Eritrea-Ethiopia War (1998-2000)

What Were the Real Reasons Behind, and Causes of, the Eritrea-Ethiopia War of 1998-2000? Hywel Sedgwick-Jell

School of Oriental and African StudiesDepartment of History

Hywel Sedgwick-Jell: 213318

Violence, Identity and Politics in Modern East and Northeast Africa (II): 154800262

“Two Bald Men Fighting Over a Comb”: What Were the Real

Reasons Behind, and Causes of, the Eritrea-Ethiopia War of 1998-

2000?


“Two Bald Men Fighting Over a Comb”: What Were the Real Reasons Behind, and Causes of, the Eritrea-Ethiopia War of 1998-2000?

“Crossing fire and wavesfrom Dankalia's Beylul to KaroraUm Hager to Massawa's sandsSahel's Anberbeb and Heshkeb

and fields of palm trees in Barka

Storms spark like stars on a windshieldhailstones of snow angry at intrusion

from those who hide from bombs & bullets in a truckFrozen on mud tracks in the middle of nowhere

where mosquitoes buzz and scorpions wait

Corpses of tanks and peoplemix to make a castle of historysilence descends and no wind”

(Ararat Iyob)

Abstract:

Historiography, Ideology and Cartography

Eritrean poet, Ararat Iyob, evokes a powerful image of modern conflict in her poem 'Reflections of

the Land', written in response to the early stages of the Eritrea-Ethiopia war. The emergence of

creative and academic literature surrounding the conflict is indicative of the gradual development of

a discourse of remembrance in Eritrean and Ethiopian society and the importance of the conflict in

the broader history of the two countries, and indeed the entire African continent. Iyob's use of the

metaphor “a castle of history” seems particularly pertinent, as the historiography surrounding the

subject of the conflict is often almost impenetrable. Much of the literature emanates from either

Eritrean or Ethiopian sources, and indeed, it remains difficult for academics to tackle the issues

pertaining to the relationship between the two nations without being accused of taking sides. This

situation is made even more complicated due to the fact that the memories of the war are so recent

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and the consequences of, and fallout from the conflict are still ongoing. Tensions between the two

countries remain heightened in the post-war era and this is, more often than not, reflected in the

literature. As Richard Reid points out, in the academic arena, “one is either a 'greater Ethiopianist',

bitterly opposed to the aggressive, militaristic independence which Eritrea had the temerity to

achieve, or an 'Eritrean nationalist', bitterly opposed to the aggressive expansionism of the

Ethiopian empire-state.”1 However, it is important to attempt to circumvent this academic dispute,

and remain as objective as possible, in order to come to any concrete conclusions concerning the

causes of the conflict. The war itself is decidedly difficult to define. Evidently it was technically an

inter-state conflict, and indeed has been the most notable war between two sub-Saharan African

nations in the post-independence period. However, in many ways, due to the nature of the two

countries and their respective and intertwined histories, the Eritrea-Ethiopia war resembles an intra-

state conflict. Tekeste Negash and Kjetil Tronvoll support this view, stating that the “war has most

of the characteristics of a civil war between one people spread out in two countries.”2 Leenco Lata

probably sums up the situation most succinctly, commenting that the war “can perhaps best be

described as an inter-state war that is strikingly similar to intra-state conflict.”3 “Two bald men

fighting over a comb” was how one international observer, a Financial Times journalist, memorably

described the outbreak of war between Eritrea and Ethiopia in 1998. This now infamous quote is

indicative of the wider phenomenon of the oversimplified and Eurocentric nature of international

media perception of the conflict at the time and also exemplifies the fact that there are significant

underlying issues which pertain to the causes of, and reasons behind, the war. Here were two of the

poorest countries in the world, spending millions of dollars on military technology, fighting over a

seemingly insignificant, unpopulated and barren strip of land separating the two African nations. As

1R. Reid, Old problems in New Conflicts: Some Observations on Eritrea and its Relations with Tigray, from Liberation Struggle to Inter-State War, Journal of the International African Institute (2003) P. 3692T. Negash & K. Tronvoli, Brothers at War: Making Sense of the Eritrean-Ethiopian War, Oxford: James Currey (2000) P. 943L. Lata, The Ethiopia-Eritrea War, Review of African Political Economy (2003) P. 374

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Reid points out, “These were two bald men fighting over a comb; two poverty-stricken African

nations (the 'hostile tribes' concept was lurking just below the surface) fighting for pride at the

expense of the material dignity of their populations; two ignorant governments engaging in brutal

and bloody 'First World War tactics' for pieces of insignificant land.”4 Moreover, Ruth Iyob raises

the question which is tantamount to a historiographical elephant in the room, and therefore, the

focus of this paper: “Why did what seemed a minor border skirmish escalate so quickly to open

warfare, especially when the paths to easy and peaceful resolution appeared wide open?” She

continues, “to some outside observers, this was 'a war that no one wanted', to others, a futile

exercise in puerile muscle-flexing; and to at least a cynic or two, something akin to 'two bald men

fighting over a comb'.”5 As Dan Connell reported from the front line at the time, “the two countries

have mobilized hundreds of thousands of troops and a staggering arsenal of Cold War arms to do

battle over less than 100 square miles of disputed scrub farmland and desert.” However, he added

that “far more is at stake than a petty border dispute”, which essentially summarises the academic

thrust of this analysis.6 Furthermore, in their authoritative work 'Brothers at War', Negash and

Tronvoll have produced perhaps the most in-depth study available on the subject at hand. They ask,

“How is it possible for two formerly friendly governments to turn into deadly adversaries in a

matter of weeks, willing to sacrifice tens of thousands of their people on the battlefields? Why

mobilise people and resources on such a scale , if the reason for the war is – as it is officially stated

– some relatively marginal square kilometres of agricultural land?”7 This study will draw on this,

admittedly modest, collection of literature available on the subject and, hopefully, present the reader

with an original answer to these questions. Indeed, in reality, the Eritrea-Ethiopia war was the result

4R. Reid, Old problems in New Conflicts: Some Observations on Eritrea and its Relations with Tigray, from Liberation Struggle to Inter-State War, Journal of the International African Institute (2003) P. 3745R. Iyob, The Ethiopian–Eritrean Conflict: Diasporic vs. Hegemonic States in the Horn of Africa, 1991- 2000, The Journal of Modern African Studies (2000) P. 6606D. Connell, Report from the Field: From Alliance to the Brink of All-Out War: Explaining the Eritrea-Ethiopia Border Crisis, Middle East Report (1998) P. 407T. Negash & K. Tronvoli, Brothers at War: Making Sense of the Eritrean-Ethiopian War, Oxford: James Currey (2000) P. 3

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of decades of political, social and economic developments, manifest in an apparently superficial

territorial conflict. The causes of the conflict are linked to factors as diverse and complex as the

colonial legacy of the two nations, their respective and often conflicting ideologies, concepts of

ethnicity, notions of the nation-state and nationality, issues surrounding borders, cartography and

demarcation, and the economic and social history of the Horn of Africa. Reid states that “ a study of

certain aspects of the recent past provides something of the answer to what many in 1998 held to be

an impenetrable puzzle, for the war now appears as part of a much longer and more complex

sequence of events and relationships.”8 This complex sequence of events and relationships is

precisely what this paper aims to decipher, with the ultimate goal of solving the impenetrable

historiographical puzzle (albeit with a few pieces still missing). In order to effectively trace the

origins of the Eritrea-Ethiopia war, this analysis will adopt what is essentially a broadly reverse-

chronological format; in other words, working backwards from the conflict itself at the end of the

twentieth century all the way to the colonial period and beyond, to pinpoint the historical

undercurrent of causality surrounding the outbreak of war between the two historically intertwined

African nations. Subsequently, certain fundamental ideas and key concepts surrounding the causes

of the conflict will be taken out of their historiographical context and analysed in more depth, so as

to try and identify recurring themes and ideas in the historical relationship between Eritrea and

Ethiopia. These concepts will then be analysed further and developed, in parallel to the

historiography, to hopefully come to a concrete conclusion concerning the real reasons behind, and

causes of, the Ethiopia-Eritrea war, and challenge the prevalent western perception and occasional

academic conception of two influential and, metaphorically, bald men, namely President Issayas

Afeworki and Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, squabbling unnecessarily over a strip of undesirable

territory, represented by a solitary and obsolete hair grooming utensil.

8R. Reid, Old problems in New Conflicts: Some Observations on Eritrea and its Relations with Tigray, from Liberation Struggle to Inter-State War, Journal of the International African Institute (2003) P. 374

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“Two bald men fighting over a comb.”

An Overview of Eritrea and Ethiopia at war, 1998-2000

A brief overview of the conflict itself is almost certainly pertinent to the question in hand.

Furthermore, the history of the war itself sheds some light on the issues concerning territory and

borders in the Horn of Africa. Although it is apparent that the border clash was not a fundamental

cause of the conflict, it undoubtedly acted as a potent catalyst for the instigation of warfare in the

region. Indeed, observers at the time often tended to see the war in terms of this superficial

territorial dispute, habitually ignoring the underlying causality of the conflict. It has been portrayed

in this way by various international media outlets, not to mention various government officials. For

example, Paul Henze asks in reference to the conflict, “but why did it happen? The answer is very

simple: it happened because Eritrea invaded Ethiopia. Without warning Eritrea sent its armed forces

into territory long administered by Ethiopia.”9 However, Henze is clearly the archetype of what

Reid defines as a 'greater Ethiopianist', having served at the U.S. Embassy to Addis Ababa and sat

on the Ethiopian National Security Council. The proliferation of such theories, risks obscuring and

disregarding decades, arguably centuries, of Eritrean and Ethiopian history which are

incontrovertibly crucial in explaining the real causes of the conflict. War broke out between the two

countries on May 6th 1998 and formally ended on 12th December 2000 with the signing of a peace

agreement in the Algerian capital, Algiers.10 The overt catalyst for the outbreak of military action

was an incident in which Tigrayan militiamen opened fire on an Eritrean patrol near the disputed

territory of Badme. Debessay Hedru defines this event as a “mindless provocation” which “led to

9P. Henze, Eritrea's War Against Ethiopia: Causes and Effects, Reflections, Prescriptions, www.ethioembassy.org.uk (2000) P. 1 (Accessed 15/04/2010)10M. Plaut, Towards a Cold Peace? The Outcome of the Ethiopia-Eritrea War of 1998-2000, Review of African Political Economy (2001) P. 125

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http://www.ethioembassy.org.uk/


the disastrous war with Ethiopia.”11 In 2005, the Eritrea Ethiopia Claims Commission reported that,

“at about 5:30 a.m. on 12 May 1998, Eritrean armed forces, composed of at least two brigades of

regular soldiers, supported by tanks and artillery, attacked the town of Badme and several other

border areas...the weight of the evidence indicated that the Ethiopian defenders were composed

merely of militia and some police, who were quickly forced to retreat by the invading Eritrean

forces. Given the absence of an armed attack against Eritrea, the attack that began on 12 May

cannot be justified as lawful self-defence under the UN Charter.”12 This exemplifies the way in

which the international community was determined to reduce the conflict to the status of a simple

border squabble and ignore the underlying issues at hand. This instigation of provocation prompted

a program of militarisation in the region on the part of Eritrea which subsequently triggered an

Ethiopian deceleration of war.13 A state-sponsored broadcast on Eritrean radio accused Ethiopia of

pursuing a policy that was tantamount to one of “total war”.14 There were two further significant

military surges after this initial exchange of gunfire. In February 1999, fighting began in earnest and

intensified throughout the month, eventually grinding to a halt when Eritrea lost control of Badme

village and the surrounding area. Subsequently, in May 2000, “Ethiopia marked the second

anniversary of the conflict's eruption by resuming fighting along the entire frontline.”15 The war

caused significant fallout on both sides of the border and inflicted major social, demographic and

economic damage to the two nations. Martin Plaut explains that the ending of the conflict, “came as

a huge relief to the people of both countries, who had paid such a high price for the war, which

claimed some 100,000 lives and displaced more than 600,000 civilians...the cost in financial terms

has run into hundreds of millions of dollars...as both rank among the poorest countries in the world,

11D. Hedru, Eritrea: Transition to Dictatorship, 1991-2003, Review of African Political Economy (2003) P. 44012H. Houtte et al., Eritrea Ethiopia Claims Commission, The Hague (2005) P. 513D. Connell, Shootout in the Horn of Africa: A View from Eritrea, Middle East Report (1999) P. 514http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/107985.stm (Accessed 20/04/2010) 15L. Lata, The Ethiopia-Eritrea War, Review of African Political Economy (2003) P. 382

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it was a price that neither could afford.”16 During the conflict, Ethiopian troops destroyed houses

and looted property in occupied Eritrean settlements. In addition Ethiopian soldiers often raped

women in areas of temporary occupation. Furthermore, “this political drama was enacted against a

background of sharp economic decline and widespread famine. The war dislocated external trade

and brought Eritrea's urban economy, such as it was, to a standstill.”17 A further demographic

consequence of the war was the mass displacement of significant civilian populations from both

countries.18 Indeed, after the war, a Claims Commission was established in order to “unravel the

claims and counter claims of the tens of thousands of Eritreans deported from Ethiopia, and the

Ethiopians deported in the other direction.”19 The Algiers Declaration was brokered by the OAU,

under the leading role of the Algerian government, and resulted in the establishment of the

International Commission in The Hague with third-country nominees from both sides and a neutral

chair person nominated by the UN.20 In addition, a Boundary Commission was enacted, to settle the

territorial dispute which had allegedly caused the war in the first place, with a mandate based on

pertinent colonial treaties. However, Plaut pointed out at the time that “the severity of the conflict,

and the lack of trust between the two sides, would appear to suggest that there is little prospect that

peace will be maintained and the demarcation be successfully completed.”21 Iyob states that “the

Badme incident probably need not have escalated to general war.”22 Although the overt border

skirmish was undeniably the trigger for the instigation of conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia, and

indeed, wider issues concerning the nature of borders and demarcation are crucial in explaining the

16M. Plaut, Towards a Cold Peace?, Review of African Political Economy (2001) P. 12517D. Hedru, Eritrea: Transition to Dictatorship, 1991-2003, Review of African Political Economy (2003) P. 44418A. Naty, Environment, Society and the State in Western Eritrea, Africa: Journal of the International African Institute (2002) P. 59219M. Plaut, Towards a Cold Peace? The Outcome of the Ethiopia-Eritrea War of 1998-2000, Review of African Political Economy (2001) P. 12720L. Cliffe, Peace in the Horn of Africa, Review of African Political Economy (2002) P. 12521M. Plaut, Towards a Cold Peace? The Outcome of the Ethiopia-Eritrea War of 1998-2000, Review of African Political Economy (2001) P. 12722R. Iyob, The Ethiopian–Eritrean Conflict: Diasporic vs. Hegemonic States in the Horn of Africa, 1991- 2000, The Journal of Modern African Studies (2000) P. 678

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war, it is reductive to see the dispute in such black and white terms. As Plaut explains, “both the

initial proposals and the final accord treated the war essentially as a border conflict. By doing so the

mediators hoped that a comparatively simple demarcation exercise to define the border could

resolve the differences between the two countries. By taking this stance they swept under the carpet

a host of problems that underlay the outbreak of hostilities, and perpetuated the crisis when

negotiations might otherwise have produced a peace treaty.”23

A New Beginning?

Independent Eritrea, 1991-1998

Eritrean independence, de facto from May 24th 1991 and de jure on May 24th 199324, was

accompanied by a wave of optimism both from within the continent and among the international

community. This optimistic attitude concerning Ethio-Eritrean relations in the post-independence

era was exemplified by the signing of an agreement of Friendship and Co-operation between the

two countries in 1993, followed by the rapid establishment of various commissions and committees

designed to oversee the supposedly smooth transition to Eritrean independence.25 However, “far

from being able to embrace a ‘new beginning’ between military victory in 1991 and the UN-

monitored independence referendum in 1993, even though the rhetoric of the time focused on this

very notion, independent Eritrea inherited a set of legacies from the era of violent colonialism with

which it has yet to come to terms.”26 Tensions were carried over from the period of liberation

struggle, as the tactical alliance developed at the time did not necessarily constitute a deeper

23M. Plaut, Towards a Cold Peace? The Outcome of the Ethiopia-Eritrea War of 1998-2000, Review of African Political Economy (2001) P. 12624T. Medhanie, Eritrea & Neighbours in the 'New World Order', Hamburg: Lit Verlag (1994) P. 125Walta Information Centre, Internet Responses to the Ethio-Eritrean Conflict, A Selection of the Views of Civil Society Sent to the Walta Web Site During 1998 and 1999, Addis Ababa: Walta Information Centre (1999) P. 29726R. Reid, Caught in the Headlights of History: Eritrea, the EPLF and the Post-War Nation-State, Journal of Modern African Studies (2005) P. 468

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friendship. As Iyob points out, “comrades in war do not necessarily transform into partners in

peace.”27 This aspect of the causality of the conflict will be analysed in more detail in the next

section of this analysis. Moreover, during this period, economic issues came to the forefront of the

tenuous relationship between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Intense economic competition in the region

instigated a veritable scramble for resources. Much of this was centred around access to coastal

trading outposts, specifically the port of Asab. Ethiopia had not opposed Eritrea's terms of

independence in 1993, despite the fact that the agreement effectively transformed Ethiopia into a

landlocked country. However, opposition to this agreement emerged soon afterwards, with many

Ethiopians arguing that “Eritrea took unfair advantage of an overly idealistic or politically naïve

Ethiopian government.”28 This situation was exacerbated by large-scale refugee movements in the

region which placed enormous pressure on resources. The clearest manifestation of these economic

tensions was the problematic nature of the introduction of an independent currency by Eritrea,

named the nafka after the symbolically important town of the same name which had been heavily

bombarded during the Eritrean liberation struggle. Furthermore, there were additional tensions

between the two countries surrounding the issue of coastal trade and access to ports. Indeed, Guy

Arnold postulates that, “ Ethiopia was angry at the cost of access to the port of Assab, while Eritrea

was angry because Ethiopia had insisted that all trade between them had to be conducted in dollars

after Eritrea had launched its own currency, the nafka, in 1997.”29 However, Iyob refutes the notion

that the introduction of the nafka was a root cause of the conflict: “Both the Ethiopian and Eritrean

governments dismissed popular misconception in both countries (as well as those in the diaspora)

that the conflict was generated by the birth of an independent Eritrean currency - the nakfa.”30

27R. Iyob, The Ethiopian–Eritrean Conflict: Diasporic vs. Hegemonic States in the Horn of Africa, 1991- 2000, The Journal of Modern African Studies (2000) P. 67628S. Adejumobi, The History of Ethiopia, London: Greenwood Press (2007) P. 13729G. Arnold, Africa: A Modern History, London: Atlantic Books (2005) P. 86030R. Iyob, The Ethiopian–Eritrean Conflict: Diasporic vs. Hegemonic States in the Horn of Africa, 1991- 2000, The Journal of Modern African Studies (2000) P. 667

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Arnold continues, drawing a link between modern territorial disputes and ancient empires, stating

that, “perhaps the root of the quarrel was the reduction of Ethiopia to a landlocked country by

Eritrea, which had been a part of greater Ethiopia: in other words, anger at loss of empire.”31 Reid

draws a direct link between the introduction of the nafka and the outbreak of the war, but also points

out that, much like the issues surrounding borders and territory in the Horn of Africa, this was

simply the most prominent cause of disharmony, and was in reality a political manifestation of

wider and more complex issues. “The most visible indication of disharmony came with the

introduction of a new Eritrean currency in late 1997, which created a certain degree of rancour in

commercial and financial relations; and then, in May 1998, with supposedly shocking suddenness,

the two countries found themselves at war over the matter of borders and undemarcated territory at

various points along their common frontier.”32 Yohannes Petros, from the Centre of Ethiopian

Studies, outlines a comprehensive list of perceived Ethiopian economic and political grievances

against the newly independent Eritrean state, in the introduction to a collection of documents

outlining Ethiopian foreign policy: “In the implementation of the 1993 Treaty, Ethiopia was

disadvantaged in trade, high tariffs, bureaucratic red tape for access to the sea, the flow of refugees,

illegal aliens, and front trade companies into the resource areas for competition for resources and

power, illegal trade, currency trafficking, and the smuggling of goods. The decline of value of

exports affected Ethiopia's domestic politics and became objects of common discussions and

worries.” He continues, pointing out that ultimately, “the differences in economic and monetary

policies, trade, taxation, the unequal convertible BIRR/NAFKA currencies, the state subsidized

consumer price, the overvalued exchange rate, the fiscal policies and the limitation of the amount of

border trade accelerated the tensions between the two states.”33 Although evidently a fairly biased

31G. Arnold, Africa: A Modern History, London: Atlantic Books (2005) P. 86032R. Reid, Old problems in New Conflicts: Some Observations on Eritrea and its Relations with Tigray, from Liberation Struggle to Inter-State War, Journal of the International African Institute (2003) P. 37433Y. Petros, Selected Documents of Ethiopian Foreign Policy, Addis Ababa: Centre of Ethiopian Studies (2000) P. iv

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account of relations between the two states, it is clear that this document provides a representative

account of Ethiopian attitudes towards the post-independence economic dichotomy in the Horn of

Africa the way in which it increased tensions and ultimately partially contributed to the outbreak of

war between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Ruth Iyob explains how:

“Innovative approaches to sharing economic and political resources, which had earlier served the

two organizations well, were extended to the post-war period. Permeable borders during peacetime

necessitated the crafting of mutually agreed pacts which respected the rights of individual citizens,

migrant communities and the sovereign rights of the two states. When misunderstandings and

disagreements between regimes became entangled in historical grievances, and national identities

became mired in a battle between pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial identities, the claims and

counter-claims for territories also became personalized, nationalised, regionalised and

internationalized. What had begun as 'comradely' understanding had evolved into a divergence of

'national interests' which shattered the earlier vision of a common economic market and a regional

security network. It also exposed the fragility of an alliance already hailed as a symbol of

continental renaissance.”34

This analysis shows how the overt economic dispute between the two countries during this period

was in fact indicative of underlying tensions concerning nationalism, identity and ultimately,

divergent histories and memories which will be explored in more depth towards the end of this

analysis, in an attempt to deconstruct the ideologies which culminated in the outbreak of open

warfare between Eritrea and Ethiopia, and indeed, have caused or contributed to warfare generally

throughout history. Furthermore, Iyob's theory of Eritrea as an archetypal diasporic state will also

34R. Iyob, The Ethiopian–Eritrean Conflict: Diasporic vs. Hegemonic States in the Horn of Africa, 1991- 2000, The Journal of Modern African Studies (2000) P. 667

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be analysed in more detail to assist in the explanation of the development of nationalism and

ideology in the region. However, first we come to the thirty year period of liberation struggle which

preceded this so-called era of new beginnings for Eritrea and Ethiopia.

“ The point of no return.” 35

Military Resistance & Liberation Struggle, 1961-1991

The thirty year Eritrean liberation struggle sowed the seeds of tensions and ultimately, conflict

between Eritrea and Ethiopia. Connell, writing at the time, stated that, “although the Eritrean and

Ethiopian leaderships cooperated during the immediate postwar years, deep-seated tensions over the

effects of the long conflict – which claimed hundreds of thousands of lives between 1961 and 1991

– remained, providing fertile ground for a resumption of hostilities...the fact that each side is

heavily armed with weapons left over from the struggles of the 1970s and 1980s only heightened

this potential.”36 Here, Connell raises two interesting points which pertain to the way in which the

Eritrean war of independence can be directly linked to the outbreak of hostilities in 1998. Firstly, it

is clear that thirty years of conflict between the two countries created a sense of mutual antagonism

which by no means disappeared after Eritrea won its independence. Secondly, he addresses the

simple fact that war produces weapons. The prevalence of both light and heavy firearms, as relics of

warfare, in both countries evidently increased the likelihood of a resumption of hostilities between

the two states. Indeed, Bereket Habte Selassie wrote in 1986 that, “The Soviet alliance has

introduced arms into the region on a massive scale, increasing the military power of Ethiopia

tenfold...this massive arms infusion and the consequent militarisation of Ethiopian society has

35P. Nugent, Africa Since Independence, New York: Palgrave Macmillan (2004) P. 43736D. Connell, Report from the Field: From Alliance to the Brink of All-Out War: Explaining the Eritrea-Ethiopia Border Crisis, Middle East Report (1998) P. 41

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aggravated the instability of the region.”37 Plaut states that “the differences between Addis Ababa

and Asmara are many and complex, going back over decades to the origins of the Eritrean and

Tigrayan movements that now rule their respective capitals.”38 Reid writes that, “it was unavoidable

that the Eritrean and Tigrayan liberation struggles would become intertwined, in terms of

geographical proximity if not fraternal union; they shared the most basic common objective in the

destruction of the Derg regime.”39 In 1961 the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) began to launch

small scale attacks against Ethiopian police outposts and enclaves. However, the predominantly

Muslim led, ELF movement soon began to fracture as it was regarded as overtly hierarchical and

increasingly reactionary. This led to the emergence of the more radical and populist Eritrean

People's Liberation Front (EPLF). The EPLF were resolutely Marxist in their ideology from the

outset, and “went on to redefine their cause as a social-cum-national struggle dedicated to the

transformation of society in the process form liberation rule.”40 This ideological progression further

sowed the seeds of Eritrean nationalism, resolutely defined in opposition to its Ethiopian

neighbours. The struggle of the Tigrayan population against Ethiopian rule, was led by the Tigrayan

People's Liberation Front from the mid-1970s onwards. Meles Zanawi emerged as the leader of the

movement, who would later become president of the modern Ethiopian state. Although the EPLF

and the TPLF cooperated in overthrowing Mengistu Haile Mariam's regime and the authority of the

Derg, relations between the two groups were characterised by their mutually antagonistic nature and

recurring ideological conflict. There were constant disputes and disagreements over the ultimate

goals of the alliance and relations were strained between the two movements. For example, Paul

37B. Selassie, The Eritrean War and Prospects for Peace in the Horn of Africa, in, Conflict and Conflict Resolution in the Horn of Africa, Proceedings: 1st International Conference on the Horn of Africa, New York: New School for Social Research (1986) P. 2938M. Plaut, Towards a Cold Peace? The Outcome of the Ethiopia-Eritrea War of 1998-2000, Review of African Political Economy (2001) P. 12639R. Reid, Old problems in New Conflicts, Journal of the International African Institute (2003) P. 38140J. Markakis, Nationalism and Marxism in the Horn of Africa, in, The Ethiopian Revolution and its Impact on the Politics of the Horn of Africa, Proceedings: 2nd International Conference on the Horn of Africa, New York: New School for Social Research (1987) P. 132

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Nugent explains that the “nadir in their relationship came at the height of the famine in 1985 when

the EPLF severed relations and prevented food aid from passing through Sudan to Eritrea, thus

forcing the TPLF to construct its own road at short notice. This use of famine as a political weapon

– something normally associated with the Derg – created an enmity between the leaderships of the

two organisations which never really disappeared.”41 Furthermore, anti-Ethiopian and nationalist

rhetoric was extremely prevalent at the time as illustrated by this extract from an Eritrean appeal to

the General Assembly in New York in 1971: “ Under the yoke of Ethiopian oppression they have

been forced to resort to an armed struggle in order to defend themselves against Ethiopian

aggression and regain their freedom and fundamental human rights.”42This testimony is indicative

of the extent to which Eritrean nationalism had escalated as a result of the liberation struggle and

furthermore, how Eritrean identity was defined in opposition to the 'other' represented by their

Ethiopian neighbours. Moreover, during the struggle against the Ethiopian regime, the two groups

developed considerable underlying ideological differences. Medhane Tadesse comments that “the

TPLF openly questioned the democratic nature of the EPLF and concluded that it would only

provide it with critical support. In other words, as early as 1981 the TPLF made it clear that its

alliance with the EPLF was only tactical and not strategic.” Also, the TPLF openly condemned the

Soviet Union at a time when the EPLF considered the USSR as a crucial strategic ally.43 These

obvious ideological differences coloured the tense relationship between the two liberation

movements and were carried over into the post-independence era. Keller points out that, “once the

fighting was over, it was quickly apparent that Eritrean self-determination was not a foregone

conclusion.”44 This period of ambiguity simply added to the build up of political and ideological

41P. Nugent, Africa Since Independence, New York: Palgrave Macmillan (2004) P. 43942The Eritrean Liberation Front, Eritrea: A Victim of U.N Decision and of Ethiopian Aggression, New York: Eritrean Studies (1971) P. 4 43M. Tadesse, The Eritrean-Ethiopian War: Retrospect and Prospects, Addis Ababa: Mega Printing Enterprise (1999) P. 7644E. Keller, Revolutionary Ethiopia, Bloomington: Indiana University Press (1988) P. 151

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tensions in the region. Nugent, in support of the theory that the period of liberation struggle

ultimately contributed to the outbreak of the Eritrea-Ethiopia war, argues that, “Whether this was

just a border dispute is open to question. Arguably, the war arose out of the clash of wills between

two rival liberation movements who disagreed so fiercely because they had so much in common.”45

A Channel 4 news program broadcast in March 1999 reported that, “in Eritrea, hard won

independence from Ethiopia has bred a fierce patriotism.”46 This illustrates the way in which the

Eritrean liberation struggle engendered a strong sense of nationalism in the country, which

ultimately contributed significantly to the outbreak of the war. Furthermore, Medhane Tadesse

writes that, “In light of the support that the EPLF secured from many corners, the obsession with

the history of 'self-reliance' is only bizarre.” However, “many Eritreans continued to deny the above

fact and convinced themselves that 'by defeating the Ethiopian and the world at large', they had

accomplished a miracle.”47 This illustrates one of the crucial reasons why the winning of

independence bred such strong nationalism and also the way in which the defeat of the incumbent

Ethiopian regime gave Eritrea an arguably inflated sense of strength and importance which would

only exacerbate the fraught nature of the situation leading up to the outbreak of war. Moreover, the

EPLF were able to further strengthen Eritrean nationalist sentiment and ideology during this time

by changing the fundamental social basis of Eritrean nationalism “through the incorporation of the

highland peasantry and the educated youth and women”48 which naturally reinforced the

foundations of the Eritrean nationalist framework, within which the EPLF were able to build a

sense of fierce protectionism in the post-independent era, ultimately leading to open warfare with

Ethiopia. Connell, in a report from the war zone published in 1998, stated that “for 30 years, the

45P. Nugent, Africa Since Independence, New York: Palgrave Macmillan (2004) P. 44046http://www.channel4.com/news/ (Accessed 17/04/2010)47M. Tadesse, The Eritrean-Ethiopian War: Retrospect and Prospects, Addis Ababa: Mega Printing Enterprise (1999) P. 12248D. Pool, From Guerrillas to Government: The Eritrean People's Liberation Front, Oxford: James Currey (2001) P. 195

15

http://www.channel4.com/news/


Horn of Africa served as one of the Cold War's most intense - and destructive - battlefields...the

legacy of these years - the poverty, the social dislocation, the rival nationalist passions and the

weapons left behind by the departing superpowers - now threatens to transform a localized hiccup

into a regional contagion”.49 This essentially summarises the extremely significant contribution that

the history of the Eritrean liberation struggle has made to the underlying causality of the Eritrea-

Ethiopia war of 1998-2000. Ultimately, the legacy and impact of conflict in the Horn of Africa

during this period, both armed conflict between liberation forces and the incumbent Ethiopian

regime and ideological conflict between the two liberation forces themselves, made a significant

contribution to the tensions that were manifest in post-independence relations between the two

nations and can be seen as a definite causal undercurrent in the build up to the outbreak of war

between Eritrea and Ethiopia in 1998. Now we come to the history of the turbulent and long drawn-

out colonial era in the Horn of Africa, where the seeds of these twentieth century tensions were

sown.

Colonialism & Conflict in Eritrea and Ethiopia:

Histories, Memories & Identities, 1890-1961

The roots of the Eritrea-Ethiopia war are planted firmly in the complex colonial histories of the two

nations. The respective, and starkly contrasting, colonial legacies of Eritrea and Ethiopia have

shaped notions of identity, fermented ideologies of independence and resistance and ultimately

contributed significantly to the outbreak of war at the end of the twentieth century. In fact, it is

possible to trace these developments back as far as the pre-colonial era. Mesfin Araya argues that,

“traditional animosities that had their roots on pre-colonial history were reinforced during the

49D. Connell, Report from the Field: From Alliance to the Brink of All-Out War: Explaining the Eritrea-Ethiopia Border Crisis, Middle East Report (1998) P. 40

16


colonial period.”50 However, due to a lack of sources and space, this analysis shall primarily focus

on the period of European colonialism in the Horn of Africa and its contribution to the outbreak of

war between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Ethiopia's colonial history or, more to the point, lack thereof, has

engendered a strong sense of nationalism, independence and entitlement now virtually engrained in

the collective Ethiopian conciousness. Ruth Iyob explains “that the monarchs of Ethiopia should

style themselves emperors, and their domain, an empire, was no accident of history: they had

always assumed that the peoples of the Horn should be their vassals, and at various times during

Ethiopia's history, they had been.”51 This phenomenon has exacerbated the existing imbalance in

power relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea and can be seen, coupled with Eritrea's respective

colonial experience, as a fundamental cause of the modern conflict between the two states. During

the scramble for Africa, “Ethiopia alone won the race for power, routing an invading Italian army in

1896, securing its sovereignty by treaty, and going on to extend its own imperial ruler over

surrounding peoples. It would remain independent until 1936, when it fell to Mussolini's invading

fascist army.”52 This unique position as an early African vanguard state against colonial rule, as well

as its historic existence as a nation, generated a strong sense of Ethiopian nationalism and ideology.

“Though defeated, because of the spirited defence she put up and the enormous sentiment she

aroused among Africans in particular and the black peoples throughout the world, Ethiopia had at

the end of 1935 become the burning symbol of Africa's awakening form colonial rule.”53 This strong

sense of nationalism, identity and entitlement which developed at this time, was eventually set to

heavily exacerbate tensions between the two states in the lead up to war in the late twentieth

50M. Araya, Reflections on Eritrean Nationalism, in, Conflict and Conflict Resolution in the Horn of Africa, Proceedings: 1st International Conference on the Horn of Africa, New York: New School for Social Research (1986) P. 1351R. Iyob, The Ethiopian–Eritrean Conflict: Diasporic vs. Hegemonic States in the Horn of Africa, 1991- 2000, The Journal of Modern African Studies (2000) P. 66152J. Parker & R. Rathbone, African History: A Very Short Introduction, Oxford: Oxford University Press (2007) P. 9953M.B. Akpan, Liberia and Ethiopia, 1880-1914: the survival of two African states, in, A. Boahen (ed.), UNESCO General History of Africa, Vol. VII: Africa Under Colonial Domination 1880-1935, California: University of California Press (1985) P. 313

17


century. Eritrea's colonial experience is also extremely important in explaining the emergence of

Eritrean nationalist ideology. Indeed, the modern state of Eritrea was created by the amalgamation

of three Italian colonial possessions in January 189054 which the Italian government dubbed

Erythrea (subsequently changed to Eritrea).55 Michela Wrong states that, “it's hard to think of

another African country that was interfered with by foreign powers quite so thoroughly, and so

disastrously, as Eritrea.”56 Francesca Locatelli explains the importance of the Italian colonial period

in explaining modern day Eritrean perceptions of nationality, identity and history. “The question of

Eritrean national identity is intimately connected to its colonial history, which in many ways

remains marginalized in the analysis of Eritrean past. The Italian colonial period between 1890 and

1941 was a crucial moment in the definition of those social and political transformations which

contributed to the formation of Eritrea as a nation.”57 In fact, Eritrea was unfortunate enough to be

occupied by three separate colonial powers during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, namely

Italy, Britain and Ethiopia respectively. This tripartite nature of colonial rule had a profound effect

on Eritrean state, society, identity and ideology. Indeed, Martin Meredith explains how Eritrea, “as

an Italian colony for fifty years...had gained a distinct identity of its own.”58 A document published

by the Government of Eritrea in 1993 states that “each of these foreign interventions had a distinct

impact on the development of Eritrea as a nation and in the formation of an Eritrean identity.”59 The

creation of a unique Eritrean national identity, defined in opposition to Ethiopia, was fostered and

engendered by successive colonial administrations in the country. The construction of an ambitious

and expensive railway by the Italian colonial state, “marked the time when Eritrea, exposed to

54T. Negash & K. Tronvoli, Brothers at War: Making Sense of the Eritrean-Ethiopian War, Oxford: James Currey (2000) P. 555S. Pankhurst, Eritrea on the Eve, Walthamstow: The Walthamstow Press (1952) P. 4256M. Wrong, I Didn't Do It For You: How the World Betrayed a Small African Nation, London: Fourth Estate (2005) P. xii 57F. Locatelli, The Archives of the Municipality and the High Court of Asmara, Eritrea: Discovering the Eritrea "Hidden from History", History in Africa (2004) P. 46958M. Meredith, The State of Africa, Great Britain: The Free Press (2005) P. 20859Government of Eritrea, Eritrea: Birth of a Nation, Asmara: Department of External Affairs (1993) P. 8

18


Western influences and endowed with the infrastructure of a modern industrial state, started down a

path that would lead its citizens further and further away from their neighbours in feudal

Abyssinia.”60 Moreover, “when the Italians were defeated in 1941, the British military

administration which provisionally took control of the territory further stimulated a sense of

Eritrean identity by encouraging the creation of political parties, labour unions and a free press,

none of which was to be found in Ethiopia.”61 This fostered the emergence of independent ideology

and reinforced the prevalence of internal opposition to Ethiopia and a unique identity, specifically

defined in contrast to their neighbouring nation. Also, “Under the British military occupation that

lasted until 1951 there emerged in Eritrea a number of political parties which reflected the

complicated ethnic and religious situation.” These included the Unionist party which was broadly

defined as Christian and aligned itself with Ethiopia and was in support of a unilateral federation

between the two countries. On the other end of the political spectrum was the Muslim League, later

renamed the Independence Bloc, which identified itself as Islamic and sought absolute

independence for Eritrea.62 However, Trevaskis argues that “ Italian defeat had brought Eritrea into

the shadows of disease, disorder, and famine.”63 This illustrates the negative aspects of colonialism

which in turn explains the gradual development of Eritrean nationalist sentiment. In fact, the British

had tried to enlist the support of the Eritreans against the Fascists even before World War II. They

pledged to push for Eritrean self-determination if the Eritreans would turn against their colonial

masters. During the Fascist occupation of the Horn, the British further raised hopes for a changed

situation by bombarding the region with leaflets that appeared to support self-determination for

Eritrea. One leaflet dropped by the RAF on Asmara read:

60M. Wrong, I Didn't Do It For You: How the World Betrayed a Small African Nation, London: Fourth Estate (2005) P. 6561M. Meredith, The State of Africa: A History of Fifty Years of Independence, Great Britain: The Free Press (2005) P. 20862I. Hrbek, North Africa and the Horn, in, A. Mazuri (ed.), UNESCO General History of Africa, VIII: Africa since 1935, California: James Currey (1993) P. 15163G. Trevaskis, Eritrea, A Colony in Transition:1941-52, Westport: Greenwood Press (1960) P. 18

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“Message from the British government, Eritrean soldiers listen!

Desert form the Italians and join us...you people who wish to live under the flag of His Imperial

Majesty, Haile Selassie I, and to have your own flag, we give you our word you shall be allowed to

choose what government you desire”64

However, despite certain promises before, and positive developments under, British colonial rule, in

reality things remained relatively unchanged. Many Italian officials were retained by the British

administration, which led to increasing resentment of colonial rule amongst the Eritrean population.

After this ultimately detrimental period of British administration, Eritrea was passed into the less

than capable hands of Haile Selassie under the spurious authority of the Ethiopian empire. Ali

Mazuri explains that, “Eritrea became an integral part of the Ethiopian empire. Bahru Zewde argues

that in regards to the occupation of Eritrea, “Ethiopia had a strong case on the grounds of history,

national defence and access to the sea.”65 This argument raises the issues of conflicting histories

which were to come to the forefront of Eritrean-Ethiopian relations after Eritrean independence, and

will be examined in more detail towards the end of this paper. Thus, the seeds of future conflict

were sown at this time, particularly when further opposition leaders went into exile and when in the

country itself armed guerilla groups began the fight against the Ethiopian administration and troops,

thus creating another grave problem for Ethiopia.66 Haile Selassie, having been handed Eritrea as a

colony of his Empire, viewed the country with suspicion from the very beginning and soon began to

systematically abolish one democratic institution after another. A ban on political parties was

instituted in 1956 followed by an outright ban of Eritrean symbols and the abolition of the Eritrean

64S. Pankhurst, British Policy in Eritrea and northern Ethiopia, Woodford Green (1946) P. 165B. Zewde, A History of Modern Ethiopia, London: James Currey (1991) P. 18166I. Hrbek, North Africa and the Horn, in, A. Mazuri (ed.), UNESCO General History of Africa, VIII: Africa since 1935, California: James Currey (1993) P. 151

20


flag in 1958.67 Basil Davidson explains that “In defiance of UN promises, Eritrea was absorbed into

this Ethiopian empire as a mere province with no powers of its own. Trouble followed at once.

Eritrean nationalism had grown much stronger and more effective by now. Challenging this

Ethiopian annexation, young Eritrean nationalists began a guerilla war for independence.”68 In this

way, we can see that the colonial legacy in Eritrea had a profound effect on the construction of

Eritrean identity and nationality, which in turn exacerbated the heightening of tensions before the

war with Ethiopia. Furthermore, it is clear that colonialism in the Horn of Africa also had a huge

impact on aspects of society and in the political arena. Moreover, it appears indisputable that

Ethiopian colonialism led to the emergence of Eritrean armed resistance to colonial rule which, as

we have observed, ultimately contributed significantly to the underlying tensions surrounding the

Eritrea-Ethiopia war of the late twentieth century. Finally, “it was Italian colonialism that

demarcated the Eritrean space from that of Ethiopia.”69 Indeed, a treaty drawn up in 1990 between

Italy and Ethiopia states that the “line Tomat-Toduluc-Mareb-Belessa-Muna, traced on the map

annexed, is recognized by the two Contracting Parties as the boundary between Eritrea and

Ethiopia.”70 These initial colonial boundaries were reinforced, dissolved and redrawn throughout

Eritrea's colonial experience but can ultimately be seen as the origin of the modern Eritrean state

and thus the root cause of much of the tensions now surrounding relations between Eritrea and

Ethiopia.

67E. Keller, Revolutionary Ethiopia, Bloomington: Indiana University Press (1988) P. 18068B. Davidson, Modern Africa: A Social and Political History, London: Longman (1995) P. 11469K. Tronvoll, Borders of Violence - Boundaries of Identity: Demarcating the Eritrean Nation-State, Journal of Ethnic & Racial Studies (1999) P. 4370H. Ghebre-Ab, Ethiopia and Eritrea: A Documentary Study, Trenton: Red Sea Press (1993) P. 10

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The Border Issue:

Demarcation and the Concept of a Nation

Iyob explains how the “barrage of information that flowed from the usually reticent Eritreans was

quite novel, as was the deluge of government-sanctioned Ethiopian publications questioning the

role of independent Eritrea in the history of the sub-region, the validity of its claim to separateness,

and its inherited colonial boundaries.”71 This process of the production and propagation of

propaganda on the part of Ethiopia is indicative of the underlying importance of the border issue.

Indeed, although the overt territorial conflict has already been dismissed as superficial to the

genuine causality of the war it is clear that wider concepts surrounding the subject of borders and

boundaries are crucial in explaining the outbreak of war between Eritrea and Ethiopia. Territorial

claims even date back as far as the pre-colonial period. David Pool explains how Ethiopia's claim of

sovereignty over Eritrea during the period of liberation struggle was based on, “its 'control' over the

area for 3,000 to 4,000 years...based on the existence of the kingdom of Axum.”72 Redie Bereketeab

argues that the period of Eritrean liberation struggle, “played a salient role in the general process of

nation formation” in Eritrea. He continues, “the armed struggle for the liberation of Eritrea

represents the most outstanding and vital process in a chain of historical events which began in

1890 and culminated in the formation of the State of Eritrea in 1991.”73 Carl von Clausewitz wrote

in the nineteenth century that, "war is not merely a political act, but also a real political instrument,

a continuation of political commerce, a carrying out of the same by other means."74 It is clear that

the Eritrea-Ethiopia war was, in many ways, the continuation of politics by other means. Tesfatsion

Medhanie, writing incredibly prophetically in 1994, lamented the existence of elements in Ethiopian

71R. Iyob, The Ethiopian–Eritrean Conflict: Diasporic vs. Hegemonic States in the Horn of Africa, 1991- 2000, The Journal of Modern African Studies (2000) P. 66772D. Pool, Eritrea: Africa's Longest War, London: Anti-Slavery Society (1979) P. 1473R. Bereketeab, Eritrea: The Making of a Nation 1890-1991, Uppsala: Repro Ekonomikum (2000) P. 21874Clausewitz, On War, London: Penguin (1982) P. 18

22


society who still saw Eritrea as their sovereign territory. He stated that the proliferation of this

opinion “tends to undermine the effort to deepen the cooperation between the two countries and

attain a level of relations approximate to unity. It is a viewpoint which can lead to war; and another

round of war is something which neither Ethiopians nor Eritreans can afford.”75 This shows how an

engrained sense of the Ethiopian nation in the collective conciousness of elements of society

contributed to the outbreak of warfare, and also, that the war was not necessarily unexpected. Iyob

also explains the fundamental incompatibility of the existence of regions with different systems of

rule, technically administered by Ethiopia but ultimately under Eritrean jurisdiction. She states that,

“In times of peace such administrative coexistence could serve as a harbinger of regional

integration, but when disagreements arose between Eritrean and Tigrayan farmers over land claims,

the problems of sovereignty began to make themselves felt. Though numerous meetings were held

to resolve what were considered minor 'local' issues, the problem remained that of reconciling

territorial sovereignty with local administration."76 Thus, what came later to be known as a border

dispute had its beginnings in the conflicting interpretation of the two authorities over the

governance of adjacent border areas.” This shows how the issue surrounding borderlands between

the two countries went far deeper than two bald men fighting over a comb, and contributed to the

conflict as an underlying cause, as well as an overt catalyst. The overarching and obvious dispute

concerning territory and borderlands was a manifestation of pre-existing concerns about borders and

indeed nations, which have furthermore been closely linked with concepts of ethnicity, identity and

nationality in the Horn of Africa.

75T. Medhanie, Eritrea & Neighbours in the 'New World Order', Hamburg: Lit Verlag (1994) PP.121-12276R. Iyob, The Ethiopian–Eritrean Conflict: Diasporic vs. Hegemonic States in the Horn of Africa, 1991- 2000, The Journal of Modern African Studies (2000) P. 673

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Contrasting Histories; Conflicting Ideologies:

Ethnicity, Identity and Nationality

Despite the importance of borders and demarcation in explaining the outbreak of the Ethiopian-

Eritrean war, Reid argues that, “While problems over boundaries, festering as they have done over

the past two decades or more, can be seen to have been the catalyst for conflict, they should also be

seen as having been secondary in importance to the much larger and more explosive questions of

nationality, ethnicity and unity.”77 As Tadesse states, “history shows that no state will go to war over

a small issue. In most cases, conflict demands deeper reasons to justify it.”78 Paul Nugent points out

that, from the very beginning, “Cementing a sense of Eritrean nationhood was a tall order in view of

the mutually reinforcing fault-lines which separated highlanders from lowlanders, agriculturalists

from pastoralists and Christians from Muslims. There was nothing which made Eritrea in any sense

'natural', and as a political idea it arose out of Italian colonialism.”79 It has already been discussed in

detail how Eritrea's colonial experience led to the rise of nationalism and a unified sense of identity

within the territory. Suffice it to say here that more than 70 years of colonial rule not only

constructed 'Eritrea' but also fostered a strong sense of what it was to be Eritrean, which was very

much defined in opposition to its colonial rulers. However, Mesfin Araya refutes this stating that,

“not even collective oppression under colonial rule for half a century had produced any unifying

nationalist tradition within Eritrea.” 80 Indeed, Bereketeab points out that “several foreign observers

as well as Eritreans maintain that in actuality, Eritrean nationalism and nationhood was ultimately

77R. Reid, Old problems in New Conflicts: Some Observations on Eritrea and its Relations with Tigray, from Liberation Struggle to Inter-State War, Journal of the International African Institute (2003) P. 39578M. Tadesse, The Eritrean-Ethiopian War: Retrospect and Prospects, Addis Ababa: Mega Printing Enterprise (1999) P. 12079P. Nugent, Africa Since Independence, New York: Palgrave Macmillan (2004) P. 43780M. Araya, Reflections on Eritrean Nationalism, in, Conflict and Conflict Resolution in the Horn of Africa, Proceedings: 1st International Conference on the Horn of Africa, New York: New School for Social Research (1986) P. 13

24


formed through the national liberation struggle.”81 Undoubtedly then, colonialism in the Horn of

Africa sowed the first seeds of Eritrean nationalism and laid the foundations for the State of Eritrea,

but evidently it took the solidifying process of the thirty year liberation struggle to encourage these

seeds to blossom into fully fledged Eritrean nationalistic sentiment. In support of this argument,

Richard Grennfield argues that, “it is within the overall setting of the African revolution that Italian

colonialism in general and land policies in particular, and British military administration, both,

provided the culture in which modern Eritrean nationalism could develop. The Eritreans recognised

a common historical experience. The catalyst was their growing and dissatisfied indigenous

working class – ever more politically aware and stimulating a politically progressive Eritrean

nationalism.”82 It was this strong sense of nationalism, coupled with and reinforced by the legacy of

colonialism, which was to contribute heavily towards the instigation and continuation of conflict

between Eritrea and Ethiopia. Araya also argues that “nationalist movements, whatever their forms,

thrive on past national history, on myth, on past national rituals”. He suggests that Eritrea lacks this

nationalistic background but it appears, through evidence provided previously, that the opposite is

the case and it is precisely this which was cultivated and stimulated by colonialism and liberation.

He also argues that Eritrea has no genuine national hero to rally behind.83 However, now Eritrea

arguably has a national hero to call its own in the form of Issayas Afeworki who has emerged from

the liberation struggle to stand at the forefront of the Eritrean state and has managed to construct an

identity of heroism within a framework of intense, and often blind, nationalism and jingoism. David

O'Kane states that, “mass nationalism produces mass warfare”.84 Indeed, it is clear that the very

nature of nationality breeds a strong sense of territorial identity. Thus, the natural development of

81R. Bereketeab, Eritrea: The Making of a Nation 1890-1991, Uppsala: Repro Ekonomikum (2000) P. 21882B.Davidson, An Historical Note, in, B. Davidson et al. (eds.), Behind the War in Eritrea, Nottingham: Spokesman (1980) P. 2583M. Araya, Reflections on Eritrean Nationalism, in, Conflict and Conflict Resolution in the Horn of Africa, Proceedings: 1st International Conference on the Horn of Africa, New York: New School for Social Research (1986) P. 1384D. O’Kane, War in Africa: Space, Place and the Eritrea-Ethiopia War of 1998-2000, in, A. Éigeartaigh & D. Getty (eds.), Borders and Borderlands in Contemporary Culture, Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Press (2006) P. 27

25


nationalism when attached to a territorial entity is for that ideology to manifest itself in either the

defence or the expansion of the 'nation'. This seemingly inevitable process can be observed

throughout the broad spectrum of global history. Explaining the detrimental effect of nationalism on

creating unaccountable and often tyrannical leadership, Gaim Kibreab states that “if according to

Karl Marx, 'Religion...is the opium of the people,' surely it can be said that nationalism is the crack

cocaine of the human conscience.”85 This effectively sums up the way in which strong and

unbridled nationalism in Eritrea led to the emergence of a authoritarian leadership which was thus

able to go to war without question or protest. Ruth Iyob's theory of Eritrea as a diasporic state is

extremely useful in understanding the nature of Eritrean nationalism and of the relationship between

Eritrea and Ethiopia. She argues that Eritrea adopted the role of a diasporic state and Ethiopia that

of a hegemonic state in the region. “In short, the alliance embodied a paradox: the very energy

which generated its short-lived success also led to its collapse.”86 Moreover, Leenco Lata describes

the importance of underlying ethnic tensions and notions of ethnicity in explaining the conflict,

“although the war is officially between Eritrea and Ethiopia, 'The people who are fighting each

other should not be viewed as all of Ethiopia against all of Eritrea', according to Chester Crocker.

'It's really Tigrayans and Eritreans going at each other'.”87 Evidently, historic ethnic identities were

also behind much of the animosity between the two sides during the build-up to the conflict, and

indeed during the war itself.

85G. Kibreab, Eritrea: A Dream Deferred, Woodbridge: James Currey (2009) P. 39186R. Iyob, The Ethiopian–Eritrean Conflict: Diasporic vs. Hegemonic States in the Horn of Africa, 1991- 2000, The Journal of Modern African Studies (2000) P. 66087L. Lata, The Ethiopia-Eritrea War, Review of African Political Economy (2003) P. 370

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Conclusions:

The Causes and Consequences of the Eritrea-Ethiopia war

Ultimately, it is practically impossible to completely put the together the impenetrable puzzle of the

Eritrea-Ethiopia war. Due to the contemporary nature of the conflict there are evidently still some

key pieces missing. However, as this analysis has shown, it is certainly possible to construct a fairly

accurate approximation of what the completed puzzle would look like if we could find all the

missing pieces. It is fundamentally clear that there was a lot more to the conflict in question than the

neo-colonialist western view of two bald men fighting over a comb. To conclude, it seems pertinent

to offer a brief overview of the consequences of the Eritrea-Ethiopia war and the overall situation in

the Horn of the Africa in the twenty-first century. Debessay Hedru paints a bleak picture of the post-

war Eritrean state, “In the new millennium, Eritrea is known as a rogue state ruled by a rigid

dictatorship. Following a reckless war with its giant neighbour Ethiopia that lasted two years (1998-

2000), Eritrea has become a place where comrades-in-arms of a lifetime have turned on each other,

heroes of yesterday are the 'traitors' of today, and brother dare not trust brother. Imprisonment and

disappearances designed to keep the population in line are common, while famine is stalking the

countryside. Once again, Eritreans are seeking refuge abroad, this time fleeing oppression from

their own government, and those who fled Ethiopian oppression earlier, are not planning to

return.”88 This passionate and damning portrayal of modern day Eritrea reflects a viewpoint which

is almost unanimously subscribed to outside the confines of the country itself, which has become

something akin to a national prison and effectively a police state. Indeed, the international

community has almost unanimously labelled Eritrea as a so-called 'failed state'89. The reasons for

this downward spiral into totalitarianism could easily constitute the basis of another analysis

88D. Hedru, Eritrea: Transition to Dictatorship, 1991-2003, Review of African Political Economy (2003) P. 43589http://www.fundforpeace.org/ (Accessed 25/04/2010)

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http://www.fundforpeace.org/

http://www.fundforpeace.org/


altogether but it is enough to say here that it pertains heavily to the exploitation of the passionate

nationalism which was borne out of colonialism, liberation struggle and warfare, by Issayas

Afeworki and the Eritrean government. Furthermore, “active hostilities with Ethiopia enabled him

[Issayas Afeworki] to charge the opposition with defeatism and treason, and to raise the spectre of

an Ethiopian re-occupation of Eritrea.”90 Ruth Iyob asks, “Could the war have been prevented?” and

concludes that, “Yes, in all likelihood, had the two governments taken the trouble to demarcate the

borders in the area of contention and settle on mutually acceptable, and generally understood,

administrative, juridical, and security arrangements. But they had not, preferring to leave such

matters to be 'resolved' under the benevolent and permissive aura of the alliance. There is even

justification for arguing that by May 1998, the alliance was already beyond recall, and that it needed

only a spark to end it once and for all.”91 Although it is clear that the border conflict could have

potentially been avoided, the underlying tensions between the two countries would have inevitably

persisted. It would have only taken another catalyst to spark the eventual outbreak of war. Reid

explains that “some might argue that some form of armed conflict was in fact necessary in the

shaping of regional identities-in the confirmation of Eritrean independence.”92 However, there is

little evidence that the war itself has resolved any real disputes or differences between Eritrea and

Ethiopia. Indeed, tensions remain fraught in the Horn of Africa, especially as neither side has been

able to come to satisfactory terms of agreement concerning the overarching question of their mutual

border. Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi has been quoted as saying, “Normalisation of

relations is normal upon signing peace treaties, but a relation of good neighbourliness is

unbelievable and not foreseeable with the incumbent in Eritrea.”93 This current state of cold peace

90D. Hedru, Eritrea: Transition to Dictatorship, 1991-2003, Review of African Political Economy (2003) P. 44391R. Iyob, The Ethiopian–Eritrean Conflict: Diasporic vs. Hegemonic States in the Horn of Africa, 1991- 2000, The Journal of Modern African Studies (2000) P. 67792R. Reid, Old problems in New Conflicts: Some Observations on Eritrea and its Relations with Tigray, from Liberation Struggle to Inter-State War, Journal of the International African Institute (2003) P. 39593M. Plaut, Towards a Cold Peace? The Outcome of the Ethiopia-Eritrea War of 1998-2000, Review of African Political Economy (2001) P. 128

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clearly demonstrates the ultimate futility of the conflict itself. Guy Arnold states that the Eritrea-

Ethiopia war, “demonstrated both the fragility and underlying hostilities that existed throughout the

Horn.”94 Indeed, the wider implications and ramifications of the conflict are extremely important to

take into consideration, and could again, form the backbone of an additional analysis. Plaut states

that the “war between Ethiopia and Eritrea has been transformative for the whole region.”95 Since

independence, the Horn of Africa has been perpetually prone to political and social instability. One

need only look to the conflict and ongoing instability in Sudan and the political situation in

Somalia, not to mention Eritrea's military disputes with Yemen and Djibouti, to see that disruption

and dislocation are practically endemic in the region. The causes of much of this regional instability,

just like the Ethiopia-Eritrea war, can undoubtedly be attributed to the impact of the colonial legacy

in the region and the prevalence of conflicting ideologies and concepts of nationhood, identity and

ethnicity in the Horn of Africa. By analysing the history of the conflict, from the war itself to the

beginnings of the colonial period in the Horn of Africa, it has been possible to identify key issues

and underlying themes which can be directly linked to the overall causes of, and reasons behind, the

Eritrea-Ethiopia war. It is clear that far from being about two bald men fighting over a comb, the

Eritrea-Ethiopia war was about two distinct nations, with divergent and markedly different histories

and ideologies, fighting over unfinished business which had been carried over from the colonial era

and the period of liberation struggle.

94G. Arnold, Africa: A Modern History, London: Atlantic Books (2005) P. 86095M. Plaut, Towards a Cold Peace? The Outcome of the Ethiopia-Eritrea War of 1998-2000, Review of African Political Economy (2001) P. 129

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Eritrea-Ethiopia War (1998-2000)

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