EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWJANDA, LOUELLA O.

People vs. Cayat-EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWFACTS:In 1937, there exists a law (Act 1639) which bars native non-Christians from drinking gin or any other liquor outside of their customary alcoholic drinks. Cayat, a native of the Cordillera, was caught with an A-1-1 gin in violation of this Act. He was then charged and sentenced to pay P5.00 and to be imprisoned in case of insolvency. Cayat admitted his guilt but he challenged the constitutionality of the said Act. He averred, among others, that it violated his right to equal protection afforded by the constitution. He said this an attempt to treat them with discrimination or mark them as inferior or less capable race and less entitled will meet with their instant challenge. The law sought to distinguish and classify native non-Christians from Christians.ISSUE:Whether or not the said Act violates the equal protection clause.HELD:The SC ruled that Act 1639 is valid for it met the requisites of a reasonableclassification. The SC emphasized that it is not enough that the members of a group have the characteristics that distinguish them from others. Theclassificationmust, as an indispensable requisite, not be arbitrary. The requisites to be complied with are;(1) must rest on substantial distinctions;(2) must be germane to the purposes of the law;(3) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and(4) must apply equally to all members of the same class.Act No. 1639 satisfies theserequirements. Theclassificationrests on real or substantial, not merely imaginary or whimsical, distinctions. It is not based upon accident of birth or parentage. The law, then, does not seek to mark the non-Christian tribes as an inferior or less capable race. On the contrary, all measures thus far adopted in the promotion of the public policy towards them rest upon a recognition of their inherent right to equality in the enjoyment of those privileges now enjoyed by their Christian brothers. But as there can be no true equality before the law, if there is, in fact, no equality in education, the government has endeavored, by appropriate measures, to raise their culture and civilization and secure for them the benefits of their progress, withthe ultimate end in view of placing them with their Christian brothers on the basis of true equality.People of the Philippines vs Jose VeraFACTS: In 1934, Mariano Cu Unjieng was convicted in a criminal case filed against him by the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation (HSBC).In 1936, he filed for probation. The matter was referred to the Insular Probation Office which recommended the denial of Cu Unjiengs petition for probation. A hearing was set by Judge Jose Vera concerning the petition for probation. The Prosecution opposed the petition. Eventually, due to delays in the hearing, the Prosecution filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court alleging that courts like the Court of First Instance of Manila (which is presided over by Judge Vera) have no jurisdiction to place accused like Cu Unjieng under probation because under the law (Act No. 4221 or The Probation Law), probationis only meant to be applied in provinces with probation officers; that the City of Manila is not a province, and that Manila, even if construed as a province, has no designated probation officer hence, a Manila court cannot grant probation.Meanwhile, HSBC also filed its own comment on the matter alleging that Act 4221 is unconstitutional for it violates the constitutional guarantee on equal protection of the laws. HSBC averred that the said law makes it the prerogative of provinces whether or nor to apply the probation law if a province chooses to apply the probation law, then it will appoint a probation officer, but if it will not, then no probation officer will be appointed hence, that makes it violative of the equal protection clause.Further, HSBC averred that the Probation Law is an undue delegation of power because it gave the option to the provincial board to whether or not to apply the probation law however, the legislature did not provide guidelines to be followed by the provincial board.Further still, HSBC averred that the Probation Law is an encroachment of the executives power to grant pardon. They say that the legislature, by providing for a probation law, had in effect encroached upon the executives power to grant pardon. (Ironically, the Prosecution agreed with the issues raised by HSBC ironic because their main stance was the non-applicability of the probation law only in Manila while recognizing its application in provinces).For his part, one of the issues raised by Cu Unjieng is that, the Prosecution, representing the State as well as the People of the Philippines, cannot question the validity of a law, like Act 4221, which the State itself created. Further, Cu Unjieng also castigated the fiscal of Manila who himself had used the Probation Law in the past without question but is now questioning the validity of the said law (estoppel).ISSUE:1. May the State question its own laws?2. Is Act 4221 constitutional?HELD:1. Yes. There is no law which prohibits the State, or its duly authorized representative, from questioning the validity of a law. Estoppel will also not lie against the State even if it had been using an invalid law.2. No, Act 4221 or the [old] Probation Law is unconstitutional.Violation of the Equal Protection ClauseThe contention of HSBC and the Prosecution is well taken on this note. There is violation of the equal protection clause.Under Act 4221, provinces were given the option to apply the law by simply providing for a probation officer. So if a province decides not to install a probation officer, then the accused within said province will be unduly deprived of the provisions of the Probation Law.Undue Delegation of Legislative PowerThere is undue delegation of legislative power. Act 4221 provides that it shall only apply to provinces where the respective provincial boards have provided for a probation officer. But nowhere in the law did it state as to what standard (sufficient standard test) should provincial boards follow in determining whether or not to apply the probation law in their province. This only creates a roving commission which will act arbitrarily according to its whims.Encroachment of Executive PowerThough Act 4221 is unconstitutional, the Supreme Court recognized the power of Congress to provide for probation. Probation does not encroach upon the Presidents power to grant pardon. Probation is not pardon. Probation is within the power of Congress to fix penalties while pardon is a power of the president to commute penalties.

Ichongvs Hernandez- EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSEFacts:Republic Act No. 1180 is entitled "An Act to Regulate the RetailBusiness." In effect it nationalizes the retail tradebusiness.

Petitioner attacks the constitutionality of the Act, contending that: (1) it denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives of their liberty and property without due process of law ; (2) the subject of the Act is not expressed or comprehended in the title thereof; (3) the Act violatesinternationaland treaty obligations of the Republic of the Philippines; (4) the provisions of the Act against the transmission by aliens of their retailbusinessthru hereditary succession, and those requiring 100% Filipino capitalization for a corporation or entity to entitle it to engage in the retailbusiness, violate the spirit of Sections 1 and 5, Article XIII and Section 8 of Article XIV of the Constitution.

Inanswer, the Solicitor-General and the Fiscal of the City of Manila contend that: (1) the Act was passed in the validexerciseof the police power of the State, whichexerciseis authorized in the Constitution in the interest of national economic survival; (2) the Act has only one subject embraced in the title; (3) no treaty orinternationalobligations are infringed; (4) as regards hereditary succession, only the form is affected but the value of the property is not impaired, and the institution of inheritance is only of statutory origin.

Issue:Whether the conditions which the disputed law purports to remedy really or actually exist.

Held:Yes. We hold that the disputed law was enacted to remedy a real actual threat and danger to national economy posed by alien dominance and control of the retailbusinessand free citizensandcountryfrom dominance and control. Such enactment clearly falls within the scope of the police power of the State, thru which and by which it protects its own personality and insures its security and future. Furthermore, the law does not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution because sufficient grounds exist for the distinction between alien and citizen in theexerciseof the occupation regulated, nor the due process of law clause, because the law is prospective in operation and recognizes the privilege of aliens already engaged in the occupation and reasonably protects their privilege. The wisdom and efficacy of the law to carry out its objectives appear to us to be plainly evident as a matter of fact it seems not only appropriate but actually necessary and that in any case such matter falls within the prerogative of the Legislature, with whose power and discretion the Judicial department of the Government may not interfere. Moreover, the provisions of the law are clearly embraced in the title, and this suffers from no duplicity and has not misled the legislators or the segment of the population affected; and that it cannot be said to be void for supposed conflict with treaty obligations because no treaty has actually been entered into on the subject and the police power may not be curtailed or surrendered by any treaty or any other conventional agreement.Villegas vsHiuChiong Tsai Pao HoFacts:The Municipal Board of Manila enacted Ordinance 6537 requiring aliens (except those employed in the diplomatic and consular missions of foreign countries, in technical assistance programs of the government and another country, and members of religious orders or congregations) to procure the requisite mayors permit so as to be employed or engage in trade in the City of Manila. The permit fee is P50, and the penalty for the violation of the ordinance is 3 to 6 months imprisonment or a fine of P100 to P200, or both.Issue:Whether the ordinance imposes a regulatory fee or a tax.Held:The ordinances purpose is clearly to raise money under the guise of regulation by exacting P50 from aliens who have been cleared for employment. The amount is unreasonable and excessive because it fails to consider difference in situation among aliens required to pay it, i.e. being casual, permanent, part-time, rank-and-file or executive.[ The Ordinance was declared invalid as it is arbitrary, oppressive and unreasonable, being applied only to aliens who are thus deprived of their rights to life, liberty and property and therefore violates the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution. Further, the ordinance does not lay down any criterion or standard to guide the Mayor in the exercise of his discretion, thus conferring upon the mayor arbitrary and unrestricted powers. ]Dumlaovs COMELEC- EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWDumlao was the formergovernorof Nueva Vizcaya. He has retired from his office and he has been receiving retirement benefits therefrom. He filed for reelection to the same office for the 1980 local elections. On the other hand, BP 52 was passed (par 1 thereof) providing disqualification for the likes of Dumlao. Dumlao assailed the BP averring that it is class legislation hence unconstitutional. His petition was joined by Atty. Igot and Salapantan Jr. These two however have different issues. The suits of Igot and Salapantan are more of a taxpayers suit assailing the other provisions of BP 52 regarding the term of office of the elected officials, the length of the campaign and the provision barring persons charged for crimes may not run for public office and that the filing of complaints against them andafterpreliminary investigation would already disqualify them from office. In general, Dumlao invoked equal protection in the eye of the law.ISSUE:Whether or not the there is cause ofaction.HELD:The SC pointed out the procedural lapses of this case for this case would never have been merged. Dumlaos cause is different from Igots. They have separate issues. Further, this case does not meet all the requisites so that itd be eligible for judicial review. There are standards that have to be followed in the exercise of the function of judicial review, namely: (1) the existence of an appropriate case; (2) an interest personal and substantial by the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the plea that the function be exercised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the necessity that the constitutional question be passed upon in order to decide the case. In this case, only the 3rdrequisite was met. The SC ruled however that the provision barring persons charged for crimes may not run for public office and that the filing of complaints against them andafterpreliminary investigation would already disqualify them from office as null and void.The assertion that Sec 4 of BP 52 is contrary to the safeguard of equal protection is neither well taken. The constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws is subject to rational classification. If the groupings are based on reasonable and real differentiations, one class can be treated and regulated differently from another class. For purposes of public service, employees 65 years of age, have been validly classified differently from younger employees. Employees attaining that age are subject to compulsory retirement, while those of younger ages are not so compulsorily retirable.In respect of election to provincial, city, or municipal positions, to require that candidates should not be more than 65 years of age at the time they assume office, if applicable to everyone, might or might not be a reasonable classification although, as the Solicitor General has intimated, a good policy of the law should be to promote the emergence of younger blood in our political elective echelons. On the other hand, it might be that persons more than 65 years old may also be good elective local officials.Retirement from government service may or may not be a reasonable disqualification for elective local officials. For one thing, there can also be retirees from government service at ages, say below 65. It may neither be reasonable to disqualify retirees, aged 65, for a 65-year old retiree could be a good local official just like one, aged 65, who is not a retiree.But, in the case of a 65-year old elective local official (Dumalo), who has retired from a provincial, city or municipal office, there is reason to disqualify him from running for the same office from which he had retired, as provided for in the challenged provision.

Ormoc Sugar Central vs Ormoc City

Facts:The Municipal Board of Ormoc City passed Ordinance No. 4 imposing on any and all productions of centrifugal sugar milled at the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., in Ormoc City a municipal tax equivalent to one per centum (1%) per export sale to USA and other foreign countries. Payments for said tax were made, under protest, by Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. filed before the Court of First Instance of Leyte a complaint against the City of Ormoc as well as its Treasurer, Municipal Board and Mayor alleging that the ordinance is unconstitutional for being violative of the equal protection clause and the rule of uniformity of taxation. The court rendered a decision that upheld the constitutionality of the ordinance. Hence, this appeal.

Issue:Whether or not constitutional limits on the power of taxation, specifically the equal protection clause and rule of uniformity of taxation, were infringed?

Held:Yes. Equal protection clause applies only to persons or things identically situated and does not bar a reasonable classification of the subject of legislation, and a classification is reasonable where 1) it is based upon substantial distinctions; 2) these are germane to the purpose of the law; 3) the classification applies not only to present conditions, but also to future conditions substantially identical to those present; and 4) the classification applies only to those who belong to the same class. A perusal of the requisites shows that the questioned ordinance does not meet them, for it taxes only centrifugal sugar produced and exported by the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. and none other. The taxing ordinance should not be singular and exclusive as to exclude any subsequently established sugar central for the coverage of the tax.

Basco v. PAGCORGRN 91649, 14 May 1991)

FACTS:On July 11, 1983, PAGCOR was created under Presidential Decree 1869, pursuant to the policy of the government, to regulate and centralize through an appropriate institution all games of chance authorized by existing franchise or permitted by law. This was subsequently proven to be beneficial not just to the government but also to the society in general. It is a reliable source of much needed revenue for the cash-strapped Government.

Petitioners filed an instant petition seeking to annul the PAGCOR because it is allegedly contrary to morals, public policy and public order, among others.

ISSUES:Whether PD 1869 is unconstitutional because:1.) it is contrary to morals, public policy and public order;

2.) it constitutes a waiver of the right of the City of Manila to improve taxes and legal fees; and that the exemption clause in PD 1869 is violative of constitutional principle of Local Autonomy;

3.) it violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution in that it legalizes gambling thru PAGCOR while most other forms are outlawed together with prostitution, drug trafficking and other vices; and

4.) it is contrary to the avowed trend of the Cory Government, away from monopolistic and crony economy and toward free enterprise and privatization.

HELD:1.) Gambling, in all its forms, is generally prohibited, unless allowed by law. But the prohibition of gambling does not mean that the government can not regulate it in the exercise of its police power, wherein the state has the authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare.

2.) The City of Manila, being a mere Municipal Corporation has no inherent right to impose taxes. Its charter was created by Congress, therefore subject to its control. Also, local governments have no power to tax instrumentalities of the National Government.

3.) Equal protection clause of the Constitution does not preclude classification of individuals who may be accorded different treatment under the law, provided it is not unreasonable or arbitrary. The clause does not prohibit the legislature from establishing classes of individuals or objects upon which different rules shall operate.

4.) The Judiciary does not settle policy issues which are within the domain of the political branches of government and the people themselves as the repository of all state power.

Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality, thus, to be nullified, it must be shown that there is a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution. In this case, the grounds raised by petitioners have failed to overcome the presumption. Therefore, it is hereby dismissed for lack of merit.

BINAY vs DOMINGO

Facts:

The Burial Assistance Program (Resolution No. 60 assisting those who only earn less than P2,000/month of burial assistance in the amount of P500.00) made by Makati Mayor JejomarBinay, in the exercise of the police power granted to him by the municipal charter, was referred to the Commission on Audit after the municipal secretary certified the disbursement of four hundred thousand pesos for its implementation was disallowed by said commission of such disbursements because there cannot be seen any perceptible connection or relation between the objective sought to be attained and the alleged public safety, general welfare, etc. of its inhabitants.

Issue:Whether or not Resolution No. 60 of theMunicipalityofMakatiis a valid exercise of police power under the general welfare clause.

Held:

Resolution No. 60 of theMunicipalityofMakatiis a valid exercise of police power under the general welfare clause. The police power is a governmental function, an inherent attribute of sovereignty, which was born with civilized government. It is founded largely on the maxims, Sic uteretuo et ahenum non laedas (use your property so as not to impair others) and Saluspopuliest suprema lex (the welfare of the people is the supreme law). Its fundamental purpose is securing the general welfare, comfort and convenience of the people.Police power is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people.It is the most essential, insistent,and illimitable of powers. In a sense it is the greatest and most powerful attribute of the government. It is elastic and must be responsive to various social conditions. The care for the poor is generally recognized as a public duty. The support for the poor has long been an accepted exercise of police power in the promotion of the common good.NPC v. De GuzmanG.R. No. 106724 | 1994-02-09FACTS: The case at bar had its origin in the implementation of the compulsory retirement of PNP officers as mandated in Sec. 39 RA 6975, otherwise known as "An Act Establishing the Philippine National Police Under a Reorganized Department of the Interior and Local Government", which took effect on January 2, 1991. Among others, RA 6975 provides for a uniform retirement system for PNP members. Section 39 thereof reads:

"SEC. 39. Compulsory Retirement. ---- Compulsory retirement, for officer and non-officer, shall be upon the attainment of age fifty-six (56); Provided, That, in case of any officer with the rank of chief superintendent, director or deputy director general, the Commission may allow his retention in the service for an unextendible period of one (1) year.

Based on the above provision, petitioners sent notices of retirement to private respondents who are all members of the defunct Philippine Constabulary and have reached the age of fifty-six (56).Respondents aver that the age of retirement set at fifty-six (56) by Section 39 of RA 6975 cannot be applied to them since they are also covered by the 4 year transition period of Sec. 89.That term "INP" includes both the former members of the Philippine Constabulary and the local police force who were earlier constituted as the Integrated National Police (INP) by virtue of PD 765 in 1975.Petitioners contend that the 4-year transition period provided in Section 89 applies only to the local police forces who previously retire, compulsorily, at age sixty (60) for those in the ranks of Police/Fire Lieutenant or higher (Sec. 33, PD 1184); while the retirement age for the PC had already been set at fifty-six (56) under the AFP law.Trial Court ruled that the term "INP" in Section 89 of the PNP Law includes all members of the present Philippine National PoliceISSUE: WON it is a valid classification. YesHELD: The Court is merely giving life to the real intent of the legislators based on the deliberations of the Bicameral Conference Committee that preceded the enactment of RA 6975.The legislative intent to classify the INP in such manner that Section 89 of R.A. 6975 is applicable only to the local police force is clear. The question now is whether the classification is valid. The test for this is reasonableness such that it must conform to the following requirements: (1) It must be based upon substantial distinctions; (2) It must be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It must not be limited to existing conditions only; (4) It must apply equally to all members of the same class (People vs. Cayat, 68 Phil. 12 [1939]). The classification is based upon substantial distinctions. The PC, before the effectivity of the law (RA 6975), were already retirable at age 56 while the local police force were retirable at 60, and governed by different laws (P.D. 1184, Sec. 33 and Sec. 50). The distinction is relevant for the purpose of the statute, which is to enable the local police force to plan for their retirement which would be earlier than usual because of the new law. Section 89 is merely transitory, remedial in nature, and loses its force and effect once the four-year transitory period has elapsed. Finally, it applies not only to some but to all local police officers. It may be appropriate to state at this point that it seems absurd that a law will grant an extension to PC officers' retirable age from 56 to 60 and then gradually lower it back to 56 without any cogent reason at all. Why should the retirement age of PC officers be increased during the transitory period to the exclusion of other PC officers who would retire at age 56 after such period? Such absurdity was never contemplated by the law and would defeat its purpose of providing a uniform retirement age for PNP members.

Himagan vs PeopleHimagan is a policeman assigned in Camp Catititgan, Davao City. He was charged for the murder of Benjamin Machitar Jr and for the attempted murder of Benjamins younger brother, Barnabe. Pursuant to Sec 47 of RA 6975, Himagan was placed into suspension pending the murder case. The law provides that Upon the filing of a complaint or information sufficient in form and substance against a member of the PNP for grave felonies where the penalty imposed by law is six (6) years and one (1) day or more, the court shall immediately suspend the accused from office until the case is terminated. Such case shall be subject to continuous trial and shall be terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment of the accused. Himagan assailed the suspension averring that Sec 42 of PD 807 of the Civil Service Decree, that his suspension should be limited to ninety (90) days. He claims that an imposition of preventive suspension of over 90 days is contrary to the Civil Service Law and would be a violation of his constitutional right to equal protection of laws.ISSUE:Whether or not Sec 47, RA 6975 violates equal protection guaranteed by the Constitution.HELD:The language of the first sentence of Sec 47 of RA 6975 is clear, plain and free from ambiguity. It gives no other meaning than that the suspension from office of the member of the PNP charged with grave offense where the penalty is six years and one day or more shall last until the termination of the case. The suspension cannot be lifted before the termination of the case. The second sentence of the same Section providing that the trial must be terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment does not qualify or limit the first sentence. The two can stand independently of each other. The first refers to the period of suspension. The second deals with the time from within which the trial should be finished.The reason why members of the PNP are treated differently from the other classes of persons charged criminally or administratively insofar asthe applicationof the rule on preventive suspension is concerned is that policemen carry weapons and the badge of the law which can be used to harass or intimidate witnesses against them, as succinctly brought out in the legislative discussions.If a suspended policeman criminally charged with a serious offense is reinstated to his post while his case is pending, his victim and the witnesses against him are obviously exposed to constant threat and thus easily cowed to silence by the mere fact that the accused is in uniform and armed. the imposition of preventive suspension for over 90 days under Sec 47 of RA 6975 does not violate the suspended policemans constitutional right to equal protection of the laws.Suppose the trial is not terminated within ninety days from arraignment, should the suspension of accused be lifted?Theansweris certainly no. While the law uses the mandatory word shall before the phrase be terminated within ninety (90) days, there is nothing in RA 6975 that suggests that the preventive suspension of the accused will be lifted if the trial is not terminated within that period. Nonetheless, the Judge who fails to decide the case within the period without justifiable reason may be subject to administrative sanctions and, in appropriate cases where the facts so warrant, to criminal or civil liability. If the trial is unreasonably delayed without fault of the accused such that he is deprived of his right to a speedy trial, he is not without a remedy. He may ask for the dismissal of the case. Should the court refuse to dismiss the case, the accused can compel its dismissal by certiorari, prohibition or mandamus, or secure his liberty by habeas corpus.TABLARIN VS. GUTIERREZ [152 SCRA 730; G.R. No. 78164; 31 July 1987]

FACTS:The petitioners sought to enjoin the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports, the Board of Medical Education and the Canter for Educational Measurement from enforcing Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, and MECS Order No. 52, series of 1985, dated 23 August 1985 and from requiring the taking and passing of the NMAT as a condition for securing certificates of eligibility foradmission, from proceeding with accepting applications for taking the NMAT and from administering the NMAT as scheduled on 26 April 1987 and in the future. Thetrial courtdenied said petition on 20 April 1987. The NMAT was conducted and administered as previously scheduled.

Republic Act 2382, as amended by Republic Acts Nos. 4224 and 5946, known as the "Medical Act of 1959" defines its basic objectives in the following manner:

"SECTION 1. Objectives. This Act provides for and shall govern (a) the standardization and regulation of medical education; (b) the examination for registration of physicians; and (c) the supervision, control and regulation of the practice of medicine in the Philippines."

The statute, among other things, created a Board of Medical Education. Its functions as specified in Section 5 of the statute include the following:

"(a) To determine and prescriberequirements foradmissioninto a recognized college of medicine;

(f) To accept applications for certification foradmissionto a medical school and keep a register of those issued said certificate; and tocollectfrom said applicants the amount of twenty-five pesos each which shall accrue to the operating fund of the Board of Medical Education;

Section 7 prescribes certain minimumrequirements forapplicants to medical schools:

"Admissionrequirements. The medical college may admit any student who has not been convicted by any court of competent jurisdiction of any offense involving moral turpitude and who presents (a) a record of completion of a bachelor's degree in science or arts; (b) a certificate of eligibility for entrance to a medical school from the Board of Medical Education; (c) a certificate of good moral character issued by two former professors in the college of liberal arts; and (d) birth certificate. Nothing in this act shall be construed to inhibit any college of medicine from establishing, inadditionto the preceding, other entrancerequirementsthat may be deemed admissible.

MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, issued by the then Minister of Education, Culture and Sports and dated 23 August 1985, established a uniform admissiontest called the National MedicalAdmissionTest (NMAT) as an additional requirement for issuance of a certificate of eligibility foradmission into medical schools of the Philippines, beginning with the school year 1986-1987. This Order goes on to state that: "2. The NMAT, an aptitude test, is considered as an instrument toward upgrading the selection of applicants foradmissioninto the medical schools and its calculated to improve the quality of medical education in thecountry. The cut-off score for the successful applicants, based on the scores on the NMAT, shall be determined every year by the Board of Medical Educationafterconsultation with the Association of Philippine Medical Colleges. The NMAT rating of each applicant, together with the otheradmissionrequirementsas presently called for under existing rules, shall serve as a basis for the issuance of the prescribed certificate of eligibility foradmissioninto the medical colleges.

ISSUE:Whether or not Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, and MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985 are constitutional.

HELD:Yes. We conclude that prescribing the NMAT and requiring certain minimum scores therein as a condition foradmissionto medical schools in the Philippines, do not constitute an unconstitutional imposition.

The police power, it is commonplace learning, is the pervasive and non-waivable power and authority of the sovereign to secure and promote all the important interests and needs in a word, the public order of the general community. An important component of that public order is the health and physical safety and wellbeing of the population, the securing of which no one can deny is a legitimate objective of governmental effort and regulation. Perhaps the only issue that needs some consideration is whether there is some reasonable relation between the prescribing of passing the NMAT as a condition foradmissionto medical school on the one hand, and the securing of the health and safety of the general community, on the other hand. This question is perhaps most usefully approached by recalling that the regulation of the practice of medicine in all itsbrancheshas long been recognized as a reasonable method of protecting the health and safety of the public.

MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985 articulates the rationale of regulation of this type: the improvement of the professional and technical quality of the graduates of medical schools, by upgrading the quality of those admitted to the student body of the medical schools. That upgrading is sought by selectivity in the process ofadmission, selectivity consisting, among other things, of limitingadmissionto those who exhibit in the required degree the aptitude for medical studies and eventually for medical practice. The need to maintain, and the difficulties of maintaining, high standards in our professional schools in general, and medical schools in particular, in the current stage of our social and economic development, are widely known. We believe that the government is entitled to prescribe anadmissiontest like the NMAT as a means for achieving its stated objective of "upgrading the selection of applicants into [our] medical schools" and of "improving the quality of medical education in thecountry. We are entitled to hold that the NMAT is reasonably related to the securing of the ultimate end of legislation and regulation in this area. That end, it is useful to recall, is the protection of the public from the potentially deadly effects of incompetence and ignorance in those who would undertake to treat our bodies and minds for disease or trauma.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED and the Order of the respondenttrial courtdenying the petition for a writ of preliminary injunction is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.

Lim vs. Pacquing [G.R. No. 115044. January 27,1995]16AugustPonente: PADILLA,J.FACTS:The Charter of the City of Manila was enacted by Congress on 18 June 1949 (R.A. No. 409).On 1 January 1951, Executive Order No. 392 was issued transferring the authority toregulatejai-alai from local government to the Games and Amusements Board (GAB).On 07 September 1971, however, the Municipal Board of Manila nonetheless passed Ordinance No. 7065 entitled An Ordinance Authorizing the Mayor To Allow And Permit The Associated Development Corporation To Establish, Maintain And Operate A Jai-Alai In The City Of Manila, Under Certain Terms And Conditions And For Other Purposes.On 20 August 1975, Presidential Decree No. 771 was issued by then President Marcos. The decree, entitled Revoking All Powers and Authority of Local Government(s) To Grant Franchise, License or Permit And Regulate Wagers Or Betting By The Public On Horse And Dog Races, Jai-Alai Or Basque Pelota, And Other Forms Of Gambling,in Section 3 thereof, expressly revoked all existing franchises and permits issued by local governments.In May 1988, Associated Development Corporation (ADC) tried to operate a Jai-Alai. The government through Games and Amusement Board intervened and invoked Presidential Decree No. 771 which expressly revoked all existing franchises and permits to operate all forms of gambling facilities (including Jai-Alai) by local governments. ADC assails the constitutionality of P.D. No. 771.ISSUE:Whether or not P.D. No. 771 is violative of the equal protection and non-impairment clauses of the Constitution.HELD:NO. P.D. No. 771 is valid and constitutional.RATIO:Presumption against unconstitutionality.There is nothing on record to show or even suggest that PD No. 771 has been repealed, altered or amended by any subsequent law or presidential issuance (when the executive still exercised legislative powers).Neither can it be tenably stated that the issue of the continued existence of ADCs franchise by reason of the unconstitutionality of PD No. 771 was settled in G.R. No. 115044, for the decision of the Courts First Division in said case, aside from not being final, cannot have the effect of nullifying PD No. 771 as unconstitutional, since only the CourtEn Banchas that power under Article VIII, Section 4(2) of the Constitution.And on the question of whether or not the government isestoppedfrom contesting ADCs possession of a valid franchise, the well-settled rule is that the State cannot be put in estoppel by the mistakes or errors, if any, of its officials or agents. (Republic v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 209 SCRA 90)Philippine Judges Association vs. Prado227 SCRA 703FACTS:The main target of this petition is Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 as implemented by the Philippine Postal Corporation through its Circular No. 92-28. These measures withdraw the franking privilege from the SC, CA, RTC, MTC, MeTC and the Land Registration Commission and its Registers of Deeds, along with certain other government offices. The petitioners are members of the lower courts who feel that their official functions as judges will be prejudiced by the above-named measures. The petition assails the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7354.

ISSUES:(1) Whether or not its title embraces more than one subject and does not express its purpose

(2) Whether or not it did not pass the required readings in both Houses of Congress and printed copies of the bill in its final form were not distributed among the members before its passage;

(3) Whether or not it is discriminatory and encroaches on the independence of the Judiciary

HELD:(1) Article VI, Sec. 26 (l), of the Constitution providing that "Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof." The purposes of this rule are: (1) to prevent hodgepodge or "log-rolling" legislation; (2) to prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislature by means of provisions in bills of which the title gives no intimation, and which might therefore be overlooked and carelessly and unintentionally adopted; and (3) to fairly apprise the people, through such publication of legislative proceedings as is usually made, of the subject of legislation that is being considered, in order that they may have opportunity of being heard thereon, by petition or otherwise, if they shall so desire.

It is the submission of the petitioners that Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 which withdrew the franking privilege from the Judiciary is not expressed in the title of the law, nor does it reflect its purposes. R.A. No. 7354 is entitled "An Act Creating the Philippine Postal Corporation, Defining its Powers, Functions and Responsibilities, Providing for Regulation of the Industry and for Other Purposes Connected Therewith." The petitioners' contention is untenable. The title of the bill is not required to be an index to the body of the act, or to be as comprehensive as to cover every single detail of the measure. It has been held that if the title fairly indicates the general subject, and reasonably covers all the provisions of the act, and is not calculated to mislead the legislature or the people, there is sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement. Furthermore, the repeal of a statute on a given subject is properly connected with the subject matter of a new statute on the same subject; and therefore a repealing section in the new statute is valid, notwithstanding that the title is silent on the subject. The reason is that where a statute repeals a former law, such repeal is the effect and not the subject of the statute; and it is the subject, not the effect of a law, which is required to be briefly expressed in its title. The withdrawal of the franking privilege from some agencies is germane to the accomplishment of the principal objective of R.A. No. 7354, which is the creation of a more efficient and effective postal service system.

(2) It is a matter of record that the conference Committee Report on the bill in question was returned to and duly approved by both the Senate and the House of Representatives. Thereafter, the bill was enrolled with its certification by Senate President Neptali A. Gonzales and Speaker Ramon V. Mitra of the House of Representatives as having been duly passed by both Houses of Congress. It was then presented to and approved by President Corazon C. Aquino on April 3, 1992. Under the doctrine of separation powers, the Court may not inquire beyond the certification of the approval of a bill from the presiding officers of Congress. The enrolled bill is conclusive upon the Judiciary (except in matters that have to be entered in the journals like the yeas and nays on the final reading of the bill).

(3) It is alleged that R.A. No. 7354 is discriminatory because while withdrawing the franking privilege from the Judiciary, it retains the same for the President of the Philippines, the Vice President of the Philippines; Senators and Members of the House of Representatives, the Commission on Elections; former Presidents of the Philippines; the National Census and Statistics Office; and the general public in the filing of complaints against public offices and officers. The withdrawal of the franking privileges was indeed discriminatory. If the problem of the respondents is the loss of revenues from the franking privilege, the remedy is to withdraw it altogether from all agencies of government, including those who do not need it. The problem is not solved by retaining it for some and withdrawing it from others, especially where there is no substantial distinction between those favoured, which may or may not need it at all, and the Judiciary, which definitely needs it. The problem is not solved by violating the Constitution. The classification was not based on substantial distinctions.SISON vs. Ancheta 130 SCRA 654GR No. L-59431, 25 July 1984FACTS:Section 1 of BP Blg 135 amended the Tax Code and petitioner Antero M. Sison, as taxpayer, alleges that "he would be unduly discriminated against by the imposition of higher rates of tax upon his income arising from the exercise of his profession vis-a-vis those which are imposed upon fixed income or salaried individual taxpayers. He characterizes said provision as arbitrary amounting to class legislation, oppressive and capricious in character. It therefore violates both the equal protection and due process clauses of the Constitution as well asof the rule requiring uniformity in taxation.

ISSUE:Whether or not the assailed provision violates the equal protection and due process clauses of the Constitution while also violating the rule that taxes must be uniform and equitable.

HELD:The petition is without merit.On due process - it is undoubted that it may be invoked where a taxing statute is so arbitrary that it finds no support in the Constitution. An obvious example is where it can be shown to amount to the confiscation of property from abuse of power. Petitioner alleges arbitrariness but his mere allegation does not suffice and there must be a factual foundation of such unconstitutional taint.

On equal protection - it suffices that the laws operate equally and uniformly on all persons under similar circumstances, both in the privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed.

Assuming that said amount represents a portion of the 75% of his war damage claim which was not paid, the same would not be deductible as a loss in 1951 because, according to petitioner, the last instalment he received from the War Damage Commission, together with the notice that no further payment would be made on his claim, was in 1950. In the circumstance, said amount would at most be a proper deduction from his 1950 gross income. In the second place, said amount cannot be considered as a "business asset" which can be deducted as a loss in contemplation of law because its collection is not enforceable as a matter of right, but is dependent merely upon the generosity and magnanimity of the U. S. government. As of the end of 1945, there was absolutely no law under which petitioner could claim compensation for the destruction of his properties during the battle for the liberation of the Philippines. And under the Philippine Rehabilitation Act of 1946, the payments of claims by the War Damage Commission merely depended upon its discretion to be exercised in the manner it may see lit, but the non-payment of which cannot give rise to any enforceable right.It is well known that our internal revenue laws are not political in nature and as such were continued in force during the period of enemy occupation and in effect were actually enforced by the occupation government. As a matter of fact, income tax returns were filed during that period and income tax payment were effected and considered valid and legal. Such tax laws are deemed to be the laws of the occupied territory and not of the occupying enemy.On the matter that the rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable - this requirement is met when the tax operates with the same force and effect in every place where the subject may be found." Also, the rule of uniformity does not call for perfect uniformity or perfect equality, because this is hardly unattainable." When the problem of classification became of issue, the Court said: "Equality and uniformity in taxation means that all taxable articles or kinds of property of the same class shall be taxed the same rate. The taxing power has the authority to make reasonable and natural classifications for purposes of taxation..." As provided by this Court, where "the differentiation" complained of "conforms to the practical dictates of justice and equity" it "is not discriminatory within the meaning of this clause and is therefore uniform."Nolasco v COMELEC275 SCRA 762

FACTS:isqualification case was filed against Meycauayan, Bulacan Mayor-elect Florentino Blanco for alleged performing acts which are grounds for disqualification under the Omnibus Election Code giving money to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing election functions: for committing acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy, and for spending an amount for his campaign in excess of what is allowed by the law.

The COMELEC First Division required both parties to submit their position papers. The case was decided against Blanco.

A reconsideration was moved by Blanco in the COMELEC En Banc. Nolasco, the vice-mayor-elect took part as intervenor, urging that should Blanco be finally disqualified, the mayoralty position be turned over to him. The parties were allowed to file their memoranda. En Banc denied Blanco and Nolascos motions thus this petition for certiorari.

ISSUES:

1. WON Blanco was denied due process and equal protection of laws2. WON the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in proclaiming Alarilla as the duly elected mayor

HELD:

1. Blanco was not denied due process and equal protection of the laws. He was given all the opportunity to prove that the evidence on his disqualification was not strong. Blancos contention that the minimum quantum of evidence was not met is untenable. What RA 6646 and the COMELEC Rules of Procedure require is a mere evidence of guilt that should be strong to justify the COMELEC in suspending a winning candidates proclamation.

2. Nolasco, not Alarilla, is adjudged as the Mayor of Meycauayan. It is already a settled principle in the case of Reyes v COMELEC that the candidate with the second highest number of votes cannot be proclaimed winner in case the winning candidate be disqualified. There cannot be an assumption that the second placer would have received the other votes otherwise it is a judgment substituting the mind of a voter. It cannot be assumed that the second placer would have won the elections because in the situation where the disqualified candidate is excluded, the condition would have substantially changed.

Telecommunications And Broadcast Attorneys Of The Phils. Vs. COMELEC289 SCRA 337G.R. No. 132922April 21, 1998

Facts:Petitioner Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. (TELEBAP) is an organization of lawyers of radio and television broadcasting companies. It was declared to be without legal standing to sue in this case as, among other reasons, it was not able to show that it was to suffer from actual or threatened injury as a result of the subject law. Petitioner GMA Network, on the other hand, had the requisite standing to bring the constitutional challenge. Petitioner operates radio and television broadcast stations in thePhilippinesaffected by the enforcement of Section 92, B.P. No. 881.

Petitioners challenge the validity of Section 92, B.P. No. 881 which provides:Comelec Time- The Commission shall procure radio and television time to be known as the Comelec Time which shall be allocated equally and impartially among the candidates within the area of coverage of all radio and television stations. For this purpose, the franchise of all radio broadcasting and television stations are hereby amended so as to provide radio or television time, free of charge, during the period of campaign.

Petitioner contends that while Section 90 of the same law requires COMELEC to procure print space in newspapers and magazines with payment, Section 92 provides that air time shall be procured by COMELEC free of charge. Thus it contends that Section 92 singles out radio and television stations to provide free air time.

Petitioner claims that it suffered losses running to several million pesos in providing COMELEC Time in connection with the 1992 presidential election and 1995 senatorial election and that it stands to suffer even more should it be required to do so again this year. Petitioners claim that the primary source of revenue of the radio and television stations is the sale of air time to advertisers and to require these stations to provide free air time is to authorize unjust taking of private property. According to petitioners, in 1992 it lost P22,498,560.00 in providing free air time for one hour each day and, in this years elections, it stands to lost P58,980,850.00 in view of COMELECs requirement that it provide at least 30 minutes of prime time daily for such.

Issue:Whether of not Section 92 of B.P. No. 881 denies radio and television broadcast companies the equal protection of the laws.

Whether or not Section 92 of B.P. No. 881 constitutes taking of property without due process of law and without just compensation.

Held:Petitioners argument is without merit. All broadcasting, whether radio or by television stations, is licensed by the government. Airwave frequencies have to be allocated as there are more individuals who want to broadcast that there are frequencies to assign. Radio and television broadcasting companies, which are given franchises, do not own the airwaves and frequencies through which they transmit broadcast signals and images. They are merely given the temporary privilege to use them. Thus, such exercise of the privilege may reasonably be burdened with the performance by the grantee of some form of public service. In granting the privilege to operate broadcast stations and supervising radio and television stations, the state spends considerable public funds in licensing and supervising them.

The argument that the subject law singles out radio and television stations to provide free air time as against newspapers and magazines which require payment of just compensation for the print space they may provide is likewise without merit. Regulation of the broadcast industry requires spending of public funds which it does not do in the case of print media. To require the broadcast industry to provide free air time for COMELEC is a fair exchange for what the industry gets.

As radio and television broadcast stations do not own the airwaves, no private property is taken by the requirement that they provide air time to the COMELEC.

Tiu v. Court of Appeals, 301 SCRA 278(1999)

Theconstitutionality and validity of EO 97-A, that provides that the grant and enjoyment of the tax and duty incentives authorized under RA 7227 were limited to the business enterprises and residents within the fenced-in area of the Subic Special Economic Zone (SSEZ), was questioned.Nature of the case:A petition for review to reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals which upheld the constitutionality and validity of the E.O. 97-A.Facts of the case:The petitioners assail the constitutionality of the said Order claiming that they are excluded from the benefits provided by RA 7227 without any reasonable standards and thus violated the equal protection clause of the Constitution. The Court of Appeals upheld the validity and constitutionality and denied the motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition was filed.Issue:WON E.O. 97-A violates the equal protection clause of the ConstitutionArguments:Petitioners contend that the SSEZ encompasses (1) the City of Olongapo, (2) the Municipality of Subic in Zambales, and (3) the area formerly occupied by the Subic Naval Base. However, EO 97-A, according to them, narrowed down the area within which the special privileges granted to the entire zone would apply to the present fenced-in former Subic Naval Base only. It has thereby excluded the residents of the first two components of the zone from enjoying the benefits granted by the law. It has effectively discriminated against them, without reasonable or valid standards, in contravention of the equal protection guarantee.The solicitor general defends the validity of EO 97-A, arguing that Section 12 of RA 7227 clearly vests in the President the authority to delineate the metes and bounds of the SSEZ. He adds that the issuance fully complies with the requirements of a valid classification.Decision: Panganiban J.,The Court held that the classification was based on valid and reasonable standards and does not violate the equal protection clause.The fundamental right of equal protection of the laws is not absolute, but is subject to reasonable classification. If the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that make real differences, one class may be treated and regulated differently from another. The classification must also be germane to the purpose of the law and must apply to all those belonging to the same class.Classification, to be valid, must (1) rest on substantial distinctions, (2) be germane to the purpose of the law, (3) not be limited to existing conditions only, and (4) apply equally to all members of the same class.Ruling:Petition denied. The challenge decision and resolution were affirmed.301 SCRA 298; G.R. NO. 12809620 JAN 1999]LACSON VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

Facts:Eleven persons believed to be members of the KuratongBaleleng gang, anorganizedcrime syndicate involved in bank robberies, were slain by elements of the Anti-Bank Robbery andIntelligenceTask Group (ABRITG). Among those included in the ABRITG were petitioners and petitioner-intervenors.

Acting on a media expose of SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes, a member of the Criminal Investigation Command, that what actually transpired was a summary execution and not a shoot-out between the KuratongBaleleng gang members and the ABRITG, Ombudsman AnianoDesiertoformed a panel of investigators to investigate the said incident. Said panel found the incident as a legitimate police operation. However, a review board modified the panels finding and recommended the indictment for multiple murder against twenty-six respondents including herein petitioner, charged as principal, and herein petitioner-intervenors, charged as accessories. After a reinvestigation, the Ombudsman filed amended informations before the Sandiganbayan, where petitioner was charged only as an accessory.

The accusedfiled separate motions questioning the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, asserting that under the amended informations, the cases fall within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court pursuant to Section 2 of R.A. 7975. They contend that the said law limited the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to cases where one or ore of the principal accused are government officals with Salary Grade 27 or higher, or PNP officials with rank of Chief Superintendent or higher. Thus, they did not qualify under said requisites. However, pending resolution of their motions, R.A. 8249 was approved amending the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan by deleting the word principal from the phrase principal accused in Section 2 of R.A. 7975.

Petitioner questions the constitutionality of Section 4 of R.A. 8249, including Section 7 which provides that the said law shall apply to all cases pending in any court over which trial has not begun as of the approval hereof.

Issues:

(1) Whether or not Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 violate the petitioners right to due process and the equal protection clause of the Constitution as the provisions seemed to have been introduced for the Sandiganbayan to continue to acquire jurisdiction over the KuratongBaleleng case.

(2) Whether or not said statute may be considered as an ex-post facto statute.

(3) Whether or not the multiple murder of the alleged members of the KuratongBaleleng was committed in relation to the office ofthe accusedPNP officers which is essential to the determination whether the case falls within the Sandiganbayans or Regional Trial Courts jurisdiction.

RULING:Petitioner and intervenors posture that Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 violate their right to equal protection of the law is too shallow to deserve merit. No concrete evidence and convincing argument were presented to warrant such a declaration. Every classification made by the law is presumed reasonable and the party who challenges the law mustpresentproof of arbitrariness. The classification is reasonable and not arbitrary when the following concur: (1) it must rest on substantial distinction; (2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) must not be limited to existing conditions only, and (4) must apply equally to all members of the same class; all of which arepresentin this case.

Paragraph a of Section 4 provides that it shall apply to all cases involving certain public officials and under the transitoryprovisionin Section 7, to all cases pending in any court. Contrary to petitioner and intervenors argument, the law is not particularly directed only to the KuratongBaleleng cases. The transitoryprovisiondoes not only cover cases which are in the Sandiganbayan but also in any court.

There is nothing ex post facto in R.A. 8249. Ex post facto law, generally, provides retroactive effect of penal laws. R.A. 8249 is not apenal law. It is a substantive law on jurisdiction which is not penal in character. Penal laws are those acts of the Legislature which prohibit certain acts and establish penalties for their violations or those that define crimes and provide for their punishment. R.A. 7975, as regards the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction, its mode of appeal and other procedural matters, has been declared by the Court as not apenal law, but clearly a procedural statute, one which prescribes rules of procedure by which courts applying laws of all kinds can properly administer justice. Not being apenal law, the retroactive application of R.A. 8249 cannot be challenged as unconstitutional.

In People vs. Montejo, it was held that an offense is said to have been committed in relation to the office if it is intimately connected with the office of the offender and perpetrated while he was in the performance of his official functions. Such intimate relation must be alleged in the information which is essential in determining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. However, uponexaminationof the amended information, there was no specific allegation of facts that the shooting of the victim by the said principal accused was intimately related to the discharge of their official duties aspolice officers. Likewise, the amended information does not indicate that the said accused arrested and investigated the victim and then killed the latter while in their custody. The stringent requirement that the charge set forth with such particularity as will reasonably indicate the exact offense whichthe accusedis alleged to have committed in relation to his office was not established.

Consequently, forfailureto show in the amended informations that the charge of murder was intimately connected with the discharge of official functions ofthe accusedPNP officers, the offense charged in the subject criminal cases is plain murder and, therefore, within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court and not the Sandiganbayan.

SORIANO v. CA G.R. No. 123936 March 4, 1999Payment of civil indemnity is not violative of the equal protection clause as this is imposed by law as a consequence of the commission of a crimeFACTS: Petitioner Ronald Soriano was convicted of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting to homicide, serious physical injuries and damage to property after being involved in a vehicular accident which killed IsidrinoDaluyong. His application for probation was granted and among the terms and conditions imposed were: (a) he shall meet his family responsibilities; (b) devoting to a specific employment or pursuing a prescribed secular study or vocational training; (c)indemnify the heirs of the victim Daluyong in the amount of P98,560.A motion to cancel his probation was filed due to his failure to indemnify the heirs of the victim and a supplemental motion alleging petitioners commission of another crime while he was awaiting arraignment. The trial court denied the motion and instead directed petitioner to submit a program of payment of the civil liability imposed on him. Based on the information providedby the heirs of Daluyong, petitioner still failed to satisfy his civil liability. Soriano was made to explain his non-compliance and to submit his program of payment immediately otherwise he would be cited for contempt. For continuous failure to comply with the orders, his probation was revoked on October 1994 for his failure to: (a) meet his family responsibilities; (b) engage in a specific employment, (c) satisfy his civil liability to the heirs of the victim, and (d) cooperate with his program of supervision. Petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari with the Court of Appeals claiming that respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in holding petitioner contempt and revoking his probation. The CA dismissed the petition holding that Sorianos stubborn unwillingness to comply with the orders of the trial court shows his refusal to reform himself and to correct a wrong.A motion for reconsideration was likewise denied for lack of merit. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether the revocation of petitioners probation is lawful and proper RULING: YES. Revocation of probation is lawful and proper. Probation is not an absolute right. It is a mere privilege whose grant rests upon the discretion of the trial court subject to certain terms and conditions. Having the power to grant probation, the trial court also has the power to revoke it in a proper case and under appropriate circumstances. Since petitioner admitted in violating the terms and conditions of his probation, he cannot anymore assail the revocation of his probation. Soriano claims that his non-compliance was due to his poor financial condition and that it was impossible for him to formulate a program as he only relies on his parents for support and he was in no position to comply with the same. He even questioned the constitutionality of the requirement imposed as this harped on his alleged poverty.This requirement is NOT violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution. Payment of civil liability is not a conditionprecedent to probation. The trial court could not have done away with imposing civil liability as it is not an arbitrary imposition but one required by law. Petitioner may be poor, but this isprecisely the reason why the trial court gave him the chance to make his own program ofpayment in contrast to the cited Salgadocase where a program of payment was already imposed upon the petitioner therein. Petitioner also asserts that his non-compliance with the orders of the trial court to submit aprogram of payment was not deliberate as the notice was received by his counsel and did not notify petitioner immediately.NO MERIT. His refusal to comply with said orders cannot be anything but deliberate as petitioner had notice of both orders and refused to comply with the trial courts directive. Petitioners counsel has notbeen shown to be grossly irresponsible as to cause prejudice to petitioners rights. The fact thatpetitioner submitted a motion for reconsideration of the said order, shows proof that he received the notice but still failed toprovide the required program of payment.

TUPAY T. LOONG vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ABDUSAKUR TANG.R. No. 133676April 14, 1999

FACTS:

Automated elections systems was used for the May 11, 1998 regular elections held in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) which includes the Province of Sulu. Atty. Jose Tolentino, Jr. headed the COMELEC Task Force to have administrative oversight of the elections in Sulu.

On May 12, 1998, some election inspectors and watchers informed Atty. Tolentino, Jr. of discrepancies between the election returns and the votes cast for the mayoralty candidates in the municipality of Pata. To avoid a situation where proceeding with automation will result in an erroneous count, he suspended the automated counting of ballots in Pata and immediately communicated the problem to the technical experts of COMELEC and the suppliers of the automated machine. After the consultations, the experts told him that the problem was caused by misalignment of the ovals opposite the names of candidates in the local ballots. They found nothing wrong with the automated machines. The error was in the printing of the local ballots, as a consequence of which, the automated machines failed to read them correctly. Atty. Tolentino, Jr. called for an emergency meeting of the local candidates and the military-police officials overseeing the Sulu elections. Among those who attended were petitioner TupayLoong and private respondent Abdusakar Tan and intervenorYusopJikiri (candidates for governor.) The meeting discussed how the ballots in Pata should be counted in light of the misaligned ovals. There was lack of agreement. Some recommended a shift to manual count (Tan et al) while the others insisted on automated counting (Loong AND Jikiri).Reports that the automated counting of ballots in other municipalities in Sulu was not working well were received by the COMELEC Task Force. Local ballots in five (5) municipalities were rejected by the automated machines. These municipalities were Talipao, Siasi, Tudanan, Tapul and Jolo. The ballots were rejected because they had the wrong sequence code.

Before midnight of May 12, 1998, Atty. Tolentino, Jr. was able to send to the COMELEC en banc his report and recommendation, urging the use of the manual count in the entire Province of Sulu. 6 On the same day, COMELEC issued Minute Resolution No. 98-1747 ordering a manual count but only in the municipality of Pata.. The next day, May 13, 1998, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 98-1750 approving, Atty. Tolentino, Jr.'s recommendation and the manner of its implementation. On May 15, 1998, the COMELEC en banc issued Minute Resolution No. 98-1796 laying down the rules for the manual count. Minute Resolution 98-1798 laid down the procedure for the counting of votes for Sulu at the PICC.

COMELEC started the manual count on May 18, 1998.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is the appropriate remedy to invalidate the disputed COMELEC resolutions.2. Assuming the appropriateness of the remedy, whether or not COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in ordering a manual count. (The main issue in the case at bar)2.a. Is there a legal basis for the manual count?2.b. Are its factual bases reasonable?2.c. Were the petitioner and the intervenor denied due process by the COMELEC when it ordered a manual count?3. Assuming the manual count is illegal and that its result is unreliable, whether or not it is proper to call for a special election for the position of governor of Sulu.

HELD:

the petition of TupayLoong and the petition in intervention of YusopJikiri are dismissed, there being no showing that public respondent gravely abused its discretion in issuing Minute Resolution Nos. 98-1748, 98-1750, 98-1796 and 98-1798. Our status quo order of June 23, 1998 is lifted.

(1.) Certiorari is the proper remedy of the petitioner. The issue is not only legal but one of first impression and undoubtedly suffered with significance to the entire nation. It is adjudicatory of the right of the petitioner, the private respondents and the intervenor to the position of governor of Sulu. These are enough considerations to call for an exercise of the certiorari jurisdiction of this Court.

(2a). A resolution of the issue will involve an interpretation of R.A. No. 8436 on automated election in relation to the broad power of the COMELEC under Section 2(1), Article IX(C) of the Constitution "to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election , plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall." Undoubtedly, the text and intent of this provision is to give COMELEC all the necessary and incidental powers for it to achieve the objective of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections.

The order for a manual count cannot be characterized as arbitrary, capricious or whimsical. It is well established that the automated machines failed to read correctly the ballots in the municipality of PataThe technical experts of COMELEC and the supplier of the automated machines found nothing wrong the automated machines. They traced the problem to the printing of local ballots by the National Printing Office. It is plain that to continue with the automated count would result in a grossly erroneous count. An automated count of the local votes in Sulu would have resulted in a wrong count, a travesty of the sovereignty of the electorate

In enacting R.A. No. 8436, Congress obviously failed to provide a remedy where the error in counting is not machine-related for human foresight is not all-seeing. We hold, however, that the vacuum in the law cannot prevent the COMELEC from levitating above the problem. . We cannot kick away the will of the people by giving a literal interpretation to R.A. 8436. R.A. 8436 did not prohibit manual counting when machine count does not work. Counting is part and parcel of the conduct of an election which is under the control and supervision of the COMELEC. It ought to be self-evident that the Constitution did not envision a COMELEC that cannot count the result of an election.

It is also important to consider that the failures of automated counting created post election tension in Sulu, a province with a history of violent elections. COMELEC had to act desively in view of the fast deteriorating peace and order situation caused by the delay in the counting of votes(2c) Petitioner Loong and intervenorJikiri were not denied process. The Tolentino memorandum clearly shows that they were given every opportunity to oppose the manual count of the local ballots in Sulu. They were orally heard. They later submitted written position papers. Their representatives escorted the transfer of the ballots and the automated machines from Sulu to Manila. Their watchers observed the manual count from beginning to end.3. The plea for this Court to call a special election for the governorship of Sulu is completely off-line. The plea can only be grounded on failure of election. Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code tells us when there is a failure of election, viz:

Sec. 6. Failure of election. If, on account of force majeure, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes, the election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed, or had been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting, or after the voting and during the preparation and the transmission of the election returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to elect, and in any of such cases the failure or suspension of election would affect the result of the election, the Commission shall on the basis of a verified petition by any interested party and after due notice and hearing, call for the holding or continuation of the election, not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect but not later than thirty days after the cessation of the cause of such postponement or suspension of the election or failure to elect.There is another reason why a special election cannot be ordered by this Court. To hold a special election only for the position of Governor will be discriminatory and will violate the right of private respondent to equal protection of the law. The records show that all elected officials in Sulu have been proclaimed and are now discharging their powers and duties. These officials were proclaimed on the basis of the same manually counted votes of Sulu. If manual counting is illegal, their assumption of office cannot also be countenanced. Private respondent's election cannot be singled out as invalid for alikes cannot be treated unalikes.The plea for a special election must be addressed to the COMELEC and not to this Court.[G.R. No. 128845. June 1, 2000]INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL ALLIANCE OF EDUCATORS (ISAE), petitioner, vs. HON. LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING in his capacity as the Secretary of Labor and Employment; HON. CRESENCIANO B. TRAJANO in his capacity as the Acting Secretary of Labor and Employment; DR. BRIAN MACCAULEY in his capacity as the Superintendent of International School-Manila; and INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL, INC., respondents.KAPUNAN, J.:FACTS: Petitioners work under private respondent International School. The school hires both local and foreign hires. Foreign hires are granted with more benefits and higher salary. Respondent says this is because of dislocation factor and limited tenure. Petitioners contested the difference in salary rates between foreign and local hires. They claim that it is discriminatory to Filipinos and it constitutes racial discrimination.ISSUE: WON THERE IS A VIOLATION OF EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE

HELD: There is violation of equal protection. Equal pay for equal work, persons who work with substantially equal qualifications, skillsm effort, and responsibility under similar conditions should be paid similar salaries. If an employer accords the same rank and position, the presumption is that they perform equal work. Here, both groups have similar functions which they perform under similar conditions. There is no evidence that foreign hires perform 25% more efficient than local hires. The dislocation factor and tenure are properly accorded by the benefits they received.ROSELLER DE GUZMAN, Petitioner,VS COMMISSION ON ELECTION and ANGELINA DG. DELA CRUZ, Respondents.G.R. No. 180048 June 19, 2009YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:FACTS:The Comelec reassigned petitioners to other stations pursuant to Section 44 of the Voters Registration Act.The Act prohibits election officers from holding office in a particular city or municipality for more than four years.Petitioners claim that the act violated the equal protection clause because not all election officials were covered by the prohibition.ISSUE: WON THERE IS A VIOLATION OF EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSEHELD:The law does not violate the equal protection clause.It is intended to ensure the impartiality of election officials by preventing them from developing familiarity with the people of their place of assignment.Large-scale anomalies in the registration of voters cannot be carried out without the complicity of election officers, who are the highest representatives of Comelec in a city or municipality.[G.R. No. 158359. March 23, 2004]ABDULLAH D. DIMAPORO, petitioner, vs. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and ABDULLAH S. MANGOTARA, respondents.TINGA, J.:FACTS: This is a petition brought by Congressman Dimaporo seeking to nullify the twin Resolutions of the HRET which denied his Motion for Technical Evaluation of the Thumbmarks and Signatures Affixed in the Voters Registration Records and Motion for Reconsideration of Resolution Denying the Motion for Technical Examination of Voting Records. Pursuant to the 1998 HRET Rules Congressional candidate Mangotara Petition of Protest (Ad Cautelam) seeking the technical examination of the signatures and thumb the protested precincts of the municipality of Sultan Naga Dimaporo (SND). Mangotara alleged that the massive substitution of voters and other electoral irregularitiesperpetrated by Dimaporos supporters will be uncovered and proven. Fromthis and other premises, he concluded that he is the duly-elected representative of the 2ndDistrict of Lanaodel Norte. Noting that the Tribunal cannot evaluate the questioned ballots because there are no ballots but only election documents to consider HRET granted Mangotara'smotion and permitted the latter toengage an expert to assist him in prosecution of the case, NBI conducted the technical examination.ISSUE: 1. W/N Dimaporo was deprived by HRET of Equal Protection when the latter denied his motion for technicalexamination.2. W/N Dimaporo was deprived of procedural due process or the right to present scientific evidence to show the massive substitute voting committed in counter protested precincts.RULING:1. Resolution of HRET did not offend equal protection clause. Equal protection simply means that all persons and things similarly situated must be treated alike both as to the rights conferred and the liabilities imposed. It follows that the existence of a valid and substantial distinction justifies divergent treatment. According to Dimaporo since the ballot boxes subject of his petition and that of Mangotara were both unavailable for revision, his motion, like Mangotaras, should be granted. The argument fails to take into account the distinctions extant in Mangotaras protest vis--vis Dimaporos counter-protest which validate the grant of Mangotaras motion and the denial of Dimaporos.First.The election results in SND were the sole subjects of Mangotaras protest. The opposite is true with regard to Dimaporos counter-protest as he contested the election results in all municipalities but SND. Significantly, the results of the technical examination of the election records of SND are determinative of the final outcome of the election protest against Dimaporo. The same cannot be said of the precincts subject of Dimaporos motion.It should be emphasized that the grant of a motion for technical examination is subject to the sound discretion of the HRET. In this case, the Tribunal deemed it useful in the conduct of the revision proceedings to grant Mangotaras motion for technical examination. Conversely, it found Dimaporos motion unpersuasive and accordingly denied the same. In so doing, the HRET merely acted within the bounds of its Constitutionally-granted jurisdiction. After all, the Constitution confers full authority on the electoral tribunals of the House of Representatives and the Senate as the sole judges of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective members. Such jurisdiction is original and exclusive.2. Anent Dimaporos contention that the assailed Resolutions denied him the right to procedural due process and to present evidence to substantiate his claim of massive substitute voting committed in the counter-protested precincts, suffice it to state that the HRET itself may ascertain the validity of Dimaporos allegations without resort to technical examination. To this end, the Tribunal declared that the ballots, election documents and other election paraphernalia are still subject to its scrutiny in the appreciation of evidence. It should be noted that the records are replete with evidence, documentary and testimonial, presented by Dimaporo. Dimaporos allegation of denial of due process is an indefensible pretense. The instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.[G.R. No. 148208. December 15, 2004]CENTRAL BANK (now BangkoSentralngPilipinas) EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., petitioner, vs. BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS and the EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, respondents.PUNO, J.:Facts: RA 7653 otherwise known as the New Central Bank Act took effect July 3 1993, effectively replacing the earlier Central Bank of the Philippines (established 1949) by the BangkoSentralngPilipinas. On June 8 2001, petitioner Central Bank (now BSP) Employees Association Inc. filed a petition against the Executive Secretary of the Office of the President to restrain BSP from implementing the last proviso in Section 15 (i), Article II of RA 7653 which pertains to establishment of a Human resource management system and a compensation structure as part of the authority of the Monetary Board. Employees whose positions fall under SG 19 and below shall be in accordance with the rates in the salary standardization act. Petitioner contends that the classifications is not reasonable, arbitrary and violates the equal protection clause. The said proviso has been prejudicial to some 2994 rank- and file BSP employees. Respondent on the other hand contends that the provision does not violate the equal protection clause, provided that it is construed together with other provisions of the same law such as the fiscal and administrative autonomy of the BangkoSentral and the mandate of its monetary board. The Solicitor General, as counsel of the Executive Secretary defends the provision, that the classification of employees is based on real and actual differentiation and it adheres to the policy of RA 7653 to establish professionalism and excellence within the BSP subject to prevailing laws and policies of the government.Issue: Whether or not the contended proviso if RA 7653 violates the equal protection of laws, hence unconstitutional.Held: Yes the proviso is unconstitutional as it operate on the salary grade or the officer employee status, it distinguishes between economic class and status with the higher salary grade recipients are of greater benefit above the law than those of mandated by the Salary Standardization Act. Officers of the BSP receive higher wages that those of rank-and-file employees because the former are not covered by the salary standardization act as provided by the proviso. Coconut Oil Refiners v. TorresG.R. No. 132527. July 29, 2005Facts:This is a Petition to enjoin and prohibit the public respondent Ruben Torres in his capacity as Executive Secretary from allowing other private respondents to continue with the operation of tax and duty-free shops located at the Subic Special Economic Zone (SSEZ) and the Clark Special Economic Zone (CSEZ). The petitioner seeks to declare Republic Act No. 7227 as unconstitutional on the ground that it allowed only tax-free (and duty-free) importation of raw materials, capital and equipment. It reads:The Subic Special Economic Zone shall be operated and managed as a separate customs territory ensuring free flow or movement of goods and capital within, into and exported out of the Subic Special Economic Zone, as well as provide incentives such as tax and duty-free importations of raw materials, capital and equipment. However, exportation or removal of goods from the territory of the Subic Special Economic Zone to the other parts of the Philippine territory shall be subject to customs duties and taxes under the Customs and Tariff Code and other relevant tax laws of thePhilippines [RA 7227, Sec 12 (b)].Petitioners contend that the wording of Republic Act No. 7227 clearly limits the grant of tax incentives to the importation of raw materials, capital and equipment only thereby violating the equal protection clause of the Constitution.He also assailed the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 97-A for being violative of their right to equal protection. They asserted that private respondents operating inside the SSEZ are not different from the retail establishments located outside.The respondent moves to dismiss the petition on the ground of lack of legal standing and unreasonable delay in filing of the petition.Issues:Whether or not there is a violation of equal protection clause.Held:The SC ruled in the negative. The phrase tax and duty-free importations of raw materials, capital and equipment was merely cited as an example of incentives that may be given to entities operating within the zone. Public respondent SBMA correctly argued that the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, on which petitioners impliedly rely to support their restrictive interpretation, does not apply when words are mentioned by way of example.The petition with respect to declaration of unconstitutionality of Executive Order No. 97-A cannot be, likewise, sustained. The guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based which was based on reasonable classification. A classification, to be valid, must (1) rest on substantial distinction, (2) be germane to the purpose of the law, (3) not be limited to existing conditions only, and (4) apply equally to all members of the same class. Applying the foregoing test to the present case, this Court finds no violation of the right to equal protection of the laws. There is a substantial distinctions lying between the establishments inside and outside the zone. There are substantial differences in a sense that, investors will be lured to establish and operate their industries in the so-called secured area and the present business operators outside the area. There is, then, hardly any reasonable basis to extend to them the benefits and incentives accorded in R.A. 7227.Rodolfo S. Beltran vs. Secretary of HealthGR Nos. 133640, 133661 and 139147, 25 November 2005 The promotion of public health is a fundamental obligation of the State. The health of the people is a primordial governmental concern. The National Blood Services Act was enacted in the exercise of the States police power in order to promote and preserve public health and safety. What may be regarded as a denial of the equal protection of the laws is a question not always easily determined. No rule that will cover every case can be formulated. Class legislation, discriminating against some and favoring others is prohibited but classification on a reasonable basis and not made arbitrarily or capriciously is permitted. Facts:Republic Act No. 7719 or the National Blood Services Act of 1994 was enacted into law on April 2, 1994. The Act seeks to provide an adequate supply of safe blood by promoting voluntary blood donation and by regulating blood banks in the country. It was approved by then President Fidel V. Ramos on May 15, 1994 and was subsequently published in the Official Gazette on August 18, 1994. The law took effect on August 23, 1994. On April 28, 1995, Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1995, constituting the Implementing Rules and Regulations of said law was promulgated by respondent Secretary of the Department of Health (DOH). Section 7 of R.A. 7719 provides, Phase-out of Commercial Blood Banks - All commercial blood banks shall be phased-out over a period of two (2) years after the effectivity of this Act, extendable to a maximum period of two (2) years by the Secretary. Section 23. Process of Phasing Out. -- The Department shall effect the phasing-out of all commercial blood banks over a period of two (2) years, extendible for a maximum period of tw