Erik Peterson

3
Erik Peterson (A) a. What problems are facing Erik Peterson? Peterson was the general manager of Green Mountain Cellular, one of CelluComm’s subsidiaries. Meeting with Knight to discuss several problems that Peterson’s organization was experiencing and Peterson’s plans for dealing with them. GMCT had originally been targeted to begin service to subscribers on February 1, but it was now a month behind target because of several major problems. The newly revised turn-on date that Peterson had submitted to headquarters was April 1—three weeks away—and the purpose of the meeting with Knight was to go over Peterson’s plans for meeting that date. When Jenkins (i.e., President of CelluComm) made Peterson the offer, Jenkins explained that the Green Mountain system was having a number of serious start-up problems and that it was a relatively high-exposure situation for CelluComm. Peterson knew that Jenkins was such a demanding task master that when the new Sacramento system had failed to meet his expectations, he replaced the former manager and had the new manager report directly to him. Jenkins had seen Sacramento as an opportunity for CelluComm to develop a showcase system; instead, the operation had encountered enormous cost and schedule problems. To remedy the situation Jenkins put a promising young manager in charge of Sacramento, and he himself became actively involved in working with the new manager. When Peterson arrived in August, an existing organization of six people was already engaged in working on the design and initial construction of the system. GMCT’s offices were located in Hanover, New Hampshire. The GMCT system consisted of 21 cells, although Peterson had planned on having only 16 operational when the system turned on and GMCT actually began marketing its services to customers. The remaining

description

case

Transcript of Erik Peterson

Page 1: Erik Peterson

Erik Peterson (A)a. What problems are facing Erik Peterson?

Peterson was the general manager of Green Mountain Cellular, one of CelluComm’s subsidiaries. Meeting with Knight to discuss several problems that Peterson’s organization was experiencing and Peterson’s plans for dealing with them.

GMCT had originally been targeted to begin service to subscribers on February 1, but it was now a month behind target because of several major problems. The newly revised turn-on date that Peterson had submitted to headquarters was April 1—three weeks away—and the purpose of the meeting with Knight was to go over Peterson’s plans for meeting that date.

When Jenkins (i.e., President of CelluComm) made Peterson the offer, Jenkins explained that the Green Mountain system was having a number of serious start-up problems and that it was a relatively high-exposure situation for CelluComm.

Peterson knew that Jenkins was such a demanding task master that when the newSacramento system had failed to meet his expectations, he replaced the former manager and had the new manager report directly to him. Jenkins had seen Sacramento as an opportunity for CelluComm to develop a showcase system; instead, the operation had encountered enormous cost and schedule problems. To remedy the situation Jenkins put a promising young manager in charge of Sacramento, and he himself became actively involved in working with the new manager.

When Peterson arrived in August, an existing organization of six people was already engaged in working on the design and initial construction of the system. GMCT’s offices were located in Hanover, New Hampshire. The GMCT system consisted of 21 cells, although Peterson had planned on having only 16 operational when the system turned on and GMCT actually began marketing its services to customers. The remaining five cells would be added during the first eight months of operation to expand coverage on the system’s perimeter. While these fringe or perimeter cells could be added after the turn-on date, but Peterson without such coverage, GMCT would not be able to offer seamless coverage to subscribers—they would experience dead spots within the service area. Moreover, GMCT would be at a distinct competitive disadvantage to its competitor in the region—New England Telephone (NET), the local Bell telephone company.

-7 months of problems

The past seven months had been a difficult and at times frustrating period for Erik Peterson. He regularly worked 60 to 80 hours a week, and at times GMCT’s problems seemed so incessant that he would wake up in the middle of the night thinking about them. The problems began almost immediately. On arriving in Hanover, he discovered that instead of reporting to Jenkins, as he had assumed would be the case, he was assigned to Jeff Hardy, CelluComm’s director of budgets and plans. Hardy had been put in charge of all pre-operating systems in addition to his other duties during Peterson’s orientation period. Hardy had received his MBA a couple of years before

Page 2: Erik Peterson

Peterson, but had never had any system operating experience. As a result, Peterson found that Hardy was unable to offer him any initial advice or guidance that was specific or helpful. The nature of their relationship was somewhat ambiguous and awkward in the beginning, in fact, because Peterson had never been formally told by either Jenkins or Hardy of the reporting relationship; it just seemed to have occurred.

Problem 1: Peterson discovered he was reporting to Jenkins instead of Hardy. Hardy had been put in charge of all pre-operating systems in addition to his other duties during Peterson’s orientation period (2 months). Hardy had received his MBA a couple of years before Peterson, but had never had any system operating experience. As a result, Peterson found that Hardy was unable to offer him any initial advice or guidance that was specific or helpful. The nature of their relationship was somewhat ambiguous and awkward in the beginning, in fact, because Peterson had never been formally told by either Jenkins or Hardy of the reporting relationship; it just seemed to have occurred.1) Peterson’s direct supervisor did not have system operating experience. Consequently,

they were relationship was ambiguous and awkward.2) Hardy and Jenkins failed to formally inform Peterson who his boss was. (He never

asked?)

b. What are the underlying causes of these problems? How effective has Peterson been in taking charge of the Hanover startup, in terms of managing the new operation and of providing leadership?

c. What actions, if any, should Peterson take to turn the situation around and prepare for his meeting with Chip Knight?