Ethics in Buddhist Perspective

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Ethicsin Buddhist Perspective

by

K. N. Jayatilleke

M A (Cantab.), Ph. D (London)Professor of Philosophy

University of Ceylon

Talks given in 1970 at the Buddhist Information Centre, Colombo.

Buddhist Publication SocietyKandy Sri Lanka

The Wheel Publication No. 175/176

Copyright BPS, 1972.First Edition 1972Second Printing 1984

BPS Online Edition (2008)

Digital Transcription Source: BPS Transcription Project

For free distribution. This work may be republished, reformatted, reprinted and redistributed in

any medium. However, any such republication and redistribution is to be made available to thepublic on a free and unrestricted basis, and translations and other derivative works are to beclearly marked as such.


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Contents

I. The Basis of Buddhist Ethics...........................................................................................................3II. The Buddhist Ethical Ideal of the Ultimate Good.......................................................................9III. The Buddhist Conception of Evil...............................................................................................14

Hell...................................................................................................................................................14Problem of Evil...............................................................................................................................15Primacy of the Good......................................................................................................................15Destruction of Evil.........................................................................................................................18Pirit..................................................................................................................................................19

IV. The Criteria of Right and Wrong...............................................................................................20V. The Ethical Theory of Buddhism.................................................................................................27

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I. The Basis of Buddhist EthicsEthics has to do with human conduct and is concerned with questions regarding what is goodand evil, what is right and wrong, what is justice and what are our duties, obligations and

rights.Modern ethical philosophers belonging to the Analytic school of philosophy consider it their

task merely to analyse and clarify the nature of ethical concepts or theories. For them, ethicsconstitutes a purely theoretical study of moral phenomena. They do not consider it theirprovince to lay down codes of conduct, which they deem to be the function of a moral teacher, areligious leader or a prophet.

However, there are some philosophers, even in the modern world, as, for example, some ofthe existentialists, who consider it the duty of the philosopher to recommend ways of life ormodes of conduct, which they consider desirable for the purpose of achieving some end, whichthey regard as valuable. Kierkegaard, for instance, considers that there are three stages of life,

namely, the aesthetical or sensualist, the ethical and the religious. He indirectly recommends inhis philosophy that we pass from one stage to another. The aesthetical or sensualist way of life,according to him, leads to boredom, melancholy and despair, so it needs to be transfigured inthe ethical stage, and so on.

In the philosophy of the Buddha, we have an analytical study of ethical concepts and theoriesas well as positive recommendations to lead a way of life regarded as the only way ( ekyanamagga; esova maggo natthao dassanassa visuddhiy, Dhp 274) for the attainment of the summumbonum or the highest Good, which is one of supreme bliss, moral perfection as well as ofultimate knowledge or realisation. This way of life is considered both possible and desirable

because man and the universe are just what they are. It is, therefore, justified in the light of arealistic account of the nature of the universe and of mans place in it.

While this way of life in its personal or cosmic dimension, as it were, helps us to attain thehighest Good, if not in this very life, at least in some subsequent life, it also has a socialdimension insofar as it helps the achievement of the well-being and happiness of the multitudeor of mankind as a whole (bahujanahita, bahujanasukha). The well-being and happiness ofmankind is another end considered to be of supreme, though relative, value in the Buddhisttexts and this well-being and happiness is conceived of as both material and spiritual welfare.

Buddhist ethics, therefore, has a close connection with a social philosophy as well. This socialphilosophy is also fully developed. We have, in the Buddhist texts an account of the nature andorigin of society and the causes of social change. There is also an account of the nature andfunctions of government, the form of the ideal social order and how it is likely to be broughtabout.

In dealing with the ethics and social philosophy of Buddhism, we are trying to give ananswer to the question, What should we do? In our previous essays, we tried to give answersto the questions, How do we know? and What do we know? The question, What shouldwe do? has a personal as well as a social dimension. In a Buddhist frame of reference, thequestion, What should we do? concerns, on the one hand, what the goal of life should be or isand what we have to do for self-improvement, self realisation and the attainment of the highestGood. On the other hand, the question has a social dimension and concerns what we have to dofor the good of society or for the welfare and happiness of mankind. The questions, Whatshould we do for our own good? and What should we do for the good of others or society?

are mutually related and what the relationship is, according to Buddhism, we shall examinelater on.

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At the same time, we must bear in mind that the questions, What should we do? What dowe know? and How do we know? are also interrelated.

The majority of the essays in this series concerned the question, What do we know? Theanswer to this question constituted the Buddhist account of reality or the nature of man and theuniverse. It is a legitimate question to raise as to how we do know that reality was so and so.The answer to this was given in the earlier essays concerning the means of knowledge and thenature of truth.

Now when we ask the question, What should we do? the answers we give presuppose acertain account of reality. Let us illustrate this. In one stanza in the Dhammapada, the sum andsubstance of Buddhist ethics is summed up as follows: Not to do any evil, to cultivate the goodand to purify ones mindthis is the teaching of the Buddhas (183). Now, someone may raisethe question as to how we can be without doing what is called evil and cultivate what iscalled the good unless human beings have the freedom to do so.

If all our present actions, choices and decisions were strictly determined by our psycho-physical constitutionwhich is partly hereditary, by our environmental influences, by ourpsychological past, or by all togetherhow is it possible for us to refrain from evil or do good?The very possibility of our refraining from evil and doing good, therefore, depends on the factthat our choices and decisions are not strictly and wholly determined by such factors and in thissense are free. So ethical statements become significant only if there is human freedom in thissense. But the question as to whether there is human freedom in this sense is a questionpertaining to the nature of reality. Is man so constituted that he has the capacity for free actionin the above sense without his actions being strictly determined by external and internal causes?

If not, these ethical statements cease to be significant. It does not make sense to ask a humanbeing to refrain from evil, if, considering his nature, he is incapable of doing so. If, however,man is free in the above sense, it would be significant to ask him to exercise his choice in a

certain way, which is what we do when we ask him to refrain from evil and do good. Butwhether he is free or not in the above sense is not a question concerning ethics but a factualquestion concerning human nature. The answer belongs to the theory of reality and not ethics.This is an instance as to how ethics is related to the theory of reality. Or, in other words, how theanswer to the question, What should we do? is related to the answer to the question, Whatdo we know about man and the universe?

This question as to whether freedom in the above sense or free will is a fact is not the onlyone. There could be further questions. Even though one could, to some degree, refrain from eviland cultivate the good, despite all the influences external and internal that one is subject to, onemay still ask what use it is for oneself to refrain from evil and do good.

One may maintain that if sporadic acts of evil or good do not change ones nature for thebetter or make ones lot happier and if death is the end of life, what purpose does it serve torefrain from evil, to do good and to cleanse the mind? Here, again, one of the answers would bethat if this activity does not change our nature for the better or make our condition happier anddeath, in fact, is the end of life, there would not be much purpose in refraining from evil, doinggood and cleansing the mind, even if we had the freedom or capacity to do so. So all this would

be to some purpose, only if such activity changed ones nature for the better and made onescondition happier in the long run, and if death was not, in fact, the end of individuality.

But the question as to whether this was so is a factual question: Does refraining from eviland doing morally good acts tend to change ones nature for the better and make ones

condition happier in the long run in a world in which physical death is not the end ofindividuality? It is only if the answer to this question too is in the affirmative, that it would

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seem worthwhile or desirable in a moral sense (as opposed to a merely social sense) ofrefraining from evil, doing what is good and purifying the mind.

Although it would appear to be worthwhile to do this if the answer is in the affirmative andthere is human survival after death, and the refraining from evil, the cultivation of the good andthe purification of the mind result in a happier state for the individual, it may still be askedwhether there is an end to such a process. Is there a highest Good or must the process ofrefraining from evil and cultivating the good, go on for ever with progression and regression?Here again, the question as to whether there is an end, which is one of supreme bliss, perfectionand realisation of an unconditioned state of ultimate reality is a purely factual question. It isonly if there is such a state that an end to conditioned existence would be possible.

So an ethical statement, which recommends the attainment of a highest Good, and lays downa way of life for such attainment, would be significant only if there is such a state which can beconsidered the highest Good for each and all to attain, and if the way of life does, in fact, lead toit. The question as to whether there is such a highest Good, and whether the way of liferecommended leads to it, is, however, a factual question, which has to be established

independently of the ethical recommendations.It would, therefore, be the case that the ethics of Buddhism would be significant only if

certain facts are true, viz. (1) there is freedom or free will in the sense enunciated, (2) there ishuman survival or the continuity of individuality, (3) this continuity is such that the avoidanceof evil and the cultivation of the good along with the purification of mind tends to make ournature better and our condition happier, while the opposite course of action has the reverseeffect, and (4) there is a state, when the mind is pure and cleansed of all defilementsa state of

bliss, perfection, realisation and ultimate freedom.

In examining the Buddhist account of reality, we have already shown the truth of (2), (3) and(4). We have shown that there is pre-existence and survival after death, constituting a

continued becoming (punabbhava). We have shown that karma (in the Buddhist sense) isoperative and that morally good, evil and mixed acts make a difference to ones nature and arefollowed by pleasant, unpleasant and mixed consequences, as the case may be. We have shownthat there is that realm (atthi tad yatana, Ud 80) of Nibbna beyond space-time andcausation, which is the ultimate Good that all should attain and without which it would not bepossible to transcend conditioned existence.

It remains for us to examine more fully than we have done, whether or not the Buddhaasserts the reality of freedom or free will in the sense explained. By free will in a Buddhistcontext, it is not meant that there is a will, choice or decision which is unaffected by causalfactors that affect it, but that our volitional acts or will, choice or decision, while being

conditioned by such factors, are not wholly shaped or strictly determined by them, since there isin man an element of initiative (rabbhadhtu) or personal action (purisakra) or individualaction (attakra), which can, within limits, resist the factors that affect it. If not for this factor ofhuman personality, moral responsibility would be a farce and the forces that impel us to actwould be responsible for our actions.

This is, in fact, what the Buddha says. On the one hand, he distinguishes the Buddhist theoryof the causal genesis (paiccasamuppda) of events from all forms of strict determinism,whether theistic or natural. According to the theistic version of strict determinism, everyoutcome in the universe is foreknown and pre-determined by an omniscient and omnipotentPersonal God. In such a situation all our experiences would be due to the creation by God

(issara-nimmna

-hetu

). If so, argues the Buddha, God is ultimately responsible for the (good and)evil that human beings do.

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Such theistic determinists lived during the time of the Buddha. We must not forget that theyare also found today. Dr. Hastings Rashdall, Fellow of New College, Oxford, whose twovolumes on The Theory of Good and Evil (Oxford University Press, 1907) are widelyrecommended and read by students of ethics even today was such a theistic determinist. Hesays in one place in his book: And after all a doctrine of free-will which involves a denial of

Gods Omniscience cannot claim any superiority over such a theistic Determinism as I havedefended on the score of avoiding a limitation of the divine Omnipotence (Vol. II pp. 343, 344).He is led to believe in determinism because of his total distrust of indeterminism at the timewhen scientists believed in deterministic causation, prior to the discoveries of quantum physics.Dr. Rashdall, however, gives this scientific doctrine of his times an idealistic twist and says:When the theory of Determinism is held in connexion with a philosophy which finds theultimate ground and source of all being in a rational will, it is impossible to escape the inferencethat the will of God ultimately causes everything in the Universe which has a beginningincluding therefore souls and their acts, good and bad alike (ibid., p. 339).

Having taken up this position, he finds the consequences not too palatable and difficult to

explain away, for he says: Yet from the metaphysical or theological point of view we mustadmit also that the soul is made or caused by God: and one cannot help asking oneself thequestion why God should make bad souls, and so cause bad acts to be done (ibid., p. 340)

He also admits the central difficulty of his position, which he tries to explain awayunsatisfactorily, viz. We have seen then that the only point at which a difficulty is createdeither for Morality or for Religion by the acceptance of Determinism lies in its tendency to makeGod in a sense the author of evil. (ibid., p, 345). So we see that the logic of theisticDeterminism is no different from the Buddhas time to the present.

The Buddha also rejects different forms of natural determinism. One such theory was thatexperiences of (the good or) evil we do is due to our (hereditary) physiological constitution

(abhijti-hetu). Another theory upheld psychic determinism (cp. Freud) and held that all ourpresent acts and experiences are entirely due to our past actions (pubbekata-hetu). In addition,there were at the time of the Buddha natural determinists (svabhva-vdin), who held that allevents were strictly determined by natural forces. Praa Kassapa was a determinist(niyativdi), who held such a theory. As a result of his natural determinism, he was like the 19 th

century rationalists of Europe, an amoralist who denied that there was good or evil as such,since man was not responsible for his so-called good or evil acts.

It is important to remember that the Buddhist theory of causation was opposed to all suchDeterministic theories, both theistic and natural, as also to the theory of total Indeterminism(adhicca-samuppanna) or Tychism, which denied causal correlations in nature altogether. As such,the Buddhist theory of causation seems to accept an element of indeterminacy in nature, which,in the case of human actions, manifests itself as the free will of the individual, which isconditioned but not totally determined by the factors that affect it.

While the Buddha distinguished his causal theory from determinism, he also faced thequestion of free will and asserted its reality in no uncertain terms. On one occasion, it is said, acertain brahmin (aataro brhmao) approached the Buddha and told him that he was of theopinion that there was no free will on the part of himself (attakra) or others (para-kra). TheBuddha admonished him and asked him how he could say such a thing when he himself of hisown accord (saya) could walk up to the Buddha and walk away from him.

On this occasion, the Buddha says that there is such a thing as an element of initiative

(rabbha-dhtu

) and as a result one can observe beings acting with initiative and this, says theBuddha, is what is called the free will of people (sattna attakro). He also goes on to say

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that there is an element of origination (nikkama-dhtu), an element of endeavour (parakkama-dhtu), an element of strength (thma-dhtu), an element of perseverance (hiti-dhtu) and anelement of volitional effort (upakkama-dhtu), which makes beings of their own accord act invarious ways and that this showed that there was such a thing as free will (A III 337, 338).

We notice on the other hand that Makkhali Gosla, the theist, who held that the world wascreated by a divine fiat and continued to unfold itself like a ball of thread flung on the ground,held that beings were devoid of free will (natthi attakro), devoid of personal will (natthipurisakro), devoid of power, effort, personal strength or personal endeavour ( natthi bala,viriya, purisathma, purisapparakkamo) (D I 53). Those who denied the possibility and power ofmoral acts or in other words, free will and its consequences, were known at this time as akiriya-vdins. Thus, again, Makkhali Gosla, the theist, is said to have held the doctrine that there isno karma, there is no free action and no potentiality of action (natthi kamma, natthi kiriya,natthi viriya) (A I 286). It is well-known, however, that the Buddha was accepted even by his

brahmin opponents as a kiriya-vdin, a teacher of the efficacy of action.

All this goes to prove that the Buddha faced the problem of free will at the time and reiterated

the view that asserted the reality of human freedom or free will without denying at the sametime that this free will was conditioned but not wholly shaped or determined by factors whichaffected it. There are certain things beyond our powers but there are at the same time certainpowers which one can exercise within limits. For example, I cannot, even if I tried my utmost,speak a thousand words a minute, but I can certainly vary my speed of utterance within limitsmerely to show that I have the power to do this. It is this power that we all have within limitsfor refraining from evil and doing good. The more we exercise this power the more freedom andspontaneity we acquire.

Many scholars have failed to see that Buddhism upheld a theory of non-deterministic causalconditioning along with the doctrine of free will. As a result Buddhism has been represented by

some Western scholars as a form of fatalism because of their misunderstanding of the doctrineof karma as well as the doctrine of causation.

This misunderstanding, however, is not limited to Western scholars. A local Sinhala Buddhistscholar, a layman, has represented the Buddhist teaching on this matter as follows in a paperread before a philosophers conference: What does Buddhism have to say regarding free will?The question does not seem ever to have been asked of the Buddha, but, if he had been asked,he would probably have answered that the question does not arise or that it is inaccurately put.There can be no such thing as a free will outside the causal sequence which constitutes theworld process.1 Another local Buddhist scholar, a monk, says the following: The question offree will has occupied an important place in Western thought and philosophy. But according toConditioned Genesis, this question does not and cannot arise in Buddhist philosophy Notonly is the so-called free will not free, but even the very idea of free will is not free fromconditions.2

These three doctrines, namely upholding the reality of free will (kiriya-vda) as opposed to thedenial of free will (akiriya-vda) in the sense specified, upholding the reality of survival afterdeath (atthi paro loko) as opposed to the denial of survival (natthi paro loko) and upholding thereality of moral causation (hetu-vda) as opposed to the denial of moral causation (ahetu-vda)form the basis of Buddhist ethics. They are upheld because they are considered to be verifiablytrue.

1

G. P. Malalasekera, The Status of the Individual in Theravda Buddhist Philosophy in The Statusof the Individual in East and West, Ed. Charles A. Moore, University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu, 1968, p. 73.2 Walpola Rhula, What the Buddha Taught, Gordon Fraser, 1959, pp, 5455.

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It is these doctrines which make individual moral responsibility meaningful. Without themthere is no sense in which we can be said to be morally responsible for our actions although wemay be socially responsible. In the Apaaka Sutta,3 where the Buddha addresses rationalsceptics, he states that even if one is sceptical about free will, survival and moral causation, itwould be pragmatic and rational to act on the basis that they are true rather than their

opposites, for in such a case, whatever happens, we do not stand to lose. If we act on the basisthat free will, survival and moral causation are true, then if they turn out to be true, we would

be happy in the next life and if not true, praised by the wise in this life, whereas if we do not acton this basis, then, if they are true, we would be unhappy in the next life, and if they are nottrue, we would be condemned by the wise in this life for acting without a sense of moralresponsibility.

While the ethics of good and evil (in a moral sense as opposed to what is merely socially goodand evil) require the above three postulates, which, according to the Buddhist account of reality,are facts, the ethics of salvation from conditioned existence require the postulate of anUnconditioned Reality, which, according to Buddhism, is also a fact.

Man and the universe being what they are, the ethical and spiritual life (which in a sense ispart of it) is both possible and the most desirable in our interests as well as of others.

3 Translated in The Wheel No. 98/99.

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II. The Buddhist Ethical Ideal of theUltimate Good

Moral philosophers use the term good in two important senses. There is the sense in whichwe speak of what is good as an end or what is intrinsically good. There is also the sense inwhich we speak of what is good as a means or what is instrumentally good. The two sensesare inter-related. For what is instrumentally good, or good as a means, is necessary to bringabout what is intrinsically good, or good as an end.

When the Dhammapada says that, health is the greatest gain (rogy param lbh), it is, in asense, treating the state of health as being what is good as an end. For whatever our gains may

be, most people are prepared to lose them, or use them in order to recover their health, if theyfall ill. Besides, it is only if we are healthy that we can adapt the means to gain material or evenspiritual riches. If health is a desirable end to achieve or is good as an end, then what isinstrumental in achieving this state of health is good as a means. Since medicines, even whenthey are bitter, are often useful as a means to the cure of illnesses, they are deemed to be good asa means, or instrumentally good.

Although some people would regard a state of physical health in the above sense as beinggood as an end, others may say that good health is only a relative end since the ultimate end orgoal that we should seek is happiness, and good health is only a necessary condition forhappiness. So while no one would say that bitter medicine is good as an end, many peoplewould regard a state of health as being good as an end only in a relative sense, as contributingto ones well-being and happiness. Ones well-being and happiness would, therefore, be forthem an ultimate end in a sense in which even physical health is not. Besides, in the world inwhich we live, we can enjoy a state of physical health only in a relative sense since we may fall

ill from time to time and even healthy men eventually die.In this chapter we shall be concerned only with what is ultimately good from the Buddhist

point of view. Buddhism presents a clear conception of what is ultimately good and what isinstrumentally good in order to achieve this. What is instrumentally good to achieve this end isregarded as good as a means. It consists mainly of right actions and the other factors that help in

bringing about what is ultimately good.

These right actions may often be called good actions as opposed to evil actions. But we shallavoid the word good actions and consistently use the word right actions (as opposed towrong actions) in speaking about what is primarily necessary in order to achieve what isgood as an end.

In the Buddhist texts, the terms that are most often used to denote right actions are kusalaand pua. Kusala means skilful and denotes the fact that the performance of right actionsrequires both theoretical understanding as well as practise. The person who has attained theideal or the highest good is referred to as a person of accomplished skill or the highest skill(sampannakusala parama-kusala). Akusala, its opposite, means the unskillful. Pua as usedof right action means what is meritorious as opposed to ppa, which means demeritorious.It is not a term that is employed to denote the highest good. In fact, the person who has attainedthe highest good is said to have cast aside both meritorious and demeritorious actions (pua-ppa-pahna).

As we shall see in examining the nature of right actions, this does not imply that meritorious

actions (as opposed to demeritorious ones) are not necessary for the attainment of the highestgood, nor that those who have attained are amoral. The path to salvation or the path leading to

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the highest good in Buddhism is a gradual path, and although we may start with our egoistic orself-centred desires as a motive for self-advancement, they have progressively to be cast asideuntil eventually the goodness of the actions alone remains without the personal motivation fordoing good.

If we acquaint ourselves with the nature of the ethical ideal or the conception of what isintrinsically good or good as an end, we would be in a better position to understand theBuddhist conception of right and wrong.

Moral philosophers have conceived of the ethical ideal in various ways. Some have thoughtof the ideal as pleasure and others as happiness. Yet others considered the notion of duty orobligation as central to ethics, while others again think of the goal as perfection.

What is the Buddhist conception of the ideal? Buddhism conceives of the ethical ideal as oneof happiness, perfection, realisation and freedom. These ethical goals, in fact, coincide and thehighest good is at the same time one of ultimate happiness, moral perfection, final realisationand perfect freedom. This is the goal to be attained in the cosmic or personal dimension ofexistence.

This is a goal for one and all to attain, each in his own interest as well as that of others.Besides, there is a social ideal, which is also desirable to bring into existence. This is broadlyconceived of as the well-being or happiness of the multitude or mankind (bahujanahityabahujanasukhya). Here well-being and happiness is conceived of both materially as well asspiritually. The ideal society in which this well-being and happiness will prevail in an optimumform is conceived of as both socialistic, being founded on the principle of equality, anddemocratic, as affording the best opportunities for the exercise of human freedom. Such asociety is also just, as it is based on principles of righteousness.

We shall explore the nature of these conceptions in greater detail when examining the social

philosophy of Buddhism. We shall also examine in a later chapter the relationship that existsbetween the social ideal and the personal ideal. Although from an individualistic point of viewthe path to the acquisition of wealth is one, while the path to Nibbna is another (a hilabhpanis a nibbnagmini), even the social ideal can be attained, it is said, only by peoplewho are motivated to act in accordance with the ten virtues (dasa-kusala-kamma) in a society builton firm economic, political and moral foundations.

What is the role of pleasure and the performance of ones duties in relation to the Buddhistethical ideal? Let us first take the role of pleasure. Buddhism recognises the importance of thehedonistic principle that man is predominantly motivated to act out of his desire for happinessand his repulsion for unhappiness (sukha-km hi manuss dukkha-paikkl). In fact, the centraltruths of Buddhism the four truths concerning unhappiness (dukkha-sacca), are formulated inthe manner set forth so as to appeal to mans intrinsic desire for happiness and the desire toescape from or transcend his unhappiness.

Pleasure is classified in the Buddhist texts according to its different grades, and it is statedthat the most refined and sublimest form of pleasure (uttaritara patatara) is the bliss ofNibbna. This experience of the bliss of freedom (vimutti-sukha-paisaved) is so differentfrom the conditioned pleasure and happiness of worldly existence that there is a reluctance onthe part of the texts to use the word vedan (feeling of it) since vedan as represented in theformula of conditionality is always conditioned.

The attitude to pleasure in the Buddhist texts is a realistic one. It does not deny the fact orvalue of pleasure. The limited good (assda) as well as the evil consequences (dnava) of eventhe gross forms of pleasure are recognised. The Buddha did not advocate a form of asceticismwhereby we should shun all pleasures by closing our eyes and ears (and becoming like the blind

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and the deaf) to objects which arouse sensuous pleasure. Instead the Buddha wanted those whowere addicted to such pleasures to realise their limitations.

One form of pleasure that we experience is by the gratification of our desires. We getsatisfaction from time to time by gratifying our desire for sensuous pleasures and sex ( kma-tah). We get such temporary satisfaction, again, by gratifying our egoistic instincts ( bhava-tah) such as the desire for self-preservation (jvitu-kma), for security, for possessions, for fame,for personal immortality, etc. We also get satisfaction by gratifying our desire for destruction(vibhava-tah) or aggression (paigha) or the elimination of what we dislike. The enjoyment ofthese pleasures is often accompanied by rationalisations or erroneous beliefs, such as, forinstance, that we have been created for such a life of enjoyment of this sort or that we shouldeat, drink and be merry today for tomorrow we die.

What is important is not to shun pleasure or torment the body, but to realise for oneself thelimitations of pleasures and the diminishing returns they afford, so that eventually we cantranscend them by a life of temperance and restraint and enjoy the immaterial or spiritual formsof pleasure (nirmisa-sukha), which accompany selfless and compassionate activity based on

understanding. One must give up the gross forms of pleasure for the more refined and superiorkinds of happiness. As the Dhammapada states, if by renouncing a little pleasure we can find agreat deal of happiness, then the prudent man should relinquish such trifling pleasures ondiscovering an abundant happiness (matt sukha-pariccg passe ce vipula sukha, caje mattsukha dhro samphassa vipula sukha, Dhp 290).

This is only an extension of the hedonistic principle that man has a tendency to seek pleasureand to recoil from pain and, therefore, that he ought to do what is both rational and possible bygiving up the gross forms of pleasure for the more sublime forms until he eventually attains thesupreme bliss of Nibbna.

These more sublime forms of pleasure are correlated with forms of activity, which are

spiritually elevating and socially desirable. It is not always necessary that one should literallyrenounce the worldly life in order to cultivate them. Both laymen and monks can attain the firststage of spiritual progress (sotpanna) as well as some of the later stages as well. A person whocan perform the duties associated with his livelihood, provided it is a right mode of living(samm jva), with a sense of selfless service to his fellow men out of concern, compassion, andunderstanding; can act without a narrowly selfish motivation, and derive happiness from hiswork. The Buddha compared the spiritual gains to be had from the lay life and the life of themonk to agriculture and trade. Agriculture gives slow but steady returns, while trade givesquicker returns though it is more risky. According to the Buddha, nothing could be worse thanthe outward renunciation of the lay life in order to live a life of corruption and hypocrisy as arecluse. Such a person, apart from the disservice he would be doing to the community, would

be digging his own grave.

However, the ignorance that clouds the judgment of man is such that a man who enjoys thegrosser forms of pleasure cannot experience anything more refined or more sublime, since heis addicted to them. So what often happens is that he experiences less and less of both pleasureand happiness because of his reluctance to go against the current (paisotagm) until eventuallyhe becomes a slave to his passions, losing both his freedom and happiness as well as every otherquality, which can bring him closer to the ethical ideal.

While Buddhist ethics recognises, and appeals to, the hedonistic tendencies of man, it doesnot fall into the error of hedonism by asserting that pleasure alone, abstracted from everything

else, is what is worth achieving. The hedonistic ideal of supreme happiness, for example, is alsoidentical with the therapeutic goal of perfect mental health.

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So the path to happiness is also the path to mental stability, serenity, awareness, integrationand purity of mind. The Buddha classified diseases as bodily (kyika) and mental (cetasika) and itis said that while we have bodily diseases from time to time, mental illness is almost continualuntil arahatship is attained so that only the saint or a person with a Nibbnic mind can be saidto have a perfectly healthy mind.

While the four noble truths, as we have pointed out, on the one hand, indicate the path fromunhappiness to perfect happiness, they have also the form of a medical diagnosis. From thispoint of view, the truths give an account of (1) the nature of the illness, its history andprognosis, (2) the causes of the illness, (3) the nature of the state of health that we ought toachieve and (4) the remedial measures to be taken in order to achieve this. This diseased state ofthe mind is due to the unsatisfied desires and the conflicts caused by the desires that rage withinour minds both at the conscious and unconscious levels. Thus, the desire for sense pleasures andselfish pursuits is found as a subliminal or latent tendency as well (rgnusaya; cp. kma-raga,bhavarga). So is our hatred or aggression (paighnusaya). Mental serenity, stability and sanitycan be achieved neither by free indulgence in our desires (kmasukhalliknuyoga) not by ascetic

repression and self-torment (attakilamathanuyoga). When we become more aware of the waythese desires operate in us by the exercise or practise of awareness (satipahna), we graduallyattain a level of consciousness, in which there is a greater degree of serenity and stability. Theculmination of this development, when the mind is purged of all its defilements, is the perfectstate of mental health, which coincides with the experience of the highest bliss.

Buddhism points to the sources of unhappiness, or the causes of suffering, not to make usunhappy or brood over our lot, but in order that we may emerge from our condition withstronger, happier and healthier minds. Such people could say in the words of the Dhammapada:

So happily we live, free from anger among those who are angry(susukha vata jvma verinesu averino, Dhp 197)

So happily we live in good health amongst the ailing(susukha vata jvma turesu antur, Dhp 198)

So happily we live relaxed among those who are tense(susukha vata jvma ussukesu anussuk. Dhp 199)

The person who has attained the ideal is said to have fulfilled all his obligations ( kata-karaya)since the greatest obligation of everyone, whatever else he may do, is the attainment of the goalof Nibbna. But, till he does this, man has all his social duties to perform towards the variousclasses of people in society. The duties and obligations of parents and children, employers andemployees, husbands and wives, religious men and their followers etc. are given in theSiglovda Sutta, while duties and rights of a king or state and its citizens are recorded in theAggaa and Cakkavattishanda Suttas. Even such duties and obligations are to be performedin a spirit of selfless service, love and understanding, so that we are treading the path toNibbna in the exercise of these obligations.

So while the ultimate end is one of perfect happiness and mental health, it is not one in whichone is obliged to perform ones duties for dutys sake. Likewise, when the arahant serves societyas the several enlightened monks and nuns mentioned in the Thera- and Thergth did, theydid so out of a spontaneous spirit of selflessness, compassion and understanding.

It is, therefore, a mistaken notion to hold, as some scholars have held, that the arahant isamoral and could even do evil with impunity. It is true that an arahant casts aside bothmeritorious and demeritorious actions (pua-ppa-pahna). By this is meant only that he doesnot do any acts, whether they be good or evil with the expectation of reward nor do these actshave any efficacy for bringing about karmic consequences in the future. They are mere acts

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III. The Buddhist Conception of EvilWe have shown that Buddhism considered the attainment of Nibbna to be intrinsically good. Itwas the highest state of well-being, characterised by bliss, perfection, realisation and freedom. It

was a condition in which our finitude comes to an end for there was no criterion with which tomeasure the person who has attained the goal (atthagatassa na pama atthi, Sn 1076). It wasthe most desirable state to attain, and the highest aesthetic experience, although it was to berealised only by shedding our self-centred desires.

In contrast, what falls short of Nibbnic reality is, to that extent, afflicted with the evils ofunhappiness or suffering, imperfection, ignorance and the bondage of finite self-centredexistence. The degree to which those in conditioned forms of existence are affected by these evilsvaries with their level of existence and the extent of their moral and spiritual development.

So all sentient beings are subject to evil in its various forms until they attain Nibbna. The evilthey are subject to may be external and physical (natural or man-made), such as floods,

accidents, nuclear weapons, etc., or they may be experienced in ones body in the form of illness.They may be psychological, such as the experience of pain or mental anguish. The evil may bemoral such as the presence of undesirable traits in us, such as jealousy, hypocrisy, ingratitude,etc. Or the evil which affects and afflicts us may be social and political such as the experience ofpoverty, injustice, inequality or the lack of freedom.

Hell

Yet, whatever evils we may be, subject to in our finite self-centred conditioned existence, there isno form of existence in the universe which is intrinsically evil according to the Buddhist texts.

Nothing could be more intrinsically evil than the sufferings of an everlasting hell, from whichthere is no escape for eternity, but there is no such place according to the Buddhist conception ofthe universe.

In fact, the Buddhist conception of hell was both enlightened and rational. The Buddhadenounced some of the superstitious popular beliefs about hell, held by the people at the time.For instance, he says in one place: When the average ignorant person makes an assertion to theeffect that there is a hell (ptla) under the ocean, he is making a statement which is false andwithout basis. The word hell is a term for painful bodily sensations (S IV 306).

This does not mean that we create our heavens and hells only in this life and that there is, infact, no afterlife, for elsewhere the Buddha speaks of the worlds that he could observe with his

clairvoyant vision, in which everything one senses and experiences (including the thoughts thatoccur to one) are foul, repulsive and ugly (S IV 126), while other worlds are quite the opposite.

These are the hells of the Buddhist texts, apart from the experience of hell in this lifeitself. We learn from history about the existence of cannibalistic tribes in the past, not to speak oflife in the concentration camps set up not so long ago in the centres of twentieth centurycivilisation. As such, we need not necessarily look to other planets for the presence of sub-human forms of existence, which are foul, repulsive and ugly. Yet none of these states arepermanent, even though they exist.

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Problem of Evil

The Buddha squarely faces the existence of evil in the universe. He sees things as they are(yathbhta) and wants his disciples, too, to look at things in this way through the eyes of arealist. There is no escape into a world of make-believe, no undue pessimism nor facileoptimism. The Buddha says: There are religious teachers, who, because of their state ofconfusion, do not recognise the difference between night and day, but I would treat night asnight and day as day (M I 21). Buddhism, therefore, frankly accepts the existence of both goodand evil in the world of conditioned existence.

Evil becomes a problem only for a theist, who maintains that the world was created by aperfect being, omniscient, omnipotent, and infinitely good. In such a situation, it would bepossible to account for evil by denying the omniscience, omnipotence or goodness of God, butthen one would be denying that the world was the creation of a perfect Being. So the problem isSi Deus bonus, unde malum? If God is good, whence cometh evil?

In order to account for evil with these presuppositions, some have denied outright the fact ofevil, others have stated that evil is a privation or illusion, or has only a relative existence, whilestill others have maintained that evil is necessary as a component in the best of all possibleworlds, which God necessarily creates. This last solution has, on the whole, been favoured bymodern theists, but even this does not satisfactorily account for the suffering of animals, of littlechildren and innocent people within the framework of orthodox theistic beliefs.

What is the Buddhist solution of this problem? The problem does not exist in the above formfor the Buddhist since he does not start with the theistic presumption that the world was created

by a perfect Being. Instead, he accepts the fact of evil and argues on its basis that the world withall its imperfections could not be the creation of a perfect Being.

The argument is briefly stated as follows: If God (Brahm) is lord of the whole world andcreator of the multitude of beings, then why (I) has he ordained misfortune in the world withoutmaking the whole world happy, or (II) for what purpose has he made a world with injustice,deceit, falsehood and conceit, or (III) the lord of beings is evil in that he has ordained injusticewhere there could have been justice (J-a VI 208).

The Buddhist is under no compunction to deny or explain away the fact of evil. If we denythe existence of evil, there would be no reason or even the possibility of getting rid of it. If we

justify it, it would still be unnecessary to try and eliminate it. But evil is real for the Buddhistand must be removed as far as possible at all its levels of existence for the good and happinessof mankind, by examining its causal origins.

This does not mean that Buddhism holds that all existence is evil. The Buddha is oftenrepresented by Western scholars as having said this or assumed such a stand.

The Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics says that, existence seemed to the Buddha to beevil (See Article on Good and Evil). Yet nowhere has the Buddha said that even finiteconditioned existence is wholly evil. What he has often said is that such existence has its goodside or pleasantness (assda) as well as its evil consequences (dinav), and, considering thepossibility of transcending such finite conditioned existence, it was desirable to do so.

Primacy of the Good

Buddhism does not hold that evil predominates in nature. It is possible to take up differentpositions regarding the presence or primacy of good or evil.

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We can say that (i) good predominates over evil although both exist, or that (ii) good aloneexists but not evil or that (iii) evil predominates over good although both exist or that (iv) evilalone exists but not good or that (v) both good and evil exist with equal strength and vigour(dualism,) and there is a perpetual battle in the universe between the forces of good and evil orthat (vi) neither good nor evil exist in any strict sense (e, g. relativism, amoralism, illusionism

(myvda) ).Buddhism seems to favour the first point of view. It accepts the reality of both good and evil

and seems to uphold the view that good predominates over evil.

The presence of some forms of evil such as suffering, it is said, has a tendency to awaken usfrom our lethargic state of existence and induce belief in moral and spiritual values(dukkhupanis saddh, S II 1).

We are attached to the world because of the joys and satisfactions it affords us by way of thegratification of our desires. But because of the disappointments, frustrations, anguish andsuffering that we also experience in the process we seek to understand and transcend our finiteconditioned existence.

So some forms of evil such as suffering have a tendency to make us seek the good. But, ingeneral, the problem of evil for the Buddhist is to recognise evil as such, to look for its verifiablecauses and by removing the causes, eliminate evil as far as possible at all its levels of existence.

To look for the metaphysical causes of evil is deemed to be intellectually stultifying andmorally fruitless. If we are struck with an arrow, our immediate task should be to remove itrather than investigate the credentials of the person who shot it. We may be in a better positionto do so after we have been healed. The Dhamma, as the Buddha pointed out, is comparable to araft, which has to be thrown aside after we have attained Nibbna with its help and acquired amore comprehensive picture of the totality of things. In the meantime, the presence of evil is a

challenge to us and our task should be to get rid of it: One should conquer evil with good(asdhu sdhun jine).

The baseless charge has been brought against Buddhism, namely that it is pessimistic, but it isa curious fact that it has given a less pessimistic account of both man and nature than someforms of theism. We have already pointed out that there is no conception of an eternal hell innature according to Buddhist teachings. Even in respect of man, he has never been regarded aspredominantly evil.

Man is fundamentally good by nature and the evil in him is an extraneous outcome of hissasric conditioning. The mind of man is compared in the Buddhist texts to gold-ore, which issaid to have the defilements of iron, copper, tin, lead and silver but when these impurities are

removed, then the gold shines, with its natural lustre. So does the mind when the evil is got ridof.

The Buddha states that the mind is naturally resplendent though it is corrupted byadventitious defilements ( pabhassara ida citta ta ca kho gantukehi upakkilesehiupakkiliha). Man, therefore, despite the fact that he has committed sin (ppa) and is capable ofsinning is not addressed as a sinner but as meritorious being (e. g. Sinhala,pinvatn) becauseof his potentiality for good.

Even the evil that he commits is not due to his basic depravity or wickedness but to hisignorance. This ignorance can be got rid of and man himself is capable of doing so. Buddhismdoes not agree with the theist who holds that man in his present condition is so degenerate by

nature that he is incapable of saving himself without the grace of an external power. The futureof man is in his own hands; he is master of his fate. In denying an eternal hell, in not regarding

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man as a sinner who is incapable of attaining salvation by his own efforts, Buddhism gives aless pessimistic account of man and nature than is to be found in some forms of theism.

Although in this respect, it upholds the primacy of the good, Buddhism is not an easy-goingoptimism, which ignores the evil in man and nature. A realistic view of nature is partlypessimistic in that one has to take cognizance of the darker side of things as well. Many people,out of fear, do not wish to contemplate the fact that we are all liable to suffer from decay,disease and death. The Buddha, on the contrary, holds (like Socrates and Plato) that thecontemplation of death (maranussati) is of therapeutic value in making for mental stabilityand peace. To this extent, Buddhism recommends a partly pessimistic outlook(asubhnupassi viharanta, Dhp 8) insofar as it is realistic and is a factor necessary to promoteand establish ones personal happiness on firm foundations.

Mra

Buddhist realism, therefore, takes stock of all that is evil in man and nature, so that we mayunderstand evil for what it is and overcome it at all its levels of existence in so far as this can be

done.Death (mtyu) had been personified prior to Buddhism and the athapatha Brhmaa refers

to the legendary figure of Death, the Evil One (mtyuh ppm). This conception re-appears inthe Buddhist scriptures as Mro Ppim, i.e. Death, the Evil One, who signifies all the evilassociated with or causally related to the phenomenon of death. Since all conditioned existenceis subject to death, Mra is said to hold sway over the entire universe.

The term Mra is formed of the root m, to kill (cf. Latin, mors), and means killer or death.In the scholastic tradition, the term is said to have four meanings. It may signify physical death(maccu-mra); it may denote the constituents of ones personality, which are subject to changeand, therefore, to death in this wider sense (khandha-mra); it may mean moral evil or the

defilements, which are the cause of repeated (birth and) death (kilesa-mra); or it may refer to theEvil One as a person (devaputta-mra), who tempts and obstructs people who seek emancipationfrom conditioned existence by means of a life of moral and spiritual development.

In this last sense, Mra symbolises all the opposition and obstruction that spiritual seekershave to contend with, whether this be internal (psychological) or external (physical, social). It isdifficult to say that there is no such opposition towards those who seek to do good, when weknow that outstanding teachers in history who tried to preach or establish a new universal ethichad to face not only opposition but even death at the hands of their own people, whichprovoked the Shavian remark that it is dangerous to be too good.

The question is often asked as to whether Buddhism recognises the existence of such an EvilOne as a person (such as Satan or the Devil). The forces ( sena) of Mra as depicted in theBuddhist texts constitute merely the symbolic representation of evil in various forms. Forexample, the Mah Niddesa speaks of the forces of Mra as consisting of lust (kma), aversion(arati), hunger and thirst (khuppips), desire (tah), sloth and torpor (thnamiddha), fear (bhru),doubt regarding moral and spiritual truths and values (vicikicch), hypocrisy (makkha), hardnessof heart (thambha), the gain, praise, respect and fame obtained by false pretences ( lbho silokosakkro micchladdho ca yo yaso) as well as boasting about oneself while despising others (yocattna samukkase pare ca avajnti; (Mah Niddesa, I 96).

There are, however, situations in the Canon where Mra appears in person and criticisessome of the teachings of the Buddha or propounds doctrines which are opposed to them. Does

this not prove the personal existence of Mra? Even prior to Buddhism we find that the KahaUpaniad employed the figure of Death or Mtyu to impart an tman-doctrine: The entire

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country. If the country is not properly governed, it is up to the people to ensure such agovernment in order to promote the material and spiritual welfare of the people by thepromotion of the good and the elimination of evil in the body politic.

PiritWe have so far dealt with realistic forms of evil. But some of our fears (which are themselvesevil) are based on irrational foundations, such as the fear of the unknown. At the time of theBuddha, such fears were allayed by magical and ritualistic means with the help of the chantsand incantations of the Atharva Veda or the resort to demonological practises. Where the peoplewere not mentally equipped to give up these beliefs and practises, what the Buddha did was tosubstitute Buddhist chants (paritta, safeguard) of a more meaningful character, which developedinto the institution ofpirit.

Instead of chanting in an unintelligible language, the Buddha used the language of thepeople. In doing so, he used it as a vehicle of instruction as well. For example, the Magala Sutta(chanted as pirit) is an attempt to answer the question, What are the auspicious things? Theword magala could also be translated as superstitious observance and in one place theBuddha, referring to the lay people at the time, says that they were superstitious (gihmagalik, Vin II 140). Now the list of auspicious things or observances given in the MagalaSutta, far from being superstitions, were factors or practises which contributed to the social andpersonal advancement of people. To take but one stanza, the Buddha says: a good, education(bhusacca), acquiring a technical skill (sippa), a well-cultivated sense of discipline (vinayo casusikkhito) and cultured speech (subhsit ca y vc)these are the auspicious things (Sn 261).The practises recommended are of relevance to any civilised society.

So while the people derived a psychological satisfaction and a sense of security by listening to

this chant, they also received an education in the Dhamma. Those who listened with raptattention, appreciated what was said, and tried to live in accordance with the teachings, wouldalso have the protection of the Dhamma, for it is said that the Dhamma protects him who livesin accordance with the Dhamma (dhammo have rakkhati dhammacri).

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IV. The Criteria of Right and WrongWe normally use the words right or wrong to denote classes of acts and sometimes thespecific acts of human beings. Thus, what we mean when we say that, murder is wrong is that

the class of acts, which are classified as murder are wrong. But sometimes we may say thathis action in the specific situation in which he was placed was right. We do not use thesewords to denote the acts of animals though, perhaps, the acts of some animals in rare situationsmay seem to us to be right or wrong, as the case may be.

Even with regard to human beings, we do not consider all their acts as being right orwrong. When a person eats bread instead of buns for his morning meal, when what he eatsmakes no difference to him or others, we do not consider this act of his right or wrong. Wedeem it to be morally neutral along with many of his actions, including reflex actions.Likewise, some of his actions may be partially right and partially wrong and therefore of amixed character. So a mans actions may be classified as being morally right ( kusala), morallywrong (akusala), morally neutral (avykata) and morally mixed (i.e. both right and wrong,vokia) in character.

It makes sense to speak of some acts as being right and others as being wrong or mixed incharacter, only if human beings were free to act within limits in a causally conditioned world. Ifa mans actions were mere responses to stimuli or merely reflected the hereditary structure orconstitution of his body, or were strictly determined by his psychological past, then it would notmake sense to say that his actions were right or wrong, since they are constrained and not free.So if his actions are deemed to be right or wrong, it is because although his decisions and actsare causally conditioned by circumstances, they are not strictly determined and man has thefreedom (attakra) to act within certain limits in the universe in which he lives.

Besides, as we have shown in our previous talk, man and the universe are such that the moraland spiritual life is not only possible but is the most desirable. This is because in addition to thefact of freedom within a context of causal conditioning, there is ethico-psychological causationas well as survival after death. Our decisions, which result in right or wrong acts, make adifference to our nature and future. They have their own personal reactions in this life as well asin lives to come. These three facts, as often emphasised by the Buddha (e. g. Apaaka Sutta),namely freedom (kiriyavda), survival (atthi paro loko) and moral causation (hetuvda) make moralresponsibility a reality and self-development a practical possibility as well as a dire necessity.What we do by way of our mental, verbal and bodily acts makes a difference to our nature andregulates our future development.

This is what is often emphasised in the Dhammapada: By oneself alone is evil done, by

oneself is evil avoided and by oneself alone is one saved (lit purified). Salvation and damnationdepend on oneself (paccatta) no one can save another (Dhp 165). We are what we are not

because of evolutionary necessity, Gods grace or accidental happiness but because of what wecan make of ourselves by the exercise of our own freedom and effort. So the teaching of theBuddha can help us only if we decide to follow it: You yourselves must make the effort, saysthe Buddha, the Transcendent Ones are only teachers; those who follow the path and meditateare delivered from the bonds of Mra (Dhp 276).

This moral and spiritual development, as we have shown in one of our previous talks, is notan unending process for its goal is Nibbna, the ultimate good or the ethical ideal according toBuddhism, a goal which may be achieved by some in this life itself.

In this talk, we propose to examine the nature and the characteristics of these acts, which aredesignated right or wrong. What makes right acts right and wrong acts wrong? What is the

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measure or what are the criteria, which enable us to recognise and distinguish right acts fromwrong?

We may state at the outset that moral philosophers have expressed a variety of opinions onthis subject. Few thinkers are, in fact, in agreement about the nature of right or wrong acts ortheir analysis.

The objectivists have held that acts are right or wrong, irrespective of the person by whom orthe time and place at which they are performed. Among the objectivist theories aremetaphysical theories such as those of the theists. They have held either that right actions areright because this is Gods will or that God has willed them because they are right or that Godswill and what is right coincide. However, the conflicting accounts of Gods will in the differenttheistic scriptures and the fact that some of the alleged divine commands do not appear to beright, apart from the objections from relativism, makes this a difficult theory to accept. Otherobjectivists have put forward naturalistic theories. Some are sociological and hold that rightactions are actions which are conducive to the survival of mankind. Still others, such as theutilitarians assert that right actions are productive of a maximum amount of pleasure for human

beings.Among the objectivists many are intuitionists, who claim that the rightness or wrongness of

actions can be directly apprehended by ones intuition like mathematical truths or can beperceived like perceiving the difference between the colours of objects, although the utilitariansor the proponents of evolutionary ethics are empirical in their approach.

In direct opposition to them are the subjectivists or emotivists, who believe that the rightnessor wrongness of actions depend on the thoughts and feelings of human beings. Right actions areactions which all or most people like or approve of whereas wrong actions are disliked ordisapproved of.

The relativists take a different stand and put forward the view that the notions of right andwrong have differed in different periods of history and in different societies, though they have arelative objectivity within their frames of reference. The sceptics on the other hand claim that wecannot know anything regarding the nature of right and wrong, while logical positivists havedismissed ethical concepts as pseudo-concepts.

A positivist who says that they reject the subjectivist view states his point of view asfollows: The propositions which describe the phenomena of moral experience, and theircauses, must be assigned to the science of psychology, or sociology. The exhortations to moralvirtue are not propositions at all, but ejaculations or commands which are designed to provokethe reader to action of a certain sort (A. J. Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic, London, VictorGollancz Ltd., 1958, pp. 103104).

Modern analytic philosophers are evolving a more satisfactory analysis of ethicalpropositions, although this is by no means perfect as yet.

What is the position of Buddhism regarding ethical propositions and the notions of right andwrong? Is the Buddhist account objective, subjective, relativist, sceptical, positivist or somethingtotally different? Only a careful study of the analysis of right and wrong in the scriptures canreveal the Buddhist point of view, which appears to be different from all of the above theories,although it may be compared with some of them in certain respects.

We have already stated that it is a necessary condition of right actions (or wrong actions) thatthey should be performed within a context of relative freedom, despite the causal conditioning.

According to Buddhist conceptions, another necessary condition, which differentiates rightactions from wrong ones, is the motive and intentions with which they are done. Suppose a

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person gets hold of a knife and cuts open anothers body. Is this a right action or a wrongaction? Some modern Western philosophers, who try to determine the rightness or wrongnessof an action by virtue of the observable characteristics of the action itself or its consequenceswithout reference to motive or intention, would find it difficult to answer this question. It is themotive and intention, which make a tremendous difference to the nature of the act.

If the intention of the person was to injure or kill the other man and he was motivated bypersonal animosity, we would regard it as a wrong act (akusala). If, however, the intention wasto prolong the other persons life by performing a surgical operation and he was motivated by adesire to be of service to a fellow man, then we would regard it as a right action ( kusala). It isprimarily the motive and intention (cetan), which determines whether the act was right orwrong.

According to the Buddha, it is the motive and intention, which ought to be a primaryconsideration in determining the rightness or wrongness of an action. But this is only anecessary condition and not a sufficient condition. Mere good intentions are not enough. The actmust be performed as well before we can say whether a right action has been done. Besides, for

the action to be a skilful (kusala) action, the act itself must be appropriate. Consider the casewhere a layman, who with the best of intentions gives his friend in an emergency a dose ofmedicine, which turns out to be poisonous because he gave the wrong dosage. Here he actedwith the best of intentions and motives but did not do a totally skilful (kusala) act.

So in considering the skilfulness or rightness of an action one has to take into account notonly the motive and intention but the nature of the act, the manner in which it was carried out,its consequences, the people it affected etc. It is good to give but one should give withdiscrimination (viceyya dna dtabba), so that the most needy are benefited with the thingsthat they most need. The motive and intention are, therefore, only a necessary condition inevaluating the rightness or wrongness of an action but there are other factors as well to be taken

into account.Predominant among these other factors is the tendency on the part of these right actions to

bring about the ultimate good of the individual as well as of society. So one of the main criteriaof a right action concerns the question as to whether it constitutes the right means towards therealisation of the ultimate good. The ultimate good for each individual is the attainment ofNibbna, a state of highest happiness, moral perfection, supreme realisation, utter freedom andperfect mental health. The ideal for one is, in fact, the ideal for all.

The question may be raised as to whether the quest for such a goal is not narrowly egoistic.The answer is that it is not so, unless the goal is misconceived. The quest for Nibbnanecessarily implies the practise of other-regarding virtues, such as selflessness (cga) and

benevolence (mett). So although the personal quest for Nibbna may appear to be egoistic it isa form of enlightened egoism, apart from the fact that the goal itself is permeated withselflessness. On the other hand, mere altruism may not be in the best interest of others. As theBuddha points out: It is not possible for one who is stuck in the mud to help out another; it isonly possible for one who is not stuck in the mud to help out another who is stuck in the mud. Itis not possible for a man who has not saved himself to save another; it is only a man who hassaved himself who can help save another (M I 46). Such unenlightened altruism would beillustrated in the activity of a foolish person with good intentions, who wishes to help his friendwithout being able to do anything of value. So enlightened altruism necessarily involves self-regarding activity.

The Dhammapada therefore firmly says: One should first establish oneself in what is proper:then only should one instruct others. Such a wise man is not liable to be reproached. As he

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instructs others, so should he act himself (Dhp 158159). What Buddhism recommends,therefore, is the ideal neither of ethical egoism nor of ethical altruism. It may be called the idealof ethical universalism. As the Buddha says on one occasion: There are these four persons inthe world. What four? He who is bent neither on his own welfare nor on the welfare of others.He who is bent on the welfare of others but not his own. He who is bent on his own welfare but

not of others, and he who is bent on the welfare of oneself as well as of others . . He who is benton the welfare of oneself as well as of others, is of these four persons the chief and best, topmost,highest and supreme (A II 95).

This is why right actions tend to benefit not only oneself, but others as well. When we statethe truth, for example, on certain occasions, it may not be of immediate benefit to us, though itwould benefit the community. It is an action, therefore, which tends to bring about the goodand happiness of the multitude (bahujanahitya bahujanasukhya) and indirectly benefits us. Nodoubt we directly experience the reward of good conscience even if we derive no immediatematerial benefit by such an action. So in this sense, speaking the truth serves in the long runones own welfare as well as that of others.

Viewing the individual and the social goods separately, a right action is, therefore, one whichtends to bring about ones own ultimate good as well as contributes to the weal and welfare ofsociety. The ten right actions (dasa kusala kamm), which have these characteristics are stated asfollows: (1) He refrains from killing and abides full of mercy to all beings; (2) He refrains, fromstealing and is honest and pure of heart; (3) He refrains from sexual misconduct and does nottransgress the social mores (critta) with regard to sex; (4) He refrains from lying and is devotedto truth. On being summoned as a witness before an assembly or a court of law, he claims toknow what he knows, he does not claim to know what he does not know, he claims to have seenwhat he saw and does not claim to have seen what he did not see; he does not utter a consciouslie for the sake of himself, for the sake of others or for some gain; (5) He refrains from slanderand holds himself aloof from calumny. What he hears here, he repeats not there in order tocause factions among people. He is a peacemaker, who brings together those who are divided,delights in social harmony and makes statements which promote harmony; (6) He refrains fromharsh speech and uses language that is civil and pleasant to hear; (7) He refrains from idlegossip and speaks at the right time in accordance with facts, what is meaningful, righteous andin accordance with the law; (8) He refrains from covetousness, does not covet anothers property(and is generous at heart); (9) He refrains from ill will (and is benevolent); (10) He refrains fromholding false views and holds the right philosophy of life, believing in the reality of this worldand the next, in moral recompense, moral obligations and values and in religious teachers whohave led good lives and have proclaimed by their superior insight, the nature of this world andthe next (M III 4752).

Right actions are, therefore, those which are instrumental in bringing about the ultimate goodof one and all. Since happiness is one of the basic characteristics of this ultimate good, rightactions are those which tend to promote the happiness of oneself as well as of others. But thishappiness is not to be considered in isolation from moral perfection, realisation or knowledgeregarding the nature of things, emancipation of mind, perfect mental health etc.

Another account of right actions from the standpoint of the individual ultimate good as thegoal is the noble eight-fold path, consisting of right beliefs (samm dihi) etc. Here again, as theMahcattrsaka Sutta (M III 71 ff.) points out, right effort ( samm vyma) is involved in tryingto give up false beliefs. In dispelling these wrong beliefs and consciously adopting right beliefsas a basis for action, one is led by right awareness (samm sati). These in turn, namely right

beliefs, right effort, and right awareness help in the cultivation of the other factors of the path.Thus, right beliefs help the cultivation of right aspirations, which in turn promote right speech

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and right action. Right action makes for a right mode of livelihood. This helps right effort, whichin turn furthers right awareness or right mindfulness, which results in right meditation untileventually they culminate in right understanding (samm a) and right emancipation (sammvimutti). So we see that right actions are right (samm) in being the efficient means for therealisation of the good.

Wrong actions, on the other hand, constitute those that prevent or obstruct the realisation ofthe goal on the part of oneself and others (attavybdhya savaati paravybdhya savaati).

Although we said that right motives were a necessary condition of right action, we may notethat they are included in the eight-fold path as right aspirations (samm sakappa), so that allright actions could be defined as what are instrumental in bringing about the ultimate good.

Since right actions constitute a middle path (majjhima paipad) between two extremes, theseextremes constitute wrong means for the attainment of the goal. The actions constituting themare, therefore, wrong actions. One wrong means, constituting a set of wrong actions consists ofcausing pain to oneself (attantapa) or others (parantapa) or both. As the Buddha has shown in theKandaraka Sutta (M I 539ff) ascetics who mortify the flesh, hunters, fowlers and robbers whocause pain and suffering to others, kings who practise penance and burden their subjects withthe performance of wasteful and cruel sacrifices, all fall into the category of people who do thesewrong actions by causing pain to oneself, others or both.

In the other extreme are those who recommend free indulgence in ones desires, saying, forexample, that there is nothing wrong in indulgence in sensual pleasures (natthi kmesu doso; MI 305). Such persons, the Buddha says, enjoy limited pleasures in the present but because of theirfailure to see that indulgence gives diminishing returns by way of pleasure and results in our

becoming slaves to our passions, undergo suffering later. The Buddha says in theMahdhammasamdna Sutta (M I 309) that those whose desires are strong are likely to achievehappiness in due course by restraining and curbing their desires in the present even at the cost

of a little unhappiness. This exercise of restraint by the cultivation of ones emotions andmeditative self-analysis is different from the mortification of the flesh. On the other hand, thosewhose desires are not strong, it is said, can easily achieve stable states of happiness bytransforming themselves.

Right actions are right because they are based on a realistic understanding of man and nature,an awareness of the goal of human endeavour and of the correct means to realise it. Theirrightness is to be judged by the nature of their motivation as well as the nature of theirconsequences. These consequences may be psychological or social and experiencable in this lifeor in future lives.

In my talks on Survival and Karma, I gave instances of the verifiable and verified personalconsequences of such actions in future lives. In stating the karmic consequences of some of thesewrong actions, the Buddha says that they tend to bring ones status down to sub-human levelsof existence in subsequent lives but that if we are born among human beings, then one is likelyto experience certain consequences of these wrong actions For instance, a habitual liar is likelyto become the object of false accusations (A IV 247). One who gossips is not likely to be acceptedat his word. One who drinks heavily is likely to be born insane. Elsewhere, it is said that theseconsequences are to be expected in this life itself. The heavy drinker is said to end his days as analcoholic and an insane person (Sn 398). The Dhammapada says: Speak not harshly to anyonefor those thus addressed will in turn retort (Dhp 133).

If right action is a means to the attainment of an end which is the ultimate good, the question

arises as to whether the means must not themselves be good. Buddhism does not seem to holdthat ends are means or means are ends or that the means to be adopted to attain a good end

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must themselves be wholly good. There is a definite goal to be achieved, which is called. theend of unhappiness (dukkhassanta) or the supreme state of happiness (parama sukha).

It may be argued that a good end can only be attained by means wholly good. But the fact isthat we are not wholly good (if we were there would be no necessity to attain the end) and not

being wholly good and not having a clear conception of the goal we cannot perform actionswhich are perfectly right (paramakusala). Our right actions are, therefore, only approximationsto what is perfectly right. It is only gradually that we refine them and doing so acquire clearerconceptions of the goal.

The desire for fame or happiness in this life or the desire to be born in a better state in the nextlife could provide the initial incentive for betterment. Even if we are developed enough to haveour eyes on the goal we must have the desire to attain the ineffable (chanda-jto anakkhte, Dhp218). Desire is to be given up depending on desire (taha nissaya taha pahtabba),namely the desire to end our self-centred desires. Conceit is to be given up depending on theconceited wish (mna nissaya mna pahtabba) that I would attain the goal. A minimum ofimperfection is, therefore, involved in our initial and sustained efforts to reach the goal. As the

Buddha points out in the Abhayarjakumra Sutta, if a child has got something stuck in histhroat, it may be necessary to cause a minimum of pain in order to get it out. Truth is not alwayspleasant and it is sometimes necessary to state unpleasant truths or remind ourselves of them inorder to arouse others or emerge from our state of smug satisfaction.

The question may be raised as to how we may know that right actions are right and wrongactions wrong. One answer is that the Buddha and the arahants have personally verified thenature of these actions and their consequences, and that, in principle, we ourselves are in aposition to do so.

Another answer that is often suggested is that our conscience tells us what is right andwrong. Theists hold that conscience is the voice of God, while psychologists and sociologists

claim that conscience and guilt feelings are a result of conditioning from our childhood throughour parents and the society in which we are brought up. The Buddhist view of conscience issomething between the two. The Buddha says in one place that when we state a falsehoodknowingly, then our conscience knows whether what we say is true or false ( att te purisajnti sacca v yadi v mus, A I 149).

The mind, according to Buddhism, has a prior origin to our present human life. It hasundergone a lot of sasric conditioning and so its guilt feelings and its sense of uneasiness incertain situations is due to this conditioning, which extends beyond this life into the past. Its

judgment, therefore, as to the rightness or wrongness of our actions, is not to be ignored thoughit cannot always be trusted. Besides, the mind cleansed of its adventitious defilements, possesses

certain extrasensory intuitive powers, so that when ones self is tamed it becomes a light toman (att sudanto purisassa joti).

There is another sense in which the criterion of oneself (attpam) may be employed indetermining what is right and wrong. This is done extensively in the Anumna Sutta. Forexample, if a person boasts about himself and declaims others, such a person would bedisagreeable and repulsive to me. So if I behaved in this manner, I would likewise bedisagreeable and repulsive to others. Such actions, which cause unpleasantness, would begenerally disapproved of and be deemed wrong actions.

Sometimes we find the criteria for deciding what are wrong actions stated as follows: (I) Myconscience reproaches me if I do it (att pi ma upavadeyya); (2) the wise would disapprove of it

after examination (anuvicca vi garaheyyu); (3) one would tend to be born in states ofdownfall as a result of doing it (parammara duggati pikakh).

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Therefore, while motives and consequences are the predominant factors, the dictates of ourconscience and the approval and disapproval of the wise may also be taken into account. So indeciding what is right and wrong, we are ruled by our conscience ( attdhipateyya), by what theworld says (lokdhipateyya) and what the Dhamma states (dhammdhipateyya).

In the light of these findings, we shall explore the nature of Buddhist ethical theory as awhole in our next talk.

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V. The Ethical Theory of BuddhismAnalytic philosophy is the current fashion in the English-speaking world, When this school ofphilosophy uses the term ethical theory, it means nothing more than an analysis of moral

language as it is found today among English-speaking peoples. Says one scholar: fullyadequate ethical theory would analyse and systematise the whole variety of linguisticperformances and commitments that are embodied in the use of moral language (George C.Kerner, The Revolution in Ethical Theory, Oxford University Press, 1966, p. 250).

Such an ethical theory obviously would not satisfy people who wish to know whether thenature of man, society and the universe makes a moral life possible for human beings, whetherthere are ends worth attaining and, if so, the proper means to attain them.

We see an attempt to meet this demand on the part of some Existentialist philosophers, whospeak of authentic living as an end worth achieving and sometimes of the means of achievingit.

Marxists outwardly reject ethics. Apart from it being an adjunct of bourgeois philosophy,the workings of dialectical materialism and economic determinism would make a moral lifeimpossible or meaningless. The socialist state is a product of history and not of voluntaryhuman action.

However, Marxists do make constant allusions and appeals to ethical values in their writings.The classless state is often considered an end worth attaining and as a means to it a proletarianrevolution. So the proletarian revolution is also considered a relatively good end worthachieving and what is helpful for this purpose is deemed to be right or instrumentally good. Thefollowing paragraph from the Programme of the Communist Party of Russia, adopted at theeighth party congress (March, 1919) indicates the relevance of certain ethical traits (printed here

in Italics) in bringing about a certain desirable goal, thought of as a relatively good end: Tobring about the victory of the world-wide proletarian revolution it is essential that there shouldbe absolute and mutual trust, the most intimate brotherly alliance, and the highest possiblecohesion of the revolutionary activities of the working class in the more advanced lands(Nikolai Bukharin and E. Preobrazhensky, The ABC of Communism, The University of MichiganPress 1966, p. 377).

Mao Tse-Tungs interpretations of Marxism and Leninism are also often deeply coloured byethical values, which derive from the altruistic ethics of Mahyna Buddhism. Consider, forexample, the following passage from the Little Red Book At no time and in no circumstancesshould a Communist place his personal interests first; he should subordinate them to theinterests of the nation and of the masses. Hence, selfishness, slacking, corruptions, seeking thelimelight, and so on, are most contemptible, while selflessness, working with all ones energy,whole-hearted devotion to public duty, and quiet hard work will command respect (Quotationsfrom Chairman Mao Tse-Tung, Bantam Books, 1967, pp. 153, 154).

Here we may note that selfishness, slacking, corruption, seeking the limelight arecondemned as vices and some basically Buddhist virtues such as selflessness, working with allones energy etc. are commended as virtues to be cultivated.

Even the theists cannot strictly speak of ethics. The history of a theistic universe (being acreation of God) is foreknown in all its ramifications, since God is held to be omniscient. At thesame time, God is also entirely responsible for it, being omnipotent. Besides, if a man happens

to be good, it is often claimed to be due to the grace of God. So, considering mans predicamentin a theistic world, the performance of ethical actions on his part is strictly an impossibility since

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everything is due to Gods will and real human freedom is incompatible with a theisticdeterminism.

However, theists, too, inconsistently with their theory, proclaim an ethic. They recommendvirtues to be cultivated and condemn vices, which are to be eliminated under threat of divinepunishment.

According to Buddhism, the events of history, including human actions, are not due toeconomic determinism or Gods will. Economic factors, no doubt affect and condition human

behaviour; and according to the Buddhist philosophy of society, the economic factor constitutesone of the predominant factors (along with the ideological factor) in bringing about socialchange. But it is not the only factor. Nor does it strictly determine human behaviour.Hereditary, environmental and psychological factors condition mans actions according to theBuddhist account of conditioned genesis (paiccasamuppda), but still, man has within himself anelement of initiative (rabbha-dhtu) or free will (attakra), by the exercise of which he can makedecisions, which make the future (including his own) different from what it would otherwise be.

This factor of freedom, along with human survival after death, and the correlation betweenmoral acts and consequences (the good acts tending to bring about pleasant consequences andthe evil acts unpleasant consequences) make individual moral responsibility a reality.

In fact, without survival and this correspondence between acts and consequences (which isknown as karma in a Buddhist context), a religious et

Ethics in Buddhist Perspective

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