sera donc la clef de tout progrès dans ces matières profondément liées aux différentes traditions et cultures nationales63. 4.1.1. Vers un espace européen de justice civile? Des avancées possibles dès la prochaine législature (2009-2014) Il s'agira dans un premier temps d'achever les travaux commencés et annoncés à la fin de la sixième législature dans ces domaines où la nécessité d'assurer une meilleure sécurité juridique est devenue prioritaire, avant tout le droit de la famille. La dissolution d'un lien familial dans un contexte transnational pose en effet des difficultés importantes quant à la réglementation relative à la responsabilité parentale, au partage du patrimoine des époux et aux éventuelles pensions alimentaires. Malgré un acquis important dans ces domaines, des lacunes juridiques persistent. Par conséquent, le déblocage de la procédure d'adoption du règlement "Rome III" sur la loi applicable aux divorces transfrontaliers devient prioritaire. Dans l'agenda législatif du Parlement

62 Etude Eurobaromètre: "les européens et la mobilité": http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/workersmobility_2006/uploaded_files/documents/FIRST%20RESULTS_Web%20version_06.02.06.pdf 63 Dialogue déjà entrepris lors de la sixième Législature à travers l'organisation par le Département thématique C, pour la commission JURI, d'un forum sur la justice civile, appuyé sur des études externes et internes substantielles, et auquel ont participé les représentants des Parlements nationaux.

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européen, à partir du début de son nouveau mandat, sera également inscrite la proposition du règlement sur les successions internationales, qui devrait être présentée au cours du mois de juin 2009 dans le but de supprimer l’incertitude juridique apportée par le morcellement des successions dans l’UE. La proposition de règlement sur les régimes matrimoniaux relève également des priorités à court terme. Une proposition législative est en effet attendue pour 2010. Garantir un degré élevé de sécurité juridique est également essentiel pour les citoyens lésés par des faits dommageables dans le cadre de leurs déplacements transfrontaliers. À ce sujet, la commission des affaires juridiques du Parlement européen a souligné la nécessité d'améliorer la situation des victimes d'accidents de circulation transfrontaliers dans l'UE, notamment pour assurer que la compensation accordée dans l'Etat membre du lieu de l'accident couvre la totalité des frais médicaux engendrés dans l'Etat de résidence de la victime. À cette fin, la révision du règlement Rome II sur la loi applicable aux obligations non contractuelles est susceptible d'être proposée à brève échéance64. Cette initiative pourrait également inclure la question de la loi applicable aux obligations non contractuelles découlant des atteintes à la vie privée et aux droits de la personnalité, afin de combler une lacune de ce règlement, âprement soulignée par le Parlement au moment des échanges avec le Conseil dans le cadre de la procédure d'adoption de ce texte. Des défis à moyen terme Du succès de travaux législatifs susmentionnés dépendra en large mesure la capacité de l'UE à progresser dans d'autres domaines du droit civil, sur lesquels le Parlement européen a sollicité des initiatives. Il est donc envisageable qu'à moyen terme l'UE soit confrontée aux questions juridiques relatives aux unions civiles autres que le mariage ainsi qu'à la capacité et l'état civil des personnes, notamment quand elles exercent leur droit à la libre circulation conformément à la législation de l'Union. En premier lieu, la nécessité de sécuriser les relations juridiques des partenariats civils enregistrés, quand elles s'entament dans un cadre transfrontalier, a été explicitement soulignée par la résolution du Parlement sur la situation des droits fondamentaux de l'Union européenne. La reconnaissance mutuelle des partenariats enregistrés est donc susceptible de faire l'objet d'une réflexion au sein de l’UE, dans une perspective plus ample que la seule réglementation des aspects patrimoniaux de ces unions. En deuxième lieu, l'UE est appelée à relever les défis posés par le changement démographique et plus particulièrement par le vieillissement progressif de la population. Dans ce contexte, l'adoption de mesures communautaires pour assurer une meilleure protection transfrontalière des personnes âgées

64 La Commission européenne vient de publier une étude sur le dédommagement de ces victimes qui pourrait constituer la première étape de l'élaboration d'une initiative législative.

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vulnérables répondrait à un véritable besoin65. Un instrument visant à améliorer la reconnaissance des mesures ou décisions prises pour l'organisation et la gestion de la protection des adultes juridiquement incapables, comme par exemple les mandats d'inaptitude, offrent des solutions sur lesquelles le Parlement européen s’est déjà prononcé. Enfin, en vue de développer une Europe au service des personnes, il est également prioritaire de supprimer toute barrière administrative aux démarches quotidiennes des citoyens. A ce sujet, les citoyens dénoncent des difficultés pour prouver leur état civil, comme une naissance, un décès, un mariage, dans un État membre autre que celui où ces événements se sont produits. L’actualité a déjà mis en lumière des cas édifiants de non reconnaissance de certificats de paternité d’un État membre à l’autre, notamment via le système de pétitions au Parlement européen. L'application de la reconnaissance mutuelle automatique des documents d’état civil pourrait renforcer la sécurité juridique dans ce domaine. En outre, promouvoir la mise en place des registres nationaux dans les Etats membres qui n'en disposent pas encore ainsi que l'interconnexion des registres nationaux de l'état civil permettrait aux citoyens européens d'obtenir aisément leurs attestations civiles au delà de leurs frontières nationales. Parmi les défis susceptibles d'occuper l'agenda politique européen pendant la prochaine législature s'inscrit sans doute l'avenir du droit européen des contrats, dans la perspective de garantir un degré élevé de sécurité juridique dans les transactions commerciales transfrontalières au bénéfice des citoyens et des entreprises. Le cadre commun de référence pour le droit des contrats (projet lancé et financé par la Commission) est désormais une réalité, mais la portée juridique à lui attribuer et donc sa valeur ajoutée pour les citoyens et les entreprises sont des questions qui restent ouvertes. Dans ce domaine, les institutions européennes pourraient lancer une réflexion sur un futur droit contractuel commun que les parties contractantes des différents Etats membres pourraient choisir pour réglementer leurs relations commerciales. Il s’agirait donc d’envisager la possibilité de créer un 28ème régime juridique optionnel. Perspectives pour l'horizon 2019 En fonction des résultats obtenus dans les domaines mentionnés ci-dessus, d'autres perspectives pourront éventuellement être esquissées, en vue de l'établissement d'un espace européen de justice civile à l'échéance 2019. Il est probable que les travaux en matière de droit de la famille, comme l'actualité le montre, seront assez difficiles même sous l'empire du traité de Lisbonne. La recherche d’un accord unanime dans ce domaine pourrait donner lieu à des ralentissements ou, dans le pire des cas, à l’échec des procédures législatives. Par ailleurs, le contrôle du respect du principe de subsidiarité par les parlements nationaux, dans l'exercice de leurs pouvoirs renforcés par le traité de Lisbonne, pourrait provoquer des objections fréquentes. Pour y remédier, l’UE pourrait lancer une réflexion sur la mise en place d’un "28ème régime juridique

65 En novembre 2008, le Département thématique C a publié une étude comparative sur les régimes juridiques de protection des majeurs incapables.

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optionnel". Il s’agirait d’un droit européen de la famille, que les citoyens seraient libres de choisir pour la réglementation de leurs relations familiales transfrontalières. Cette solution aurait l'avantage de respecter la compétence nationale dans ce domaine, tout en offrant un cadre juridique complet et uniforme aux couples binationaux ainsi qu'aux citoyens résidant dans des Etats membres dont ils ne sont pas ressortissants. A l’échéance 2019 il est également envisageable que les éventuelles avancées réalisées en matière d’état civil, comme préconisé ci-dessus, débouchent sur un autre défi, à savoir la création d'un document officiel européen unique rassemblant les attestations (identité, nationalité, situation familiale etc.), que les citoyens pourraient faire valoir dans tout État membre. Cette solution serait d’un intérêt pratique considérable pour le citoyen européen, puisque, en tant que source de sécurité juridique, elle afficherait une information immédiate et reconnue de la situation personnelle et familiale de tout citoyen quel que soit son Etat de résidence. En outre, il contribuerait de toute évidence au renforcement du contenu de l’identité citoyenne européenne. 4.1.2. Garantir un accès facile et efficace à la justice civile Des étapes prioritaires pour la prochaine législature (2009-2014) Construire l’UE en tant qu’espace judicaire commun signifie également garantir aux citoyens un accès facile et efficace à la justice civile pour le règlement des litiges transfrontaliers. Bien que des résultats importants aient déjà été atteints, notamment avec la mise en place de quelques procédures européennes (injonction européenne de payer et procédure européenne de règlement des petits litiges) il n’y pas de doute que le prochain objectif dans ce domaine consiste dans l’avancée des travaux en matière de reconnaissance et exécution mutuelles des décisions. Consacrée à Tampere, consolidée par le plan d’action de La Haye, elle continuera à être le fil conducteur du programme de Stockholm pour les années 2009-2014. Dans cette optique, la suppression complète de l’exequatur pour l'exécution des décisions étrangères sera une des priorités à court terme des institutions européennes à travers la proposition de révision du règlement Bruxelles I, qui est attendue pour fin 2009. La promotion du principe de la reconnaissance mutuelle ne peut pas ignorer d’autres instruments juridiques d'utilisation fréquente dans la vie quotidienne des citoyens, à savoir les actes authentiques66. Par conséquent, les institutions européennes devraient se préparer à relever le défi relatif à la définition des conditions d’une circulation simplifiée des actes authentiques au sein de l'UE, sur la base des recommandations déjà formulées par le Parlement européen. La suppression de la formalité d’apostille pourrait alors devenir prioritaire tout comme l’option d’un instrument authentique européen. Par ailleurs, la reconnaissance mutuelle et l’exécution automatiques des actes authentiques

66 En novembre 2008, le Département thématique C a publié une étude comparative sur les actes authentiques au sein de l'Union européenne.

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pourraient aussi avoir pour effet d’inciter les citoyens à transcrire les accords civils et commerciaux dans des titres sécurisés ayant la force probante et exécutoire afin de réduire la probabilité de litiges et donc de recours aux tribunaux. Le renforcement de la justice préventive pourrait ainsi faire l’objet d’une réflexion au niveau de l’UE. Dans ce cadre, la mise en place d'un certificat européen d’héritier et d'un réseau européen des registres testamentaires permettrait également de simplifier la circulation des preuves des qualités héréditaires. La création d'un tel outil et l'uniformisation des règles de conflit des lois devraient être incluses dans une initiative législative qui, comme mentionné ci-dessus, est attendue pour l’été 2009. Des priorités à court terme relève également la mise en place des nouvelles procédures européennes qui s’ajouteraient à celles déjà existantes, à savoir la procédure européenne d’injonction à payer et de règlement de petits litiges. Il s’agit, en premier lieu, de l'adoption des règles procédurales pour l'obtention de mesures provisoires donnant accès aux informations sur le patrimoine du débiteur. Une initiative dans ce sens a été, en effet, sollicitée récemment par le Parlement européen. En deuxième lieu, l'instauration d'une procédure européenne garantissant la saisie des avoirs bancaires a été envisagée par la Commission européenne dans un livre vert et soutenue avec faveur par le Parlement. Les deux procédures auraient pour but de faciliter et accélérer le recouvrement transfrontalier des créances. Par ailleurs, il convient de préciser que l'exigence d'un accès facile pour les citoyens à la justice civile dans les affaires transfrontalières inclut le recours tant aux voies judiciaires qu’extrajudiciaires. La directive sur la médiation en matière civile et commerciale en est un exemple significatif. Dans ce domaine, le traité de Lisbonne contient une nouvelle base juridique pour le développement de méthodes alternatives de résolution des litiges. Une fois entrée en vigueur, cette base juridique pourrait donner lieu à de nouvelles initiatives au cours de la prochaine législature. Enfin, parmi les objectifs susceptibles de s’afficher à brève échéance il convient d’évoquer les opportunités offertes par les nouvelles technologies de l’information ainsi que le développement d’une formation judiciaire européenne. D’une part, l’application dans le domaine judiciaire des procédures électroniques interopérables ainsi que l’accès en ligne à la justice sont susceptibles de faire l’objet d’initiatives concrètes dans le cadre du projet e-Justice. D’autre part, dans une Europe de justice civile la formation des magistrats et des autres professionnels du droit aux instruments du droit civil européen est un enjeu très important. Une coopération judiciaire peut être efficace seulement si ses acteurs ont les moyens nécessaires pour appliquer les outils sur lesquels cette coopération s’appuie. Conscients de cet enjeu, les rédacteurs du traité de Lisbonne ont créé une base juridique spécifique pour le développement et le renforcement d’une formation judiciaire européenne, qui pourrait être à l'origine de nouvelles propositions.

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Perspectives pour l'horizon 2019 Si au cours de la prochaine législature 2009-2014 les projets susmentionnés sont accomplis, le cadre juridique en matière de justice civile sera composé par une panoplie d'instruments communautaires en matière de procédure civile, s'ajoutant aux actes déjà en vigueur. Or, ces actes législatifs présentent des solutions différentes quant à leur champ d’application, aux motifs de refus de la reconnaissance des décisions étrangères ainsi qu'à certains aspects de la procédure. Ces divergences peuvent créer des difficultés d’application pour les praticiens du droit. A l'horizon 2019 il est envisageable que garantir non seulement l’efficacité et la rapidité des procédures intra-communautaires mais également leur cohérence sera un objectif prioritaire. Cette nécessité pourrait donc engendrer une révision systématique des règles communautaires de procédure civile pour en assurer la coordination en vue de la construction d'un espace judiciaire civile lisible. 4.1.3. La dimension extérieure de la coopération judiciaire civile Dans une Europe ouverte sur le monde le renforcement de la dimension extérieure de la politique de l'UE en matière de coopération judiciaire civile devient prioritaire. Il est en effet important, d'une part, de garantir aux citoyens européens la sécurité et la prévisibilité juridiques au delà de la frontière de l'Union moyennant des accords avec des pays tiers et, d'autre part, d'assurer l'application uniforme de l'acquis communautaire dans les négociations internationales. A ce sujet, très récemment des travaux ont eu lieu pour la mise en place d'une procédure pour la négociation et la conclusion d'accords bilatéraux entre les États membres et les pays tiers dans les domaines de la justice civile régis par les instruments communautaires. La mise en œuvre de partenariats ou des réseaux des juges et professionnels du droit entre les Etats membres et les pays tiers pourrait également faire l'objet d'une initiative à moyen terme. Roberta PANIZZA

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4.2. Droits des societés 4.2.1. Les grandes tendances La crise financière internationale et le ralentissement économique actuels constituent des défis majeurs. Au niveau européen relever ces défis signifie, entre autre, rétablir la confiance des investisseurs et des entreprises ainsi que la compétitivité de l'économie européenne à l'échelon mondial. Il ne fait aucun doute que la réalisation de ces objectifs nécessite de nouvelles initiatives dans le domaine du droit des sociétés. Par ailleurs, ces initiatives se relient à la nécessité de simplifier l'environnement juridique des sociétés ainsi que du renforcement de la sécurité juridique pour les activités transfrontalières des entreprises, ces deux éléments étant le fil conducteur de l'action européenne en matière du droit des sociétés. 4.2.2. Les priorités pour la prochaine législature (2009-2014) En réponse à la crise financière, la révision des règles sur la comptabilité et la supervision financière devient une priorité à court terme. La Commission propose, en effet, d'engager une importante reforme des directives comptables (la quatrième: 78/660/CEE et la septième: 83/349/CEE). A ce sujet, la crise actuelle, née aux Etats Unis mais dont les conséquences sont globales, a mis en évidence combien la mondialisation accentue le besoin de coordination et de régulation au niveau international. La comptabilité des sociétés devrait donc s’adapter aux nécessités internationales de transparence et de comparabilité des informations financières. Par conséquent, la révision des directives comptables pourrait être menée dans le contexte d'un processus de convergence comptable internationale. En matière de contrôle financier, la mise en place d'une réglementation et d'une surveillance appropriées aux acteurs et aux activités qui comportent des risques significatifs relève des objectifs déjà annoncés par la Commission. Le Parlement européen au début de son nouveau mandat sera appelé à apporter sa contribution, à travers l'examen d'une proposition de directive visant à établir un cadre harmonisé sur le contrôle des risques que présentent les gestionnaires de fonds d’investissement alternatifs pour leurs investisseurs et plus généralement pour la stabilité financière. Ce texte a été publié à la fin du mois d'avril 2009. Des initiatives dans la même direction pourraient être adoptées dans d'autres secteurs du marché financier. Une autre priorité à court terme est la finalisation des travaux entamés pour la pleine application de l'initiative européenne de 2008 en faveur de petites entreprises ("Small Business Act"). Il est donc probable que l’examen du projet de directive concernant la lutte contre le retard de paiement dans les transactions commerciales ainsi que l’achèvement de la première lecture de la proposition de directive visant à supprimer les exigences comptables pour les plus petites entreprises, commencée à la fin de la sixième législature,

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soient inclus dans l’agenda législatif du Parlement européen tout au début de son nouveau mandat. Comme mentionné ci-dessus un autre objectif découlant de la crise actuelle est le renforcement de la compétitivité de l'économie européenne à l'échelon mondial. Considérant que 99 % des entreprises dans le marché unique européen sont des petites et moyennes entreprises (PME), la nécessité de créer un environnent juridique favorisant l’exploitation du potentiel de croissance des PME demeure un enjeu important pour l’UE. Il est donc envisageable que la surpression des barrières fiscales, juridiques et administratives entravant les opérations intracommunautaires des PME reste le fil conducteur de futures initiatives de l’UE en matière de droit des sociétés au cours de la prochaine législature. Une réponse importante au besoin d'une meilleure sécurité juridique pour les activités transfrontalières de PME sera la mise en œuvre du statut de la société privé européenne. Adopté en première lecture par le Parlement européen, il devrait être approuvé en priorité par le Conseil. Compte tenu que d’autres acteurs économiques dans le marché intérieur revendiquent des nouveaux outils favorisant leur mobilité intracommunautaire, il est envisageable que d’autres initiatives se calquant sur le modèle du statut de la société privé européenne feront l'objet de l'agenda de l’UE pour 2009-2014. A ce sujet, la Commission a, en effet, entamé en février 2009 une consultation sur la nécessité et le contenu d’un éventuel statut de la fondation européenne qui pourraient donner lieu à une initiative législative. Cette action pourrait également favoriser la reprise des travaux relatifs à la définition du statut de la société mutuelle européenne et de l’association européenne. Considérant que le projet de créer des personnes morales européennes a été conçu afin de permettre aux entreprises d'exercer leurs activités dans plusieurs États membres sous un seul régime juridique (le droit communautaire), la révision du statut de la société européenne pourrait également faire l'objet d'une réflexion au sein de l'UE. En raison de plusieurs renvois aux différents droits nationaux, le statut de la société européenne n'offre pas un cadre juridique uniforme. 4.2.3. L'avenir du droit des sociétés à l'échéance 2019 La réalisation des objectifs susmentionnés pourraient préparer le terrain à une réflexion sur l'avenir du droit des sociétés à l'échéance 2019. La valeur ajoutée d'une réglementation du transfert transfrontalier du siège (à travers l'adoption de la 14ème directive) pourrait faire l'objet d'un débat renouvelé à la lumière des avancées éventuellement accomplies dans l'instauration des formes sociétaires européennes. Enfin, dans le cadre des projets dans le domaine du droit des sociétés à l'échéance 2019 pourrait également s'inscrire le regroupement de l'intégralité des textes législatifs dans un document unique. L'acquis communautaire en matière de droit des sociétés est en effet assez fragmentaire, les premières initiatives datant des années '60 et les actes principaux ayant été modifiés à plusieurs reprises. La consolidation de ces textes, bien que demandant un effort de grande ampleur en raison de la multiplicité de sources de droit existant,

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favoriserait une sécurité juridique accrue et établirait un cadre juridique facilement lisible et accessible. Roberta PANIZZA

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4.3. Droit de la propriété industrielle et intellectuelle Un des éléments clés de la nouvelle Stratégie de Lisbonne pour la Croissance et l'Emploi est l’amélioration du traitement des droits de propriété intellectuelle dans l'Union. Ces droits valorisent et protègent la création et l’innovation, facteurs importants de compétitivité et de croissance et garantissent également la diversité culturelle. Il convient, dans un premier temps, de souligner que l'article 118 du traité de Lisbonne prévoit l'adoption, en codécision, de mesures relatives à la création de titres européens pour assurer une protection uniforme des droits de propriété intellectuelle dans l'Union, et à la mise en place de régimes d'autorisation, de coordination et de contrôle centralisés au niveau de l'Union. Cette disposition laisse présager des avancées concrètes à moyen terme. Dans ce domaine, deux volets sont à prendre en considération : les droits de propriété industrielle et les droits d’auteur.

4.3.1. Droits de propriété industrielle: priorité absolue au système des brevets.

Pour ce qui est de la propriété industrielle, l’Union européenne doit se doter de droits forts afin de protéger ses innovations et de rester compétitive dans l’économie mondiale de la connaissance, de plus en plus concurrentielle. En la matière, à court terme, la problématique cruciale reste celle du système des brevets. Or, selon les données rassemblées par la Commission, l'UE est en retard sur les Etats Unis et le Japon en termes d'activité brevet et ses brevets coûtent plus cher. La fragmentation actuelle du système des brevets en Europe, en particulier l'absence de titre unitaire et de mécanisme unifié de règlement des litiges, rend complexe et coûteux l'accès à ce système et difficiles l’émission et la défense effective des brevets, notamment pour les PME. Afin d’offrir aux entreprises européennes, quelque soit leur taille, une protection efficace en matière de brevets à l'échelon communautaire, il s’agira de fournir un système de brevet simple, à guichet unique, présentant un bon rapport coût-efficacité et de grande qualité, à la fois quant aux procédures d'examen et de délivrance, que de post-délivrance. Ce système devra également comprendre une solution fiable pour le règlement des litiges. La proposition initiale de règlement sur le brevet communautaire date de 2000. En 2007, le débat avait été relancé par une communication de la Commission qui posait les jalons du brevet communautaire et d'une meilleure juridiction brevet pour l'Union européenne. Le 20 mars 2009, une étape supplémentaire a été franchie, la Commission ayant présenté une recommandation au Conseil visant à l’autoriser à ouvrir des négociations avec ses Etats membres et les Etats parties à la Convention du Brevet Européen, sur la base de l'article 300 TCE, en vue de l'adoption d'un accord créant un système unifié de règlement des litiges en matière de brevets.

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4.3.2. Droits d'auteur: la nécessaire adaptation au numérique. En matière de droits d'auteur, le principal défi de l’Union tient dans l’adaptation indispensable du système de protection des droits d’auteur aux avancées de la technologie du numérique. Le développement rapide et permanent de ces nouvelles technologies ainsi que les mesures de contournement mises en place illégalement, posent une multitude de problèmes auxquels il faut répondre, tout en garantissant les droits des auteurs et leur rémunération dans un contexte de marché unique et de libre concurrence. Deux enjeux distincts et contradictoires: l’accès des consommateurs aux contenus (artistiques, culturels ou scientifiques) d’une part et d’autre part, la protection des droits des auteurs. Dans ce contexte, le principe de la territorialité des licences, qui réduit les possibilités d'accès à l'offre et l'intégration du marché européen de l'offre en ligne, devrait faire l’objet de l’attention prioritaire de l’Union. Ainsi, la question des licences multiterritoriales, plus adaptées à l'environnement numérique devient primordiale. Le Parlement européen a rappelé la nécessité d'une directive-cadre dans ce domaine. Il a également souligné la nécessité d’établir des règles de gestion et de fonctionnement transparentes des sociétés de gestion collectives. Il a plaidé pour que la Commission propose une directive-cadre dans le domaine de la gestion collective transfrontalière du droit d’auteur et des droits voisins dans le domaine des services licites de musique en ligne. Soucieux des intérêts en jeu en matière de protection des droits d'auteur en général, il a d'ailleurs mis en place, dans les derniers mois de la législature 2004-2009, un groupe de travail qui s'est penché sur les problèmes rencontrés et les défis à relever en la matière. Si l'expérience perdure lors de la prochaine législature, on peut espérer que ce groupe influencera et accélèrera les travaux de la Commission dans le sens d'une amélioration à la fois de la diffusion des contenus et de la protection des auteurs. Plus généralement, il sera donc question, durant la prochaine décennie, d’améliorer la diffusion des contenus en développant l’offre légale et son accessibilité et dans un même temps de lutter contre le piratage. Claire GENTA

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4.4. Droit parlementaire Les conditions pour l'exercice du mandat au Parlement européen sont fondées sur un cadre juridique combinant le droit communautaire et le droit national. Plus précisément, l'immunité parlementaire des députés européens est réglementée différemment selon que le député se trouve sur son propre territoire national ou sur le territoire de tout autre État membre. Dans le premier cas, l'article 10 du protocole sur les privilèges et immunités des Communautés européennes (PPI) renvoie au droit national des États membres, en disposant que les membres du Parlement européen bénéficient des immunités reconnues aux membres du parlement de leur pays. Vu la disparité des régimes nationaux relatifs aux immunités parlementaires, la mise en œuvre de l'article 10 du PPI entraîne une véritable inégalité de traitement entre les députés européens, selon leur nationalité. Par ailleurs, l'application du droit national peut donner lieu à des difficultés pour les travaux mêmes du Parlement européen, qui est obligé à analyser la législation nationale applicable afin de décider sur une demande de levée de l'immunité parlementaire. Cette situation a amené le Parlement européen à demander à plusieurs reprises une révision du PPI, qui ayant le rang du droit primaire est soumis à la procédure de révision pour les traités. Aucune révision n'a pas encore été réalisée. Ceci dit, une fois le traité de Lisbonne entré en vigueur, le Parlement européen pourrait profiter du nouveau rôle que ce traité lui attribue dans la procédure de révision du traité, afin de proposer la suppression du renvoi aux régimes nationaux et la définition ainsi d'une réglementation uniforme et commune des immunités. En effet, sous l'empire du traité de Lisbonne le Parlement acquiert le droit d’initiative et de faire partie de la Convention qui sera la règle pour les modifications majeures du Traité (son approbation est par ailleurs nécessaire si aucune Convention n’est prévue). Roberta PANIZZA

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Part 5: Participation des citoyens Le "déficit démocratique" reste un lieu commun, dans la perception par l'opinion, du fonctionnement de l'Union Européenne. Le Traité de Lisbonne tente d'y répondre, sur le plan institutionnel: - il consolide le pouvoir du Parlement Européen, seule institution européenne directement élue par les citoyens, à travers la généralisation de la procédure de codécision et le renforcement du lien entre la désignation du Président de la Commission et les élections européennes; - il associe davantage les Parlements nationaux au processus législatif européen, à travers le mécanisme d'alerte précoce pour le contrôle du respect du principe de subsidiarité. Il est certain que l'émergence d'une "alliance parlementaire" sera une clef essentielle de la réponse au "déficit démocratique au cours des dix années qui viennent. La résolution issue du rapport Brok récemment adoptée explore ainsi les nouvelles formes de coopération entre le PE et les parlements nationaux tant au niveau pré-législatif que post-législatif, notamment quant au contrôle de l'utilisation des crédits de l'UE, ou de la transposition de la législation communautaire par les Etats membres. La COSAC pourrait constituer l'enceinte privilégiée de cette coopération renouvelée, pourvu que soit assuré son bon fonctionnement. Comme souligné dans la section sur les affaires constitutionnelles, la démocratie représentative souffre cependant d'une crise de confiance qui favorise la promotion du concept de "démocratie participative". Dans le contexte européen, les attentes et frustrations qui y sont attachées sont d'autant plus fortes que le fonctionnement des institutions communautaires, plus encore que celui des institutions nationales, est perçu comme difficilement compréhensible et trop éloigné des préoccupations réelles des citoyens. Pour le Parlement européen, institution européenne représentative par excellence, un défi essentiel de la prochaine décennie pourrait être de s'imposer aussi comme un des artisans de la démocratie "participative". La participation du citoyen pourrait ainsi être développée en amont et en aval du processus législatif. 5.1. Les instruments du dialogue pré-législatif avec le citoyen. Dès 199667 (et même 1995, si l'on considère les auditions organisées dans le cadre de la préparation du Traité d'Amsterdam), le Parlement européen, conscient de l'insuffisance des seules formules envisagées par les Traités (CESE et participation des partenaires sociaux68) a encouragé l'expression directe des citoyens.

67 Résolution sur la participation des citoyens et des acteurs sociaux au système institutionnel de l'Union Européenne, JO C 20 du 20.01.1997 68 Il ne sera pas question ici du Comité des Régions, qui relève plutôt de la réflexion sur le renforcement de la démocratie représentative

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5.1.1. Mieux exploiter les formules institutionnelles de dialogue avec les

citoyens a) le Comité Economique et Social Européen A l'instar de la Commission (qui a conclu un protocole de coopération avec le CESE), le Parlement européen pourrait examiner les modalités d'une meilleure exploitation de l'expertise du CESE. b) les partenaires sociaux [Sans entrer dans les détails69 du dialogue social, le Parlement européen pourrait au cours de la prochaine législature débattre de son implication dans le sommet social tripartite pour la croissance et l'emploi prévu à l'article 152 du Traité de Lisbonne]. 5.1.2. Veiller à la bonne prise en compte des consultations pré-

législatives70 La Commission organise, sur des sujets spécifiques, de nombreuses consultations des parties prenantes et du grand public. Parmi les instruments les plus structurés, on peut notamment citer les Livres blancs et verts. Mais la Commission a également recours à des comités consultatifs, des groupes d'experts, des ateliers et des forums et également à la consultation en ligne. Afin de faciliter la structuration et l'élaboration de ses initiatives, elle a introduit, en 2002, une approche intégrée (le plan d'action Mieux légiférer) dans laquelle s'inscrit l'analyse d'impact. De manière générale, toutes les initiatives politiques et propositions législatives majeures figurant dans son programme législatif et de travail annuel doivent faire l'objet d'une analyse de leurs conséquences potentielles dans les domaines économique, social et environnemental. La consultation de nombreuses parties intéressées fait partie intégrante de cette analyse d'impact. Le Parlement, qui a fait des analyses d'impact pré-législatives un cheval de bataille vis-à-vis de la Commission, doit désormais démontrer son aptitude à les utiliser au mieux dans le cadre de son propre travail législatif, en particulier en se donnant les moyens de contrôler si cette analyse a été faite et d'en évaluer la qualité, voire de se donner les moyens de réaliser ses propres analyses d'impact. Le "groupe technique de haut niveau pour la coopération interinstitutionnelle" mis en place en 2002 pourrait constituer le cadre de cette réflexion, s'agissant en particulier de la communication au Parlement des études engagées par la Commission en amont de la présentation d'une proposition législative.

69 Les questions sociales relèvent en effet du Département thématique A 70 dans ce domaine pourrait aussi être pertinente la réflexion sur le rôle des lobbies dans le fonctionnement des institutions cf Atelier pour AFCO organisé par le Département thématique C

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5.1.3. Stimuler la mise en œuvre concrète du "Plan D". Dans une communication de 2008 (COM(2008) 158) la Commission reconnaît que "l'Union a besoin d’une prise de conscience et d’un débat politiques plus large si elle veut atteindre ses objectifs et mener à bien les politiques appropriées". Il s'agit là de l’un des objectifs majeurs de sa politique en matière de communication: "impliquer les citoyens en encourageant la citoyenneté européenne active" ou plus précisément, "impliquer les citoyens en leur donnant l’accès à l’information pour qu’ils soient en mesure de prendre part à un débat bien documenté sur les questions communautaires". Elle considère à ce propos que les partis politiques et leurs élus sont les mieux placés pour aborder les questions européennes dans le débat national et susciter un débat public transnational à travers l’Europe (cf partie I). En octobre 2005, faisant suite à un appel du Conseil pour une réflexion sur la manière de faire progresser la réforme des institutions, la Commission européenne a adopté le “Plan D comme Démocratie, Dialogue et Débat”. Elle entendait encourager les États membres à organiser un large débat public sur l’avenir de l’Union européenne, en y associant les citoyens, la société civile, les partenaires sociaux, les parlements nationaux et les partis politiques, avec le soutien des institutions de l’UE. Elle a dédié un site internet à la mise oeuvre de ce plan D appelé "Debate Europe" qui permet l'organisation d'un forum de discussion avec les citoyens, il offre un cadre opérationnel permettant de nouer des contacts, d’entrer en relation et d’agir en partenariat. Les différents projets pilotes réalisés par la Commission, dans le cadre de son Plan D, ont confirmé l'existence d'une demande manifeste en faveur de mesures visant à renforcer et élargir le dialogue politique sur les questions européennes et que la démocratie participative peut compléter utilement la démocratie représentative. Le défi pour le Parlement européen consiste aujourd'hui à s’assurer que leurs résultats viennent réellement alimenter le processus de décision politique. 5.1.4. L'intervention directe des citoyens: le droit d'initiative populaire. Une des idées fortes et novatrices proposées dans le texte pour une Constitution européenne a été maintenue dans le projet de traité de Lisbonne: le droit d'initiative populaire. Ce droit permet l'intervention directe du citoyen dans le développement d'une nouvelle législation: un million de citoyens originaires de différents États membres pourront demander à la Commission de présenter de nouvelles propositions. Le Parlement aura un rôle important à jouer dans la gestion de cet instrument. L'analyse des initiatives qui procèderont de cette disposition du traité relèvera des prérogatives de la commission des affaires constitutionnelles. 5.2. Les instruments du contrôle, par le citoyen, de l'application du

droit communautaire.

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Si l'association des citoyens est essentielle en amont d'une proposition législative, il convient également de fournir des réponses à leurs interrogations sur la mise en œuvre du droit existant ou des recours en cas de mauvaise application par les institutions elles-mêmes ou par les Etats membres. Le citoyen doit pouvoir être en mesure de faire valoir son droit à une législation dûment appliquée et assurer en quelque sorte, un rôle d'alerte. On ne peut pas déplorer l'absence de solution ou instrument à disposition du citoyen européen mais plutôt leur multitude, qui rend le système opaque et ralentit voire empêche son bon fonctionnement. Ainsi, l'Union européenne offre une série de marqueurs, d'instruments d'alerte qui doit permettre d'identifier ce qui ne fonctionne pas ou mal. Les activités de la commission des pétitions et du service du courrier des citoyens du Parlement européen s'inscrivent évidemment dans ce cadre mais il est également nécessaire de tenir compte des autres instruments communautaires répondant à la même préoccupation, pour une meilleure appréhension de la question plus générale de la participation citoyenne à la mise en œuvre et au développement du système communautaire. 5.2.1. Assurer la cohérence des services d'information et de conseil. La Commission a mis divers services à la disposition des citoyens qui doivent permettre de fournir des renseignements ou de résoudre des situations dues à des incompréhensions ou une mauvaise application de la législation communautaire. Parmi ces services on trouve principalement: - Europe Direct: service d'information qui se décline en un numéro de téléphone, des bureaux de permanence partout en Europe et une adresse électronique; - l'Europe est à vous: informations pour les citoyens et pour les entreprises; - les Services d'orientation pour les citoyens: un service consultatif qui procure une aide et des conseils pratiques sur les problèmes spécifiques rencontrés par les citoyens dans l’UE et son marché intérieur; - les Euro infocentres: centres d'informations uniquement destinés aux entreprises; - SOLVIT: service conçu pour apporter des réponses rapides et pragmatiques aux citoyens et entreprises qui rencontrent des problèmes en rapport avec le fonctionnement du marché intérieur. Si certains de ses services ont un rôle bien défini, d'autres font double emploi et engendrent la confusion. Ces divers instruments doivent donc être articulés de façon cohérente pour obtenir un système plus efficient. L'amélioration de la ventilation des demandes entre les services compétents pourrait être un premier élément de réponse (en ce sens, il serait peut-être envisageable de créer un service européen unique de réception de toutes demandes en provenance des citoyens, qui serait chargé de l'orientation vers le service compétent). Une mise en perspective des activités de chacun de ces services par le biais, par exemple, de l'échange de synthèses de leurs activités pourrait permettre la contextualisation des demandes et attentes des citoyens et pourrait améliorer la cohérence et l'efficacité des réponses.

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5.2.2. Les canaux officiels de contestation directe: le médiateur

européen et la commission des pétitions. a) Le médiateur européen a pour mission de régler les cas de mauvaise administration dans les institutions et organes communautaires. Nommé par le Parlement européen, il lui présente son rapport annuel (qui fait, lui, l'objet d'un rapport de la commission des pétitions). Cette connexion étroite avec le PE en fait un instrument important de la citoyenneté européenne. b) La commission des pétitions: réduire les délais de traitement des pétitions et améliorer l'efficience de ses décisions. L'intérêt grandissant porté aux questions environnementales laisse présager un nombre croissant de pétitions dans ce domaine. Par ailleurs, si l'élargissement a déjà entrainé un accroissement du nombre de pétitions en provenance des nouveaux Etats membres, la progressive familiarisation de leur population avec le système communautaire laisse envisager une multiplication des recours aux pétitions lors des prochaines législatures. Début 2009, la Conférence des Présidents a entériné les propositions du groupe de travail mené par Dagmar Roth-Behrendt relatives à la commission des pétitions. Celle-ci sera "dé-neutralisée", et des modalités particulières de coopération renforcée avec les commissions éventuellement concernées au fond par une pétition, seront aménagées dès le début des procédures. [La dé-neutralisation pourrait avoir pour effet d'améliorer la visibilité et le poids politique des travaux de la commission des pétitions, les députés y siégeant ayant plus de temps à y consacrer]. • En ce qui concerne la coopération avec les autres commissions

parlementaires, une systématisation de l'envoi d'un avis-lettre par la commission concernée sur demande de la commission des pétitions pourrait, dans un premier temps, améliorer et accélérer le travail sur le fond. Les travaux de la commission PETI pourraient également être facilités par une collaboration plus étroite avec la commission JURI sur les questions d'analyse de la transposition de la législation communautaire. A ce sujet, la demande de la commission JURI faite à la Commission européenne pour avoir accès aux données de transposition dans chaque Etat membre serait également utile pour la commission PETI.

• Une étroite collaboration avec les services de la Commission est également

indispensable pour le bon déroulement d'une procédure de pétition. En effet, son issue dépend des démarches engagées par la Commission, dans un premier temps pour mener une enquête, par la suite, dans le lancement éventuel d'une procédure. Il semble quoiqu'il en soit que la Commission ait besoin de moyens plus importants à consacrer aux procédures de pétitions afin d'agir plus rapidement et d'assurer un suivi plus solide. Le Parlement pourrait envisager via un accord interinstitutionnel de mieux encadrer le suivi des pétitions, ne serait-ce que pour fixer un délai ferme pour les enquêtes et

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les réponses de la Commission, ainsi que déterminer les conditions dans lesquelles il pourrait contraindre la Commission à lancer une procédure (y compris le cas échéant une procédure en manquement contre un Etat membre).

• Par ailleurs, afin de ne plus être tributaire de la volonté et des moyens de la

Commission, le Parlement pourrait envisager renforcer sa capacité d'investigation autonome. La commission PETI peut recourir à deux types d'outils: la réalisation d'études (soit par les services du PE soit par des experts recrutés en externe) et l'organisation de "fact finding missions" (visites d'observation, utiles notamment en ce qui concerne les pétitions touchant aux questions de respect de l'environnement). Ces outils, les modalités du second étant à définir plus précisément, devraient permettre à la commission PETI d'obtenir une base factuelle donnant plus de poids à ses décisions. Dans certains cas, on pourrait même envisager que les conclusions d'une fact finding mission servent directement de base à une décision de la Commission.

• Le traitement des pétitions estimées non recevables. Nombre de pétitions ne sont pas recevables parce qu'elles ne relèvent pas d'un domaine de compétence de l'Union. Pourtant, le fait même qu'elles aient été présentées à la commission des pétitions peut être révélateur d'une attente vis-à-vis de l'Union européenne. Leur analyse systématique pourrait peut-être permettre de déterminer certaines des lacunes et des dysfonctionnements du corpus législatif communautaire et offrir ainsi une base travail pour la définition de certaines initiatives du Parlement. Claire GENTA

DIRECTORATE GENERAL FOR INTERNAL POLICIES

POLICY DEPARTMENT D: BUDGETARY AFFAIRS

Europe 2009 - 2019:

Analysis of forward looking trends in the area of budgets and budget control and choices which may flow from them over

the next two legislative terms

JUNE 2009

EN/FR

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Introduction 3

1. New forms of governance in the budgetary area 5

2. The multiannual financial framework (MFF) and budgetary reform: a way forward 9

3. The Implementation of EU funds and the evaluation of its impact 15

4. Valeur ajoutée européenne: mise en oeuvre des fonds de l'UE dans les États membres 20

INTRODUCTION

Europe 2009 - 2019: Towards a new governance in the area of budgets and budgetary control

The Secretary General has charged the policy departments to analyse how major policy issues could develop over the next 10 years and which policy choices may flow from such developments.

When looking ahead the point of departure is inevitably the current political reality, and the degree of projection necessarily depends on what the respective author felt comfortable with.

In the area of budgets and budgetary control the European Parliament could be faced with the following challenges:

In the area of budgets:

• The budget procedure could change drastically: the differentiation between compulsory and non-compulsory expenditure could disappear, with the Parliament and the Council entering into a co-decision procedure over the adoption of the annual budgets. Internally the Parliament will have to find new and effective ways of identifying and imposing its political priorities and, subsequently, pitch the first reading position at the right level. Parliamentary committees will have to be tied in at an early stage and kept informed, requiring a structured in-house dialogue between the Committee on Budgets and the sector committees. Conciliation procedures could become very complex as most of the sector committees may wish to be represented.

• The Multi-annual Financial Framework (MFF) could gain in importance or even become compulsory, offering on the one hand financial stability and reliability over years, while on the other hand limiting flexibility and the ability to respond. The Parliament could attempt to bring the MFF in line with parliamentary and Commission terms of office in view to increase accountability and democratic control.

• In future the Parliament could pay more attention to the often inherent link between budget and legislation. When legislation covers a multi-annual programming period, the global amount could serve as a reference for the annual budget procedures. At the same time it would be in the Parliament's interest to preserve the Budget Committee's "right of initiative" through the use of "Pilot Projects" and "Preparatory Actions".

• The Parliament could also continue to push for a simpler and fairer system of own resources which respects the existing ceilings and appears more comprehensible to European citizens.

• The Parliament could decide to further improve synergy between national budgets and the budget of the Union, starting maybe with joint budgetary debates. Synergy could imply the re-orientation of the European budget towards European-added value sectors like competitiveness, energy and commodity supply, promoting knowledge

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led service economy, research and innovation, and addressing security threats. Synergy could also imply rendering European and national budgets complementary, thereby highlighting the added value of common policies.

• The Parliament could address the question of budget unity which is raised by an increasing number of agencies and interventions by the European Investment Bank.

In the area of budgetary control:

• As approximately 80% of the EU budget is spend by and in Member States, while the Commission remains legally responsible for the budget execution, the Parliament may wish to look into the question of how to further strengthen Member Sates responsibility and accountability in the context of budget discharge. In this context the Parliament could decide to push harder for national "statements of assurance" and meaningful "annual summaries".

• The Parliament could continue to establish a structured dialogue among budgetary control committees of national parliaments, supreme audit institutions and it's Committee on Budgetary control.

• The annual budgetary procedures would benefit from taking into consideration the findings of the annual discharge procedures. In addition, timely monitoring of budget implementation could help to make effective use of limited resources and therefore serve as a useful reference during the annual budget procedures. As a consequence political links between the two committees would be strengthened.

• The Parliament could negotiate an inter-institutional agreement with the Council on discharge (such an inter-institutional agreement could also be part of a wider inter-institutional agreement on budgetary discipline and sound financial management).

• The Parliament could emphasise the "value for money" approach, underlining the effectiveness and added value of European funds. In doing so more attention could be paid to reviewing Commission's impact assessments and programme evaluations.

• In executing spending programmes irregularities occur, most of which are of administrative nature. However, with a view to better protecting the Communities' financial interests Parliament could continue to push for a reform of the European Anti-Fraud Office and the creation of a European Public Prosecutor's Office.

Christian Ehlers Head of Unit (f.f.)

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1. NEW FORMS OF GOVERNANCE IN THE BUDGETARY AREA

The Lisbon Treaty contains a number of innovations that are likely to have an impact on the budgetary affairs of the European Union. This note looks at challenges related to modification of the annual budgetary procedure - the multi-annual framework is dealt with in another note. This note also examines the possible consequences of a number of institutional innovations likely to have an impact on the Union budget. The various challenges identified are summarised at the end of this note. The main issues regarding governance of the EU agencies will be defined by the interinstitutional group on the agencies which was formed in late 2008 with a view to agreeing a set of possible solutions to problems identified by the end of 2010. In the meantime, the key challenge for the European Parliament will be in trying to ensure that the work of this group does not grind to a halt, mirroring the fate of the draft inter-institutional agreement on the agencies.

Annual Budgetary Procedure Currently the annual budget undergoes two readings in Parliament and Council before adoption by Parliament. The Lisbon Treaty simplifies the annual budgetary procedure, suppressing Council formal second reading with the introduction of one reading in each house followed by conciliation and subsequent endorsement or rejection of the conciliation results by Parliament and Council. The main challenge for EP will be in pitching the first reading position at the right level: the more ambitious the first reading, the stronger the EP bargaining position going into conciliation but the more difficult this position will be to achieve. The Guy-Quint Report1 considers that the resolution setting out EP priorities ahead of first reading will be of enhanced importance, and will act both as a guideline for the first reading and as a negotiating mandate. If agreement cannot be reached at first reading, a Conciliation Committee composed of the Members of Council or their representatives and an equal number of Members of Parliament has 21 days to agree a common text. The EP needs to consider the composition of this committee most likely to reflect the view of the institution as a whole and thus be acceptable to plenary. The Guy-Quint report suggests that the Conciliation Committee should consist of the chair of the Committee on Budgets (as co-chair of the conciliation committee), members of the Committee on Budgets and members of other parliamentary committees dealing with policy areas covering issues of specific concern for the budgetary procedure. The EP also needs to consider structures needed to help prepare the committee. The Guy-Quint report proposes the creation of an inter-institutional preparatory working party comprised on the EP side of the general rapporteur and representatives of the political groups and of the troika Permanent Representatives, supported by an interinstitutional

P6_TA(2009)0374 of 07.05.2009.

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committee secretariat. As well as agreeing the structures and their composition, the institutions will also have to agree working arrangements including chairing. Whereas currently the decision to move from the first to second reading position is taken in full transparency, in Budget Committee and in Plenary, under the new procedure the negotiation will take place behind closed doors in Conciliation Committee. The EP needs to consider how best to ensure that Members/Committees are properly consulted/informed and enhance transparency. Appropriate participation of both budget experts and members of other interested committees in conciliation negotiations will help. The possibility of setting up parallel discussions in the EP involving members of the Budgets Committee and of other Committees dealing with policy areas of particular interest in the budget negotiations might also help2 - although this might not be practicable given the very tight timetable. Once the Conciliation Committee has finished its deliberations, the compromise does not go back to the Budget Committee but straight to the vote in plenary. The plenary can vote only to accept or reject the compromise reached, except in the event that Council rejects the compromise reached by its representatives in the Conciliation Committee. In this case, the EP, in plenary has 14 days from the date of the Council rejection to decide to reinstate some or all of its first reading amendments, again across the whole budget. If such a vote should occur, a means of preparing the plenary within such a short time will need to be found. Regarding Council participation in the Conciliation Committee, the Treaty states that it ”shall be composed of the Members of Council or their representatives and an equal number of members representing the European Parliament”. The EP might also want to think about the size of this committee – the more Members of Council attend, the greater the size of the EP contingent and the more representative in terms of political groups and committees it can be. On the other hand, the smaller the Council delegation, the greater the chance of divergence between the agreement reached by the Conciliation Committee and Council. If every Member State is represented in the Counciliation Committee, it highly unlikely that Council would ever reject the agreement its representatives had reached in Conciliation Committee. Prior to the introduction of the new structures and procedure described, it may be necessary to find a means of managing the on-going budgetary procedure if it is already well advanced. A means of managing the various connected budgetary items eg transfers and amending budgets during the transitional period will also need to be agreed. Another major change to the budgetary procedure foreseen by the Lisbon Treaty concerns the abolition of distinction between compulsory expenditure (CE) and non-compulsory expenditure. The EP currently has last say over NCE, which accounted for 68% of the 2009 budget, and the Council over CE. Under the Lisbon Treaty, both institutions lose the power of last say and instead need to reach agreement on the whole budget. To date the EP has tended to focus its efforts more on NCE. Under Lisbon, the EP will have to take a position on the whole budget, which implies more complex in-house negotiations and a greater work-load.

2 See the note prepared by Johannes Lindner for the Committee on Budgets workshop of 27.3.2008 on The Role of the European Parliament under the Financial Provisions of the Lisbon Treaty.

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The conference of budget rapporteurs foreseen by the Roth-Behrendt Working Group on Parliamentary Reform could well play a very useful role in tackling a number of the issues raised above. Another issue resulting from the abolition of the distinction between CE and NCE concerns pilot projects (PPs) and Preparatory Actions (PAs). According to the Inter-Institutional Agreement on Budgetary Discipline, the EP, Council and the Commission all have access to the common pot of funds agreed for PPs and PAs. However, the EP has been responsible for the introduction of the majority of PPs and PAs adopted to date. PPs and PAs are a real chance for the EP to influence the legislative process – a significant proportion of them have resulted in modifications to existing legislative acts or adoption of new acts to continue the activities started. With the abolition of its right of last say over non-compulsory expenditure, the EP will lose its ability to impose its will with regard to the introduction of PPs and PAs. The EP may want to consider how best to ensure that its role in proposal of PPs and PAs is maintained. Institutional innovations The Lisbon Treaty contains a number of institutional innovations with implications for the Union budget: • elevation of the European Council to the status of institution,

• President of the European Council,

• High Representative,

• European External Action Service, comprising "officials from relevant departments of the General Secretariat of the Council and of the Commission as well as staff seconded from national diplomatic services of the member states",

• possible creation of the a European Public Prosecutor.

The size, scope and budget of these new structures is yet to be decided, along with the attribution of any such funding and discharge arrangements. The EP needs to ensure that it plays its part in giving its views on the various elements covered here. Its influence can be ensured through the various legislative and budgetary elements needed to implement the new structures: • modifications to the Financial Regulation (co-decision) ,

• Multi-annual Financial Framework Regulation (Council decision, EP consent).

The funding of at least some of these new structures is likely to fall to the Council budget. Since 1975 the EP and Council have had a "Gentleman's Agreement" not to modify each other's budgets. However, following the adoption of the Treaty on European Union and the inclusion of policy-related expenditure (in the fields of JHA and CFSP) into the Council Budget, Members have become increasingly concerned with the lack of appropriate democratic scrutiny. In the light of further developments in policy-related expenditure in the Council Budget resulting from the various institutional innovations described above and in particular the expansion of the scope and missions of the ESDP, the EP will need to consider the amount of information it needs to ensure appropriate scrutiny, and whether the Gentleman's Agreement is indeed still appropriate.

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In the light of increases in the size and complexity of EU funding, and the increasingly cross-border nature of crime, the European Parliament has pressed for the creation of a European Public Prosecutor. The Lisbon Treaty allows for its possible creation either by unanimous Council decision after obtaining Parliament's consent or, in the absence of unanimity, through a specific enhanced cooperation mechanism among at least nine Member States. In addition to the budgetary consequences of such a development, the EP will also want to review existing structures active in the fight against fraud, and in particular the role of OLAF. The EP will also need to decide which of its own bodies will be responsible for relations with the EPP and relevant legislation. Summary of challenges for the EP • trying to ensure that the work of the inter-institutional working group on the agencies

results in agreement on a set of solutions to problems identified

• deciding the appropriate pitch of the first reading of the budget

• deciding the appropriate composition of the budget conciliation committee

• deciding on the structures needed to prepare the budget conciliation committee and their working arrangements

• how best to inform/consult Members/Committees and ensure transparency whilst budget conciliation is carried out behind closed doors

• how to prepare a plenary vote on individual budget amendments within 14 days of Council rejecting an agreement of the budget conciliation committee

• deciding the appropriate composition of the budget conciliation committee

• finding a means of managing the on-going budgetary procedure if it is at an advanced stage when the new structures and procedures are introduced

• coping with the more complex in-house negotiations and greater work-load resulting from the need for taking a detailed position on the whole budget

• ensuring that the EP’s predominant role in proposing PPs and PAs is maintained

• deciding on the size, scope and budget of the new institutional structures included in the Lisbon Treaty, the attribution of funding and discharge arrangements

• deciding the amount of information needed to ensure appropriate scrutiny of any funding included in Council’s budget linked to these new structures, and whether the Gentleman's Agreement is still appropriate

• reviewing the role of OLAF if a European Public Prosecutor is created

• deciding on the relationship between the EP and the European Public Prosecutor

Fabia Jones

2. THE MULTIANNUAL FINANCIAL FRAMEWORK (MFF) AND BUDGETARY REFORM: A WAY FORWARD

Due to the significance of the budget reform, mid term review of current MFF, and upcoming MFF and to the rather foreseeable steps of the latter' preparation, the European Parliament (EP) already elaborated its initial position on the main milestones of years 2009 - 2016 (see section I). For this reason and also because of the extensive forward-looking analyses already carried out in this context, much of the material available in the present document comes from EP's reports3, while some other possible longer term and structural developments are presented in the second section below.

The note is organised according to the likely time horizon of the possible upcoming changes in the budgetary field, excluding those related to the Lisbon Treaty since this is the subject of another note from Policy Department D4. The first section deals with some institutional aspects and likely calendar for the mid term review of the current MFF and for the adoption of that upcoming, while the second covers emerging ideas likely to shape the possible content of the budget reforms by 2019.

2.1. THE UPCOMING MFF AND THE MID TERM REVIEW: BACKGROUND INFORMATION AND OUTLOOK FROM AN EP'S PERSPECTIVE

After an assessment of the use, since 1988, of an MFF from a Parliament's perspective, this section presents the mid-term review process and the main expected milestones in this field for the upcoming decade. It discusses then some specific issues in relation to the length of the MFF and the reform of EU financing system.

2.1.1. General assessment of the MFF Multiannual financial programming was set to get over the EU budgetary crisis of the 80s, during which the two arms of the budgetary authority could not reach an agreement on the budget in several instances. It helps to strengthen budgetary discipline and to ensure the continuity of EU multiannual programmes.

The 2007-2013 MFF included in the May 2006 Interinstitutional Agreement (IIA), while limiting to some extent the margins of budgetary manoeuvre for the EP through the setting of maximum amount of funding ("ceilings") in the EU budget each year for broad policy areas ("headings"), also provided for instruments giving some budgetary flexibility in order to cope with unforeseen events or specific financing needs (Solidarity Fund, European Globalisation Adjustment Fund, Emergency Aid Reserve, Flexibility instrument, financial instruments in cooperation with EIB). It also foresaw means and procedures to resolve possible tensions between the EP and the Council.

Indeed, the insufficient level of 2007-2013 MFF identified by the EP in 2006 led to difficulties already in the first year of application of the MFF (2007 during the preparation of 2008 Budget). Nevertheless, the Member States agreed to follow the way paved by the European Parliament and endorsed by the 3 For a more complete picture of EP's positions as at the end of 6th legislature, see the EP report on the mid term review of the 2007-13 financial framework and that on the financial aspects of the Lisbon Treaty. 4 It may just be recalled that its entry into force would among others: - render the MFF a legally binding act, - maintain the requirement that the Council should act unanimously when adopting the MFF, but allow, by means of a unanimous decision of the Council, a switch to qualified-majority voting, - only give the EP a right of approval and no genuine power of co decision, although the regulation laying down the MFF will have to be jointly approved by Parliament and the Council, under a special procedure.

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Commission to provide an appropriate Community funding for Galileo and the EIT, and later for the Food Facility instrument against soaring food prices in third countries, as well as to finance the EU contribution to the European economic recovery plan. These financing needs have been met through the mobilisation of the IIA instruments mentioned above, always following difficult negotiations with the Council.

Still, the MFF in general and particularly its headings 1a, 3 and 4 are widely acknowledged to be set at an insufficient level, notably as compared to the own resources ceilings set to 1.24% of EU GNI in payments (margins of EUR 36.6 billion in 2010, EUR 44.2 billion in 2011, EUR 45 billion in 2012 and EUR 50.6 billion in 2013). Besides, significant margins were also left each year below the MFF ceilings, notably in payments (EUR 8.3 billion in 2007, EUR 13 billion in 2008 and EUR 7.8 billion in 2009).

2.1.2. Mid term review and other expected milestones in the budgetary domain over 2009-2019

During the negotiations of the 2007-2013 MFF, some points like the financing of the budget and agricultural policy needed to be left aside to reach a final agreement. They were though covered by a review clause, being set to 2009 at the latest and involving the EP at all stages of the procedure. At the end of EP's 6th legislature, a number of uncertainties linked to the current political, economic and institutional context5 did not allow the EP to take detailed positions aiming at an ambitious review.

Still, in March 2009, the EP adopted its initial position on the mid-term review of the 2007-2013 MFF, which it considers as an important milestone aiming at addressing both new challenges and the above-mentioned unresolved deficits. The EP report reflected the achievements made so far and highlighted the deficits still existing, as a legacy from this Parliament to the next one, which will be responsible for defining EP's final position on the mid-term review.

At the level of the Commission, the next steps are expected to be following:

• presentation of a White Paper outlining the main orientations that should design the next financial framework at the latest in Autumn 2009, together with a report on the functioning of the IIA of 17 May 2006,

• possibly, proposals for the next MFF and IIA will be made by the next Commission in 2010.

These upcoming proposals, together with the mid-term evaluation of the ongoing legislative programmes, due in 2010-11, will naturally shape the interinstitutional dialogue and negotiations. Thus, this note should be read bearing in mind that some of the elements presented may become less relevant in the course of the intersinstitutional dialogue on the MFF and reform of the budget.

At EP level, the report on the mid-term review of the 2007-2013 MFF provided for in May 2006 IAA proposed the following three steps:

a) resolving deficits and left-overs in the context of the annual budgetary procedures, and assessment of the 2010-11 mid-term evaluation of legislative programmes,

b) preparation of a possible adjustment and prolongation of the current MFF until 2015/2016 in order to allow for a smooth transition for a system of an MFF of five years' duration which gives to each Parliament and each Commission the political responsibility for each MFF (see below), together with possible adjustments and prolongation of the current programmes in line with that of the MFF,

5 Relating to European elections, the nomination of the new Commission, the Lisbon Treaty ratification process and the political impact of the economic crisis and its possible consequences on the EU budget.

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c) preparation, by the Parliament elected in 2014, of the next MFF starting in 2016/2017.

2.1.3. What Length and starting date of the next MFF? In addition to various steps aiming at improving the quality, sufficiency and responsiveness of EU spending, the EP already called for an MFF of five-year duration. While possibly presenting downsides for the continuity of multiannual programmes, this would allow greater flexibility as compared to a seven-year framework, as well as the alignment of the MFF with EP's and Commission's terms of office, in view of greater democratic legitimacy and accountability.

In this respect, a possible prolongation and adjustment of the current MFF until 2015/2016 has been advocated by the EP, with due consideration of the mid-term evaluation of the ongoing legislative programmes, due in 2010-11. In order to allow for the budgetary procedure for 2017 to run already within the parameters of the framework that will be in force in 2017, the negotiations for the next MFF should be concluded by the end of the first trimester of 2016, while not beginning before mid-2014 to avoid that an outgoing Commission proposes a new EU budget to an outgoing EP, depriving the Parliament elected in 2014 of part of its budgetary powers. This is likely to set the very limited timeframe for the negotiations of the next MFF.

In addition to more democratic accountability, this alignment would improve and ease lawmaking for the considered period since the legislative and budgetary programming would be better synchronised. Legislative acts with budgetary impact would be foreseen in the MFF being under the political responsibility of the same Commission and Parliament. Indeed the preparation of the MFF, in both institutions, implies the consideration of the political priorities on the legislative side in order to ensure coherence between the institutions' priorities and their position on the upcoming MFF6.

As suggested by the EP in early 20097, this could be implemented by integrating the MFF into a comprehensive approach to interinstitutional strategic programming, with the new College of Commissioners submitting guidelines for the financial framework to achieve its political priorities for its term of office. The agreed programme and priorities for the parliamentary term would then be developed in the MFF.

2.1.4. The reform of EU financing system: state of play and way forward In line with the wording of Declaration 3 of the IIA on the mid-term review, the EP considers that there should be a link between the reform of revenue and a review of expenditure. The two processes are expected to be run in parallel with the aim of merging them in a global and integrated reform.

EP' current position on own resources was defined by its March 2007 report on the future of EU's own resources. Considering the complexity and various shortcomings of the system, it consisted in proposing a progressive approach which could be introduced in two stages. The first would lead to an improvement of the current system of national contributions, towards more equality, simplicity and solidarity. The second phase of the reform would create a new system of own resources, with the possible introduction of a genuine EU own resource.

While many Member States oppose the idea of an independent EU revenue-raising mechanism (or ‘tax’), the preliminary works conducted jointly by the national Parliaments and the EP before defining

6 This was for instance the case during the negotiations of the 2007-2013 MFF with extensive consultations of specialised committees by the Temporary Committee on Policy Challenges and Budgetary Means of the Enlarged Union 2007-2013 set up by Parliament on 15 September 2004. 7 Report on the impact of the Lisbon Treaty on the development of the institutional balance of the EU.

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EP's position resulted in the proposal that the EU benefits directly from a certain share of a tax, without increasing overall public expenditure nor the tax burden for citizens.

The reform of own resources is currently at standstill but the debate is likely to be relaunched in the early 2010s, as foreseen by the provisions on the mid-term review of 2007-2013 IIA. Another emerging idea is to consider in this context the new public resources created by EU decisions8.

2.2. POSSIBLE CONTENT OF THE BUDGET REFORM This section deals with the possible reform content for the EU budget. It should be noted that the existing position of the EP in this respect already includes some of the points below, which come from a selective review of the existing literature on the topic. These suggestions, aiming at making EU budget more responsive, better coordinating it with national budgets and changing its composition, may not take place in the current institutional framework, notably given the decision making process in this sensitive area but they may shape some reform proposals by 2019.

2.2.1. Making the EU budget more responsive In order to enhance and safeguard EU budget's effectiveness as one of the main policy tools to achieve the goals of the Union, it must be aligned with evolving policy challenges.

However, evidence shows that EU budget's structure and composition remain rather stable from one year to the next and it is often seen as a result of political trade-offs rather than a well grounded allocation decision to promote European objectives. National interests are still the key determinants of the outcome of the multiannual EU budgetary framework and the requirement of Council's unanimity to adopt the MFF is an obstacle to change. Academic literature mentions a 'status quo bias' affecting the EU budget. Possible ways to make the EU budget more policy-driven and focus it where the limited financial resources available can be used to best effect are presented below.

Instruments for more flexibility: more flexible instruments enabling quick decisions to support new initiatives and respond sufficiently flexibly and effectively to unforeseen challenges are all the more crucial that the MFF would have a legally binding nature under the Lisbon treaty. As an example, among the various instruments foreseen in the 2007-13 IIA, the Flexibility instrument covers clearly identified expenditure which cannot be financed within the limits of the MFF ceilings. Its maximal annual amount was set to EUR 200 million, but EP initially wanted to allocate it EUR 500 million a year.

Changing the negotiation process: another possible means mentioned in the literature to make the budget more responsive is to design the negotiation process in such a way as to clearly separate redistributive issues related to national net balance positions from specific EU policy priorities. This could be done through two-stage negotiations, the first stage being purely redistributive, while the second would be about the provision of public goods and other common issues. This could neutralise the bias brought by the focus on Members States' net balances.

A better implementation of EU priorities: budget review stipulates that the EU budget should be policy-driven. Indeed, it is small compared with national spending and can only add value if it demonstrates that it fills important gaps. It is a shared view among academics that the provision of EU public goods, such as defence, security and R&D, or the provision of goods with economies of scale - typically investment in infrastructure - is underrepresented in the EU budget. This is to be related to the widely recognized need for EU expenditure to present real European added value. Currently, the

8 Such as those coming from auctioning greenhouse gas emission rights or the fees received by the EU agency for the harmonisation of the internal market.

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strategic planning and programming (SPP) cycle tends to add one priority after another without taking any political decision as to issues that, given the strict limits of the MFF, need to be scaled down ('negative priorities') in order to give way to the more crucial priorities. The Activity based management / budgeting aims at a better match between priorities and resources but is still in a development phase and its implementation suffers from the inertia of budget allocations.

A stronger focus on delivery: another way towards more flexibility would be to systematically provide for a ‘sunset clause’, i.e. a mechanism whereby major spending programmes would expire at a predefined date unless their effectiveness and scope for extension are established. Another suggestion to improve the budget’s capacity to adjust is to systematically complement such sunset clauses with dynamic 'health checks' of specific policies.

This means setting-up or improving an appraisal system that covers both the ex-ante and ex-post evaluation of EU spending so as to better establish its effectiveness relative to the reported goals and possibly draw conclusions for subsequent budgets. In this respect, it is crucial to better integrate and streamline the SPP cycle so that the actual results of the implementation of policies and activities can be taken into due consideration when allocating human and financial resources. More and better evaluation of the implementation of the budget would lead to the need for change being articulated and, in turn, create more demand for change.

2.2.2. Synergy with national budgets A large part of EU's objectives are taken into account by the Member States in their national budgets. Budgetary coordination between Member States is both a question of macroeconomic efficiency, in the interests of the smooth functioning of the Economic and Monetary Union, and a crucial feature when it comes to assessing the achievement of common goals, such as EU's.

Being only a small part of the overall public expenditure in the EU (some 2.5%), EU budget can only address a limited number of issues and it should do so in conjunction with national public finances by acting as a facilitator or a lever on specific policies. This is obviously the case when cofinancing requirements foresee the budgetary participation of Member States in EU programmes and projects but also when the budgets at various levels concur to the same objectives, for instance those related to the Lisbon strategy.

This requires however harmonised tools and data for all 27 MS and the EU budget in order to make it easier to gauge the effort made by each one and identify fields where Member States' efforts need to be encouraged or complemented. For instance, such harmonised data show that public expenditure at EU and Member States for agriculture, whereas representing some 40% of EU budget, absorbs only 0.55% of EU GNI, as compared to 5.25% for education and training.

An emerging idea in this area is to organise joint budgetary debates between the national and European Parliaments, possibly first to raise awareness on the possible synergies between both governance levels and then to actually coordinate public expenditure in the various policy areas and for specific actions. This would render possible the establishment from the outset of a common framework for coordination of Member States' national policies, while also taking into account the Community contribution. This would for instance have been useful for the coordination of the European Economic Recovery Plan decided in late 2008, early 2009.

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2.2.3. What budget allocations? Even if the allocation of the EU budget is a highly sensitive question that can only be addressed by EU's highest political authorities, some contributions to the current debate on EU budget reform suggested the following criteria for EU spending:

• "European added value" of EU spending, based on subsidiarity and proportionality principles, notably to face the predominant challenge of globalisation through improving Europe's global competitiveness, ensuring energy supply, promoting a knowledge and service economy adapting to demographic trends through a balanced migration policy and addressing security threats, maintaining the social model.

• Priorities indicate widespread support for re-orientation with many contributions advocating reductions in spending on agriculture (mainly 1st pillar) and increased spending on research technologies, innovation and energy. Cohesion receives strong support despite diverging opinions on how it should be reformed, while putting emphasis on the reduction of regional disparities.

• Priorities identified by EP include Research and Innovation and new challenges such as energy security, climate change, citizenship, freedom, security and justice, the fight against organised trans-border crime and Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).

It should also be borne in mind that the accession of new Member States and new competences provided by the Treaty of Lisbon may necessitate a push upwards for the EU budget, ceteris paribus.

CONCLUSION This note aimed at presenting some of the challenges in the budgetary domain that will have to be addressed by the EP during the 7th and 8th legislatures. It was sought to describe their timing and nature, as well as possible ways for change and policy choices that will have to be made.

Among the latter, it is worth mentioning:

• How to get the budget and MFF levels up to forthcoming challenges?

• What instruments for an increased flexibility and for what amount?

• What length and starting date of the next MFF?

• How to foster and influence the reform of EU own resources system?

• How to make the EU budget more responsive to existing and upcoming challenges?

• What solutions for a greater European value added and effectiveness of the budget?

• How to better synchronise EU and national budgets for better delivery?

• What composition of EU budget in the future?

François Javelle

3. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF EU FUNDS AND THE EVALUATION OF ITS IMPACT

The main purpose of the implementation of the EU budget is to achieve the political objectives pursued by the Community programmes and instruments. These are defined, along with specific rules, in the regulations establishing the different instruments, funds, programmes. The Financial Regulation sets the rules specific to the EU budget. The Commission implements the budget on its own responsibility. The Member States must cooperate with it to ensure that the appropriations are used in accordance with the principles of sound financial management i.e. economy, efficiency and effectiveness, the latter one meaning that the wanted purposes are achieved. From this we see that any budget implementation is confronted with two main objectives: • proper and responsible spending of the tax payers' money and

• pursuing the objectives of the policies established for the sake of the citizens as a whole.

With this in mind we can address challenges associated with the implementation of the EU budget and formulate some priorities for the future. Value for money For any new action, it should be shown that the objective pursued is worth more, often even a multiple more than the value of the implemented money. At the end of the action, it should be shown how much the pursued objectives have been achieved. Of course it is not always possible to measure quantitatively the added value. But a qualitative evaluation should always be possible ex ante and ex post. This is facilitated by the Commission's "activity based budgeting" (ABB) and "activity based management" (ABM) allowing to better follow up the corresponding spending and other management activities in the different policy areas. However, for the sake of the interest and participation of the citizen as ultimate stakeholders of the EU policies, it is important to give much more transparency and prominence to what the EU is achieving by its spending. Therefore, it is up to the Parliament as representatives of the citizen:

• to push the Commission and the Member States for providing the monitoring, evaluation and publicity on the different EU activities,

• to contribute themselves to such monitoring and evaluation of the programmes and to the publicity to the citizen.

As assessment of the "added value" depends largely from the point of view of the assessing persons, and as the scopes of assessment are reflecting the different parts of society/citizens, it is important that assessment is not left essentially to the Commission and Member State bodies, thus assessing their own executing.

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Therefore it is important that the Members of the European Parliament have an efficient infrastructure at hand which assists them in assessing independently from the Commission the different policy activities. This does not only apply to the implementation by budgetary means of a policy. But having such efficient Impact Assessment infrastructure available in-house and empowered with a network of external experts, is also important already in the legislative stage when it comes to assess the Commission's legislative proposal or to assess the impact of amendments considered in Parliament. Whereas most amendments may be considered as of a rather "fine tuning" nature, some single amendment may have drastic positive or negative consequences. In such cases it would be good for the MEPs to have the opportunity of an assisting infrastructure providing the necessary input for their own assessment. This input could comprise an assessment of possible consequences of a measure/of an amendment, but could also comprise formulation of possible options together with an assessment of the probable budgetary, administrative, technical and other consequences. As our world is increasingly interconnected and complex, it is important to note that measures in one policy area may have substantial impacts in other policy areas; such possible impacts may not be apparent at once but come to light only in the course of the work. This suggests two consequences:

• it is important that the structure for assisting Members in impact assessment has, from the outset, an approach that is not limited to one policy area;

• committees that initially have not been associated with a legislative procedure, but where the

assessment work shows that the proposal has an impact in their own policy area, should have the possibility to express their opinion.

One could reply that this would slow down the legislative procedures and it is sufficient that the infrastructure assisting for impact assessment pronounces the possible consequences and options. This is however not adequate as not an assistant infrastructure is called to impose final assessments, but it is up to the elected Members to draw their final conclusions and qualitative assessment. Therefore, when it becomes apparent that options in one policy area have impacts in other ones, then it should always be the committee competent and expert in that other area, which should have the opportunity to pronounce their opinion (even if this was not foreseen at the outset of the legislative procedure). It must be reminded here that the objective is better law making, as an important tool also for better budget implementation, rather than having a big throughput of legislative acts. We do not need more rules but better rules. A major reason for the Court of Auditors having to report substantial quota of irregularities in budget implementation each year are not fraud or bad intentions but simply the fact that the rules imposed in many regulations are too difficult to apply formally correctly! Therefore it is important that in the future any legislative project and even amendment is checked :

• not only for its possible material impact in the policy area of its own and in other policy areas, but also

• for the administrative impact at the Commission and any other executing bodies, and

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• for the bureaucratic impact on any citizen, enterprise or other body confronted with the rules.9

Often it will be necessary, for enabling a proper assessment of the options and impacts associated with a measure, to organize additional consultations and hearings of experts and stakeholders. Where to take the time for these additional consultations and considerations? The additional considerations do not necessarily take much more time if access to the necessary information is available smoothly and readily. The necessary greater transparency and visibility must include the comitology committees. The EP can exert its "scrutiny" only if the information and documentation of the comitology committees is available completely and instantly. This implies that EP committee secretariats have sufficient staff available to cope with the comitology information to be digested timely for the Members. This "facilitated" scrutiny is also necessary for avoiding that in the comitology committees representatives of the MS governments take decisions at European level in an in-transparent way (allowing later on the governments to deny their responsibility but pointing the finger at "Brussels who has decided what the government has to execute".) Where to take the time for the necessary additional consultations? Not only comitology information must be made available to members more readily. Information from the different stakeholders can be solicited and made available more transparently, and why shouldn't parliamentary committee chairs not more often in regular committee meetings give the floor to experts and stakeholders, thus enriching and enlightening the discussion. Sometimes a short expert statement could avoid long discussions in the dark. Time could be gained also by initiating less but better law making. This may hold, last not least, also for the Financial Regulation. Although completely recast in 2002, and decentralising on DG level the budgetary management and control, it has seen a lot of amendments in the mean time, and it is nevertheless still not the only financial regulation as special rules apply in different areas, for agencies and for special funds. Therefore it should be carefully and diligently checked, also in the light of the findings of the Court of Auditors, how these rules can be harmonized, brought together and streamlined, but always bearing in mind that any amendment may affect the work of thousands of people involved in budgetary implementation. Accounting: for 3 years the Commission is using a new "accrual accounting" system, allowing to register not only when amounts of money are flowing but also when legal commitments are entered into. Virtually the system allows to reflect at any moment all assets and obligations of the Commission. Certainly this was am important step forward. But the job is not yet completely done, and the system is not yet developed and exploited to all its potential - possibly a challenge for more than one legislative period. But the work must not be delayed. The following questions should be checked: 9 Considering this may even influence the choice of the form of the legislative proposal. E.g. a well reflected regulation setting uniform rules in an area for all Member States may in some cases be more favourable to SMEs than a regulation (or, by its nature, a directive) leaving too much room for Member States' imposing specific rules so that the SME is confronted with different specific rules in different MSs. A small enterprise would have problems in coping with this type of diversity, non obstant any reasons in favour of "subsidiarity". It is finally a political choice to be taken on the form of regulation or directive, in the light of which options bring an "optimum" of positive impact for all concerned.

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How is the system reflecting the values of assets which, although a material asset may stay unchanged, its value is changing, e.g. in the wake of the financial crisis? How are the activities of the Commission in banking and granting of guarantees reflected in the accrual system? Shouldn't the system be further developed so that it reflects for all programmes implemented at various levels in the Member States, not only the top level of the amounts committed by the Commission but also at the lower levels, by the different implementing bodies, the status of the amounts? Couldn't such development and implementation, together with obligatory meaningful annual declarations of the implementing bodies at all levels, contribute to a positive declaration of assurance by the Court of Auditors? Isn't it urgent to use the system in a way that the billions of "RAL" (reste à liquider, i.e. money committed but not spent) become more transparent? In fact, also the billions of Euros of RAL are tax payers' money, and for all the years it is not spent for the initial objectives or as long as it is not de-committed and returned, it is dead capital - not really the incentive our economy needs. It is therefore important to look in detail into the RAL and how it is handled by the Commission, in the different policy areas. For the sake of transparency, and hopefully with help of the Commission's new and further developed accrual accounting, the different types of RAL, also those amounts "sleeping" at the various executing bodies, should be traced and chased. MEPs and their assisting experts should be vigilant in this area as by simple definitions and subtle actions large amounts of money may disappear from being "RAL" by its narrow definition but nevertheless stay parked for undue long time at executive bodies. Public interest disclosure The 2006 revision of the Financial Regulation, thanks to pressure by the EP, has achieved a rule on disclosure of information on beneficiaries of funds deriving from the Agricultural Funds. Such disclosure is favourable to detecting fraud and is therefore also useful as a preventive tool. Another type of disclosure in the public interest is disclosure by "insiders" who inform representatives of the public interest of substantiated or sincerely suspected evidence on fraud or other intentional irregularities. It is evident that honest "whistleblowers" risk severe reactions by the purpetrator of the irregularities. On the other hand, such whistleblower can give the essential information needed to stop the fraudulous activities which otherwise even by hundreds of additional auditors of the Court of Auditors or by investigators from the Anti-fraud office OLAF could not uncover. Therefore, protecting whistleblowers in the public interest can be a very efficient tool to uncover and also to prevent fraud. A CONT study has revealed that the whistleblower protecting rules currently in vigour at the European institutions are not effective, and it has identified as best practice the British PIDA Public Interest Disclosure Act of 1998. For the sake of protecting the financial interests of the EU which includes using the funds for the intended objectives, it would be worth while for the new Members of Parliament to engage for upgrading the current EU whistleblowing protection rules to the PIDA 1998 level, and even to promote their application in the Member States which are implementing 80 % of the EU budget. In any case, never must a body be allowed to punish a "whistleblower" for having informed MEPs.

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Another potential of improvement lies in the structure of the Court of Auditors The rule "one Member of the Court of Auditors" per MS has lead to a sort of hydrocephalus as every Auditor has its own cabinet and the bulk of cabinets absorb already a substantial part of expert staff. The rule of one Auditor per MS may give occasionally way to protecting his/her MS's presumed particular interests which may differ from the EU financial interests. The matter is subtle. It may mean a reluctance of naming (and therefore "blaming and shaming") in the Court's reports MSs or other bodies who haven't sufficiently implemented the budget. The impact of this impediment could nevertheless be tremendous as not sufficient pressure is exerted on the MSs to comply with all rules and to be more cooperative for achieving a positive declaration of assurance. Therefore here, too, is a field where MEPs can in the following legislative period actively contribute to reforming the Court of Auditors. Helmut Werner

4. VALEUR AJOUTEE EUROPEENNE: MISE EN OEUVRE DES FONDS DE L'UE DANS LES ÉTATS MEMBRES

Introduction Les questions posées par la gestion partagée d'une partie des fonds européens, le refus récurrent de la DAS par la Cour des comptes, la problématique des résumés annuels, des taux tolérables d'erreur et de la fraude au budget européen, la nécessaire réforme du Code de conduite applicable aux Commissaires européens, comme le rôle des Institutions en charge du contrôle, sont autant de préoccupations légitimes des citoyens européens, auxquels il convient de répondre par la promotion d'une bonne gouvernance, notamment d'une bonne gestion financière et d'une plus grande transparence, ceci en particulier en période de crise majeure. Relever ce défi ne peut que rapprocher les citoyens de l'Union et des institutions européennes.

4.1. LA VALEUR AJOUTEE EUROPEENNE DANS LE CADRE DE LA MISE EN ŒUVRE DES FONDS EUROPEENS DANS LES ÉTATS MEMBRES ET LA FRAUDE

4.1.1. La valeur ajoutée de l'UE des dépenses agricoles Une politique génère une valeur ajoutée lorsque les gains dépassent les coûts, non seulement dans le domaine de la mise en œuvre, mais également dans tous les domaines concernés. Le bénéfice final réel doit dépasser les bénéfices générés par des utilisations alternatives des fonds, autrement dit, les coûts d’opportunité. Néanmoins, la situation actuelle est loin d’être satisfaisante. Les réformes visaient avant tout à réduire les distorsions causées par la politique agricole sur les marchés domestiques et internationaux, plutôt que d’assurer que les politiques atteignent des objectifs efficaces et les besoins actuels. On peut considérer la situation présente comme une période de transition vers une politique nouvelle, mais sans orientation claire. Affirmer son souci permanent de lutter contre la fraude en matière agricole, suppose - et c'est un des préalables pour le public européen - que les États membres jouent le jeu d'une véritable transparence en ce qui concerne les bénéficiaires de la PAC; or, à ce jour, seuls sept États membres ont accepté de le faire. Nombre de pays sont réticents face à cette obligation de transparence, alors qu'ils sont d'importants bénéficiaires, arguant par exemple que l'obligation de diffusion des aides obtenues, constituerait une atteinte au respect de la protection des données privées. Dans les prochaines années, le PE devra en permanence, se montrer soucieux d'une plus grande transparence, comme de l'amélioration de l'optimisation des paiements directs de la PAC.

4.1.2. Développement rural et Fonds structurels (dépenses non-obligatoires) • En ce qui concerne le développement rural :

Le développement rural est en train de devenir un outil important du développement écologique et économique dans les zones rurales, mais il reste à déterminer s'il devrait s’étendre, afin d'inclure des interventions allant au-delà du domaine agricole.

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Une part substantielle du soutien pourrait avoir pour objectif de générer un développement économique sur une base 'territoriale’, tout en mettant l’accent sur des actions stratégiques qui génèrent une croissance endogène. Le programme Leader a démontré avec succès les implications positives d'une telle approche. De même le soutien du secteur agricole devrait avoir des critères d’éligibilité plus stricts pour éviter des frais improductifs. En ce qui concerne les paiements directs de la PAC, ceux-ci ont à l'heure actuelle une distribution non-optimalisée au vu des objectifs retenus et rechercher une meilleur valeur ajoutée rend nécessaire un meilleur alignement des paiements avec un objectif d'affinement et de resserrement des critères d’éligibilité, afin d'aboutir à une allocation efficace des fonds. Les paiements directs devraient être progressivement basés sur une analyse coûts-avantages et leur optimisation devrait libérer d'importantes ressources. Celles-ci pourraient être utilisées en faveur d’actions plus efficaces dans le domaine du développement rural. La recherche d’une valeur ajoutée de la politique de cohésion commence par la mise en place de politiques qui fixent correctement les objectifs à atteindre, avec l'utilisation de moyens et d'instruments adéquats: aussi le Parlement européen doit-il s'interroger sur le maintien et l'entretien d'un système de soutien basé sur des objectifs affirmés, avec des instruments qui ne sont pas conçus pour les atteindre.

• La valeur ajoutée européenne et les Fonds structurels régionaux Les difficultés de mise en œuvre des Fonds structurels dans la période qui a suivi immédiatement l'adhésion, 2004-2006, ont abouti à un faible taux d'absorption dans les nouveaux États membres. Pour la prochaine décennie (2009-2019), le Parlement européen devrait veiller particulièrement à ce qu'une amélioration significative continue d'être apportée au cadre juridique concernant la mise en œuvre des fonds, au cadre organisationnel (encourager une concentration de la compétence sur les Fonds structurels dans les ministères concernés), ainsi qu'aux ressources humaines (celles-ci restent insuffisantes, notamment en termes de formation). En prenant pour référence, les investissements des Fonds dans les infrastructures des nouveaux États membres, par exemple, on dispose désormais d'un recul suffisant concernant les statistiques. Aussi le Parlement devrait-il engager ou commander des études afin de savoir si, à la fin des périodes de programmation, les objectifs des programmes ont été atteints et s'il y a lieu ou non de les réviser par régions, avec pour souci une continuité des priorités politiques. D'autres difficultés devront retenir l'intérêt du PE pour les prochaines années, à savoir l'implication contestable des institutions financières dans certaines régions, avec ici le risque de connaître des conflits d'intérêt. Le Parlement doit aussi veiller à l'amélioration du contrôle grâce à des systèmes plus efficaces et des stratégies de renforcement des capacités de gestion. Il devrait aussi défendre l'idée d'une future programmation qui soit plus rigoureuse en ce qui concerne la concentration des ressources à un nombre plus limité de priorités. De même, le renforcement des mécanismes de coopération entre les acteurs concernés de l'Etat membre et les responsables de la Commission européenne serait fort utile afin de lutter contre les irrégularités et les fraudes. Enfin, le Parlement devrait poursuivre sa réflexion en ce qui concerne le renforcement systématique des moyens disponibles à tous les niveaux, l'intensification de la vérification de l'aide de l'UE, mais aussi réfléchir à la conception future de l'aide de l'Union.

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4.2. GESTION ET CONTROLE C'est au travers de la gestion partagée, des résumés annuels des États membres pour les fonds en gestion partagée, du rôle des Institutions Supérieures de Contrôle, de l'observation des taux tolérables d'erreur, de la fraude, mais aussi de la DAS (déclaration d'assurance) et du Code de conduite applicable aux Commissaires européens, que nous serons mieux à même de voir quelles sont les solutions proposées ou qui pourraient l'être par le Parlement et susceptibles d'être mises sur pied durant la période 2009-2019, avec comme objectif ultime le renforcement de la confiance des citoyens de l'Union dans les institutions européennes et leur fonctionnement.

Les résumés annuels (annual summaries)

Dans le contexte de la gestion partagée (shared management), il apparaît nécessaire d'évaluer la conformité, la valeur ajoutée et l'impact potentiel des résumés annuels (RA) sur les États membres et les autres parties prenantes au niveau de l'Union.

Cependant, après plus d'un an de mise en œuvre des RA, la Cour des comptes européenne (CDCE) considère que, «les résumés ne peuvent pas (…) être considérés comme une appréciation fiable du fonctionnement des systèmes de contrôle». La Cour attend aussi de la Commission qu'elle utilise les RA comme un outil pour identifier et promouvoir des bonnes pratiques parmi les EM et pour analyser le lien entre la conformité des systèmes et les critères définissant le niveau d'erreur acceptable, lequel vise à une meilleure gestion financière.

Une définition uniquement quantitative (critère coûts/bénéfice) de ce concept, ne paraît pas suffisante. Il doit aussi être défini en termes qualitatifs (risque en termes de réputation, intégrité d'ensemble d'une organisation, etc..). On peut aussi se demander quel pourrait être l'impact politique de la situation actuelle, sur la réputation de l'Union européenne, dans la mesure où rien ne changerait? Peut-on, d'autre part, envisager que la Cour des comptes présente une DAS positive, à partir de la vérification approfondie de quelques éléments précis seulement? Par ailleurs, la qualité des informations disponibles transmises par les États membres, à ce jour, n'est pas suffisante pour servir de base à l'établissement et à l'approbation d'un risque d'erreur tolérable fondé.

Perspectives: vers une déclaration nationale de gestion (DNG)

Si la raison d'être des RA est de renforcer la responsabilité et s'il continue à en être ainsi, il est dès lors nécessaire de changer leur forme, avec pour objectif à long terme de les transformer en DNG.

Un futur modèle de déclaration nationale de gestion devrait être étroitement lié avec ce qui suit:

a) Le concept du taux d’erreur tolérable (proportionnalité des contrôles), comme introduit par l'avis de la Cour des comptes sur le contrôle unique,

b) Les initiatives administratives et législatives ayant pour but de simplifier les règles complexes dans le domaine des dépenses structurelles,

c) Les aspects d’efficience et d’efficacité par rapport aux questions de la pure régularité,

d) Les différences culturelles, organisationnelles, juridiques et autres entre les membres de l’UE.

Enfin les fondations pour le modèle de DNG pourraient prendre en compte ce qui suit:

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a) Les DNG devraient faire l'objet de contrôles réalisés par les Institutions nationales supérieures et garantir la pleine indépendance des ISC,

b) Les DNG devraient être approuvées au niveau politique approprié avec un mandat clair du gouvernement.

Signalons cependant que le taux d’erreur dans le domaine de la recherche et du développement technologique a spectaculairement chuté depuis quelques années, dépassant à peine 2%.

Dispositions concernant l'audit

La mise en place des déclarations nationales de gestion signifierait que chaque Etat membre produise une prise de position des responsables sur la conformité des systèmes de contrôle ainsi que sur l’exactitude et la régularité des dépenses rapportées.

La Cour des comptes devrait évaluer la qualité d’une telle assurance et, dans la mesure du possible, la prendre en considération pour l'élaboration de sa DAS, puisque la prise de position des responsables audités constituerait une information.

Selon la Commission européenne, un grand nombre d’erreurs ainsi que des baisses d’efficacité des systèmes de surveillance et de contrôle sont le résultat d’"obligations juridiques compliquées ou imprécises". Aussi le Parlement doit-il engager la Commission à accélérer l’exercice de simplification. Les États membres devraient être astreints à apporter les améliorations indispensables à leurs systèmes de contrôle, "notamment par l’application des suspensions de paiement et des corrections financières".

ONG

Le Parlement a observé que les ONG sont de plus en plus nombreuses à jouer un rôle dans la gestion des fonds communautaires. Il convient de continuer à demander à la Commission européenne de revoir les subventions de fonctionnement aux sièges bruxellois des ONG et de les réduire progressivement conformément au règlement financier. La Commission doit aussi établir, pour la fin de l’année 2009, une liste complète des ONG percevant des fonds communautaires.

4.3. DAS: UNE DECLARATION D'ASSURANCE POSITIVE - 2009-2019: VERS UN CONTROLE BUDGETAIRE PLUS AFFIRME DU PARLEMENT EUROPEEN?

Au mois d'avril 2009, même si la majeure partie des dépenses budgétaires de l’UE ont été approuvées par le PE, celui-ci a décidé d’ajourner l’octroi de la décharge relative aux dépenses du Conseil de l’Union européenne, considérant que les dépenses administratives de celui-ci avaient pris une tournure de plus en plus opérationnelle; le Parlement a en effet estimé qu’il devait, par conséquent, avoir un droit de regard minutieux sur le budget de cette institution, montrant ainsi qu'il prenait ce dossier très au sérieux. Depuis 14 ans, la Cour des comptes n'a pas été en mesure de donner une DAS positive.

Aussi le PE demande-t-il:

• qu'une conférence interinstitutionnelle soit rapidement organisée impliquant tous les acteurs concernés par la gestion et le contrôle des fonds communautaires afin d’entamer une

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réflexion globale permettant d’envisager les réformes nécessaires à "l’obtention d’une déclaration d’assurance positive le plus tôt possible",

• que les États membres coopèrent mieux pour contrôler les dépenses de l’UE et le recouvrement des fonds dépensés en violation des règles,

• que le Conseil, comme les autres institutions, remette un rapport annuel d’activité au Parlement et que ses dépenses administratives soient soumises au même contrôle parlementaire que celles des autres institutions européennes dans le cadre de la procédure de décharge.

4.4. LE CODE DE CONDUITE DES COMMISSAIRES Pour le PE, l'efficacité et l'efficience du Code de conduite peuvent et doivent être encore améliorées et il s'agit d'en faire un instrument plus efficace dans le soutien à une conduite irréprochable et viser au renforcement de la confiance du public dans ce Code de la CE. Il faut que le Code soit en ligne avec les meilleures pratiques internationales et que la Commission montre son engagement politique et éthique. Aussi le PE doit-il demander:

• une amélioration des déclarations d’intérêt des Commissaires (dans leur forme actuelle, les déclarations ne permettent pas une analyse aisée des possibles conflits d’intérêts et une disponibilité "on line" de ces déclarations),

• une limitation de l’activité politique (nationale) des Commissaires, (le Code de conduite ne prévoit pas de critères pour examiner la disponibilité de service d’un Commissaire),

• un renforcement des exigences en ce qui concerne un emploi, suite à l'occupation d'un poste au sein de la Commission (les restrictions actuelles sont limitées à un an),

• une transparence renforcée sur les missions et dépenses opérationnelles des Commissaires,

• l'établissement d'une procédure transparente afin de résoudre les conflits d’intérêts, pour l'ensemble du collège,

• l'introduction d'un système de suivi et d’évaluation et l'instauration d'une supervision vis-à-vis du Président de la Commission.

Afin de gagner en crédibilité, le PE ne devrait-il pas en effet, encourager ses Membres à révéler leurs dépenses opérationnelles? Qu'en est-il d'un Code de conduite pour les Membres du Parlement? Plus que jamais l'institution doit en effet se trouver à la pointe des exigences en ce qui concerne le comportement de ses Membres. Elle doit être exemplaire et ce qu'elle est en droit d'attendre de la Commission européenne - comme ce que sont en droit d'attendre les citoyens de l'UE, de leurs parlements nationaux, comme du PE - celle-ci doit être en mesure de se l'appliquer à elle-même et dans des délais acceptables. Jean-Jacques Gay

DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR EXTERNAL POLICIES OF THE UNION

DIRECTORATE B

- POLICY DEPARTMENT -

FORWARD-LOOKING POLICY PAPERS ON

"EUROPE 2009-2019"

EXPO/B/PolDep/Forward looking policy papers "Europe 2009-2019" July 2009 PEXXX.XXX EN

Forward looking policy papers on "Europe 2009-2019"

AUTHORS:

Etienne Bassot Ana Caprile Levente Csaszi Sandro D'Angelo Dominique Delaunay Maria-Elena Efthymiou Georgios Ghiatis Stefan Krauss Pedro Neves Xavier Nuttin Jarmo Oikarinen Herbert Pribitzer Gerrard Quille Stefan Schulz Dag Sourander

LINGUISTIC VERSIONS

Original: EN FR DE ES according to authors

ABOUT THE EDITOR

Manuscript completed in July 2009. Brussels, © European Parliament, 2009.

DISCLAIMER

Any opinions expressed in this document are the sole responsibility of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the official position of the European Parliament.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION - Etienne Bassot ............................................................................................ 9

CHAPTER ONE: KEY POLICY CHALLENGES IN AN ERA OF GLOBAL INSECURITY .........11

GLOBAL POWER OR GLOBAL PLAYER: FRAMING CFSP AND ESDP IN 2019 - Gerrard Quille ..................................................................................................................13

GLOBALIZACIÓN Y DESARROLLO: DESAFÍOS, RESPONSABILIDADES Y OPORTUNIDADES - Anna Caprile.........................................................................................21

PROMOTING HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY - Jarmo Oikarinen ................................29

EU TRADE POLICY IN A CHANGING GLOBAL LANDSCAPE - Levente Csaszi......................37

LA POLITIQUE COMMERCIALE DE L'UNION EUROPEENNE ENTRE MULTILATERALISME ET BILATERALISME - Dominique Delaunay............................................................................47

CHAPTER TWO: REINVIGORATING OUR STRATEGY IN THE WIDER NEIGHBOURHOOD............................................................................................................55

ENLARGEMENT:

I. ENTRENCHED FATIGUE OR FULL STEAM AHEAD? - Georgios Ghiatis .............................57

II. REINTEGRATING THE WESTERN BALKANS - Herbert Pribitzer........................................65

TURKEY: INTEGRATING A REGIONAL POWER? - Sandro D'Angelo .....................................71

OUR EASTERN NEIGHBOURHOOD: DEALING WITH TRANSITION FAILURES - Dag Sourander ..................................................................................................................77

SÜDLICHE NACHBARSCHAFT UND NAHER OSTEN – ZUSAMMENARBEIT ZWISCHEN AMBITIONEN UND REALITÄT - Stefan Krauss......................................................................87

CHAPTER THREE: NEW AND OLD GLOBAL PLAYERS .....................................................93

CONSOLIDATING TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS: A NEW PARTNERSHIP FOR GLOBAL ORDER? - Stefan Schulz .........................................................................................................95

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THE 21ST CENTURY: ASIA'S CENTURY? - Xavier Nuttin ......................................................101

EUROPEAN UNION-LATIN AMERICA: TOWARDS A BI-REGIONAL STRATEGIC ASSOCIATION IN 2019? - Pedro Neves...............................................................................107

EU-RUSSIAN FEDERATION RELATIONS - Maria-Elena Efthymiou.......................................115

REFERENCES 120

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INTRODUCTION

Remarque sur la méthode

De nombreux travaux de prospective utilisés à l'appui de la présente contribution du Département thématique de la Direction générale des politiques externes ont été réalisés en utilisant la méthode des scénarios. Il été choisi ici de travailler sur la base de tendances existantes et supposées continues au cours de la décennie à venir: conflits gelés, évolutions démographiques, besoins en énergie, changements climatiques, émergence progressive de nouvelles puissances au niveau mondial... . L'évaluation de ces tendances permet d'envisager le contexte probable dans lequel l'Union européenne va évoluer au cours de la décennie à venir.

A côté de ces tendances lourdes, il est patent que des évènements brutaux ou des ruptures peuvent survenir. La 5ème législature a été marquée par les attaques du 11 septembre 2001 contre le World Trade Center et le Pentagone. La fin de la 6ème législature a coïncidé avec une crise soudaine du financement de l'immobilier aux Etats unis, qui a vite dégénéré en une crise financière et économique aux répercussions mondiales. De nature différente, ces évènements ont en commun de ne pas avoir été prédits par la plupart des analystes.

Des évènements brutaux ou des ruptures de cette nature peuvent aussi survenir dans la décennie à venir: il a été ici préféré de les intégrer dans une réflexion stratégique comme facteur de risque ou d'incertitude, plutôt que d'extrapoler sur des scénarios aléatoires.

Opportunités pour le Parlement européen dans le contexte global

Deux grandes tendances caractériseront le contexte global dans lequel le Parlement européen aura à opérer au cours de la décennie 2009-2019 (7ème et 8ème législatures):

- Un monde multipolaire. La confrontation est-ouest de la guerre froide avait généré un équilibre. Ce système d'avant-hier n'a pas été remplacé tandis que la globalisation de l'économie s'est imposée et que le monde est devenu progressivement interdépendant. Aucune des anciennes grandes puissances n'a la capacité - ni même sans doute l'ambition - de dominer à elle seule. De plus, les nouveaux acteurs globaux tels que sont la Chine, l'Inde, le Brésil, l'Indonésie rendent le système international plus hétérogène et moins marqué par la culture occidentale.

- La nécessité d'une gouvernance mondiale. Pour répondre aux défis globaux de la grande pauvreté, de la démographie et des flux migratoires, des changements climatiques, de l'insécurité, des désordres économiques, il faudra faire émerger une gouvernance mondiale. La globalisation requiert des règles du jeu et ces règles du jeu doivent être perçues comme légitimes pour être acceptées. Malgré les obstacles, une réforme des Nations unies reste cruciale. Les institutions financières internationales doivent être repensées. Enfin, il faut que l'OMC trouve les moyens de dépasser ses blocages.

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Au delà de la réforme et du renforcement des organisations multilatérales, il faut aussi constater l'importance du rôle des sommets tels que le G8 et le G20 dans la gouvernance mondiale même si la légitimité de ces sommets est parfois mise en cause - choix des pays participants, prédominance de l'intergouvernemental et absence de contrôle démocratique. Ces sommets qui regroupent des grandes puissances et des puissances régionales sont une expression du monde multipolaire actuel et peuvent prendre des décisions avec flexibilité.

En outre, les organisations de coopération ou d'intégration régionale, comme l'Union européenne, l'ASEAN et l'Union africaine sont aussi un niveau de coordination efficace pour répondre à des défis globaux comme la fourniture en eau ou en énergie.

Enfin, la coordination de ces différents niveaux de gouvernance est essentielle.

Le défi pour le Parlement européen : devenir un acteur incontournable.

Dans ce contexte global le Parlement a une position particulière, comme institution de l'Union européenne mais aussi en tant que tel.

Le Parlement européen a des atouts considérables avec les pouvoirs budgétaires, législatifs, de ratification des traités. Il a également acquis des pouvoirs de contrôle de la mise en œuvre des instruments financiers pour l'assistance extérieure. Cet exercice de contrôle qui a commencé au cours de la précédente législature devra encore être développé et ajusté pour être une supervision politique. En outre, le Parlement devra élaborer et mettre en oeuvre une méthodologie pour le suivi des missions PESD. Il peut également se faire le promoteur de la démocratie, y compris par le biais de l'observation électorale. Enfin, il devra adopter des positions politiques claires sur les grandes questions de politique internationale et développer ensuite une diplomatie parlementaire pour les défendre. A cet égard, un des enjeux interne au Parlement est de gérer sa propre diversité politique.

Ces atouts qui existent déjà, seront renforcés à court terme par l'entrée en vigueur probable du Traité de Lisbonne. Celle-ci aura des implications majeures sur l'action extérieure parmi lesquelles l'élection d'une présidence du Conseil européen, la nomination d'un Haut représentant de l'Union pour les affaires étrangères et la politique de sécurité, vice-président de la Commission, la création d'un service européen pour l'action extérieure et la généralisation de la procédure législative ordinaire (actuelle procédure de codécision) en matière commerciale. Le nouveau cadre institutionnel, s'il est adopté, restera vraisemblablement stable pendant les deux législatures à venir.

Enfin, dans le contexte global, le Parlement européen a une légitimité sans pareil. On sait que la légitimité est devenue un élément clé de succès dans les relations internationales. Le Parlement européen a intérêt à faire valoir sa position unique. Il est une institution démocratiquement élue qui représente un demi-milliard de citoyens. Mieux que le couple Commission/Conseil il est une institution qui transcende les intérêts nationaux. Enfin, il est ouvert sur le monde, reconnu aussi comme promoteur des valeurs de démocratie et de droits de l'homme au niveau global.

Cette position unique autorise le Parlement européen, au cours de la décennie à venir, à prétendre influencer les changements au niveau global plutôt que les subir. C'est le principal résultat des travaux présentés ci-après.

Etienne Bassot, Chef d'unité

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CHAPTER ONE:

KEY POLICY CHALLENGES IN AN ERA OF GLOBAL INSECURITY

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GLOBAL POWER OR GLOBAL PLAYER: FRAMING CFSP AND ESDP IN 2019 - Gerrard Quille

The area of Security and Defence under the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) is perhaps the outstanding strategic policy area to be developed by the European Union over the next 50 years. Whilst the current mood reflects one of geopolitical insecurity and the impression of an overwhelming range of conflicts and challenges to address, a structured debate can help focus European minds on a limited number of regional priorities. This was not achieved in the 2008 review of the implementation of the European Security Strategy. Therefore addressing this short-fall by developing a process to define strategic interests will help the EU to identify key priorities upon which it can focus its comprehensive, even if limited, resources. Such a process will also help European institutions, parliaments and the Member States to achieve a greater unity of purpose and, through a broader debate, achieve public legitimacy for the EU's role in responding to geopolitical trends. This paper concludes with suggestions that would help structure such a strategic reflection and reinforce the trend whereby the European Parliament (increasingly in the presence of National Parliaments) has become the key "public space" where the EU's external relations are debated and where broader public legitimacy is sought for responding to the global challenges.1

The key strategic debates on the agenda of the European Parliament during the period to 2019 will address the role of the EU in a period of strategic flux where challenges are shifting from the Balkans and Southern Neighbourhood to the East and South (and with climate change the arctic area will attract further strategic interest in the North). In particular debate will focus upon the role of the EU in easing anti-western tensions in the Middle East and in particular in addressing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; the prospects and challenges in normalising relations with Iran; responding to the emerging Afghanistan-Pakistan regional security complex; and in pursuing the new window of opportunity provided by the new Africa-European Union Strategic Partnership. Although this note concentrates on the security policies of the European Union, NATO is referred to throughout. This reflects a growing consensus that both the EU and NATO can provide complimentary frameworks for the Member States to pursue their common security and defence objectives such as in coordinated capability development and side-by-side in Afghanistan, Kosovo and the Gulf of Aden.

MAJOR TRENDS, CHALLENGES AND THREATS

1. Institutional Drivers2

European defence matters were discussed primarily within NATO during the Cold War.3 Nevertheless, the desire to discuss foreign affairs and defence matters amongst Europeans remained and achieved a major breakthrough in 1992 with the creation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and a commitment to "the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence."4 This process represented the 1 The trends presented here sketch global security concerns to 2019, as such they are general in nature and skirt over

local conflict dynamics and human insecurity in many parts of the world. 2 For a detailed overview see: Howorth, J., “Security and Defence Policy in the European Union”, Palgrave, 2007; Quille, G.,

Timeline in the development of ESDP, Policy Department DG EXPO (forthcoming), 2009; Nickel, D. & Quille, G. “In the Shadow of the Constitution: CFSP/ESDP adapting to a changing external environment”, Jean Monnet Working Paper, No. 2, 2007.

3 Following the rejection of a proposal for a European Defence Community by the French Assemblée Nationale in 1954. 4 TEU, article 17 para 1

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externalisation of what had until now been an internal project for the promotion of peace and economic prosperity on the continent of Europe.

Despite criticisms levelled at Europeans for their failure to handle the Balkan Wars, the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty reconfirmed the ambitions of 1992 and introduced important innovations such as the position of High Representative for CFSP. Defence ambitions were expressed in modified language in the commitment to "the progressive framing of a common defence policy.....which might lead to a common defence, should the European Council so decide."5 At the same time operational ambitions were introduced in the form of the so-called Petersberg Tasks which amounted to a commitment to crisis management (not excluding intense military commitments) on a scale that would allow Europeans to handle any future Balkan-type scenario.

In 1998, the UK and France struck a compromise on how to activate the commitments made at Maastricht and Amsterdam and thereby revitalise European defence in order to manage conflicts in its neighbourhood and elsewhere.6 This confirmed that the EU would focus upon "progressive" steps to create credible forces whilst ambitions for a common defence policy would remain a longer-term objective. This was the context for the creation of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) at the 1999 Cologne European Council. The pending Lisbon Treaty confirms this trend where a new chapter on a Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) - the new name for ESDP – lists the incremental developments already achieved under ESDP and leaves the objective for the creation of a Common Defence Policy for a future decision. Therefore ESDP (or CSDP) will remain the focus for discussing European defence matters throughout the period to 2019.

2. Geopolitical drivers

Geopolitical trends can have a substantial impact upon security policy issues. For instance, the break up of Yugoslavia and the Balkan Wars were clearly part of the major geopolitical changes at the end of the Cold War. The September 11th 2001 "shock" brought about by the attack on the Twin Towers in New York, unleashed new geopolitical trends that have included the invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq. These trends have had a profound effect on European security and the way Europeans shape their policy responses. In addition, other trends have accelerated such as the new global financial and economic crisis.

2.1. Shaping the rules of a Multipolar World

Some experts in Europe and the United States seem to agree that during the next two decades the international system will move away from a US unipolar world towards one of multipolarity.7 This will not be a linear trend and it will extend well beyond the period to 2019 but it will be a key element shaping all policy decisions including those on security. The ability of Europeans and the United States to shape any new international architecture will be a key determinant in the transition from pax Americana to a multipolar world, potentially, overseen by a new pax Transatlantica.

5 Ibid. 6 Franco-British Summit. Joint Declaration on European defence, 4 December 1998, St Malo, France. The compromise

included a call for the EU to develop "the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises."

7 Grevi, G., "Scanning the future: American and European perspectives", ISS Policy Brief, EU ISS, December 2008. National Intelligence Council "Mapping the Global Future 2020", Government Printing Office, December 2004. National Intelligence Council " Global Trends 2025", Government Printing Office, November 2008 and Gnesotto, N., Grevi, G., "New Global Puzzle", EU Institute for Security Studies, Paris, 2006. The author of this paper has taken part in discussions surrounding a number of these exercises and draws on that experience in identifying the following general trends.

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2.2. Asia, the Middle East and Africa

Analysts also agree that the economic centre of power will continue the general shift from West to East. This has already affected US military strategic considerations and force deployments will continue to move from Europe towards and around Asia. China and India are upgrading military force projection capabilities in the naval and air force sectors. Meanwhile, Russia seeks to renew military naval facilities in energy-rich Algeria and Syria as well as reasserting its influence through Central Asia.8 If one adds the existing or planned oil and gas pipelines across Central Asia and the Middle East one can see an interesting correlation between changing strategies for the location of military bases, power projection capabilities and energy interests. In addition, military expenditure continues to grow whereby between 1999 and 2008 US military spending has increased 45% and, although relatively still far lower than the US, during the same period that of China and Russia has almost tripled.9 According to SIPRI India, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Israel, South Korea, and Algeria also made substantial contributions to the total increase in military expenditure in 2008. 10

The rise of Asia as an economic power is clearly important to international trade, and Central Asia will remain of particular importance to the European Union. Not only is it a source of and transit route for important energy supplies but instability in this region, including crucially Afghanistan, can have a regional spill over effect on Europe’ security. Successful handling of the Afghan/Pakistan conflict will therefore remain a strategic priority for the EU during this period. The Middle East remains a region of close strategic importance to the European Union and any break-through in the peace process will require EU support. Strategic threats such as nuclear weapons and their further proliferation in Asia and the Middle East shall remain of high concern to the international community as a whole. Instability in Africa can have similar consequences (regional turmoil, uncontrolled movement of goods and people) on Europe's southern borders. Public opinion in the face of humanitarian tragedies also remains a pressure on European governments to respond to developments on this continent. In addition, long-standing relations between Europe and Africa will see the deepening of the Africa-EU Strategic Partnership during this period.

2.3. Regional Security and Terrorism (or aftermath of 9/11)

This period will also be one where the European Union will be active in managing the fallout from 9/11 including fighting international terrorism and regional conflict dynamics triggered by the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. Older enmities will play into these regional security complexes where Iran’s decision to play the role of spoiler or to normalise its relations with Europe and the United States remains a major incognito. Protracted conflicts in strategic places such as the Middle East and Central and Southern Asia will also be on the agenda of the European Union in particular where they affect trade and energy flows as well as the strategic communications routes i.e. Global Critical Infrastructure.11 The period to 2019 will be characterised by regional security challenges from the Middle East to Central and South Asia as well as in Sub-Saharan Africa and ongoing challenges of local terrorism inspired by global ideologies such as Al Qaeda. Groups disenfranchised from globalisation may also pose a threat to the international system.

8 Rogers, J., & Simon, L., "The status and location of the military bases of the Member States of the European Union and

their potential role for ESDP", Policy Department, DG EXPO, March 2009. 9SIPRI Yearbook on Armaments, Disarmament and International Security, OUP, 2009. See:

http://www.sipri.org/media/press_event/media/pressreleases/8june_yearbook_launch 10SIPRI, see: http://www.sipri.org/media/press_event/media/pressreleases/8june_yearbook_launch 11This includes the protection of important sea-lanes (in particular through the straits of Malacca, and from the Suez

Canal to the Gulf of Aden and off the coast of Somalia); strategic air corridors; and cyber-space (including space based as well as terrestrial capabilities).

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2.4. International organisations

How the international community responds to these trends is triggering a debate about the role and appropriateness of international organisations in channelling our national interests and shaping our collective responses. For instance the resurgence of Russia in the Caucasus (from Chechnya to Georgia) is part of a longer-term trend where it appears to be rejecting the values of democracy, non-aggression and human rights. As a consequence Russia appears to be turning its back on organisations such as the OSCE and Council of Europe and has started to build new political alliances, including with China, in particular the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and a military alliance in the form of the Comprehensive Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO).12

The fate of old and new international organisations is also relevant for the European Union as it develops partnerships. Established bodies such as in the UN system, sometimes perceived as moribund, are facing stiff competition from newer often more flexible international arrangements such as the G8, G20 and in the security domain the Proliferation Security Initiative, and Regional Economic and Political Organisations. In some cases the EU has invested political, financial and human resources in forging partnerships (like the EU support to the African Peace and Security Architecture) to promote the development of peaceful, stable and economically prosperous regions. Progress should start to become evident towards the end of the period to 2019.

The recent global financial and economic crisis has also affected the confidence of elite clubs, such as the G8, that had been setting economic and increasingly security and development priorities for the world. A growing awareness has developed that rising powers such as China, India and Brazil need to be included to encourage them to follow the rules established by the club members. The speed and scale of the recent crisis has accelerated this trend with a shift away from the G8 to the G20 and the prospect of an overdue reform of the global international financial institutions (IFIs).13 These trends will continue and become more prominent throughout the period to 2019.

3. European civilian and defence drivers

In order to respond to ongoing strategic trends NATO and the EU have developed decision-making frameworks and policy processes to help their Member States to transform their Cold War defence establishments to meet the new global challenges. However, defence transformation takes place at a slower rate than is required to respond to the rapidly evolving geopolitical trends and a global security system that is in flux. This is compounded by a continuing decline in the defence budgets of the individual EU member states and a more recent increase in operational demand upon our armed forces (from approx. 65,000 to over 80,000 deployed troops). Other telling statistics highlight that most of the EU's security burden sharing is uneven with defence spending falling on a very few Member States. Officially we talk about rationalising, synergising, transforming or getting "more bang for our euro", but the trend over almost 20 years since the end of the Cold War has been declining budgets and greater and more dangerous operational demands. 14

In the civilian area we have also seen growing operational demand for police, judges, and civilian administrators. However, at the national level such experts work daily for our national needs and are not standing around in vast numbers waiting to be parachuted to various part of the world. Beyond considerations of financial resources, there is a need to create legal frameworks where national civilian experts can take part in international civilian crisis management missions and be

12The latter appearing to be designed more in the image of ESDP with a focus upon crisis management rather than the

scale of a military alliance such as NATO. 13Interestingly the first major international tour by the US President led him to address consecutive meetings at the G20

in London, NATO in Strasbourg and Kehl and the EU Summit in Prague. 14

For more data and tables see www.sipri.org and www.iiss.org.

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guaranteed a stable career or to be reintegrated back intro his /her civilian employment at the end of an assignment.

EUROPEAN RESPONSES AND PROSPECTS TO 2019

1. Responding to the global policy trends

1.1. The European Security Strategy

The publication in December 2003 of a European Security Strategy (ESS) occurred during a period of strategic flux as Europeans adjusted to the aftermath of 9/11. The document has become a key reference point in all European Council and Commission documents in the field of external relations and as such has a significant strategic impact.

The emphasis in the ESS upon "effective multilateralism" was a deliberate move to distance itself from the "unilateralism" pronounced by the US and associated with the invasion of Iraq. Nevertheless, although a difference of accent was placed on the method of pursuing security objectives, the five threats and challenges identified were similar to those of the United States.15 In addition, the ESS also had similar characteristics with other documents including NATO's Strategic Concepts (1991 and 1998).

In essence the European Security Strategy reflected and, importantly, tailored this inherited strategic culture to the specificities of the European Union. This is most clearly evident by the way security responses are not solely militarily but they are first and foremost civilian using the EU's economic, trade and diplomatic leverage and to be supported by military crisis instruments as a last resort. The message is one of projecting stability rather than force, which is also in tune with the EU as first and foremost an economic, trade and development actor. Nevertheless, military and civilian crisis management instruments are seen as key policy responses to ensure stability in the neighbourhood and project stability further afield in the form of concentric circles. Our economic and trade interests are global and this is also reflected in our security ambitions.

1.2. EU Security Architecture: decision-making and the first Crisis Management Operations

The decision making framework developed since 1999 has been complemented by operational experience that confirm the EU can be used as a framework for developing defence, crisis management and security responses to address aspects of the global trends. The three general levels of the framework for responding to global trends include:

• decision-making apparatus and structures based around the Political and Security Committee(PSC). The Member Stats are represented by Ambassadors in the PSC and supported by military and civilian experts;

• ESDP operations - 23 complete or ongoing missions (17 of which are civilian crisis management operations). 16

• capability development process structured (from 2004) around the European Defence Agency and complemented more recently by efforts to extend the internal market to defence in the form of two Directives on intra-community transfers and defence procurement.

15The key threats and challenges identified were international terrorism; the proliferation of materials and weapons of

mass destruction; failed states; organised crime; and regional conflict. 16Important ongoing military missions include, inter alia, Bosnia (Althea) and Somalia (Atalanta) and major civilian

missions Kosovo, Georgia and Afghanistan.

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2. Responding to the defence trends

On paper the European Union has significant defence resources (approx. 200 billion euros a year and there are approx. 2 million men and women in uniform). However, declining (or static) defence budgets and growing operational demand is creating greater pressure on the EU (and NATO) to help achieve access to key enabling capabilities - triggering the resurrection of ideas for multi-national solutions such as pooling, sharing, specialisation, and joint procurement - including in the areas of strategic lift (eg A400M), tactical lift (eg helicopters), C4ISR (eg deployable headquarters, earth observation and telecommunications satellites, unmanned aerial vehicles etc), logistics, and so on.

Economic pressures also create a role for the European Union, where the question asked is whether the success of the internal market can be instrumentalised to help Member States transform their defence industrial base? A partial response can be seen in the current trend towards the creation of an internal market for defence products in initiatives such as the European Defence Agency's Code of Conduct on defence procurement or the two Directives on intra-community transfers and defence procurement. The European Parliament and Member States in the Council adopted the two directives, marking the first legislation in the area of the defence market and, by extension, of the ESDP.

As European defence capability continues the slow trajectory of transformation, other strategies have been developed to respond to global challenges. This includes, in Europe a realisation that military force alone is inadequate to meet the challenges of today and an accent has also been put on developing Civil-Military Concepts and Civilian Crisis Management capabilities. The latter is generally seen as the EU's most innovative and potentially effective contribution to meeting global challenges. Whilst ideological debates continue about whether the EU is complimentary or competitive to NATO, the simple self-interested truth is that no Member State can address the global challenges alone and that they need to work together and increasingly pool their military and civilian capabilities. The UN, NATO, and EU will be preferred frameworks for certain situations, increasingly all three will be used simultaneously as the biggest international challenges, eg Kosovo and Afghanistan, require a mix of different skills and policies - the challenge to 2019 will be to ensure such actors work with unitary purpose and action!

Early examples of the EU's potential to apply a comprehensive “toolbox” of political, economic, development and crisis management instruments include:

DRC where the Military “EUFOR” mission was funded by the Member States directly and through the Athena mechanism; the Civilian missions EUPOL and EUSEC are funded from the EU’s CFSP budget; and development assistance has also been provided for broader post-conflict socio-eco development.

Chad/CAR the military mission was funded by Member States directly and through the Athena mechanism; the Instrument for Stability (IfS) supports the UN Fund to train Chadian gendarmes to protect Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) and Refugee camps (Minurcat); as well as post conflict socio-economic development from the European Development Fund.

The recent Operation “Atalanta” off the coast of Somalia also combines a humanitarian concern to protect World Food Shipping and the protection of significant global commercial shipping interests through the Gulf of Aden i.e. protecting global critical infrastructure.

The ability of the European Union to respond to such security threats and challenges will require ongoing support from the European Parliament as a political and budgetary actor.

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3. A financial framework for civilian responses?

Military crisis management is funded by the Member States (directly or through the Athena mechanism) and this is not expected to change even if the Lisbon Treaty has introduced language on a "Start up fund" under CFSP. The financial trend at the EU level in support of civilian crisis management offers greater potential. For instance, since 2003 when the CFSP budget averaged around 40 million euros a year it has now grown to 285 million in 2008 and is expected to grow further by the end of the Financial Perspectives to approx. 400 million euros in 2013. The European Parliament has been consistent in demanding a CFSP budget commensurate with the ambitions of the European Union. In addition operations in Kosovo and Afghanistan are of a size and political commitment that requires new thinking about their long-term financing. The European Parliament will be instrumental in designing appropriate financial architecture over the period to 2019.

4. European Security Strategy II or strategic inertia?

During 2008 following proposals from the French President a review process was carried into the "implementation of the ESS". However, the "review" process clearly had a more limited objective and lower political profile within the institutions and amongst the Member States than in 2003. It therefore reflected more a strategic inertia in European and institutional thinking brought on by the stalled Lisbon Treaty, the security realities in Afghanistan as well as uncertainty about security trends including the global financial crisis. It was therefore a missed opportunity. The result was a rather disappointing document adopted by the European Council in December 2008 focussed upon "reviewing the implementation of the ESS". A shopping list approach saw new threats being added (including cybercrime and climate change). A number of observers, including in the European Parliament, called for a more ambitious root and branch review of European security. 17

The general disappointment with the process and outcome of the 2008 exercise was accompanied by a growing feeling that a public debate was necessary and the Council clearly called upon all European institutions, including the European Parliament, to take up the challenge because: “Maintaining public support for our global engagement is fundamental. In modern democracies, where media and public opinion are crucial to shaping policy, popular commitment is essential to sustaining our commitments abroad. We deploy police, judicial experts and soldiers in unstable zones around the world. There is an onus on governments, parliaments and EU institutions to communicate how this contributes to security at home”.18

EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT'S ROLE

1. Shaping the debate and framework for defining European Security Responses

The European Parliament is fulfilling its role by providing political consensus behind the decisions of the Member States as well as fulfilling its treaty responsibilities over CFSP/ESDP. Whilst political choices remain to be made, below are some initial reflections on policy options for structuring the current debate in order to help define European responses to global trends over the period to 2019.

2. Policy Options

2.1. European Security Strategy Review: every five years. A regular process to review the European Security Strategy and generate a public debate on security and defence. The process and structure of such a review has been elaborated in recent Reports (Kuhne and von Wogau) of the European Parliament on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy and ESDP. A regular strategic

17P6_TA(2009)0075 European Parliament resolution on the Implementation of the ESS and ESDP, 19 February 2009. 18S 407/08 Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy, 11 December 2008, p.12.

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reflection (for instance every 5 years or in response to a major strategic shock) would address the missed opportunity of 2008 and respond to Member States demand for all institutions and parliaments to play a greater role.

2.2. Parliamentary legitimacy and scrutiny of ESDP: Adopt Resolutions/Recommendations before the decision to launch or deployment of each Civilian and Military ESDP mission;

2.3. The power of the purse:

• Ensuring coherence between political priorities and across the financial instruments (CFSP; IfS, DCI, ENPI and EIDHR) in external relations.

• Review of the 2006 IIA to ensure adequate CFSP resources responding to global ambitions.

• Through the mid-term review but in particular for the next Financial Perspectives ensure mechanisms for stricter assessment of coherence between CFSP/ESDP actions and geographic and thematic instruments.

• Prepare with National Parliaments for the budgetary implications of the Lisbon Treaty (in particular the start-up fund under CFSP) and ensure greater transparency in reporting on ESDP military crisis management operations and capability development processes in the framework of the EDA.

2.4. Military and Civilian Capability Development: Build consensus for a new process that reviews the existing capability development structures. Ideas have been put forward including for example that by the Chair of SEDE for a process to develop a European White Book which should be a public document based on a broad debate defining the common interests of the EU, the threats against these interests and how to face them, and making concrete proposals (to be followed) concerning the civilian and military capabilities needed by the EU to face the threats and to assert its role a global (or major) actor on the world stage.

2.5. Internal Market and Security Research: Continue monitoring and supporting initiatives that complement the Member States efforts to restructure the defence industrial base and develop capabilities for crisis management. In particular actively play its role as defined in the two Directives on Intra-Community Transfers and Defence Procurement and monitor areas for further improvement.

2.6. Monitoring and Evaluation of ESDP: Development of an inter-institutional lessons learned process for ESDP operations and include a mechanism to share with National Parliaments.

2.7. Pursuing "coherence and unity of action" in external relations: The European Parliament is uniquely placed to use its scrutiny and budgetary instruments to support Member States and European institutions in their declared objective to be more coherent actors in external relations. Improving coherence between ESDP actions and other policy areas should be addressed.

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GLOBALIZACIÓN Y DESARROLLO: DESAFÍOS, RESPONSABILIDADES Y OPORTUNIDADES - Anna Caprile

Nos enfrentamos, probablemente, a la primera gran crisis del mundo globalizado, con efectos de recesión o fuerte desaceleración en todo el planeta. Diez años después de la Declaración del Milenio, los efectos de la crisis en los países en desarrollo podrían truncar una década virtuosa de crecimiento económico vigoroso y de modestos resultados en la lucha contra la pobreza mundial, con costes sociales y humanos aún por evaluar. Es posible que la recesión dificulte aún más el compromiso de los países en desarrollo en la lucha contra el cambio climático. Dar una respuesta adecuada a estos desafíos es tanto una obligación de la UE, en consonancia con los valores que encarna, como una necesidad frente a las amenazas que conllevan. Y constituye, además, una magnífica oportunidad para la UE de ocupar un espacio propio y de apostar con más fuerza por una potencial reforma de las instituciones internacionales.

PRINCIPALES TENDENCIAS, DESAFÍOS Y AMENAZAS

1. El contexto: ¿Una crisis global o una crisis de la globalización?

El mundo se enfrenta a una crisis global, o a una superposición de crisis con efectos globales. Primero tuvo lugar la crisis del precio de los alimentos, seguida de cerca por la crisis del precio del petróleo, ambas con repercusiones en prácticamente todos los países. A partir de 2008, la crisis financiera internacional desemboca en una crisis económica global, con efectos de recesión o fuerte desaceleración en todo el planeta, y consecuencias aún desconocidas en términos de coste social y humano. Se podría decir que nos enfrentamos a la primera crisis de gran envergadura del mundo globalizado. Como tal, esta crisis ha puesto a prueba los mecanismos internacionales de control y reacción, y ha puesto en estrepitosa evidencia las lagunas de la gobernanza mundial. La necesidad de mecanismos adecuados de gobernanza mundial era señalada desde hace varios años por analistas, políticos y activistas, sin encontrar, hasta ahora, el consenso político necesario para hacerle frente. Esta crisis ha intensificado hasta tal punto la necesidad de reglas y mecanismos de decisión comunes que ha creado las condiciones necesarias para forjar tal consenso global, al menos a corto plazo, representado por el emergente G-20. Es por ello que podríamos hablar no sólo de crisis global, sino de crisis de la globalización o, incluso, de crisis de crecimiento de la globalización. La pregunta es si (y hasta qué punto) este impulso de gobernar la globalización se limitará a lo puramente económico o alcanzará otros ámbitos donde la necesidad de gobernanza se ha manifestado igualmente (cambio climático, ayuda al desarrollo y seguridad colectiva, por citar algunos). El próximo decenio podría ser decisivo para consolidar esta tendencia y establecer instituciones internacionales a la vez legítimas y eficaces en diversos ámbitos donde la globalización ha impuesto su lógica.

2. El mundo en desarrollo y la crisis económica: ¿Una década perdida?

Recientes análisis concuerdan en señalar que ningún país será inmune a los efectos de esta crisis: los países menos integrados en la economía global, lejos de estar protegidos, se verán también severamente afectados y, además, tendrán menos recursos para hacerle frente.

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El informe anual del Banco Mundial19 confirma unas nada alentadoras previsiones: el primer efecto será una fuerte y relativamente duradera contracción de flujos financieros hacia el mundo en desarrollo, por el efecto combinado de la caída de inversiones, la bajada de precios de materias primas, la caída del volumen de exportaciones, y la fuerte reducción de remesas. Consecuentemente, se espera una fuerte reducción del crecimiento económico en estos países: la proyección de crecimiento del PIB en los países en desarrollo para el año 2009 es hoy 1/4 de las previsiones anteriores a la crisis económica. Para el mundo en desarrollo en su conjunto las previsiones de crecimiento en 2009 son del 1,6 %, comparado con un 8,1 % en 2006-2007, mientras que en el África Subsahariana el crecimiento esperado para 2009 es de 1,7 %, comparado con el 6,7 % en 2006-2007. Pero, quizá, el dato más desalentador es que, previsiblemente, el PIB per cápita disminuirá en 50 países en desarrollo en 2009.

La traducción de estos datos en un aumento de la pobreza será casi inmediata puesto que, si bien el crecimiento económico se traduce lentamente en reducción de la pobreza, el efecto inverso es prácticamente automático, especialmente en países con redes de protección social débiles o inexistentes. El Banco Mundial ha alertado sobre un previsible aumento de entre 55 y 90 millones adicionales de personas atrapadas en la extrema pobreza, así como de un aumento del hambre crónica en el mundo, que afectará a más de 1.000 millones de personas en 2009. Previsiones igualmente alarmantes afectan a la mortalidad infantil (entre 200.000 y 400.000 niños más morirán al año en el periodo 2009- 2015), así como a los indicadores de educación y salud, con consecuencias duraderas en términos de pérdida de capital humano. Se trunca así, al menos a corto plazo, una tendencia virtuosa de años de crecimiento, reducción de la pobreza y del hambre en el mundo, poniendo en peligro casi una década de (modesto) progreso en ambos campos: si el cumplimiento de los Objetivos de Desarrollo del Milenio (ODM) en la fecha prevista (2015) era ya una empresa ardua cuando se hizo la última revisión hace un año, hoy parece inalcanzable, especialmente en los países del África Subsahariana.

Es difícil hacer proyecciones fiables sobre la evolución del mundo en desarrollo a lo largo del próximo decenio, en primer lugar porque en buena parte dependen de las medidas que se tomen en los próximos meses. Hay, sin embargo, ciertas tendencias que se perfilan claramente:

Concentración de la pobreza La extrema pobreza continuará concentrándose en una serie de países, los "agujeros negros" del desarrollo, una lista de países que Paul Collier20 cifró en alrededor de 50, y que suponen aproximadamente 1.000 millones de personas (cerca de 1/6 de la población mundial). El número de países podría variar, pero el fenómeno presentará las mismas características: una serie de países, la mayoría situados en África, permanecerán atrapados en el círculo vicioso de la pobreza extrema, la incomunicación, la inestabilidad y el conflicto armado. La mayoría están totalmente aislados de la economía mundial, y generalmente son demasiado arriesgados incluso para las agencias públicas de ayuda al desarrollo (los “huérfanos” de la cooperación).

Nuevos estados fallidos El aumento de la pobreza en Estados ya frágiles, unido a la previsible degradación medioambiental, aumentará el riesgo de aparición de nuevos Estados fallidos en los próximos diez años, siguiendo el ejemplo de Somalia. Crecerá, en paralelo, la amenaza que estos países suponen a corto y medio plazo para la estabilidad regional e internacional: i) los conflictos, exacerbados por la escasez de recursos naturales, tenderán a regionalizarse y enquistarse,

19Global Monitoring Report 2009: A Development Emergency, The World Bank, 2009. 20Paul Collier, The Bottom Billion, Oxford University Press, New York, 2007.

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haciendo aún más difícil su resolución; ii) los Estados frágiles o fallidos, donde diversos actores no-estatales y redes criminales ocuparán crecientemente el espacio del estado, expandirán la criminalidad internacional en sus diversas formas (piratería, terrorismo, tráfico de armas, de drogas o de seres humanos).

Impacto del cambio climático en los países en desarrollo

Según el Grupo Intergubernamental de Expertos sobre el Cambio Climático (IPCC) los países en desarrollo serán los más afectados por el cambio climático y, en particular, los países menos adelantados y los pequeños estados insulares en desarrollo. Incluso en el supuesto de que se consiga, a escala global, contener el nivel de emisiones de gases de efecto invernadero y mantener el calentamiento global en torno a los 2 grados centígrados, estos países necesitarían invertir considerables recursos en adaptarse a los efectos climáticos de esta subida de temperatura.

La necesaria reducción de emisiones y las obligadas medidas de adaptación no se han integrado todavía en el diseño de las políticas de cooperación con estos países. Y sin embargo es urgente. Sufragar el coste de las mismas también lo es. El informe 2007-2008 del PNUD21 cifró el coste de las medidas de adaptación en países en desarrollo en 86.000 millones de euros hasta el 2015. Una propuesta clara sobre cómo financiar parte de este coste es la contrapartida que los países en desarrollo esperan antes de comprometerse a reducciones obligatorias de niveles de emisión de gases. La UE no ha formulado todavía su propuesta, aunque se espera que la esboce antes de la reunión de diciembre de 2009 en Copenhague.

África subsahariana, el continente más vulnerable

El África subsahariana continuará siendo la región más vulnerable del mundo desde el punto de vista económico, político, social y medioambiental. La población del continente superará los 1.000 millones de personas en 2025, de los cuales más de la mitad tendrán menos de 24 años de edad22, y la gran mayoría de la población será urbana. Seguirá siendo el continente más desigual en cuanto a distribución de riqueza. El boom demográfico, unido a la inestabilidad política y a la degradación medioambiental, exacerbará la presión migratoria, principalmente sobre Europa.

PRINCIPALES OPCIONES POLÍTICAS PARA LA UE

En los próximos diez años la UE deberá tomar posiciones frente a los desafíos que se han descrito. Dar una respuesta adecuada a estos desafíos es tanto una obligación de la UE, en consonancia con los valores que encarna, como una necesidad frente a las amenazas que conllevan. Pero constituye, además, una magnífica oportunidad de ocupar un espacio propio. En tiempos de aguda crisis económica e introversión, con gobiernos nacionales dedicados a gestionar complejas agendas domésticas, la UE tiene dos opciones: puede seguir la dinámica nacional y encerrarse en sí misma, o puede, por el contrario, suplir las carencias nacionales y liderar respuestas frente a los retos internacionales.

21PNUD, Informe sobre desarrollo humano 2007-2008, La lucha contra el cambio climático: Solidaridad frente a un mundo

dividido. 22Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World, National Intelligence Council, 2008, p.56.

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La posición de la UE como mayor donante mundial, mayor socio comercial, mayor inversor y mayor fuente de remesas para los países en desarrollo, será ciertamente relevante. Pero además, la UE dispone de una amplia gama de programas, instrumentos y políticas para actuar en varios campos a la vez: cooperación, comercio, diplomacia, capacidad militar en auge.

Dos requisitos son necesarios para que la UE pueda utilizar de forma coherente y eficaz este amplio abanico de instrumentos: i) mandatos inequívocos de los Estados Miembros a sus instituciones, y principalmente a la Comisión Europea, que deberá ser percibida como un facilitador y no como un posible rival; ii) recursos presupuestarios adecuados para sostener la acción de la UE en el ámbito de la acción exterior. La ratificación del Tratado de Lisboa facilitaría la tarea puesto que, entre otras cosas, reforzaría y simplificaría la arquitectura institucional de la UE en materia de acción exterior, pero no es una condición imprescindible, ni una excusa para no actuar.

1. La UE frente a la reforma de las organizaciones internacionales

La necesidad de gestionar mejor la globalización es tan antigua como el propio fenómeno. La ONU lleva años debatiéndose entre continuas reformas para conseguir más capacidad de actuación y más poder coercitivo, sin conseguirlo realmente. La cuestión es simple: reglas e instituciones globales implican transferencias de soberanía nacional, y ninguna transferencia ocurre a menos que su necesidad quede fuera de duda. El resultado es que las organizaciones o reagrupamientos internacionales se mueven entre dos parámetros aparentemente opuestos: a mayor representatividad (asociada comúnmente a mayor legitimidad), menor eficacia, y viceversa.

La crisis económica global ha puesto en evidencia hasta tal punto la necesidad de reglas y mecanismos de decisión comunes que ha creado las condiciones necesarias para un consenso global en este sentido, al menos a corto plazo, y al menos en el ámbito de la gobernanza económica. El G-20, que reagrupa al G-8 y a 11 países emergentes23, fue creado tras las crisis financieras de los años 90 con un mandato soft en materia de concertación económica. Ahora reaparece como guía indiscutible para salir de la crisis, con un mandato mucho más amplio y susceptible de ser ampliado a otros campos. Aun distando mucho de ser globalmente representativo, ha sido el único foro Norte–Sur capaz de tomar decisiones efectivas. En resumen, es, a día de hoy, el mejor compromiso posible entre representatividad y eficacia, y su legitimidad no será discutida mientras no fracase.

El G-20 ha dado un mandato claro a las instituciones de Bretton Woods, y principalmente al FMI, para que concluyan de forma expedita las reformas necesarias en cuanto a mandatos y cuotas de representación. Sin embargo no se ha pronunciado sobre las propuestas de reforma emanadas de la ONU24, y no ha tomado iniciativas en materia de cambio climático, por lo que ha sido criticado. La pregunta es: ¿Podía realmente hacerlo? Probablemente habría sido mucho más criticado si hubiera “invadido” espacios sin la necesaria legitimidad. La realidad es que el G-20 no puede ser ni será la respuesta a todas las cuestiones abiertas.

El “efecto G-20” puede, eso sí, impulsar la regulación y la consolidación de instituciones en ámbitos tan necesarios como el cambio climático, la ayuda al desarrollo, la justicia y seguridad internacionales, pero no reemplazará las instituciones existentes ni suplirá indefinidamente la carencia de instituciones adecuadas.

23Los miembros del G-20 son Alemania, Arabia Saudí, Argentina, Australia, Brasil, Canadá, China, Corea del Sur, EEUU,

Francia, India, Indonesia, Italia, Japón, México, Reino Unido, Rusia, Sudáfrica, Turquía. La UE, representada por la Presidencia de turno, es el miembro número 20.

24Recomendaciones preparadas por la Comisión de Expertos presidida por Joseph Stiglitz, A/63, 19.03.09.

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En términos de opciones políticas, la UE y sus Estados Miembros tendrán que posicionarse, en primer lugar, frente a las reformas del FMI y del Banco Mundial, donde la cuota de la UE está destinada a reducirse sensiblemente, reflejando la caída de su importancia demográfica y de su peso económico relativo. La adecuada representación de países emergentes ha sido abiertamente defendida por la UE, en consonancia con su principio de multilateralismo efectivo. Ahora corresponde al pragmatismo de la UE imponerse y maximizar su poder de decisión en el nuevo sistema de cuotas. En el mismo sentido, la toma de posición de la UE en el seno de las reformas de la ONU tiene que responder a una estrategia conjunta, y la UE estará mejor posicionada si lidera el proceso que si simplemente responde a iniciativas ajenas. En este cometido la posibilidad de jugar con la duplicidad de membresía (UE-Estados Miembros) debería representar una ventaja entre aliados, y no un inconveniente entre rivales.

2. La UE y la ayuda al desarrollo: ¿Nuevas reglas de juego?

Hace ya algunos años que se debate sobre la eficacia real de la ayuda al desarrollo. Las escuelas de pensamiento van desde la ortodoxia entusiasta de Jeffrey Sachs25, director del “Proyecto del Milenio” de la ONU, a la crítica feroz de William Easterly26, pasando por la posición revisionista pero constructiva de Paul Collier27. La escuela más crítica de pensamiento ha recibido recientemente un espaldarazo mediático con la publicación del libro "Dead Aid28", de la economista zambiana Dambisa Moyo.

Discusiones académicas y fenómenos mediáticos pasajeros aparte, crece la evidencia de que, si se quiere llegar a atajar los problemas de los “agujeros negros” del desarrollo, las bases de lo que conocemos como ayuda al desarrollo necesitan una redefinición sustancial en términos de objetivos, instrumentos, interlocutores y arquitectura internacional. El sentido del debate se dirigirá hacia un concepto de ayuda más global, que encapsule las varias dimensiones del fenómeno de la pobreza (desarrollo, comercio, seguridad, gobernanza) sin diluir por ello los objetivos esenciales e integrando, además, la dimensión de la lucha contra el cambio climático: algo más fácil de decir que de realizar. La crisis económica intensificará por una parte la necesidad de demostrar al contribuyente que cada euro disponible se gasta eficazmente, y por otra aumentará la necesidad de usar mejor una ayuda ya escasa frente a necesidades crecientes. El próximo decenio verá, por tanto, reavivarse este debate y la posición de la UE, mayor donante mundial de ayuda oficial al desarrollo, puede ser determinante. El debate sobre el objetivo y alcance de la ayuda al desarrollo debería también tratar los propios indicadores de éxito de la ayuda: las tendencias de concentración de pobreza nos indican que la ayuda, donde es verdaderamente necesaria (Estados frágiles o fallidos, rehabilitación post-conflicto), es también, por definición, arriesgada. La existencia de este riesgo implícito no ha sido todavía asumida de manera integral por todos los donantes, ni por sus agencias de control.

3. ¿En qué instancias y foros tendrá que posicionarse la UE?

En primer lugar, en los foros de donantes internacionales, que tendrán que decidir en los próximos años cuánto, cómo y dónde actuar. Una cuestión clave será el montante de la ayuda, que

25La obra más representativa de J. Sachs es The End of Poverty: Economic Possibilities for Our Time, The Penguin Press, New

York, 2005. 26La obra más representativa de W. Easterly es The White Man´s Burden: Why the West's Efforts to Aid the Rest Have Done So

Much Ill and So Little Good, The Penguin Press, New York, 2006. 27La obra más representativa de P. Colllier es The Bottom Billion, Oxford University Press, New York, 2007. 28Dambisa Moyo, Dead Aid: Why aid is not working and how there is another way for Africa, The Penguin Books, New York,

2009.

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es posible que tienda a recular en tiempos de recesión económica. La capacidad, o no, de la UE y de sus Estados miembros de cumplir con compromisos previamente adquiridos será determinante como indicador de tendencia. El siguiente debate de importancia será, sin duda, la discusión sobre el paradigma de la cooperación post-2015, año en el que “caducan” los ocho Objetivos del Desarrollo del Milenio acordados en el seno de las Naciones Unidas en el 2000. El replanteamiento de los ODM, hasta ahora guía indiscutible de la comunidad internacional en materia de ayuda al desarrollo, podría suponer una revisión sustancial del concepto mismo de cooperación y conviene tener claras las posiciones en el seno de la UE.

En segundo lugar, frente a sus socios, hasta ahora privilegiados, del grupo de países ACP (África, Caribe y Pacífico). El Acuerdo de Cotonú, que gobierna las relaciones de la UE con este grupo de 78 países, expirará en 2020, tras dos revisiones en 2010 y 2015. Las señales apuntan a que la misma razón de ser del grupo ACP podría cuestionarse, visto que su justificación histórica (los lazos post-coloniales) comienza a perder significado y que uno de los principales elementos de cohesión, el trato comercial preferencial por parte de la UE, concluyó abruptamente a finales del 2008. La Comisión Europea ha anticipado este proceso de progresiva desintegración, publicando estrategias separadas para cada región (Caribe, Pacífico, África). La emergencia de la Unión Africana, que se ha convertido en el principal interlocutor de la UE para la ejecución de la estrategia conjunta Africa-UE, y la progresiva integración de los países del Caribe en el bloque América Latina - Caribe harán aún más necesaria la revisión de los términos de la relación UE–ACP y la relación de la UE con cada uno de los tres bloques de países.

En tercer lugar, en el seno de la misma UE, en términos de coordinación interna. La política de cooperación al desarrollo es una competencia mixta de la UE, o lo que es lo mismo, en estos momentos los cerca de 49.000 millones de euros que los países de la UE destinan a esta política se gestionan a través de 27 agencias de cooperación bilaterales, más la Comisión Europea (que gestiona sólo un sexto del total). Un estudio encargado por la Comisión evalúa en torno a 5.000 – 7.000 millones de euros el coste anual de la no-Europa en materia de cooperación: en otras palabras, los gastos debidos a mala coordinación y duplicación de esfuerzos, y susceptibles de ser suprimidos, suponen cerca de un 10 – 13 % de la ayuda concedida29. Numerosos expertos han reclamado la convergencia hacia una única política de desarrollo, centralizada en su mayor parte por Bruselas y con una gestión simplificada30, más acorde con los principios de eficacia de la ayuda pactados en la Agenda de París.

EL PAPEL DEL PARLAMENTO EUROPEO

En materia de cooperación al desarrollo el Parlamento Europeo posee poderes relativamente amplios: poder presupuestario y de control, poder de codecisión en materia legislativa, derecho de escrutinio en el marco de la comitología. Usados de forma efectiva y estratégica, esta combinación de poderes podría impulsar una toma de posiciones enérgica por parte de la UE frente a los retos descritos. Un "pero" importante es que los poderes del Parlamento no se extienden al Fondo Europeo de Desarrollo (FED), destinado a los países ACP y que continúa funcionando como un fondo multilateral de Estados Miembros de la UE, fuera del presupuesto comunitario, aunque gestionado por los servicios de la Comisión Europea. Esta verdadera "atipicidad" será tratada, con toda probabilidad, en el curso del próximo decenio. El Tratado de Lisboa no alteraría esencialmente las competencias del Parlamento Europeo en materia de cooperación, aunque sí podría conllevar ciertos cambios en lo que respecta a la coordinación de la política de desarrollo

29El estudio será publicado en breve. Las cifras preliminares fueron comunicadas por el Comisario de Desarrollo, Louis

Michel, a los representantes de los Estados miembros de la UE durante el GAERC del 18-19 Mayo 2009. 30Simon Maxwell, “A six point plan for reforming EU aid”, Autumn 2008.

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con el resto de las políticas externas. A continuación se enumeran algunos de los momentos clave en los que el Parlamento deberá posicionarse a lo largo de la séptima y octava legislaturas.

1. Revisión del marco financiero plurianual 2007-2013 y preparación del siguiente marco financiero

El actual marco financiero será revisado en breve y las reflexiones para el próximo marco financiero plurianual empiezan a emerger. La dotación de recursos suficientes para hacer frente a los compromisos adquiridos en materia de cooperación al desarrollo31, así como la inclusión de nuevos apartados, como la lucha contra el cambio climático en terceros países, deberían ser prioridades políticas para el Parlamento. La propuesta sincronización de la discusión sobre el nuevo marco plurianual con la toma de posesión del nuevo Parlamento32 permitiría llevar la discusión sobre las grandes opciones presupuestarias a los discursos programáticos de los partidos políticos europeos, aumentando la transparencia y publicidad del proceso y la presión sobre los Estados miembros.

2. Revisión de los instrumentos comunitarios de acción exterior

Los diversos instrumentos sobre los que actualmente se basa la acción exterior de la UE, tales como el de cooperación al desarrollo, el instrumento de estabilidad y el instrumento de promoción de la democracia y derechos humanos, por citar los que afectan más directamente a los países en desarrollo, expiran en 2013. La discusión sobre los nuevos instrumentos, que se iniciará con la Comisión entrante, supondrá un debate sobre el concepto mismo de la ayuda (objetivos, alcance, instrumentos, interlocutores), sobre su relación con el resto de políticas e instrumentos y, posiblemente, sobre el paradigma post-Objetivos de Desarrollo del Milenio (post-2015). Recordemos que la aprobación del paquete de instrumentos actuales supuso cerca de dos años de debate, a veces enconado, entre Parlamento, Comisión y Consejo. Parece necesario realizar un ejercicio de reflexión sobre ese proceso, seguido de la elaboración de una estrategia coherente para abordar la siguiente revisión. Esto permitiría al Parlamento dedicar más energía a la concepción y al diseño de estos instrumentos, y menos al escrutinio detallado de cada acción particular; en otras palabras, jugar más el papel de estratega que el de contable.

3. Revisión del Acuerdo de Cotonú y preparación del marco post-Cotonú

La segunda revisión del Acuerdo de Cotonú acaba de iniciar y finalizará en el 2010. El Acuerdo expirará en el 2020, tras una tercera y última revisión en el 2015. El Parlamento deberá pronunciarse según el procedimiento de dictamen conforme y, además, podrá utilizar la Asamblea Parlamentaria Paritaria ACP-UE para marcar su posición sobre una serie de cuestiones tales como: i) la necesaria inclusión del FED en el presupuesto comunitario33; ii) el futuro del grupo ACP y de las instituciones emanadas del Acuerdo de Cotonú; iii) el papel de los parlamentos nacionales en el diálogo político UE-países ACP y en la ejecución del acuerdo en general.

31La UE (Comisión + Estados Miembros) se ha comprometido a destinar, globalmente, un 0,56 % y un 0,7 % del PIB a la

ayuda al desarrollo (ODA) en 2010 y 2015, respectivamente. 32Resolución del Parlamento Europeo de 7 de mayo de 2009 sobre los aspectos financieros del Tratado de Lisboa,

P6_TA-PROV(2009)0374. 33Los fondos FED representan cerca del 40 % de los fondos de ayuda al desarrollo gestionados anualmente por la

Comisión Europea.

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4. Tercera Cumbre África-UE (2010), revisión de la estrategia conjunta África-UE.

La tercera cumbre África-UE, que tendrá lugar en el 2010, hará una primera revisión de la estrategia conjunta África – UE y adoptará un nuevo plan de acción bianual. El Parlamento deberá continuar ejerciendo la máxima presión para que la dimensión parlamentaria se refleje adecuadamente en el siguiente plan de acción: i) rol más claro del Parlamento Panafricano (PAP) y de los parlamentos nacionales en la ejecución de la estrategia; ii) definición de buena gobernanza que incluya de forma mucho más contundente la implicación de los parlamentos en la vida política; iii) acciones de capacitación institucional parlamentaria. Desde un punto de vista más general, el Parlamento debería velar por que la estrategia conjunta África-UE sea realmente inclusiva y refleje la visión del entero continente africano.

5. El Parlamento Europeo como plataforma para impulsar la coordinación de políticas de desarrollo en el seno de la UE.

El consenso europeo sobre desarrollo de diciembre de 2005, que expresa objetivos y principios de la política de desarrollo compartidos por todos los países de la UE y sus instituciones, significó un gran paso adelante hacia la progresiva coordinación e integración de políticas de desarrollo, en tanto que plasmó una visión común. Sin embargo, su asimilación por parte de muchas agencias bilaterales es desigual. La acordada división del trabajo entre Estados miembros y Comisión progresa lentamente, bloqueada por inercias institucionales. El Parlamento podría utilizar su actividad diplomática parlamentaria para impulsar más activamente un progreso real en estos campos. En particular, las reuniones anuales con parlamentarios nacionales organizadas por la Comisión de Desarrollo podrían tratar este tema de forma más sostenida y coherente.

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PROMOTING HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY - Jarmo Oikarinen

Following an era of dramatic breakthroughs in democratisation culminating in the fall of the Berlin wall twenty years ago, promotion efforts of human rights and democracy are facing a more challenging world. In this context European Union's democracy and human rights promotion policies are very likely to require increased resourcing and face pressure to re-evaluate existing policies and methods in order to adapt them to the changed international environment ahead. At the same time, political determination and resilience to realise European Union's strong commitment to human rights and democracy by pursuing these values-based policies will be tested under the pressure of other policy objectives and interests.

MAJOR TRENDS, CHALLENGES, THREATS

1. Democracy and human rights – points of departure

While looking at some of the likely trends affecting efforts to achieve progress in spreading democratic values and better human rights protection during the terms of the 7th and 8th legislatures, it is necessary to note first that the world is facing complex challenges posed by an insecure era – and both breakthroughs and set-backs in this area have historically proven to be very difficult to predict. Three quite fundamental points of departure may nevertheless be suggested: (1) While major changes in terms of adoption of democratic values or protection of human rights are rooted in the internal socio-economic and political development of societies, experience has shown that breakthroughs do not happen in isolation of wider international political and economic developments – thus opening up a meaningful window for international promotion efforts. (2) The perception that democracy and high level of human rights protection are key constitutive elements of an economically, politically and culturally successful social model is a crucial factor in making democracy appealing as a political system. Equally important is the profound universal appeal of human rights based on basic human impulse toward human decency and respect. These are profound motivating factors regardless of what combination of political promotion and support strategies is adopted. (3) While it is true there is no uncontested theory or historical law governing democratisation or transfer of human rights norms – and sometimes exceptions are as important as generalisations – empirical studies continue to show tendencies that support the idea of democracy and human rights promotion in combination with policies promoting sustainable social and economic development; namely that (a) there is a relatively high correlation between well developed broadly based economy and acceptance of democratic values; and (b) even higher correlation exists generally between stable democracy and respect for human rights as it is through respect for human rights that societies create the space for peaceful democratic contestation.

2. The recent democratisation wave

Although the exact definitions of democracy and human rights remain a subject of some academic and political debate, it is widely accepted that the last quarter of the twentieth century included major breakthroughs in the advancement of democratic values and human rights. This 'third wave' of democratisation – as it is often called – has in some important cases been solidified, in many Eastern European, Latin American, and East/South-East Asian states in particular. This coincided

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with clear advances in the development of international human rights law, strengthening (or initiating) regional human rights mechanisms, and creation of a new high-level UN office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. In varying degrees, these advances in the creation of international norms and institutional arrangements also led to improvements in state respect of human rights in practice – this was the case especially in a significant number of newly democratised countries. The enlargement process of the European Union has in many ways been a paragon of the progress achieved.

3. Emergence of stronger democracy and human rights promotion policies

This wave of democratisation was clearly a motivating background factor in the post-Cold War emergence of much stronger democracy and human rights promotion policies based on constructive political engagement, technical assistance and election observation, people-to-people contacts, and conditionality arrangements. These elements have become – albeit in varying forms – respected policy features at UN and EU levels alike, and quite often in the national foreign policies of OECD countries as well. This coincided with the rising acceptance that state sovereignty is or should become conditional to the state respect and implementation of human rights and democratic principles as a source of international legitimacy (most clearly witnessed in the development of the Responsibility to Protect agenda and in the creation of the International Criminal Court). The consequence on the political level has been the strengthening commitment to mainstreaming human rights across all policy areas both in the United Nations and in the EU. At the same time the concept of human rights based approach to development has been winning wider acceptance in the framework of development assistance and cooperation programming. The level of international agreement was witnessed at the Millennium Summit of 2000, where the world's leaders resolved to "spare no effort to promote democracy and strengthen the rule of law, as well as respect for all internationally recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the right to development."

4. Challenging trends

However, in many of the countries that made progress during the 1980s and 1990s the development has since been visibly different. Far from being solid democracies, standards of democratic processes and human rights protection have recently taken clear steps backwards in a number of important cases; some countries have fallen back into authoritarianism or conflict. Although not all news has been negative, there has been a clear change of general mood that reflects a more challenging international environment in democracy promotion that has been echoed at the highest levels of international human rights community as well.

This challenge is linked to a number of trends: (1) the rise of at least temporarily economically successful semi-democratic, semi-autocratic or plainly authoritarian regimes, which have in varying degrees warded off efforts at democratisation and human rights promotion and challenged the transnational character of universal human rights in the name of national sovereignty (perhaps most importantly, admittedly in very different ways, this concerns Russia and China).34 (2) The difficulties involved in gaining major tangible results in the form of solidified progress from the democracy and human rights promotion policies; perhaps most saliently in complex post-conflict reconstruction and peace-building efforts, but the same problem exists to

34On the future prospects in these two countries, see e.g. Lilia Shevtsova, Lost in Transition: The Yeltsin and Putin Legacies,

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2007; Minxin Pei, China's Trapped Transition: The Limits of Developmental Autocracy, Harvard 2008; For a U.S. government sponsored long-term assessment raising the question whether "better economic performance of many authoritarian governments could sow doubts among some about democracy as the best form of government", see U.S. National Intelligence Council, Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World, Washington 2008, 87.

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some degree in more peaceful contexts as well, including the European Neighbourhood.35 (3) The political sensitivities regarding engagement with an increasing number of civil or political movements that have real popular support and/or engage and win influence in democratic processes, but whose ideology includes elements that do not correspond with the principles – including human rights – adopted at UN or in EU policies. This confrontation is perhaps most extreme in the specific cases of Hamas and Hezbollah, but it has much wider implications in efforts to engage civil society actors in target countries. (4) Increasing political difficulties to build wide enough international pro-democracy and pro-human rights coalitions (e.g. at UN Human Rights Council) to move forward a positive agenda – to the extent that the outgoing UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Louise Arbour flatly stated that even the "the principle of universality [of human rights] itself is now under attack" by those raising the relativist argument of human rights as a Western construct or seeking to resurrect the idea of state sovereignty as a paramount international value. This trend has coincided with quite pronounced negative bloc behaviour at UN to limit the applicability of the Responsibility to Protect agenda and to fight back or delay the implementation of ICC's indictment of the President of Sudan.36 (The frictions among the most powerful democratic states regarding proper respect for human rights and methods for democracy promotion, e.g. in the cases of U.S. rendition and detention policies and concerning the concept of forcible regime change, have not helped.37)

In this context, the major challenge of our time is to bridge the gaps between the high aspirations of human rights and the realities on the ground, as well as between the rhetoric and commitments of governments on the one hand and the lack of political will evident in their implementation on the other. In addition to this mostly political dynamic, it is necessary to remember that it is highly likely that during the 2009-2019 period climate change will already have an increasing impact on protection of human rights – this danger is especially acute concerning vulnerable groups like the indigenous peoples in the developing world, but it could have much larger ramifications.38

KEY EU POLICY CHOICES

1. Commitment and credibility in mainstreaming

The basic treaties of the European Union as agreed by the Member States manifest a very strong commitment to support democracy and human rights in the policies of the EU – and recent surveys indicate that this commitment is widely shared by the European citizens as well.39 Article 11 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) states that one of the objectives of the Common Foreign and Security Policy is "to develop and consolidate democracy and rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms". Article 21 of the Lisbon Treaty on European Union (consolidated version, pending ratification) goes even further in noting that "[t]he Union's action on the international scene shall be guided by the principles which have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement, and which it seeks to advance in the wider world: democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the

35See e.g. the contributions to Richard Youngs (ed.), Is the European Union Supporting Democracy in its Neighbourhood ?

FRIDE in association with the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), Madrid 2008. 36On European Union's political challenges in the United Nations, see e.g. Richard Gowan and Franziska Brantner, A

Global Force for Human Rights? An Audit of European Power at the UN, European Council on Foreign Relations, London 2008.

37For a critical but forward-looking analysis, see the report by International Commission of Jurists, Assessing Damage, Urging Action: Report of the Eminent Jurists Panel on Terrorism, Counter-terrorism and Human Rights, ICJ, Geneva 2009.

38See e.g. International Council on Human Rights Policy, Climate Change and Human Rights, Geneva 2009. 39European Commission, The Standard Eurobarometer 69, Values of Europeans, November 2008, 14-21.

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United Nations Charter and international law." The most fundamental policy choice for the 2009-2019 period is the resilience and political determination to stay true to these values in these challenging times under the pressure of other policy objectives and interests. In practice, the main chosen method to realise this commitment in European Union's policies is based on mainstreaming, which highlights the concerns over coherence, consistency, and credibility. In order to harness the true dimensions of mainstreaming, the EU could consider reviewing the collective 'human rights and democracy impact' of all its policies on individual countries. These reviews should also include relevant EU policies outside the formal external relations sphere like EU's global climate change policy and its impact on e.g. the rights of indigenous peoples. And in so far as the European Union is bound to make compromises due to other policy interests, it is important to find transparent ways of communicating these policy choices in order to avoid a growing credibility gap between value commitments and actual policy. Under the new Lisbon Treaty the EU can and should provide leadership by signing up to human rights treaties as a Union. The EU should also take care of its own credibility by insisting on Member State ratification and implementation of the international human rights instruments EU is advocating toward third countries (e.g. not all member states have signed, ratified and implemented the Optional Protocol of the Convention against Torture).

2. Adequate resourcing and strategic planning for dedicated policies

Alongside mainstreaming, European Union has developed a range of dedicated human rights and democracy instruments and policies for specific action in this policy area. These instruments include the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (covering inter alia support for civil society actors, EU election observation missions, and institutional support for the international framework for human rights) and dedicated human rights dialogues and human rights guidelines. While the implementation of current policies involve drafting of multi-year strategy papers, the challenging times will likely create a growing need to reach a more profound strategic consensus to frame the legitimate space for action and to guide the application of EU's promotion policies. This would allow for clarity and a better coordination between EU policies and improve identification of needs to revise or reformulate them. It would also be valuable to develop more probing implementation strategies (e.g. for the EU guidelines on human rights). These implementation strategies could highlight best practices based on impact assessments and 'lessons learned' reviews, but they could also include advance planning that takes into account that progress is not necessarily linear, that there may be clear set-backs, and that the varying responses by the government in target country may include repression, fraud, denial, and purely tactical concessions (e.g. how to follow-up when observed elections clearly go wrong or a human rights dialogue is failing its purpose).

Mid-term review of the current financial instruments, their new strategy documents for the remaining period and the preparations related to the new financial framework after 2014 will provide a window of opportunity to review the experiences and plan strategically for the future to get the best out of the European Instrument on Democracy and Human Rights as well as other instruments that include human rights and democracy promotion elements (especially Investing in People inside the Development Cooperation Instrument, Neighbourhood Instrument and the Instrument for Stability). A related major resourcing decision will be taken regarding the place for human rights and democracy specialists in the structures of the new European External Action Service.

3. International coalition building

The relative economic and international political weight of countries supporting parliamentary democracy and human rights remains a key factor in determining future development during the 2009-2019 period. However, the likelihood of success from democracy and human rights promotion policies is undoubtedly also linked to the ability of international pro-democracy and

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pro-human rights actors to use the potential of combined forces, pooled resources and concerted action. In this context the European Union should show leadership in building upon the 2005 UN World Summit outcome where world leaders make a strong commitment "to actively protecting and promoting all human rights, the rule of law and democracy and recognize that they are interlinked and mutually reinforcing and that they belong to the universal and indivisible core values and principles of the United Nations."40 On that basis, a recent high-level panel – convened on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights – suggested the creation of an independent World Court on Human Rights and a new Global Fund for National Human Rights Protection Systems as ambitious but achievable targets for the next decade.41 The European Union also has a key role in influencing the major reviews of both the International Criminal Court and the UN Human Rights Council scheduled for the years 2010 and 2011 respectively.

In terms of potential coalition building, the new human rights policy direction adopted by the Obama administration in the United States may provide opportunities for a deeper EU-US cooperation combining the political influence of the world’s two most important economic forces. While this type of cooperation could potentially make a major difference, the true extent of common ground between the EU and the new United States approach still remains to be seen.42 Another potential direction to take is to see whether the potential of major regional democracies such as South Africa, Brazil, Indonesia or India could be used to anchor democracy promotion regionally.43 A parallel possibility is to seek further strengthening of the regional human rights institutions and pursue closer cooperation between them (as well as with the emerging networks of national human rights institutions). European Parliament's parliamentary diplomacy and its engagement through the rising number of parliamentary assemblies could potentially play an important role here. Another important objective is to regain initiative in the OSCE area where democracy promotion coalition based on cooperation between Council of Europe, European Union and OSCE/ODIHR has been challenged (perhaps most importantly but not alone by Russia). In this context a major issue of principle is whether the European Union should consider sending its own EU Election Observation Missions to Eastern Neighbourhood countries instead of participating in OSCE/ODIHR-led international missions.

4. Coalition building through people-to-people contacts

Aside from these state-centred issues, the European Union will need to make choices concerning its outreach to civil society actors and popular movements. (1) This should take the form of further support to national and transnational social mobilisation in the form of pro-democracy and pro-human rights NGOs and networks of human rights defenders. In a world where those who defend the rights of are still often silenced; religious and ethnic minorities persecuted; opposition to oppressive regimes is met with brutal force; and discrimination on the basis of race, ethnicity or gender is daily reality, European Union's support can make a difference in providing further financial or technological assistance to the creation of human rights defenders' networks and working out arrangements that allow for safe haven facilities in Europe. Although many of the recent backlashes in authoritarian states have been designed to block the rising influence of transnational mobilisation through moves against freedom of association and to monitor the use of new information technologies (Internet and various wireless communication technologies), EU's

402005 UN World Summit Outcome, 16 September 2005, United Nations A/RES/60/1. 41Eminent Persons Panel, Protecting Dignity: An Agenda for Human Rights, Geneva Academy of International

Humanitarian Law and Human Rights, 2008. 42For an early estimate see Frances Burwell, Beyond Closing Guantanamo: Next Steps to Rebuild a Transatlantic Partnership

in International Law, The Atlantic Council of the United States in association with Chatham House, Washington 2009. 43On this point and also more generally, see Marika Lerch, Democracy in the Ascendant? Opportunities and Limitations of

Strategies to Promote Democracy, Berlin 2007.

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promotion policies can benefit from the march of technological advances which is likely to create a significantly altered situation regarding any authoritarian regime’s ability to silence the voice of human rights defenders and democracy advocates. (2) The European Union must also consider when and how to engage with humanitarian, civic or political movements, who have a substantial base of legitimate public support demonstrated by membership, mobilisation or electoral success, but whose ideological underpinnings include elements that do not correspond to EU's fundamental principles. Any engagement with these movements will require careful assessment of their nature – including their closeness to extremist elements and related security issues – but the decision not to engage these movements means leaving out the possibility of influencing the future direction of influential movements in a wide variety of target countries.

5. Continuity and follow-up in institution building, support and reform

At the same time it is important to note that human rights or democracy deficits in target countries remain very often linked to basic problems of socio-economic development and governance; i.e. absence of effective and accountable institutions together with lack of capacity and/or resources to make meaningful changes. If courts are corrupt, over-burdened and/or inefficient, basic civil rights will be violated. Lack of capacity may block the arrangement of credible elections, and even free and fair elections do not guarantee clear progress, if parliaments lack institutional capacity to assume their responsibilities in the country's political life. Institution building and governance reform remain essential elements in transforming the rhetoric of democracy and human rights into practical reality through assistance, protection and redress for the people they serve. Much is already done via European Union's development policies and other policy instruments, but the challenge remains in coordination and providing the necessary continuity and follow-up to EU's efforts from crisis management and peace building to development cooperation in order to ensure real progress toward strong democratic institutions – in line with meeting the democracy and governance related Millennium Development Goals by the deadline year 2015.

ENHANCING THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT'S RESPONSE

1. Input to EU policy process and the inter-institutional dynamics

The European Parliament can justifiably claim to have been a major actor in putting human rights on the EU agenda and pushing it forward. Considering the challenging international environment ahead and the multiplication and growing scope of EU's policies to support democratisation and human rights, Parliament will undoubtedly be under pressure to enhance its operations in order to maintain its influential role in this area. European Parliament has a distinctive role inside the EU policy process as it is not an institution controlled by majority party or coalition supporting an executive authority like most national parliaments. This relative independence has provided clear advantages as the Parliament has had the autonomy to push human rights on the European agenda and challenge the Council and the Commission to move the policies forward. Equally useful has been the transparency and openness of Parliament's deliberations, allowing for an active engagement with civil society actors. In this sense, Parliament's distinctiveness has served it well and allowed it to make important contributions. That said, it is often apparent that when the institutions can all pursue similar objectives and express similar views the chances of having an impact are much greater. As Parliament's institutional powers and responsibilities are once again about to grow with the likely adoption of the Lisbon Treaty, it is not unthinkable that this will create openings in the long run for more intensive inter-institutional cooperation allowing for Parliament to have a more substantial input to the policy processes – and therefore increasing the

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chances of converging policy positions between the Parliament and the other EU institutions.44 In this context, Parliament's co-decision powers regarding the financial instruments and the likely future application of Article 218 of the Lisbon Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) concerning the requirement of Parliament's consent to EU's external agreements are important openings for exerting Parliament's influence to ensure mainstreaming of human rights and democracy objectives in EU's external relationships.45 Parliament should also keep an eye on the development of the European External Action Service to influence how it will be shaped.

2. Internal policy coherence and efficiency

Considering that the European Parliament is a representative political institution with strong political groups and it does not have a government-opposition dynamic or a ruling majority coalition, the applicability of the idea of policy coherence clearly has its limits. That said, it is common sense that the impact of Parliament's work is strengthened when its different activities work as part of an overall exercise of Parliament's powers and parliamentary diplomacy – based on the positions formally adopted. Currently the Parliament contributes to the drafting, implementation and evaluation of EU policies in the field of human rights and democracy in a wide variety of ways including resolutions, reports, delegation visits, special hearings, election observation missions, direct support to parliaments in new and emerging democracies etc.. Institutionally the political work in this area involves inter alia the plenary, a number of committees – including the Sub-Committee on Human Rights – standing and ad-hoc delegations, and the Election Observation Group. Political groups are a key to the shaping of Parliament's positions at all levels and the Presidents of the Parliament have been very engaged in human rights issues. As administrative units one can add the Human Rights Unit and the newly created Office for the Promotion of Parliamentary Democracy. Efforts are also now under way to establish a Sakharov Network to connect the work of the Parliament more closely with the winners of the Sakharov Prize. As a whole these activities manifest Parliament's commitment, but raise the challenge of coordination – and put pressure on Parliament's communication policy to find innovative ways to make these activities known to European citizens and global audience alike.

An external study on Parliament's activities and impact in this area specifically pointed out the problems related to coherence and follow-up of Parliament's actions and suggesting better interweaving and coordination of human rights activities inside the Parliament.46 In this context discussions have taken place and ideas have been floated e.g. regarding a possible change in the Committee structure of the Parliament. Outside experts have for some time suggested adoption of a single integrated committee structure for dealing with both the internal and the external dimension of Human Rights policy.47 In the course of internal preparations for the 2009-2014 legislature, serious discussions took place within the Parliament whether it would wise to change the status of the current Sub-Committee on Human Rights to a full committee allowing it to

44On Parliament's changing role, see also European Parliament resolution of 7 May 2009 on Parliament's new role and

responsibilities in implementing the Treaty of Lisbon, P6_TA(2009)0373 (2008/2063(INI)). 45According to Article 218 (Consolidated version), Council must act after obtaining the consent of the European

Parliament in the following cases: (i) association agreements; (ii) agreement on Union accession to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms; (iii) agreements establishing a specific institutional framework by organising cooperation procedures; (iv) agreements with important budgetary implications for the Union; (v) agreements covering fields to which either the ordinary legislative procedure applies, or the special legislative procedure where consent by the European Parliament is required. In other cases (exclusively CFSP related agreement are still left out), Parliament will be consulted.

46See Horst Fischer et al, The impact of the resolutions and other activities of the European Parliament in the field of human rights outside the European Union, External study by the European Inter-University Centre for Human Rights and Democratisation (EIUC) for the European Parliament, EP Policy Department 2006.

47Philip Alston and J. H. H. Weiler, 'An EU Human Rights Policy' in Philip Alston, Mara Bustelo, James Heenan (eds.), The EU and Human Rights, Oxford 1999, 45.

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present its own proposals to the plenary and to work more effectively with other committees -- but at the same time demarcating its mandate vis-à-vis its current parent committee. Regardless of whether either of these particular initiatives will be picked up in the future, it is very likely that Parliament is bound – as part of institutional learning process – to build on experience gained and to seek new ways to strengthen the impact and coherence of the wide range of human rights and democracy related activities in the institution. A better coordination would also make it possible for the Parliament to further enhance cooperation in this area with other international actors (e.g. with Council of Europe, UN bodies) and – considering their strengthening status within the workings of the European Union – with national parliaments.

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EU TRADE POLICY IN A CHANGING GLOBAL LANDSCAPE - Levente Csaszi

A new wave of global economic integration will characterise the next decade, driven by the fast growing emerging economies, changes in technology and consumer behaviour. One of the key issues of the global agenda will be reconciling international trade rules with a renewed global regulatory framework for financial governance and climate change mitigation.

The key challenges for the EU include stepping up its commercial presence in the most dynamically transforming regions, such as Asia, while safeguarding and promoting its collective preferences and values, including a rules-based international trading system, enhanced global governance and high environmental standards.

Strengthening the democratic scrutiny of trade policy at EU level and at the global regulatory framework will remain high on the agenda. The Lisbon Treaty would significantly increase the European Parliament’s powers, effectively marking a new era in the democratic oversight of international trade policy whereby European citizens’ concerns are directly represented.

INTRODUCTION

International trade is only one of the many powerful and often irreversible forces shaping globalisation (such as technological change and innovation, progress in transport and communication, a rapidly expanding world population, environmental pressures and global institutions). Despite the current financial and economic crisis the world is set to witness a new, perhaps more cautious but still dynamic, wave of globalisation in the coming decade, requiring continuous adjustment from the EU.

EU trade policy has a major influence on citizens’ lives. Its impact goes well beyond the price of products or where they are made. It profoundly affects the conditions for value creation in goods and services and the competitiveness of European companies by providing the external pillar of the EU growth and jobs strategy. Trade policy indirectly also shapes the ways and means available to fight climate change or defines whether European product design and quality remains the benchmark in various industries worldwide. It reflects and promotes European preferences and values (e.g. on food and product safety, GMO crops, labour and environmental standards) while it also affects livelihoods around the globe and may indirectly serve foreign policy goals such as the promotion of human rights and democracy by applying conditionality in trade and cooperation agreements.

EU trade policy is formulated in a complex, “three-level game”. Its legal boundaries and the global level are defined by WTO rules and multilateral negotiations. Decisions at EU level are shaped by interinstitutional dynamics in which the Commission dominates (negotiating agreements, representing the EU at the WTO, managing trade defence instruments, etc.). Until now the Parliament has had a very restricted role. At the same time EU trade policy has to take into account interaction and coherence with other EU policies (e.g. agriculture, internal market, external action). The third level is national policy formation. Each EU member state has its own, sometimes shifting national preferences. Trade policy has been a crucial instrument for the EU at the service of its strategic goals. The EU is not only the largest, and thus, one of the most influential players in

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commercial terms, but under the common commercial policy (CCP) the EU is also able to act with a single voice on the global stage.

It is within the above described setting that, with the entering into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the European Parliament may turn from an institution with no formal role to a player with considerable influence and responsibility, directly representing EU citizens.

1. HARNESSING GLOBALISATION?

During the last decade trade has been a major driver of rapid worldwide economic integration as global commercial flows have grown about twice as fast as world economic output. Though trade and investment flows suffered a significant setback in the current crisis, the trend is clear. The volume of transactions, conducted irrespective of the physical distance between those engaged, will continue to expand. The continuing internationalisation of markets for goods, services and labour will remain a key feature of globalisation. This, however, is also a source of risks, as local markets become increasingly exposed to destabilising fluctuations in the wider global economy.

The EU will face the triple challenge of

1. adapting to a changing trading landscape, where the overwhelming trend is the rise of the large emerging economies (led by the BRIC - Brazil, Russia, India and China);

2. preparing for external and “systemic” shocks enshrined in the increasingly interdependent global economy;

3. enhancing global governance, including reconciling financial regulation, climate change mitigation, labour and environmental standards and the international trading system.

1.1. The global economy and the changing trading landscape

The world is flat, declared Thomas L. Friedman as the title of his book on globalisation in 2005. On the one hand he referred to increasing opportunities for the global South to benefit from globalisation and integration into the global economy and on the other to an increasingly level playing field for all economic actors. This is mainly the result of technological progress as well as a rapid opening up to trade and investment around the globe. However, flattening the world is by no means straightforward business and tensions already present in the world trading system are likely to be accentuated in the next decade.

An important symptom of the challenges ahead, also acknowledged by the Commission in its communication entitled Global Europe two years on, is the EU’s stagnating or decreasing market share in the dynamically growing Asian countries. Japan and the US are also struggling to keep up their commercial presence in this key region where the largest economic gains are going to originate from in the next decade.

In the world of global supply chains even the theory of comparative advantage has its limitations. It is not countries that trade with each other and specialise in final products. Rather, it is various inputs (often non-material but tradable inputs) that are exchanged and often by companies with worldwide operations. This also makes the reform of EU trade defence instruments (TDIs) more challenging as the notion of "European interest" is becoming more fragmented and less tangible.

The rise of China and other countries with cheap labour in abundance is well underway. The “China price” in itself could be an opportunity rather than a threat for EU companies that can benefit from synergies and a quickly expanding market as competing on labour costs in low-end

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goods is not an option48. However, it is also clear that the EU’s declared trade strategy of harnessing globalisation is challenged by some key trends.

First of all, a key feature of the emerging world order and commercial landscape is the rise of the BRIC and other dynamically growing developing countries. Relations between the North and the BRIC will define the future of the WTO and global governance, including UN reform and climate change mitigation. Within a decade, developing countries together may account for nearly two thirds of global GDP (15 years ago their share was below 40 percent). While North-South relations get a lot of attention, it should not be overlooked that South-South trade and investment is growing rapidly. These nations also rely increasingly on their expanding domestic markets. Some analysts even started talking about “decoupling”, proposing that the global crisis would hit these countries less severely and their recovery would be quicker. Today half of China’s exports are with developing countries. Therefore the view that China is a mere outsourcing or manufacturing hub of the West is heavily misguided. It also overtook the US as Brazil’s first export market while investing heavily in some African states. Economic integration is also raising levels of political interdependence between states. For instance, to a very large extent the US relies on China to finance its current account deficit, while the US trade deficit is largely "made in China". Similarly, the EU’s political relations with Russia are defined by a growing economic interdependence.

These countries, led by India, Brazil and increasingly China, are very reluctant to offer trade concessions to the developed countries or even to other smaller and/or poorer developing nations, while they still uphold significant barriers to trade and investment, including in services and public procurement49. In the WTO’s institutional dynamics this is reflected by the prominent role of the group that emerged as the “G20”50 and the stalemate of the current Doha Development Agenda. It must also be noted that being largely open, with the exception of further reducing agricultural tariffs and subsidies and stepping up trade facilitation as well as aid for trade, the EU has not got much left to offer to trading partners (phasing out agricultural export subsidies has already been offered). This makes a “grand bargain” at the WTO much more difficult and a successful conclusion of the Doha round may not happen for several years.

Second, behind-the-border measures and regulatory issues, including technical barriers to trade are becoming ever more important and the EU has limited means to influence these in other countries, while its own standards are increasingly under pressure. Some countries seem to remain competitive on the world market not simply because of cheaper labour costs but by applying loser environmental, safety and labour standards. “State capitalist” or non-market economies also use hidden subsidies to boost the performance of their exporters. This will remain a huge challenge in

48 The global supply chain resulting in a "Made in China" label may involve EU-based inputs such as design, logistics,

business services, retail distribution and marketing, which actually give the bulk of the value added. Consumers in the EU may also benefit from lower prices. The job creation impacts of the new international division of labour are not a zero-sum game. For instance, while jobs in the textile industry in the EU may have shifted to China or Vietnam, EU companies increased their exports of machinery and related services, used in textile the industry.

49 It must be acknowledged that countries like China, India or Brazil embody the huge diversity and extremes of globalisation. With a large share of the poorest people in the world some of their entire regions would qualify as LDCs. But others host high tech industries and invest in EU or US companies and have a sizeable "middle class" with significant purchasing power.

50 The G20 grouping in the WTO emerged in August 2003 and is made up of countries like Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, China, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, South Africa, Thailand, Uruguay and Venezuela. It is not the same as the G20 of developed and developing countries that recently came together to address the global financial and economic crisis. The latter, however shows that an informal and ad hoc coalition of developed and key developing nations is necessary but may still be insufficient in global governance today.

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the coming decade even if a downward spiral of lowering standards worldwide is unlikely to materialise.

Third, international rules remain limited in several areas or their enforcement is highly problematic. This is the case in particular with Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) in some key countries (e.g. China and Russia). In the knowledge economy much of the value added is created through design, innovation, patents and symbolic value behind brands and related services, even if production is organised in a global supply chain with inputs from various countries contributing to a given final product. This competitive edge is vital to the EU economy. However, IPRs are increasingly undermined. Counterfeiting and piracy will also be a huge challenge for the EU in the coming decade.

1.2. Vulnerability to external shocks and systemic failures

The accelerating integration of the global economy greatly increases interdependence and the possibility of shocks or systemic crises and failures. This vulnerability has been demonstrated by the financial crisis, which resulted in a remarkable decrease in international trade flows. The EU must prepare for serious tensions over access to energy, water and raw materials which may send shockwaves around the world economy, predictably much more dramatically than the oil shocks of the 1970s. The EU is already vulnerable as the largest importer of raw materials and energy. While EU reliance on imports is set to increase in the next decade, the main energy exporting countries’ political and economic stability may also be seriously undermined (e.g. Middle East, Russia, Iran, Central Asia, Africa).

Several analyses assessing future economic scenarios predict large increases in world energy demand. Some forecast a growth in global fossil fuel consumption of over 60 percent by 2025/2030 (natural gas volumes increasing by over 80 percent), with Asia accounting for over two thirds of this rise. Such predictions, coupled with the urgency to tackle climate change, make the scenario of energy price shocks and/or mounting pressures for a steady transformation into a less fossil fuel dependent global economy very likely. Both of these scenarios would have very important ramifications for EU trade policy.

The institutional and legal framework of world trade also looks somewhat vulnerable. A defining feature of the last few years is the stalemate of the WTO's Doha Development Agenda (which itself was an attempt to overcome a previous breakdown of WTO negotiations). At the same time we can also witness the proliferation of Free Trade Agreements (FTAs). The increasingly complex “spaghetti bowl” of FTAs can undermine trade liberalisation at multilateral level and creates a fragmented trading landscape with significant trade diversion effects51 and regulatory diversity. There is a real danger that the WTO will be sidelined for the coming years in pursuit of more bilateral deals, especially in the current economic climate that generates a very cautious approach to trade liberalisation, if not creeping trade protectionism.

Decision making in the WTO has also become more complex. Increasingly, the emerging developing countries are the key to any agreement and negotiations opened up new divisions between developing countries, further fragmenting the “traditional” North-South friction.

51 Trade diversion happens when a non-member country of an FTA loses export potential to a market merely as a

result of the trade agreement. Trade can be diverted from a more efficient exporter towards a less efficient one, causing overall losses in efficiency and output, even if participating members seem to gain from it. FTAs can also play a political role by picking friends and squeezing out rivals, while their negotiation is rewarded with quicker political success than a multilateral agreement. For instance the US-Korea FTA may hurt otherwise efficient EU trade exports to Korea. The EU is also pursuing an FTA with Korea, hoping for a level playing field with US exporters. Many economists argue that once the “first mover” advantage is dampened, the whole leitmotif of the various FTAs may be lost while they still discriminate against other non-signatory countries.

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WTO reform will also remain on the agenda. The organisation was referred to as “medieval” by its own, recently reappointed, Director General, Pascal Lamy. It has been facing mounting criticism regarding the opaqueness and limited inclusiveness of trade talks. At the same time it is also struggling to deliver as the current round is in stalemate after having dragged on for 8 years already. While WTO should address efficiency in negotiations, it will also face new waves of public pressure to deal with its “democratic deficit” and improve its legitimacy and transparency if it is to remain a pillar of global governance. An important step would be the creation of a fully fledged parliamentary assembly, upgrading the current parliamentary conference on the WTO.

1.3. The trading system and other instruments of global governance - clashes or synergy?

A key challenge of the next decade will be strengthening global governance. We are currently witnessing new forms of international cooperation to fix the global financial system. The links with international trade and investment are clear and this was addressed by a pledge to step up trade finance. Institutional relations between the WTO, IMF, World Bank and other institutions, such as the ILO will have to be reinforced.

In relation to climate change, trade is part of the problem (increasing exchanges and transport) but also of the solution (technology transfer, efficiency gains). New international rules must be elaborated to reconcile the WTO system with the post Kyoto regime of climate change mitigation. EU leadership here is crucial. Carbon leakage and compensation for competitive losses as a result of efforts to curb GHG emissions will have to be addressed. In order to reap the benefits of useful synergies between Multilateral Environmental Agreements and WTO law, some trade rules may have to be clarified and adjusted (e.g. the WTO compatibility of certain border measures or compensation schemes, creating a "green space" for certain measures under WTO law).

2. EU TRADE POLICY – THE MAIN CHALLENGES AHEAD

The stakes for EU trade policy are getting higher. The EU, as the largest market and most important foreign investor will remain a pole of attraction. However, it is clear that the EU will have to face up to the new reality that its influence in setting global industrial standards, shaping WTO rules and safeguarding European collective preferences may be eroding and globalisation is increasingly calibrated according to the will of countries like China and India. The question now is to what extent the face of globalisation will be European.

The EU has been more successful than Japan and the US in maintaining its market share in merchandise trade. However, its share in high-tech goods is lower than its overall market share in world exports. Its role as the principal exporter of high quality premium products is also challenged while its real strength and untapped potential lies in services. It will be crucial for the next decade to boost EU competitiveness with research and innovation as well as stepping up IPR protection internationally (as shown already by the ACTA52 initiative). Pursuing an active market access strategy, including in services, will be key to the EU’s success, especially in rapidly growing Asian markets.

52 Negotiations on a new Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) were launched in 2007. The goal of the ACTA

negotiations is to provide an international framework that improves the enforcement of intellectual property right (IPR) laws. It does not purport to create new intellectual property rights, but to create improved international standards as to how to act against large-scale infringements of IPR. The current negotiating parties of ACTA are: Australia, Canada, the EU, Japan, Korea, Mexico, Morocco, New Zealand, Singapore, Switzerland and the United States.

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2.1. Strengthening multilateralism

As the largest trading block, number one exporter of goods and primary trading power in services the EU has a crucial stake and responsibility in a transparent and rules based international trading system. Supporting the WTO and striving for a successful conclusion of the Doha round will remain a cornerstone of EU trade policy.

2.2. FTAs and market access

The EU defined its new strategy in the Global Europe communication and started negotiating a series of FTAs. This was driven to a large extent by the willingness to create a level playing field with the US (FTAs with Korea, Central America and the recently announced talks with Canada) and to achieve a more significant commercial presence in Asia (ASEAN, India). It must be noted that some ongoing negotiations remain problematic (often on the same stumbling blocks as WTO talks) and their successful conclusion would need an almost unexpected breakthrough (e.g. Mercosur).

Maintaining a high level trade dialogue with China and possibly other nations will remain crucial as the catalogue of problems is likely to expand (lax enforcement of IPRs and WTO obligations, subsidies, lack of transparency and unfair treatment, lack of uniformity of regulations, government procurement practices, equity restrictions on foreign investment, standards and technical barriers to trade, environmental and labour standards not applied). Regulatory dialogue and convergence with the US should be brought to a new level in the coming years. Market access in services and government procurement, especially in the large emerging economies, will be a priority and a huge challenge for the EU.

2.3. Coherence with other policies

Success as a trading power will depend to a large extent on creating stronger coherence with other policies, such as innovation and research (Jobs and Growth strategy). In terms of external policies, the Lisbon Treaty puts trade under the same heading with other areas of external action, where synergies must also be strengthened. For instance, preference erosion (gradually reduced trade protection worldwide makes trade concessions to selected partners over others less valuable) has already greatly weakened trade policy as an instrument of development policy. The EU approach to EPAs has been shaped by WTO constraints and is based on promoting the EU’s own model of regional integration but this must be accompanied by suitable development instruments. For the European Parliament, applying human rights clauses in a consistent and coherent manner will also deserve special attention. In a similar fashion, an important component of the Eastern Partnership and relations with Mediterranean partners is trade (e.g. FTA with Ukraine and possibly other partners, integration in services in the Euromed area), not to mention relations with Russia where political tensions will predictably surface again in the form of trade and investment disputes.

2.4. Safeguarding and promoting the European model of collective preferences

EU trade policy will keep its role as a promoter of EU values but will come under lots of pressure form trading partners. The examples to cite are numerous (multifunctional agriculture justifying certain types of subsidies, upholding the moratorium on GMOs, environmental standards, the recent ban on seal products even at the expense of possible challenge from trading partners).

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The EU cannot afford to lower its own standards, often underpinned by a shared conviction to act also in the global interest, and in order to safeguard its own values. However, translating this into policy will remain an even tougher challenge in the coming years, especially with an increased internal diversity.

3. THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT – A REAL PLAYER?

Though the CCP is exclusive community competence, until now the EP had a very limited influence in trade policy as it has currently no formal role as defined by the Treaties. This hitherto marginal role would fundamentally change according to the provisions of the Lisbon treaty, granting co-decision powers (ordinary legislative proposal, OLP) to the EP. However, this formal, legal democratisation of trade policy would not solve Parliament’s main underlying challenge of improving its “informal legitimacy” (e.g. voter turnouts at EP elections, visibility in media) and connecting with the citizens. The democratic scrutiny of trade policy, both at WTO and EU level will remain high on the agenda, irrespective of the fate of the Lisbon Treaty.

3.1. A new era in the democratic scrutiny of EU trade policy?

The Lisbon Treaty would be for trade policy what the Single European Act or the Maastricht Treaty was for a number of EU policy areas. It would further consolidate commercial policy making at EU level, leaving the leading role with the Commission but changing the institutional dynamics. MEPs would be able to voice citizens' preferences and concerns about globalisation and the economy and make them reflected in legislative acts. The Lisbon Treaty would make the EP unique in the democratic scrutiny of trade policy, unmatched by most parliaments around the globe (with the exception of the US congress)53.

First, the EP and Council would adopt the measures defining the framework for implementing external trade policy acting by means of the ordinary legislative procedure (OLP). This means that the EP would be granted powers on an equal footing with the Council to adopt regulations on topics such as anti-dumping, safeguards, instruments such as the Trade Barriers Regulation (TBR) and rules of origin. Parliament would also share legislative powers with the Council when it comes to implementing autonomous trade measures such as the EU’s Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) schemes. An important extension of EU competence is the inclusion of foreign direct investment (FDI)54. To date investment has been Member State or mixed competence. The Lisbon Treaty is another important step towards the creation of a comprehensive EU approach to trade and investment that reflects the nature of the international economy in which trade and investment are inextricably linked.

Second, the EP would have an enhanced role in ratifying trade agreements, with the assent procedure extended to all cases. Perhaps the formal power to block an agreement would rarely be used. Nevertheless, matched with genuine access to information on ongoing negotiations, it would certainly increase Parliament’s leverage. It must also be noted that national parliaments would also lose influence and oversight as they would not ratify agreements any more (no mixed agreements). A structured dialogue with national parliaments may ensure their involvement.

53 See also EP report on Parliament's new role and responsibilities implementing the Treaty of Lisbon (2008/2063(INI)) 54 The exact scope of investment issues falling under exclusive EU competence is not clear yet but Member States will

not be able to conclude certain types of agreements any more. Investment regulation is very fragmented. The UNCTAD listed 2573 Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) in 2007. Germany has around 140 BITs, the UK more than 120, Austria 50 and France almost one hundred.

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A third change giving the EP a greater role is that the Commission will be legally obliged to provide the EP with information on the conduct of the negotiations (though the EP will have no power to authorise trade negotiations and the mandate will be given by Council). In recent years the Commission has regularly informed the EP of the status of negotiations (based partly on the interinstitutional agreement). The Lisbon Treaty makes this a legal requirement and requires the Commission to report to both the Council’s “Art 207 Committee” (currently Article 133 Committee) and the EP. This could lead in the longer term to more active and effective scrutiny.

3.2. The new powers- what to make of it?

The real question of the next legislatures is whether the EP will be able to provide effective scrutiny and whether its increased role will result in a politicisation of EU external trade policy. Significant political cleavages exist both amongst political groups and EU Member States but these have rarely come to the surface openly in trade policy due to the nature of trade diplomacy (Council) or the lack of real stakes and political clout in the EP. The challenge ahead is to increase the role of the EP as the deliberative public space for trade policy debate, building on its formal and informal authority. For a while parliamentarians have been largely sidelined or regarded as rivals to NGOs in voicing citizens’ concerns on trade issues, be it at the WTO or in Europe. The Lisbon Treaty would mean quality change in representing citizens’ views directly in trade policy.

Trade negotiations will and should stay in the hands of government representatives (the Commission in the EU). However, it is becoming more widely accepted that parliaments have an important oversight role to play prior to, during, and after trade negotiations take place.

How the altered legal framework would shape parliamentary work in practice remains unclear in some areas. The de facto result of the extension of EP competences could partly also be the proliferation of comitology, as delegation of powers would appear suitable in an otherwise lengthy co-decision process55. Under the Lisbon Treaty it is likely that some companies would promptly update job profiles to include lobbying MEPs as the influence of Parliament may represent huge economic stakes for some industries.

The EP may also gain influence through more informal power increase, like it happened in some other policy areas. In any case the Parliament must prepare for considerable growth in legislative work and political influence in highly specialised and technical policy areas, such as trade defence instruments or rules of origin and, including all its ramifications for administrative capacity.

Beyond "hardcore legislation" there are various ways the EP can make the best of its new competences and responsibility to European citizens (much of this is valid even under the current Treaty provisions):

• a better use of existing mechanisms, such as the regular hearing of Commissioners (not only for trade but also for the customs union, agriculture or development), ambassadors and trade representatives;

• creating a more regular and formalised way of dialogue with the Commission and Council, with particular emphasis on sharing information on ongoing trade negotiations;

• improving the anticipation of and preparations for Commission proposals, especially those in more complex legislative matters. This may also necessitate improved access to information from the Commission (e.g. analyses and studies preparing proposals), and stepping up the Parliament's own resources in policy analysis;

55 However, the future of comitology is not very clear and a lot of debate is still underway about the scope of certain

instruments and legal provisions.

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• becoming an even stronger voice for considerations on human rights, environmental and labour standards in trade and economic relations with partner countries;

• insisting on a more serious role for sustainability impact assessments before concluding trade agreements;

• improving coordination to reach better policy coherence between various policies and Committees (e.g. trade policy and rules on the internal market are mutually supportive and both are essential instruments in the EU's growth and jobs strategy. Links with development policy are clear and have often been clashing in the past rather than building on complementarities or synergies);

• stepping up parliamentary diplomacy in trade by a systematic “mainstreaming” of trade relations in the interparliamentary meeting agendas;

• working towards and supporting a fully fledged Parliamentary Assembly of the WTO and other reform efforts to make the WTO more transparent, accountable and efficient.

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LA POLITIQUE COMMERCIALE DE L'UNION EUROPEENNE ENTRE MULTILATERALISME ET BILATERALISME

- Dominique Delaunay

Pour répondre aux défis de la mondialisation, l'UE s'est fait le champion du multilatéralisme et a joué à cet égard un rôle majeur dans la création de l'Organisation mondiale du commerce (OMC). Cependant, à la suite des échecs répétés des négociations du Cycle de Doha, elle s'est engagée depuis 2006, à l'instar de ses grands partenaires commerciaux, dans la négociation d'accords bilatéraux avec de nombreux pays ou regroupements régionaux. L'UE peut-elle concilier multilatéralisme et bilatéralisme? Sans doute faut-il admettre que ces deux approches ne sont pas exclusives l'une de l'autre mais complémentaires. Par ailleurs, la politique commerciale qui est une compétence exclusive de l'Union européenne échappe encore au contrôle du Parlement européen. La légitimité de la politique commerciale commune sera renforcée par le contrôle accru du Parlement européen prévu par le traité de Lisbonne.

En tant que première puissance commerciale mondiale (premier importateur, deuxième exportateur), l'Union européenne a un intérêt offensif à une ouverture régulée du commerce international qu'il s'agisse de l'accès aux marchés des produits ou à ceux des services. L'UE a toujours donné la priorité au multilatéralisme car, selon elle, le meilleur moyen de favoriser le commerce mondial et de promouvoir le développement économique est de disposer de règles communes approuvées au niveau international. C'est pourquoi, elle a joué un rôle majeur dans la création de l'Organisation mondiale du commerce (OMC) et de l'Organe de règlement des différends (ORD) qui constituent la clef de voûte du système commercial international. Elle s'est activement engagée en faveur du cycle de négociations qu'elle a contribué à lancer à Doha en 2001. Cependant, après les échecs répétés des négociations de l'OMC, elle s'est engagée en 2006, à l'instar d'autres grandes puissances commerciales, dans la négociation de nombreux accords bilatéraux, semblant suggérer un changement dans sa stratégie commerciale. Qu'en est-il au juste?

I. TENDANCES ET DEFIS: L'AFFAIBLISSEMENT DU SYSTEME MULTILATERAL

De nombreux changements sont intervenus ces dernières années dans la compétition internationale qui mettent à mal la doctrine de la "mondialisation maîtrisée" dont l'UE se faisait jusqu'à présent le champion et qui constituent autant de défis à sa stratégie fondée depuis longtemps sur le multilatéralisme.

1.1. L'échec des négociations commerciales multilatérales

L'objectif du Cycle de Doha, lancé en 2001, était de parvenir à un accord avant le 1er janvier 2005. A la suite de l'échec de la conférence ministérielle de Cancun en septembre 2003, les négociations ont pris du retard. Après des avancées limitées lors de la Conférence de Hong-Kong en décembre 2005, elles ont été suspendues en juillet 2005 en raison des difficultés persistantes à rapprocher les positions.

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Depuis la conférence de Hong-Kong, il est admis que les concessions doivent respecter un équilibre entre produits agricoles et produits industriels et services, ce qui signifie que les pays développés doivent réduire leurs subventions et leurs protections tarifaires sur les produits agricoles pour obtenir en échange un meilleur accès aux marchés des pays en développement pour leurs produits industriels et leurs services. Cette exigence n'a cessé depuis lors de dominer les négociations.

Une phase d'échanges informels a suivi à la fin de l'année 2006. Lors de la réunion de Davos en janvier 2007, les ministres du commerce d'une trentaine d'Etats membres de l'OMC ont marqué leur volonté de voir aboutir les négociations du Cycle, mais les divergences ont persisté sur les principaux points en discussion. En juillet 2008, Pascal Lamy, Directeur général de l'OMC, a organisé une conférence ministérielle à Genève en vue de boucler les négociations. Cependant, après neuf jours d'intenses négociations, les 153 pays membres de l'OMC se sont séparés à nouveau sans parvenir à un accord. Celles-ci ont échoué principalement en raison du désaccord entre les Etats-Unis, et l'Inde sur le mécanisme de clause de sauvegarde sur les importations agricoles, c'est-à-dire sur la fixation d'un seuil à partir duquel les pays importateurs seraient autorisés à augmenter les tarifs douaniers sur les marchandises pour faire face à une hausse soudaine des importations ou à une baisse excessive des prix.

En décembre 2008, Pascal Lamy a bien tenté d'organiser une nouvelle conférence ministérielle, mais devant les désaccords persistants, il y a finalement renoncé. Compte tenu des échéances électorales à venir (élections européennes en juin, mise en place de la nouvelle Commission européenne à la fin de l'année), il est probable que les négociations ne reprendront pas avant 2010. Après sept années d'intenses négociations, cet échec traduit la difficulté à mettre en place un système commercial multilatéral fort fondé sur des règles acceptées par tous les membres de l'OMC.

Plusieurs raisons peuvent expliquer l'échec des négociations de Doha et le recul du multilatéralisme:

- L'adhésion à l'OMC d'un grand nombre de pays (pas moins de 153 à ce jour) a entraîné une perte d'influence de l'UE au sein de l'organisation, ce qui n'était pas le cas à l'époque du GATT dominé par les Etats-Unis, la Communauté économique européenne et le Japon;

- L'opposition persistante des pays émergents tels que l'Inde ou le Brésil regroupés au sein du G20 sur les questions agricoles qui est à l'origine de l'impasse dans laquelle se trouvent aujourd'hui les négociations commerciales;

- La position intransigeante des Etats-Unis dans les négociations de Doha concernant la diminution de leurs subventions agricoles;

- La montée en puissance de la Chine dans le commerce mondial et sa pénétration dans les économies des pays en développement, en particulier en Afrique;

- La crise économique qui a renforcé les tentations protectionnistes ("Buy American Act" aux Etats-Unis).

1.2. La multiplication des accords commerciaux bilatéraux affaiblit le système multilatéral et diminue l'importance de l'OMC.

La multiplication des accords bilatéraux est en train de modifier le paysage du commerce international. Depuis l'échec de la conférence de Cancun en 2001, Les Etats-Unis et le Japon ont conclu un grand nombre d'accords bilatéraux. A ce jour, ce sont près de 200 accords bilatéraux qui ont été conclus et 70 accords supplémentaires sont en cours de négociation au point que les accords bilatéraux représentent aujourd'hui 40% des échanges commerciaux. Cela contribue à une

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fragmentation du système commercial mondial qui remet en cause les principes fondamentaux de l'OMC.

Dans un article consacré à la stratégie commerciale de l'Union européenne56, Sophie Meunier57 considère que cette évolution "met l'UE dans une situation difficile car, ou bien elle continue à promouvoir le multilatéralisme et manque l'occasion de conclure des accords bilatéraux dont elle pourrait tirer avantage pour ses entreprises et ses emplois; ou bien elle choisit à son tour de se lancer dans la course aux accords bilatéraux, ce qu'elle a déjà commencé à faire depuis 2000 (avec l'Afrique-du-Sud, le Mexique, et le Chili), ce qui risque de consacrer l'échec du Cycle de Doha et d'annoncer un changement dans sa stratégie commerciale".

A vouloir se présenter en champion du multilatéralisme, l'UE se heurte, selon elle58, à trois problèmes dans les négociations commerciales multilatérales:

- Tout d'abord, cela va à l'encontre de la défense des intérêts défensifs de l'UE dans la mesure où le Système des préférences généralisées peut faire de la concurrence aux producteurs européens qui souhaitent une position plus protectionniste, en particulier concernant la politique agricole commune. La préférence communautaire entre ici en contradiction avec le SPG.

- En second lieu, la multiplication des arrangements commerciaux avec différents groupes de pays tels que les ACP est contestée par d'autres pays en développement comme étant contraires aux règles multilatérales. Tel est le cas du commerce des bananes où l'UE a des obligations vis-à-vis des pays ACP dans le cadre de la Convention de Lomé puis de Cotonou. Ces accords préférentiels ont été contestés à l'OMC par les Etats-Unis et l'Equateur et le différend a été porté devant l'OMC où l'UE a été condamnée pas moins de dix fois.

- Enfin, la position de l'UE en faveur des PED n'a pas entraîné pour autant leur ralliement dans les négociations de Doha. L'UE s'est souvent trouvée isolée du fait de son intransigeance sur l'accès des produits agricoles des PED au marché communautaire.

2. OPTIONS DE L'UNION EUROPEENNE DANS LE DOMAINE DE LA POLITIQUE COMMERCIALE DANS LES DIX ANS A VENIR

Face à ces défis, quelles peuvent être les options de l'UE en matière de politique commerciale dans les dix ans à venir ?

2.1. Le multilatéralisme demeure une priorité de l'Union européenne

Malgré la suspension des négociations du Cycle de Doha en juillet 2008, l'UE continue de placer la réussite des négociations à l'OMC en tête des priorités de sa politique commerciale. L'aboutissement positif des négociations du Cycle de Doha ne pourrait être qu'un facteur de stabilisation fort dans un monde préoccupé par la crise financière et économique et la tentation protectionniste. Ce serait également un élément important de stimulation de la croissance économique et du développement et de l'emploi dans le monde. Enfin, il contribuerait à une meilleure intégration des pays en développement dans l'économie mondiale. Dans ces conditions,

56Sophie Meunier, "L'union européenne, la mondialisation maîtrisée et l'épreuve du Cycle de Doha", Annuaire Français

des Relations Internationales, vol VIII, p. 516 & 517, Centre Thucydide, 2007. 57Chercheur à la Woodrow Wilson School of Public Affairs de l'Université de Princeton. 58Sophie Meunier, o.c. p. 522.

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il est vraisemblable que l'UE s'efforcera de relancer les négociations une fois les échéances électorales passées et la nouvelle Commission mise en place fin 2009.

Lors de la session annuelle de la Conférence parlementaire sur l'OMC organisée conjointement par le Parlement européen et l'Union interparlementaire tenue à Genève en septembre 2008, les représentants du Parlement européen ont réaffirmé leur attachement au système commercial multilatéral incarné par l'OMC car il contribue au renforcement de la sécurité, de la transparence et de la stabilité dans le commerce international grâce aux règles et disciplines multilatérales et à l'Organe de règlement des différends. C'est pourquoi, ils appellent de leurs voeux la reprise des négociations.

A ce jour, il est difficile de prévoir quand les négociations pourront reprendre. On peut cependant imaginer que le Directeur de l'OMC, Pascal Lamy, qui a été reconduit dans ses fonctions, s'efforcera de réunir les principaux acteurs de la négociation à l'issue des échéances électorales de l'année 2009 (élections en Inde en mai, élections européennes en juin, installation de la nouvelle Commission européenne à la fin de l'année). C'est donc au début de l'année 2010 qu'on peut s'attendre à une reprise des négociations. Celles-ci pourraient reprendre sur la base du "paquet" de négociations de juillet 2008. Toutefois, la position américaine sur la réduction des subventions agricoles laisse augurer de difficiles négociations et nul doute que la conclusion d'un accord prendra encore quelques années.

Un autre chantier qui occupera la prochaine décade est la réforme tant attendue de l'OMC. Cette réforme institutionnelle est difficile parce qu'elle suppose l'unanimité des 153 Etats membres et elle prendra du temps. Cette réforme institutionnelle vise à améliorer son fonctionnement et à renforcer sa légitimité démocratique. Les membres de la Commission du commerce international du Parlement européen ont souhaité à plusieurs reprises une meilleure coordination entre l'OMC et les organisations spécialisées des Nations Unies telles que l'Organisation internationale du travail (OIT), l'OMS ou encore la Banque mondiale.

2.2. L'évolution de la stratégie de l'Union européenne en matière commerciale

Au risque de laisser le champ libre à ses concurrents, l'UE ne pouvait s'interdire de s'engager dans la voie des accords bilatéraux avec les pays tiers. La poursuite de la libéralisation du commerce via des accords bilatéraux représente un complément utile aux accords multilatéraux, et, en ce sens, approche multilatérale et approche bilatérale apparaissent complémentaires.

Les échecs répétés des négociations de Doha (Cancun en 2003, Hong-Kong en 2005) ont conduit la Commission à proposer une réforme de la ligne directrice de sa politique commerciale qui est exposée dans sa communication d'octobre 2006, "Une Europe compétitive dans une économie mondialisée"59. Pour Sophie Meunier, "l'argument central de cette communication était que, puisque la politique commerciale commune joue un rôle essentiel dans la stimulation de la croissance et de la création des emplois en Europe, il faut faire en sorte que cette politique commerciale cherche avant tout à garantir une ouverture accrue des marchés des pays tiers afin que l'Europe puisse exporter ses biens et ses services, en particulier dans les marchés asiatiques. Cette nouvelle politique signifie la fin du moratoire européen sur les accords commerciaux bilatéraux"60. En ce sens, la Communication de la Commission signifiait clairement que l'UE était désormais disposée à s'engager dans la négociation d'accords bilatéraux.

59Commission des Communautés européennes, "Une Europe compétitive dans une économie mondialisée", COM(2006),

4 octobre 2006. 60Sophie Meunier, o.c. p. 523.

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La décennie 2009-2019 devrait d'abord voir la conclusion d'accords bilatéraux avec un certain nombre de pays ou d'ensembles régionaux. Jusqu'à présent, l'UE a conclu des accords bilatéraux de libre-échange avec l'Afrique-du-Sud et le Mexique en 2000 et le Chili en 2002. A la suite des Etats-Unis et du Japon, elle s'est engagée dans des négociations en vue d'accords de libre-échange (ALE) avec la Corée du Sud, l'Inde, l'ASEAN61, le Conseil de coopération du Golfe62, le MERCOSUR63 la Communauté Andine64, les Pays d'Amérique centrale65, les pays de la zone méditerranéenne, le Canada, la Suisse, la Russie, et les pays de l'ancienne Union soviétique: Moldavie, Ukraine, Azerbaïdjan, Kazakhstan, Kirghizstan, Tadjikistan, Turkménistan.

Ces négociations ne progressent pas toutes au même rythme en raison des difficultés liées au contenu réglementaire des accords qui sont de plus en plus complexes (accès au marché, services, marchés publics, investissements, concurrence) et qui sont subordonnés pour la plupart au respect de normes sociales et environnementales.

L'un des axes majeurs de la politique commerciale de l'UE est de favoriser les regroupements régionaux. Nul doute qu'elle continuera à conditionner ses projets d'accords bilatéraux de libre-échange à la formation de regroupements régionaux. Tel est déjà le cas avec le MERCOSUR, la Communauté Andine, les Pays d'Amérique Centrale, l'ASEAN, le Conseil de Coopération du Golfe, l'Union pour la Méditerranée ainsi que les accords de partenariat économique (APE) avec les ACP.

Par ailleurs, l'UE continuera à conditionner l'accès au Système des préférences généralisées (SPG) à la ratification et à l'application de certaines conventions de l'Organisation internationale du travail (OIT) et des Nations Unies relatives au respect des droits sociaux, à la protection de l'environnement, à la lutte contre la corruption et le trafic de drogue ou encore à la bonne gouvernance.

Si les échanges commerciaux de l'UE sont régis par des règles multilatérales, les échanges réels de biens et de services sont pratiqués au niveau bilatéral, c'est-à-dire entre l'Union et ses partenaires commerciaux. La Commission européenne considère que "les accords bilatéraux de l'Union conclus avec des Etats ou avec des groupements régionaux, sont souvent conçus pour répondre à des objectifs qui sont atteints par la suite grâce aux négociations multilatérales. Ainsi, la plupart des importations de l'Union sont-elles déjà exemptées de droits ou entrent dans l'Union à des taux préférentiels en vertu d'accords commerciaux bilatéraux ou du régime des préférences généralisées"66. Ce qui faisait dire au Commissaire Mandelson que les accords bilatéraux étaient complémentaires et non substituables aux négociations multilatérales.

2.3. D'autres questions qui affectent directement ou indirectement le commerce international risquent de mobiliser la politique commerciale de l'UE dans les années à venir, à savoir:

- les décisions du prochain sommet de Copenhague concernant le réchauffement climatique,

- la volatilité du prix des matières premières,

61L'ASEAN regroupe le Sultanat de Bruneï, le Cambodge, l'Indonésie, le Laos, la Malaisie, le Myanmar, les Philippines, la

Thaïlande et le Vietnam. 62Le Conseil de Coopération du Golfe regroupe l'Arabie saoudite, Bahreïn, les Emirats arabes unis, le Koweit, Oman et le

Quatar. 63Le MERCOSUR regroupe l'Argentine, le Brésil, le Paraguay, l'Uruguay et le Vénézuela. 64La Communauté Andine regroupe la Bolivie, la Colombie, l'Equateur et le Pérou. 65Les Pays d'Amérique Centrale regroupent le Costa Rica, le Salvador, le Guatémala, le Honduras et le Nicaragua. 66Commission européenne, "Maîtriser la mondialisation: L'Union européenne et le commerce mondial", décembre 2002,

p. 12.

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- l'impact des fluctuations monétaires sur les échanges commerciaux,

- la contrefaçon et les droits de propriété intellectuelle,

- l'intégration des PME dans le commerce mondial,

- l'accès aux marchés publics.

Autant de domaines sur lesquels l'Union européenne peut apporter une contribution décisive du fait de l'avancée de sa propre législation.

2.4. Enfin, les questions relatives à la réforme des instruments autonomes de la politique commerciale commune tels que les règlements de base relatifs aux instruments de défense commerciale, aux facilitations commerciales, aux mesures antidumping, au Système des préférences généralisées ou encore aux règles d'origine devraient également occuper l'UE durant la 7ème et la 8ème législatures.

3. LE RENFORCEMENT DU ROLE DU PARLEMENT EUROPEEN DANS LE DOMAINE DE LA POLITIQUE COMMERCIALE COMMUNE

3.1. L'absence de contrôle parlementaire de la politique commerciale commune

L'UE s'est dotée d'une politique commerciale commune fondée sur des principes uniformes. Le cadre juridique actuel de la politique commerciale commune (PCC) est défini à l'article 133 TCE qui dispose que "la politique commerciale commune est une compétence exclusive de la Communauté". La PCC permet ainsi aux 27 Etats membres de s'exprimer d'une seule voix sur la scène internationale et à l'Organisation mondiale du commerce (OMC), ce qui renforce leur influence.

Les instruments conventionnels de la PCC sont les accords commerciaux conclus avec un ou plusieurs Etats ou organisations internationales; les autres instruments autonomes sont essentiellement le règlement anti-dumping et les autres règlements de base relatifs au Système des préférences généralisées (SPG), qui permet un accès en franchise de droits de douane ou un accès préférentiel à taux réduit à la plupart des importations en provenance des PED et des économies en transition.

Actuellement, les accords commerciaux sont négociés par la Commission sur la base des directives de négociations adoptées par le Conseil et après consultation du "Comité 133". C'est ensuite au Conseil qu'il appartient de conclure ces accords, sans que l'approbation du Parlement européen ne soit seulement requise. Enfin, c'est la Commission qui assure la représentation de l'Union européenne à l'OMC et devant l'Organe de règlement des différends (ORD).

Le traité de Nice n'accorde aucun pouvoir législatif au Parlement européen dans le domaine de la politique commerciale. Lors des négociations ayant conduit au traité de Nice, la Commission européenne avait plaidé, sans succès, pour que le rôle du Parlement européen soit renforcé. Toutefois, depuis l'accord cadre intervenu en juillet 2000 sur les relations entre le Parlement européen et la Commission, celle-ci s'est engagée à tenir informé le PE du déroulement et de la conclusion des négociations internationales de manière qu'elle puisse tenir compte des positions du PE. Ainsi, le Parlement européen a-t-il été consulté pour avis lors de la réforme en 2005 du règlement du Conseil sur les préférences généralisées accordées aux PED.

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3.2. L'évolution du cadre juridique renforce le rôle du Parlement européen

Il faut bien admettre que l'absence du Parlement européen dans le contrôle de la PCC nuit gravement à la légitimité de cette politique. C'est pour remédier à cette situation que le traité de Lisbonne prévoit en ce qui concerne la Politique commerciale commune:

3.2.1. L'extension de la compétence exclusive de l'Union à la totalité des accords commerciaux. Ce qui signifie que toutes les questions relevant de la PCC (partie V, titre II du traité de Lisbonne) relèveront de la compétence exclusive de l'Union, y compris le commerce des biens, les services, les aspects commerciaux de la propriété intellectuelle et l'investissement direct étranger. Cela signifie en outre que les accords commerciaux seront des "accords de l'Union" et qu'il n'y aura plus d'accords commerciaux mixtes conclus à la fois par l'Union et les Etats membres.

3.2.2. Le renforcement du rôle du Parlement européen.

A la demande de la Commission du commerce international, le Service juridique du Parlement européen a rendu, le 17 mars 2008, un avis67 sur les nouveaux pouvoirs du Parlement européen dans le domaine de la politique commerciale commune dont on peut résumer les principales dispositions:

- Premièrement, la procédure législative ordinaire (la codécision) s'appliquera désormais à l'ensemble des instruments autonomes de la politique commerciale: règlements de base relatifs aux Instruments de défense commerciale, au Système des préférences généralisées (SPG), à l'Antidumping, aux Règles d'origine (article 188 C, §2 du traité de Lisbonne);

- Deuxièmement, l'extension des pouvoirs du Parlement européen ne se limitera pas à une modification de la procédure mais profitera de l'extension du champ d'application de la PCC à l'investissement étranger direct;

- Troisièmement, tous les accords commerciaux seront désormais soumis à l'avis conforme du Parlement européen (article 188 N, §6 du traité de Lisbonne) concernant la procédure de négociation et de conclusion des accords internationaux entre l'Union européenne et les pays tiers ou organisations internationales) et qu'en conséquence, le Parlement européen sera tenu régulièrement informé de l'état d'avancement des négociations (article 188 N, §10 du Traité de Lisbonne), ce qui n'était pas prévu dans les traités antérieurs.

Le rôle du PE va évoluer d'une participation exclusivement consultative et largement volontaire à une codécision sur un pied d'égalité avec le Conseil. L'extension de la codécision devrait ainsi accroître la légitimité démocratique de la législation européenne dans le domaine de la politique commerciale commune.

67"The new powers gained by the European Parliament in the field of commercial policy and the implications for the

work of the Committee on International Trade", European Parliament, Legal Service, 17 March 2008, D(2008)6296.

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CHAPTER TWO:

REINVIGORATING OUR STRATEGY IN THE WIDER NEIGHBOURHOOD

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ENLARGEMENT

I. ENTRENCHED FATIGUE OR FULL STEAM AHEAD? - Georgios Ghiatis

Enlargement has been and will continue to be an issue of strategic importance for the European Union and its future as a major player on the international scene. In a changing global environment the EU should work out a comprehensive new consensus on its enlargement strategy that serves its long term interests, ensures its viability as a political project and provides and strengthens democratic legitimacy thus allowing it to re-gain the "hearts and the minds" of the citizens.

Enlargement to the Central and Eastern European countries has been widely acknowledged as a success of all the Member States, old and new. It helped Europe overcome its division and contributed to peace and stability. It consolidated common principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and the rule of law and fostered prosperity within a market economy.

Despite this success however, dissatisfaction emerged in the EU about the scope, the course and the consequences of the enlargement process. Scepticism about future expansion grew. The Union's capacity to integrate further members has become one of the major themes in political discussion over the last three years. In several Member States, mostly among the EU "15", public acceptance of further accessions has declined. This was labelled enlargement fatigue.

Looking ahead there is little doubt that enlargement, a strategic issue already, will gain in importance. If the EU is not to alienate its potential and ambitions as a world player, as well as public opinion with regard to the future of the European integration project, outstanding questions should receive clear answers. It is in the EU's interest to sustain, within the Member States and in the candidate/ potential candidate countries, legitimacy for further enlargement.

1. MAJOR TRENDS, CHALLENGES

Background

Five years on, the fears that the EU "big-bang "enlargement of May 2004 (completed in 2007 with Romania and Bulgaria) would trigger various negative consequences proved to be quite exaggerated (e.g. the fear of massive displacement of cheap workforce from the eastern European countries to the EU "15", a massive shift eastwards of western manufacturing with ensuing redundancies, a large channelling of EU taxpayers contributions to finance the formerly state controlled economies, EU institutional paralysis etc.).

However, scepticism about enlargement was quick to surface in particular following the failure of the 2005 referenda on the Constitutional Treaty in France and in the Netherlands. "Enlargement fatigue" was fuelled, inter alia, by the fear of some Member States that their influence within the EU might be further diminished. Negative aspects of globalization were often confused with consequences of enlargement thus blaming on it negative effects which were rather related to domestic issues. The general public's reaction in the face of the complexity of the "EU system", which did not provide the citizen with the appropriate and efficient information, was one of cautiousness towards integration.

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Criticism was directed at new Member States when they adopted a far more "atlanticist" stance than the EU average, e.g. on the war in Iraq, or when they displayed a more enthusiastic attitude about market economy. Scepticism was further fuelled by long standing disputes, e.g. the Cyprus question and ensuing relations with Turkey which remained unsolved; the preparation and ability of the "last arrived" Member States to effectively assume their full obligations was questioned.

The Eurobarometer survey on EU Enlargement68

Public opinion perceptions about the consequences of the recent enlargement are set out in a survey conducted in January 2009 in the 27 Member States. Its findings show that 92% of the respondents in the enlarged EU agree that the integration of the Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries has led to increased possibilities to freely move and travel within the EU. 76% of respondents agreed that it contributed to the modernization and growth in CEE economies, 73% that it facilitated the spread of democratic values and protection of human rights and that it has increased the EU's global role (73%). 70% agreed that the western European countries made "massive financial transfers" to help eastern countries modernize.

However, with regard to the challenges the enlarged EU is faced with, two thirds of the respondents considered that enlargement made the EU more difficult to manage (66%). Over half of the respondents said that enlargement contributed to job losses in their country (56%) and that it created problems because of the divergent cultural traditions (54%). Half of the respondents (50%) considered that enlargement led to an increased feeling of insecurity although 58% agreed that it helped to preserve security and stability in Europe.

With regard to the issues that should be taken into account prior to any future EU enlargement, respondents considered (from a personal, national and EU viewpoint) the key issues to be freedom and democratic values and economic issues. Citizens from each Member State ranked economic issues as either the most or the second most important issue to be considered. The third most important was immigration followed by cultural and religious issues.

From the results it appears that EU citizens do not have fundamentally different opinions about the key factors to be considered prior to further enlargement. However nuances could be important for the understanding of the reasons/arguments prompting support for or opposition to the inclusion of new EU Member States.

The framework

The December 2006 European Council69 confirmed that the EU's enlargement strategy would be based on the principles of consolidation of commitments, fair and rigorous conditionality and better communication with the public "combined with the EU's capacity to integrate new members". The acceding countries must be ready and able to fully assume the obligations of EU membership and the Union must be able to function effectively and to develop. The pace of the accession process "depends on the results of the reforms in the negotiating country, with each country being judged on its own merits". The European Council reiterated that the future of the Western Balkans lies in the EU70.

68 Flash Eurobarometer N°257: Views on European Union enlargement, The Gallup Organization, February 2009. 69 European Council 14/15 December 2006, Presidency Conclusions, p. 2. 70 ibid , p. 3.

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In this framework, a first set of questions with regard to the prospects for the EU enlargement by 2019 could be as follows: How many Member States are likely to constitute the EU in 2019? Under which conditions will they have joined? What evolution for the EU institutional framework and accession criteria and what level of integration/cooperation between Member States will have been achieved by then? Will other forms of relationship of the EU with candidate/potential candidate countries have emerged by then constituting valid alternatives to enlargement?

The structural factors and the trends

Analysts consider as the key structural factors that shape the global environment in the medium /longer term those of demography, the economy, energy, the environment and science and technology. The EU, in order to establish itself as a fully-fledged actor on the world stage, will have to take account of the emerging trends and reach a shared assessment of the future challenges, threats and opportunities with which it will be confronted and of the best options in order to drive change71.

Experts suggest that the globalization of the economy will continue and even intensify. This will increase interdependence but will also magnify differences between and within states and regions. Emerging economies will gain relative power within the global arena and the number of important players on the international stage is likely to increase. Economic globalization has also important implications in international politics and in the sphere of culture. Many argue that we have already entered the process of shifting into a multipolar world within which the role of multilateral regional structures (such as the EU) is likely to be consolidated. At the same time there is a risk of fragmentation and a proliferation of "failing states" which can become sources of insecurity. Such developments will make the international system more heterogeneous and more complex. One of the likely consequences is a more acute perception of disparities-and inequalities- in a world of ever-growing information flow and communication. Broadened communication through information technologies and the Internet acts as a "uniformizing" force but also opens the door to understanding diversity and exploring cultural confrontation.

Furthermore, the population in the developing world is expected to grow while in the developed it should remain almost stable. Europe, with low fertility rates, an ageing population and the ensuing needs in additional resources for pensions and long term care may be faced with a declining growth rate72. At the same time, demographic expansion combined with urbanization, pollution, scarce resources, climate change and environmental degradation will have important effects in some regions (e.g. the Middle East-North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa). These will very likely result in a significant internal displacement of populations and migratory flows which will be of direct concern to EU Member States. They may also constitute an important health challenge to Europe. Global energy demand is expected to grow substantially particularly in the developing countries. Fossil fuels (oil, gas, coal) will most likely account for at least 4/5ths of the demand. The EU's energy dependence upon outside sources will continue. Renewable sources will not cover more than 10% of demand hence greenhouse gas emissions are expected to increase.

Various challenges will therefore emerge while the possibility for largely coordinated international institutions' responses might be reduced. Although some analysts argue that enlargement could be the EU's best policy to respond successfully to globalization, a prudent approach seems more realistic. Globalization offers opportunities for change but is also likely to be a factor of

71 The New Global Puzzle- What World for the EU in 2025? EU Institute for Security Studies, Paris, 2006. 72 Commission Staff Working Doc: Europe's Demographic Future-Facts and Figures, SEC(2007)6381, 11.05.07.

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instability as it can provoke the expression of nationalism (political, economic), encourage fundamentalism or trigger various forms of protest.

Against this background on the global stage, the EU will pursue its objective of reinforcing its role as a global player, an issue whose importance is identified in the above Eurobarometer findings. It will intensify its efforts towards sustaining stability and democratization in its neighbourhood. Accession negotiations will continue but their pace may vary according to the progress made by the concerned candidate country in adopting and implementing the acquis. It may also be that specific circumstances emerging in those negotiations may further affect their evolution (e.g. the border dispute between Slovenia and Croatia).

In general, it looks highly unlikely that the EU will be tempted to embark into a new round of "massive enlargement" in particular as long as the Lisbon Treaty ratification process is not complete, and as public opinion in several Member States remains sceptical towards further expansion and/or has not a clear grasp of what further integration may entail. Economic issues are perceived within Member States as probably the most important element to be considered prior to further enlargement. They will certainly have a major influence on the EU's strategy on enlargement.

Programming the financing of enlargements' costs for the period after 2013 may prove a quite "sensitive" operation as the economic situation in the Member States and consequently the resources to be programmed for the financing of EU policies are likely to be negatively affected, for at least the next few years, by the current crisis. In a potentially restrictive climate for EU finances a further complication might arise in the case that the duration of the EU Multiannual financial programming cycle (Multiannual Financial Framework- MFF) were adjusted, as of 2014, from seven to five years, so that it could roughly coincide with the period of the EP's legislature and the corresponding Commission's mandate.

A debate about "Europe's borders", although an issue that goes back to the 60s (De Gaulle), has gained in importance for more than a decade now. It looks that this is likely to continue in the years ahead, prompted by the experience of the last enlargement, the candidature of Turkey and whether or not it should be allowed to join, as well as recent developments in the EU's neighbourhood (Caucasus area conflict, energy security issues etc). Some argue that such debate is provoked in order to distract from the correct and strict implementation of set criteria and conditionalities. However, as long as scepticism towards further EU expansion is expressed by a large part of public opinion(s), the issue will most likely remain on the EU agenda.

It is therefore quite likely that after Croatia's accession (2013?) the EU will seek to define a new "consensus" on enlargement strategy which may be enriched with a more detailed prescription of the successive stages in the road to accession. It may also contain ideas/conditions on forms of participation of potential candidate countries to multilateral structures of a cooperative nature which could develop into relationships that may be alternative to EU membership.

The European Parliament has already made suggestions73 as to the broad lines to be followed with a view to developing such a new enlargement strategy, which could be summarised as follows:

(a) maintain the ongoing accession negotiations under the "rigorous and fair conditionality" principles, while clarifying the notion of the EU's integration capacity; ensure that every enlargement is followed by adequate consolidation and political concentration through a reassessment of EU policies in order to guarantee the viability of the EU political project;

73 P6_TA(2008)0363-Resolution on the Commission's 2007 enlargement strategy paper, 10 July 2008 (Brok report).

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(b) persuade potential candidate countries which need long periods for making effective reforms to take part in specific multilateral frameworks as an "intermediate step" until they have made sufficient progress to qualify for candidate status; countries taking part in such frameworks would continue to benefit from EU policy instruments;

(c) develop and propose in particular to the eastern European neighbours for the medium and longer term a new form of specific regional cooperation frameworks of policies developed together; consolidate such cooperation in specific agreements (Eastern Partnership, Black Sea Cooperation Agreement)

These are proposals that will be high on the EU internal debate agenda for the next few years and will no doubt influence the bilateral or multilateral aspects of the EU's external action. Such a revised strategy is likely to be developed in parallel with the negotiations for a new EU Multiannual Financial Framework. It should also be reminded that the EP has consistently stressed for more than a decade now that the resources foreseen to finance the EU's external action(s) were insufficient. It is very likely that this EP position will be reiterated in the context of the future MFF.

Should the EU proceed with the review and fine-tuning of its enlargement strategy, applications for accession, further to the ones presented by now, will have to be dealt with in the light of such developments. Countries of the Western Balkans whose progress might have proven very slow or inadequate could see a revised strategy apply in their case. It looks likely that at least for the first half of the period under consideration the EU will be taking more time to assess its policies and means to implement them with regard to possible impacts that an enlargement might generate. It seems also likely that further enlargement(s) will be rather less influenced by considerations of "realpolitik" and "equilibrium in the treatment of candidates" than the 2004 enlargement was.

By 2019 it is likely that the EU will count around 30 Member States: it will include Croatia and, probably, a couple more among the other Western Balkan states (Serbia? Montenegro? fYROM?), depending on whether they will have fully complied with the criteria and will have fulfilled their obligations under the Stabilization and Association Agreements-SAA (see also the paper: Reintegrating the Balkans). It could not be excluded that by that time only the accession negotiations with those or some of those countries will have been completed and that the actual accession will be following in due course.

However, it should not be excluded that European Economic Area (EEA) countries may come up with a request for EU membership. Iceland is currently discussing the possibility of introducing such an application in the near future. It could be argued that enlargement fatigue and the required consolidation period (following the Croatia accession) would be of no relevance in this case, considering the existing convergence of EEA countries with EU legislation. Accession negotiations in such cases, once opened, are likely to be concluded quite rapidly so that the accession process could be concluded well before 2019.

It is still unclear whether conditions for a "shared" understanding on the issues of integration visions and assessments of past experience as well as on plans for enlargement will prevail, or whether the decisive factor for determining the EU's policy on further enlargement will be "the lower common denominator approach". The EU will have undermined its own credibility and ambitions if it allowed itself to get bogged down in contrasting national agendas.

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2. KEY POLICY CHOICES

The EP has supported the Union's enlargement strategy. It contributed to clarify and make explicit the concept of integration capacity of the EU. It stressed that the budgetary and broader economic and social implications of further enlargements must be duly taken into account in drafting the Multiannual Financial Framework for the post 2013 period. It also insisted that every enlargement should be followed by a "serious reassessment of EU policies and means" in order to respond to the expectations of the European citizens but also to ensure that the EU's internal cohesion and capacity to act will not be negatively affected. A shared assessment of the future challenges and opportunities the EU will be faced with means that the EU enlargement strategy should be reviewed in such a way as to ensure its viability and further successful results/outcome. The EP further suggested that there should be a more in depth analysis of the links between the ENP and the enlargement policy and insisted that their relationship should be completed with a qualitative analysis.

This will require working-out a further "consensus" on (a) the notion /scope for the Union's effectiveness and efficiency as a political entity in defining and putting into effect "the things we want to achieve together" and (b) on the means to be used (legal, political, financial/budgetary, institutional) in order to achieve the defined objectives. For such a consensus to be reached it is necessary to ensure that at each phase of the agreed-projected action the "legitimacy requirement" be fulfilled.

Without public support for enlargement, either within the Member States or inside the Member State(s)-to be, throughout the various stages of the enlargement process, there will be looming the risk of setbacks in the process with ensuing dissatisfaction, distrust and potential loss of credibility for the EU, turning possibly into open challenge of the usefulness of the measures at stake or even of the projected outcome (enlargement) as a whole.

Having in mind the already acknowledged "enlargement fatigue", EU Member States' public opinion will need in particular to be informed in clear and understandable terms on the effects that specific options are expected to have on their situation. In other words the anticipated consequences, should this or that other country join, would have to be clearly spelled out. Public opinion(s) will have to be convinced of the expected broader benefits that such operation, on balance, will bring. Such communication strategy would be also expected to specify the links that exist between the EU's policies and the Member State's interests/positions. Indicating only the broader principles that inspire the proposed enlargement and the goals that it would serve is likely to prove insufficient as information to win the necessary support of the simple citizen.

The information/communication on enlargement needs therefore to be developed in a coordinated manner between Member States but also among EU institutions involving possibly Member States' and candidate country's institutions and- most importantly- civil society. The EU institutions (and the EP in particular) could undertake initiatives so that such coordination may be achieved.

In this respect, at the same time, people-to-people contacts can be instrumental in helping achieve such developments and therefore it would be of major importance that an agreement is found so that the EU proceeds with the lifting of existing obstacles in this area (e.g. for the Western Balkan countries to move rapidly to a visa-free regime).

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It could be argued that for the next ten years, the EU's "governability" will be measured, mainly, in terms of its efficiency and transparency, as well as its democratic legitimacy. Consequently, enlargement plans as well as integration-related efforts will only have real chances of success if they are explained to and understood by Europe's citizens. Citizens will give their support if they feel they take part in the overall process and if they are convinced of the validity of the project(s). It will be the EU's capacity to face internal and external challenges while sustaining the political integration project that will most probably determine the scope, timing and conditions for future enlargement.

In that context Europe has an interest to oppose threats such as nationalism through the reinforcing of a European identity, counter fundamentalism through the promotion of democratic dialogue and effective control and to channel protest by further engaging with civil society (integrating the work of NGOs) enhancing transparency and sustaining participation. Thus legitimacy and effectiveness will be fostered.

Furthermore the right balance should be found between the period required for consolidation after an accession has taken place and the launching of a following enlargement so that it may be understood and supported in a steady manner by public opinion. This element is important in the current and future accession negotiations. In addition, setting dates for accession and raising over-optimistic expectations is counterproductive because there is the risk that a "de-motivating effect" may be produced undermining the "sustainability" of the project. In general, it is right to suggest that an enlargement/accession project, which is a rather long process, should not be mainly dependent on the changing moods of public opinion. Its "swings" however should not be underestimated. Political leadership is required so that such swings can be re-worked and answered through information/communication in order to secure that democratic legitimacy and support by public opinion will not decline. The EU and the EP in particular are expected to provide such leadership because it is through enhancing the legitimacy of the European project that steps could be taken towards building a common political culture in the EU.

3. ENHANCING THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT'S RESPONSES

The EP took the view that the "conceptual, political and legal gap existing between the EU's Enlargement strategy and its Neighbourhood policy needs to be filled...". It therefore asked for a "more substantive qualitative change" to be carried out in the Neighbourhood Policy so as to respond to the expectations of the EU eastern neighbours74. It should be expected that the EP will be working in the next few years on the ways and means to fill such gap.

It will be monitoring more closely the European Neighbourhood Policy Instrument (ENPI) implementation in the context of democratic scrutiny. In parallel the EP will be multiplying its efforts towards strengthening the parliamentary dimension within the pre-accession and accession process. For this to happen it will have to:

- intensify contacts with the Parliaments of both the candidate and potential candidate countries including at the level of its relevant bodies such as parliamentary committees, delegations, committee chairs, rapporteurs etc.; the EP could be a major "player" in "building legitimacy" throughout the period both within Member States and in candidate countries;

74 P6_TA(2008)0363-resolution on the Commission's 2007 enlargement strategy paper, 10 July 2008 (Brok report).

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- promote multilateral frameworks for contacts and act as a forum for contacts between Parliaments of Member States and those of candidate/potential candidate countries, fostering cooperation on items of legislative and non-legislative nature, on the way parliamentary scrutiny and democratic control are implemented and diffusing best practice; . interparliamentary dialogue could thus be strengthened;

- intensify and deepen its contacts with the Parliaments of the Member States75 on EU pre-legislative, post-legislative and non-legislative matters;

- engage more decisively with civil society both within Member States and within potential candidate/candidate countries; the EP can play a major role also in this area.

Furthermore the EP will have a role to play in the negotiation aimed at concluding an agreement on a new Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF)76. This role will be enhanced in case the ratification process of the Lisbon Treaty was completed.77

In the MFF the envelope for the financing of the EU external action should be increased. This should consequently be translated into higher amounts when transposing the MMF into specific programmed action authorized in the annual budgetary procedure (where the EP co-decides with the Council). It will also exercise its powers of democratic scrutiny and of ex-post budgetary control in order to ensure that the EU taxpayers' money is efficiently and effectively used for the approved objectives.

75 P6_TA(2009)0388- resolution on the development of the relations between the EP and national parliaments under

the Treaty of Lisbon, 7 May 2009. 76 P6_TA(2009)0374 -resolution on the financial aspects of the Lisbon Treaty, 7May 2009. 77 P6_TA(2009)0387 -resolution on the impact of the Treaty of Lisbon on the development of the institutional balance

of the EU,7 may 2009 - see also P6_TA(2009)0373 -resolution on Parliament's new role and responsibilities in implementing the Treaty of Lisbon, 7 May 2009.

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II. REINTEGRATING THE WESTERN BALKANS - Herbert Pribitzer

The prospect of EU membership will continue to be the driving force for the reform process and the overall stability in the Western Balkans during the forecast period. However, their integration will be time-consuming and cumbersome because of the difficult post conflict transition and the experiences of the last enlargement in 2007. It will also become harder to convince EU citizens of the benefits of further EU enlargement.

Therefore, only Croatia will join the European Union during the forecast period (likely in 2012 or 2013). The other Western Balkan countries will not enter the European Union before 2019. However, Serbia and Montenegro (and possibly the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Albania) will have completed or will be close to completing accession negotiations by 2019.

In order to maintain stability in the region it will become necessary to use more effectively the leverage available to the population of the Western Balkans who want their countries to join the European Union. This includes a more coherent and strategic application of all available community instruments particularly in the most vulnerable countries Bosnia & Herzegovina and Kosovo.

All the countries of the Western Balkans have been granted a European Union (EU) perspective as confirmed by the Council conclusions of 16 June 2003 and endorsed by the Thessaloniki European Council of 19/20 June 2003. So far, the prospect of EU membership has proven to be a catalyst for the Western Balkan countries to implement political, economic and institutional reforms, albeit with significant regional differences. The EU's key policy tool has been the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP), which is a long-term political and financial commitment to the region.

Croatia and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) have already become EU candidate countries. While Croatia's opening of the remaining negotiation chapters depends on the resolution of the border conflict with Slovenia, FYROM has yet to start its negotiations since Greece has blocked these negotiations over the unresolved name dispute. In the meantime, Montenegro and Albania have applied for membership, and Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina are expected to follow in the second half of 2009.

Despite this progress, the EU's enlargement policy is today more controversial than ever, with declining support from citizens particularly in 'old' member states:

The recent Eurobarometer survey published in November 200878 showed that only the accession of Croatia is supported by a majority of EU citizens (52% in favour - 34% against). The integration of the other Western Balkan countries gets just minority approval: Kosovo (34% in favour - 51% against), Albania (34% - 50%), Serbia (38% - 47%), Bosnia and Herzegovina (40% - 44%), FYROM (40% - 43%) and Montenegro (41% - 41%).

It is interesting to note, though, that a majority of EU citizens consider that the accession of the Western Balkan countries to the European Union would contribute to stability in the region (48% in favour compared to 39% against).

78 Eurobarometer No 69 "5. The European Union today and tomorrow", http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb69/eb69_part3_en.pdf

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MAJOR TRENDS AND CHALLENGES

It is obvious that the process of integrating the Western Balkan countries into the EU will be more difficult and time consuming than was the case with the recent 12 new member states, having in mind the specific situation - most notably the post-war transition process - and the lessons learned during the last enlargement round in 2007.

Common features

In spite of country-specific differences among the various Western Balkan countries there are common features, which will apply to all of them in the future:

• The overwhelming majority of the population across the Balkans will continue to want their countries to join the European Union; this is regardless of their political views or ethnicity. The economic crisis, which will seriously hit the Western Balkan economies in due course, may even strengthen citizens' desire in this respect. Overall, the populations' enthusiasm for Europe will remain the most important if not the only lever for the European Union.

• At the same time, the political elites of these countries regardless of whether they are formally in government or in opposition will likely stay in power in the medium-term future. The post-war political system favours those who have already been in power and makes it difficult for new politicians to appear on the scene. This means that Bosnia and Herzegovina and to some extent FYROM will remain in the hands of politicians, who have largely failed to demonstrate a serious commitment to seizing the opportunities offered by the European Union; Albania and Serbia will also be governed by politicians who are at logger-heads with democratic values such as media freedom. It is crucial, therefore, that the EU responds to these politicians in a coherent, credible and tough-minded way.

• It is unlikely that the Balkans will fall back into conflict, despite the fact that stability will remain fragile in Kosovo and rumours will continue in Bosnia and Herzegovina that paramilitary groups are on the rise.

• However, there are increasingly worrying signs that democratic freedoms and civil society have suffered serious setbacks over the last two years across almost the whole of the Balkans. For example, there have been serious attacks on free media in Serbia, Albania, and Bosnia and Herzegovina in the last 12 months. It is not unlikely that these problems will persist in the medium-term, since the current flawed political system allows political elites to use citizen's fears as a mobilizing tool ahead of elections. The real danger, though, as Paddy Ashdown, the former High Representative and EU Special Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina recently argued at the US Helsinki Commission79, is that Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina will become 'another Cyprus': "a divided, dysfunctional space that the [European Union] cannot afford to leave . . . because it is too destabilising, but [the European Union] is also unable to push forward toward full statehood".

Outlook of individual countries

It is safe to argue that in the period to 2019 Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo will remain the most vulnerable countries in the Western Balkans.

79 US Helsinki Commission, Hearing "The Western Balkans: Challenges for U.S. and European Engagement" of 2 April

2009; "http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900sid/SNAA-7QV8PG?OpenDocument

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Bosnia and Herzegovina: The single most important issue will be constitutional reform aimed at creating a fully functional and democratic state. This process, which is currently dominated by the leaders of the three ethnic political parties in power, will need to be put on a wider basis with full participation of the broader public. Pro-democratic opposition leaders, as well as civil society, will need to be allowed to participate as equal players in debating, drafting and advocating for the new constitutional provisions. Otherwise, the process and its outcome will not receive the necessary popular legitimacy and will fail, as happened in 2006. As the next general elections will take place in October 2010, it is unlikely that this process will start before the new Governments - whose formation could take as long as six months - are in place. Therefore, Bosnia and Herzegovina is unlikely to have a new constitution before 2013/2014. Another major challenge for the country’s political 'stability' will be the census, which is foreseen to be conducted in 2011. This may indirectly influence the overall pace of reform and further delay constitutional reform and other issues.

Kosovo: It is likely that Serbia with the support of Russia will continue to fight Kosovo's independence through diplomatic channels in the medium-term. This means that Kosovo's politics will be dominated by this issue and by its attempts to assert full sovereign rights in the medium- to long-term. The key milestone will be the ruling of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on the legality of Kosovo's declaration of independence, which is expected to be issued in 2010. The relations between Serbia and the Kosovo government will remain strained in the medium-term.

Clashes could arise as the Serbian Government finds it harder to maintain its influence in Kosovo Serb areas, while the Kosovo authorities step up their insistence on recognition of statehood as a precondition for official contact of any kind. At the same time, the Kosovo government will request more and more strongly that UNMIK's mandate be ended. This may lead at some point in the near future to a rejection of UN authority altogether.

It is likely that Kosovo will remain economically unsustainable in the medium-term and strongly dependent on international aid and remittances. The economic crisis and the rapid decline of remittances may lead to further political instability with the possibility of social unrest. In any case, this will negatively influence the reform process and the political relationship with the EU.

Serbia: EU integration will likely remain Serbia's main foreign policy priority in the medium-term, but any immediate progress will depend on the arrest of Ratko Mladic, a top indictee of the International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in The Hague. It is possible that Serbia and FYROM will be the first countries after Croatia for which the EU will abolish the visa regime, in early 2010. Nevertheless, the increasing domestic unpopularity of the Serbian Government will further slow down the reform process, which makes it unlikely that Serbia will meet the necessary EU requirements in the medium-term.

The future course vis-à-vis Kosovo will largely depend on whether or not the current government can regain wider public support. Although the government has repeatedly stated that it will never recognise Kosovo it has softened its policy since it came to power in October 2008. It is expected that most of its harsh opposition to Kosovo's independence will be for domestic consumption. The key event will be the ruling of the International Court of Justice (ICJ).

Montenegro: The government’s overriding goal will be to advance to the EU and NATO, (although NATO accession remains highly controversial and strongly opposed by the pro-Serb parties). Montenegro submitted a formal application to join the EU in December 2008. The main issues to tackle will remain the fight against organised crime and corruption as well as judicial and public administration reform.

Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM): The prospects for the EU integration (and NATO accession) of FYROM will likely further decline and it is even possible that FYROM will lose its

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position as a forerunner. It seems that FYROM will submit a detailed case to the ICJ against Greece in the course of 2009, which will lead to a further deterioration in relations. Although FYROM's recognition of Kosovo, which came as a result of demands from the local Albanian parties, has improved inter-ethnic relations in FYROM, Kosovo will remain a potential source of instability due to the fact that radical ethnic Albanian elements in the two countries will maintain close links.

Albania's main foreign policy priority will remain EU integration (after it successfully joined NATO on 1 April 2009). Despite the submission of an EU membership application in May 2009, it is unlikely that the country will be granted candidate status in the medium-term. The latest Commission progress report of 2008 was significantly critical and highlighted the need to improve the functioning of the judicial system, to enhance the fight against corruption and organised crime and to make more progress on structural economic reform.

Situation in 2019

It is highly improbable that any of the above mentioned countries will have joined the European Union by 2019. Nevertheless, it is possible that some of these countries - most likely Serbia and Montenegro and possibly FYROM and Albania - will have completed or will be close to completing accession negotiations by 2019.

The only exception is Croatia, which has made good progress over the last few years. Nevertheless it is difficult to predict at this stage when Croatia and Slovenia will reach a mutually acceptable agreement on the border issue, which has been blocking the negotiation process for quite some time now. If the process can be unblocked in course of 2009 Croatia could realistically finish accession negotiations in the first half of 2010 (provided that Prime Minister Sanader's resignation does not create a policy change of the new Government). The initial target date for concluding negotiations by the end of 2009 seems completely unrealistic now. The scenario of concluding the negotiations in 2010 would allow Croatia to join the European Union by 2012 or 2013 depending on how long the ratification process in all member states lasts.

Regional integration

Regional integration will remain the cornerstone of successful integration into the European Union and therefore a key element in the EU Stabilisation and Association Process. The three key instruments of regional integration, which may become still more prominent in the future, are the Regional Cooperation Council (RCC), which succeeded the Stability Pact, the Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA) and the Energy Community Treaty ("Athens Treaty").

These three instruments will continue to make significant contributions to development across the Balkans in the medium term. Yet, they can only help the countries to help themselves. They may emerge as useful indicators of each country’s ability to take ownership of its affairs, as well as serving as a barometer of the countries’ capacity to show social and economic solidarity. These forms of cooperation could conceivably be upgraded in the medium-term if the full integration process is delayed or takes too long.

It will be important that lessons learned through the EU accession process are shared throughout the region. This relates not only to Slovenia but also to Croatia. Following recent statements from Croatian Government officials, it is possible that Croatia will take a leadership role in the region and help to transfer knowledge to the other Western Balkan countries.

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KEY POLICY CHOICES

Despite the clear European perspective of the countries of the Western Balkans and the support for their preparation that is being extended through various policy instruments, there is growing frustration on both sides:

The EU and the member states are increasingly frustrated about the slow pace of reform in these countries despite the enormous technical and financial support they have received. This is also reflected in the declining support of European citizens for the enlargement process. On the other hand, the perception of the Western Balkan countries is that the EU is becoming more and more indecisive about the further enlargement process, with EU citizens showing scepticism about the prospect of their accession.

Nevertheless, it seems likely that the EU will continue to employ a number of tools:

• The Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP), which has become the most important policy tool through which the progress of individual countries to the European Union membership is evaluated and supported. The underlying idea of the SAP is to place countries on the European Union integration track while employing the conditionality principle to encourage reforms in different sectors. This tool is well suited to guide the complex integration process and deal with its technical aspects. It will likely remain the most important tool to align the policies of the Western Balkans with those of the European Union.

• The ESDP operations in Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina, which have contributed to the stability of the region and successfully promoted the rule of law principle. It is possible that member states may call for the downsizing or the phasing out of some of these operations, such as the Althea operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It will be important that discussion of these issues is based on a comprehensive and through political assessment.

• The appointment of EU Special Representatives in Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina with the objective of ensuring better coordinated and communicated EU actions.

It is foreseeable that these three elements will remain the key tools during the enlargement process. However, it will be important to apply them more coherently and effectively in the future.

At the same time, it will be crucial to exercise more effectively the leverage arising from the fact that the overwhelming majority of the population, including all major political parties, want their countries to join the European Union. This entails, among other things, a better and more direct communication with the broader public in the region. But it also requires sticking to conditions which the European Union has established to drive the enlargement process forward. If conditions are applied incoherently (as happened in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the case of police reform) there is a risk that the European Union will lose its credibility. Therefore, the European Union will need to put more emphasis on setting the right conditions, which are crucial for the integration process, and ensuring that these conditions are fully met.

Some of the tools suffer from a lack of purpose. It will be important to give clearer support to the European Union Special Representatives (EUSR) primarily to the one in Bosnia and Herzegovina. One of the crucial elements is to provide the EUSR with a clear and strong mandate as requested by the European Parliament in its Resolution on Bosnia and Herzegovina of 24 April 200980.

80 European Parliament resolution of 24 April 2009 on the situation in Bosnia and

Herzegovina, P6_TA(2009)0332, available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P6-TA-2009-0332+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN

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Furthermore, it will be increasingly important to avoid a perception that the EU and the Western Balkans are drifting more and more apart. For this reason the EU has to resolve the question of its capacity to absorb new members. The European Union must also communicate more effectively that there is a clear choice to be made by local politicians: to become a member of the European Union or to be consigned to the global margins, beset by poverty, crime and neglect.

Finally, it is possible that the rise of the EU as a key foreign policy actor may trigger the development and expansion of tools at its disposal, particularly those involving soft powers (dialogue, facilitation etc). These 'soft power' tools require a high level of resources and a high degree of sensitivity, since it is not easy to transfer learning from other regions or to build new structures in a fractured civil society. However, these soft power tools have the capacity to build trans-national and interethnic solidarity, both of which are conspicuously lacking in the Western Balkans.

ENHANCING THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT'S RESPONSES

The European Union’s overall leverage in the Western Balkans will depend on the credibility of its commitment to a European future for the region.

In this respect, the European Parliament has played an important role by supporting the Commission and the Council in their efforts and at the same time by helping to shape the process. For example, the European Parliament has repeatedly stressed the importance of intensifying dialogue with the civil society of the Western Balkans; it has also called for rigorous application of the principle of conditionality. By doing so it has helped to shape the enlargement process and win general acceptance for the process among the responsible EU institutions.

The European Parliament is currently considering the possibility of working more closely with the Regional Cooperation Council in Sarajevo. This would be an important contribution to closer regional cooperation among the countries of the region.

At the same time, there are three areas where the European Parliament could further enhance its responses:

1. The European Parliament's strongest involvement is in its capacity to exercise the right of democratic scrutiny, particularly scrutiny of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) including its funding. In addition, the European Parliament may act more visibly as a facilitator and mediator among EU institutions when it comes to controversial issues such as the status of Kosovo and the recognition of its declaration of independence, or the full visa liberalisation process.

2. The European Parliament could also more effectively exploit the potential of the framework for parliamentary cooperation with the Parliaments of the region. Active involvement of regional Parliaments in the countries' preparations for the EU is a key determinant of progress. In this respect, the regular Joint Parliamentary Committee meetings among members of the European Parliament and of the respective regional Parliaments could become a powerful instrument to promote reforms and raise public awareness of European values. In the medium-term, these meetings could evolve to become the political counterpart of the rather technical SAP meetings between the Commission and the representatives of the regional Governments.

3. Finally, the political groups of the European Parliament could more actively contribute to the modernisation and democratisation of political parties in the Western Balkans through their political family contacts.

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TURKEY: INTEGRATING A REGIONAL POWER? - Sandro D'Angelo

EU accession remains Turkey's main priority after the beginning of May 2009's cabinet reshuffle, but future Turkish foreign policy could be aimed at pursuing an independent path on key regional issues playing a more assertive role in its immediate geopolitical neighbourhood. The key elements of this new vision are, on the one hand, a relative weakening of the “Western dimension” of Ankara’s international strategy and, on the other hand, a relative strengthening of its role as a regional power (including ties with Middle Eastern neighbours and the South Caucasus countries). However, Turkey's new regional aspirations do not suggest that Turkey wants to dissociate itself from the West but rather it wishes to have other options in case EU membership proves not to be successful.

Due to its particular location astride two continents - Europe and Asia - and with a unique blend of Eastern and Western tradition, Turkey has come to acquire increasing strategic significance: a rising regional power in the Eurasian landmass with strong historic, cultural, economic and military influence in the area between Europe to the west, Russia to the north, Central Asia to the East and Middle East to the south. But Turkey is important not only for where it is but also for what it is: the most powerful, unitary, democratic and secular state in the Muslim world81.

1 - TRENDS AND CHALLENGES AHEAD

Since its foundation as a republic, in 1923, it has become increasingly integrated with the West through membership of organizations such as the Council of Europe, NATO, OECD, OSCE, and is the only candidate country for EU membership which is also a member of the Organization of the Islamic Conference. A member of the G-20 major economies, since the economic crisis of 2001 Turkey has seen impressive progress: economic growth has been strong, inflation has fallen dramatically and the level of foreign direct investment (FDI) has risen substantially. Fostered by the start of Turkey’s EU accession negotiations in 2005, it has gradually opened up its markets through economic reforms by reducing government controls on foreign trade and investment, privatization of publicly owned industries and liberalization of many sectors.

Even if economic growth slowed last year – as it did everywhere – and the employment market is getting weaker (it engages only 43% of the working-age population), the overall performance of the Turkish economy demonstrated that its foundations are substantially stronger than some years ago. In this regard, it is interesting to note that the impact of the global financial crisis has remained limited so far. However, huge foreign debt remains a major burden.

Regarding military capacity the Turkish Armed Forces is the second largest standing armed force in NATO, with a combined strength of 1,000,000 uniformed personnel serving in its five branches.

81 P. Khann, The Second World – How Emerging Powers are Redefining Global Competition in the Twenty-First Century,

Penguin Books, 2009, p. 37; St. Kinzer, Crescent and Star: Turkey Between Two Worlds, Strauss and Giroux, New York, 2001; H. Pope, Son of the Conquerors: The Rise of the Turkic World, Overlook Press, London, 2005.

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The powerful military, traditionally seen as the guardian of the secular system, has a long history of involvement in politics; but in recent years, its profile has been lower in public life82.

The most defining aspect of Turkey’s foreign relations has been its ties with Europe, which is in line with its traditional Western orientation. Turkey has had a long association with the project of European integration: it applied in 1959 for associate membership of the European Economic Community (EEC), and in September 1963 an association agreement (known as the Ankara Agreement) was signed, aiming at bringing Turkey into a Customs Union with the EEC (1995) and to eventual membership. Turkey began full membership negotiations in 2005. In line with EU requirements, along with economic reforms it went on to introduce substantial human rights, abolishing the death penalty, overhauling the penal code, introducing some reforms in the areas of women’s rights and the Kurdish minority, which by some estimates constitutes up to a fifth of the population. The ensuing pro-European euphoria for the opening of accession negotiations was to be short lived, and for all practical purposes the accession negotiations have now reached deadlock: since 2005 Turkey completed its obligations under the screening process in all 35 chapters, but just one chapter has been provisionally closed, while 10 are currently opened and under negotiation.83

However, in the case of Turkey's membership it is not just a question of adopting all the EU acquis as things are much more complicated. There are some EU governments who declare that even if Turkey meets all the accession criteria, they would still oppose its accession. President Nicolas Sarkozy said on 5 May 2009 that the EU should create a common economic and security space with Turkey as an alternative to Turkey's membership in the Union. Instead of full membership, he proposed a reinforced partnership in the economy and security sectors. A few days later German Chancellor Angela Merkel added that she would prefer Turkey to receive a privileged partnership from the EU, rather than full membership. Not only are EU governments deeply divided on whether Turkey should become a member or not, but citizens are too. According to the results of the Eurobarometer (spring 2008)84, EU citizens are far more divided on the question of further enlargement, which fewer than half support. Although a majority of respondents are - a priori – against Turkey joining the European Union, they remain divided on the question of the country’s membership once it has complied with all the conditions fixed by the European Union: in this case, 45% of respondents are in favour of Turkey joining the EU, while a like proportion remain opposed to Turkish membership.

However such developments have caused a rising disillusionment in Turkey to perceptions that the EU would always keep it at arms length. The difficulties have had a detrimental impact on both Turkish politicians and on public opinion that has lost faith in Europe. Domestic support for EU membership had reached 70% at the start of the negotiations, but now that figure is closer to 40%.

Many Turkish analysts think that the current degree of close cooperation between Turkey and the EU should not be taken for granted and question whether it should continue if the accession process fails. Equally important, if Turkey does not become a member, this would constitute a failure in the EU’s enlargement policy where the EU’s capacity to project its normative power and bring about political and economic transformation would be greatly undermined.

82 E. Aydinli, N.A. Ozcan and D. Akyaz, “The Turkish Military’s March Toward Europe”, Foreign Affairs, January-February

2006. 83 Due to the Turkish failure to apply the Additional Protocol to the Ankara Agreement to Cyprus, the December 2006

European Council decided that eight relevant chapters will not be opened and no chapter will be provisionally closed until Turkey has fulfilled its commitment. However, this did not mean that the process of negotiations was blocked and in fact as of January 2007, the negotiations were back on track on the chapters that were not suspended.

84 Eurobarometer 69, European Commission, November 2008.

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THE DEMOGRAPHIC ISSUE

Turkey’s accession is relevant also for demographic reasons. Today, one of the most significant and vital problems of the EU is its ageing population. According to current demographic trends and indicators, the European population is likely to decrease sharply. This will lead to shrinking markets, less taxable income and lower revenues from social contributions. Some experts estimate that by the year 2025, the EU’s population may even decrease to less than 400 million from the current figure of around 500 million. On the other side Turkey has a young and increasingly educated population which could, taking a long term perspective, bring additional dynamism and important benefits to the older population of Europe. However, just the size of the population raises many concerns. Because of its large population (about 75 million - with an annual growth rate of 1.3 percent85), right now Turkey would occupy a large enough bloc of seats in the European parliament to put it ahead of France, with a voting power second only to Germany. Moreover, at current rates of population growth, Turkey would outweigh even Germany by 2012 with about 82 million inhabitants.86

2 - EU POLICY CHOICES: FUTURE DEVELOPMENT DURING THE 2009-2019 PERIOD

Turkey's considerable political, economic and military weight would greatly enhance the EU's international leverage. As pointed out in many EU documents, Turkey’s strategic importance to the EU has further increased in key areas such as energy security, conflict prevention and resolution and regional security in the Southern Caucasus and the Middle East. The country's engagement with the EU, through the negotiations and related reforms which are underway, makes it a stronger force for stability in a region facing many challenges. In particular as regards the energy sector, EU countries recognise Turkey’s ambition to become a Eurasian “energy hub”, and its role in further contributing to strengthen Europe’s energy security (namely through support to the Nabucco87 project).

For the European Union it is not only the size and the strategic location of the country that is extremely important, but the Turkish economy is becoming more and more integrated with the economy of the EU and is already today the second most important strategic partner to the European Union after the United States88.

Furthermore, the debate on Turkey’s European Union membership should also take into consideration the strengthening of the EU soft power, i.e. its capability to enhance the EU civilian power especially in the Muslim world. Turkey’s unique role in Europe of bringing together different cultures around a common understanding is important if one considers the fact that one of the sources of the current crisis in international politics comes from a lack of understanding between different cultures and religions. Turkey’s endorsement of the European stance in world matters could bring legitimacy to the EU’s position in the eyes of non-Europeans.

However, the frustrations of dealing with an "undecided" Europe have led Turkish policy-makers to focus their efforts on an area where the expected return on their "investment" was more

85 According to the "Turkish Statistics Institute". 86 Shrinking Regions: a Paradigm Shift in Demography and Territorial Development, external study commissioned by the

European Parliament, June 2008. 87 The Nabucco pipeline project, aimed at bringing Caspian gas to the West through Turkey, is often described as an

alternative plan to diversify energy sources and curtail the Russian monopoly. 88 Turkey is the 17th largest global economy, a member of the G20 and, as of late a non-permanent member of the UN

Security Council.

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immediate and more concrete. Prime Minister Erdoğan has recently visited many countries in the Middle East – Syria, Lebanon, Egypt, Algeria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Iran and Iraq. While in four years he made his first visit to Brussels last January 2009.

As matter of fact, almost all of Turkey's foreign policy moves over the last couple of years have a pronounced Eurasian and Middle Eastern bent, prompting more than one analyst to say that "Turkey is shifting its attention from west to south, from Brussels to Beirut and beyond"89. The question is whether this turnaround is a structural phenomenon – a sign of a fundamental shift in Turkey’s policy– or just a temporary and transitional phase. As the architect of Turkey's current foreign policy, Ahmet Davudoğlu, has indicated "Ankara plans to become an increasingly active player in reshaping current power balances in the regions", such as Middle East, Caucasus90 and the Balkans.

Turkey’s geography is predominantly Asian, Turkey’s emotions are increasingly Middle Eastern, and yet Turkey’s elites – whether civilian or military - remain resolutely pro-Western and pro-European, considering themselves the indispensable modernizers. But for how long? A Turkish proverb says "You can't dance at two weddings at the same time." While the music in each has already started, just which dance Ankara will join -- North or South -- remains to be seen. One of the most common reasons for not integrating new countries in the Union is its reluctance to accept more members, especially the big ones. This is true not only for the current low public acceptance towards enlargement policy but also for the institutional uncertainties, e.g. standstill with respect to the entry in force of the Lisbon Treaty. In this respect Turkey’s accession to the European Union is more than a Turkish "problem", this would be considered rather as an EU "dilemma" to which the EU governments have to respond. Therefore, if Turkish accession contributes, according to the debate, to make Europe more adaptable, flexible and with a stronger influence on the world stage, so the chances of successful membership seem to be good. In practical terms if the EU stays on course and Turkey remains committed to its reform course, some experts say that it could join the European Union within 15 years.

3 - ENHANCING THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT'S RESPONSES

On 12 March 2009 the EP approved a resolution on Turkey's progress report 2008, in which it pointed out once again the ongoing polarisation within Turkish society and between the main political parties. Particularly, the document underlines that the EP

"is concerned to see in Turkey, for the third consecutive year, a continuous slowdown of the reform process, and calls on the Turkish government to prove its political will to continue the reform process to which it committed itself in 2005; stresses that such modernisation is first and foremost in Turkey's own interest and for the benefit of Turkish society as a whole"

It means that progress on negotiations primarily depends on Turkey's ability to meet opening benchmarks and to adopt and implement EU-related reforms.

89 Sinan Ülgen, "Turkey’s route to the EU may be via the Middle East", Europe's World, Spring 2009. 90 The recent rapprochement (April 2009) with Armenia is part of a broader Turkish strategy to establish friendly

relations with all of its neighbours. Restoring relations between the countries could fundamentally change political alignments in the Caucasus.

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According to the above stated considerations, the EP's action could continue to stress the importance to Turkey of accelerating the reform process in every aspect of society (human rights, democratic accountability, fundamental rights and freedoms), to restore and to improve its relations with Armenia, to resolve the Kurdish minority question and the Cyprus issue. The best way forward for the Europe Parliament in order to achieve its main goals is to act with justice and fairness, two key elements that cannot be separated.

More specifically, the European Parliament should urge Turkey to develop a cross-party consensus on an active reform process based on respect for human rights and the rule of law, including welcoming political parties, ethnic and religious minorities and civil society entities in the drafting of a new constitution. Regarding specific human rights issues, freedom of expression and freedom of the press are still not sufficiently protected in the country, so, the EP, as it has done so far, could continue to call specifically for the repeal of the notorious Article 301 of the Turkish Penal Code91. One of the main reasons blocking the start of the talks on new chapters is the non-recognition of Cyprus. The recognition of all EU member states is a basic prerequisite for membership. Without it, without a comprehensive settlement of the question based on UN Security Council resolutions and without compliance with the obligations under international law, the resumption of negotiations seems to be difficult.

During the plenary session in May 2009, Parliament's political parties took a critical stance towards Turkey. While recognizing the enormous progress made by Turkey on the path of reforms, however, it was confirmed that the reform process has currently stalled. Even those member governments that have in the past supported enlargement have become much more muted on the subject. In order to obtain concrete results, the European perspective should be maintained to achieve reforms in Turkey.

In the course of the next two legislatures European Parliament should focus on three areas which still require further attention:

- Democracy: constitutional reform must be pursued and, considering recent events, it is necessary to understand whether the policy implemented by the parties in charge is sensible.

- Freedom of expression: it is the basis of democracy. The progress achieved on the reform of Article 301 does not justify attacks on freedom of the press.

- Rule of law: it is the basis for the effective functioning of society and the economy and it is a key value of the EU.

In this respect MEPs could look in particular at the role played by the Turkish military in influencing the country’s political affairs. Even if the civil-military relations in Turkey have shown a substantial improvement with the constitutional amendments and legislative changes between 2002 and 2007 certain important issues need to be addressed in pursuing this process, for example, allowing civilian actors to play a more active role and improving the implementation of parliamentary control over Turkey’s military budget and expenditure. The EU institutions should encourage Turkey’s political elite to focus public awareness on the need to enhance the democratic control of the armed forces.

91 In April 2008 Turkey adopted an amendment to Article 301 but it does not go far enough as people continue to be

prosecuted for expressing non-violent opinions.

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"PRIVILIGED RELATIONSHIP" WITHOUT ACCESSION?

The direction of Turkey-EU relations in the next few years is one of the most controversial issues currently debated by many EU specialists, politicians and the media. The main consensus is that relations will continue to follow the same path as the previous year. There are relatively positive signs for 2009, such as the visit of the Prime Minister to Brussels, the new EU Chief Negotiator's fresh start in the process, and the establishment of Kurdish broadcasting. But as stated above the pace of accession negotiations with Turkey will reflect the pace of reform as well as the country's fulfilment of the relevant conditions. On the other hand as national governments give their citizens a greater say in EU affairs, Turkey must take its case directly to the European public in order to try to maintain popular support for accession. In so doing, Turkish advocates of EU membership should go beyond the notion of Turkey as a "bridge to the Middle East". Arguments that focus on Turkey as a mediator or a model for the Muslim Middle East fail to address central concerns held by Europeans about the costs of Turkish accession in terms of development assistance, competition for jobs, and having 75 million new neighbours who are “strange” or “different.” Until Ankara can effectively convey to Europeans that these costs will be outweighed by concrete benefits, the prospects for Turkish membership will continue to be uncertain, regardless of the strategic advantages that come with it. The European Parliament, which is naturally committed to strengthening dialogue with citizens, could play an important role in this in the two forthcoming legislatures, for example forging party-to-party contacts, or supporting the opening of cultural centres, the increasing of the number of sponsored internships and academic exchanges in order to highlight the convenience of having Turkey in the Union.

Finally, as regards the question of Turkey's membership of the EU it is worth remembering that the EP in the Resolution of March 200992 stressed that full compliance with all the Copenhagen criteria and EU integration capacity, in accordance with the conclusions of the December 2006 European Council meeting, remain the basis for accession to the EU, and that in fact the negotiation process with Turkey "does not lead a priori and automatically to accession".93

92 European Parliament resolution of 12 March 2009 on Turkey’s progress report 2008. 93 European Parliament resolution on the 2004 regular report and the recommendation of the European Commission

on Turkey's progress towards accession.

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OUR EASTERN NEIGHBOURHOOD: DEALING WITH TRANSITION FAILURES - Dag Sourander

Instead of "Europeanisation", our eastern neighbours got continued rule of self-serving, undemocratic elites and protracted conflicts. Russian post-imperial ambitions go against interests of the countries of the region as well as interests and values promoted by the EU. Viewing the region as a mere arena for geopolitical competition is, however, misleading and unacceptable. The EU needs both to deal with Russia's influence and to become a more efficient promoter of reforms. The EP can gain a bigger role in EU policy-making and become better at influencing interlocutors in the neighbourhood if it re-organises its own work.

BRIEF OVERVIEW OF POST-SOVIET DEVELOPMENTS

Seen in a big perspective, Europe is still living through the fallout of the implosion of the Soviet empire. In the westernmost states in the former empire, the implosion was followed by transition - under EU and NATO auspices - to western-European-style democracy and market economy. Peace and stability were secured. By contrast, transition processes in the remaining ex-Soviet space stalled, were de-railed or even reversed, with the continuation of many authoritarian practices and the thriving of mostly reform-averse oligarchic elites as important results. Serious inter-ethnic tensions persist, inter-state relations (within the region and with its immediate neighbours Russia, Turkey and Iran) are in several cases hostile and deceptively named "frozen conflicts" may re-erupt, as already happened in Georgia, with Russian participation, in August 2008.

The "colour revolutions" in Georgia and Ukraine 2003-2005 brought fresh hope that transition might ultimately succeed also in these countries - and potentially as well in others in the ex-Soviet space. But these events also sounded alarm bells in the resurgent Russia, which sees democratisation and "Europeanisation" as incompatible with its interests.

With the stepping up of Georgia's and Ukraine's NATO membership ambitions and the split NATO's hesitant, but in principle positive response, the conflict with Russia's ambitions became acute. Russia punished Georgia by dismembering it of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The Kremlin also made it clear that it regarded the mainly ethnic Russian populated Crimea's inclusion in Ukraine as an accident and that the 1997 Russian-Ukrainian friendship treaty, in which Ukraine's borders are recognised, could be denounced.

Russia is now concerned that a second new spring for transition might come - this time from an improved EU cooperation and integration offer that could entice ruling elites to become much less selective in their implementation of reform agendas. The level of concern is moderate, since the EU's upgrade of its European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP)/East to the Eastern Partnership (EaP) may well prove insufficient to substantially change these elites' calculations of their interests and policies. But Russia feels a need to check the EU's activities and demands a right to be associated to the EaP.

Russia alleges that the EU is seeking to build a sphere of influence in the region. In reality, the EU's policy remains fundamentally different from that of Russia. It continues to be focused on promoting stability and on increasing mutually beneficial cooperation. It works through the EU's power of attraction, not through coercion. Although conditionality exists, political conditions are rarely applied.

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Developments in the region will be deeply influenced by both Russia and "the West" (mostly the EU, US and NATO). But for compelling principle as well as pragmatic reasons, the EU must oppose every attempt to reduce the region to an arena for geopolitical competition and refuse to treat its countries and peoples as pawns in a game of chess.

It should be noted that what has made the six countries included in the Eastern Partnership into what they currently are is mainly domestic processes triggered by the collapse of communism and of Kremlin control. Russian and western policies have played significant, but smaller roles. The interests of the elites in the six states look set to remain decisive for many developments. For them, securing and further increasing their own wealth and power is fundamental and this is likely to remain a tremendous obstacle to transition-oriented reforms. Possible gains from further increased trade and deeper interaction with the west are, however, likely to at least sustain the limited interest in reforms that most of these elites presently demonstrate. The extent of the interest will depend on the size of the possible gains, as well as on how they can be obtained (including on what conditions foreign actors introduce).

When analysing the region as the European part of the "ex-Soviet space", it must be noted that this space is ever less homogenous. The extent to which transition has occurred (with Belarus on one end of the scale and Georgia and Ukraine on the other) is only one of the respects in which the countries differ strongly. For example, Azerbaijan stands out as a petro-state showing signs of becoming a victim of the "resource curse"94 - and of having become completely immune to EU attempts to stimulate democratic development and other reforms. It is also a country where radical Islamism appears to have a future95. Georgia's dependence on western support is truly huge and is unlikely to go down much. Armenia's economic and security links to Russia are so strong that this country in some respects could almost be regarded as forming part of the Russian Federation. In Ukraine, the oligarchic elite is deeply split, with changeable groupings of comparable strength competing with each other. The preservation, since the Orange Revolution, of a remarkable level of pluralism in Ukraine may in fact be due to this competition as much as to the functioning of democratic institutions (which remains precarious) or to the spread of a democratic mind-set (which seems to be ultra-slow within public institutions).

MAJOR FORCES AT PLAY AND TRENDS

"State capture" by self-serving elites

The dissolution of the Soviet Union led to transformation of "captive nations" into "captured states". In these states, mostly oligarchic, but in some cases more communist party or security apparatus coloured elites, generally grown out of local chapters of the Soviet "nomenklatura", control the state apparatus and tend to use it to further own, rather than national interests. Corruption is pervasive and not decreasing, with Georgia as a notable exception. Elections are flawed and never lead to a change of government, except in Ukraine (where they since the Orange Revolution have always done)96.

Theoretically, new "colour revolutions" could occur (there was indeed an attempt after the presidential election in Armenia in 2008). The likelihood of this does, however, seem low.

94See my Comprehensive note on Azerbaijan, p 7 (can also be accessed via the website of the Policy Dept - External

Policies on the EP's intranet, www.expo.ep.parl.union.eu/expo/cms/pid/17). 95Op cit, pp 10-11. 96The political system in Ukraine is discussed in my General Briefing on Ukraine, pp 8-10.

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Governments determined to stay have learnt lessons and use an array of measures to prevent the emergence of propitious conditions. Inhibitions against the use of force against demonstrators appear to have gone down and the international support for fair elections has certainly become weaker97.

An effective system of checks and balances may emerge in Ukraine, where progress in this direction has been made (media freedom, free and fair elections) and in Georgia, where western actors have huge leverage. Elsewhere, a combination of strong popular pressure and major new incentives provided by the west would probably be required to loosen elites' grips on the states.

Demographic decline

Due in particular to very low birth rates since the fall of the Soviet Union, the working age populations of most of the countries of the region will continue to decline. After the current economic crisis, Russia's need for immigrant workers will grow again. Ever more people in the EaP region may go to Russia, and also to the EU, for work, with potential implications for bilateral relations, as well as for the socio-psychological conditions for Europeanisation.

Brisk economic growth - but currently a crisis with possible enduring consequences

For years before the outbreak of the current economic crisis, economic growth in the region was strong. In the medium term, a return to the earlier growth path looks likely. Reasons include these countries' rather well-educated and relatively cheap workers; the vicinity and access, on increasingly favourable terms, to the EU market, as well as to the Russian one, and the countries' potential to become very attractive locations for foreign direct investment, if governance standards and the general business climate improve.

The economic crisis is all but certain to entail new domestic tensions. It could lead to increased authoritarian or dictatorial tendencies, but also to greater dependency on foreign actors with an interest in transition. The foreign policy implications of the economic crisis in Russia are moot. Needs to deal with crisis-related domestic problems could lead to toning down, or postponement, of efforts to project more Russian power in what Russia terms its "near abroad". But in the context of rising discontent and possible tendencies towards a revival of opposition forces and towards regional disintegration, the leadership in the Kremlin might resort to nationalist campaigns and provocation of tensions, or even limited conflicts, with selected foreign actors as a means to shore up its own position. None of this would be without longer-term consequences.

Nationalism

Nationalism has bolstered state-building, but frequently been exploited for other purposes. It has provoked tensions and inter-ethnic hatred and, in the first years after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, even wars. Increasing exploitation of nationalism is a moderate risk throughout the region. It may aggravate inter-ethnic tensions and lead to increased violence - possibly all the way from more frequent attacks on foreigners in the streets to new wars over disputed territories.

97 A more detailed discussion can be found in my General Briefing on Armenia, pp 9-12.

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Opportunistic "multi-vector" foreign policies

With a view to balancing dependencies and maximising opportunities, most governments conduct what some of them call "multi-vector" foreign policies. Strategic choices are generally avoided and instead of broadly implementing agreed European Neighbourhood Policy Action Plans, the governments in practice tend to treat them as pick and choose menus. If the EU further increases its offer, it may be able to obtain more whole-hearted commitment to the implementation of reform programmes.

EU "gravitational pull"

The EU's power of attraction is anyway huge, due inter alia to the size of its market; its potential as a source of aid, investment and technology transfers; its excellent education facilities; its attractive labour markets; as well as the proven capacity of its economic system to produce wealth and of its social arrangements to ensure cohesion. Moreover, the EU is a powerful symbol of respect for human rights and peace.

Although these factors will probably ensure strong pull also in the coming decade, it is wise not to take this for granted. Renewed economic success of Russia and the rise of China, India and other countries may divert attention from the EU. And the EU's value as a model will certainly fall in case of dismal economic performance or if EU societies fail in their handling of migration and ethnic tolerance issues.

The gravitational pull is essentially a result of what the EU is. What the EU does, and in particular what it could do, is dealt with further down in this paper.

Russian perceptions and policy

Vladimir Putin considers the dissolution of the Soviet Union to have been the biggest geopolitical catastrophe of the past century. The Kremlin has not come to terms with its loss of empire and its claim to a sphere of influence tends to set Russia on collision course with leaders and citizens of neighbouring countries. In its relations with these countries, Russia uses manipulation, pressure and (in the case of Georgia) even warfare. It exploits undemocratic and human rights violating leaders' tendency to prefer a partner that makes no fuss about governance standards and citizens' rights and interests, but it has after the colour revolutions also become increasingly skilled in nurturing friendly civil society organisations and arranging different sorts of exchanges to strengthen links with Russia.

If the Kremlin will again deem that using military power could be effective in the pursuit of a vital interest, it will probably feel rather low inhibitions against doing so. At least politically, it got away very cheaply with its warfare in Georgia. But in normal circumstances, the energy weapon and non-military support to secessionist or other opposition forces will be more useful coercive instruments.

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US policy

While the EU and the Eastern European and South Caucasus countries need to manage interdependence that is due to their geographical proximity, the US outlook is different. Washington tends to let its policies be guided by the fact that these countries and the five ex-Soviet Central Asian republics are situated between the US' European allies, the Greater Middle East (with its friends and foes of the US) and America's biggest geopolitical competitors Russia and China. US policies in the region will probably also in the future depend heavily on how US relations outside the region develop. And the scope for coordination of EU and US policies in the region will be much influenced by the degree to which the EU and the US will have common perceptions and compatible policies outside of it.

Competition for control of gas supplies

The EU seeks to develop a Russia-independent "Southern Corridor" for westward transport of Caspian gas98, but even if these efforts are finally crowned with success, this might only marginally affect the EU's huge and fundamentally growing dependency on Russia. A possibly just as important question is: to what extent will it become easier for Russia to subject Ukraine, Belarus or Moldova to pressure through interruption of gas supplies? If realised, the Russian-led Nord Stream and South Stream gas pipeline projects in the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea respectively will facilitate this by disentangling exports to the EU from exports to the three east European countries.

In 2019, the EU may well be even deeper trapped in its gas dependency on Russia than at present. Substitution of piped gas with liquefied natural gas (LNG, which can be transported in special tankers between any ports with the required infrastructure, almost like oil) may have brought some alleviation. But this will hardly have solved the problem, especially since LNG may still be costly. For Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus, LNG is unlikely to be of much help. But at least in Ukraine, the potential for energy savings and reduction of import needs is truly enormous.

By 2019, Russia may already have exploited its gas leverage on the EU in a dramatic way. This would not necessarily have to be through any sudden turning of gas taps, or threat of this. A re-orientation of gas exports towards the probably insatiable Chinese market could instead be used, or threatened in a credible way. In return for saving the EU from being starved of gas, Russia might demand that it be granted a freer hand to build its coveted sphere of influence in Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus.

When looking for gas from other sources than Russia, the EU is already courting the Turkmen regime. It may soon enough also be negotiating with the Iranian regime, which has even greater gas reserves - and an even more ghastly human rights record. The EU's attempts, against terrible odds, to secure its gas supply without damaging other important foreign policy objectives may well become agonising. Reducing the pressure on foreign policy to solve problems caused by the EU's own energy use will then become a strong wish. In the coming years, the foreign policy case for reducing EU fossil fuel use is likely to be made more often and gain wider recognition, beside the obvious climate case for this.

Some technological breakthrough in the energy sphere may provide an escape from the worsening foreign policy dilemma into which our high energy consumption now leads us. But in the current circumstances, betting on this seems reckless.

98This includes Azerbaijani gas. The Azerbaijani gas reserves are, however, small in relation to the EU's needs.

Azerbaijan's gas production is likely to peak before 2020.

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A weakened status quo in the South Caucasus

The South Caucasus, with its Azerbaijan-Georgia-Turkey oil and gas pipeline corridor, has become a flash-point in the struggle for control of fossil fuel supplies. Russia's dropping of precision bombs just beside a pipeline during the war in Georgia was with all likelihood a message, not an accident99. But more than control of energy is at stake in this strategically located region between the rising powers Russia, Turkey and Iran. For a number of reasons, the status quo - with inter alia the unresolved, flammable Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and the closed Armenian-Azerbaijani and Armenian-Turkish borders - seems to be getting less sustainable. These reasons include Azerbaijan's enormous military investments, Russia's new level of pressure on Georgia, the consequent increased Turkish interest in protecting existing and developing new trade routes in the region and the further raised need for Armenia to get out of the isolation in which the closed borders are keeping it (due to that the Georgia route, used for vitally important trade with Russia, now looks more insecure).

The entangled character of these and more problems in the region suggests that it will be difficult to solve any of them without simultaneously addressing others. Ideas on a process aimed at a major redefinition of relations in the region have repeatedly been advanced, most recently by Turkey after the war in Georgia, but with no result. Future developments will depend inter alia on how far Russia will be prepared to go to block the development of the Southern Corridor. Also to be noted: the risk of a new Nagorno-Karabakh war - even deadlier and more devastating than the one in 1992-94 - is real100.

A new modus vivendi with Russia?

Before and after its warfare in Georgia and recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states, the Kremlin proposed the launch of a diplomatic process to elaborate a new security order in Europe. This has led to nothing. Among the possible reasons are the vagueness of the proposal and strong suspicions regarding the Kremlin's actual strivings: Devaluing the "OSCE acquis"? Ultimately obtaining a new Yalta-like division of the continent? Having found the damage to its international relations caused by its actions in Georgia fully manageable and having succeeded in slowing down or even reversing Georgia's and Ukraine's progress towards NATO membership, the Kremlin itself now looks less interested in its proposal. But at some point, key actors may deem that formulation of an acceptable revised security order in Europe has become realistic and make an attempt.

CHALLENGES FOR THE EU

● Dealing with Russia's claims and policies and reduce the risk of further Russian use of force in the region. To stimulate long-term transformation of Russia's perception of the region and Russia's role in it and to prevent destabilisation, the EU could:

- more clearly and systematically oppose the idea that Russia has special post-imperial rights which it can enforce against the will of countries in the region and against international law,

99For more on the possible energy consequences of this war, see my note The Consequences of the South Ossetia War,

pp 7-8. 100See Thomas de Waal: The Karabakh Trap. Dangers and Dilemmas of the Nagorny-Karabakh conflict, in particular the

section Scenarios, pp 8-11.

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- help ensure respect for legitimate security interests and genuine security concerns of Russia, as well as of all other relevant actors, by promoting further development of common security arrangements, building on, and not compromising, the "OSCE acquis",

- take every opportunity that might arise to reduce the dangerous opposition between its and Russia's external energy policies, e.g. if Russia becomes more dependent on and ready to make concessions in return for western support for maintaining its oil and gas production capacity (this may well happen, not least given the costs involved, Gazprom's shortage of funds and the toll the economic crisis is taking on Russia's resources),

- vigorously tackle obstacles to exploitation by EaP countries of their enormous potential for reducing their energy consumption - and with it their carbon emissions, import needs and vulnerability to interruptions of supplies,

- stimulate and support EaP countries to conduct effective and well-balanced minority and cohesion policies, so as to decrease destabilisation risks.

● Developing its approach to the problems in the South Caucasus. Through its ESDP Monitoring Mission in Georgia, the EU suddenly and rather surprisingly (also to itself!) established itself as a significant security actor in the region. With its big post-war aid programme, the EU is also making an important contribution to Georgia's economic security (which is related to Georgia's security as a sovereign state). In the face of the urgency created by the war, the customary reluctance of a major group of EU member states against increased EU engagement in the region receded. Unless there will be new dramatic developments in the region, a return to the long-term trend of a relatively slow, but steady expansion of the EU's policy is likely. Energy interests will no doubt play a role.

As to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, the EU could increase its support to the Russian-US-French ("Minsk co-chairs") mediation, e.g. by doing more to stimulate changes in attitudes of the conflicting parties. To be effective, such efforts should target both the leadership and the popular levels and include more civil society projects. The EU could also prepare for participating in peace-keeping forces and for taking a leading role in reconstruction, which will be crucial elements in any settlement.

● Becoming a more effective promoter of reforms. New elements, additional funds and a new label - the Eastern Partnership - are now being added to the EU's policy101. Meanwhile, the economic crisis is hitting hard and with great likelihood reinforces governments' focusing on short-term and tactical issues instead of on strategic issues for the development of their countries. The EU has to adapt to this, e.g. by discussing new macro-financial assistance measures with governments in the region (with implications for the EU budget) and being extra cautious when promoting economic reforms with considerable initial costs for the respective countries.

Addressing governance issues is becoming more acute, not only because of the need to ensure that the growing EU assistance is properly and efficiently used. Governments are likely to face increasing public discontent and may be tempted to react with authoritarian measures. They should instead be persuaded to use their powers in cleaner and more confidence-inspiring ways. In an optimistic view, the crisis will provide an opportunity for progress in political reforms by

101A summary of the new elements and overview of the funds are included in a Commission press release of 5 May 2009.

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generating stronger domestic pressure for this, while also increasing the leverage of the EU and other reform-promoting foreign actors.

● Reviewing approaches to governments and societies. Political and economic reforms are objectives recognised by the respective governments in the ENP Action Plans that each of them and the EU have adopted (Belarus is, however, a different case). But the rhetoric and the reality are often far apart. The EU errs on the side of caution whenever EaP government misrepresentation of facts and conditions is not fully proved. When describing violations and wrongful acts by EaP country authorities, the EU often uses euphemisms or omissions, attempting to limit the fallout of criticisms on bilateral relations.

If the distance also between the EU's rhetoric and the reality is great, the EU is as a matter of fact complicit in hypocrisy. What EU representatives perceive as diplomatic tactfulness then appears as an affront to the peoples whose rights are violated, including to democracy campaigners, human rights defenders and journalists revealing truths, putting their own welfare on the line. Civil society activists in the region loathe EU statements that they see as conferring undeserved credibility on governments' commitment to democracy and on elections.

When EaP governments talk the talk but don't walk the walk, the EU should certainly encourage walking, but what to do about the talk? Distance the EU from it? Regard much of it as a useful recognition, after all, of what should be aimed for? The EP's position that civil society should be more listened to and involved may provide guidance.

● Developing - or not - long-term perspectives for the cooperation and integration process. The absence of any EU membership perspective weighs heavily on the motivation of EaP countries to undertake difficult or costly reforms. Giving the most advanced EaP countries such a perspective could work as a shot in the arm, but would constitute a huge commitment with consequences that are difficult to predict. Some argue that the entire EU project will be wrecked if enlargement is not brought to an end. Reaching consensus within the EU on "ultimate borders" does, however, look impossible and many oppose the very idea. The loss of EU influence in countries placed outside is one of their arguments, the unpredictability of future challenges is another.

IMPORTANT ISSUES FOR THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

● Strengthen its role as a forum for debate on the above choices and effectively contribute to EU policy-making. The EP's role in the ENP/EaP has so far been very small102. Only two general resolutions have been passed and there timing was not adapted to that of major EU decisions or important events. Democratic scrutiny of the implementation of EU aid through the ENPI has hit many obstacles, including Members' lack of time to engage in this complex matter. A revised EP approach could include:

- AFET appointment of country rapporteurs (possibly a single rapporteur for the South Caucasus countries) and adoption of an annual resolution on the implementation and further development of the EaP,

- integration of the democratic scrutiny into the preparation of the annual resolution.

102For an overview of relevant EP powers, activities and positions, see my factsheet on the ENP (last section).

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● Make its inter-parliamentary delegations more efficient in promoting EP positions and feeding knowledge and proposals to the EP's policy-making bodies. The EP could:

- ensure close cooperation between Delegation Chairs and relevant AFET rapporteurs,

- fix max 3 priority EP objectives for each PCC meeting and mission, in order to ensure better focusing and help create conditions for a stronger EP impact,

- take a clear line on rhetoric versus reality problems and adopt a policy on joint statements (in particular in order to prevent incoherence with EP positions),

- always time and organise meetings with civil society representatives in ways that ensure that they can influence PCC meetings and meetings with government representatives,

- insist on unrestricted access for independent journalists to all PCC meetings.

● Develop efficient cooperation with other actors. The EP could inter alia:

- systematise its cooperation with the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), thereby also avoiding further friction with the EURONEAST,

- actively support the setting up of the EaP Civil Society Forum and listen to its conclusions.

● Review its election observation activities. After its big role in the colour revolutions, international election observation could not be continued in the same way. Preliminary statements now emphasise positive features, even if the negative ones are striking. In this context, the EP has particular reason to consider risks of being complicit in hypocrisy.

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SÜDLICHE NACHBARSCHAFT UND NAHER OSTEN – ZUSAMMENARBEIT ZWISCHEN AMBITIONEN UND REALITÄT -

Stefan Krauss

Mittelmeerraum und Naher Osten behalten ihre zentrale Priorität. Das EP muss systematischer und gezielter als bisher Standpunkte entwickeln, um seine Kontrollfunktion besser wahrnehmen und EU-Politik gegenüber Bürgern und Drittstaaten besser begründen zu können. Die Palästina-Frage bleibt der Brennpunkt im Verhältnis zur gesamten arabisch-muslimischen Welt. Dem müssen die Arbeitsstrukturen des EP Rechnung tragen. Ein Zugehen auf den politischen Islam ist die wichtigste strategische Zukunftsaufgabe, zu deren Lösung das EP praktisch beitragen kann. Das Spannungsverhältnis zwischen Stabilitätspolitik und Demokratieförderung wird sich zuspitzen. Hier kann das Parlament helfen, eine Abkehr von einem formalen Demokratieverständnis einzuleiten. Profilierungsmöglichkeiten bestehen außerdem in den Bereichen Energie-außenpolitik, Umwelt und bei der Ausdifferenzierung der Europäischen Nachbarschaftspolitik.

Zehn Jahre Entwicklungen in einer chronischen Krisenregion lassen sich nicht vorausberechnen. Vor zehn Jahren war der Irak ein stabiles Land, das World Trade Center kein Symbol für den weltweiten Terror und der Islam wurde kaum als politische Bedrohung empfunden. Diesen Unwägbarkeiten zum Trotz sind es eher Konstanten, welche die Mittelmeerregion und den Nahen Osten prägen. Die Verwerfungen im Verhältnis der EU zu dieser Region hängen mit Strukturen, Ressourcen und Ideologien zusammen. Wiederkehrende Krisen verweisen mithin symptomatisch auf die Stärken und Schwächen europäischer Politik. Die in diesem Papier behandelten Herausforderungen und Trends sind danach ausgewählt, ob und wie sich das Europäische Parlament bis 2019 positionieren und seinen Handlungsspielraum erweitern kann.

1. OPTIMIEREN POLITISCHER KONTROLLE

Die gesamte politische Beschäftigung des EP mit dem Mittelmeer und dem Nahen Osten in den letzten Jahren zeigt enorme Erwartungen in Bezug auf politische Vorgaben und Leitlinien, die an das EP von außen herangetragen werden und derer es andererseits selbst zur Erfüllung seiner Kontrollfunktion bedarf. Dieser Trend wird sich fortsetzen.

Assoziationsabkommen (Zustimmung des EP erforderlich) sind in der südlichen Nachbarschaft nahezu flächendeckend in Kraft (Ausnahmen: Syrien103 und Libyen104; Algerien strebt derzeit Korrekturen am Assoziationsabkommen an) und bieten daher in naher Zukunft wenig Gestaltungsspielraum. Anders die finanzielle und inhaltliche Ausrichtung der Nachbarschafts-politik und die parlamentarische Kontrolle der Union für das Mittelmeer.

Die Schlagkraft des EP in diesem nicht-legislativen Bereich hängt zuvorderst an der Setzung politischer Schwerpunkte, die sich gegenüber Kommission und Rat und im Außenverhältnis leicht vermitteln und mit dem EP identifizieren lassen. Entscheidend ist daher, dass sich das Parlament die Möglichkeiten gibt, zu allen relevanten Ländern, Regionen und horizontalen Themen systematisch Grundsatzpositionen zu beziehen und echte, d.h. wenige Prioritäten zu setzen. Diese

103Ratifikation durch den Rat 2009 möglich. 104Im Dezember 2008 wurden Verhandlungen über ein Rahmenabkommen zwischen der EU und Libyen aufgenommen.

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bilden die Messlatte seiner politischen Kontrolle der EU-Außenbeziehungen und lassen sich zur Begründung der EU-Politik gegenüber Bürgern und Drittstaaten heranziehen.

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Bennennung von ständigen Berichterstattern (AFET) für die verschiedenen Länder/Ländergruppen der Region sowie zu horizontalen Themen (Menschenrechte, Sicherheit, Migration, Umwelt); Brückenfunktion zur Arbeit der Delegationen

Das EP hat mit der Einführung der neuen Finanzinstrumente einen Dialog über die entsprechenden Strategiepapiere durchgesetzt ("Democratic Scrutiny"), verfügt aber für das Nachbarschaftsinstrument ENPI anders als beim Entwicklungsinstrument (DCI) über keinen Kriterienkatalog zu deren Beurteilung105. Die AFET-Arbeitsgruppe für die südliche Nachbarschaftspolitik hat im Hinblick auf die Halbzeitüberprüfung des ENPI 2009/2010 die Möglichkeit, die Kommission zum Aufstellen von Benchmarks zu drängen und ist selbst gefordert, politische Schwerpunkte zu setzen

Das EP kann die Neuverhandlung der Finanzinstrumente ab 2011 nutzen, um politische Vorgaben zu machen und die Bestimmung der Empfängerländer von Governance Facility (50 Mio. € 2007-2010), Stabilitätsinstrument (225 Mio. € 2009-2011) und Neighbourhood Investment Facility (700 Mio. € 2007-2013) stärker politisieren

Ausrichtung der Arbeit der Europa-Mittelmeer-Versammlung (EMPA) auf die Kontrolle der Projekte der Union für das Mittelmeer

2. PRIORITÄT PALÄSTINA

Der symbolisch und emotional hoch aufgeladene israelisch-palästinensische Konflikt wird auch weiterhin die größte Belastung der politischen Zusammenarbeit der EU mit dem Mittelmeerraum und dem Nahen Osten darstellen. Das Zeitfenster für die Umsetzung einer Zwei-Staaten-Lösung schließt sich. Der Ansatz der EU seit Oslo, den Aufbau eines palästinensischen Staates zu unterstützen (Institutionen, Wahlen), wird ohne ein Friedensabkommen mit Israel auch in Zukunft ins Leere gelaufen. Das erhöht die Schwierigkeit, europäische Finanzhilfe gegenüber dem Bürger zu rechtfertigen. Das Eintreten der EU für die Achtung des Völkerrechts bleibt Prüfstein für den moralischen Anspruch europäischer Außenpolitik und ihre Wahrnehmung in der arabischen Welt.

Die USA stecken im Nahostkonflikt weiterhin den Rahmen, in dem die EU politisch lediglich eine nachrangige Rolle spielen kann. Nur eine unwahrscheinliche Stärkung ihrer Entscheidungs-strukturen weit über den Lissabonner Vertrag hinaus könnte dem entgegenwirken. Zugleich besteht nach dem von Präsident Obama angekündigten politischen Kurswechsel gegenüber der muslimischen Welt (Kairoer Rede, 4. Juni 2009) die Chance auf eine bessere transatlantische Koordinierung und Synergien mit der EU.

Im Falle einer Friedenslösung wird die Frage ihrer Absicherung durch den Einsatz europäischer Truppen aktuell werden.

105Der bislang von der Kommission als Bemessungskriterium zur Vergabe von ENPI-Mitteln herangezogene

Korruptionsindex von Transparency International reicht dazu nicht aus.

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Fortführung der übergreifenden Arbeitsgruppe "Middle East" zur Bündelung der EP-Aktivitäten und Verdeutlichung der hohen Prioritätsstufe des Friedensprozesses

Regelmäßige Videokonferenzen mit dem U.S. Kongress (vgl. Pilotkonferenz im Mai 2009)

Einwirken auf das Mandat etwaiger EU-Friedenstruppen

Einbringen parlamentarischer Erfahrung in Projekte zur Förderung von Aussöhnung und Zusammenarbeit: z.B. durch dauerhafte Verankerung des Seminars für junge politische Führungskräfte aus Europa, Israel und Palästina; ebenso EuroMed Scola

3. UMGANG MIT DEM POLITISCHEN ISLAM

Das kommende Jahrzehnt ist entscheidend dafür ob es gelingt, aus dem kulturell-religiösen Konfliktschema auszubrechen, durch dessen Brille seit dem 11. September 2001 das Phänomen des weltweiten Terrorismus und die Beziehungen zur arabisch-muslimischen Welt betrachtet werden. Die bisherige Antwort auf den "clash of civilisations" war der Dialog der Kulturen für die einen und "Krieg" gegen den Terrorismus für die anderen. Letzteres wird in muslimischen Ländern faktisch als Krieg gegen den Islam empfunden.

Die Dichotomie zwischen "Moderaten"106 und "Extremisten" liefert keine brauchbare Orientierungshilfe. Die Zukunft kennzeichnet entweder die Rückkehr zum Primat politischer Auseinandersetzung und einer realistischen Wahrnehmung von Bedrohung oder die Vertiefung einer Bruchlinie, die für die EU nicht nur eine außenpolitische ist, sondern sich mitten durch ihre Gesellschaften zieht (Zuwanderer).

In den Zielländern ist eine Ausdifferenzierung islamischer Strömungen im Gange zwischen denen, die sich als zivilgesellschaftliche Organisationen auf religiöser Grundlage um soziale Gerechtigkeit bemühen bzw. als politische Bewegungen auf demokratische Beteiligung setzen und jenen, die einen Regimewechsel anstreben und dazu Gewalteinsatz bzw. Terror nicht ausschließen oder sogar aktiv unterstützen. Die EU tut gut daran, auf diese Entwicklungen mit einer differenzierten Politik zu antworten. Islamistische Bewegungen, die unverrückbare Faktoren der politischen Landschaft sind (etwa Hamas und Hisbollah), zu ignorieren oder zu boykottieren hat sich nicht ausgezahlt. Handlungsspielräume erschließen sich der EU in diesen Fällen nur durch Dialog.

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Neben dem Bekenntnis zum interkulturellen Dialog muss das Parlament auf islamische Parteien und islamische zivilgesellschaftliche Organisationen zugehen. Richtschnur dafür könnte deren Verzicht auf Gewalt sein

Bei der praktischen Vorbereitung des Dialogs sollte, etwa durch gezielte Themenauswahl, sichergestellt werden, dass die Gesprächspartner nicht in ihrer Eigenschaft als Muslime, sondern als politische Kräfte eingebunden werden

106Paradoxerweise beginnt die Aufzählung "moderater" Regime im Nahen Osten häufig mit Saudi Arabien!

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Ein Zugehen auf den politischen Islam lässt sich möglicherweise nur durch eine Überprüfung des Instruments der europäischen Liste terroristischer Organisationen erreichen. Funktionalität sollte dabei ausschlaggebend sein, d.h. Finanzquellen des Terrorismus trockenzulegen und gleichzeitig politischen Handlungsspielraum zu behalten

4. DEMOKRATIEFÖRDERUNG UND STABILITÄTSPOLITIK

Die fortdauernde Unterstützung autoritärer Regime in der Region durch die EU hat ihren moralischen Anspruch auf die Verteidigung von Demokratie und Menschenrechten nachhaltig untergraben und ihr den Vorwurf eingetragen, mit zweierlei Maß zu messen. Das Spannungsverhältnis zwischen kurz greifender Stabilitätspolitik im Dienste des Status quo und halbherzigem Vorantreiben demokratischer Reformen wird sich in den kommenden Jahren zuspitzen. Die Ambition der EU, politische und wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit an Governance-Kriterien zu knüpfen (Konditionalität) wird im Mittelmeerraum und im Nahen Osten (wie bereits in Afrika) durch die Präsenz Chinas unter Druck geraten.

Die Demokratieförderung der EU hat sich bislang sehr auf ein formelles Demokratieverständnis gestützt. Verfahrensaspekte (Wahlrecht, Wahlen), Institutionen und die Verabschiedung von Gesetzesvorhaben wurden dabei als Ausgangspunkt und weniger als Ziel eines demokratischen Prozesses betrachtet. Stattdessen einem materiellen Demokratiebegriff Vorrang einzuräumen und die Verankerung demokratischer Kulturen zu fördern, ist in der Praxis keine leichte Aufgabe. Gerade der Förderung parlamentarischer Demokratie sind in der Region angesichts der herrschenden Machtstrukturen Grenzen gesetzt.

EU-Wahlbeobachtungsmissionen haben bisher nur Palästina, Libanon und Mauretanien akzeptiert. Andere Länder könnten folgen, bringen die EU aber in die Gefahr, sich zum Erfüllungsgehilfen inszenierter Wahlen zu machen.

Größtes Testlabor für Stabilisierung und Verankerung demokratischer Kultur bleibt der Irak. Die EU hat hier die Chance, in den nächsten drei Jahren den Truppenabzug politisch zu flankieren und den Aufbau rechtstaatlicher Strukturen (Justiz, Polizeiwesen) europäisch zu prägen.

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Einwirken auf Länderauswahl und Finanzierung von EU- Wahlbeobachtungs-missionen; Drängen auf einen umsichtigen Einsatz dieses Instruments

Entwicklung klarer politischer Vorstellungen zum Umgang mit Wahlergebnissen vor der Entsendung von Wahlbeobachtungsmissionen; Drängen auf Maßnahmen zur Wahlnachbereitung und Begleitung demokratischer Prozesse

Benennung von Schwerpunktländern für die Arbeit des 2006 eingerichteten Office for the Promotion of Parliamentary Democracy (OPPD). Prüfung, ob das EP einen Ausbau des OPPD wünscht. Dazu müssten die minimalen personellen Ressourcen und die Mittel-ausstattung (380 000 € für 2009 bzw. 470 000 € für 2010 für im Prinzip weltweite Aktivitäten) des OPPD aufgestockt werden.

Unterstützung des Aufbaus rechtstaatlicher Strukturen im Irak (Ausbau von EUJUST-LEX) und Bereitstellen entsprechender Mittel unter der Auflage einer besseren Sichtbarkeit des europäischen Engagements

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5. ENERGIEAUSSENPOLITIK

Die Sicherung der Energieversorgung wird sich in zunehmendem Maße zum Kernbestandteil europäischer Außenpolitik entwickeln. Das EP hat das Thema in dieser Legislaturperiode in einer Entschließung107 aufgegriffen, die allerdings der Mittelmeerregion weniger Aufmerksamkeit schenkt als Osteuropa. Unerwähnt bleibt auch die Option der Sicherung von Energieversorgung (etwa Infrastruktur im Ausland) mit militärischen Mitteln, die in den kommenden zehn Jahren durchaus aktuell werden kann.

Die Aussichten auf einen Rückgang der Ölproduktion und der Bevölkerungszuwachs erhöhen auch im Mittelmeerraum und Nahen Osten die Attraktivität alternativer Energiequellen. Ein Wettlauf um die zivile Nutzung von Kernenergie hat begonnen, zu dem die Arabische Liga ihre Mitglieder 2006 ausdrücklich ermuntert hat. Für die EU ist die Nichtverbreitung militärisch nutzbarer Kernenergie ein Konsensthema. Im Zivilbereich jedoch herrscht Uneinigkeit. Über die Union für das Mittelmeer will die EU massiv die Nutzung von Solarenergie vorantreiben. Bilateral dagegen beteiligen sich einige Mitgliedstaaten ebenso wie die USA und Russland an der Einrichtung von Kernkraftwerken und am Transfer von Nukleartechnologie an die Region.

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Weiterentwicklung der Leitlinien für eine europäische Energieaußenpolitik unter stärkerer Berücksichtigung des Mittelmeers

Aufwertung des übergreifenden Themas Energieaußenpolitik durch engere Koordinierung der betroffenen EP-Gremien und ihrer Sekretariatsstrukturen. Als Arbeitsschwerpunkte bieten sich Solarenergie, zivile Nutzung der Kernenergie und Nichtverbreitung im Mittelmeerraum und im Nahen Osten an

6. UMWELT

Es ist davon auszugehen, dass Klimawandel und Umweltprobleme, verschärft durch die Bevölkerungsentwicklung, den Migrationsdruck erhöhen. Im Nahen Osten wird die Wasserproblematik weiterhin politischen Sprengstoff liefern. An messbaren Fortschritten im Umweltbereich wird sich auch der Erfolg der Union für das Mittelmeer ablesen lassen.

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Unterstützung der Umweltprojekte der Union für das Mittelmeer (Entgiftung des Mittelmeers) insbesondere durch Drängen auf Fortschritte über den EMPA-Umweltausschuss und Bewilligung entsprechender Mittel durch das EP

Politische Unterstützung für Projekte, für die die europäische Integrationserfahrung nutzbar gemacht werden kann (Middle East Water Community, Peace Park Projekt für den Golan und das Jordantal)

107Entschließung "Auf dem Weg zu einer gemeinsamen europäischen Energieaußenpolitik", 26. September 2007,

P6_TA(2007)0413.

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7. STRUKTUREN DER ZUSAMMENARBEIT

Die Zusammenarbeit mit dem Mittelmeerraum steht seit den 1990er Jahren im Aufmerksamkeits- und Ressourcenwettbewerb mit der EU-Politik gegenüber den östlichen Nachbarn. Die Einrichtung der neuen Östlichen Partnerschaft führt zu einer stärkeren Differenzierung innerhalb der ENP und dürfte diese Rivalität weiterbestehen lassen.

Zugleich kristallisieren sich innerhalb der südlichen Nachbarschaft unterschiedliche Grade der Annäherung an die EU heraus. Fortgeschrittene Beziehungen wie sie die ENP anbietet, ohne sie jedoch inhaltlich zu definieren (vgl. "statut avancé" für Marokko, "upgrading" im Fall Israels), werden bereits von einer Reihe an weiteren Ländern eingefordert (Jordanien, Tunesien, Ägypten)108. Das stellt die Absichtserklärung der EU, engere Bande (nur) mit einem gemeinsame Werte teilenden "Ring aus Freunden" einzugehen, auf den Prüfstand. Die Entscheidung über das Eingehen engerer Nachbarschaftsbeziehungen entzieht sich formell der Zustimmung des EP, bietet sich aber für eine stärkere Politisierung an.

Die Beziehungen zum Golfkooperationsrat (GCC) führen im Vergleich zur Mittelmeerzusammenarbeit ein Schattendasein. Ihre Belebung liegt im strategischen Interesse der EU, insbesondere um in regionalen Fragen (Irak, Iran, Palästina, Nichtverbreitung) politische Schnittmengen zu finden. Zum Anstoß demokratischer Reformen und für die Einforderung von Menschenrechten kann die EU in der Golfregion auch in Zukunft weniger politische Anreize bieten als im Bereich der südlichen Nachbarschaft.

Mit dem Beobachterstatus im Rahmen der Union für das Mittelmeer drängt sich die Arabische Liga zunehmend als Akteur in die Mittelmeerzusammenarbeit. Gleichzeitig setzt sie ihren Trend zur Herausbildung von Strukturen fort, die förmlich Anleihen bei der EU nehmen (vgl. Arabisches Übergangsparlament). Die EU ist gut beraten, diese Entwicklungen nicht als Beginn politischer Integration zu missdeuten und ihre Hoffnungen auf eine fruchtbare multilaterale Zusammenarbeit entsprechend nicht zu hoch zu hängen.

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Politisierung der Intensivierung bilateraler Nachbarschaftsbeziehungen; gegebenenfalls Nutzung des Zustimmungsrechts zur Beteiligung von Drittländern an EU-Programmen und -Agenturen zu diesem Zweck (im Fall Israels bereits geschehen)

Aufstocken der finanziellen Ausstattung der ENP-Süd (Gesamtvolumen gebundener ENP-Mittel Ost und Süd 2009: 787 708 000 €) entsprechend dem höheren Bedrohungs- und Krisenpotenzial im Süden

Anpassen der parlamentarischen Beziehungen an den Grad der Annäherung des Partnerlandes an die EU, z.B. Einrichtung eines Gemischten Parlamentarischen Ausschusses mit Marokko

Eine Vertiefung der Zusammenarbeit mit dem GCC durch den möglichen Abschluss des Freihandelsabkommens in der 7. Legislaturperiode (Zustimmungsverfahren) könnte dem EP das Zugeständnis abverlangen, die bisherige Systematik von Menschenrechtsklauseln in Abkommen mit Drittstaaten aufzuweichen.

108Mitteilung der Kommission an das Europäische Parlament und den Rat: Umsetzung der Europäischen

Nachbarschaftspolitik im Jahr 2008 (KOM(2009) 188/3).

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CHAPTER THREE:

NEW AND OLD GLOBAL PLAYERS

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CONSOLIDATING TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS: A NEW PARTNERSHIP FOR GLOBAL ORDER? - Stefan Schulz

Although it would appear that transatlantic relations over the coming decade will essentially be with a Democrat administration in the US, the first 100 days of the Obama Presidency have shown that this still carries potential for friction. Based on shared values and interests, the EU should therefore move to re-affirm its relevance to US foreign policy and consolidate the fundamental relationship, in order to deal more efficiently with inevitable divergences on specifics.

For the European Parliament, this means asserting its role vis-à-vis Council and Commission, and going beyond its traditional delegation structure to further enhance its Transatlantic Legislators’ Dialogue with the US Congress at all levels, including a permanent liaison structure.

TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS AFTER BUSH

1. Which America?

Geographically, the concept of transatlantic relations if taken literally ought to include Canada. EU relations with “North America’s Europeans” are of quite different scope and nature from EU-US relations however - both easier in many fields and burdened with specific challenges in some. This paper will therefore focus on the rather unique EU-US relationship, thereby following the EU institutions’ general usage of the term “transatlantic”, and indeed Parliament’s own practice in its Transatlantic Legislators’ Dialogue with the US Congress.

Politically, although electoral forecasting as such is not the purpose of this exercise, most observers in the US and abroad seem to agree that the Democratic Party is currently set to retain its hold on power for several years to come: With the Republicans still backward-looking and focussed on defending the record of the Bush administration, Congressional elections for 2010 and even 2012 appear to pose no serious threat, while a credible challenge for the White House seems unlikely before 2016 at the earliest. It appears safe to assume therefore that over much of our outlook period, the EU’s transatlantic relations will mean dealing with a Democrat-governed United States. After the many irritations and deep divergences of the Bush years, this would facilitate rebuilding the relationship based on the auspicious beginnings of the Obama Administration.

2. A Transatlantic Market

The prospect of rebuilding transatlantic relations does not rest on hope alone: It is underpinned by clear economic interests, given the unprecedented volume of exchanges and the resulting degree of interdependence between our economies.109 This solid base remained largely unaffected by the recent, considerable strains in the political sphere: Boycott rhetorics notwithstanding, both trade and mutual foreign direct investment kept growing, even in 2003 as dissensions flared over Iraq.

109 In remarkable symmetry, some 7 million jobs on either side now depend on the transatlantic economy.

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110 Despite the set-back of the economic crisis, total trade volume may be expected to breach the 2-billion-a-day ceiling rather sooner than later in the decade under consideration.

This trend however cannot be taken for granted. Perhaps not surprisingly, foreign direct

For the next decade however, the US and Europe are likely to remain the twin engine of the world

3. A Community of Values 

f  course,  Europe  and  the United  States  are  bound  together  by more  than  economic  interest. 

As shown by the mood shift in the United States after “9/11” however, those lofty principles can no 

Nor may  they  be  assumed  to  be  safely  behind  us,  a momentary  aberration  by  a  conservative 

investment proved less resilient to the financial crisis than to earlier political irritations – what was surprising was the height of the drop in US investment flows to Europe, from €194 bn in 2007 to a mere 45 bn in 2008111 Even before the latest crisis, a number of non-tariff barriers prevented this transatlantic economy from reaching its full potential. With the full impact of the crisis on business and politics, the temptation of protectionism is strong, both as an economic recipe and even more so as a political prop, from “Buy American” provisions attached to the US stimulus plan to European government’s concern for their carmakers and other industries. And where operators remain outward-looking, from the US as well as from Europe their gaze increasingly turns from the Atlantic towards the Pacific, to the huge markets and manpower reservoirs of India and China.

economy. According to a study commissioned (again, pre-crisis) by the OECD112, a fully integrated transatlantic economy could yield GDP growth of up to 3% for the two partners, and some 1,5% additional growth for the global economy, given both sides’ leading role as economic partners to almost all other states. Developing the transatlantic economy thus appears as both opportunity and responsibility: Having just about avoided sinking separately, the US and Europe must now, more than ever, swim together to keep everyone’s head above water.

 OTheirs  is first and foremost a community of values, much‐invoked throughout the Cold War years, and even more perhaps  in  its aftermath. Beyond  the market economy,  the defence of  freedom, democracy  and  human  rights  has  always  been  the  implicit  goal  not  just  of  the military, North Atlantic Alliance, but of a  long‐standing, diplomatic alliance  in the UN Security Council and other international fora. 

more be taken for granted in times of crisis than the market economy and free trade. The “War on Terror” and its methods , even more than the War in Iraq and its “collateral damage”, caused deep unease and vocal protests among European leaders and citizens alike, precisely because they were perceived as a departure from those shared values.  

administration beholden to the religious right, to be wiped out in one stroke of the new incumbent’s pen. As though dealing with this dark legacy in terms of raison d’Etat was not complex enough, it is compounded by the necessity to address real and subjective threat perceptions of the military and the  population  at  large.  This  is  amply  demonstrated  by  recent  decisions  ‐  and  reversals  ‐  by President Obama: Deciding to close Guantanamo, then reviving the military commissions to judge its most dangerous inmates; releasing the legal memos justifying torture, but refusing to prosecute their authors or those who applied them; first agreeing to release pictures of detainee abuse, then fighting  their  release  in  court.  –  The  overall  outlook  is  that  the  new  administration  is  certainly applying much more stringent ethical standards, but will approach each  issue pragmatically, from 

110 Daniel S. Hamilton / Joseph P. Quinlan: Deep Integration: How Transatlantic Markets are Leading Globalization.

Washington DC, 2005 111 European investments in the US shrank much less, from € 171 bn in 2007 to 149 bn in 2008. (Agence Europe, 14 May

2009) 112 OECD Economics Department: Working Paper “The Benefits of Liberalising Product Markets and Reducing Barriers To

International Trade and Investment: The Case of The United States and the European Union”. Paris, 2005.

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That said, the new style in foreign policy practiced by President Obama and State Secretary Clinton 

 

AGREEING TO DISAGREE

1. Making the relationship work

The need  to  actively nurture  the  transatlantic  relationship  and develop  its potential, both  in  the 

 Transatlantic Economic Council (TEC) 

 cannot  long be sustained without  the other however, so  the  future work of  the TEC will 

an essentially American point of view, without overdue consideration for the sensitivities of liberal Europeans – nor indeed, of parts of its own electoral base. 

does constitute a clean break with  their predecessor’s  tone. As such,  it has already brought back some much needed credibility, and  if upheld, should  let the United States reclaim the moral high ground  in  international affairs. This  in turn would seem a prerequisite for the US to  lead again on international issues, and for Europeans to support it. Questions of shared concern to Europe and the United States literally span the globe, mirroring that community of values, from regional security in the Middle East,  Iran,  Iraq and Afghanistan, through addressing Russia’s assertiveness and China’s seemingly unstoppable rise, to the global challenges of containing Islamist terrorism, ensuring long‐term energy security, reducing poverty and dealing with the effects of climate change. At the same time, both sides could benefit from sharing best practices in dealing with challenges closer to home, be  it the  introduction of biofuels or exploding social costs  (for health care  in the US,  for an aging population  in  Europe).  – Plenty  of  opportunities  for  a  better‐coordinated  approach  and  perhaps even  joint EU‐US action, not  just  in “coalitions of  the willing”, but on a broader  front and a more stable base. 

economic and  in  the political sphere, has been  realised by  leaders of both sides. Not  least due  to calls for action emanating from the European Parliament113, successive transatlantic summits have produced  a  string of political declarations  re‐confirming  the political partnership,  listing  areas of agreement and re‐iterating the importance of economic ties.  

More specifically, the EU‐US Summit of April 2007 created theas  a  cabinet‐level  body  to  monitor  the  various  panels  and  processes  discussing  regulatory convergence,  and  provide  them  with  the  necessary  political  impetus.  It  is  also  intended  as  a clearing‐house for the inevitable trade disputes, to try and reach agreement bilaterally before filing for the complex and  lengthy WTO arbitration procedure.  In both functions however,  it has shown mixed results so far – “keeping the process alive” periodically became more important than tangible results.  

The onehave  to achieve a new  level of efficiency  to  justify  the exercise. To  that end,  the EU needs  to be prepared to make some sacrifices on  issues the other side sees as test cases. Given the American adversity  to  institutional approaches, TEC may otherwise quickly be perceived as  redundant  if  it cannot “deliver”. 

113 European Parliament resolution of 1 June 2006 on transatlantic economic relations, (E. MANN report - P6

TA(2006)0239)

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In a similar vein, the political dimension needs to be strengthened by closer and more frequent consultation at top levels. One approach, advocated by Parliament in its latest resolution on transatlantic relations114, would be to establish a political council (TPC) of similar standing to the TEC. This would co-ordinate foreign and security policies, feeding into summit meetings raised to twice-yearly encounters.

2. Consolidating the legal framework

All  of  these  declarations,  high‐level  meetings  and  processes  remain  non‐binding  and  highly personalised  however,  their  long‐term  continuation  anything  but  assured:  During  the  2008 transition period, the future of the TEC process was seriously in doubt for some time. At the same time, they  fulfil an essential  function  in the continued management of transatlantic relations. For some  time  therefore,  there have been  calls  for  anchoring  them more  solidly, within  a new  legal framework, noting that the United States remain the only major partner with whom the EU has no partnership agreement. 

The hoped‐for entry  into  force of  the Lisbon Treaty, with  its provisions about external  trade, but also several other policy areas relevant to EU‐US relations such as Justice and Home Affairs, may provide an opportunity to push for such a framework agreement. The current legal basis, the New Transatlantic Agenda dating back to 1995, would need updating and adapting to the EU’s new legal configuration in any case. 

Such  a Transatlantic Partnership Agreement115 would  provide  a  stable  framework  for  the whole range of  cooperations  currently ongoing, with  the added benefit of a  legally binding  foundation. Programmes would thus be  less vulnerable to political  irritations, allowing for  increased academic exchanges and people‐to‐people contacts. They would also stand as safer investments for potential public‐private partnerships, as a way to expand the cooperation in times of limited public funds. 

A  framework  partnership  agreement  could  and  should  also  include  mechanisms  for  dispute settlement in the economic sphere. Even in the best of cooperative spirits, such disagreements are bound  to keep occurring given  the divergent approach  to  issues of market  regulation,  consumer protection and health and safety that characterises our two related, yet different cultures. It would be better therefore that they could be resolved bilaterally than to have trade wars burden the WHO system or worse, destabilise the world’s markets.  

Another area of co‐operation, at the nexus of the economic and diplomatic domains, which could be  developed  on  such  a  secure  base  is  a  standing  body  on  issues  of  energy  security,  where independent observers have been urging  closer  coordination of EU and US policies  in  the global interest.116

114 European Parliament resolution of 26 March 2009 on the state of transatlantic relations in the aftermath of the US

elections (MILLAN MON report - P6 TA(2009)193) 115 European Parliament resolution of 1 June 2009 on improving EU-US relations in the framework of a Transatlantic

Partnership Agreement (BROK Report - P6 TA(2006)238) 116 Janusz Bugajski et al.: Energy Security and Climate Change. Transatlantic Policy Forum paper, Prague, 2009.

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TOWARDS A TRANSATLANTIC ASSEMBLY

3. Enhancing the Transatlantic Legislators’ Dialogue

For the European Parliament, an intensified transatlantic coordination and possible framework agreement would bring many opportunities, but also a need to adapt procedures and structures. At the political level, the challenge is to make the TLD more relevant, both to its Congress counterparts and to the two executives. The Lisbon Treaty will obviously go some way to achieving this by enhancing Parliament’s powers on trade decisions, which in the US are largely the prerogative of the Senate, so far absent from the TLD.

As the transatlantic relationship covers so much more than just trade however, reaching into core legislative areas, its parliamentary shadowing will need to go beyond traditional forms of inter-parliamentary relations in order to effectively mainstream transatlantic issues. The TLD was intended from the start to serve as platform for coordinating across-the board contacts, but so far this remains an ideal rarely achieved. Beyond a few video-conferences and occasional EP committee visits to Washington, the Transatlantic Legislators’ Dialogue still essentially takes place during two inter-parliamentary meetings per year, between a set EP delegation and a House delegation largely convened ad hoc.

If the format of those meetings thus proves resistant to change, perhaps the format of the EP delegation could be worked on. This might involve modifications to Parliament’s Rules, but covering a unique relationship may well require unique procedure: Replacing the traditional, standing delegation and across-the-board agendas by meetings focussed on a limited number of topical issues, with an EP delegation drawn specifically from the legislative committees concerned, much as the US side has practised all along. Eventually, the different committee representatives from both sides might even hold meetings and hearings in parallel to save time and cover more ground. Such a picture would then come fairly close to the “Transatlantic Assembly” which Parliament has called for.

4. Developing Parliament’s support structure

At the level of Parliament’s  services,  the  challenge will be  to  ensure proper  support  for  such  an enhanced TLD. As  for  the delegation’s  functioning,  this may  require  thinking  across  the  lines of units  and  DGs,  beyond  the  current,  loose  network  of  TLD  correspondents  among  committee secretariats.  

A  first  step  towards  securing  the  indispensable,  timely  information  about US  legislative projects would be to implement the Bureau decision of 11 December 2006 creating a permanent post for an EP official in Washington. Obviously, this lone official would need to be supported by local agents, at  least one secretary and one research assistant or stagiaire. More  importantly however, once  in place  this  “early warning  post” will  generate  a  constant  flow  of  information,  and will  therefore require  a  contact  structure  within  the  EP  to  ensure  its  reception  and  targeted  dispatching  to legislative  committees and other  interested parties. This could be achieved by  redeploying posts currently dealing with transatlantic relations in other contexts, from both DG ExPo (Special Adviser, Delegations or Policy Department) and DG Ipol (Legislative Coordination?). 

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Consideration should also be given to ways of offering the US Congress reciprocal facilities with the European  Parliament.  Given  the  partisan  nature  of  much  of  the  congressional  staff  structure however,  a  permanent  posting  to  Europe  is  probably  unrealistic.  In  practical  terms,  the  nearest equivalent we could offer might well be a rotating fellowship for researchers from the Congressional Research Service, who are non‐partisan professionals. Attaching such a post to the EP Library may perhaps offer the best overview of Parliament’s various activities, as well as practical access to the relevant resources. 

Finally,  closer  cooperation  between  parliamentary  staff  would  be  helped  by  regular  training sessions and  staff exchanges,  such as have been organised  in  recent years by DG ExPo’s Special Adviser on Transatlantic Relations in conjunction with the professional training unit. Given the cost of such programmes as well as the  importance of the subject matter, these could perhaps benefit from  being  included  more  systematically  in  EP  career  development  policies,  so  as  to  build  a reservoir of administrators qualified to support an enhanced TLD in various functions.

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THE 21ST CENTURY: ASIA'S CENTURY? - Xavier Nuttin

The rise of Asia as a new global player is now an evidence that, despite -or because- the current financial and economic crisis, will continue in the next decade and transform the geopolitical landscape. Failure to understand and accept this reality may confine Europe (particularly if it remains divided) to a second-class role in the margins of the new international system. Asia, therefore, constitutes a test case for the EU’s ability ‘to be and act as a major power’. The challenge for the EU is to define a line to respond to the new world order in the making, and particularly to deal with a rising Asia, the continent that will be the engine for change over the next decade. This requires a clear definition of the EU security and economic interests in Asia that must be well articulated with the values the EU wants to promote.

INTRODUCTION: THE WIDER CONTEXT

In the last 25 years Asia has emerged as the world's fastest growing region. For now, growth is bringing wealth, respect and freedom of action. The region, confident in its economic power and relying on the sheer size of its population is claiming a pre-eminent position on the world scene. The rise of Asia as a new global player is now an evidence that, despite -or because- the current financial and economic crisis, will continue in the next decade and transform the geopolitical landscape. Failure to understand and accept this reality may confine Europe (particularly if it remains divided) to a second-class role in the margins of the new international system .

China and India in particular are altering the balance of power and challenging the current world order, particularly America's prominence. A key uncertainty is whether the rise of China and India will occur smoothly117. Indeed few countries are likely to have more impact on the world over the next 10-15 years than China , and one may well wonder if the world is moving from a Pax Americana to a Pax China ?

Seen through European eyes, world progress and development has long taken place around the Mediterranean sea, to then move around the Atlantic ocean in the last 200 years. There is little doubt that mankind's future development will now concentrate on the shores of the Pacific ocean and that the 21st century will be Asia's century.

However according to many Asian scholars, the rise of Asia, far from being a new development, suggests that the old world order is re-establishing itself : " Until the year 1820 , the two largest economies of the world were consistently China and India. The economic domination of the West took place only in the last 200 years118".

POLICY CHALLENGES, TRENDS, and THREATS

Asia is the most diverse continent in population, languages, races, religions, traditions and cultures. The region accounts for more than half of the world’s population, a quarter of the economic wealth created every year, and is home to four of the ten largest economies in the world (Japan, China, India and Korea).While Japan and Singapore are among the richest economies in the world, countries such as Bangladesh, Cambodia, Laos, or Burma/Myanmar remain among the poorest.

117 Mapping the Global Future, report of the NIC's 2020 project. 118 Dr. K. Mahbuani, National University of Singapore , in Europe's World, Spring 2009.

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Poverty remains therefore a significant challenge, as the region is still home to two thirds of the world’s poor. Major threats like terrorism, human trafficking, a revived drug production and the risk of nuclear proliferation are also prevalent in Asia. Many parts of the region are prone to natural disasters and suffer from infectious diseases. Ongoing conflicts or tensions in several countries, coupled with generally weak civil societies, add to vulnerability and contribute to human rights abuses, including discrimination of minorities.

A demographic "time-bomb" with huge impact on population mobility and migration flows

Demographic trends project a world population of 7.8 billion by 2020. On a representative group of 100 people, fifty-six of them would be from Asia, including 19 Chinese and 17 Indians (and only six from Europe). Asia will remain the most populated continent with a population nearly ten times as large as that of the European Union. The whole region will be under heavy demographic pressure which will impact the most on those countries posting feeble rates of economic growth119. Besides China and India, the two giants, one should not underestimate the weight of Indonesia (projected population of 267 million by 2020), Pakistan (229 million) or Bangladesh (186 million). China will face two issues: population ageing and urbanisation rate. The one-child policy will lead to a rapidly increasing number of elderly people (estimated at 20% of the population by 2025) and economic discrepancies between rural areas and cities will provoke massive rural migration (with an urbanisation rate estimated at 57%, or 824 million people, by 2025). By contrast, India will remain younger and a mainly rural country (with two-thirds of the population living in rural areas).

Economic development and poverty: Asia as the engine for world growth

Asia’s economic growth in the past two decades has been remarkable. Many countries achieved growth rates of 5% on average in the last 20 years, partly due to increased openness and the undertaking of major economic reforms. Asia’s share of global exports has soared from 16% in the 1980s to 27% today. It has the largest currency reserves and the highest savings rate in the world. China alone is the EU's second largest trade partner after the US. This development enabled significant progress in reducing absolute poverty across the continent and achieving the MDGs.

However, these achievements have taken place in a context of growing income disparities within and between countries and strong pressure on the environment. More than 600 million people in the Asia and Pacific region still live in absolute poverty defined as less than $1 a day. Almost half of the world’s absolute poor live in South Asia alone. In the People’s Republic of China, 452 million people live under the $2-a-day poverty marker, while in India the figure is 868 million.

Despite the current economic crisis China will have become by 2020 the largest trading nation in the world (and the second largest economy) and the region will produce around 40% of the world GDP in PPP terms120. The percentage of people living on less than $1 a day in the region could fall from 10 to 2%, but this will require continued work to sustain the current high rates of GDP growth per capita, as well as additional effort to ensure that the poor are able to participate in, benefit from, and contribute to the growth process.121 Many of the strongest economies of the region are indeed export-oriented and the next challenge will be to develop a sustainable domestic market: a must to fight the economic crisis. The development of social protection systems, currently inexistent, is required to change the pattern of life which now favours high domestic savings, and increase domestic consumption. The EU can be a model and an ally in this field to develop sustainable social security systems.

119 The New Global Puzzle, ISS Paris, 2006. 120 ibid. 121 Long term strategic framework 2008-2020 , Asian Development Bank, April 2008.

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ose fields.

Environment and climate change: weighing economic imperatives against wider considerations

Vulnerability to climate change while being a fact has not yet been operationally incorporated at policy level. Still the rise in sea-level threatens the habitat of millions of people as 40% of Asia’s population (almost 2 billion) lives within 60km from the coastline. Water stress and loss of agricultural productivity will make it difficult for Asia to feed its growing population who will also be more exposed to infectious diseases122. Managing water resources is likely to become more difficult within and between states123. Deforestation, water pollution, overfishing, natural disasters, loss of biodiversity affect everyone: there are no more boundaries between domestic and foreign policies in th

The Chinese continuous efforts to secure new sources of energy and natural resources to sustain economic growth has led the country to increase its presence in Africa and Latin America and to provide support to regimes that are corrupt and that deny fundamental freedoms to their people. The implications at international level of those choices on the political, security and environmental priorities of the EU could be far reaching.

Demographic pressure, rapid economic growth, inadequate environmental investments and legislation, and poorly enforced environmental protection measures, will contribute to the increasing stress on the environment and lead to unsustainable use of natural resources. The high geological and climatic instability that characterise the continent represents a major threat: conflicts over remaining resources and unmanaged migration will lead to instability.

Ethnic and Religious conflicts in countries with weak national cohesion could spill over

Many Asian countries as we know them now had their borders defined by their colonizers and bring together different ethnicities, languages and religions while those borders are sometimes dividing communities. Growing ethnic and religious identification among both majority and minority populations is leading to local and regional conflicts creating instability but also to international terrorism that is a direct threat to EU interests. The rise of Hindu and Muslim fundamentalisms is a fact that is directly linked to the re-emergence of nationalisms and will increase with a deteriorating economic situation. Bangladesh, India, Indonesia and Pakistan represent the largest four Muslim populations and account for 45% of the world Muslim population. From the south of the Philippines to Afghanistan, armed groups claiming identities apart from the nation-state are fighting the established regimes under the name of God.

A democratic deficit but also a growing demand for more political freedom

Despite the lack of an indigenous history of democracy Asia has been shaped during the past two decades by a previously unknown dynamic in the transition to democracy. Since the beginning of the "third wave of democratization," the number of democracies in the region has almost tripled (but half of all area countries are still governed by authoritarian regimes)124.

.While very different political regimes continue to coexist (authoritarian, communist, democratic, monarchial, dictatorial) several democracies have indeed emerged but democratization in the region remains a fragile process and is often reduced to elections, its main visible feature. Moreover Asian countries often have a different view of the same concept and there has been little

122Climate Change and International Security, paper by the High representative and the European Commission (S113/08),

14 March 2008. 123 A. Ruche , "Do we need an EU strategy towards Asia ?", conference at SOAS, London, 2009. 124 Aurel Croissant, in Strategic Insights, December 2005.

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room for the Western liberal model in Asia. Rather a ‘state capitalism’ model, where the state has a prominent role in economic management, has developed. Although most governments in Asia follow a strategy of free market economic reforms, the levels of their accomplishments vary widely. The overall trend in the region is not one towards democracy and market economy but one of a pronounced decoupling of both transformations125.

Nevertheless with economic success and greater wealth also came greater political consciousness and demand for more participation from among the new emerging middle class but also from discriminated minorities. But in many Asian countries a single party or dynasty embodied the core of national identity and has dominated all politics for decades if not from independence. They came to see themselves as the only viable custodians of national unity and success and remaining in power became an end to itself126. How those regimes, and particularly China, will be able to answer to the increasing demands for political rights while avoiding social instability and centrifugal forces will be central to their political future and shape the long-term face of the region.

KEY POLICY CHOICES: THE EU RESPONSES

Asia is going through dramatic changes, yet the European Union doesn’t seem to pay sufficient attention to the fundamental evolutionary processes at work. Added to this is the EU’s perceived lack of credibility in Asia as a united and coherent actor127. For all these reasons, the level of expectation towards the European Union is rather low and the USA remains the power to be reckoned with. Asia, therefore, constitutes a test case for the EU’s ability ‘to be and act as a major power’. Particularly with regard to China, India and Japan which all have strategic partnerships with the EU. In the new multilateral context, Asia will have a substantial influence in shaping the rules governing the global order which could be divided into three clusters: North America, Europe and East Asia, competing in setting trans-regional rules and regulations.

To maintain its influence the challenge for the EU is therefore to define a line to respond to the new world order in the making, and particularly to deal with a rising Asia, the continent that will be the engine for change over the next decade. This requires first a good understanding of Asia's priorities (one has to take into account that foreign policy is all about the domestic policies of others128) and second a clear definition of the EU security and economic interests in Asia that must be well articulated with the values the EU wants to promote. But in the absence of a clear, well defined and coherent CFSP (which makes it difficult for third countries to understand what the EU stands for) how to engage with the continent and how to integrate Asia in the global system while at the same time prepare for a possible Chinese challenge?

First the EU must set one clear core objective to guide the future development of its relations with Asia into the coming decade: it must focus on strengthening its political and economic presence across the region, and raising this to a level commensurate with the growing global weight of an enlarged EU. The EU must begin to integrate its economic engagement with a more visible political presence. In addition to trade, public health, migration, human trafficking, climate change, energy sources, the EU should be active on such issues as security, non-proliferation, anti-terrorism. This can be done through existing cooperation mechanisms such as ASEM and ASEAN Regional Forum but they must be strengthened.

125 ibid. 126 Michael Wesley, Far Eastern Economic Review, April 2009. 127 The EU's strategic interests in Asia, EIAS, August 2005. 128 Javier Solana, "Five lessons in global diplomacy", Financial Times , 20 January 2009.

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An EU-style regional integration is unlikely to happen in Asia for several decades but there is wide scope to learn in Asia from the EU model. From joint responses to common challenges to the use of soft power; from the single market to the pooling of financial resources there is growing interest in many Asian countries for the EU approach. The region needs to build regional institutional frameworks to tackle security, energy or financial issues. Building institutional capacity to support regional integration in Asia is an avenue that the EU will continue to use to develop closer links and better mutual understanding.

Asia matters to Europe and is ready to look towards Europe. We must come to terms with this new situation and look East if we are to live up to our global responsibilities and consolidate our way of life. The Asians look for concrete results129. Avoiding a ‘fortress Asia’ and promoting a secure and stable region would be key long-term EU interests.

ENHANCING THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT'S RESPONSES

With or without the Lisbon treaty the decision-making role of the European Parliament in foreign affairs, while growing, will remain limited (with the notable exception of the common commercial policy). This is not to underestimate the EP budgetary powers nor its clout derived from its democratic legitimacy but it is a fact that the CFSP is and will remain inter-governmental. To improve the impact of the EP on EU foreign policy decisions there is a need to take clear positions based on policies that remain consistent and to support increased funding for the external policies of the EU including CFSP and ESDP. But can the EP speak with one voice on the international stage?

In the next two legislatures the EP could concentrate on a limited number of issues that are at the core of the EU values and architecture, such as: i) good governance, human rights and the rule of law; ii) effective multilateralism; iii) the EU integration model.

- Our democratic model is a cornerstone for our foreign relations and wisely so but we should not take for granted that it will be accepted by, and much less imposed on, the Asian countries which have different views based on different history and culture and often refer to EU double standards when addressing those issues. The need to address the democratic deficit in most Asian countries is vital but there is also an urgent need to build political common ground and to avoid pushing those concepts from a high moral ground. Follow-up measures to the election observation missions (institution building, public administration reform) may contribute. Experience from EU Member States that have experienced transitions from dictatorships to democracies accompanied by a modernisation of their economic and social structures should be given special attention.

- The new emerging powers , including China and India, are challenging the current international order : their demand for a greater say in international fora (Bretton Wood institutions, G-8) deserve respect as existing multilateral institutions were designed for a different geopolitical order. Asian powers can be strong allies for the EU strategic interest in effective multilateralism provided the EP clearly supports their increasing role.

- The region is complex and the dialogue with Asia involves sub-regional partners such as ASEAN and SAARC. With its wide experience in the European integration model the EP should promote regional integration through regional parliamentary assemblies. Asia is in the process of building regional institutional frameworks that will allow the continent to play its role in a globalised world. The parliamentary aspect is however mostly absent from those frameworks and needs to be developed to answer to the current democratic deficit .

129 The EU's strategic interests in Asia, European Institute of Asian Studies, August 2005.

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To progress towards those goals, the organs of the EP dealing with external relations need to be adapted. The inter-parliamentary Delegations, while useful in developing bilateral relations, lack coherence and consistency. They should be replaced by standing Contact Groups made of a limited number of MEPs (for example, 5 MEPs, one each for AFET, DEVE, INTA, DROI, SEDE) responsible for continuous and close follow-up of, and relations with, the concerned country or sub-region. The Contact Group would act as the focal point for committees' debates on specific country/sub-region issues and for the urgency resolutions. They would be enlarged for the annual inter-parliamentary meetings according to the topics included in the agenda in each specific case. A Euro-Asia parliamentary assembly composed, on the EP side, of the members of the Contact Groups covering the Asian countries needs to be created.

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EUROPEAN UNION-LATIN AMERICA: TOWARDS A BI-REGIONAL STRATEGIC ASSOCIATION IN 2019? -

Pedro Neves

In 2019, an enlarged, richer and safer EU, but facing the problem of an ageing population, will be confronted by a more interdependent, complex and unstable world. In Latin America there will be a democratic consolidation and economic growth but poverty levels will decrease modestly and its economic competitiveness will continue to lag behind that of Asia. Brazil and Mexico will become leading regional powers but their efforts to promote Latin American integration will be realized only in part. The ALBA countries130, promoters of "21st century socialism" will see their influence reduced. The US could also lose its traditional weight in the region. The European Union and Latin America, linked by historical, cultural and common values and principles, could have made considerable progress towards the bi-regional strategic association initiated 20 years before at the Rio Summit. The European Parliament, the EuroLat Assembly and the regional and sub-regional Latin America parliamentary fora will strengthen the democratic legitimacy of the strategic association and will help to find political solutions to the problems of both partners.

MAJOR TRENDS FOR THE PERIOD 2009-2019

1. Irreversible globalization

In the last 25 years, governments around the world have felt it necessary to forge an appropriate response in order to meet the challenge of globalization. Latin American leaders have also reacted and, in the process, have brought economic growth to Latin America, but have not solved an increasing number of social problems. By 2019 an integrated Latin America could be a "global player" if reforms are carried out.

2. Emerging powers

China and India will most likely surpass the GDP of most other economies by 2019. It is unlikely that a free trade area encompassing the whole of the American continent will be established. Mexican President Felipe Calderón has recently expressed his desire to build a grand alliance of Latin American and Caribbean countries. The initiative would have a considerable impact on the Latin-American regional integration process which is fragmented between regional and sub-regional groups: SICA (Central American countries), CAN (Colombia, Ecuador, Bolivia and Peru) and Mercosur (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay and Venezuela). Furthermore, it would enhance the dialogue between Mexico and Brazil, the countries that could become the engine of Latin American regional integration.

Brazil's government has realized it needs to play a stronger role in the region. By 2019, the Brazilian economy could surpass all but the largest European countries. However, Brazil is still debating between being "first among the poor or last among the rich", and this is evident in certain symbolic gestures, such as its pursuit of a permanent seat in a hypothetical, enlarged UN Security

130 Bolivarian Alliance for Americas which is led by Venezuela and Cuba.

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Council. On the other hand, the United States will remain the most powerful player, but will be less dominant. After the 2009 financial crisis, the US economy will grow at a respectable rate thanks to America's leading role in technological innovation and research.

3. An enlarged European Union

In 2019, globalization, the ageing population and the increasing complexity of public action, will press Europeans to change the 'European social model'. The new technologies will allow the EU to remain competitive. Moreover the EU will have the potential to affect the direction and pace of globalization. It will face three challenges:

- to foster economic competitiveness without endangering social cohesion;

- to continue the neighbourhood policy with Eastern European and South Mediterranean countries. This should go hand in hand with the process of enlargement and the clarification of the European political design;

- to promote convergence between a multi-polar political system and a multilateral order in the more interdependent, complex and unstable world of 2019.

4. Violence, organized crime and terrorism

Instability in Africa, the Middle East and Asia is likely in the next decade. In Latin America, terrorist attacks have been carried out essentially by revolutionary movements. Nowadays, there is a weakening of the phenomenon, due to measures undertaken by national governments and to the US's war on drugs and terrorism. Residual terrorism in Latin America will no longer pose a threat to political stability. However, the continent will continue to suffer from youth gang violence and drug trafficking. In Latin America the gap between the richer and poorer sectors of society is very pronounced. On average only 1 to 2% of total income goes to the bottom 20% of the population. Latin American leaders should fight crime by making social investments and by reforming the judiciary and the police to strengthen the rule of law.

5. Future of Democracy

There are prospects for greater democratization. However, globalization will subject many recently democratized countries to increasing social and economic pressures that could undermine democratic institutions. In September 2001 Latin American governments signed the Inter-American Democratic Charter. However, democratic political institutions are still weak in some countries, evident in the increasing levels of voter abstention.

6. Demographic challenge

By the year 2019 Asia will hold about 60% of the world's population, and Africa will contain 17% approximately. Latin America and the Caribbean will represent 8.5% and Europe even less. In Latin America, population growth will be relatively moderate with the rural poor and the indigenous populations growing at a faster rate. In the EU the low birth rate and the ageing population will become serious problems. To avoid economic stasis, EU member states must adapt their work forces, reform their social welfare, education and tax systems, and accommodate growing immigrant populations.

In Latin America, 25 years of democracy and globalization have not enhanced the overall economic development. This is evidenced by the millions of Latin Americans that emigrate and will emigrate to the US and to the EU, and by the economic significance of the 'remittances' to Latin American countries.

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7. Indispensable social cohesion

Distribution of income has almost universally deteriorated with Latin America being branded as the region with the greatest inequality. In the continent, over 200 million (39.8%) of 550 million people live below the poverty line. Although there is no general humanitarian emergency, Latin American countries will have difficulties in achieving all the Millennium Development Goals scheduled for 2015. In this context, Latin America must strive for income redistribution and for equal opportunity in education and health, old age and minimum welfare provision.

8. Environmental threats

Climate change is expected to exacerbate resource scarcity and loss of agricultural production. By 2019 the impact in Europe will be mild. However, in Latin America the situation will be more problematic. Global warming could turn the Amazon from a major carbon sink into a carbon emitter. The damage to Latin America's environment will continue, unstopped by the lack of awareness of ordinary people and the low level of participation of grassroots organizations.

9. The challenges of energy politics

Current technologies are inadequate for replacing traditional energy on the scale needed and new energy technologies probably will not be commercially viable and widespread by 2019. Global demand for primary energy is expected to increase (1.6%) per year). Fossil fuels will continue to be the world's primary energy source. The share of nuclear energy will decline in most developed market economies, but it will increase in developing countries. Finally, renewable energies will grow faster than any other energy source, particularly in OECD countries. The growing dependency of the EU on energy imports poses technical and political challenges. Latin America produces 9% of global energy. It produces 15% of the world's oil (exporting 50% of it) and 7.5% of gas. In this context, Latin America will play a key role in the future politics of energy supply. If the majority of the Latin American countries can commit to a new Partnership for Energy Security, it is possible that energy nationalism, stimulated by Venezuela and Bolivia, particularly in an environment of relatively moderate prices - can be kept at bay, opening the door for rational energy integration and rapid transformation of the energy economies.

EUROPEAN UNION - LATIN AMERICA RELATIONS

The EU has established and built up links with Latin America since the 1960s. The relationship between the two regions has substantially evolved over the past three decades at three levels: political dialogue, cooperation and trade relations. The European Union and Latin America comprise almost one third of the United Nations States, over one billion people and over a quarter of the world's GDP. Moreover, the EU is the leading donor in Latin America, the first foreign investor and the second most important trade partner.

1. Political Dialogue

The three main fora for political dialogue between the EU and Latin America are the EU- LAC Summits, the EU-Rio Group and San José Ministerial Meetings and the EU-Latin America Assembly (EuroLat).

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1.1. EU-LAC Summits

Every two years there are summits between the heads of state and government of Latin America, the Caribbean and the EU, that alternatively take place in one of both regions. The most recent EU-LAC summit (the 5th) took place in Lima (May 2008). The next summit will take place in Spain (2010) during the Spanish Presidency of the EU. Such summits are occasions to have a political dialogue at the highest level, addressing important issues to the future partnership between both regions. In 1999 in Rio, during the 1st EU-LAC Summit, the aim of a strategic association between the two continents was approved. That aim, based on profound affinities uniting both regions, is to be implemented by increased political dialogue, greater and more balanced liberalisation of economic and financial trading, and increased cooperation in key sectors such as development, culture, science and education.

2. Cooperation

The Commission has an arsenal of thematic and geographical cooperation instruments, framed by the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI), to implement the European Union's priorities with Latin America. The European Union's cooperation policy is based on Articles 177, 179 and 181 of the EC Treaty. The European Union (Member States and the Commission) is the region's leading donor, even outstripping the US, with the Commission providing an estimated €500 million a year on average. The aid package for 2007-2013 allocated to Latin America is €2,690 million.

An examination of the regional strategy documents for Latin America shows clear elements of continuity. In the political field, the priority is democratic governance, specifically the consolidation of democratic institutions and the rule of law; reform of the state; respect for human rights; and 'good government'. In the economic field, the themes are regional integration, institutional capacity-building, policy coordination, civil society participation and access to external markets. In the social field, the themes are the fight against poverty and social exclusion in order to promote 'social cohesion'. Finally, with regard to the management of interdependencies, the EU's priorities are to protect the environment, combat illegal drugs and prevent and combat natural disasters. Cross-cutting themes such as gender equality and the fight to stop discrimination against indigenous people, Afro-descendants and minorities have also remained on the agenda. In addition, new priorities have emerged from the EU-LAC Summit meetings to promote higher education and the development of the information society. This change has created some problems: there is a notable imbalance between the political commitments made at EU-LAC Summit meetings and the available financial resources, which have not increased. Additional resources could come, for instance from the establishment of a bi-regional solidarity fund proposed by the EP since 2001, the Latin America Facility granted by the EIB or the new financial mechanism proposed in Prague on 13 May 2009 by Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner.

2.1. Regional integration

The European Union encourages the countries of the world to forge strong ties with their neighbours and to organise themselves in regional groups with common institutions. The EU has unfailingly supported regional and sub-regional integration in Latin America. The recent Union of South American countries (UNASUR) could be the starting point for a future community of Latin-American nations, a preferential partner of the European Union. Until that day the sub-regional experiments in integration - Central America, Andean Community and Mercosur - can only be encouraged by the EU.

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3. Trade and association agreements

The EU has developed institutionalised relationships with several Latin American countries on a bilateral basis. Since neither Mexico nor Chile belong to any Latin American regional group, they have developed strong bilateral links with the EU.

3.1. EU-Mexico Agreement

Mexico is the largest economy in Latin America and one of the emerging powers of the region. Mexico was the first Latin American country to sign a privileged partnership agreement with the EU. The Economic Partnership, Political Coordination and Cooperation Agreement signed in 1997, known as the 'Global Agreement', testifies to the closeness and maturity of relations between the EU and Mexico. Since the Global Agreement entered into force on 1 October 2000, trade relations between Mexico and the EU (its second most important trading partner) have increased considerably.

3.2. EU-Chile Agreement

Chile's successful macro-economic performance over the last two decades has positioned it among the most dynamic economies in the world. The Association Agreement signed by the EU and Chile in 2002 entered into force in 2005. The Agreement is ambitious and truly innovative in a number of areas. The balance of the Agreement is largely positive for both partners.

3.3. EU-Central America Agreement

The EU has undertaken an ambitious programme of rapprochement with Central America in recent years that will lead to a bi-regional Association Agreement as decided in the Vienna Summit (2006). The European Commission, negotiating on behalf of the EU, and Central America has had six successful rounds of negotiations to date. These negotiations cover three pillars: Political Dialogue, Cooperation and Trade. The EU welcomed the most recent achievements in the Central America regional integration process, notably the signature of the Customs Union Framework Agreement by five Central American countries.

3.4. EU-Andean Community Agreement (CAN)

The EU has supported the process of Andean sub-regional integration since 1969. During a high-level EU-CAN meeting held on 12-13 July 2006, the representatives of the European Commission and of the Andean Community decided to undertake the necessary steps allowing for the launch of negotiations for an Association Agreement between the EU and the Andean Community. The fourth round of negotiations between Europeans and the Andeans was due to be held in July 2008 but did not take place. The Commission decided to cancel it in view of the lack of agreement within the CAN. Colombia and Peru are in favour of making rapid progress on each of the negotiation chapters, while Bolivia and to a lesser extent Ecuador have reservations on certain chapters.

3.5. EU-Mercosur Agreement

Mercosur is a dynamic regional integration process conducted by Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay and Venezuela. Since Mercosur was launched in 1991, the EU has been supporting the sub-regional integration process, and it continues to do so today with the goal of establishing a close and deep-rooted partnership. In September 1999 the EU Council mandated the Commission

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to negotiate an association agreement between the EU and Mercosur. However, after 15 rounds of negotiations and despite mutual commitments to conclude the negotiations before the end of October 2004, the two parties did not reach agreement at the ministerial meeting held in Lisbon on 20 October 2004, leading to the suspension of discussions. The disagreements were mainly on agricultural issues and the opening up of public markets and services.

4. Strategic Partnerships

4.1. EU-Mexico

A member of OECD, Mexico is along with Brazil one of the two economic powers of Latin America. Taking this background into account, in July 2008 the Commission proposed to set up a major strategic partnership in EU-Mexico relations, (the same as the existing partnerships with Russia, India, China, etc.). This strategic partnership would put in place a reliable political framework and thus accentuate the EU-Mexico dialogue on bilateral issues and coordination of their action at international level.

4.2. EU-Brazil

The EU is at present Brazil's largest trading partner. Their relations go back to the 1960s. Their development led to the signing of the EU-Brazil framework agreement on cooperation and the EU-Mercosur framework agreement on cooperation in 1995. The EU-Brazil strategic partnership was set up at the first EU-Brazil summit in July 2007. It constitutes a political commitment by the EU and Brazil to play an active role in the world's political, regional, economic and social problems.

ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

1. Interparliamentary relations

The European Parliament was a pioneer strengthening links with the Latin American Parliament (PARLATINO) and the sub-regional Parliaments.131 The first Inter-parliamentary Conference was held in Bogota in 1974. Up to 2005, 17 Inter-parliamentary Conferences were held. These encounters were the main channel for dialogue and cooperation between MPs of the two regions.

After the 2004 elections, the EP set up five delegations for relations with the Latin-American area, taking account of the existing regionalism132. A delegation for relations with Brazil should be created because that country has become an EU strategic partner and all the strategic partners have a specific delegation.

Over the years the EP has adopted a number of resolutions on Latin American issues and Latin American countries which led progressively to a parliamentary diplomacy.

Finally, the European Parliament, in order to support the democratic values, which have become dominant in Latin America, has sent several observation missions to oversee the elections in some Central American and Andean countries. These missions, which have for the most part been held in parallel with a European Union Electoral Observation mission (organized by the Commission), were much appreciated by the local authorities because the European lawmakers' presence was a strong stimulus to democracy and a legitimisation of the election process. 131 Andean Parliament (PARLANDINO), Central America Parliament (PARLACEN) and the Mercosur Parliamentary

Committee. 132 Delegation for relations with the countries of Central America, Delegations for relations with the countries of the

Andean Community, Delegation for relations with Mercosur, Delegation to the EU-Mexico Joint Parliamentary Committee and Delegation to the EU-Chile Joint Parliamentary Committee.

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2. Euro-Latin American Assembly (EuroLat)

The EU-LAC Vienna Summit, held in May 2006, was aware of the EP's request for the creation of EuroLat, which constitutes a positive stimulus at the highest level towards strengthening the parliamentary arm of the EU-LAC Bi-regional Strategic Partnership. The EuroLat Assembly, which had its constituent session in Brussels on 9 November 2006, is a forum for parliamentary debate, control and review of all questions relating to the Bi-regional European Union - Latin America Strategic Partnership, as the parliamentary institution of that partnership and in line with the EuroLat Constituent Act.

Eurolat, which is composed of 150 members, 75 from the EP and 75 from the various regional, sub-regional and national Assemblies, has the main objective to support, promote and consolidate in practical terms the Bi-regional Strategic Partnership by covering its three main concerns, namely

(a) questions relating to democracy, external policy, governance, integration, peace and human rights;

(b) economic financial and commercial affairs;

(c) social affairs, human exchange, the environment, education and culture.

During the V EU-LAC Summit, held in Lima, in May 2008, the establishment of EuroLat was particularly appreciated. The heads of state and government present in Lima took note of the Assembly's resolutions and called on the institutions and bodies for integration in Latin America and Europe to cooperate closely with the Assembly.

TOWARDS AN EU-LAC STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP?

The creation of a Europe-Latin America Area of Strategic Association is an ambitious project that will require solutions to many challenges that go beyond the short-term. Whereas the bi-regional summits are the major political instruments to advance EU-LAC relations, the association agreements are the most powerful tool to achieve this objective. In order to strengthen the association agreements that are in place and conclude those that have not yet been implemented it is necessary to evaluate the diversity within the LAC, recognize intra and bi-regional asymmetries and acknowledge that different realities require different solutions, recognizing at the same time the diversity within the region's integrationist aspirations. The establishment of the common agenda should integrate the region's diversity and, simultaneously, find convergence channels that allow the confluence of common objectives.

Complementing and articulating the social and economic dimension with the institutional and political dimension of the bi-regional relation is one of the great challenges to forge a true strategic association that takes the needs of citizens into consideration. In this way, political dialogue in a parliamentary context offers a privilege venue for exchanging and generating consensus. The EP, the EuroLat Assembly and the regional, sub-regional and bilateral parliamentary fora strengthen the democratic legitimacy of the association and help find political solutions based on respect for diversity. It is because of this that they are called forward to strengthen their role with the promotion of viable proposals and fulfilling their responsibility to political control.

However, the EP in its Resolutions on Latin America was too optimistic in proposing 2012 as the Year of the Bi-regional Partnership implementation. Unfortunately, there are still many obstacles to overcome. The EU and Latin America have a long way to go before reaching that objective.

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After Rio, the Strategic Association was able to count on such notable achievements as the new EU association agreements with Mexico (2000) and Chile (2002). However, since it made its appearance, the 'strategic partnership' has had to deal with an unfavourable international context, and Latin America seems to have slipped down the EU's foreign relations agenda. This is due to factors such as the demands of EU enlargement, the displacement of European priorities towards the east, the Balkans, and South Mediterranean countries, and the primacy that security and the war on terror has acquired in international relations since the 11 September attacks, pushing other issues into the background. Moreover, with regard to trade, the EU and some Latin American countries have prioritised negotiations in the WTO, which with the enlargement of the EU, meant tackling the difficult reform of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP).

In contrast to the state of European integration, forged through paced geographic expansion and anchored in community legislation and complex common institutions, the LAC region is characterized by fragmentation and heterogeneity. This region lacks an institutional environment comparable to that of the EU and encompassing the totality of the geographic extension. What we have are multiple sub-regional integration processes in constant evolution that overlap each other and lack a clear set of functions, responsibilities and goals. The implementation of a customs union, the adoption of a single currency, the reform of regional and sub-regional institutions will not be easy. Moreover, the consequences of the present economic and financial crisis, the deadlock in the negotiations for the EU-Mercosur and EU-CAN Association Agreements, the negative effects in Latin America of the 'Retour Directive' and above all the lack of political will of some Latin American governments do not promote the implementation of the bi-regional strategic association.

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EU-RUSSIAN FEDERATION RELATIONS - Maria-Elena Efthymiou

The relations between the European Union and Russia have gone through various phases with the active participation of the European Parliament. Neither the EU nor the Russian Federation appear to have a very clear idea what their relations should be, hence the delay in preparing the new agreement. The same uncertainty seems to rule their respective external policies although in the trade and economy sector the issues are much clearer. For this reason, despite their political differences and the absence from the Russian side of any real "convergence of legislative standards", the idea of a market democracy trading and economic partnership is increasing, and this trend is expected to continue this trend in the foreseeable future. However, there is scope for improved political relations and the European Parliament's contribution could be essential.

1. MAJOR TRENDS AND CHALLENGES

Demography: with a surface of 17,075 million sq. meters, the Russian Federation is the biggest country in the world from the point of view of surface. However, the population density is low, 8.43 inhabitants per sq. km. (existence of large inhospitable areas and/or harsh climate).

Russia faces a profound demographic challenge. Despite a slight migration flow and a marginal rise in the fertility rate (1.40 to 1.58), the population is likely to fall steeply from the actual 143.2 million to 129.2 million people over the next twenty years. This is not expected to raise major economic problems, as the share of working population will probably remain quite high but the increase of the share of elderly people (from the current 17.1% to 24.3% by 2025) could create serious social problems. On the other hand, the pressure on resources and energy consumption is likely to decrease, which will promote the success of environmental protection measures and combat climate change.

Economy: After a decade of severe economic decline, the Russian economy became highly profitable during the last eight years. The GDP growth rate was increasing at a rate of more than 7 % for several years and the GDP per capita was around 2.382 Euros in 2004. The growth was driven mainly by energy production and exports but industrial productivity was also increased. It has been estimated that the oil and gas sector may have accounted for up to 25% of GDP in 2003, while employing less than 1% of the population. The government has pursued a stable macro-economic policy, an internationally lauded fiscal policy, and launched structural reforms in vital sectors of the economy.

The global crisis has hit also Russia hard, mainly after the severe decline in oil prices. It is estimated that real GDP fell by 9.5% year in 2008, compared with a previous estimate of a contraction of 7-8%. The average figures in the EU are in decline by 2. 5%. Industrial output data for March were disappointing, and the unemployment rate has risen more sharply than expected, reaching 9.5% in the first quarter and, after a lag, real incomes and consumption are now declining133 Economic analysts had placed Russia in the emerging economies (the BRIC grouping, composed of Brazil, Russia, India, and China) whose economic growth are predicted to overtake that of France or Italy by 2025. Such best-case scenario is dependent on Russia building the conditions for growth

133 Economist Intelligence Unit.

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through sound macroeconomic policies, strong and stable political institutions, openness to trade and foreign investment as well as high levels of education.

If the economic crisis intensifies, serious disturbances cannot be ruled out. There are already some signs of growing popular dissatisfaction. However, the popular standing of the prime minister, Vladimir Putin, or the president, Dmitry Medvedev134 does not seem to have been significantly affected.

Military capacities: One of President Medvedev's major policy announcements was the modernisation of the army. Russia seeks to develop modernised armed forces, in parallel with a competitive military industry. The use of force is likely to retain a role in Russian foreign policy, especially in the area of the former Soviet Union. Equally, Russia maintains large stockpiles of nuclear weapons and fissile materials.

The increase and upgrading of Russia's military capacities cannot in any way challenge the hegemony of the USA, as the Russian defence budget is only 4% of that of the USA.

As stated lately by American eminent politicians135 it is neither feasible nor desirable to isolate a country adjoining Europe, Asia and the Middle East. Russia could be an equal partner in a number of important security issues such as Iran and Afghanistan. As reported earlier this year, the US and Russia have agreed to reset their relations and work on a new nuclear arms-control agreement by the year-end.

It would seem that the relations between US and Russia are now entering a new phase, as stated by Vice President Joseph Biden in Munich on 7 February 2009 ..."It is time to press the reset button and to revisit many areas where we can and should work together". This seems to point at an increased cooperation USA-Russia to address many core global security issues such as nuclear security, non-proliferation and terrorism.

Democracy/governance: After 1999, Vladimir Putin succeeded in consolidating a deeply enfeebled state by strengthening the central executive power. He also declared that Russia would follow the path of crafting a 'sovereign democracy' as more suitable to Russian conditions. This has raised concerns in the West as in practice it has translated into weakening political pluralism, increased state control over the media, arbitrary application of the rule of law and pressures against the civil society. The form of governance has many characteristics of an 'illiberal democracy' as it combines a liberal democratic form with illiberal content.

After Dmitry Medvedev, with his relatively liberal reputation replaced Vladimir Putin in the Presidency of the Russian Federation in 2008, a positive momentum in this area was expected. However, Russia did not demonstrate any signs of liberalisation. Instead of reforming the system of governance, the new President limited his reforms in legislation extending the presidential and parliamentary terms of office. A limited reform of the judiciary and a new law making it mandatory for public office holders to declare the assets belonging to them as well as to their immediate family was a significant step towards combating corruption but its full implementation will necessitate further efforts. Even with committed political impetus, it would still take some time to implement all the reforms necessary to make Russia compliant with Council of Europe standards, as it has agreed, and remove doubts about the fairness and independence of its justice system. This is because Russia is a vast country, with a decentralized territorial organization, and time will be required to adapt procedural rules to the functioning of new courts. Reform is also an expensive process and, although the EU has recognized and assisted these reforms with contributions through the previous TACIS (Technical Aid to the Commonwealth of Independent States) program, there is still a long way to go. 134 Idem. 135 Henry Kissinger and George Schultz, Washington Post, October 8, 2008.

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Although this form of governance has given stability to the Russian political system, the longer-term of this kind of democracy is far more uncertain. The liberal opposition in Russia is in disarray and the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF) is a declining force. Some independent labour groups have emerged recently but most trade union organisations are close to the government.

The most important destabilising factor for the future is the dissociation between the centralised state from one side, an increasingly alienated society and the pressures for a more equal distribution of powers for the regions on the other. These disparities could seriously threaten the status quo. The danger would be in particular the rise of intolerance and exclusive nationalism and combined with regionalism.

2. KEY POLICY CHOICES

Current EU policies: The EU has in place a programme of financial cooperation that has evolved over time to support the achievement of common objectives

Partnership and Co-operation Agreement signed in 1994, in force since 1997 for 10 years (expired 2007)

- Common Strategy on Russia (adopted in the 1999 Cologne European Council). It was to remain in force until June 2004 (extended for further three years) and aimed to establish greater consistency in the EU’s policies towards Russia.

- New PCA: in June 2008 the bilateral summit welcomed the launch of the negotiations on a new framework agreement that had been blocked for almost two years by the European side. The aim is to conclude a strategic agreement that will provide a comprehensive framework for EU/Russia relations for the foreseeable future and develop the potential of a closer relationship. It should provide for a strengthened legal basis and legally binding commitments covering all main areas of the relationship, as included in the four EU/Russia common spaces and their road maps which were agreed in 2005.

- EU-Russia dialogue covers issues such as the current global economic challenges, energy cooperation, climate change, human rights, Europe’s external security, and the frozen conflicts in Russian neighbourhood. EU-Russia interdependence in the energy sector is a core element of the relationship.

As declared by the Commission136 "trading and economic partnership is booming. Russia is now the 3rd biggest trading partner of the European Union. And, over half of Russian exports go to the European Union". With its sustained high growth rates and emerging middle class, Russia is an important emerging market on EU's doorstep that offers opportunities to EU enterprises. The EU is the major investor in Russia, accounting for 80% of cumulative foreign investment and European investment will be needed even more in future, given Russia's quest for diversification and modernisation. The EU firmly supports Russia's bid to join the World Trade Organisation.

Assessment of EU policies: Despite the boom in EU/Russia trade and investment and the many specific area dialogues established under the Common Economic Space, there have been difficulties in several areas, from problematic customs procedures to Siberian Over-flights as well as the inconsistent implementation of international sanitary and phytosanitary standards by Russia. A solution to these problems would be Russia's accession to WTO (World Trade

136 Commissioner Benita Ferrero-Waldner 04/06/2008, press conference.

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Organisation) which the EU is supporting since the beginning of the current decade, but this has not been achieved because of the requirements set by the US Congress.

If the commercial and economic relations between the EU and Russia are progressing satisfactorily, the political relations are characterised by a very long list of bilateral controversies and contradictions, and a worsening mutual image. Russia and EU cannot agree about the future of their common neighbourhood. The European Union has no option but to increase its activities in the countries bordering Russia, while it cannot accept this is Russia's sphere-of-influence. Europe has been supportive of reforms in Ukraine, demands the liberalization of the regime in Belarus, and is a donor for Georgian post-war economic recovery.

According to some political analysts, the United States and its European allies have conflicting ideas about relations with Russia. Not only in Europe, but around the world interests are less stable and clear-cut in this era of globalisation.

A positive step in the direction of a clearer policy towards this part of Europe is the most recent EU initiative the Eastern Partnership which provides for a position for Russia as a non-participant. The stance that Russia will adopt in relation to this policy remains to be seen, although a positive response should not be expected.

Future trends: It is evident that the EU does not have a uniform and thought-out policy towards the Russian Federation. It has been alleged that Moscow is playing a game of dividing the European Union specifically by using its power as energy provider. However, the divisions in the stance of EU countries towards Russia can be attributed more to their diverse geopolitical positions as well as their diverse historical and ideological evolution than to any external manipulator. The absence of a common foreign policy might be considered a major lacuna of the EU and is apparent in many other instances but it is also the result of the diversity which constitutes its wealth.

From its part, the Russian Federation seems to be also lacking a coherent and consequential foreign policy both towards Europe and towards the world in general. In recent years, political analysts have marked a tendency of Russia to reclaim part of its previous superpower status and become more of an "actor" of globalisation and less its "victim". The defence of what Russia considers its sphere of influence and its economic development are one of the major contradictions in Russia's foreign relations that will have to be solved in the near future.

As shown by the recent visits of President Medvedev (in Brazil and Japan for example) and international leaders' meetings which took place in Russia, Russian foreign policy is likely to continue its movement away from the Western and European focus and more towards new states that arise as regional and global leaders, such as China and India. However, Europe will remain a key interlocutor because of the importance of economic relations and the role of EU in the international scene. Russian foreign policy is likely to continue aiming at the building of a multi-polar world.

3. THE POSITION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

Assessment of European Parliament's policies: In the second half of the legislature, the European Parliament has intensified its relations with the Russian Federation both on the level of inter-parliamentary relations and in its scrutiny of the political developments. Main focus has been the defence of human rights, the freedom of the Media, and the implementation of the rule of law, as well as the trade and economic relations and the security of energy supply. The conflict in Georgia was also closely followed. A number of declarations, resolutions, visits and bi-lateral meetings were the strong evidence of its marked interest for Russia's further democratisation. The

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European Parliament has repeatedly stated that “the human rights situation in Russia should be an integral part of the EU-Russia political agenda” and that “extensive economic cooperation between Russia and the EU must be based on high standards of democracy and free market principles”137

The field of foreign relations is not, in the constitutional tradition of most of EU Member States, a prerogative of the law-making institution. However, in a changing word this doctrine seems to be less rigid than theory would indicate. The European Parliament, as well as the parliamentary bodies of the Member States, disposes of a large spectrum of possibilities of action in the external relations area.

Future possibilities and trends: The European Parliament is ideally positioned to compensate for the technical and bureaucratic relations between EU and Russia. It could promote a true "working" dialogue between the various actors by-passing thus the official mechanisms which have not been very successful in establishing a meaningful cooperation. These possibilities can be used to promote a better understanding and a closer cooperation with the Russian Federation in various levels: parliamentary, civil society, political parties, business, government. New areas of dialogue and cooperation can be established by mutually avoiding divergent questions and promoting common interests as is already the case in precincts such as the Northern Dimension. The visit of the Temporary Committee on Climate Change to the Russian Parliament in October 2008 was a very clear example of the opportunities for dialogue between the two law-making bodies.

More specifically, strong statements on human rights and rule of law situation are manifestly considered as "preaching" and "interfering" on internal matters from the Russian side and have been revealed as counterproductive. As these issues are important for the European Parliament, the recognition of what is important for the Russian counterparts could promote a better mutual understanding on a quid pro quo basis.

137 OJ C 146 E, 12.6.2008, p. 95.

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REFERENCES

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Ayuso, A., Acuerdo de Asociación Global Interregional para la creación de una zona de asociación global, Parlamento Europeo, Bruselas, Marzo 2009

Ayuso, A., Análisis de Viabilidad del Fondo de Solidaridad Birregional Unión Europea - América Latina, Parlamento Europeo, Bruselas, Febrero 2006

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Bordachev, T., "EU Crisis: What opportunities for Russia", Russie. CEI. Visions, (7), October 2005

Brantner, F., Gowan, R., A Global Force for Human Rights?An Audit of European Power at the UN, European Council on Foreign Relations, London 2008

Burwell, F., Beyond Closing Guantanamo: Next Steps to Rebuild a Transatlantic Partnership in International Law, The Atlantic Council of the United States in association with Chatham House, Washington 2009

Chambon, N., Rubio, E., Quels contours pour les politiques Européennes à l’horizon 2020?, Synthèse des Travaux, Troisième forum européen des think tanks, Paris, 19-20 septembre 2008

120/125

Forward looking policy papers on "Europe 2009-2019"

Cockayne, J., Transnational Organized Crime: Multilateral Responses to a Rising Threat, International Peace Institute, April 2007

Cockayne, J., Mikulaschek, C., Transnational Security Challenges and the United Nations: Overcoming Sovereign Walls and Institutional Silos, International Peace Institute, February 2008

Delaunay, D., The Doha Round of negotiations: State of play, September 2008, Policy Department, DG EXPO, European Parliament

Erixon, F., "Europe’s World guide to the EU in 2020", Europe's world, No. 3, Summer 2006, p. 118-125

Ferguson, D., Expert Seminar Report: Europe's Long-Term Vision of the Defence Environment in 2025: Sharp or Fuzzy?, Security & Defence Agenda, Brussels, 13 June 2006

Florescu, E, Glenn, J.C., Gordon, T.G., 2008 State of the Future, The Millennium Project, World Federation of UN Associations, 2008

Fraser, M., (Ed.), European Union: the next 50 years. 50+ top thinkers set out their ideas for Europe, FTBusiness, London, 2007

Geremek, B., Pitch, R. (Eds.), Visions d'Europe, Paris, Odile Jacob, 2007

Gnesotto, N., Grevi, G., (Eds.), Le monde en 2025, Paris, R. Laffont, 2007

Gnesotto, N., Grevi, G. (Eds.), The New Global Puzzle: What world for the EU in 2025?, EU Institute for Security Studies, 2006

Grant, C., Valasek, T., Preparing for the multi-polar world: European foreign and security policy in 2020, Centre for European Reform, December 2007

Hamilton, D., Quinlan, J., Deep Integration: How Transatlantic Markets are Leading Globalization, 2005

Heikkilä, T., Europe 2050: challenges of the future, heritage of the past, Helsinki, Edita, 2006

121/125

DG EXPO Policy Department

Jurine, M., Robert, C., Human Rights and Democracy Indicators, Definition and Implications, European Parliament, Brussels, 24 February 2006

Khann, P. The Second World – How Emerging Powers are Redefining Global Competition in the Twenty-First Century, Penguin Books, 2009

Kinzer, St., Crescent and Star: Turkey between Two Worlds, Strauss and Giroux, New York, 2001

Keohane, D., Valasek, T., Willing and able? EU defence in 2020, Centre for European Reform, June 2008

Leonoard, M. Divided world: The struggle for primacy in 2020, Centre for European Reform, January 2007

Lerch, M., Democracy in the Ascendant? Opportunities and Limitations of Strategies to Promote Democracy, Berlin 2007

Mallinen, J., The Econoly Crisis is the moment of truth for Russia, Baltic Rim Economies expert article (299), 2009

Mannermaa, M., Democracy in the Turmoil of the Future. Societal influence within a new frame of reference, Committee for the Future, Eduskunta, Parliament of Finland, 2007

McDermott, R., "Russia's Armed Forces: The Power of Illusion", Russie.CEI. Visions, (37), March 2009

McDougall, W., Will “Europe” survive the 21st century?: meditation on the 50th anniversary of the European Community, Philadelphia, Foreign Policy Research Institute, 2007

Meunier, S., "L'Union européenne, la "mondialisation maîtrisée" et l'épreuve du Cycle de Doha", in: L'Union européenne, acteur des relations internationales, Annuaire Français des Relations Internationales, vol.VIII, pp. 513-525, Centre Thucydide, 2007

Monaghan, A., Russia at the presumption of NATO-Russia Relations, NATO Research Devision, January 2009

122/125

Forward looking policy papers on "Europe 2009-2019"

Moreau Defarges, P., "L'Europe, pour quoi faire?", Rapport annuel sur le système économique et les stratégies, Institut français des relations internationales, 2007, Ramses, p. 31-40

Moshes, A., EU-Russia Relations: a regrettable continuation, Fondation Robert Schuman, Issues, (129), 24 February 2009

Pei, M., China's Trapped Transition: The Limits of Developmental Autocracy, Harvard 2008

Pope, H., Son of the Conquerors: The Rise of the Turkic World, Overlook Press, London, 2005

Pullinger, S., "European security in 2020: Threats, challenges and responses", European Security Review, No 37, International Security Information Service (ISIS) Europe, March 2008

Sanahuja Perales, J.A., The Effectiveness of European Union Development Cooperation with Latin America: Assessment and Perspectives, European Parliament, Brussels, April 2008

Shevtsova, L., Lost in Transition: The Yeltsin and Putin Legacies, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2007

Steinhilber, J., Kompass 2020: Germany in international relations. Aims, instruments, prospects, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, February 2008

Trenin, D., "Moscow the Muscular": The Loneliness of an Aspiring Power Centre", Briefing Vol. 11, Carnegie Moscow Centre, spring 2009

Ülgen, S., "Turkey’s route to the EU may be via the Middle East", Europe's World, Spring 2009

Worcester, M., The threat of transnational crime, Institut für Strategie- Politik-

Sicherheits- und Wirtschaftsberatung, 2007

Youngs, R., (en collaboration avec Bossuyt, J., De Jong, K., Van Doorn, M., Von Meijenfeldt, R., No Lasting Peace and Prosperity without Democracy and Human Rights. Harnessing Debates on the EU's Future Financial Instruments, European Parliament, 27 July 2005

123/125

DG EXPO Policy Department

Youngs, R., (Ed.), Is the European Union Supporting Democracy in its Neighbourhood? FRIDE in association with the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), Madrid, 2008

Commission européenne, Maîtriser la mondialisation: L'Union européenne et le commerce mondial, Décembre 2002

Comisión Europea, Comunicación de la Comisión al Consejo y al Parlamento Europeo, Una Asociación reforzada entre la Unión Europea y América Latina, COM (2005) 636 final, Bruselas, 8 Diciembre 2005

DCDC, The DCDC Global Strategic Trends Programme 2007-2036, December 2006

Euro-Latin American Assembly, Resolution on the V Summit "EU - Latin America and the Carribbean, 30 April 2009, Peru

Euro-Latin American Assembly, Resolution on "Globalisation: Challenges and Opportunities", 20 December 2007, Brussels

European Commission, Latin America: Regional Programme Document 2007-2013, 12 July 2007, (E/2007/1417)

European Defence Agency, Initial Long-Term Vision Report for European Defence Capability and Capacity Needs, 2006

European Inter-University Centre for Human Rights and Democratisation (EIUC), The Impact of the Resolutions and other Activities of the European Parliament in the field of human rights outside the European Union, 2006

European Inter-University Centre for Human Rights and Democratisation (EIUC), Human Rights mainstreaming in EU’s external relations, 2009

OECD Economics Department, The Benefits of Liberalising Product Markets and Reducing Barriers To International Trade and Investment: The Case of The United States and the European Union, Working Paper, Paris, 2005

République Française, Ministère de la Défense, Prospective géostratégique à l’horizon des trente prochaines années, 13 Février 2008

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Forward looking policy papers on "Europe 2009-2019"

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The Economist Intelligence Unit, Foresight 2020: Economic, industry and corporate trends, 2006

The UK Government's Foresight Programme, Cyber Trust and Crime Prevention, March 2003 - June 2004

The US National Intelligence Council, Mapping the Global Future: Report of the National Intelligence Council's 2020 Project, December 2004

The US National Intelligence Council, Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World, November 2008

The US Department for Homeland Security, Advisory Council, Report of the Future of Terrorism Task Force, January 2007

Foundation for Defense of Democracies, Future of Terrorism project, (http://www.defenddemocracy.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1342&Itemid=335)