Essential FeaturesEssential Features: Speed, Lethality : Speed, Lethality and Surprise within a Joint and Surprise within a Joint

Framework at the CINC’s disposal.Framework at the CINC’s disposal.

The US Army’s Light Reconnaissance Strike Groups are designed to be on the leading edge of the revolution in military

affairs and provide the blueprint for future ground force development into the next century.

THE US ARMY’s VANGUARD FORCE IN THE RMA

Kosovo Lessons: U.S. Army Example is a Warning!

• Must adapt force structure to future security environment within a new Joint Operational Architecture

• “Army After Next” looks too much like the Army today

• Division Organization Too Slow, Too Centralized; Not organized for rapid deployability within JTF

• A Combination of Strategic Air and fast Sea Lift can move reorganized Army Forces faster!

• Must be organized to conduct any mission the NCA assigns including both peace support operations and warfighting

Improve Army’s agility & punch through organizational change to achieve rapid deployability and

real Joint Warfighting Capability.

Improve Army’s agility & punch through organizational change to achieve rapid deployability and

real Joint Warfighting Capability.

SOFIA

FederalRepublic of Yugoslavia

BOSNIA - HERZEGOVINA

BULGARIA

SARAJEVO

KOSOVO

MONTENEGRO

SKOPJE

TIRANAFYROM

ALBANIA

PRISTINA

SFOR

AOR

KOSOVO

THESSALONIKI

JFLCCREAR

CBT CDR

JFACCJFLCCDEEP

COMBATCDR

JFLCC CLOSECOMBAT CDRJFC

JFLCCCDR

During the Kosovo Crisis, a Light Recon Strike Group would have been a flexible deterrent force!

In JAN 99, an LRSG could have deployed to demonstrate US readiness to intervene and threaten the Serb position

in Kosovo. Army Prepositioning Afloat could have rapidly reinforced within days if released to the CINC by

the JCS. This action would have influenced Belgrade!

I I

2400TROOPS

CBT ENG MOBILITY

BN

GROUP SPT

SQDN

I I I I AIR

ATTK

500 TROOPS

550 TROOPS

700TROOPS

SQDN

RECONI I

C 4 I SQDN

I I

700 TROOPS

Light Recon-Strike Group (5,000 Troops)

•3 Groups should be Conus-based and ready on a rotational basis for immediate global deployment.•Equipment sets could be leased for 7-8 years.

This Light Reconnaissance Strike Group is designed to be moved by existing USAF aircraft anywhere in the world in

24 hours with 162 C-17 Sorties!

Light Recon-Strike Group Medium Weight BrigadeREQUIRED C-17 SORTIES= 162

Troops: 4,741

Equipment: 584 vehicles + (100) 463L Pallets

114 AGS 105mm gun with adv munitions (30 tons)200 Light Strike Vehicles (18 tons) [35mm & LOSAT + (27) 120mm Adv. Mortar system] 24 M9 ACE Engineer Vehicles 7 Fox Nuclear/Biological/Chemical Vehicles 9 MLRS rocket launchers160 HUMMV Vehicles (various configurations) 70 Trucks (medium weight) 40 Hughes 600 Armed Helicopters 12 UH 60 (Armed and Transport Helicopters

REQUIRED C-17 SORTIES= 168

Troops: 3,600

Equipment: 600 wheeled armored vehicles armed with 25mm and 90mm cannon plus either TOW or LOSAT + additional equipment. No stabilized gun platform; cannot fire on the move.

Note: Software system for determining individual plane loads is the Air Load Planning System

(ALPS) and equipment information comes from FM 55-15 Transportation Reference Data.

•Brigadier General with seasoned staff commands a ready, cohesive, all arms Battlegroup capable of real Independent Warfighting Operations within the Joint Task Force!

•Equipment sets are leased for eight years to support the establishment of three Light Recon-Strike Groups on rotational readiness!

•Colonel Commands Conventional Brigade Combat Team within the existing ten division structure. No new Joint Operational Architecture.

•Not structured for independence. Without significant reinforcement, exclusively Small Scale Conflict Force (peacekeeping).

•Equipment sets are purchased with enormous sunken costs and little salvage value. Technology is moving too fast to buy in most cases. Old R&D process cannot keep up! Civil leads Military!

THE LIGHT RECONNAISSANCE STRIKE GROUP: THE LIGHT RECONNAISSANCE STRIKE GROUP: COMMAND AND CONTROL STRUCTURECOMMAND AND CONTROL STRUCTURE

BRIGADIER GENERAL (COMMANDER )

PERSONNEL (LTC)

OPERATIONS& INTELLIGENCE

(LTC)

STRIKECOORD(LTC)

LOGISTICS/SUSTAINMENT

(LTC)

CIVIL AFFAIRS &

PSYOPS(LTC)

INFORMATIONSUPPORT (C4)

(LTC)

In contrast to the current Brigade Commander, the Group Commander can reach acrossIn contrast to the current Brigade Commander, the Group Commander can reach acrossservice lines to mobilize Joint capabilities to achieve maneuver dominanceservice lines to mobilize Joint capabilities to achieve maneuver dominance..

••Strike Coordination officerStrike Coordination officer orchestrates precision strike capabilities of all services within orchestrates precision strike capabilities of all services withinmaneuver framework of land warfare. maneuver framework of land warfare. Single link to JFACCSingle link to JFACC..

••Information Support officerInformation Support officer manages information assets in support of the Group’s manages information assets in support of the Group’soperations.operations.

••Operations and Intelligence officersOperations and Intelligence officers are integrated into one structure. are integrated into one structure.

••Civil Affairs & PSYOPS officerCivil Affairs & PSYOPS officer is permanent link to interagency process and regional or is permanent link to interagency process and regional orlocal civil authorities.local civil authorities.

••Personnel and LogisticsPersonnel and Logistics could be integrated on the Intelligence/Operations model. could be integrated on the Intelligence/Operations model.

COMMAND AND STAFF STRUCTURE OF A

COMBAT GROUP(Also includes a Colonel as deputy CDR)(HQTRS Cap of 150 Officers and Soldiers)

CHIEF OF STAFF ( COL )

(C4I Battalion Structure in a (C4I Battalion Structure in a Close Combat GroupClose Combat Group; configuration of ; configuration of Deep & Rear C4I BNs will be similar, but tailored to different needs.)Deep & Rear C4I BNs will be similar, but tailored to different needs.)

Breaking the PhalanxBreaking the Phalanx, pages 71-73.

I

600 Troops

I

I

NLOS NLOS BATTERYBATTERY

ISR/IW ISR/IW COCO

I

I AIR AIR

DEFENSE DEFENSE BATTERYBATTERY

CHEMICALCHEMICAL

CO CO

HHC

I Command & Command & Control CO Control CO

• GROUP HEADQUARTERS COMPANY: Administration and

Maintenance activities• NON-LINE-OF-SIGHT (NLOS) CO/BATTERY: Tactical UAVs/

Over-the horizon attack systems (EFOGM).

• ISR/INFO WARFARE CO: Intelligence/Info Opns

• AIR DEFENSE BATTERY: Short-range Air Defense

• CHEMICAL CO: Recon, Detection and limited Decon support

• Command and Control CO: Designed for dispersed, mobile communications

• MILITARY POLICE SECURITY DETACHMENT: Added or integrated as necessary for deployments and training.

THE C4I BN: CRITICAL COMPONENT OF THE JOINT THE C4I BN: CRITICAL COMPONENT OF THE JOINT C4ISR OPERATIONAL ARCHITECTURE.C4ISR OPERATIONAL ARCHITECTURE.

•In the Group-based structure, Army Forces are involved in one of three 180 day operational readiness cycles in peacetime. This reduces personnel tempo, makes deployments and costs predictable.

•Training Cycle (six months): Unit and Individual Training under Service control.

•Deployment Cycle (six months): Units are ready for deployment to Joint Command and Control and become part of the pool that responds to Major Theater of War or Lesser Theater of War contingencies.

•Reconstitution Cycle (six months): Unit returns to home station for re-fitting, modernization (if required) and leave.

This approach creates a pool of 35-40,000 ready, CONUS-based Army Expeditionary Forces that can deploy 24 hours a day, seven

days a week to fight, deter or conduct any mission the National Command Authorities decide to assign.

Reorganization creates a larger pool of ready, available Army Forces!

Ground Force Deployment Readiness in the Group-based Force Structure

RECONSTITUTIONRECONSTITUTION

PHASEPHASE

(2)(2)AIRBORNE-AIRBORNE-AIR ASSLTAIR ASSLTGROUPSGROUPS

(1) LIGHT(1) LIGHTRECON-RECON-STRIKESTRIKEGROUPGROUP

(4) COMBAT(4) COMBATMANEUVERMANEUVER

GROUPSGROUPS

(1) AVIATION(1) AVIATIONSTRIKESTRIKEGROUPGROUP

DEPLOYMENTDEPLOYMENTPHASEPHASE

CINC CONTROLCINC CONTROL

(2)(2)AIRBORNE-AIRBORNE-AIR ASSLTAIR ASSLTGROUPSGROUPS

(1) LIGHT(1) LIGHTRECON-RECON-STRIKESTRIKEGROUSGROUS

(4) COMBAT(4) COMBATMANEUVERMANEUVER

GROUPSGROUPS

(1) AVIATION(1) AVIATIONSTRIKE GROUPSTRIKE GROUP

CONUS-BASEDCONUS-BASED

CLOSE COMBATECHELON

TRAINING-READINESS

PHASEARMY CONTROLARMY CONTROL

AIRBORNE-AIR ASSLTGROUPS

LIGHTRECON-STRIKEGROUPS

COMBATMANEUVER

GROUPS

(2)AIRBORNE-AIR ASSLTGROUPS

(1) LIGHTRECON-STRIKEGROUP

(4) COMBATMANEUVER

GROUPS

AVIATIONSTRIKEGROUPS

(1) AVIATIONSTRIKE GROUP

ARMY CONTROLARMY CONTROL

SIX MONTHS SIX MONTHS SIX MONTHS

OverseasOverseasPresencePresence

(1)

AIRBORNE-AIR

ASSAULTGROUP

(3)

COMBATMANUEVER

GROUPS

(1)

AVIATIONSTRIKEGROUP

ARMYFORCES IN

ROK,EUROPE &

SWA.

NONE.

ALL LRSGsARE CONUS-

BASED

CONUSCONUS

► To make a difference in the 21st Century, the US Army should field three Light Reconnaissance Strike Groups. Fielding one LRSG is just tinkering on the margins!

► Adopting the Combat Group organizational structure is the first step toward leveraging specialized modules of Army combat power within a training and readiness system that ensures the Army is relevant to Joint Operations across the spectrum of conflict.

► Compression of division and brigade into new echelon to achieve fewer C2 nodes, deep/close/rear functionality and the consolidation of CSS into JTF Support Group structures are critical steps in this broader strategic process.

► Implementing new Joint C4ISR architecture to facilitate the employment of Army Ground Forces within the JTF is vital!