Espionage History of the Submarine Force - Taken from the accounts from -

Blind Mans Bluff By: Sherry Sontag and Christopher Drew

The evil nature of men who would use [submarines] as a means of destruction at the bottom of the sea ~Leonardo Da Vinci

Michael A. Trudeau History of Espionage

HIST 1389 01 Summer 1 | 2012

Prof. Burds

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The history of espionage regarding submarines has had multiple stages and has employed

several broad tactics to arrive at the resilient intelligence gatherer and warfighter that is being

employed by an increasing number of countries. Originally submarines were used as a stealth

warfighter to destroy enemy ships undetected and retreat with out being noticed. Initially

gathering intelligence was a secondary or even tertiary responsibility of submarines deployed

throughout the globe. This changed after World War Two due to the increasing tensions and

culture of doubt between the United States and the Soviet Union. Advances in technology made

submarines the perfect platform to collect Signal Intelligence (SIGINT) and later even greater

advances in technology gave submarines the capability to constantly monitor enemy shipping

and naval activity.

This paper attempts to discuss the concatenation of the use of American Submarines in

the gathering of intelligence by conducting espionage. The primary source for this paper will be

my personal knowledge of the topic and the novel Blind Mans Bluff by Sherry Sontag and

Christopher Drew. I am a former Sonar Technician who served in the U.S. Navy on the USS

Columbus (SSN-762) from 2004 2009. Our discussion will talk about the first attempts to

collect SIGINT by the USS Cochino, will then move to how advances in technology had

provided means for deception using Special Projects submarines, and conclude with how

submarines took a historically backwards path and moved from SIGINT to monitoring enemy

forces movement.

Valiant Beginnings During World War two the primary workhorse of the submarine force was the Gato class

submarine. A 311-foot long, diesel propelled, submarine that could stay submerged for about 48

hours. These subs were primarily used in the Pacific theater to disrupt Japanese merchant

shipping and have been credited to being one of the major contributors to the American victory

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(Potter 331). After the War while most of these submarines were being decommissioned and cut

up for scrap metal, the USS Cochino (SS-345) was stationed in Portsmouth, United Kingdom

testing Nazi technologies that were plundered after the war.

In July 1949 tensions between the Americans and Soviets were escalating and the United

States, as well as other NATO nations whose treaty had been signed a mere 3 months prior -

wanted to monitor Soviet fleet movements and radio transmissions. Because soviet short-range

radio transmissions were outside the scope of United States and NATO listening stations the

need arose to place a covert listening post close to Soviet territory. Placing a regular warship off

the coast of Russian territory would cause the Soviets to limit their radio chatter, let alone

broadcast secret material. And sending clandestine services in to the Soviet Union to record

radio traffic would be time consuming and ran the risk of capture. How could the allies get close

enough intercept radio transmissions without being noticed? The submarines natural stealth

provided the ideal platform to get close to a shoreline and conduct missions that the NATO

alliance needed. However, there were no submarines equipped with the collection capabilities

necessary to carry out these vital missions.

Cochino had been outfitted with a new snorkel system that had been devised by the

Germans during the war, to keep the ship submerged longer than other submarines in her class.

This made her ideal to test the new strategy for gathering SIGINT, however, she still needed a

few upgrades. Under orders from the Chief of Naval Operations a young radioman and linguist

by the name of Harris M. Austin was to make the necessary modifications to the Cochino which

involved mounting Antenna to he sail (conning tower) and drilling holes thru her pressure hull.

Needles to say the Captain of the ship, Cmd. Rafael C. Benitez, was not keen on poking holes in

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the steel plating that protected Cochinos crew from the pressures of the ocean. But as the Navy

ordered, the work was completed.

The strategy was to sail passed the Arctic Circle and sit on station1 off the coast of

Murmansk (Map 1) with hopes to intercept radio chatter coming from the soviets. Cochino

would do this by periodically sticking her sail just above the water line long enough so that the

new listening devices could be used to tune into to soviet broadcasts and hopefully intercept

pertinent intelligence. Murmansk was home of the Soviet Northern fleet at Severomorsk Naval

Base and had been the headquarters for Submarines and Icebreakers in the region. This made it a

valuable target for the Americans to eavesdrop and gain some vital intelligence.

In particular it was believed that the Soviets were testing a new long-range rocket that

had the potential to reach cities in Western Europe. Part of the new listening equipment that was

onboard the Cochino could detect Soviet missile telemetry in the eventuality of a launch.

However, on this mission, being the first of its kind, the Cochino was not so lucky. Later

missions would be able to detect missile launches and even evidence of nuclear blasts within the

Soviet Union, but on this endeavor the Cochino suffered a battery fire and was sunk off the coast

of Norway. The fate of the Cochino was indicative of the risk that submariners take to gather

intelligence vital to national security. While the Cochino was not able to collect that key piece of

data that gave the NATO alliance the edge over the soviets, the potential for collecting multiple

pieces of information to contribute to the overall picture was there and the decision was made to

make intelligence gathering a primary function of submarines.

Better Technology The major drawback to this scheme was the longevity of how long these submarines

could stay on station undetected. Until this point submarines while submerged ran on electrical

1 On Station is lingo for an area where submarines lurk to gather intelligence

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battery that had to be recharged every two days by a diesel engine. And to do so, required a

submarine to leave station as to not be detected by soviet Sonarmen listening passively on

patrolling destroyers. After all, sound travels thru water on average four times faster, and

therefore it sounds four times as crisp, than in air. A submarine running its diesel engines to

recharge its battery while on station would be a clear indictor of their presence and all

intelligence-gathering activities would cease.

The Americans needed a way to be able to stay on station longer and solutions were not

all that apparent. An obvious solution for the submarine force would be just to build a bigger

submarine with a larger battery-well to store more energy and therefore stay on station longer.

However, in light of the Cochino incident and given the high propensity for batterys to catch

fire, this seemed like it was not a feasible option. How could the Navy solve this problem?

Rear Admiral Hyman Rickover was known as a micromanager and a stalwart to the

maximum degree. He demanded excellence wherever he went and if he did not get it he would

replace or fix the deficiency, even if it meant going to congress over his chain of command to get

it. He was imaginative and expected perfection from those underneath him - a real genius - and

he thought he had a solution for the Submarine forces longevity problem. With the completion

of the Manhattan Project the power of the atom had been unlocked and it was now possible for

an engine to produce steam without the need of air like a diesel engine needs. Rickover

theorized that a submarine with a nuclear reactor could stay submerged indefinitely, have enough

power to filter and produce its own air, and only surface to resupply the food stores. This

solution was just what the Navy was looking for and approved funding for Rickover to develop

and construct the Nautilus.

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Rickover immediately began his work and assembled the best and the brightest he could

find in order to engineer one of the most technical machines ever built by man. Rickovers

indomitable will made the selection process for these naval officers somewhat of a legend. He

was known for making people wait for him in his lobby for hours or even days to test their will,

and when they got into the interview he would ask pick a topic, any topic, and teach me about

it. The interviewee would quickly find out that even though he had chosen the topic, he had no

real knowledge of it compared to the genius Rickover who would humiliate the interviewee

and banish them to Siberia (a broom closet) for a number of hours. Once Rickover selected an

interviewee, he was part o