Es And Empowerment Elmes Strong Volkoff

INFORMATION

Information and Organization 15 (2005) 1–37

www.elsevier.com/locate/infoandorg

ANDORGANIZATION

Panoptic empowerment and reflective conformityin enterprise systems-enabled organizations

Michael B. Elmes *, Diane M. Strong, Olga Volkoff

Department of Management, Worcester Polytechnic Institute, Worcester, MA 01609, US

Received 18 August 2003; received in revised form 22 August 2004; accepted 9 December 2004

Abstract

In this study of enterprise system (ES) use at a global manufacturing organization, we have

taken an interpretive perspective and used a Glaserian grounded theory methodology to

explore the ES-enabled changes in organizational control that emerged after system implemen-

tation. From our field data we identified two seemingly contradictory theoretical concepts:

panoptic empowerment and reflective conformity. Panoptic empowerment refers to the greater

visibility of information provided by the common shared database of an ES that empowers

workers to do their work more efficiently and effectively, but which also makes them more vis-

ible to others throughout the organization who can then more easily exercise process and out-

come control. Reflective conformity describes how the integrated nature of the ES with its

embedded rules and procedures for organizational processes leads to greater employee disci-

pline while simultaneously requiring them to be highly reflective as well in order to achieve

organizational benefits from the ES. These concepts embody an understanding of organiza-

tional control that is rooted in a Foucauldian view of disciplinary power rather than a tradi-

tional perspective of mechanistic bureaucracy.

� 2004 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Keywords: ERP systems; Enterprise systems; Control; Empowerment; Panopticon; Discipline

1471-7721/$ - see front matter � 2004 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

doi:10.1016/j.infoandorg.2004.12.001

* Corresponding author.

E-mail addresses: [email protected] (M.B. Elmes), [email protected] (D.M. Strong), ovolkoff@

wpi.edu (O. Volkoff).

mailto:[email protected]

mailto:[email protected]

mailto:ovolkoff@

2 M.B. Elmes et al. / Information and Organization 15 (2005) 1–37

1. Introduction

Enterprise systems (ES�s) have become increasingly popular over the last 15 years.

Produced by companies such as SAP, Oracle, and PeopleSoft, enterprise systems are

commercial software applications that support and integrate organizational pro-cesses across functional boundaries. They are designed to replace disparate, local leg-

acy systems and to support a full range of business functions from finance and

accounting, inventory management, and sales order processing to HR and payroll,

warehouse management and production planning. The salient and identifying char-

acteristic of ES is their ability to integrate these business processes by standardizing

data, storing them in a common, shared database, and ensuring that these data are

accessible to whoever needs them on a real time basis (Davenport, 1998; Klaus,

Rosemann, & Gable, 2000; Shanks & Seddon, 2000).Known also as enterprise resource planning systems (ERP), ES�s have evolved

from their roots as transactional systems supporting back office functions such as

inventory management and sales order processing, to enterprise-wide systems that

encompass a broad range of organizational and inter-organizational functions from

customer service to supply chain optimization (Davenport, 2000). By 2002, 67% of

all companies and 74% of manufacturing companies were using or implementing

some form of ES, and 15% of the remainder were intending to do the same (Scott

& Shepherd, 2002). This pervasiveness, coupled with the integrated and organiza-tion-wide and even inter-organizational reach of such systems, as compared to the

localized domain of their predecessors, heightens the need for understanding the

organizational implications associated with using them.

Organizations purchase enterprise systems for a variety of reasons, both technical

and organizational. Expected benefits include improved efficiency, reduced costs,

better decision making, increased customer responsiveness, better performance con-

trol, and increased data visibility (Besson & Rowe, 2001; Markus, Axline, Petrie, &

Tanis, 2000; Ross & Vitale, 2000; Shang & Seddon, 2000). At the heart of many ofthe intended organizational impacts lies a desire to create rationalized and efficient

processes with predictable outcomes.

Increased rationality lies at the heart of the traditional bureaucratic hierarchy

(Blau & Meyer, 1971; Weber, 1947), and in many ways ESs are structured to sup-

port bureaucratic control. For example, the software promotes organizational dis-

cipline both through constraining users to follow prescribed processes and by

limiting access to transactions to specific organizational roles. This mirrors bureau-

cratic features such as the application of consistent rules to operations and a clear-cut division of labor with specialized experts in each position. At the same time an

ES provides visibility of data, which goes beyond the characteristics of a hierarchi-

cal bureaucracy, but which is the cornerstone of Foucault�s (1977) views on disci-

plinary power and control. Foucault suggests that because employees know that

their actions are more visible to others, they will engage in greater self-discipline

and act in ways that are aligned with a rationalized system. One objective of this

paper is to discover how enterprise systems are used in the exercise of management

control.

M.B. Elmes et al. / Information and Organization 15 (2005) 1–37 3

The rhetoric around enterprise systems is not, however, limited to the enhance-

ment of organizational control and discipline. Somewhat paradoxically, organiza-

tions purchasing such systems also expect that the increased visibility of data will

empower employees, enabling them to be more responsive to customers (Ross & Vi-

tale, 2000) and each other, and increase their autonomy, morale, and satisfaction(Shang & Seddon, 2000). The prospect of increasing empowerment through ES

seems unlikely, however, if an ES increases both bureaucratic and disciplinary (Fou-

cauldian) control. A second objective of this paper is to explore this apparent

contradiction.

Our three-year grounded theory study of the organizational consequences expe-

rienced during and after an ES implementation allowed us to explore the extent to

which these broad and potentially contradictory expectations of ES purchasers

and/or the claims of vendors are realizable. As our theoretical understanding ofthe control mechanisms that are employed in an ES-supported organization

emerged from the data, we compared them to traditional views on management

control. We found that while new mechanistic and rationalizing mechanisms are

enabled by an ES, consistent with the tenets of an ideal bureaucracy, its integrated

nature interferes with the realization of completely rationalized efficiency. In addi-

tion, workers are indeed empowered, but in a way that is strongly constrained. In

particular, the ‘‘gaze’’ enabled by an ES has significant differences from what Fou-

cault (1977) described, leading to a complex web of power/empowerment. Further-more, the integrated nature of an ES requires increased reflection on tasks, even

though organizational procedures that are embedded in software routines require

greater conformity and discipline. Below we consider these seeming contradictions

by first examining the literature on control, empowerment, Foucault, and enter-

prise systems.

2. Background literature

2.1. Control in a rationalized organization

Methods of organizational control are essential for influencing whether and how

managers and workers engage in instrumental rational action to achieve institutional

objectives. In the literature on organizational control, one standard definition is ‘‘at-

tempts by the organization to increase the probability that individuals will behave in

ways that will lead to the attainment of organizational objectives’’ (Flamholtz, Das,& Tsui, 1985). This definition assumes that organizations have objectives, and that

individuals working in organizations are purposeful and goal seeking, but that their

goals may differ from the ideal state. Thus, from a managerial control perspective,

controls are needed to engage workers in instrumental rational action that is aligned

with the firm�s objectives.The origins of current approaches to organizational control lie in Weber�s

(1947) delineation of the core elements of an ideal bureaucracy (Beniger, 1986;

Child, 1972). The defining features Weber identified include the division of labor


into fixed and official jurisdictional areas, office holding as a vocation based on

specialized training, a hierarchy of offices with both accountability to superiors

and authority to give commands to subordinates on matters within the jurisdiction

of the office, and the impersonal and objective application of a consistent system

of abstract rules. Combined, these characteristics enable organizations to conductbusiness according to calculable rules and to decrease the importance of individual

action.

These characteristics of bureaucracy enable the exercise of process (also called

behavioral) control. Process control uses devices such as operating manuals, standard

operating procedures and reporting structures to specify and monitor acceptable

behaviors directly. The purpose of process control is to control the behaviors of

employees as they work by overseeing how tasks are executed and more generally,

to structure the process of transforming inputs into outputs (Snell, 1992).While process controls are relatively effective in mechanistic organizations operat-

ing in stable environments (Burns & Stalker, 1961), attempts to define rules and pro-

cedures becomes more difficult as task uncertainty increases. In an unstable

environment it is more efficient to allow workers greater discretion (Galbraith,

1973). To maintain alignment with organizational goals, two alternatives to process

control are available. Outcome controls focus on performance outcomes and finan-

cial measures. The central attribute of outcome controls is that at the end of either

a set period of time or a specific set of activities, a measurable objective is supposedto be attained; control is exercised by comparing actual to expected performance

(Eisenhardt, 1985; Ouchi & Maguire, 1975; Snell, 1992).

Informal/internal controls use various forms of socialization to promote the inter-

nalization of values, beliefs, and behavioral scripts that align employee objectives

and behaviors with the objectives of the organization. Informal/internal controls

mentioned in the literature include clan controls (Ouchi, 1979) and self-control or

self-management (Manz & Sims, 1980; Mills, 1983). Clan controls (Ouchi, 1979) in-

clude socialization processes designed to ensure that the right individuals are selectedand properly socialized into the values, beliefs and goals of the firm; they ‘‘appeal to

the shared values and the sense of belonging to align workplace behaviors’’ with

organizational objectives (Tang, Sia, Soh, & Boh, 2000, p. 504). Clan control as-

sumes that with sufficient socialization, individuals will act in the best interests of

the organization without explicit outcome or process controls. Self-control, also

called self-management or self-regulation, is defined as ‘‘the extent to which an indi-

vidual exercises freedom or autonomy to determine both what actions are required

and how to execute these activities’’ (Henderson & Lee, 1992; Manz & Sims, 1980;Mills, 1983).

Studies of the conditions under which each form of control is most effective have

generally confirmed Ouchi�s framework (1977, 1979). Specifically, use of controls de-

pends on (1) whether performance objectives are well-defined and measurable (if so,

outcome controls are effective) and (2) whether behaviors are observable and the

relationship between behaviors and process outcomes are well-understood (if so,

process controls are effective) (Snell, 1992). If neither, then organizations may use

some form of informal or internal controls. While outcome and process control


are considered to be better forms of control because they can be well-designed formal

systems of control consistent with rational objectives and thinking, organizations sel-

dom rely on only one mode of control; they use all together or some combination to

achieve organizational effectiveness (Ouchi, 1979). Informal controls are typically

part of an organization�s portfolio of control methods (Kirsch, 1997). Orlikowski(1991) notes that training and socialization served to support the formal process con-

trols embedded in CASE tools.

The three modes of organizational control described above - outcome, process,

and informal/internal – are not the only way to conceptualize control. For example,

Henderson and Lee�s (1992) study of IT development teams includes team control

and Orlikowski�s (1991) study of CASE tools defines control in terms of whether

the mechanisms through which control is exercised are external or internal to the

organization. In our study we use traditional modes and definitions of control sothat we can distinguish how ES enable and inhibit control of outcomes, control of

processes, and the exercise of clan control and self-control.

2.2. Empowerment in a rationalized organization

Empowerment has been defined as ‘‘power sharing, the delegation of power or

authority to subordinates in the organization’’ (Daft, 2002, p. 411) and the ‘‘use of

voice to provide active participation and commitment to organizational members’’(Putnam, Phillips, & Chapman, 1996). Conger and Kanungo (1988) have conceptual-

ized empowerment as both a relational construct based on superior-subordinate

authority sharing and a motivational construct that satisfies an individual�s desire

for self-determination and self-efficacy. By giving subordinates greater information

and authority to address organizational issues quickly and autonomously, efforts to

empower workers have been framed as an antidote to the adverse effects – e.g., over-

specialization, lack of motivation, competition among functional groups, customer

dissatisfaction – of highly rationalized systems and structures inmodern bureaucracies(Bandura, 1986; Nielson, 1986).

In this paper, we define empowerment as any increase in worker power (through,

for example, increased formal authority or greater access to more useful informa-

tion) that enables workers (and, collectively, the organization) to achieve institu-

tional objectives with greater efficiency and effectiveness. By greater efficiency we

mean with reduced costs and in less time. By greater effectiveness we mean with bet-

ter quality and higher levels of customer satisfaction. By redistributing power in

ways that enable workers to achieve institutional objectives more efficiently andeffectively, empowerment serves to rationalize work processes but in a way that is

different from Weber�s ideal bureaucracy. Unlike various forms of control that serve

to rationalize through, for example, the measurement of outcomes, the monitoring

of processes, or socialization into a particular set of values, empowerment rational-

izes the system by both removing or minimizing organizational barriers and giving

workers the means (e.g., information, power, authority) by which they can achieve

institutional objectives more efficiently and effectively.


2.3. Foucauldian views of the panopticon and disciplinary power

The literature on understanding IT effects in organizations and on workers has

cited two concepts from Foucault: (1) panopticism (e.g., Sayer & Harvey, 1998;

Sia, Neo, & Tan, 2003; Zuboff, 1988) and (2) disciplinary power (e.g., Orlikowski,1991; Robey & Boudreau, 1999). These concepts are key for understanding the ways

in which an ES enables organizational changes beyond those that strengthen existing

forms of managerial control.

Panopticism is based on Bentham�s panopticon, an architectural structure with a

central tower for observation and cells around the central tower for individual pris-

oners (Foucault, 1977). It involves ‘‘the gaze’’, continuous surveillance that is hier-

archical (the observers can observe the prisoners and can themselves be observed

by their superiors) and one-way (the prisoners cannot see the observer, cannot seeeach other, and cannot know whether they are being observed). A key point of

the panopticon structure is that the gaze need not actually be continuous – prisoners

begin to act as if they are being observed because they cannot tell when or whether

they are being observed. While the panopticon was proposed as an ideal structure for

observing prison inmates and thus exercising control over their behaviors, Foucault

discussed it and other arrangements of space to explain the same phenomenon – the

gaze – in schools, in hospitals, in the military, and in the workplace (Foucault, 1977,

pp. 141–149).Disciplinary power increases as a result of the gaze. As individuals become accus-

tomed to the gaze, i.e., as they are continuously observed by parents, teachers, super-

visors, military commanders and police, they learn to exercise self-discipline, i.e., to

act as though they are under the gaze even when they may not be. As Foucault

(1977) noted, once there is some form of panoptic observation, there is no need to

observe continuously because disciplinary self-control will be exercised.

By applying the panopticon concept to IT, Zuboff (1988) proposed the concept of

an ‘‘information panopticon’’ in which IT rather than a physical structure providedthe gaze. More recently, Sia et al. (2003) suggested that the panopticon lens, still only

infrequently employed in studying IT-enabled control and empowerment in organi-

zations, would produce a better understanding of current contradictory results on

the impact of ES implementation in organizations. Enterprise systems with their

integrated common database provide a much better approximation to the ideal

information panopticon than the earlier technologies from which the concept was

developed. An ES employs a gaze because it records all user actions, which can be

observed in real-time and also stored for later observation. Thus, with no extra effortES surveillance is essentially continuous.

In addition to the panopticon and disciplinary power from the gaze, Foucault�sconcepts about power and their relationship to individual actions, governance,

knowledge, and truth are helpful in understanding the emerging control and empow-

erment effects of ES in organizations. First, power is a relational concept that ‘‘exists

only when it is put into action’’; ‘‘the exercise of power . . . is a way in which certain

actions modify others’’ (Foucault, 1983, p. 219). Power can only be exercised over

free subjects. If subjects do not have the freedom to choose actions, then by defini-


tion there can be no exercise of power to influence those actions (Foucault, 1983).

Power is exercised, that is power relations come into being, through many means

including complex controls and systems of surveillance (Foucault, 1983). Thus,

power is not a thing possessed by individuals, groups, or organizations, but actions

taken at the local level governed by local rules that can affect the actions of others.As such, the traditional concept of empowerment as the delegation of power, i.e.,

authority and resources such as information, from managers to workers is problem-

atic since power is not a thing that can be transferred between individuals (Hardy &

Leiba-O�Sullivan, 1998).Second, the concept of power as actions that affect others� actions is related to the

concept of governance, which Foucault defines as structuring the possible actions of

others (Foucault, 1983). ‘‘The exercise of power consists of guiding the possibility of

conduct and putting in order the possible outcome’’ (Foucault, 1983, p. 221), whichhas similarities to conventional process and outcome controls exercised by managers.

But Foucault�s analysis is at the level of society, rather than an organization. From

his historical analysis, he sees that power in society has moved from a sovereign king

as the source of power to power embedded in the operation of the state, which ap-

plies to everyone, even those with authority over others. Power is exercised through

surveillance, that is, the gaze, such that each individual exercises surveillance and dis-

ciplinary power over themselves (Foucault, 1980a). This connection to governance

helps us understand how the nature of organizational control changes in the presenceof the continuous gaze of an ES.

Third, there is a close relationship between knowledge and power. The knowledge

that they are being observed is what generates disciplinary power in individuals in

the form of self-discipline. In addition, the knowledge gained from surveillance gives

observers power over the observed. Thus, knowledge and power are intertwined as

knowledge produces power and power produces knowledge (Foucault, 1980b).

Knowledge as a source of power is important for understanding how employees

are empowered through their use of an ES.Finally, truth and power are related through ‘‘regimes of truth’’, which are the

rules negotiated at local levels according to which truth and falsehood are distin-

guished and power becomes associated with truth (Foucault, 1980b). Each society

has its regime of truth, e.g., centered on the scientific production of knowledge

and truth, which determines the types of discourse that are accepted as truth (Fou-

cault, 1980b). At an organizational level, the installation of an ES may change the

organization�s ‘‘regime of truth’’, for example by privileging discipline and control

over clever and creative responses to problems.

2.4. Enterprise systems

Early research on ES focused on this new IT artifact itself and how it differed

from the legacy systems it was replacing (Klaus et al., 2000). This led to an under-

standing of why organizations adopted ES, finding that organizations are motivated

to purchase such systems because, among other benefits, they expect enhanced infor-

mation capture, increased transparency and better information flow (Bernroider &


Koch, 1999; Besson & Rowe, 2001; Markus & Tanis, 2000; Newell, Huang, Galliers,

& Pan, 2003; Ross & Vitale, 2000).

As ES implementation challenges became apparent, a significant portion of ES re-

search turned to investigating the factors contributing to successful implementation

(e.g., Akkermans & van Helden, 2002; Brown & Vessey, 2003; Holland & Light,1999; Hong & Kim, 2002; Scott & Vessey, 2002) because, without successful imple-

mentation, organizations incurred enormous costs while failing to achieve the ex-

pected benefits. These studies typically examined findings from conducting case

studies of successful and unsuccessful implementations. While some critical success

factors are typical of any large-scale IT implementation, e.g., top management sup-

port, others arise from the integrated nature of an ES. For example, research studies

found that impediments (Pan, Newell, Huang, & Cheung, 2001) and tensions (Strong

& Volkoff, 2004) arose as groups within organizations attempted to agree upon thecommon processes and data elements that form an integrated system. As these

groups negotiated these commonalities, some were able to exert more power and

control over their future than others (Scott & Wagner, 2003).

As various ES implementation process issues emerged in these cases studies, re-

search began to focus more explicitly on specific problematic issues and on under-

standing the implementation process over time. One such emerging issue is the

difficulty of organizational learning and knowledge transfer as employees attempted

to learn and use an ES effectively in their organizations (Lee & Lee, 2000; Robey,Ross, & Boudreau, 2002; Volkoff, Elmes, & Strong, forthcoming).

Other studies have explored the implementation process itself. For example, in a

case study involving several implementation phases in one organization, Luo and

Strong (2004) explored the pattern of differences in the focus on re-engineering busi-

ness processes as compared to changing the ES to match existing processes among

these implementations. Using an interpretive case study, Scott and Wagner (2003)

explored the process of negotiating change over time by examining connections

among which work practices are abandoned, which are transported over time, andwhich are created. They took a theoretical approach and used Actor-Network theory

to understand the achievement of order resulting from negotiations over time about

the future of work using an ES. Several studies examine the various phases through

which an ES implementation proceeds and identify the problems encountered and

risks faced in different environments and phases (Krumbholz, Galliers, Coulianos,

& Maiden, 2000; Markus & Tanis, 2000; Soh, Sia, & Tay-Yap, 2000; Sumner, 2000).

While current research continues to investigate the problems, contradictions, ten-

sions, and risks that emerge during the ES implementation process, studies are start-ing to explore the outcomes of ES implementation, that is, ES-enabled

organizational changes, both intended and unintended, that are emerging in organi-

zations. Studies of ES-enabled organizational change, like the study described in this

paper, build on the foundation of existing ES research that has uncovered and stud-

ied various problems and contradictions during implementation and investigated the

need for negotiations as organizations attempt to resolve contradictions and tensions

that are inherently not resolvable (Pan et al., 2001; Scott & Wagner, 2003; Strong &

Volkoff, 2004).


Our study focuses on emerging changes in control and empowerment in organiza-

tions as enabled by an ES. Before describing our study, we review the few papers that

examine ES consequences related to control and empowerment.

2.5. Studies of ES, control, and empowerment

Fundamental changes in organizations may arise from the opportunity for in-

creased managerial control through the improved visibility of operations and ac-

cess to information afforded by an ES implementation. While ES implementation

studies noticed this potential, focused investigation of such changes has drawn lit-

tle research attention with a few notable exceptions (Hanseth, Ciborra, & Braa,

2001; Sia, Tang, Soh, & Boh, 2002; Tang et al., 2000). Sia et al. (2002) examined

the potential for both increased panoptic control and employee empowermentthrough ES implementation at a hospital in Singapore. They defined panoptic

control as ‘‘the heightened workplace visibility through embedded system access

or workflow dependencies’’ (Tang et al., 2000, p. 503). In theory, according to

the authors, the underlying ES characteristics can enable increases in both panop-

tic control and empowerment. ES can enhance control because of their ability to

track workplace behavior and make it easier for managers and peers to observe

worker activities. They can empower workers by making information more visible,

obviating the need to seek information from others, and potentially enablingworkers to be better informed to make decisions at local levels. Sia et al.

(2002), however, found greater evidence for increases in panoptic control than

empowerment, which they attributed less to the technology itself than to institu-

tional and organizational conservatism, a desire to do things the ‘‘old way’’,

and paternalistic cultural values.

By contrast, in their study of SAP implementation at the European fertilizer divi-

sion (HAE) of Norsk Hydro, Hanseth et al. (2001) found that despite the standard-

ization, streamlining, and integration of business processes inherent in the ES, whichshould have made it an ideal control technology, the actual result was a loss of con-

trol. In attempting to establish common work practices across various divisions (and

thus making it easier to monitor and control the processes from head office), various

irreconcilable local differences required that the ‘‘universal’’ solution evolve into spe-

cific site ‘‘variants.’’ In addition, users extracted data from the ES and put it into lo-

cally created ‘‘extension’’ applications using Lotus notes or spreadsheet software,

not visible to headquarters. Borrowing a term from Giddens (1999), the authors

characterized an ES as a manifestation of the ‘‘juggernaut’’ of the modern world –‘‘a runaway engine of enormous power, that, collectively as human beings, we can

drive to some extent but that also threatens to rush out of our control in directions

we cannot foresee’’ (Hanseth et al., 2001, p. 46).

These two studies are inconclusive but do suggest that the implementation of an

ES is likely to impact organizational control systems in significant, and often contra-

dictory, ways. They support our interest in investigating further the sometimes con-

tradictory changes in organizational control we observed at our field site.


3. Research setting

The research reported in this paper presents findings from a three-year case study

at a global organization (ACRO) undergoing a multi-year, multi-phased ES imple-

mentation. ACRO is a global leader in the design, assembly, and post-sales serviceof certain high-precision industrial products. While ACRO�s corporate headquar-

ters, engineering design, and assembly operations are concentrated along the entire

East Coast of the United States, component production and after-sales service plants

are scattered throughout North America, Europe and Asia. With 20,000 employees

and world-wide distributed operations, coordination and control issues are a major

concern of ACRO�s top management. In order to address these issues, in 1998

ACRO embarked on a multi-phase, multi-year plan to implement ES software from

SAP, configured as a single instance, throughout the company.The first two phases consisted of relatively small, localized projects, and helped

the company gain experience with both the software and the implementation pro-

cess. We started our observations in 2000, shortly before Phase 3 go-live. This phase

focused on component production and assembly operations, and entailed imple-

menting a full set of SAP modules including Finance, Production Planning, Sales Or-

der Management and Materials Management. Before Phase 3 ended, the company

started work on Phase 4, which focused on extending the functionality to support

the maintenance and repair operations. In Phase 5, the last of the phases that we ob-served, the system was implemented in the engineering design units and introduced

functionality to monitor progress of the company�s multi-year research and develop-

ment projects by measuring earned value. The advantage of starting our observa-

tions when we did is that the company had learned a great deal about ES

implementation during the earlier phases, so the issues being encountered pertained

more to the organizational impacts of the system than to the implementation process

itself.

We collected data at five different locations. Corporate headquarters is situated ata large industrial site that houses the main R&D facility, as well as some production

and warehouse operations. A second location has the main production and assembly

plant and product test facilities. We also visited two different after-market service

locations, and the separate site that housed the large (more than 200 people) ES

implementation team.

4. Research methodology

Data collection and analysis employed grounded theory methods (Glaser &

Strauss, 1967). The choice of methodology was based on the research problem:

our objective was to discover the organizational impacts associated with the imple-

mentation of an ES, and to understand how these organizational changes arise. We

needed to employ a methodology that could uncover rich information, and that did

not limit us to looking for impacts suggested by theory. A case-based methodology is

recommended for exploratory research that tries to understand how a process un-


folds (Yin, 1994). Grounded theory specifically rejects a priori theorizing and allows

for discovery of descriptive and explanatory theories that arise directly from empir-

ical observations (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). To the extent that Glaser and Strauss di-

verged in their approach to grounded theory methodology after the publication of

their original book, we have taken a Glaserian approach. 1

We take the position that IT-enabled organizational change is an emergent and

dialectical process that evolves from the sequence of social interactions that occur

over the course of system implementation and use. This perspective demands that

we collect data from multiple sources (Klein & Myers, 1999). Epistemologically,

our approach is interpretive rather than either positivist or critical (Howcroft &

Truex, 2001; Klein & Myers, 1999).

4.1. Data collection

For each of the three implementation phases studied we collected data through

observations, interviews and informal conversations. We made 155 trips (approxi-

mately one trip per week over three years) and conducted 71 formal interviews (some

of which were group interviews) with 60 different people. In addition to these formal

interviews we attended meetings, observed testing and training sessions, sat in the

‘‘war rooms’’ during go-live, shadowed people as they solved implementation prob-

lems, and collected documents, such as training material and handouts at meetings.We also conducted informal interviews during our visits, engaging in casual conver-

sation in the war rooms, before and after meetings, and during testing and training

sessions. In addition we had the opportunity to listen in on group conversations,

both casual and formal.

With a few exceptions, formal interviews were taped and transcribed. The

remaining data were captured in field notes taken on site and written up after each

visit. Data collection for each phase started before go-live, and continued through

the early days of use, to a period of stable use, more than a year after go-live. Thepurpose of longitudinal data collection was to ensure that we understood the start-

ing point so we could better gauge what had changed once the ES was imple-

mented. It was also valuable for developing good personal relations with our

informants.

At the start of each phase we identified 6–8 key informants through our corporate

contacts. We looked for people who were users, but who were actively involved in

the implementation. In addition to conducting formal interviews with the informants

1 The main difference between the Glaserian and Straussian approaches lies not in the underlying

motivation and core analytic procedures, but in the relationship between the researcher and the

phenomena under study (Locke, 1996; Locke, 2001). In particular, Strauss and his coauthors suggest

structured interrogation of the data through a sequence of different types of coding and a specific set of

questions. Glaser, on the other hand, prefers to take a more passive approach, where the researcher does

not initiate the questions, but rather responds to the data. While some have suggested that this assumption

of neutrality is inherently positivistic, we do not assume a single reality, but attempt to let the different

voices in our data speak for themselves.


at several different times over the course of the implementation, we shadowed them

as they worked and spoke informally with them often. In most cases our key infor-

mants were power users (individuals who were selected to help test the system before

go-live, become familiar with its operation, and train other users), since they were the

only users involved from before go-live to full operation. They represented all theareas that were going to be affected by the new software, and those chosen generally

had significant experience with the organization, often in a variety of positions. Most

had been with the company for more than a decade and many for much longer than

that. These people were ideal as key informants, not only because of their knowledge

of the company, the software, what it could do, and how to use it, but also because

they were primarily users, with a ‘‘business’’ rather than an ‘‘IT’’ perspective. Their

involvement in testing and training over protracted periods of time allowed them to

reflect on how the new system fit with the organizational processes.We were never ‘‘participants’’ in the implementation, but over the course of our

three-year association developed close relationships with the key informants. Obser-

vations were made by shadowing them over the course of a visit as they attended

meetings, worked at their desks or in the war room (during go-live), and conducted

testing or training. During a testing session, for example, we would sit behind them

as they worked through a test script. Often they encountered problems that needed

to be resolved by the ES team before they could move forward, and as they waited,

they were happy to chat with us. In many cases they seemed to appreciate havingsomeone external to the operation who would listen sympathetically to their con-

cerns and to whom they could freely express their frustrations and satisfactions with

the system and the implementation process.

They also introduced us to other users whom we then interviewed. In addition,

during the downtime before and after meetings or training sessions there were many

opportunities to engage in conversation, not just with the key informants, but with

the other attendees, who became accustomed to our presence. By shadowing the key

informants, we came in contact with many members of the organization, and thisassociation provided us with credibility, so that other users spoke freely in front

of us.

In addition to the multiple interviews and regular conversations with the 21 key

informants, we formally interviewed 39 other users, ranging from managers to shop

floor employees, and spoke casually with many others, including members of the ES

implementation team. Table 1 gives a breakdown of the interviewees by phase, role,

and location. While all of the authors participated in data collection, either singly or

in pairs, one of the authors took primary responsibility for Phase 3 and the manu-facturing plants, and another took primary responsibility for Phase 4 and the repair

and maintenance operation. During Phase 5, one author took responsibility for the

subproject devoted to measuring earned value while all three authors spent time fol-

lowing the implementation in the R&D operations.

Initial interviews, lasting anywhere from 30 to 60 min, employed an interview pro-

tocol that addressed some broad themes using open ended questions (see Appendix

A for our initial interview protocol). These themes, suggested by our initial research

objectives, included existing job processes and responsibilities (focusing on current

Table 1

Distribution of interviews across phases, locations and roles

# of times each person was interviewed

Phase 3

Location 1

6 key informants 1 manager 2 times

3 power users 3 people · 2 times

2 users 2 · 2

6 non-key informants 1 manager 1

5 users 5 · 1

Phase 4

Location 1

2 key informants 1 power user 2

1 user 2

4 non-key informants 4 users 4 · 1

Location 2

6 key informants 6 power users 5 · 3, 1 · 1

8 non-key informants 1 manager 2

3 power users 2 · 2, 1 · 1

4 users 2 · 2, 2 · 1

Location 3

10 non-key informants 3 managers 3 · 1

2 power users 2 · 1

5 users 5 · 1

Phase 5

Location 4a

7 key informants 5 power users 1 · 3, 2 · 2, 2 · 1

2 users 1 · 1, 1 · 2

11 non-key informants 9 power users 3 · 2, 6 · 1

2 users 2 · 1

Totals

21 key, 39 non-key 6 managers 8b

29 power users 52b

25 users 31b

a While most of the operations related to Phase 5 occur at Location 4, several of these individuals also

spend time at Location 1, and some of the interviews occurred at Location 5, where the ES team was

located.b Because some of the individuals were interviewed together, there were only 71 separate interviews

conducted to obtain these 91 person-interviews.


task structure, flexibility and communication patterns) and expectations regarding

how the new software would alter these. Our objective during these interviews was

to get base-line information on the pre-ES organization. Subsequent interviews fol-

lowed up on the same themes and the changes that had been encountered, and in-

cluded new questions suggested by information from previous interviews. Field

notes and interviews were transcribed, with coding and analysis occurring through-

out the data collection process.


4.2. Data analysis

The central tasks in a grounded theory approach are to identify descriptive con-

cepts within the data and to uncover the ways these concepts are related to each

other. The primary activities used to accomplish these tasks include coding the data,making constant comparisons of incidents, both to each other and to the emerging

theory, and memoing (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Locke, 2001). Analysis starts early in

the data collection process and evolves as the research progresses.

At first, the data are examined line by line and coded in a way that names each

incident (open coding). At this stage most of the codes are ‘‘substantive’’ and labeled

by words taken from the protagonists� vocabulary (Glaser, 1978). In this study the

first few interviews were coded by all three researchers. We then met to discuss the

codes, to ensure we all used the initial labels to mean the same thing. After that eachinterview was coded by the researcher who conducted it, since being able to recall the

body language used to generate the words on a page helps to keep the interpretation

of the words aligned with the speakers� intentions. As we each added to the initial list

of codes, we shared the labels and their intended meanings with each other. Our final

list includes 53 codes. As open coding progressed, memos were written to propose

potential relationships, and codes were organized into trees.

At the same time as substantive codes are emerging, researchers should look for

theoretical codes that conceptualize how the substantive codes relate to each other.Glaser (1978) indicates that while these codes may have their origin in the disciplin-

ary training of the researcher, they only earn their way into the final analysis if they

fit the data in the same way that the substantive codes do. He asserts that the

grounded theorist needs to ‘‘know many theoretical codes in order to be sensitive

to rendering explicitly the subtleties of the relationships’’ in the data (Glaser,

1978, p. 72). He lists 18 coding families as an aid to researchers, but reminds them

that these families are neither exhaustive nor mutually exclusive, and urges research-

ers to combine coding families and spawn new families in whatever ways make sensein the context of the data. Glaser�s approach is in contrast to that of Strauss, his for-

mer co-author, who advocates a more formal activity of axial coding to follow open

coding. Glaser finds axial coding overly restrictive, with questions emanating from

the researcher rather than the data (Locke, 2001).

In following a Glaserian approach, we combined three coding families, namely his

‘‘Six C�s’’ family (causes, contexts, contingencies, consequences, covariances and

conditions), the ‘‘type’’ family, and the ‘‘degree’’ family. Thus as the core coding cat-

egories of ‘‘visibility’’ and ‘‘discipline’’ started to emerge from the data, we lookedfor the different types of each, the conditions and contexts surrounding each type,

and the consequences. For example, as discussed in our results section, we discovered

that changes in visibility of information might occur along four different dimensions,

namely visibility of information from other functional areas, visibility of information

from other geographic locations, visibility of new forms of historical data, and vis-

ibility of all of this information in real-time. We also looked for the range of out-

comes, such as visibility either increasing or decreasing, and the job contexts in

which the different changes were occurring.


Discovering these relationships and building up the theoretical codes is done

through a process of constant comparison. By comparing data incidents with each

other and noting similarities, the categories become more clearly defined. Differences

help identify the properties of each category, and the conditions under which they

arise. Data incidents also need to be compared to the emerging theoretical codesto ensure that the latter are a good fit.

Theoretical sampling is used to ensure that the full breadth of emerging possibil-

ities is explored and each category is ‘‘saturated’’. Since the purpose of an ES is to

integrate across functional boundaries, we started by deliberately choosing infor-

mants from different functional areas. Since the emerging category ‘‘discipline’’ usu-

ally refers to different levels in an organizational hierarchy, we interviewed managers,

salaried and hourly paid workers. To uncover the effects of different contexts, we

looked at the differences between an assembly plant, the after-service facilities, andthe research and development organization and between two after-service facilities

(one of which was considered a more successful implementation than the other).

Once the categories ‘‘visibility’’ and ‘‘discipline’’ emerged, we paid special attention

to the earned value functionality, as it focused specifically on enabling a group of

individuals to monitor R&D project progress.

As substantive and theoretical coding progresses, it moves from ‘‘open’’ coding,

where every line is examined, to ‘‘selective’’ coding, where the researchers focus on

data that illuminates the emerging categories. Thus those parts of the interviewsand field notes that related to our main categories were used to elaborate the emerg-

ing theoretical concepts. We also turned to the literature on management control,

discipline and visibility to see how prior research fit with our findings.

In conducting a grounded theory study, various tensions need to be managed

(Locke, 2001). While total immersion in the data helps to keep the emerging concepts

grounded, it inhibits the ability to keep them in perspective. The researcher must stay

close to the text, but also make abstractions to a higher level of generality. Further-

more, researchers are urged to suspend knowledge of existing concepts and proposi-tions, while at the same time remaining theoretically sensitive so they can

conceptualize their data. The advantage of having three researchers with very differ-

ent backgrounds and raised in different intellectual traditions was that no precon-

ceived ideas could enter the analysis without the scrutiny of a different mindset to

ensure that the inclusion of a theoretical concept had earned its place by fitting with

the data. In addition none of the three of us had a background in managerial control

beyond general knowledge, and it was only after the data led us to our understanding

of visibility and discipline in an ES-supported environment that we turned to un-cover what had been written about these topics in the literature.

4.3. From data to results

Once we had established the core categories of visibility and discipline and satu-

rated our understanding of the various ways in which they were manifested in the

data, we turned to understanding them from a theoretical perspective. What

we learned from the field suggested an examination of the literature on managerial


control, particularly work that discussed control and IT, and the writings of Max

Weber and Michel Foucault on discipline and control in organizations. In a

grounded theory study the literature is not used as the starting point, but one more

source of data and a stimulus of theoretical sensitivity (Glaser, 1978, p. 31). While we

found much in this literature that could be folded into our results, we also uncoveredsome contradictions that required more careful consideration.

From this analysis two theoretical concepts emerged, panoptic empowerment and

reflective conformity, which are critical aspects associated with the introduction of

an ES into an organization. These two concepts capture the contradictions we ob-

served in the organizational changes related to managerial control.

5. Results

Below we present the analysis of our data that led to the two theoretical concepts.

In particular, we highlight the contradictory observations regarding our two core

categories. In Section 5.1, we present data showing that increases in visibility

brought about by the ES simultaneously empowered workers and increased control.

In Section 5.2, we present data on how the integrated nature of the ES increased dis-

cipline and conformity to rules and procedures while at the same time demanding

greater reflection on local, integrated, and future work practices.

5.1. Visibility of information

As we conducted interviews and made observations at ACRO, we saw how the

salient characteristics of an ES, namely its ability to integrate business processes

through a common, shared database, available in real time, increased the visibility

of information. Through increased visibility users experienced various types of

changes in both empowerment and control.

5.1.1. Visibility and empowerment

The ES increased the visibility of cross-functional, global and historical informa-

tion and provided this information in real time. One group of employees experienc-

ing increased visibility to cross-functional information was customer service

representatives.

2 A

proces

times.

We can see a lot of other functional areas that we couldn�t see in our [legacy]database. We have access to certain shipping records and even financial records[such as] invoice records and billing records that [previously] we were not ableto view, [and for which we] had to call on other areas. (Customer servicerepresentative). 2

t the request of the reviewers, we have edited the quotations for clarity, and in particular removed

s-specific jargon. This particular quote combines statements made by the interviewee at two different


Being able to view shipping or other order status information allowed them to re-

spond immediately to customer requests rather than having to call the assembly

plant for status information before getting back to the customer. In addition, view-

ing financial data related to a customer, e.g., invoicing and billing records, allowed

them to answer these types of questions from customers instead of referring them tothe Finance Department, the previous standard practice. With this increased visibil-

ity of information, customer service representatives were empowered both to per-

form tasks without having to go to someone else for additional information and

to be more responsive to the customer, which they viewed as an important part of

their job.

The increased visibility of global information was a benefit to materials planners,

who are responsible for ensuring that the correct parts are available when it is time to

assemble the product.

You can look at all your orders you are working with, you can look at all yourinventories, across [the whole company], not only just here in our area. . ..Whereas before, we didn�t have access to information like that. We had togo to either our spares group, call [one of the plants] or other places, whereat a flick of a button [now] you can grab that information. (Materials planner,plant 1)

With the old legacy system, they had system access only to the local inventory. Toaccess global inventory, they had to call other plants and beg for parts. The ability to

search for parts from the world-wide inventory when there was a critical shortage

made their job much easier. It increased their control over the part shortage process

and their sense that they were empowered to access and use world-wide inventory. It

also provided better part availability to production, which reflected well on the job

performance of the materials planners. With this visibility of global inventory infor-

mation, materials planners also had authority via ES transactions to access and use

this inventory.Access to historical data was similarly empowering, as users could perform more

analysis, allowing them to do better planning.

A lot of people are just ordering one part for every one required. Now we�ll beable to use historical data to plan ahead. . . . It will reduce purchase order costs.(materials planner in a second plant)

The integrated nature of the ES also helped to keep historical information in amore accessible form. While the system was still too new to have collected much his-

torical data at the time of our interviews, users anticipated being able to trace move-

ments of goods and equipment over time.

. . .this is going to improve the process, in that we�ll have more history on ourtools, where they are located, where they�ve been, who they belong to. . . .we�vegot a hodgepodge of tooling out there that [the client] comes back to us andsays ‘‘Hey, where is all of our tooling?’’ We don�t know. . . .At least now withthe system [we will have that information]. (Manufacturing Engineer)


In these quotes, we see visibility of information directly supporting job roles and

empowering employees to perform better at these roles, or even expanding those

roles.

In addition to increasing visibility of data across functions, around the world, and

back in time, the new system provided data in real time. Because outcomes and pro-cess performance were now visible in real time, people were alerted sooner to issues

requiring attention either in their own work, or in the work of their colleagues or

subordinates. An employee who worked in one section of the plant, but who recog-

nized that products had to flow through various processes to get to him, and through

other processes after they left him, noted that SAP relieved time pressures.

SAP has relieved a lot of that [time] pressure, because everything is identifiedimmediately. It�s identified when it�s received, it�s identified when it�s beingready to start, it�s identified when it�s sitting or ready to go to inspection, it�sidentified a lot faster. (Inspector)

The idea that responding to real-time data relieves time pressure may seem incon-

gruous, but shop-floor workers and materials planners previously spent a lot of time

looking for parts and for partially assembled products, e.g., whether they were still

out for repair or waiting in the inspection area, and checking whether something was

ready for the next step. The system provided this status and location information in

real-time alleviating time spent checking on things. Employees could also see partsand products in earlier stages and were more able to anticipate when they needed

to perform their tasks. This visibility was empowering because it provided employees

with more control over their jobs.

As seen in the above analysis, from the viewpoint of individual employees, in-

creased visibility of information has an empowering effect. In the cases of increased

visibility of other functional areas, to global operations, and to historical data, the

consequence was that the users felt more empowered to perform a task, irrespective

of whether it was an explicit part of their job, without having to go to someone elsefor additional information. Overall, increased visibility of information made their

jobs easier and they were more in control of their tasks because they knew what

was happening, and they had to ask others for assistance less often. Thus, increased

visibility of information enabled by the ES increased employee empowerment.

The ES, of course, was not perfect in increasing visibility of information. There

were situations in which visibility decreased, for example, when the complexity of

the ES contributed to difficult and time-consuming searches for information, when

some information previously available in legacy systems was not converted to theES, and when the required common data definitions and editing constraints matched

the needs of some local units better than others.

The decreased visibility of most interest from an empowerment perspective arose

from the abstract representation of concrete physical objects in the system. Like any

information system, an ES ‘‘informates’’ business processes – generates information

about the underlying organizational processes, making them more transparent or

visible – but it does this by representing physical reality in symbolic form (Zuboff,

1988). As Zuboff discusses, abstraction can be challenging at any time by requiring


a new level of intellectual effort. In an ES the difficulty is compounded by the de-

mands of integration. Abstractions that have meaning in one part of the business

may not, in fact, provide useful information in another functional area. At ACRO,

the problematic effects of abstraction were experienced by materials planners and

handlers as they moved from a world of physical parts labeled with colored statustags to a world of bar-coded parts whose status was stored in the system. For exam-

ple, while they thought of repair parts in terms of characteristics such as time in ser-

vice, the system tracked parts as part of a production batch, a repair order, or a

purchase order:

it stocks [items that] are time controlled and serial number controlled. . ...in thewarehouse by a batch number. And it is just an arbitrary number that isassigned to it. (materials planner)

Part of the problem was that in an ES, the artifact, e.g., an item out for repair,

stopped being treated like a physical entity, and was instead represented as a piece

of data. For the materials planners the specific representation chosen, namely a num-

ber associated with a sales or service order, was not particularly useful. Abstracting

the movement of a physical object in this way might be useful to finance or sales, but

materials handler were more interested in looking at information related to specific

parts, regardless of the sales or service order to which they were attached.

At ACRO, to overcome gaps in the information available to them, users started tokeep private spreadsheets of data that were not readily available in a form that suited

their specific needs. Thus, for cases of reduced visibility, employees developed work-

arounds to ensure their ability to do their job efficiently. As such, these employees

took responsibility for remaining empowered to do their job.

5.1.2. Visibility and control

The same ES-provided information that empowered employees also enabled man-

agers to exercise tighter control over employees. By providing visibility in real-timeto all operations, the ES at ACRO served as a near-perfect panopticon for manage-

ment – an excellent mechanism for increasing control. Visibility of global, cross-

functional and real-time information was clearly useful to senior management since

it supported their already legitimate control over the entire firm. This was especially

helpful for establishing better outcome control over production and service facilities

in Europe and Asia.

One of the goals for the ES was to provide more visibility of and control over re-

search and development activities and costs performed under contract to others. Inthe ES, each contract was set up as a project where labor hours, other costs, and per-

cent completion were recorded against the project plan. The rules for tracking con-

tract progress and costs were designed by a new organization at ACRO, the Earned

Value Group, and embedded in the ES. The ES provided increased outcome control

by computing earned value, which compares project completion rates to project

expenditure rates. While the establishment of the earned value group was not

‘‘caused’’ by the ES, it was only through the additional information provided by


the ES that this group and the contract project leads were able to manage and con-

trol the research and development activities and costs.

Outcome control increased at ACRO, both through a reduction in the time

needed before outcomes could be examined – information was now available in real

time – and because the information was visible to a wider group of people, bothpeers and managers. Outcomes were no longer the weekly or monthly reports that

were compiled for management after the fact, but were the daily, hourly or instan-

taneous data that were monitored by a broad audience. For example, finance began

to review outcomes daily. The ES provided the information needed to follow-up on

anything unusual. In addition to daily reports, reports could be run at the comple-

tion of any set of work activities to provide immediate outcome control. For exam-

ple, a cost manager had increased ability to exercise real-time cross-functional

outcome control:

[SAP] has the ability to put in standard labor. . . hours and then you can runreports to see where you are on a daily basis. It�s not the end of the cycle.You can say, ‘‘Okay, this module is finished, so how many hours was it?’’And it�s over your threshold, you can go to the floor very quickly and say‘‘You were 400 times over on your hours. I need to know what happened.’’. . .[I]f you wait at the end of 30 to 60 days, you�re going to go, ‘‘Oh my, I don�tknow what they did.’’

The above instance demonstrates cross-functional control as a manager responsi-

ble for costs can immediately check on outcomes that do not match planned out-

comes. At ACRO people on the floor were aware that others had this visibility,

and discussed it in terms of ensuring data accuracy and proper procedure:

. . ..it�s basically coming down to inventory. You have to have proper inventorylevels. What you say you have you should have and what you don�t have youshouldn�t have. It�s that simple. . . .. We�ve been doing a lot of inventory adjust-ments. Our financial people don�t see those today, because there�s no dollar val-ues on them. They�re not getting feeds from SAP, but come [next go-live],they�re going to. (long-time materials planner)

At the time of this quote, finance was not seeing inventory changes in real-time

because the system was not yet associating costs with every inventory transaction,

but the materials planners knew this was coming in the next phase. When asked what

the financial people were going to see after the next go-live, the materials planner re-

sponded that finance would see every plus and minus inventory adjustment.This enhanced visibility by managers and fellow workers to real-time data about

operations increased disciplined action among workers. For example,

The material is coming in a timely manner now. You can�t have what you call‘‘in transits’’ hanging out there forever. There are reports that are drawn nowthat show exactly what�s in transit over. . .. four days now, and everybody isdriving to clean that stuff up . . . (MRP controller)

When asked who looked at those reports, the user responded:


Everybody. Everybody in materials, from higher management down and itcomes down through [my boss], who would generate that down to me . . .

Such increased information visibility served to conflate process and outcome con-

trol. Interim outcomes – realistically every step of a process and not just final out-

comes – were being monitored. Every step in the process could be controlled in

the same way outcomes had been controlled – by comparing results to a standard

or goal – and this could be done in real-time. Outcome control was no longer exer-

cised periodically, but continuously, and was no longer concerned only with planned

outcomes, but also with the process itself. Thus, we saw the emergence of continuousoutcome control, that is, outcome control that was exercised continuously rather

than periodically and included elements of process control as the result of individual

process steps being controlled as outcomes.

While most of the changes in control observed at ACRO were increases in con-

trol exercised by managers and peers, we did observe two instances of some loss of

control. The first was a side-effect of increased empowerment. For inventory plan-

ners, access to global inventory information was empowering and allowed these

workers to perform their jobs better and to better meet organizational goals. Theynow had authority to use information directly related to the performance of their

job. There was, however, some loss of control as they lost sole authority over their

local inventory. Global inventory visibility violated the highly rationalized nature

of an ideal bureaucracy by supporting an organizational goal of optimal use of

world-wide inventory, yet still measuring production performance at the local

plant.

The other instances of loss of control were due to decreased visibility caused by

difficulties of reversing transactions in SAP which made changing entries difficultor impossible. This meant that in certain circumstances it was easier not to enter

the information while it was still subject to change, even where that information

might have been helpful for planning purposes. A user responsible for writing up

work orders explained:

. . .[in the old system] you could save [what you typed in] and . . . you were ableto change it – well in SAP you can�t do that, you�ve got to save it and you can�tgo back and revise what you did, it�s all grayed out and you can�t change it. Soit�s tough. . . ..

Since the people performing this function found this unacceptable and confusing

to those reading the work scope instructions, they developed a workaround.

What [we�re] learning to do is to type the work scope into a Word documentand then . . .. save the Word document and right when [we�re] ready to releaseit, [we�ll] cut and paste it over to SAP, so if there is a change in work scope [wecatch it] before [we] release it.

That is, they delayed entering information into SAP until they were more confi-

dent of its accuracy, thus reducing the timeliness of the information and the visibility

of that information.


At ACRO, we observed increases in outcome and process control due to informa-

tion visibility, with only rare instances of decreases in control. Overall, the ES served

as a mechanism for increasing organizational control. For senior management and

financial controllers especially, the ES became an ideal control mechanism – just

as ES vendors and advocates have advertised. Unexpectedly, this happened at thesame time that workers were experiencing greater empowerment.

5.2. Implications of integration

‘‘Discipline’’ is the code we used whenever people talked about ‘‘doing what they

were supposed to do’’ – adhering more closely to predefined operating processes. As

we analyzed the data coded under this core category we discovered that heightened

levels of discipline were closely related to the integrated nature of an ES. At the sametime, integration demanded that employees reflect on business processes.

5.2.1. Disciplined action

We have already seen how increased visibility of information enhances outcome

control. The integrated nature of an ES further supports control in two ways: (1) di-

rect process control by embedding process rules and procedures into the system and

controlling which actions must be, can be, and cannot be performed, and (2) infor-

mal/internal controls by promoting a mindset of disciplined actions.Over time, many users became aware that the process rules and procedures

embedded in the ES profoundly influenced how they were expected to perform their

job. For example, a user responsible for the movement of material talked about get-

ting prompted if some procedure remained incomplete:

Before if every part wasn�t kitted, it didn�t stop anything. It didn�t have a flagcome up and say, ‘‘Hey, you didn�t kit specific material.’’ As we�re moving for-ward, everything has to show that it�s in the ‘‘withdrawn category,’’ and it�skitted.

If users ignored these flags, then they were stopped further down in the process

when the system would not let them confirm that a specific set of activities was com-

plete. The integrative nature of an ES supported cross-functional and real-time vis-

ibility of data, but it also required that tasks be done properly and in a timely

manner, and that data be both correct and complete. In a continuation of the pre-

vious comment the user added:

If a section of that [product] is now saying ‘‘Hey on these sheets, this is billed,’’it needs to reflect that in the system. And. . .. one of the things we do, is wemake sure that it does. If it doesn�t, we need to get it corrected or you can�tdo what they call confirm the network. Which is to go into the system andsay, ‘‘Yes this is confirmed and everything is there and that assembly is built.’’

A user performing the same function in a different plant summed it up succinctly

as follows:


If you are not doing your job the way you are supposed to, the system willcatch you. . .. SAP creates a standard process for everyone to follow. . .. Thereis a set order to do things.

Embedding rules and procedures into the software is the traditional concept of

using IT to increase control. The system controls what users are allowed to do. Orli-

kowski�s (1991) study of IT-enabled control examined CASE tools into which the

organization�s development methodology was embedded. While in principle these

users could take other actions (Giddens, 1984), in practice they were required to fol-

low the steps in the methodology as they did their work (Orlikowski, 1991). Simi-larly, the ES has defined procedures and sequences, which users must use to

accomplish their tasks. Furthermore, the integrated nature of an ES highlights any

failure to follow procedures as mis-steps in one area stall further progress in another

area.

In addition to software features that alert users to errors and omissions, and

embedded procedures that ensure correct process, users of an ES are further con-

strained to follow official procedure through carefully controlled authorizations that

limit access to transactions. With integration everybody works off the same database,so anyone could, in theory, have access not only to view all data but also to make

changes. While cross-functional visibility may have many benefits, there are risks

in allowing cross-functional transaction access. As a consequence, authorization to

perform each transaction must be assigned to specific roles. At ACRO the lack of

flexibility this imposed on users was frustrating at times, not least because these con-

straints often had the effect of slowing down production. A middle manager pre-

sented the following scenario:

Before ERP implementation occurred, I had the ability to go into the systemand [determine availability. . .. In] just a couple of keystrokes, I could get thematerial pulled appropriately with all the right codes, with all the right avenuesand send somebody on the road to pick it up and get it here within an hour ortwo maybe at the most. Now. . .. I don�t have that authorization anymore, it�s abuyer/planner function, I�ve been told I can�t have a buyer/planner code. . ..

This manager went on to explain how he personally used to have the ability tofind a part, place an order to have it pulled from inventory, and have it en route

to where it was needed within minutes. Under the new set of role-based authoriza-

tions he had to find other people to perform these transactions as he was not autho-

rized to perform them despite his position as a manager. This had the effect of

delaying arrival of the necessary parts for hours, disrupting production.

The combination of embedded procedures, separation of roles, and transactions

authorized only to selected roles increased disciplined action and process control.

In the above examples, only the material buyer/planner role and the spares manage-ment role had authority to approve requests for inventory. A middle manager on the

shop floor could no longer both request and approve parts by himself. This increased

control over inventory, a stated goal of ACRO, at a cost of occasional delays in

production.


In addition to these structures for enforcing discipline, the ES system generally

encouraged a culture and a mindset where the discipline of following the process

properly was valued. One exchange between two employees responsible for control-

ling the bill of materials suggests that while users were frustrated by some of the con-

straints put on them by the new system, some were starting to support the need forgreater discipline imposed by the system:

[S]ystem functionality. . .says you must have all this data prior to issuing a pur-chase order. . .for decades. . .we placed purchase orders with almost noth-ing. . .and it was a factor of speed. . . This system is forcing us to do thingswhich quite frankly don�t fit with the business. . . (First individual)

The second individual countered that updating purchase orders in the old way

had a detrimental effect on quality, and the need for speed did not justify ignoringcorrect procedures:

They�re forcing people to do what is [proper]. Like today you�re saying you cango in and change your purchase order or issue a purchase order with very lim-ited information on it. Is that right? I do not think so. I think when you�re talk-ing quality, you�re talking quality, when you�re talking [about data that affects]finance, you�re talking finance, and all that [purchase order information]should be there. (Response from second individual)

Given the integrated nature of an ES, data entered in one area immediately affects

other areas. Unlike before ES at ACRO when different parts of the organization

were more loosely coupled and buffered from the effects, increased integration and

the authorizations that controlled who could do what increased the cost of errors.

Reversing an entry involved undoing all the ripple effects, not just changing an entry

on a screen. Not only was reversing a process inherently complex, it might also have

involved a variety of individuals, each of which had authorization to perform a sub-

set of the transactions involved. Such problems raised the need for more faithful andaccurate execution of processes, and limited the scope for process variation. Further-

more, the need for both increased data accuracy and more timely data was an under-

lying motivation for increased discipline.

Overall at ACRO, we noticed a growing sense that disciplined behavior became

increasingly important after the implementation of the ES. In general a greater

understanding of the integrated nature of organizational processes, and how the

ES links them together, led to recognition of the importance of following prescribed

processes. The notion that processes should be done in a particular way was a reflec-tion of how an ES serves to rationalize the organization by inculcating the value of

discipline in everyday task behaviors. As one materials user stated, ‘‘I think things

are starting to be done the way that they should’’.

5.2.2. Reflection on work practices

At the same time as users were conforming to embedded processes, they were also

reflecting on how the system supported the network of business processes they were

engaged in. Reflecting on work practices is an important part of how practitioners


address and solve problems (Schon, 1983). Our interviews provided examples of in-

creased reflection on local, integrated and future work practices involving the ES.

We focus on the latter two, reflection on integrated and future work practices, since

these are the unexpected findings.

The integrated processes in the ES encouraged workers to reflect on work prac-tices outside their local area. For example, in the following excerpt a troubleshooter

from the receiving area of one plant explained how he unraveled problems that oc-

curred in his area, and how he tried to get users in other areas to realize that errors

made in one place had an impact elsewhere.

I think a lot of it was people didn�t understand what information they wereinputting, how it was affecting somebody else. A lot of what happens in[inspection], when they route a part out, we don�t see the problem until it getsback to receiving. . . . Well once you got into understanding how to fix it, whywas it happening in the first place? Well actually because [inspection] wasinputting the wrong information. So we would have to go back and say‘‘Hey look, don�t do that, because in the end, we�re going to catch it back here’’(inspector)

The ES would not receive a part into the system unless all the records for that part

matched, i.e., the bar code on the part as it was received had to match the bar code ofthe part requested. At ACRO after go-live, the receiving well of plants started to fill

up with parts the ES rejected and no one knew what to do about that.

To solve these problems the workers went through the pile of parts, determined

the problems, and the initial source of the problem, as indicated in the quote above.

Gradually, by explaining to all how the system worked and what they needed to do,

the rejects in receiving declined to almost nothing, and for those that occurred, the

workers in receiving knew how to resolve the problems. As one receiving inspector

noted:

So what we�ve had to do is learn what the other department was going throughin order to, how we can solve our problem to fix their problem at the sametime. . . So we�ve done a lot of going back and forth trying to understand justoverall just how the whole process works. And that has helped. We are able tocatch the problems before they even happen anymore. . . . And we have to com-municate back and forth a lot, you know, just so everybody understands howeverything is going to work.

This increased reflection and understanding of the new integrated processes went

beyond just the receiving area. For example, the site implementation manager noted:

We�re trying to log what area is experiencing the problem and then the rootcause, we want a narrative of what area created the problem. The reason we�redoing that is so that we can utilize this information and we�ll be able to see thatthe individuals that generate the network or the sales order are causing theseproblems that don�t become apparent until three or four weeks later and theinspector has the problem.


While the materials inspectors had problems generated by other areas, these

inspectors also came to realize that their work could generate problems for others.

As one materials inspector noted:

What I do affects the whole process. If I mess it up from the start, materials ismessed up, warehouse is messed up, . . .

At another service plant they initially attributed the receiving problems and

other problems to the ES. When the ES would not accept received parts, they used

various workarounds including re-ordering the parts to get the parts they needed.

The result was excessive and out-of-control inventory costs – the opposite of the

benefit expected from the ES. When they heard about the success at the other plant,

they realized they needed to learn the system better and to understand how itworked.

Some might argue that these findings of increased reflection on work practices

in the ES environment were temporary; and as soon as everyone understood what

they needed to do, reflection would stop. Our observations did not support this

explanation. The assembly plant continued to explore ways to make better use

of the ES to improve the assembly and inventory planning processes. In an inter-

view two years after Phase 3 go-live, a process engineer discussed several changes

to ES-related work practices that would improve their use of the ES. Forexample:

So we�ve had some meetings over this and they would like a change now whereit will allow them to approve a plan with multiple parts. . .

This idea for better use of the ES in the future and the other ideas he mentioned

are process improvements that would not have been possible without the ES. The ES

provided an infrastructure that enabled workers to reflect on what additional sup-port could be provided and to request changes, enhancements, or add-ons. There

have been on-going formal and informal discussions of improved future work pro-

cesses and IT support for these.

Even workers at plants that initially had many problems with the ES started to

reflect on the future possibilities enabled by the ES:

I would like to see the parts flowing through the facility a lot quicker, get rid ofall the holdups. I would like to see the parts that don�t need inspection not haveto go to inspection because that just creates a bottleneck, everywhere. (a mate-rials handler)

Furthermore, this reflection extended across plants:

ACRO is doing one thing that is real good, is getting the business unitstogether. I spent two weeks with [two other repair plants], talking about com-mon issues and common reports, so that now that we�re all up and we�ve gotsome level of experience and we�ve made it through that first knowledge,now we�re going back and as a group sitting down and trying to look at whatare common issues. (controller)


While we observed increased reflection, not all workers engaged in such reflection.

Because the ES was complex and difficult to understand, reflection on work in the

context of the ES was not easy. Some workers did not engage in problem-solving

but rather depended on the power users to do work for them or waited for someone

to explain to them what to do. Furthermore, the reflection stimulated by the ES wassometimes narrowly focused on solving problems in current ES-related work prac-

tices. In summary, what we did observe was that, despite an increase in the level

of conformity to specified processes imposed or encouraged by the ES, this new sys-

tem simultaneously demanded, and often elicited, an increased level of reflection on

how the processes related to each other, and on ways to alter and improve them to

achieve organizational objectives.

6. Discussion

Our observations, far from resolving the question of whether an ES enhances con-

trol or empowerment, suggest instead that it enhances both at the same time. Simi-

larly, based on our observations, we note a simultaneous increase in both conformity

to and reflection about business processes. Paradoxes of this nature are an inherent

part of organizational life (Lewis, 2000). By exploring these tensions rather than try-

ing to eliminate them, we can illuminate the complexity and avoid oversimplifyingorganizational reality.

Various strategies exist to address apparent paradoxes (Lewis, 2000; Poole & Van

de Ven, 1989). These range from trying to resolve the paradox by identifying how the

competing elements reflect different levels of analysis and/or moments in time, or

transcending the paradox by reframing the way we view the two sides so they can

be synthesized. Acknowledging the interdependence of two opposing concepts rather

than focusing on their distinctions permits a richer understanding of complex phe-

nomena (Jackson, 1999). In the discussion that follows, we propose a concept we call‘‘panoptic empowerment’’ as a means of transcending the tension between control

and empowerment. Following this we propose a second concept, ‘‘reflective confor-

mity’’, as a means of transcending the tension between conforming to the ES while

simultaneously reflecting on its use, and discuss why these elements not only can, but

in an ES environment, must coexist.

6.1. Panoptic empowerment

The simultaneous increase in control and empowerment occurs through the medi-

ating effects of information visibility. Workers are empowered, not because they

have more authority, but because they have more information, which in turn gives

them greater control over factors that affect the way they execute their jobs. This

same access to information allows for a certain degree of job expansion. Visibility

is, however, a two-edged sword, and at the same time an ES enables individuals

to see more and do more, it also makes them more visible to others. Control in-

creases in part from the creation of a panopticon, where individuals are likely to


be disciplined in their behavior and to engage in high levels of self control because

their actions can be watched by others. Furthermore, real-time information visibility

reduces the time cycles over which outcome control can be exercised, effectively con-

flating outcome control with process control.

The contradiction between control and empowerment arises when control isviewed in the bureaucratic sense of a supervisor exercising power over a subordinate,

and empowerment is viewed as the transfer of power from managers to workers. If

instead of this zero-sum view of power we take a Foucauldian perspective, then

empowerment and control can coexist more comfortably. By making actions of

employees visible in real-time and enabling continuous real-time control of outcomes

and processes, an ES fits well with Foucault�s understanding of disciplinary power

and control (with some limitations, which we discuss below).

Work cannot be done without the ES, which generates the paperwork or datamovement necessary for the next step in the process. As each step is completed,

the system records who executed the transactions and when. All this process and out-

come status information is stored in the shared database, available to anyone with

access at any time. As with the panopticon, since employees know their actions

are being recorded, disciplinary power will be in effect whether anyone is observing

or not. Furthermore, even if users are not observed in real-time, the information is

available in complete detail at a later time, so that process and outcome controls can

be exercised whenever convenient. As a panopticon, the ES serves to perpetuate andre-enforce existing managerial power and control in organizations, similar to the re-

sults observed by Sia et al. (2002). Thus, our findings of increased outcome and pro-

cess control are consistent with conventional literature and consistent with the

expected benefits of an ES, which is designed and sold as a mechanism for increased

organizational control. The question then becomes: How do we theoretically explain

the simultaneous finding of increased empowerment?

An ES differs in three potentially critical ways from the ideal panopticon. First,

the mechanism of observation is less visible. In the panopticon, the window in theobservation tower reminds prisoners constantly that they could be under observa-

tion. While employees know the ES is recording everything, the gaze is less visible

– the system is not primarily for observing employees, but for doing work – so they

are not constantly reminded that they are being watched. Potentially, this could

weaken the disciplinary power and self-control of a panopticon, and could increase

a willingness to act independently.

Second, while there is no escape from the gaze in an ideal panopticon, there is

some room to hide with an ES. Although there is complete visibility of any informa-tion entered into the ES (and usually, to do one�s job, there is no choice but to enter

it), individuals sometimes withhold information until the last moment. While process

controls can reduce such activity (it is clear when information has not been entered),

outcome control is diminished until the information is available.

Third, the ideal panopticon provides hierarchical visibility in only one direction

(only observers have visibility), and no horizontal visibility (the observed cannot

see each other) (Foucault, 1977). An ES goes well beyond panoptic visibility – every-

one can see everything in the common database – to provide a network of cross-func-


tional, global, and real-time visibility. It is this violation of the ideal panopticon that

provides the possibility for empowerment. The employees at ACRO clearly saw this

visibility of information as empowering, and took actions based on this additional

information. They also used this visibility to follow up on anomalies in their own

work that they believed might have been caused elsewhere. These results contrastwith Sia et al.�s (2002) ES study, in which similar opportunities for empowerment

due to visibility were available, but where the nurses studied viewed these opportu-

nities as extra work, which they refused to do.

Some might argue that the increased empowerment we observed is not ‘‘true’’

empowerment because managers have not given some of their authority and re-

sources to employees. In fact, few of the actions that employees had been enabled

or empowered to do were previously done by their supervisors or managers. Rather

than a transfer of power as envisioned in the traditional empowerment literature, wesaw an increase and a spread of knowledge that was empowering. Some of this

knowledge was previously held only in local legacy systems, e.g., inventory informa-

tion and order and invoice status information, while other knowledge was previously

either non-existent or not in an easily usable form, e.g., historical and real-time data.

From a Foucauldian view, then, there was an increase in knowledge and thus an in-

crease in the power to do things. In this way, an ES can be empowering without

transferring power from managers to employees – allocation of power need not be

viewed as a zero-sum game. Furthermore, Foucault would argue that power is notheld by individuals in any case, so cannot be ‘‘transferred’’, but instead is a property

of the system as a whole.

While this information provides empowerment, it also provides the opportunity

for peers and other managers, not just hierarchical managers, to exercise control.

The effect of everyone being able to gaze upon everyone else in real-time changes

the nature of control in organizations from hierarchical to multi-directional. The

transparent environment also fosters an organizational culture that promotes disci-

pline. The theoretical concept ‘‘panoptic empowerment’’ captures this combinationof empowerment and simultaneous, multi-directional visibility.

6.2. Reflective conformity

The demands arising from the integrated nature of an ES simultaneously require

conformity to specific operating processes and increased reflection on how the sys-

tem supports those processes. Conformity is not enforced through hierarchical con-

trol, but through the disciplinary power inherent in the rules and proceduresembedded in the ES. Since in an ES these rules and procedures integrate organiza-

tional activities more closely, conformity is essential so that actions taken in one area

do not interfere with operations elsewhere. This systemic set of constraints creates a

‘‘regime of truth’’ – a discourse that values disciplined action over individual heroism

to meet production goals. At the same time the realities of organizational life cannot

all be programmed into the embedded processes, particularly those that must serve

the conflicting objectives of different functional areas. This challenge combined with

the inherent complexity of how an ES might be used to support variants to standard


procedure requires deliberate reflection. Furthermore, the opportunities that an ES

presents can only be exploited if the users reflect on the possibilities.

In the literature, conformity is associated with reduced reflection. For example in

her study of IT-enabled control, Orlikowski (1991, p. 38) noted that ‘‘. . . workers be-come less competent as knowledgeable agents as they become less able to reflect ontheir means of production and the knowledge embedded therein’’. After implemen-

tation of a system with embedded procedures, Orlikowski observed deskilling of

workers and little reflection on work processes, and speculated that this would cause

future problems as the firm became less able to adjust its practices as the environ-

ment changed. In her study, embedded rules and procedures in combination with

informal controls had the effect of both instilling discipline and reducing reflection.

In stark contrast, in our study we observed examples of increased reflection. While

much of this reflection was directly related to solving problems related to the use ofthe ES, such reflection was also the start of reflection on better work practices in the

future. Since reflection is especially important for non-routine problems and for pro-

cess improvements over time, whether or not an ES contributes to more or less reflec-

tion by workers on their work practices is an important concern.

Our observations support the critical importance of reflection on work practices

in an ES environment. Specifically, without reflection and increased understanding

of the new integration of work across functions, the ES does not function well. Those

workers who did only what the system asked without understanding the impacts onother areas contributed to an out-of-control inventory situation. Other workers la-

bored to understand the system and how its integrated nature affected work across

organizational boundaries. They also followed prescribed procedures, but through

their reflections were able to contribute to increased inventory control.

These are contradictory observations – the ES works well as a control system only

to the extent that workers take control of their work and of the system. We capture

this contradiction in the term ‘‘reflective conformity’’, our second theoretical con-

cept. The net result is that while the ES can contribute to less reflection due to theembedded processes, it ultimately requires increased reflection to achieve the control

benefits.

Conformity to specified processes is enforced by an ES through built-in error

checks and flags, and role-specific authorizations to perform transactions. These fea-

tures create the system-embedded governance structure that Foucault saw as the

nexus of power and control. Without such constraints, the enhanced information vis-

ibility would empower individuals to perform tasks well outside the scope of their

roles. In fact power users who have broad authorizations can end up performingtasks for any part of the plant. The need to maintain conformity arises because every

action in an integrated system has ripple effects far beyond the initiator�s location.Integration also demands that transactions be completed in specific sequences, and

failure to execute all steps as expected can create roadblocks for other users.

This same integration and its associated complexity simultaneously generates a

need for more reflection. While the constraints imposed by embedded procedures

might be assumed to ensure that a user can automatically follow prescribed proce-

dures without much reflection, this is not always the case. No finite set of embedded


processes can accommodate all possible operational needs, and individuals will de-

vise ways to deal with exceptions as they arise. As expressed by several users, the sys-

tem worked well under ‘‘sunny day’’ conditions, but any deviation, including simple

data entry errors or malfunctions of parts or equipment, required a clear understand-

ing of how to undo the ripple effects, or force a deviation from embedded proce-dures. We suggest that without this understanding, working around problems can

create chaos. Furthermore, the system will need to evolve with changing circum-

stances. Both blind adherence to built in procedures and unreflective accommoda-

tions to nonstandard situations can have serious negative consequences. Thus

while an ES demands conformity, it simultaneously demands conscious thought

about how processes inter-relate, and how the system supports them.

In summary, the contradictions noted in ‘‘panoptic empowerment’’ and ‘‘reflec-

tive conformity’’ are more easily resolved when we consider these findings in thecontext of a Foucauldian perspective and how it relates to core ES characteristics.

Specifically, the mediating effects of increased information visibility support

both employee empowerment and greater managerial control. The unforgiving

nature of an integrated system demands both a mindset of discipline and more

reflection.

7. Conclusions

The two new theoretical concepts that emerged from our research, ‘‘panoptic

empowerment’’ and ‘‘reflective conformity’’ both add to the literature and illuminate

practical implications of ES implementations. From a theoretical perspective we ex-

tend the literature on IT-enabled organizational control by unraveling the traditional

views on discipline and control and integrating them with our grounded results to

create a new understanding of the real control effects associated with an ES.

From a practical perspective the emergence of ‘‘panoptic empowerment’’ and‘‘reflective conformity’’ in the course of an ES implementation present an interesting

challenge for organizations and the people who work for them. While an ES really

can deliver on its promise to increase discipline and control while empowering work-

ers, it does this at some cost and with considerable effort. In particular, employees

are under much more pervasive surveillance than in the past, and this gaze can be

exercised by their peers and workers in other parts of the organization, as well as

managers. While they are empowered by being able to see much more than before,

they are also required to become more knowledgeable and reflective.Harnessing the power of an ES requires balancing the inherent tensions of panop-

tic empowerment and reflective conformity, so that the various interconnected activ-

ities support rather than interfere with each other. First, employees are only

empowered and reflective to the extent they understand the ES. Because of its com-

plexity, this is not a simple task. To be effective, users need not only to learn the

mechanical aspects of conducting transactions with the software, but also to under-

stand the ES�s essential structure and how the transactions they execute feed the

activities of other people.


Second, the level of reflection required goes beyond employees� own tasks, and

while still task oriented, extends to the network of tasks that includes their own jobs.

In other words the salient characteristic of an ES, namely its ability to integrate orga-

nizational functions, works against the traditional bureaucratic rationality that re-

quires functional specialization. Not everyone in the organization wants thechallenge of reflecting so broadly, particularly when what they can actually transact

in the ES is limited by task specific authorizations. Thus, in some ways, the ES

encourages narrow thinking and mindless entry of transactions, often at the expense

of effective system functioning.

Third, there is significant flexibility in how much and what kind of transactional

authority and information visibility is allocated to different organizational roles. The

balance between empowerment and control depends both on how the ES is set up,

and the organizational incentives put in place.There are a number of other effects of working in an ES environment that we have

not explored. For example, the ES enables peer-to-peer control as employees have

cross-functional visibility. How this will work, and how it might affect managerial

and self-control is still to be explored.

While our research was conducted at one company, which could call into ques-

tion the generalizability of our findings, we did observe a number of different oper-

ating units within the organization, and their different responses to the ES

implementation support our conclusions. Of course our two theoretical concepts,panoptic empowerment and reflective conformity, should be investigated in other

organizations.

Our theoretical analysis suggests that with the advent of integrated software sys-

tems such as ES, a Foucauldian lens that treats discipline and control as a function

of the knowledge and power embedded in the organizational system and released by

visibility of information will continue to be a source of insight and understanding of

the organizational impacts of ES. Through this lens we will begin to explain the par-

adoxical and seemingly contradictory outcomes of these systems that, while enhanc-ing traditional control, discipline, and rationality, also give rise to greater reflection

and empowerment, in contrast to the principles of an ideal bureaucracy. To under-

stand IT-enabled organizational changes, more research is needed that uses a Fou-

cauldian lens. This means not just the panopticon, but also disciplinary power,

and Foucault�s concept of power/knowledge embedded in the organizational system

rather than primarily in individuals in positions of authority. These concepts become

important as we study the nature of IT-enabled empowerment and reflection in the

context of multi-directional control.

Acknowledgments

This research was supported in part by the National Science Foundation under

Grant No. 0114954. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations

expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the

views of the National Science Foundation.


We thank the organization we studied for generously providing us with open ac-

cess to observe their implementation process, attend meetings, and interview employ-

ees, at a time when they were extremely busy. We also thank the many employees

who willingly talked with us about their experiences with the newly implemented

ES. Finally, we appreciate the thoughtful comments from Dan Robey and the anon-ymous reviewers who helped us think through our ideas and present them in a more

understandable way.

Appendix A. Initial interview protocol

1. Introduction (when required)

Who we areWe are here to understand the process of implementing SAP and how it changes

workflow. In this interview we want to find out something about the way jobs are

done now, before SAP.

We will start by asking some general questions.

We will want to come back later with more questions about how things have chan-

ged after go-live.2. Current: before SAP

How long have you been at [ACRO]?What is your current job at [this plant]? What other jobs have you had at

[ACRO]?

Probes:

With respect to the current/latest job, what are the main things you do? (Describe

the process)

What are you responsible for?

Is this job fairly self-contained – or does it depend on other people?

Who are the primary people you interact with to get the job done?Where, if any, are the time pressures?

Is the process fairly standard, or are there lots of special cases? Examples?

When a special case comes up, who makes the decision on how to handle it?

How closely are your tasks bound by work instructions?3. Once SAP is here

Knowing what you do about SAP, how will the work process you described ear-

lier change?

Probes:Will the responsibilities of the person doing this job change?

Will the job be more or less self-contained/interdependent than before?

Who will you need to interact with now – is this a change?

Will the time pressures change?

Will the approach to special cases change?

What about the new procedures and work instructions – will they be any more or

less specific with respect to what you have to do?

Will SAP make the job more or less complex? Examples?


What things will you be able to do that you can�t do now? What things will you beunable to do that you can do now?

In what ways will SAP make this job easier? Harder?

At some point we�d love to see this job in action so we can really understand it!

4. Training

What training is being planned over the next little while? When and where will it

be held? May we sit in and watch?

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