Ethics Canon 3 Final

7/30/2019 Ethics Canon 3 Final

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CANON 3IMPARTIALITY



OVERVIEW

Impartiality is a fundamental value in

judicial ethics. It is essential to the proper

discharge of the judicial office. Theadministration of justice through the

mediation of courts is based upon this

principle.



• Impartiality applies not only to the decision

itself but also to the process by which the

decision is made.

• A judge has both the duty of rendering a

just decision and the duty of doing it in a

manner completely free from suspicion as

to his fairness and as to his integrity



SECTION 1

Judges shall perform their judicialduties without favor, bias or prejudice.



―Impartiality‖ denotes absence of bias

or prejudice in favor of, or against,

particular parties or classes of parties, as

well as maintaining an open mind inconsidering issues that may come before

the judge.



Supreme Court in several cases held:

― The judge as the person presiding

over that court is the visible

representation of the law and justice.These are self-evident dogmas which do

not even have to be emphasized, but to

which we are wont to advert to when some

members of the judiciary commit legalmissteps or stray from the axioms of

judicial ethics.‖



BURDEN OF PROOF

The complainant carries the burden of proof.



SECTION 2

Judges shall ensure that his or her

conduct, both in and out of court,

maintains and enhances the confidenceof the public, the legal profession and

litigants in the impartiality of the judge and

of the judiciary.



This provision is designed to maintain and

improve public confidence in the entire judiciary as an impartial dispenser of

justice.



SECTION 3

Judges shall, so far as is reasonable,

so conduct themselves as to minimize the

occasions on which it will be necessary for

them to be disqualified from hearing or deciding cases.



Judges may, in their exercise of sound

discretion, restrict themselves voluntarily

from sitting in a case, but such a decision

should be based on good, sound or ethical grounds, or for just and valid

reasons.



DUTY TO SIT DOCTRINE

It is a judge’s duty to refuse to sit whenhe is disqualified, but it is equally his duty

to sit when there is no valid reason for

recusation.



RULE OF NECESSITY

• The majority view is that the rule of

disqualification of judges must yield to

demands of necessity.

• It means that a judge is not disqualified to

sit in a case if there is no other judge

available to hear and decide the case.



SECTION 4

Judges shall not knowingly, while a

proceeding is before or could come before

them, make any comment that might

reasonably be expected to affect theoutcome of such proceeding or impair the

manifest fairness of the process. Nor shall

judges make any comment in public or otherwise that might affect the fair trial of

any person or issue.



This Section warns judges against

making any comment that might

reasonably be expected to affect theoutcome of the proceedings before them

or "impair the manifest fairness of the

process.‖



SECTION 5

Judges shall disqualify themselves from

participating in any proceedings in which

they are unable to decide the matter

impartially or in which it may appear to areasonable observer that they are unable

to decide the matter impartially. Such

proceedings include, but are not limited toinstances where:



SECTION 5

(a) The judge has actual bias or prejudice

concerning a party or personal knowledge

of disputed evidentiary facts concerning

the proceedings;



NOT GROUND FOR

DISQUALIFICATION• the mere filing of an administrative case

against a judge

• that the judge is a next-door neighbor of

the complainant in a case• Mere divergence of opinion between a

judge and a party's counsel as to

applicable law and jurisprudence• reasons of strained personal relationship,

animosity and hostility between a judge

and party or counsel



SECTION 5

(b) The judge previously served as a

lawyer or was a material witness in the

matter in controversy;



Any justice or judge shall disqualify

himself in any case in which he has a

substantial interest, has been of counsel,

is or has, been a material witness, or is sorelated to or connected with a party or his

attorney as to render it improper, in his

opinion, for him to sit on the trial, appeal,or other proceeding therein.



SOME DISQUALIFICATIONS

• if the judge was formerly associated with

one of the parties or their counsel

• notarizing the affidavit of a person to be

presented as a witness in a case before

him.

• if a judge previously represented a party

• if a judge is a material witness in a case,

the judge may not hear the case



SECTION 5

(c) The judge or a member of his or her family, has an economic interest in the

outcome of the matter in controversy;



ECONOMIC INTEREST

"Economic interest," as set forth in the

Terminology section of Rule of Conduct of

US, means ownership of more than a de

minimis legal or equitable interest.



DE MINIMIS INTEREST

"De minimis" denotes an insignificant

interest that could not raise reasonable

questions as to a judge's impartiality.



Except for situations in which a judge

participates in the management of such a

legal or equitable interest, or the interest

could be substantially affected by theoutcome of a proceeding before a judge, it

does not include:



(1) an interest in the individual holdings

within a mutual or common investmentfund;

(2) an interest in securities held by an

educational, religious, charitable, fraternal,or civic organization in which the judge or

the judge's spouse, domestic partner,

parent, or child serves as a director,

officer, advisor, or other participant;



(3) a deposit in a financial institution or

deposits or proprietary interests the judge

may maintain as a member of a mutual

savings association or credit union, or similar proprietary interests; or

(4) an interest in the issuer of government

securities held by the judge.



MEMBER OF JUDGE’S FAMILY

“Member of the judge's family” means a

spouse, domestic partner, child,

grandchild, parent, grandparent, or other

relative or person with whom the judge

maintains a close familial relationship.



SECTION 5

(d) The judge served as executor,

administrator, guardian, trustee or lawyer

in the case or matter in controversy, or a

former associate of the judge served as

counsel during their association, or the

judge or lawyer was a material witnesstherein;



SECTION 5

(e) The judge's ruling in a lower court is thesubject of review.



(f) The judge is related by consanguinity or affinity to a party litigant within the sixth

civil degree or to counsel within the fourth

civil degree;



FOURTH DEGREE OF RELATIONSHIP

The following persons are relatives within

the fourth degree of relationship: great-

grandparent, grandparent, parent,

uncle, aunt, brother, sister, first cousin,

child, grandchild, great-grandchild,

nephew or niece.



SIXTH DEGREE OF RELATIONSHIP

The sixth degree of relationship includes

second cousins.



• The law conclusively presumes that a

judge cannot objectively or impartially sit in

such a case.

• The purpose is to preserve the people's

faith and confidence in the courts' justice



SECTION 5

(g) The judge knows that his or her spouse

or child has a financial interest, as heir,

legatee, creditor, fiduciary, or otherwise, in

the subject matter in controversy or in a

party to the proceeding, or any other

interest that could be substantially affectedby the outcome of the proceedings.



This rule is intended to ensure judges’

impartiality by preventing situations inwhich a judge must consider familial

interests in the conflicts before him or her.



SECTION 6

A judge disqualified as stated above may,

instead of withdrawing from the

proceeding, disclose on the records the

basis of disqualification. If, based on suchdisclosure, the parties and lawyers,

independently of the judge's participation,

all agree in writing that the reason for inhibition is immaterial or unsubstantial,



SECTION 6

the judge may then participate in the

proceeding. The agreement, signed by allparties and lawyers, shall be incorporated

in the record of the proceedings.



Notably, the decision to continue hearing

the case, despite the existence of reasons

for disqualification should be:

(1) coupled with a bona fide disclosure to

the parties-in-litigation; and

(2) subject to express acceptance by all

the parties of the cited reason as notmaterial or substantial.



CASE

Dr. Isagani Cruz v. Judge Philbert Inturralde

RTC Antipolo City

Section 1



Facts• April 18, 2001 – Dr. Isagani Cruz filed a complaint

against his wife Yolanda a Complaint for Injunction atRTC Antipolo, Branch 72 family court.

• The hearings were conducted by Exec. Judge Mauricio

Rivera since Branch 72 has no presiding judge

• Parties filed joint motion to suspend with prayer of holddeparture order on Mrs. Cruz.

• Judge Rivera granted the Motion for suspension but

denied the issuance of hold – departure order

• 9/21/2001 – Mrs. Cruz filed a motion to allow her and her 2 children to take a vacation to Switzerland and to

compel Dr. Cruz to return her travel documents.



FACTS

• 10/19/2001 – Judge Iturralde assumed as the newpresiding judge of Branch 72

• Dr. Cruz filed his Opposition to the Motion at a hearing

but during the same, Judge expressed his predisposition

to grant Yolande’s Motion. This supposedly constitutedpartiality which showed that he had already prejudged

the incidents of the case.

• Dr. Cruz filed a Motion to Inhibit which was denied by

Judge.



Respondent’s Comments

• He merely upheld Judge Rivera’s earlier decision.

• On the Motion to Inhibit, he first met the parties and their

counsels only during that hearing.

• He even advised the parties to appeal his Orders by way

of petition for certiorari if they found it erroneous.

.



ISSUE

Whether or not Judge Iturralde should beinhibited from hearing the case?



Ruling

• No. As to allegation of bias and partiality, SC Circular

provides that hold-departure orders may be issued only

in criminal cases.

• the subject case is not criminal in nature, had the

respondent ruled otherwise, he would have been guilty

of gross ignorance of the law and/or willful violation of

the Circular



• The issue of partiality has not been reasonably

established, respondent cannot be faulted for denying

the Motion for Inhibition.

• A ruling not to inhibit oneself cannot be overturned in the

absence of clear and convincing evidence to prove thecharge.

• It is settled that mere suspicion of partiality is not

enough. There should be hard evidence to prove it, as

well as a manifest showing of bias and partialitystemming from an extrajudicial source or some other

basis.



Let it be known that this Court will never tolerate or

condone any conduct, act or omission that would

violate the norm of public accountability or diminish

the people’s faith in the judiciary. However, when anadministrative charge against a court personnel

holds no basis whatsoever in fact or in law, this

Court will not hesitate to protect the innocent court

employee against any groundless accusation thattrifles with judicial processes.



Case 2

LEON UMALE VS HONORABLE

ONOFRE VILLALUZ, HONORABLE

BENJAMIN AQUINO, PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, EDUARDO FELICIANO,ANTONIO DAVID, CECILIO CHICO,

BENJAMIN ESCANDOR, ROLANDO

SAMSON AND ALFONSO CO

MAY 25, 1973 – Section 5 par. a



FACTS• Petitioner Leon Umale impugn the validity of the order of

respondent Judge Villaluz disqualifying or inhibiting

himself from trying the robbery charge against 16

accused including the 6 herein private respondents

where the petitioner Is the complainant.

• The case was presided by the respondent from January

to April 12, 1971.

• On April 15, respondent voluntarily inhibited himself from

trying the case on the ground that before the criminal

case was filed in his court, he already had personal

knowledge of the same and directed the immediateforwarding of the case to Exec. Judge of CFI of Pasig

• The case was then presided by Judge Benjamin Aquino



ISSUE

WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT JUDGE VILLALUZ

COMMITTED ABUSE OF DISCRETION FOR

VOLUNTARILY INHIBITING HIMSELF, WITHOUT ANY

MOTION THEREOF BY THE PARTIES, ON THE

GROUND OF HIS PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE

CASE EVEN BEFORE THE SAME WAS FILED?



• Section 1 of Rule 137 of Revised les of Court : No

judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or

his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee,

creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or

to counsel within the fourth degree, computed according

to the rules of the civil law, or in which he has been

executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or inwhich he has been presided in any inferior court when his

ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the

written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them

and entered upon the record.

A judge may, in the exercise of his sound

discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case,

for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned

above.



RULING

• Yes. Paragraph 2 of Section 1 of Rule 137 authorizes

the judge, "in the exercise of his sound discretion, to

disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just or valid

reason other than those mentioned" in paragraph 1.

• A judge can inhibit himself from trying a case on the

ground that the opinion he express in a letter addressed

by him as counsel might in some way or another

influence his decision in the case at bar and express hisfear of not being able to render a truly impartial

judgment.



• Herein respondent Judge, because of his personal

knowledge of the case, at least had conducted a careful

self-examination after hearing some incidents on the

criminal case wherein petitioner is the complainant,

because such personal knowledge on his part mightgenerate in his mind some bias or prejudice against

the complaining witness or any of the accused or in

any manner unconsciously color his judgment one way

or the other without the parties having the opportunity tocross-examine him as a witness.



It is possible that the respondent Judge might be

influenced by his personal knowledge of the case when

he tries and decides the same on the merits, which

would certainly constitute a denial of due process to the

party adversely affected by his judgment or decision. It isbest that, after some reflection, the respondent Judge on

his own initiative disqualified himself from hearing the

robbery case filed by herein petitioner and thereby

rendered himself available as witness to any of theparties and therefore maybe subject to cross-

examination.



CASE 3Vernette Umali-Paco, Bernardino D. Ng,

Orlando H. Habitan and Josephine F. Andrada

v.

Reinato G. Quilala, sued in his capacity asthe Presiding Judge of the RTC – Branch

57 Makati City, Aida C. Lomugdang,

officer in charge and Lilia Batu, courtstenographer of the same branch



FACTS

• Complainants were officers of the Philippine Retirement

Authority, PRA, defendant in an action for specific

performance entitled Phil. Retirement Authority Members

Association Foundation Inc. PRAMA vs PRA.

• They charged respondent Judge with bias and partialityon various occasions.

• Among which was when during the hearing on plaintiff’s

application for a writ of preliminary injunction, lead and

coached a witness for PRAMA and instructed their counsel on what questions to ask



• Respondent Judge issued an order granting the motion of

PRAMA to set the case for hearing without giving the

counsel for PRA an opportunity to oppose it.• That he could very well issue the writ ex parte, on prayer

of PRAMA, impressing upon the plaintiff that he was in a

position to resolve the application without having to hear

the evidence for defendant PRA.

• That he unceremoniously interrupted Atty. Paco as she

was explaining a matter propounded by the court

• That he delegated to his acting clerk of court, Aida

Lomugdang, not a member of bar, the task of receivingevidence, as well as ruling on any objections

• Stenographer made it appear that the session was

presided by Judge when in fact he did not.



• As to respondent’s comments, the allegations of bias

and partiality were made with little substance, that it hadbeen usual practice to ask questions from witnesses.

• On issue of without giving PRA the opportunity to oppose,

he explained that cases involving a prayer for injunctive

relied necessitated expeditious and judicious resolution

and despite of that, he did not immediately issue the writ

and his willingness to hear argument of both parties

negate the accusation of bias and partiality.

• On issue of delegating the reception of evidence, it is with

the knowledge of the parties and the counsel and purely

ministerial matter and with voluntarily submission, they

should be deemed to be in estoppel.



ISSUE

Whether or not respondent Judge

exhibited partiality and bias?



RULING

• NO. Judge Quilala deviated somewhat from usual

practice when he ignored the objection of counsel and

asked the question himself. But bias and partiality could

not necessarily be inferred therefrom. Considering that

the witness is a Spanish national, with difficulty inunderstanding the questions, he must have thought it

best to take a hand in the examination.

• The judge may aptly need to intervene in the

presentation of evidence in order to expedite theresolution of a case and prevent unnecessary time.



RULING

On granting the motion of the plaintiff to set the case for

an earlier hearing without giving the counsel for

defendant an opportunity to oppose it, also no patent

irregularity could be deduced. Prayers for injunctive

reliefs are given priority in the attention of the court.Indeed under the rules, a writ of preliminary mandatory

injunction ex parte could be issued without it being

necessarily conditioned on prior notice and hearing.

• Yes. On his unnecessary bickering with Atty. Paco, his

utterances could easily and very well be mistaken for, if

not reflective of, a mark of arrogance.



―[The] statement of respondent Judge appears to be a

reckless one, uncalled for x x x. Trial judges should be

circumspect, carefully judicious and foremost, legally

correct in their pronouncements or utterances, especiallyin open court, to avoid any showing of ignorance,

arrogance or bias or partiality to a party. x x x

Parenthetically, subject statement of respondent Judge

could have been worded in a more judicially suitablemanner, short of showing his irritation towards

respondent PRA’s counsel, which may only tend to

suggest his bias against defendant PRA’s counsel or

partiality to the other party. Trial judges should be

circumspect and act with proper judicial decorum in their

pronouncements or utterances, especially in open court.‖



• On issue of delegating the task,

Section 9, Rule 30, of the Rules of Civil Procedure

provides:―Sec. 9. Judge to receive evidence; delegation to clerk of

court. --- The judge of the court where the case is

pending shall personally receive the evidence to be

adduced by the parties. However, in default or ex

parte hearings, and in any case where the parties agree

in writing, the court may delegate the reception of the

evidence to its clerk of court who is a member of the

bar. The clerk of court shall have no power to rule on

objections to any question or to the admission of exhibits,which objections shall be resolved by the court upon

submission of his report and the transcripts within ten

(10) days from termination of the hearing.‖



Respondent stenographer Lilia N. Batu, likewise, wasalso remiss, albeit without any apparent ill-motive, in her

duty to accurately record the proceedings before the

court. The afternoon session was clearly separate from

the morning hearing. A transcript of stenographic notes

should be a faithful and exact recording of all matters

that transpire during a court proceeding.

DISPOSITION



DISPOSITIONWHEREFORE, the Court finds (a) respondent Judge Reinato

G. Quilala guilty for conduct unbecoming a judge and of

violating Section 9, Rule 30, of the Rules of Court, and he

is hereby penalized with a fine of Ten Thousand (P10,000.00)

Pesos; (b) respondent acting clerk of court Aida C.

Lomugdang guilty of having acted in contravention with the

rules on the reception by her, albeit upon the directive of respondent judge, of evidence without herself being a member

of the bar, and she is hereby SEVERELY REPRIMANDED;

and (c) respondent stenographer Lilia N. Batu to have been

remiss in her duty to accurately reflect the circumstances

surrounding the proceedings in the afternoon hearing of 19February 2001, and she is ADMONISHED to henceforth be

circumspect in her duties. Respondents are each warned

against committing any further infraction on their part.



CASE 4

Rosario Castillo & Sonia VillasantaVs.

Judge Celestino Juan



FACTS

• The petitioners are the offended parties in two rapecases, on two separate occasions, in the secrecy of

Judge Juan’s chambers, the latter informed them of the

weakness of their cases, the likelihood of a verdict of

acquittal in favor of the accused, and impressed uponthem that it would be to their advantage to settle, as the

most he could do on their behalf was to have such

accused indemnify them.

• These conversations took place even before theprosecution had finished presenting its evidence, one of

them not having testified as yet.



ISSUE

WHETHER OR NOT JUDGE JUAN

SHOULD BE DISQUALIFIED FROM

HEARING THE CASES?



RULING• Yes. Trial Judge is to refrain from reaching hasty

conclusions or prejudging matters. It is not necessarythat he should possess marked proficiency in law, but it

is essential that he is to hold the balance true. What is

equally important is that he should avoid any conduct

that casts doubt on his impartiality.• Due process of law requires a hearing before an

impartial and disinterested tribunal, and that every litigant

is entitled to nothing less than the cold neutrality of an

impartial Judge.

• A judge has both the duty of rendering a just decision

and the duty of doing it in a manner completely free from

suspicion as to its fairness and as to his integrity.



• outside of pecuniary interest, relationship or previous

participation in the matter that calls for adjudication,

there may be other causes that could conceivablyerode the trait of objectivity, thus calling for

inhibition. That is to betray a sense of realism, for the

factors that lead to preferences or predilections are

many and varied. It is well, therefore, that if any suchshould make its appearance and prove difficult to

resist, the better course for a judge is to disqualify

himself.

• The administration of justice would thus be subject to areproach if there be a rejection of the plea for

disqualification.



DISPOSITION

WHEREFORE, this Court grants the

petitions for certiorari, and respondent

Judge is ordered to desist from further conducting the trial of the two

prosecutions for rape.



CASE 5

Sps.Teodorico Marfil and Teodora Espanola

Vs.

Judge Orlando Cuachon



FACTS

• March 1980 – complainants charged Judge Cuachonwith gross Ignorance of the law and acts unbecoming a

Judge.

• 1979 – Maria Soto Vda de Gonzales, aunt of the wife of

Judge Cuachon, filed a criminal complaint againstcomplainant for violation of Anti-Squatting Law, before

the sala of respondent Judge.

• Respondent took cognizance of the case and issued a

warrant for the arrest of Teodorico, apprehended anddetained.

• Complainant’s counsel prayed for his release.



• For failure of respondent to order the release, an urgent

motion to quash the criminal action was filed by the

Teodorico’s counsel which not favorably acted by Judge.

• Complainants prayed that Judge be removed from his

office.

• Respondent’s averred that he followed the usual process

when the complaint is filed.

• He announced during the hearing that the case was

called for a possible amicable settlement and when there

was no possibility, he inhibited himself, thus he could no

longer act on motion to quash and order of release.



ISSUE

WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT

SHOULD BE DISQUALIFIED IN TAKING

COGNIZANCE OF THE CASE?



RULING• Paragraph 1, Section 1, Rule 137 of the Revised Rule of

Court clearly provides:No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which

he, or his wife or child, is peculiarily interested as heir,

legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to

either party within the sixth degree of consanguinityor affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree,

computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in

which he has been executor, administrator, guardian,

trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided in any

inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the written consent of an parties in

interest, signed by them and entered upon the record.



• It is an admitted fact that the aggrieved party in Criminal

Case No. 449 is the aunt of respondent's wife. However,

notwithstanding such relationship and the above-quoted

prohibition, respondent took cognizance of the case.

• These actuations of respondent Judge opened to

question his ability to act with the cold neutrality of an

impartial Judge.

• The fact that he subsequently inhibited himself after it

became evident that no possible amicable settlement

could be reached does not extenuate his culpability.

DISPOSITION:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent

judge is hereby REPRIMANDED with warning that a

repetition of similar act will be dealt with more severely

C S



CASE 6

Juan C. Sandoval, now deceased,

represented by his surviving spouse,

Adelaida Sandovalvs.

Hon. Court of Appeals and Lorenzo Tan Jr.

FACTS



FACTS

• The property subject is a parcel of land on which anapartment building stands covered by TCT in the name

of Lorenzo L. Tan Jr married to Carolina Mangampo.

• 1984 Lorenzo discovered that the adverse claim of one

Godofredo Valmeo has been annotated on his title. Animpostor had mortgaged the property.

• 1985 – real Lorenzo met Juan Sandoval who claimed to

be the new owner.

• Lorenzo filed a case for recovery of his property whichthe trial court ruled in his favor, presided partly, heard

part of plantiff’s evidence and ruled on motions



• By Justice Victor but the decision was penned by LucasBersamin, who took over as presiding judge when Judge

Victor was promoted.

• Upon elevation to Court of Appeals, the case was

assigned to Justice Victor as ponente.

ISSUE



ISSUE

WHETHER OR NOT JUDGE VICTOR

SHOULD INHIBIT HIMSELF FROM

DECIDING THE CASE?

RULING



RULING• ―SECTION 1. Disqualification of judges. — No judge or

judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his wifeor child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor

or otherwise, or in which he is related to either party

within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to

counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to

the rules of the civil law, or in which he has been

executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or

in which he has presided in any inferior court when

his ruling or decision is the subject of review,

without the written consent of all parties in interest,signed by them and entered upon the record.

:



:

• ―Rule 3.12 of The Code of Judicial Conduct — A judge

should take no part in a proceeding where the judge’s

impartiality might reasonably be questioned. These cases

include, among others, proceedings where:

Xx (c)the judge’s ruling in a lower court is the subject of

review; xx

From the foregoing legal principles, we find no basis for

Justice Victor to inhibit himself from deciding the case.

Ethics Canon 3 Final

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