EU Agricultural Reform and its

Implications for Sub-Saharan Africa Paul Goodison November 2015 Initiativet for Handel og Udvikling

EU Agricultural Reform and its Implications for Sub-Saharan Africa – November 2015 Page 1

EU Agricultural Reform and its Implications for Sub-Saharan Africa

Table of Contents List of Abbreviations ............................................................................................................................... 2

Summary ................................................................................................................................................. 3

EU Agricultural Reform and its Implications for Sub-Saharan Africa ................................................... 5

Pre-1992: Meeting EU Food Security Concerns through ‘Price Support’ .......................................... 5

New Concerns and New Opportunities: The Basis for a Reformed Agricultural Policy .................... 6

From Quantity to Value Added and Quality Differentiated Agro-food Sector Production................. 7

Different Patterns of EU Agro-food Exports to Sub-Saharan Africa .................................................. 8

WTO Perspectives on EU Agricultural Policy Reforms ..................................................................... 8

WTO Perspectives on the EU’s Use of Agricultural Trade Policy Tools ......................................... 11

Annex 1: The Recent Evolution of EU agro-food sector trade with African, Caribbean and Pacific

Countries ............................................................................................................................................... 14

Annex 2: EU Annual Budget Expenditures: Some Overview Figures .................................................. 15

Annex 3: Definition of Terms Used ...................................................................................................... 16

Comprehensive List of Sources: ............................................................................................................ 17

EU Agricultural Reform and its Implications for Sub-Saharan Africa – November 2015 Page 2

List of Abbreviations ACP - African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States

CAP - Common Agricultural Policy

EAC - The East African Community

EC - European Commission

EPA - Economic Partnership Agreement

EU - European Union

GSP - Generalised System of Preferences

LDC - Least developed country

MFN - Most Favoured Nation

NTBs - Non-Tariff Barriers

OECD – The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

PSE - Producer Support Estimate

SDG – Sustainable Development Goal

SPS - Single Payment Scheme

SSA – Sub-Saharan Africa(n)

SSG - special agricultural safeguard

TPR - Trade Policy Review

TRQ - tariff rate quota

WTO – World Trade Organisation

EU Agricultural Reform and its Implications for Sub-Saharan Africa – November 2015 Page 3

Summary While EU Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) reforms have ensured that EU agricultural support

programmes are generally in line with WTO rules, the deployment of EU support continues to have

adverse effects on Sub-Saharan African (SSA) agro-food sectors. While levels of EU subsidies have

gradually declined in real terms over the past few years1, according to the WTO TPR EU agricultural

policies still have ‘a significant impact on other countries…whose economies depend on

agriculture’, with transfer keeping ‘production and exports higher, and imports lower’2.

In a number of sectors these external effects of EU policies are particularly strongly felt in SSA

countries (e.g. the poultry meat and dairy sectors), often breaking the link between rural production

zones and rapidly expanding urban consumer demand. This needs to be seen in the context of the

enhanced price competitiveness of EU agro-food exports, resulting from EU agricultural reforms, and

the virtual elimination of WTO constraints on EU export volumes.

Since 2010, this has seen West Africa’s agro-food sector trade surplus with the EU fall 95%,

Southern Africa’s agro-food sector trade surplus with the EU fall 23% and has transformed Central

Africa from a net agro-food sector exporter to the EU to a net agro-food sector importer3. This

potentially carries long-term implications for rural incomes and agro-food sector employment levels.

While some effects of EU policies are transitional, other effects are structural and cannot be divorced

from the EU’s reformed agro-food sector trade policy. These structural aspects include:

the EU’s continued commitment to managed trade across a range of sectors;

the granting by the EU of new agricultural trade preferences as part of trade agreements

designed to secure preferential access for EU agro-food exporters; and

sustained efforts to systematically eliminate both tariff and non-tariff barriers to EU agro-

food exports.

The EU’s objective of eliminating non-tariff barriers to its agro-food exports has seen the inclusion of

a range of provisions limiting the use of agricultural trade policy tools in new trade agreements.

These provisions include:

commitments not to increase applied tariff on imports from the EU, even within WTO bound

ceilings;

commitments on tariff reductions for some agro-food sector products;

commitments to eliminate all quantitative restrictions on imports from the EU (in a context

where the EU uses TRQs to regulate access to many EU agro-food markets); and

limitations on the use of agricultural safeguard measures (in a context of continued use of

special safeguards for certain agricultural products in the EU’s trade with major agro-food

trading nations).

The EU’s ‘offensive’ trade policy agenda thus stands in distinct contrast to its own trade policy

practice in relation to its major agro-food sector trade partners. The EC preaches free trade but

maintains a carefully managed agro-food trade regime. All of this is permitted under what are

essentially imbalanced WTO rules.

The enforcement of the new trade policy commitments, entered into by SSA governments largely to

ensure continued duty free access to the EU market, could profoundly impact on current SSA

government policy initiatives to develop local agro-food sector supply chains.

1 This takes account of EU enlargement, the impact of inflation on the value of current payments and the fact that subsidies to agricultural producers differ from overall CAP spending, which includes non-agriculture activities financed under rural development programmes 2 WTO, Trade Policy Review of the European Union’, 6 and 8 July 2011, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp348_e.htm 3 Based on data extracted from EC, ‘Factsheets on EU28 agro-food trade with the world, various regions and individual countries’, http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/trade-analysis/statistics/index_en.htm . For more details see annex 1.

EU Agricultural Reform and its Implications for Sub-Saharan Africa – November 2015 Page 4

Given the EU’s development assistance support for agricultural and rural development programmes

in SSA, this raises important issues of EU policy coherence. It suggests an urgent need to look at how

the negative external effects of EU policies on SSA agricultural producers and the development of

locally integrated agro-food sector supply chains can be minimised.

This could be addressed through enshrining in WTO rules a ‘right to development’. This ‘right to

development’ would seek to limit ‘the applicability of WTO obligations when the enforcement of

such obligations would have a significant adverse effect on development’. It would create a right for

developing countries ‘not to be harmed by the imposition of trade rules’4.

This could potentially offer an important means of ensuring greater coherence between EU

development policy objectives in the sphere of agriculture and rural development and the EU’s

evolving agro-food sector trade policy. It could also serve to ‘hard-wire’ the WTO principle of

special and differential treatment into the application of commitments entered into through bilateral

trade agreements and ensure greater consistency with SDG 2, 8 and 125.

Recommendations

The contradiction between the EU policy objective for its reformed agricultural policy (which

focusses on enhancing the price competitiveness of a globally orientated EU agro-food sector) and the

aspiration of Sub-Saharan African governments to move their agro-food sectors progressively up

value chains (so that more value and more employment is created locally in serving national, regional

and international markets), needs to be recognised.

It needs to be recognised that this raises major issues of policy coherence in the application of a

range of EU agricultural and trade policy tools, since in a number of Sub-Saharan African countries

it is creating a disconnection between local agricultural production and rising urban demand and local

food processing industries, which are increasingly dependent on imported raw materials.

Mechanisms should be established to monitor specific external effects of the EU’s reformed

agricultural policies (for example, through extending the work of the EU Milk Market Observatory to

include detailed coverage of dairy sector trade flows to Sub-Saharan African countries seeking to

develop local milk to dairy supply chains). This should be closely linked to the establishment of

dialogues on how to minimise any adverse effects on the development of locally integrated agro-food

sector supply chains.

EU governments and institutions should look to elaborating the concept of a ‘right to development’,

which should guide the application of EU trade policy instruments in relations with Sub-Saharan

Africa with the aim of limiting the applicability of obligations included in trade agreements, whether

bilateral or multilateral, where the enforcement of such obligations would have a significant adverse

effect on development.

Creating a right for developing countries not to be harmed by the imposition of trade rules should be

central to the application of the EU’s policy coherence for development commitment.

As part of its commitment to policy coherence for development, the EU should ‘hard-wire’ the WTO

principle of ‘special and differential treatment’ for least developed, island and small and vulnerable

economies, into the application of commitments entered into under trade agreements.

The EC should also seek to promote the enshrining the ‘right to development’ in WTO rules in line

with proposals advanced by Joseph Stiglitz and Andrew Charlton in 2013.

4 See, Joseph Stiglitz and Andrew Charlton, ‘The right to trade: Rethinking the aid for trade agenda’, 2013 http://thecommonwealth.org/media/news/professor-joseph-stiglitz-calls-%E2%80%98right-trade%E2%80%99 5 Goal 2, ’End hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition and promote sustainable agriculture’; Goal 8,Promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and productive employment and decent work for all, Goal 12 Ensure sustainable consumption and production patterns.

EU Agricultural Reform and its Implications for Sub-Saharan Africa – November 2015 Page 5

EU Agricultural Reform and its Implications for Sub-Saharan Africa

Pre-1992: Meeting EU Food Security Concerns through ‘Price Support’6

Since 1992, the EU’s agricultural policy has undergone a gradual process of reform. While the reform

process has been multifaceted, the most basic change is in how the EU seeks to support its farmers.

Before 1992, the EU supported farmers by guaranteeing high prices for a range of agricultural

products (so-called price support). If prices fell below a set level, EU funding was used to buy

‘surpluses’ and store them. These ‘intervention’ stocks could be sold on the EU market when prices

rose above ‘intervention’ price levels or could be exported with the aid of export subsidies. In 1992

intervention buying, storage and export refunds accounted for fully 90% of EU CAP expenditures.

This system of ‘price support’ also required the maintenance of high taxes on imports and a range of

trade restrictions, so as to prevent EU market prices from being undermined by lower priced imports

(these include: strict import licensing procedures; seasonal import bans; tariff rate quotas, minimum

import prices; etc.). This system was expensive for the EU budget and also generated high consumer

prices. However, supporting agricultural production was seen as vital to ensuring European food

security in the context of the cold war confrontation with the Soviet Union.

The ending of the cold war saw the disappearance of EU food security concerns and a growing

concern over the dominance of EU agricultural funding compared to other emerging EU policy

priorities. Coinciding with the end of the cold war it became apparent that in future most of the growth

in demand for agro-food products7 would be beyond the EU’s borders. If these new global market

opportunities were to be exploited, then a fundamental reform of the EU’s agricultural policy would

be needed to close the gap between high EU prices and lower world market prices.

Impact of the Unreformed EU Agricultural Policy on Sub-Saharan African Countries

Under the un-reformed EU agricultural policy, there were some developing country ‘winners’ and some

developing country ‘losers’.

In terms of ‘winners’, for some products (notably bananas, sugar, beef, rice and rum, but also horticulture and

floriculture products) African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) developing countries could export specific

quantities to the EU without having to pay the high taxes on imports. From 2001, this was progressively

extended to originating products from all least developed (LDCs - many of which were already covered by the

ACP scheme). This allowed ‘preferred’ importers to enjoy the full benefits of high EU prices, which were

sometimes three times higher than world market prices (e.g. in the sugar sector).

In terms of ‘losers’, the surpluses generated by the unreformed CAP were commonly exported with the benefit

of export subsidies. This gave rise to charges of ‘dumping’ of these agricultural commodities. ‘Dumping’ was a

particular source of concern where exports occurred in such volumes and at such prices as to significantly

depress prices on local markets (e.g. for beef, milk, poultry etc.). Where this occurred, maintaining high prices

for EU farmers undermined prices paid to farmers in non-EU countries.

These trade distortions resulting from the agricultural policies of the EU and other OECD countries saw the

emergence of WTO rules to try to minimise the adverse effects on other WTO members.

6 For more background on this issue see: South Centre, ‘EU’s Increasing Use of De-coupled Domestic Supports in Agriculture: Implications for Developing Countries’, March 2011 http://www.southcentre.int/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/AN_AG12_EUs-Increasing-Used-of-Decoupled-Domestic-Supports-in-Agriculture_EN.pdf South Centre, ‘EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP): Tools Protecting European Farmers’, March 2011, http://www.southcentre.int/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/AN_AG13_EUs-common-Agricultural-Policy_EN.pdf Agritrade, CAP Reform’, Executive Briefs, 2010 to 2013 http://agritrade.cta.int/Agriculture#page=/(from)//(until)/24-11-2015/(sortby)/date/(search)/cross/(nodeid)/5299/(topics)/7819/(pubtype)/7762 Agritrade, ‘Special report: Future CAP financing for 2014–2020: Implications for the ACP’, 13 December 2011 http://agritrade.cta.int/en/Agriculture/Topics/CAP-reform/Special-report-Future-CAP-financing-for-2014-2020-Implications-for-the-ACP 7 The agro-food sector includes both agricultural production and the processing of agricultural products into high value food and non-food products.

EU Agricultural Reform and its Implications for Sub-Saharan Africa – November 2015 Page 6

A key challenge faced by the EU in designing its agricultural reforms was how to lower prices

towards world market price levels, without undermining agricultural production in the EU.

New Concerns and New Opportunities: The Basis for a Reformed Agricultural Policy

Agricultural policy reforms announced in 1992 began a gradual shift from a system of price support to

a system of direct aid payments to EU farmers. Guaranteed prices were gradually reduced, with direct

aid payments to EU farmers being gradually increased, to partially compensate for income losses and

to support a restructuring of agriculture in the EU, to shift production of particular commodities to the

lowest production cost areas of the EU for that commodity.

EU agricultural policy reform has been a gradual carefully managed process, which went through a

number of stages8. However, by 2013, most direct aid payments to EU farmers were ‘decoupled’

from production of specific agricultural products9. This meant that EU farmers received direct aid

payment regardless of what was produced or the level of production. The choice of product grown by

individual farmers would then be driven by the competitiveness of the farmer in the production of

specific products and the market returns which can be obtained. It is against this background that there

is a growing debate on the impact these direct aid payments have on the level of EU agricultural

production and consequent trade outcomes.

The Impact of the Reformed CAP on Sub-Saharan African Countries

The shift from price support to direct aid payments to farmers has greatly reduced the value of the trade

preferences enjoyed by ACP and least developed countries (particularly for bananas, sugar, beef and rice). This

is creating major adjustment problems for traditionally preferred suppliers, with smallholder farmers in these

supply chains being particularly severely affected. The plight of these smallholder farmers, who are generally

an important target group for EU development assistance programmes, raises important issues of policy

coherence.

CAP reform has greatly enhanced the price competitiveness of the EU agro-food products on international

markets. The reforms have also progressively released the EU agro-food sector from WTO constraints on

exports, since WTO disciplines limited the use of export refunds. However, there is no longer any need to

routinely use export refunds to bridge the gap between EU and world market prices, since this price gap is now

significantly lower. As a consequence, the EU has not paid out export refunds since 2012 (though the EU

retains the right to use export refunds as part of its ‘safety net’ policy if needed).

Overall, this has transformed the EU from a net agro-food importer to a net agro-food exporter, with a growing

agro-trade surplus since 2010 (increasing from €2,584 billion to €18,589 billion in 2013)10.

Overall CAP reform has not decreased EU agricultural production, which has continued to rise in line with

productivity gains. What the reforms have done is eliminate ‘surpluses’, for the target market for EU

agricultural production is no longer the EU but global agro-food markets, including those in developing

countries.

This basic policy change has been accompanied by public sector support to farm modernization and

farm consolidation, which enabled increased economies of scale to be gained. Corporate level

investments and innovation also saw increased efficiency of agricultural production and processing.

With since 2007 global agricultural commodities prices rising, overall this has served to close the gap

between EU and world market prices for agro-food products.

6 With direct aid payments initially tied to area payments linked to historical levels of production, subsequently ‘decoupled’ from historical production levels and eventually ‘decoupled’ from the production of any specific commodity. Farmers were then paid simply for being farmers, with most farmer being free to choose what they produced (some payments however have remained ‘coupled’ to production of particular commodities. 9 According to OECD analysis the EU’s June 2013 political agreement on CAP reform appears to increase the scope for ‘coupled’ support in certain particularly sensitive commodities, notably sugar and cotton. See, OECD, ‘Support to agriculture rising after hitting historic lows, OECD says’, 18 September 2013, http://www.oecd.org/newsroom/support-to-agriculture-rising-after-hitting-historic-lows-oecd-says.htm 10 See Annex 1 for more details.

EU Agricultural Reform and its Implications for Sub-Saharan Africa – November 2015 Page 7

Significantly, the EU agro-food sector is no longer producing primarily for the domestic EU markets,

with ‘surpluses’ being stored or exported with public assistance, it is now focussed on price

competitively serving expanding global markets for agro-food products. This price competitiveness,

however, is still strongly influenced by the income transfers farmers receive under the direct aid

payment schemes. Without these payments, EU farmers would be much more vulnerable to global

price volatility (to which EU markets are increasingly exposed), with the prospect of EU agricultural

production being undermined by periodic market crisis situations11.

Source: DG Agriculture and Rural Development, http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/cap-history/index_en.htm.

From Quantity to Value Added and Quality Differentiated Agro-food Sector Production

An increasingly important focus of EU agro-food sector policy has been the production and export of

value added food products and ‘quality differentiated’ agro-food products. Very early on in the

agricultural policy reform process it was recognised that the value added food products sector made a

greater contribution to national income and employment creation in the EU than agricultural

production per se.

Under the EU’s revised agricultural policy the aim was that in future EU agricultural producers would

either competitively produce to serve value added product manufacturers12 or would specialise in the

production of ‘quality differentiated’ agricultural products13.

This formed part of a broader EU policy aimed at re-positioning EU agro-food producers on EU and

global markets. High food safety standards and strict SPS requirements forming an integral part of

this agricultural product quality policy.

11 For a snapshot review of the EU’s use of agricultural support measures on a sector by sector basis in 2011, see: Agritrade, ‘’The EU’s agricultural policy toolbox: A sector-by-sector review’, Special report, 13 December 2011, http://agritrade.cta.int/en/Agriculture/Topics/CAP-reform/Special-report-The-EU-s-agricultural-policy-toolbox-A-sector-by-sector-review 12 On the basis of course of high levels of direct aid payments to farmers from public funds. 13 A key feature of quality differentiated EU agricultural production is that it enables agricultural producers to secure premium prices for their agricultural products, whether it be in the form of Italian Parma Ham or Danish Havarti

EU Agricultural Reform and its Implications for Sub-Saharan Africa – November 2015 Page 8

This focus on ‘quality’ is linked to the recognition that at a certain point, as people became more

wealthy, they stop eating more and pay more attention to the ‘quality’ of the products which they

consume. Some consumers then make their purchase decisions on the basis not of price but of other

non-price factors (e.g. organically produced, coming from a particular region, produced under

Fairtrade arrangements or certified sustainably produced). These are known as ‘luxury purchase

consumers’. Other consumers continue to make buying decisions on the basis solely of price. These

are known as ‘necessity purchase consumers’14. ‘Luxury purchase consumers’ are commonly willing

to pay much more for what they consume, sometimes for something as simple as pasta, up to 10 times

more (e.g. compare the price of a supermarkets own brand pasta to the price of an artisanal, organic

Italian, brand name pasta).

Different Patterns of EU Agro-food Exports to Sub-Saharan Africa

While competition on the basis of value addition and ‘quality differentiation’ is a growing feature of

EU agro-food sector exports, this tends to be focussed on developed country markets and high

income earners in middle income countries. In terms of trade with Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) while

expanding exports of value added agro-food products remains the long term objective, in the short

term the EU maintains an important trade in bulk agricultural commodities, most notably in the

dairy and poultry sectors, but also for a range of horticultural products and basic cereal based food

products (such as wheat flour, pasta and biscuits).

This trade in bulk commodities and simple value added food products can compete strongly with local

production in Sub-Saharan Africa and can undermine government efforts to develop both local

agricultural production and local agro-food sector value chains (e.g. milk-to-dairy supply chains).

Since the food price crisis of 2007/08, many SSA governments have given renewed priority to

developing local agricultural production and local agricultural value chains, with a range of traditional

agricultural trade policy tool increasingly being used. Sub-Saharan African governments would like to

move beyond the production and export of agricultural raw materials, towards increased local

processing of agricultural production for local, regional and international markets.

Impact of the EU’s New Market Focus on Sub-Saharan African Agro-food Sector Aspirations

Sub-Saharan African governments would like to move beyond the production and export of agricultural raw

materials towards increased local processing of agricultural production for local, regional and international

markets. However, this aspiration is in direct contradiction with the EU focus on expanded exports of value

added and quality differentiated high value food products.

Given the financial muscle, which the EU can deploy in support of its farmers and agro-food sector businesses,

major issues of policy coherence arise as a result of this fundamental conflict between EU and Sub-Saharan

African agro-food sector aspirations.

This is particularly the case in sectors where bulk commodity exports disrupt efforts to develop local farm-to-

factory agro-food sector supply chains.

This can create situations where local food processing companies (particularly in coastal zones) find

it cheaper to import raw materials than to source them locally, creating a disconnect between local

agricultural production and the local food processing industry.

WTO Perspectives on EU Agricultural Policy Reforms

The WTO Secretariat assessment of the EU’s agricultural policy reforms is ambiguous. In its July

2011 review of the EU’s trade policy (Trade Policy Review or TPR), the WTO Secretariat noted how

14 For a summary of these concepts and their relevance see, Agritrade, ‘Market Access’ Executive Brief, 1 March 2010, http://agritrade.cta.int/Resources/Other/Key-topics/Market-access-and-market-developments/Executive-brief/Access-to-the-EU-market-Issues-for-the-ACP

EU Agricultural Reform and its Implications for Sub-Saharan Africa – November 2015 Page 9

EU ‘support to agriculture … remains considerable in both absolute and relative terms’, at ‘just over

€100 billion’ in 200915. This was equivalent to one third of the value of the EU’s annual agricultural

production. The WTO Secretariat went on to note that ‘in total, during the ten years to 2009,

taxpayers and consumers in the EU have transferred nearly €1 trillion to agricultural producers …,

which represents a high level of support and keeps production and exports higher, and imports lower,

than would otherwise be the case.’ It was highlighted how as a major importer and exporter the

agricultural policies of the EU ‘can have a significant impact on other countries … whose economies

depend on agriculture’. The WTO Secretariat 2011 TPR concluded that after 20 years of reform, the

CAP ‘continues to have negative effects both within and outside the EU’.

However, in May 2013 the WTO Secretariat TPR16 reported some progress has been achieved in

reducing the overall level of EU support to the agricultural sector. In July 2011 the WTO Secretariat

highlighted how since 2000/01, EU ‘Green Box’ support has increased nearly three-fold, to €62.6

billion, while Blue and Amber Box17 support have both declined by three-quarters, to about €5.2

billion and €12.4 billion respectively’. In the May 2013 TPR, it was noted how the OECD-calculated

Producer Support Estimate (PSE) for the EU ‘has declined steadily over the past few years’ to €74

billion in 2011 (17.5% of gross farm receipts), down from ‘its peak of €105 billion or 38% of gross

farm receipts in 1999’18.

This trend is broadly continuing with a September 2013 OECD analysis of agricultural support

programmes argued that the June 2013 EU CAP reform agreement ‘does not represent a major

departure from either the current orientation or size of farm support in the 28-country bloc’19. Indeed,

according to an analysis of the EU’s 2014–2020 financial perspectives by the European Parliament

Secretariat, ‘committed expenditure to direct payments and market measures in 2020 is 13% less than

in 2013, while committed expenditure to rural development measures is 18% less’20. Other

measurement methods confirm the ongoing process of reductions in both EU direct aid payments and

rural development spending. EU financed agricultural support programmes are thus increasingly

within WTO disciplines.

However, it should be noted that the CAP reform processes has greatly increased the efficiency of EU

support measures in assisting EU agricultural producers and EU agro-food sector exporters. There is

now far less ‘leakage’ and far less ‘wastage’ in the system, with far greater production and trade

effects being achieved through every Euro of expenditure made under the CAP budget, compared to

the pre-reform period21.

15 WTO, Trade Policy Review of the European Union’, 6 and 8 July 2011, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp348_e.htm 16 WTO, ‘Trade Policy Review: European Union’, 28 May 2013 http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/s284_e.pdf 17 Under WTO rules ‘Green Box’ support is permitted, with no limitations since it is defined as non-trade distorting. In reality this does not mean these support measures have no effect on trade outcomes, merely that after a process of negotiations in which WO members such as the EU had a major say, these types of support measures have been defined under WTO rules as non-trade distorting. ‘Blue Box’ subsidies are tied to programmes that limit production. Under WTO rules WTO members have to progressively reduce ‘Amber Box’ support at an agreed rate, these support measures are seen as partially trade distorting. ‘Red Box’ measures are seen as most directly trade distorting and their use has to be eliminated under WTO rules. Under WTO rules there are also exemptions to these rules for developing countries. For more details see the WTO Secretariat pages at https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/negs_bkgrnd13_boxes_e.htm 18 However, it should be noted that such a decline is to be expected in an era of higher global food prices and therefore this is not necessarily a reflection of any decline in EU support levels, or more precisely any decline in the effectiveness EU policy tools in supporting EU agricultural producers and EU agro-food sector exporters. 19 OECD, ‘Support to agriculture rising after hitting historic lows, OECD says’, 18 September 2013, http://www.oecd.org/newsroom/support-to-agriculture-rising-after-hitting-historic-lows-oecd-says.htm 20 Based on 2011 real prices, see European Parliament, ‘European Council conclusions on the multi-annual financial framework 2014-2020 and the CAP’, 2013, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/note/join/2013/495846/IPOL-AGRI_NT(2013)495846_EN.pdf 21 ‘Leakage’ refers to the fraudulent claiming and use of CAP funding. ‘Wastage’ refers to levels of CAP funding higher than actually required to attain the desired policy outcome, for example the consolidation of ‘safety net’ funding for all commodities into a single facility, rather than the allocation of individual amounts to each activity in each sector.

EU Agricultural Reform and its Implications for Sub-Saharan Africa – November 2015 Page 10

The Role of EU Trade Policy in Trade Trends with SSA Countries

EU trade policy has played an important role in the repositioning of the EU agricultural sector. Firstly, during

the early stages of the agricultural reform process, the EU has continued to protect its agro-food sectors from

competition from major global agro-food exporters22. Secondly, the EU has increasingly sought to link duty

free access to the EU market to the granting of similar reciprocal agro-food sector trade preferences for EU

exporters. Thirdly, since 2008 the EU has been seeking not only to remove import duties on EU agro-food

exports, but also has been seeking to remove all non-tariff barriers to EU agro-food exports.

Under all recently concluded EU reciprocal preferential trade agreements with SSA governments (so called

Economic Partnership Agreements or EPAs), the EU has included articles which seek to limit the ability of SSA

governments to use traditional agricultural trade policy tools. Often the commitments made in these articles go

beyond the commitments SSA governments have made in the WTO and even violate such fundamental WTO

principles as the right to special and differential treatment for specific groups of WTO members.

The strengthening of the EU’s approach to the elimination of non-tariff barriers to EU agro-food sector exports

can be found in June 2007 symposium with EU agro-food exporters, which sought to identify the main barriers

to EU agro-food exports to third country markets and set an agenda for action in on-going EU trade negotiations

to address these barriers. During this symposium, EU exporters repeatedly highlighted how non-tariff barriers

now constituted a more significant barrier to EU agro-food sector exports than tariffs.

In response, the EC Agriculture Commissioner argued these NTBs would ‘not go away by themselves’, but

would require the EU to ‘make a determined effort to dismantle them’23. It is against this background that

securing the elimination of non-tariff barriers to trade was defined as an integral part of the EU’s ‘offensive

strategy for promoting and exporting agri-food products’.

Following this symposium, the issue of the prohibition of quantitative restrictions was firmly placed on the table

in the EC’s economic partnership negotiations with SSA governments. This led to the inclusion in many trade

agreements with SSA governments of commitments to the immediate abolition of import licences and

quantitative restrictions on imports from the EU, from the date of entry into force of these agreements.

Reviews of the EU’s financial planning for the 2014–2020 period demonstrate a remarkable

consistency with the 2007–13 trend towards reduced agricultural expenditures24. Thus, while there

may be no agreement in the WTO on reducing domestic support and disciplining blue-box measures,

the EU is continuing with its process of reducing the overall level of direct financial assistance to the

agricultural sector.

This is of course closely linked to the long-term trend in rising agricultural prices, the establishment

of more targeted cost-effective instruments for dealing with global price volatility and periodic

market disruptions and the continued use of trade policy tools to manage trade in agro-food

products.

The EU played a major role in designing WTO rules, with the EU’s planned agricultural reforms very

much in mind. As a consequence, it should come as little surprise that EU agricultural support

schemes are almost entirely compatible with WTO rules (although some aspects are increasingly being

questioned25). However, this does not mean that EU agricultural support programmes no longer distort

trade in ways which harm farmers in Sub-Saharan African countries. It simply means that EU

22 While of course granting trade preferences to less competitive developing country suppliers in the ACP/LDC Group 23 ‘Going on the offensive: a new approach to EU agri-food exports’, speech Marianne Fischer Boel, SPEECH/07/415, Brussels, 25 June 2007, AGRI consultation of EU exporters, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-07-415_en.htm?locale=en 24 See CAP Reform.ec, ‘The CAP budget in the MFF agreement’, 3 July 2013, http://capreform.eu/the-cap-budget-in-the-mff-agreement/ 25 For example, the re-opening by the Australian Anti-Dumping Commission of a case against two Italian tinned tomato exporters with the purpose of examining whether EU agricultural support measures, which are generally considered WTO compatible are in fact providing effective subsidies to EU exports. The outcome of this case could potentially raise questions about the compatibility of the EU’s use of a wide range of agricultural support tools with the underlying WTO principle that such support measures should be non-trade distorting. For details see abc.net.au, ‘AU anti-dumping EU subsidies should be included’, 22 January 2015, http://www.freshplaza.com/article/133972/AU-anti-dumping-EU-subsidies-should-be-included

EU Agricultural Reform and its Implications for Sub-Saharan Africa – November 2015 Page 11

agricultural policies distort trade in ways which are fully compatible with WTO rules as currently

agreed.

Overall, recent WTO analysis has highlighted a range of areas where EU policies affect production

and trade outcomes. This arises despite the compatibility of the EU’s use of its available policy tools

with agreed WTO rules. However, from the perspective of the EU’s commitment to policy coherence

for development, it is important that discussions be launched on how to minimise the negative effects

of the external consequences of EU agricultural policies on food and agricultural sector

development on Sub-Saharan Africa countries. This is particularly important in Sub-Saharan Africa

given economic significance of agriculture in many countries, which is far greater than in the EU26 and

the importance of the EU as an agro-food sector trade partner.

An Illustrative Example of Areas of Concern

While as part of its reform process the EU has massively reduced intervention buying and storage of ‘surplus’

EU agricultural products and now increasingly uses intervention buying and support for private storage

measures only as a ‘safety net’ measure, these actions can carry important consequences for agricultural

development efforts in countries targeted by EU exporters.

This is illustrated by the large-scale expansion of EU exports of milk powder to West Africa in 2010, as milk

stocks accumulated through intervention buying in response to the EU milk price crisis were disposed of.

It is these kinds of specific adverse effects, which the EU needs to address as part of its commitment to policy

coherence for development. It is this type of issue which the Danish government should actively seek to take up

at the EU level as part of its commitment to promoting policy coherence for development.

This could build on the Danish private sector/NGO initiative launched in 2014 to promote responsible EU

corporate engagement with Sub-Saharan African dairy sector through the trade and investment relationships

established in the new context created by EU dairy sector reforms. This includes a commitment from the major

Danish Dairy cooperative Arla to pursuing its trade and investment interests in SSA in ways, which seek to

avoid any adverse effects on local milk producers27. Such commitments could usefully form the basis for a pan-

EU Code of Conduct for dairy companies, in an era of expanded EU milk production, when companies are

seeking ever increasing outlets for dairy products beyond the EU’s borders.

WTO Perspectives on the EU’s Use of Agricultural Trade Policy Tools

In terms of EU trade policy, the July 2011 WTO TPR noted that despite 20 years of CAP reform the

EU has ‘not reduced MFN tariffs which remain relatively high’. The EU had 1,998 tariff lines for

agricultural products, with an average rate of 15.2%. The EU in addition applies a large number of

non-ad valorem tariffs to agriculture goods, some specific duties, some compound duties and some

mixed duties, as well as seasonal tariffs, particularly for fresh fruit and vegetables. It was noted how

‘in response to fluctuations in world prices the EU has, within the limits of its bound tariffs changed

its MFN applied tariffs’. This can serve to shift the burden of adjustment to lower world market

prices onto the shoulders of non-EU agricultural producers.

What Are Economic Partnership Agreements?

Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) are reciprocal preferential trade agreements which the EU has

sought to negotiate to replace the non-reciprocal Cotonou Agreement trade preferences. This involved SSA

governments granting to EU exporters preferential tariff reductions, which were not granted to other major

trading partners.

26 Agriculture in the EU accounts for less than 1.6% of gross value-added, 5.1% of employment, 6.7% of exports and 5.7% of imports. 27 See Arla, ‘Arla Foods to ensure responsible approach to African markets’, 12 January 2015 http://www.arla.com/about-us/news-and-press/2015/pressrelease/arla-foods-to-ensure-responsible-approach-to-african-markets-1104299/

EU Agricultural Reform and its Implications for Sub-Saharan Africa – November 2015 Page 12

The EPA negotiations also required SSA governments to make a range of commitments on the use of non-tariff

measures, which are likely to seriously constrain the ability of SSA governments to utilise traditional agro-food

sector trade policy tools.

As a result of both tariff reduction commitments and commitments on a range of non-tariff issues, the relations

of SSA governments with other major OECD and advanced developing country trade partners is likely to

complicated, as preferences extended exclusively to EU exporters impact on patterns of SSA agro-food sector

imports.

The negotiation of these EPAs was essential for SSA governments to retain preferential access to the EU

market. Non-LDC SSA governments which declined to sign EPAs, saw themselves facing the re-imposition of

standard GSP import duties on their exports to the EU, which affected not only patterns of trade but also

patterns of investment.

Many SSA governments, after difficult negotiations, reached the conclusion that they had no alternative but to

sign an EPA, even though they had serious concerns about the impact of certain EPA provisions on the

prospects for the development of locally integrated agro-food sector supply chains, serving national and

regional markets. Many SSA governments signed these agreements to preserve current preferential access

despite the risk to their future agro-food sector development prospects.

However, it should be noted that SSA governments enjoyed varying degrees of success in their EPA

negotiations with the EU around these so called ‘contentious issues’. This gave rise to considerable variations in

the specific commitments made by individual SSA governments under different EPA agreements. What is

more, in some instances the agreed texts were compromises, the precise meaning of which was ambiguous.

This means that in the coming years the interpretation of specific EPA agreement commitments is likely to be

an important terrain of political struggle, which will carry important implications for the future prospects for

integrated agro-food sector development across a multiplicity of SSA countries.

However, as the WTO Secretariat’s 2013 TPR noted ‘relatively few countries trade with the EU on an

MFN basis’, given the many bilateral and multilateral trade agreements that the EU has in place. In the

context of these agreements and its multilateral obligations, the EU makes extensive use of

quantitative restrictions in the form of tariff rate quotas (TRQs). The WTO Secretariat identified

some 114 separate TRQs in operation in 2009 (with this falling to 112 by the time of the 2013 TPR

report28). The EU applies these TRQs in a very complex manner, with very different rates of utilization

of these various tariff rate quotas.

The WTO Secretariat has highlighted how the EU has retained the right to use special agricultural

safeguard (SSG) arrangements for 539 tariff lines (out of a total of 1,998 agricultural tariff lines).

While the use of special agricultural safeguards is more limited than this retained right suggests, for

some products price based special agricultural safeguards have been continually in place (e.g. for

products such as chicken and turkey meat and sugar), while for a range of fruit and vegetable products

the EU has used value based safeguard triggers.

In its trade with its major agricultural trade partners29, the EU’s use of the ‘water’ in its WTO bound

tariffs, quantitative restrictions in the form of TRQs and the application of special agricultural

safeguards, stands in distinct contrast to the agricultural trade policy disciplines, which the EU is

seeking to see SSA governments comply with under the newly concluded economic partnership

agreements.

28 However this number is likely to have increased again given the conclusion by the EU of a range of new trade agreements since the end of 2012. 29 For imports the EU28’s top agro-food trade partners are Brazil (13%), the US (10%), Argentina (5%), China (4%) and Indonesia (4%), Switzerland (4%), Ukraine (4%) Turkey (4%), India (3%) while for exports the top destinations are the US (13%), Russia (7%), China and Hong Kong (10%), Switzerland (6%) and Japan (4%), Norway (3%), Algeria (3%), Saudi Arabia (3%).

EU Agricultural Reform and its Implications for Sub-Saharan Africa – November 2015 Page 13

Under the EPAs, in a context where the EU is currently the major agricultural trade partner of most

Sub-Saharan African countries, the EU has sought to:

a) prevent any increase in applied tariffs on imports from the EU through the so called ‘standstill

provisions’;

b) bring about the elimination of quantitative restrictions on imports from the EU from the date

of entry into force of the EPA, through the ‘prohibition of quantitative restrictions’ provisions;

c) limit the use of safeguard measures both in terms of the number of products to which

safeguards can be applied and the duration for which safeguard measures can be maintained in

place.

This would appear to raise major issues of policy coherence for development, given the ongoing

external consequences of EU agricultural policies and the EU’s development policy focus on

supporting agriculture and rural development in SSA countries as an important vehicle for eliminating

poverty. It is against this background that proposals for the establishment of a ‘right to development’

under WTO rules need to be given serious consideration30.

Thus while currently, in their effort to develop their local agro-food sectors, many SSA African

governments use a range of agricultural trade policy tools to manage imports (e.g. conditional import

licensing, seasonal restrictions and import quotas), in the coming years, the use of these trade policy

tools is likely to be increasingly challenged by the EC. This is linked to a key objective of EU trade

policy, namely the elimination of all non-tariff barriers to EU agro-food sector exports.

There is a real irony here, for the EU remains strongly committed to ‘managed trade’ in the agro-food

sector with its major agro-food sector trade partners. The reality is that for many years the EU has

continued to make use of the same policy tools, which it is trying to prevent Sub-Saharan African

governments from using. The EU itself is likely to continue to make use of these policy tools until the

long running process of EU agricultural reform, first initiated in 1992, has been successfully

implemented. This raises major issues of policy coherence and has led to proposals being put forward

for a ‘right to development’ to be enshrined in WTO rules.

The ‘Right to Development’

The proposal for a ‘right to development’ was included in a 2013 report by Joseph Stiglitz and Andrew

Charlton, entitled ‘The right to trade: Rethinking the aid for trade agenda’. This proposal for a ‘right to

development’ would seek to limit ‘the applicability of WTO obligations when the enforcement of such

obligations would have a significant adverse effect on development’. It would create a right for developing

countries ‘not to be harmed by the imposition of trade rules’.

The enshrining of a ‘right to development’ in WTO rules would seek to ‘hardwire’ special and differential

treatment into the application of commitments entered into through any trade agreements, including bilateral

trade agreements, where the implementation of the agreed commitments could undermine the development of

particular sectors.

30 See, The Commonwealth, ‘Professor Joseph Stiglitz calls for a Right to Trade’, 27 June 2013 http://thecommonwealth.org/media/news/professor-joseph-stiglitz-calls-%E2%80%98right-trade%E2%80%99

EU Agricultural Reform and its Implications for Sub-Saharan Africa – November 2015 Page 14

Annex 1: The Recent Evolution of EU Agro-food Sector Trade with

African, Caribbean and Pacific Countries

The ACP level

Since 2010, the ACP’s agro trade surplus with the EU has fallen some 44.5%. Between 2009 and

2013, the value of EU agro-food exports to the ACP increased more than four and a half times faster

than the value of EU imports from ACP countries. This saw the ACP’s agro-food sector trade surplus

fall from over €5.13 billion to under €2.85 billion. ACP countries are an increasingly important market

for EU agro-food exports, with African markets taking on a growing importance in specific sectors,

particularly for poultry meat, bulk dairy commodity exports and for some EU member states particular

horticultural products such as onions.

West Africa

West Africa is the main destination for EU agro-food sector exports to ACP countries (taking 37.3%)

and is also the main source of agro-food imports from ACP countries (taking 34.5%). Since 2010,

West Africa’s agro-food sector trade surplus with the EU has fallen 95%. Between 2009 and 2013, the

value of EU agro-food exports to West Africa grew 75.6%, while the value of EU agro-food imports

from West Africa grew only 3.5%. This saw West Africa’s agro-food sector trade surplus fall steadily

and dramatically from €1.6 billion to 85.5 million.

Southern Africa

In 2009, Southern Africa accounted for 35.8% of EU agro-food sector exports to ACP countries. Since

2010, Southern Africa’s agro-food sector trade surplus with the EU has fallen 23%. Between 2009 and

2013, the value of EU agro-food exports to Southern Africa grew 60.4%, while the value of EU agro-

food sector imports from Southern Africa grew only 32%.

Central Africa

Since 2009, the Central African region has moved from being a net agro-food sector exporter to the

EU to being a net agro-food sector importer. The value of Central African agricultural exports to the

EU showed a steady decline between 2009 and 2013, falling by 20.6% over this five year period. In

contrast, the value of EU agro-food exports to Central Africa rose 65.8%.

The East African Community (EAC)

While the EAC is the third largest source of EU agro-food imports from ACP countries, it is not a

major market for EU agro-food exports (only 3.3% of total EU agro-food exports to the ACP).

Between 2009 and 2013, the value of EU agro-food exports to the EAC grew 42.6%, and import

values grew only 9.2%. However, the overall EU agro-food sector trade surplus of the EAC with the

EU grew 4.2% between 2009 and 2013.

CARIFORUM

Since 2009, CARIFORUM’s agro-food sector trade surplus with the EU has fallen 29%. Between

2009 and 2013, the value of EU agro-food exports to CARIFORUM countries grew 36.6% while the

value of EU imports grew only 3.4%.

Pacific

Given the distances involved, the Pacific is a minor destination for EU agro-food exports, with the

Pacific maintaining a large but fluctuating agro-food sector trade surplus with the EU. Between 2009

and 2013, the Pacific’s agro-food sector trade surplus with the EU increased 19.7%. Although the

market effects of the impending abolition of EU sugar production quotas could see this trend reversed.

EU Agricultural Reform and its Implications for Sub-Saharan Africa – November 2015 Page 15

Annex 1: Evolution of ACP-EU and EU Global Agri-food Sector Trade 2009-2013 (‘000 €) 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Growth

09-13

World

EU Imports 76,760,020 84,262,941 98,439,592 101,934,428 101,501,055 +32.2%

EU Exports 71,008,805 86,846,900 101,364,780 113,528,919 120,089,982 +69.1%

EU trade surplus -5,751,215 +2,583,959 +2,925,188 +11,594,491 +18,588,927

ACP

EU Imports 11,002,895 12,015,246 13,351,457 12,586,808 12,580,301 +14.3%

EU Exports 5,869,137 7,227,557 8,514,128 9,158,731 9,730,997 +65.8%

ACP trade surplus 5,133,758 4,787,689 4,837,329 3,424,077 2,849,304 - 44.5%

WEST AFRICA

EU Imports 3,795,968 4,346,542 4,921,067 4,198,867 3,930,560 +3.5%

EU Exports 2,189,321 2,832,058 3,194,929 3,479,831 3,845,092 +75.6%

W. A. trade surplus 1,606,647 1,514,484 1,726,138 719,036 85,468 -94.7%

SADC

EU Imports 3,190,572 3,506,705 3,680,467 3,793,769 4,210,361 +32.0%

EU Exports 2,103,746 2,488,007 3,024,897 3,334,443 3,373,371 +60.4%

SADC trade surplus 1,086,826 1,018,698 655,570 459,326 836,990 -23%

CENTRAL AFRICA

EU Imports 773,080 768,923 741,100 615,978 613,815 -20.6%

EU Exports 772,196 930,781 1,114,424 1,215,289 1,279,966 +65.8%

C. A. Trade balance +884 -161,858 -373,324 -599,311 -666,151 deficit

EAC

EU Imports 1,495,927 1,541,152 1,796,199 1,694,570 1,633,438 +9.2%

EU Exports 193,159 203,772 242,181 233,457 275,381 +42.6%

EAC trade surplus 1,302,768 1,337,380 1,554,018 1,461,113 1,358,057 +4.2%

Source: Compiled from the links on: EC, ‘Factsheets on EU28 agro-food trade with the world, various regions and individual countries’,

http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/trade-analysis/statistics/index_en.htm

Annex 2: EU Annual Budget Expenditures: Some Overview Figures

European Agricultural Guidance Fund (EAGF) and European Agricultural Fund for Rural

Development (EAFRD) Annual Commitments 2007-2013 (€ billions)* EAGF EAFRD Total ‘CAP’ Expenditures°

2007 42,311.7 12,343.0 54,654.7

2008 41,026.3 12,542.5 53,568.8

2009 41,045.7 13,623.5 54,669.2

2010 43,819.8 14,335.5 58,155.3

2011 42,861.2 14,408.2 57,269.4

2012 43,969.6 14,589.1 58,558.7

2013 43,956.5 14,788.9 58,745.4 Source: EC annual financial reports on the EAGF and EAFRD: http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/cap-funding/financial-reports/index_en.htm

° not all rural development expenditures under the EAFRD are agriculture or agro-food sector related

EC Representation of CAP Related Financial Expenditures 2014 (€ billions)

EAGF EAFRD Total ‘CAP’ Expenditures°

2014 43.780 13.990 57.77

Planned Multiannual Financial Framework 2015-2020 (€ millions)

2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 Direct aid payments 41,679.9 41,923.9 42,128.9 42,131.8 42,168.6 41,205.4

Rural Development 13,618.1 13,618.7 13,619.2 13,654.4 13,655.5 13,655.5

Technical assistance 34.1 234.1 34.1 34.1 34.1 34.1

TOTAL 55,332.1 55,776.7 55,772.2 55,820.3 55,858.2 54,895.0 Source: EC, ‘Multiannual Financial Framework 2014-2020 and the financing of the CAP’, http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/cap-

funding/budget/mff-2014-2020/mff-figures-and-cap_en.pdf

EU Agricultural Reform and its Implications for Sub-Saharan Africa – November 2015 Page 16

Annex 3: Definition of Terms Used

Definition of Terms Used

CAP (Common Agricultural Policy)

Agricultural policy is jointly agreed by all EU member states and applies in broad terms to the whole of the

territory of the EU. Since it is a common policy, it is funded largely through the EU annual budget with only a

limited range of co-financing from EU member states own budgets under certain specific policy instruments.

‘Coupled payments’

Direct aid payments to EU farmers tied to the production of a specific commodity.

‘De-Coupled payments’

Direct aid payments to EU farmers not tied to the production of any specific commodity.

Direct aid payments Payments made from the EU budget to farmers for simply farming. Over time these payments have had

different conditions attached linked to wider EU policy objectives (e.g. environmental protection, food safety

etc.)

Export Subsidies (Export restitutions)

Payments made by the EU to support exports equivalent to the difference between EU and world market prices.

Intervention stocks

Intervention stocks resulted from public purchases by the EU to support market prices. Stocks could be released

onto the EU market if internal prices exceeded intervention price levels, or could be sold on world markets with

the aid of export subsidies.

EU Agricultural Reform and its Implications for Sub-Saharan Africa – November 2015 Page 17

Comprehensive List of Sources:

South Centre, ‘EU’s Increasing Use of De-coupled Domestic Supports in Agriculture: Implications for

Developing Countries’, March 2011

http://www.southcentre.int/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/AN_AG12_EUs-Increasing-Used-of-Decoupled-

Domestic-Supports-in-Agriculture_EN.pdf

South Centre, ‘EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP): Tools Protecting European Farmers’, March 2011

http://www.southcentre.int/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/AN_AG13_EUs-common-Agricultural-Policy_EN.pdf

WTO, Trade Policy Review of the European Union’, 6 and 8 July 2011,

http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp348_e.htm

WTO, ‘Trade Policy Review: European Union’, 28 May 2013

http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/s284_e.pdf

WTO Secretariat, ‘Domestic support: Amber, Blue and Green Boxes’, Backgrounder

https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/negs_bkgrnd13_boxes_e.htm

Joseph Stiglitz and Andrew Charlton, ‘The right to trade: Rethinking the aid for trade agenda’, 2013

http://thecommonwealth.org/media/news/professor-joseph-stiglitz-calls-%E2%80%98right-trade%E2%80%99

ECDPM, ‘Supporting structural transformation in the ACP agro-food sector: Redefining possible roles of the

ACP post 2020’, Discussion Paper No. 155, January 2014

https://ecdpm.org/publications/supporting-structural-transformation-acp-agro-food-sector-acp-post-2020/

EC, ‘Historical Development of the CAP’, DG Agriculture and Rural Development,

http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/cap-history/index_en.htm

Agritrade, ‘’The EU’s agricultural policy toolbox: A sector-by-sector review’, special report, 13 December 2011,

http://agritrade.cta.int/en/Agriculture/Topics/CAP-reform/Special-report-The-EU-s-agricultural-policy-toolbox-

A-sector-by-sector-review

Agritrade, ‘Special report: Future CAP financing for 2014–2020: Implications for the ACP’, 13 December 2011

http://agritrade.cta.int/en/Agriculture/Topics/CAP-reform/Special-report-Future-CAP-financing-for-2014-2020-

Implications-for-the-ACP

Agritrade, ‘CAP reform and its implications for developing countries’, Executive Brief Update 16 December 2013

http://agritrade.cta.int/en/Agriculture/Topics/CAP-reform/Executive-Brief-Update-2013-CAP-reform-and-its-implications-for-developing-

countries

Agritrade, ‘CAP reform’, Executive Brief, Update June 2012

http://agritrade.cta.int/en/Agriculture/Topics/CAP-reform/Executive-Brief-Update-2012-CAP-reform

Agritrade, ‘CAP reform’, Executive Brief Update, 1 November 2011

http://agritrade.cta.int/en/Agriculture/Topics/CAP-reform/Executive-Brief-Update-2011-CAP-reform

Agritrade, ‘EU Common Agricultural Policy reform: Implications for the ACP’, Executive Brief Update, March

2010

http://agritrade.cta.int/en/Agriculture/Topics/CAP-reform/EU-Common-Agricultural-Policy-reform-

Implications-for-the-ACP

OECD, ‘Support to agriculture rising after hitting historic lows, OECD says’, 18 September 2013,

http://www.oecd.org/newsroom/support-to-agriculture-rising-after-hitting-historic-lows-oecd-says.htm

European Parliament, ‘European Council conclusions on the multi-annual financial framework 2014-2020 and

the CAP’, 2013,

http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/note/join/2013/495846/IPOL-AGRI_NT(2013)495846_EN.pdf

EU Agricultural Reform and its Implications for Sub-Saharan Africa – November 2015 Page 18

CAP Reform.ec, ‘The CAP budget in the MFF agreement’, 3 July 2013,

http://capreform.eu/the-cap-budget-in-the-mff-agreement/

EC, ‘Going on the offensive: a new approach to EU agri-food exports’, speech Marianne Fischer Boel,

SPEECH/07/415, Brussels, 25 June 2007, AGRI consultation of EU exporters,

http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-07-415_en.htm?locale=en

abc.net.au, ‘AU anti-dumping EU subsidies should be included’, 22 January 2015,

http://www.freshplaza.com/article/133972/AU-anti-dumping-EU-subsidies-should-be-included

Arla, ‘Arla Foods to ensure responsible approach to African markets’, 12 January 2015

http://www.arla.com/about-us/news-and-press/2015/pressrelease/arla-foods-to-ensure-responsible-approach-to-

african-markets-1104299/

EC, ‘Factsheets on EU28 agro-food trade with the world, various regions and individual countries’,

http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/trade-analysis/statistics/index_en.htm

EC ‘Annual financial reports on the EAGF and EAFRD’:

http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/cap-funding/financial-reports/index_en.htm

EC, ‘Multiannual Financial Framework 2014-2020 and the financing of the CAP’,

http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/cap-funding/budget/mff-2014-2020/mff-figures-and-cap_en.pdf