Epistemic Game Theoryepacuit/esslli2012/slides-epgth/...Plan for the week 1. Monday Basic Concepts....
Transcript of Epistemic Game Theoryepacuit/esslli2012/slides-epgth/...Plan for the week 1. Monday Basic Concepts....
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Epistemic Game TheoryLecture 3
ESSLLI’12, Opole
Eric Pacuit Olivier Roy
TiLPS, Tilburg University MCMP, LMU Munichai.stanford.edu/~epacuit
http://olivier.amonbofis.net
August 8, 2012
Eric Pacuit and Olivier Roy 1
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Plan for the week
1. Monday Basic Concepts.
2. Tuesday Epistemics.
3. Wednesday Fundamentals of Epistemic Game Theory.
• Models of all-out attitudes (cnt’d).• Common knowledge of Rationality and iterated strict
dominance in the matrix.• (If time, o/w tomorrow.) Common knowledge of Rationality
and backward induction (strict dominance in the tree).
4. Thursday Puzzles and Paradoxes.
5. Friday Extensions and New Directions.
Eric Pacuit and Olivier Roy 2
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A family of attitudes
I Conditional Beliefs: M,w |= Bϕi ψ iff M,w ′ |= ψ for allw ′ ∈ max�i (πi (w) ∩ ||ϕ||).
I Safe Belief: M,w |= [�]iϕ iff M,w ′ |= ϕ for all w ′ �i w.
I Knowledge: M,w |= Kiϕ iff M,w ′ |= ϕ for all w ′ such thatw ′ ∼i w .
Plain beliefs defined:Biψ ⇔df B>i ϕ
Conditional beliefs defined:
Bϕi ψ ⇔df 〈K 〉iϕ→ 〈K 〉i (ϕ ∧ [�]i (ϕ→ ψ))
Eric Pacuit and Olivier Roy 3
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A family of attitudes
I Conditional Beliefs: M,w |= Bϕi ψ iff M,w ′ |= ψ for allw ′ ∈ max�i (πi (w) ∩ ||ϕ||).
I Safe Belief: M,w |= [�]iϕ iff M,w ′ |= ϕ for all w ′ �i w.
I Knowledge: M,w |= Kiϕ iff M,w ′ |= ϕ for all w ′ such thatw ′ ∼i w .
Plain beliefs defined:Biψ ⇔df B>i ϕ
Conditional beliefs defined:
Bϕi ψ ⇔df 〈K 〉iϕ→ 〈K 〉i (ϕ ∧ [�]i (ϕ→ ψ))
Eric Pacuit and Olivier Roy 3
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A family of attitudes
I Conditional Beliefs: M,w |= Bϕi ψ iff M,w ′ |= ψ for allw ′ ∈ max�i (πi (w) ∩ ||ϕ||).
I Safe Belief: M,w |= [�]iϕ iff M,w ′ |= ϕ for all w ′ �i w.
I Knowledge: M,w |= Kiϕ iff M,w ′ |= ϕ for all w ′ such thatw ′ ∼i w .
Plain beliefs defined:Biψ ⇔df B>i ϕ
Conditional beliefs defined:
Bϕi ψ ⇔df 〈K 〉iϕ→ 〈K 〉i (ϕ ∧ [�]i (ϕ→ ψ))
Eric Pacuit and Olivier Roy 3
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A family of attitudes
I Conditional Beliefs: M,w |= Bϕi ψ iff M,w ′ |= ψ for allw ′ ∈ max�i (πi (w) ∩ ||ϕ||).
I Safe Belief: M,w |= [�]iϕ iff M,w ′ |= ϕ for all w ′ �i w.
I Knowledge: M,w |= Kiϕ iff M,w ′ |= ϕ for all w ′ such thatw ′ ∼i w .
Plain beliefs defined:Biψ ⇔df B>i ϕ
Conditional beliefs defined:
Bϕi ψ ⇔df 〈K 〉iϕ→ 〈K 〉i (ϕ ∧ [�]i (ϕ→ ψ))
Eric Pacuit and Olivier Roy 3
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A family of attitudes
I Conditional Beliefs: M,w |= Bϕi ψ iff M,w ′ |= ψ for allw ′ ∈ max�i (πi (w) ∩ ||ϕ||).
I Safe Belief: M,w |= [�]iϕ iff M,w ′ |= ϕ for all w ′ �i w.
I Knowledge: M,w |= Kiϕ iff M,w ′ |= ϕ for all w ′ such thatw ′ ∼i w .
Plain beliefs defined:Biψ ⇔df B>i ϕ
Conditional beliefs defined:
Bϕi ψ ⇔df 〈K 〉iϕ→ 〈K 〉i (ϕ ∧ [�]i (ϕ→ ψ))
Eric Pacuit and Olivier Roy 3
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A family of attitudes
I Conditional Beliefs: M,w |= Bϕi ψ iff M,w ′ |= ψ for allw ′ ∈ max�i (πi (w) ∩ ||ϕ||).
I Safe Belief: M,w |= [�]iϕ iff M,w ′ |= ϕ for all w ′ �i w.
I Knowledge: M,w |= Kiϕ iff M,w ′ |= ϕ for all w ′ such thatw ′ ∼i w .
Plain beliefs defined:Biψ ⇔df B>i ϕ
Conditional beliefs defined:
Bϕi ψ ⇔df 〈K 〉iϕ→ 〈K 〉i (ϕ ∧ [�]i (ϕ→ ψ))
Eric Pacuit and Olivier Roy 3
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Soft attitudes
wv1v0 v2
Suppose that w is the current state.
Knowledge (KP)
Belief (BP)
Safe Belief (2P)
Strong Belief (BsP)
Graded Beliefs (B rϕ)
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Soft attitudes
wv1v0 v2
Suppose that w is the current state.
Knowledge (KP)
Belief (Bip)
Safe Belief ([�]iP)
Strong Belief (BsP)
Graded Beliefs (B rϕ)
Eric Pacuit and Olivier Roy 4
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Soft attitudes
¬Pw
¬Pv1
P
v0
P
v2
Suppose that w is the current state.
I Belief (Bip)
Safe Belief (2P)
Strong Belief (BsP)
Knowledge (KP)
Graded Beliefs (B rϕ)
Eric Pacuit and Olivier Roy 4
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Soft attitudes
P
w
¬Pv1
P
v0
P
v2
Suppose that w is the current state.
I Belief (Bip)
I Safe Belief ([�]ip)
Strong Belief (BsP)
Knowledge (KP)
Graded Beliefs (B rϕ)
Eric Pacuit and Olivier Roy 4
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Soft attitudes
P
w
P
v1
P
v0
P
v2
Suppose that w is the current state.
I Belief (Bip)
I Safe Belief ([�]ip)
I Knowledge (Kip)
Graded Beliefs (B rϕ)
Eric Pacuit and Olivier Roy 4
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Properties of Soft Attitudes
Beliefs and conditional beliefs can be mistaken.
¬Pw
¬Pv1
P
v0
P
v2
6|= Biϕ→ ϕ
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Properties of Soft Attitudes
Beliefs and conditional beliefs are fully introspective.
¬Pw
¬Pv1
P
v0
P
v2
|= Biϕ→ BiBiϕ
|= ¬Biϕ→ Bi¬Biϕ
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Properties of Soft Attitudes
Safe Belief is truthful and positively introspective.
P
w
¬Pv1
P
v0
P
v2
|= [�]iϕ→ ϕ
|= [�]iϕ→ [�]i [�]iϕ
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Properties of Soft Attitudes
Safe Belief is not negatively introspective.
¬P,Q
v1
P,Q
w
P,Q
v0
P,¬Q
v2
6|= ¬[�]iϕ→ [�]i¬[�]iϕ
but...
|= Biϕ↔ Bi [�]iϕ
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Higher-order attitudes and common knowledge.
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“Common Knowledge” is informally described as what any foolwould know, given a certain situation: It encompasses what isrelevant, agreed upon, established by precedent, assumed, beingattended to, salient, or in the conversational record.
It is not Common Knowledge who “defined” Common Knowledge!
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“Common Knowledge” is informally described as what any foolwould know, given a certain situation: It encompasses what isrelevant, agreed upon, established by precedent, assumed, beingattended to, salient, or in the conversational record.
It is not Common Knowledge who “defined” Common Knowledge!
Eric Pacuit and Olivier Roy 11
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The first formal definition of common knowledge?M. Friedell. On the Structure of Shared Awareness. Behavioral Science (1969).
R. Aumann. Agreeing to Disagree. Annals of Statistics (1976).
The first rigorous analysis of common knowledgeD. Lewis. Convention, A Philosophical Study. 1969.
Fixed-point definition: γ := i and j know that (ϕ and γ)G. Harman. Review of Linguistic Behavior. Language (1977).
J. Barwise. Three views of Common Knowledge. TARK (1987).
Shared situation: There is a shared situation s such that (1) sentails ϕ, (2) s entails everyone knows ϕ, plus other conditionsH. Clark and C. Marshall. Definite Reference and Mutual Knowledge. 1981.
M. Gilbert. On Social Facts. Princeton University Press (1989).
Eric Pacuit and Olivier Roy 11
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The first formal definition of common knowledge?M. Friedell. On the Structure of Shared Awareness. Behavioral Science (1969).
R. Aumann. Agreeing to Disagree. Annals of Statistics (1976).
The first rigorous analysis of common knowledgeD. Lewis. Convention, A Philosophical Study. 1969.
Fixed-point definition: γ := i and j know that (ϕ and γ)G. Harman. Review of Linguistic Behavior. Language (1977).
J. Barwise. Three views of Common Knowledge. TARK (1987).
Shared situation: There is a shared situation s such that (1) sentails ϕ, (2) s entails everyone knows ϕ, plus other conditionsH. Clark and C. Marshall. Definite Reference and Mutual Knowledge. 1981.
M. Gilbert. On Social Facts. Princeton University Press (1989).
Eric Pacuit and Olivier Roy 11
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The first formal definition of common knowledge?M. Friedell. On the Structure of Shared Awareness. Behavioral Science (1969).
R. Aumann. Agreeing to Disagree. Annals of Statistics (1976).
The first rigorous analysis of common knowledgeD. Lewis. Convention, A Philosophical Study. 1969.
Fixed-point definition: γ := i and j know that (ϕ and γ)G. Harman. Review of Linguistic Behavior. Language (1977).
J. Barwise. Three views of Common Knowledge. TARK (1987).
Shared situation: There is a shared situation s such that (1) sentails ϕ, (2) s entails everyone knows ϕ, plus other conditionsH. Clark and C. Marshall. Definite Reference and Mutual Knowledge. 1981.
M. Gilbert. On Social Facts. Princeton University Press (1989).
Eric Pacuit and Olivier Roy 11
![Page 25: Epistemic Game Theoryepacuit/esslli2012/slides-epgth/...Plan for the week 1. Monday Basic Concepts. 2. Tuesday Epistemics. 3. Wednesday Fundamentals of Epistemic Game Theory. Models](https://reader034.fdocuments.in/reader034/viewer/2022042110/5e8ba89b0c6302733479562a/html5/thumbnails/25.jpg)
The first formal definition of common knowledge?M. Friedell. On the Structure of Shared Awareness. Behavioral Science (1969).
R. Aumann. Agreeing to Disagree. Annals of Statistics (1976).
The first rigorous analysis of common knowledgeD. Lewis. Convention, A Philosophical Study. 1969.
Fixed-point definition: γ := i and j know that (ϕ and γ)G. Harman. Review of Linguistic Behavior. Language (1977).
J. Barwise. Three views of Common Knowledge. TARK (1987).
Shared situation: There is a shared situation s such that (1) sentails ϕ, (2) s entails everyone knows ϕ, plus other conditionsH. Clark and C. Marshall. Definite Reference and Mutual Knowledge. 1981.
M. Gilbert. On Social Facts. Princeton University Press (1989).
Eric Pacuit and Olivier Roy 11
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P. Vanderschraaf and G. Sillari. “Common Knowledge”, The Stanford Encyclo-pedia of Philosophy (2009).http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/common-knowledge/.
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The “Standard” Account
E
W
R. Aumann. Agreeing to Disagree. Annals of Statistics (1976).
R. Fagin, J. Halpern, Y. Moses and M. Vardi. Reasoning aboutKnowledge. MIT Press, 1995.
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The “Standard” Account
E
W
An event/proposition is any (definable) subset E ⊆W
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The “Standard” Account
E
W
blablablabla
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The “Standard” Account
E
W
w
w |= KA(E ) and w 6|= KB(E )
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The “Standard” Account
E
W
w
The model also describes the agents’ higher-orderknowledge/beliefs
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The “Standard” Account
E
W
w
Everyone Knows: K (E ) =⋂
i∈A Ki (E ), K 0(E ) = E ,Km(E ) = K (Km−1(E ))
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The “Standard” Account
E
W
w
Common Knowledge:
C (E ) =⋂m≥0
Km(E )
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The “Standard” Account
E
W
w
w |= K (E ) w 6|= C (E )
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The “Standard” Account
E
W
w
w |= C (E )
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Fact. For all i ∈ A and E ⊆W , KiC (E ) = C (E ).
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Fact. For all i ∈ A and E ⊆W , KiC (E ) = C (E ).
Suppose you are told “Ann and Bob are going together,”’and respond “sure, that’s common knowledge.” Whatyou mean is not only that everyone knows this, but alsothat the announcement is pointless, occasions no surprise,reveals nothing new; pause in effect, that the situationafter the announcement does not differ from that before.... the event “Ann and Bob are going together” — call itE — is common knowledge if and only if some event —call it F — happened that entails E and also entails allplayers’ knowing F (like all players met Ann and Bob atan intimate party). (Aumann, 1999 pg. 271, footnote 8)
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Fact. For all i ∈ A and E ⊆W , KiC (E ) = C (E ).
An event F is self-evident if Ki (F ) = F for all i ∈ A.
Fact. An event E is commonly known iff some self-evident eventthat entails E obtains.
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Fact. For all i ∈ A and E ⊆W , KiC (E ) = C (E ).
An event F is self-evident if Ki (F ) = F for all i ∈ A.
Fact. An event E is commonly known iff some self-evident eventthat entails E obtains.
Fact. w ∈ C (E ) if every finite path starting at w ends in a statein E
The following axiomatize common knowledge:
I C (ϕ→ ψ)→ (Cϕ→ Cψ)
I Cϕ→ (ϕ ∧ ECϕ) (Fixed-Point)
I C (ϕ→ Eϕ)→ (ϕ→ Cϕ) (Induction)
With Eϕ :=∧
i∈Ag Kiϕ.
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Some General Remarks
I Two broad families of models of higher-order information:
• Type spaces. (probabilistic)• Plausibility models. (all-out)
I There’s also a natural notion of qualitative type spaces, justlike a natural probabilistic version of plausibility models. Nostrict separation between the two ways of thinking aboutinformation in interaction.
I In both the notion of a state is crucial. A state encodes:
1. The “non-epistemic facts”. Here, mostly: what the agents areplaying.
2. What the agents know and/or believe about 1.3. What the agents know and/or believe about 2.4. ...
Eric Pacuit and Olivier Roy 15
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Some General Remarks
I Two broad families of models of higher-order information:
• Type spaces. (probabilistic)• Plausibility models. (all-out)
I There’s also a natural notion of qualitative type spaces, justlike a natural probabilistic version of plausibility models. Nostrict separation between the two ways of thinking aboutinformation in interaction.
I In both the notion of a state is crucial. A state encodes:
1. The “non-epistemic facts”. Here, mostly: what the agents areplaying.
2. What the agents know and/or believe about 1.3. What the agents know and/or believe about 2.4. ...
Eric Pacuit and Olivier Roy 15
![Page 42: Epistemic Game Theoryepacuit/esslli2012/slides-epgth/...Plan for the week 1. Monday Basic Concepts. 2. Tuesday Epistemics. 3. Wednesday Fundamentals of Epistemic Game Theory. Models](https://reader034.fdocuments.in/reader034/viewer/2022042110/5e8ba89b0c6302733479562a/html5/thumbnails/42.jpg)
Some General Remarks
I Two broad families of models of higher-order information:
• Type spaces. (probabilistic)• Plausibility models. (all-out)
I There’s also a natural notion of qualitative type spaces, justlike a natural probabilistic version of plausibility models. Nostrict separation between the two ways of thinking aboutinformation in interaction.
I In both the notion of a state is crucial. A state encodes:
1. The “non-epistemic facts”. Here, mostly: what the agents areplaying.
2. What the agents know and/or believe about 1.3. What the agents know and/or believe about 2.4. ...
Eric Pacuit and Olivier Roy 15
![Page 43: Epistemic Game Theoryepacuit/esslli2012/slides-epgth/...Plan for the week 1. Monday Basic Concepts. 2. Tuesday Epistemics. 3. Wednesday Fundamentals of Epistemic Game Theory. Models](https://reader034.fdocuments.in/reader034/viewer/2022042110/5e8ba89b0c6302733479562a/html5/thumbnails/43.jpg)
Now let’s do epistemics in games...
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Basics again
The Epistemic or Bayesian View on Games
I Traditional game theory:Actions, outcomes, preferences, solution concepts.
I Decision theory:Actions, outcomes, preferences, beliefs, choice rules.
I Epistemic game theory:Actions, outcomes, preferences, beliefs, choice rules.
:= (interactive) decision problem: choice rule and higher-orderinformation.
Eric Pacuit and Olivier Roy 17
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Basics again
The Epistemic or Bayesian View on Games
I Traditional game theory:Actions, outcomes, preferences, solution concepts.
I Decision theory:Actions, outcomes, preferences, beliefs, choice rules.
I Epistemic game theory:Actions, outcomes, preferences, beliefs, choice rules.:= (interactive) decision problem: choice rule and higher-orderinformation.
Eric Pacuit and Olivier Roy 17
![Page 46: Epistemic Game Theoryepacuit/esslli2012/slides-epgth/...Plan for the week 1. Monday Basic Concepts. 2. Tuesday Epistemics. 3. Wednesday Fundamentals of Epistemic Game Theory. Models](https://reader034.fdocuments.in/reader034/viewer/2022042110/5e8ba89b0c6302733479562a/html5/thumbnails/46.jpg)
Basics again
The Epistemic or Bayesian View on Games
I Traditional game theory:Actions, outcomes, preferences, solution concepts.
I Decision theory:Actions, outcomes, preferences, beliefs, choice rules.
I Epistemic game theory:Actions, outcomes, preferences, beliefs, choice rules.:= (interactive) decision problem: choice rule and higher-orderinformation.
Eric Pacuit and Olivier Roy 17
![Page 47: Epistemic Game Theoryepacuit/esslli2012/slides-epgth/...Plan for the week 1. Monday Basic Concepts. 2. Tuesday Epistemics. 3. Wednesday Fundamentals of Epistemic Game Theory. Models](https://reader034.fdocuments.in/reader034/viewer/2022042110/5e8ba89b0c6302733479562a/html5/thumbnails/47.jpg)
Basics again
Beliefs, Choice Rules, Rationality
What do we mean when we say that a player chooses rationally?That she follows some given choice rules.
I Maximization of expected utility, (Strict) dominancereasoning, Admissibility, etc.
In game models:
I The model describes the choices and (higher-order)beliefs/attitudes at each state.
I It is the choice rules that determine whether the choice madeat each state is ”rational” or not.
• An agent can be rational at a state given one choice rule, butirrational given the other.
• Rationality in this sense is not built in the models.
Eric Pacuit and Olivier Roy 18
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Basics again
Beliefs, Choice Rules, Rationality
What do we mean when we say that a player chooses rationally?That she follows some given choice rules.
I Maximization of expected utility, (Strict) dominancereasoning, Admissibility, etc.
In game models:
I The model describes the choices and (higher-order)beliefs/attitudes at each state.
I It is the choice rules that determine whether the choice madeat each state is ”rational” or not.
• An agent can be rational at a state given one choice rule, butirrational given the other.
• Rationality in this sense is not built in the models.
Eric Pacuit and Olivier Roy 18
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Basics again
RationalityLet G = 〈N, {Si}i∈N , {ui}i∈N〉 be a strategic game andT = 〈{Ti}i∈N , {λi}i∈N ,S〉 a type space for G .For each ti ∈ Ti , we can define a probability measure pti ∈ ∆(S−i ):
pti (s−i ) =∑
t−i∈T−i
λi (ti )(s−i , t−i )
The set of states (pairs of strategy profiles and type profiles) whereplayer i chooses rationally is:
Rati := {(si , ti ) | si is a best response to pti}
The event that all players are rational isRat = {(s, t) | for all i , (si , ti ) ∈ Rati}.
I Types, as opposed to players, are rational or not at agiven state.
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Basics again
RationalityLet G = 〈N, {Si}i∈N , {ui}i∈N〉 be a strategic game andT = 〈{Ti}i∈N , {λi}i∈N ,S〉 a type space for G .For each ti ∈ Ti , we can define a probability measure pti ∈ ∆(S−i ):
pti (s−i ) =∑
t−i∈T−i
λi (ti )(s−i , t−i )
The set of states (pairs of strategy profiles and type profiles) whereplayer i chooses rationally is:
Rati := {(si , ti ) | si is a best response to pti}
The event that all players are rational isRat = {(s, t) | for all i , (si , ti ) ∈ Rati}.I Types, as opposed to players, are rational or not at a
given state.
Eric Pacuit and Olivier Roy 19
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Rationality and common belief of rationality (RCBR) in the matrix
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RCBR in the Matrix
IESDS
2
1
l c r
t 3, 3 1, 1 0, 0
m 1,1 3, 3 1, 0
m 0, 4 0, 0 4, 0
�
2
1
l c
t 3, 3 1, 1
m 1,1 3, 3
b 0, 4 0, 0
�
2
1
l c
t 3, 3 1, 1
m 1,1 3, 3
Eric Pacuit and Olivier Roy 21
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RCBR in the Matrix
IESDS
2
1
l c r
t 3, 3 1, 1 0, 0
m 1,1 3, 3 1, 0
m 0, 4 0, 0 4, 0
�
2
1
l c
t 3, 3 1, 1
m 1,1 3, 3
b 0, 4 0, 0
�
2
1
l c
t 3, 3 1, 1
m 1,1 3, 3
Eric Pacuit and Olivier Roy 21
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RCBR in the Matrix
IESDS
2
1
l c r
t 3, 3 1, 1 0, 0
m 1,1 3, 3 1, 0
m 0, 4 0, 0 4, 0
�
2
1
l c
t 3, 3 1, 1
m 1,1 3, 3
b 0, 4 0, 0
�
2
1
l c
t 3, 3 1, 1
m 1,1 3, 3
Eric Pacuit and Olivier Roy 21
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RCBR in the Matrix
1’s types
λ1(t1)
l c r
s1 0.5 0.5 0
s2 0 0 0
s3 0 0 0
λ1(t2)
l c r
s1 0 0.5 0
s2 0 0 0.5
s3 0 0 0
Eric Pacuit and Olivier Roy 22
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RCBR in the Matrix
2’s types
λ2(s1)
t m b
t1 0.5 0.5 0
t2 0 0 0
λ2(s2)
t m b
t1 0.25 0.25 0
t2 0.25 0.25 0
λ2(s3)
t m b
t1 0.5 0 0
t2 0 0 0.5
Eric Pacuit and Olivier Roy 23
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RCBR in the Matrix
2
1
l c r
t 3, 3 1, 1 0, 0
m 1,1 3, 3 1, 0
b 0, 4 0, 0 4, 0
λ2(s1)
t m b
t1 0.5 0.5 0
t2 0 0 0λ2(s2)
t m b
t1 0.25 0.25 0
t2 0.25 0.25 0
λ2(s3)
t m b
t1 0.5 0 0
t2 0 0 0.5
I l and c are rational for both s1 and s2.I l is the only rational action for s3.I Whatever her type, it is never rational to play r for 2.
Eric Pacuit and Olivier Roy 24
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RCBR in the Matrix
2
1
l c r
t 3, 3 1, 1 0, 0
m 1,1 3, 3 1, 0
b 0, 4 0, 0 4, 0
λ2(s1)
t m b
t1 0.5 0.5 0
t2 0 0 0λ2(s2)
t m b
t1 0.25 0.25 0
t2 0.25 0.25 0
λ2(s3)
t m b
t1 0.5 0 0
t2 0 0 0.5
I l and c are rational for both s1 and s2.
I l is the only rational action for s3.I Whatever her type, it is never rational to play r for 2.
Eric Pacuit and Olivier Roy 24
![Page 59: Epistemic Game Theoryepacuit/esslli2012/slides-epgth/...Plan for the week 1. Monday Basic Concepts. 2. Tuesday Epistemics. 3. Wednesday Fundamentals of Epistemic Game Theory. Models](https://reader034.fdocuments.in/reader034/viewer/2022042110/5e8ba89b0c6302733479562a/html5/thumbnails/59.jpg)
RCBR in the Matrix
2
1
l c r
t 3, 3 1, 1 0, 0
m 1,1 3, 3 1, 0
b 0, 4 0, 0 4, 0
λ2(s1)
t m b
t1 0.5 0.5 0
t2 0 0 0λ2(s2)
t m b
t1 0.25 0.25 0
t2 0.25 0.25 0
λ2(s3)
t m b
t1 0.5 0 0
t2 0 0 0.5
I l and c are rational for both s1 and s2.
I l is the only rational action for s3.I Whatever her type, it is never rational to play r for 2.
Eric Pacuit and Olivier Roy 24
![Page 60: Epistemic Game Theoryepacuit/esslli2012/slides-epgth/...Plan for the week 1. Monday Basic Concepts. 2. Tuesday Epistemics. 3. Wednesday Fundamentals of Epistemic Game Theory. Models](https://reader034.fdocuments.in/reader034/viewer/2022042110/5e8ba89b0c6302733479562a/html5/thumbnails/60.jpg)
RCBR in the Matrix
2
1
l c r
t 3, 3 1, 1 0, 0
m 1,1 3, 3 1, 0
b 0, 4 0, 0 4, 0
λ2(s1)
t m b
t1 0.5 0.5 0
t2 0 0 0λ2(s2)
t m b
t1 0.25 0.25 0
t2 0.25 0.25 0
λ2(s3)
t m b
t1 0.5 0 0
t2 0 0 0.5
I l and c are rational for both s1 and s2.I l is the only rational action for s3.
I Whatever her type, it is never rational to play r for 2.
Eric Pacuit and Olivier Roy 24
![Page 61: Epistemic Game Theoryepacuit/esslli2012/slides-epgth/...Plan for the week 1. Monday Basic Concepts. 2. Tuesday Epistemics. 3. Wednesday Fundamentals of Epistemic Game Theory. Models](https://reader034.fdocuments.in/reader034/viewer/2022042110/5e8ba89b0c6302733479562a/html5/thumbnails/61.jpg)
RCBR in the Matrix
2
1
l c r
t 3, 3 1, 1 0, 0
m 1,1 3, 3 1, 0
b 0, 4 0, 0 4, 0
λ2(s1)
t m b
t1 0.5 0.5 0
t2 0 0 0λ2(s2)
t m b
t1 0.25 0.25 0
t2 0.25 0.25 0
λ2(s3)
t m b
t1 0.5 0 0
t2 0 0 0.5
I l and c are rational for both s1 and s2.I l is the only rational action for s3.I Whatever her type, it is never rational to play r for 2.
Eric Pacuit and Olivier Roy 24
![Page 62: Epistemic Game Theoryepacuit/esslli2012/slides-epgth/...Plan for the week 1. Monday Basic Concepts. 2. Tuesday Epistemics. 3. Wednesday Fundamentals of Epistemic Game Theory. Models](https://reader034.fdocuments.in/reader034/viewer/2022042110/5e8ba89b0c6302733479562a/html5/thumbnails/62.jpg)
RCBR in the Matrix
2
1
l c r
t 3, 3 1, 1 0, 0
m 1,1 3, 3 1, 0
b 0, 4 0, 0 4, 0
λ1(t1)
l c r
s1 0.5 0.5 0
s2 0 0 0
s3 0 0 0
λ1(t2)
l c r
s1 0 0.5 0
s2 0 0 0.5
s3 0 0 0
I t and m are rational for t1.
I m and b are rational for t2.
Eric Pacuit and Olivier Roy 25
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RCBR in the Matrix
2
1
l c r
t 3, 3 1, 1 0, 0
m 1,1 3, 3 1, 0
b 0, 4 0, 0 4, 0
λ1(t1)
l c r
s1 0.5 0.5 0
s2 0 0 0
s3 0 0 0
λ1(t2)
l c r
s1 0 0.5 0
s2 0 0 0.5
s3 0 0 0
I t and m are rational for t1.
I m and b are rational for t2.
Eric Pacuit and Olivier Roy 25
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RCBR in the Matrix
2
1
l c r
t 3, 3 1, 1 0, 0
m 1,1 3, 3 1, 0
b 0, 4 0, 0 4, 0
λ1(t1)
l c r
s1 0.5 0.5 0
s2 0 0 0
s3 0 0 0
λ1(t2)
l c r
s1 0 0.5 0
s2 0 0 0.5
s3 0 0 0
I t and m are rational for t1.
I m and b are rational for t2.
Eric Pacuit and Olivier Roy 25
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RCBR in the Matrix
2
1
l c r
t 3, 3 1, 1 0, 0
m 1,1 3, 3 1, 0
b 0, 4 0, 0 4, 0
λ1(t1)
l c r
s1 0.5 0.5 0
s2 0 0 0
s3 0 0 0
λ1(t2)
l c r
s1 0 0.5 0
s2 0 0 0.5
s3 0 0 0
I t and m are rational for t1.
I m and b are rational for t2.
Eric Pacuit and Olivier Roy 25
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RCBR in the Matrix
λ2(s1)
t m b
t1 0.5 0.5 0
t2 0 0 0λ2(s2)
t m b
t1 0.25 0.25 0
t2 0.25 0.25 0
λ2(s3)
t m b
t1 0.5 0 0
t2 0 0 0.5
I All of 2’s types believe that 1 is rational.
Eric Pacuit and Olivier Roy 26
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RCBR in the Matrix
λ2(s1)
t m b
t1 0.5 0.5 0
t2 0 0 0λ2(s2)
t m b
t1 0.25 0.25 0
t2 0.25 0.25 0
λ2(s3)
t m b
t1 0.5 0 0
t2 0 0 0.5
I All of 2’s types believe that 1 is rational.
Eric Pacuit and Olivier Roy 26
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RCBR in the Matrix
λ1(t1)
l c r
s1 0.5 0.5 0
s2 0 0 0
s3 0 0 0
λ1(t2)
l c r
s1 0 0.5 0
s2 0 0 0.5
s3 0 0 0
I Type t1 of 1 believes that 2 is rational.
I But type t2 doesn’t! (1/2 probability that 2 is playing r .)
Eric Pacuit and Olivier Roy 27
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RCBR in the Matrix
λ1(t1)
l c r
s1 0.5 0.5 0
s2 0 0 0
s3 0 0 0
λ1(t2)
l c r
s1 0 0.5 0
s2 0 0 0.5
s3 0 0 0
I Type t1 of 1 believes that 2 is rational.
I But type t2 doesn’t! (1/2 probability that 2 is playing r .)
Eric Pacuit and Olivier Roy 27
![Page 70: Epistemic Game Theoryepacuit/esslli2012/slides-epgth/...Plan for the week 1. Monday Basic Concepts. 2. Tuesday Epistemics. 3. Wednesday Fundamentals of Epistemic Game Theory. Models](https://reader034.fdocuments.in/reader034/viewer/2022042110/5e8ba89b0c6302733479562a/html5/thumbnails/70.jpg)
RCBR in the Matrix
λ1(t1)
l c r
s1 0.5 0.5 0
s2 0 0 0
s3 0 0 0
λ1(t2)
l c r
s1 0 0.5 0
s2 0 0 0.5
s3 0 0 0
I Type t1 of 1 believes that 2 is rational.
I But type t2 doesn’t! (1/2 probability that 2 is playing r .)
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RCBR in the Matrix
λ2(s1)
t m b
t1 0.5 0.5 0
t2 0 0 0λ2(s2)
t m b
t1 0.25 0.25 0
t2 0.25 0.25 0
λ2(s3)
t m b
t1 0.5 0 0
t2 0 0 0.5
I Only type s1 of 2 believes that 1 is rational and that 1believes that 2 is also rational.
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RCBR in the Matrix
λ2(s1)
t m b
t1 0.5 0.5 0
t2 0 0 0λ2(s2)
t m b
t1 0.25 0.25 0
t2 0.25 0.25 0
λ2(s3)
t m b
t1 0.5 0 0
t2 0 0 0.5
I Only type s1 of 2 believes that 1 is rational and that 1believes that 2 is also rational.
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RCBR in the Matrix
λ1(t1)
l c r
s1 0.5 0.5 0
s2 0 0 0
s3 0 0 0
λ1(t2)
l c r
s1 0 0.5 0
s2 0 0 0.5
s3 0 0 0
I Type t1 of 1 believes that 2 is rational and that 2 believesthat 1 believes that 2 is rational.
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RCBR in the Matrix
λ1(t1)
l c r
s1 0.5 0.5 0
s2 0 0 0
s3 0 0 0
λ1(t2)
l c r
s1 0 0.5 0
s2 0 0 0.5
s3 0 0 0
I Type t1 of 1 believes that 2 is rational and that 2 believesthat 1 believes that 2 is rational.
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RCBR in the Matrix
2
1
l c r
t 3, 3 1, 1 0, 0
m 1,1 3, 3 1, 0
b 0, 4 0, 0 4, 0
λ1(t1)
l c r
s1 0.5 0.5 0
s2 0 0 0
s3 0 0 0
λ2(s1)
t m b
t1 0.5 0.5 0
t2 0 0 0
I No further iteration of mutual belief in rationality eliminatesome types or strategies.
I So at all the states in {(t1, s1)} × {t,m} × {l , c} we haverationality and common belief in rationality.
I But observe that {t,m} × {l , c} is precisely the set of profilesthat survive IESDS.
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RCBR in the Matrix
2
1
l c r
t 3, 3 1, 1 0, 0
m 1,1 3, 3 1, 0
b 0, 4 0, 0 4, 0
λ1(t1)
l c r
s1 0.5 0.5 0
s2 0 0 0
s3 0 0 0
λ2(s1)
t m b
t1 0.5 0.5 0
t2 0 0 0
I No further iteration of mutual belief in rationality eliminatesome types or strategies.
I So at all the states in {(t1, s1)} × {t,m} × {l , c} we haverationality and common belief in rationality.
I But observe that {t,m} × {l , c} is precisely the set of profilesthat survive IESDS.
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RCBR in the Matrix
2
1
l c r
t 3, 3 1, 1 0, 0
m 1,1 3, 3 1, 0
b 0, 4 0, 0 4, 0
λ1(t1)
l c r
s1 0.5 0.5 0
s2 0 0 0
s3 0 0 0
λ2(s1)
t m b
t1 0.5 0.5 0
t2 0 0 0
I No further iteration of mutual belief in rationality eliminatesome types or strategies.
I So at all the states in {(t1, s1)} × {t,m} × {l , c} we haverationality and common belief in rationality.
I But observe that {t,m} × {l , c} is precisely the set of profilesthat survive IESDS.
Eric Pacuit and Olivier Roy 30
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RCBR in the Matrix
2
1
l c r
t 3, 3 1, 1 0, 0
m 1,1 3, 3 1, 0
b 0, 4 0, 0 4, 0
λ1(t1)
l c r
s1 0.5 0.5 0
s2 0 0 0
s3 0 0 0
λ2(s1)
t m b
t1 0.5 0.5 0
t2 0 0 0
I No further iteration of mutual belief in rationality eliminatesome types or strategies.
I So at all the states in {(t1, s1)} × {t,m} × {l , c} we haverationality and common belief in rationality.
I But observe that {t,m} × {l , c} is precisely the set of profilesthat survive IESDS.
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RCBR in the Matrix
The general result: RCBR ⇒ IESDS
Suppose that G is a strategic game and T is any type space for G .If (s, t) is a state in T in which all the players are rational andthere is common belief of rationality, then s is a strategy profilethat survives iteratively removal of strictly dominated strategies.
D. Bernheim. Rationalizable strategic behavior. Econometrica, 52:1007-1028,1984.
D. Pearce. Rationalizable strategic behavior and the problem of perfection.Econometrica, 52:1029-1050, 1984.
A. Brandenburger and E. Dekel. Rationalizability and correlated equilibria.Econometrica, 55:1391-1402, 1987.
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RCBR in the Matrix
Proof: RCBR ⇒ IESDS
I We show by induction on n that the if the players have n-level ofmutual belief in rationality then they do not play strategies thatwould be eliminated at the n + 1th round of IESDS.
I Basic case, n = 0. All the players are rational. We know that astrictly dominated strategy, i.e. one that would be eliminated in the1st round of IESDS, is never a best response. So no player isplaying such a strategy.
I Inductive step. Suppose that it is mutual belief up to degree nth
that all players are rational. Take any strategy si of an agent i thatwould not survive n + 1 round of IESDS. This strategy is never abest response to a belief whose support is included in the set ofstates where the others play strategies that would not survive nth
round of IESDS. But by our IH this is precisely the kind of beliefthat all i ’s type have by IH, so i is not playing si either.
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RCBR in the Matrix
Proof: RCBR ⇒ IESDS
I We show by induction on n that the if the players have n-level ofmutual belief in rationality then they do not play strategies thatwould be eliminated at the n + 1th round of IESDS.
I Basic case, n = 0. All the players are rational. We know that astrictly dominated strategy, i.e. one that would be eliminated in the1st round of IESDS, is never a best response. So no player isplaying such a strategy.
I Inductive step. Suppose that it is mutual belief up to degree nth
that all players are rational. Take any strategy si of an agent i thatwould not survive n + 1 round of IESDS. This strategy is never abest response to a belief whose support is included in the set ofstates where the others play strategies that would not survive nth
round of IESDS. But by our IH this is precisely the kind of beliefthat all i ’s type have by IH, so i is not playing si either.
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RCBR in the Matrix
Proof: RCBR ⇒ IESDS
I We show by induction on n that the if the players have n-level ofmutual belief in rationality then they do not play strategies thatwould be eliminated at the n + 1th round of IESDS.
I Basic case, n = 0. All the players are rational. We know that astrictly dominated strategy, i.e. one that would be eliminated in the1st round of IESDS, is never a best response. So no player isplaying such a strategy.
I Inductive step. Suppose that it is mutual belief up to degree nth
that all players are rational.
Take any strategy si of an agent i thatwould not survive n + 1 round of IESDS. This strategy is never abest response to a belief whose support is included in the set ofstates where the others play strategies that would not survive nth
round of IESDS. But by our IH this is precisely the kind of beliefthat all i ’s type have by IH, so i is not playing si either.
Eric Pacuit and Olivier Roy 32
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RCBR in the Matrix
Proof: RCBR ⇒ IESDS
I We show by induction on n that the if the players have n-level ofmutual belief in rationality then they do not play strategies thatwould be eliminated at the n + 1th round of IESDS.
I Basic case, n = 0. All the players are rational. We know that astrictly dominated strategy, i.e. one that would be eliminated in the1st round of IESDS, is never a best response. So no player isplaying such a strategy.
I Inductive step. Suppose that it is mutual belief up to degree nth
that all players are rational. Take any strategy si of an agent i thatwould not survive n + 1 round of IESDS. This strategy is never abest response to a belief whose support is included in the set ofstates where the others play strategies that would not survive nth
round of IESDS. But by our IH this is precisely the kind of beliefthat all i ’s type have by IH, so i is not playing si either.
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RCBR in the Matrix
“Converse direction” From IESDS to RCBRGiven any strategy profile that survives IESDS, there is a model inand a state in that model where this profile RCBR holds at thatstate.
I Trivial? Mathematically, yes.I ... but conceptually important. One can always view or
interpret the choice of a strategy profile that would survive theiterative elimination procedure as one that results from RCBR.
Is the entire set of strategy profiles that survive IESDS alwaysconsistent with rationality and common belief in rationality? Yes.
I For any game G , there is a type structure for that game inwhich the strategy profiles consistent with rationality andcommon belief in rationality is the set of strategies thatsurvive iterative removal of strictly dominated strategies.
A. Friedenberg and J. Kiesler. Iterated Dominance Revisited. Working paper,2011.
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RCBR in the Matrix
“Converse direction” From IESDS to RCBRGiven any strategy profile that survives IESDS, there is a model inand a state in that model where this profile RCBR holds at thatstate.I Trivial? Mathematically, yes.
I ... but conceptually important. One can always view orinterpret the choice of a strategy profile that would survive theiterative elimination procedure as one that results from RCBR.
Is the entire set of strategy profiles that survive IESDS alwaysconsistent with rationality and common belief in rationality? Yes.
I For any game G , there is a type structure for that game inwhich the strategy profiles consistent with rationality andcommon belief in rationality is the set of strategies thatsurvive iterative removal of strictly dominated strategies.
A. Friedenberg and J. Kiesler. Iterated Dominance Revisited. Working paper,2011.
Eric Pacuit and Olivier Roy 33
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RCBR in the Matrix
“Converse direction” From IESDS to RCBRGiven any strategy profile that survives IESDS, there is a model inand a state in that model where this profile RCBR holds at thatstate.I Trivial? Mathematically, yes.I ... but conceptually important. One can always view or
interpret the choice of a strategy profile that would survive theiterative elimination procedure as one that results from RCBR.
Is the entire set of strategy profiles that survive IESDS alwaysconsistent with rationality and common belief in rationality? Yes.
I For any game G , there is a type structure for that game inwhich the strategy profiles consistent with rationality andcommon belief in rationality is the set of strategies thatsurvive iterative removal of strictly dominated strategies.
A. Friedenberg and J. Kiesler. Iterated Dominance Revisited. Working paper,2011.
Eric Pacuit and Olivier Roy 33
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RCBR in the Matrix
“Converse direction” From IESDS to RCBRGiven any strategy profile that survives IESDS, there is a model inand a state in that model where this profile RCBR holds at thatstate.I Trivial? Mathematically, yes.I ... but conceptually important. One can always view or
interpret the choice of a strategy profile that would survive theiterative elimination procedure as one that results from RCBR.
Is the entire set of strategy profiles that survive IESDS alwaysconsistent with rationality and common belief in rationality? Yes.
I For any game G , there is a type structure for that game inwhich the strategy profiles consistent with rationality andcommon belief in rationality is the set of strategies thatsurvive iterative removal of strictly dominated strategies.
A. Friedenberg and J. Kiesler. Iterated Dominance Revisited. Working paper,2011.
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Subgames
Let H = 〈H1, . . . ,Hn, u1, . . . , un〉 be an arbitrary strategic game.
A restriction of H is a sequence G = (G1, . . . ,Gn) such thatGi ⊆ Hi for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
The set of all restrictions of a game H ordered by componentwiseset inclusion forms a complete lattice.
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Subgames
Let H = 〈H1, . . . ,Hn, u1, . . . , un〉 be an arbitrary strategic game.
A restriction of H is a sequence G = (G1, . . . ,Gn) such thatGi ⊆ Hi for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
The set of all restrictions of a game H ordered by componentwiseset inclusion forms a complete lattice.
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Game Models
Relational models: 〈W ,Ri 〉 where Ri ⊆W ×W . WriteRi (w) = {v | wRiv}.
Events: E ⊆W
Knowledge/Belief: 2E = {w | Ri (w) ⊆ E}
Common knowledge/belief:21E = 2E2k+1E = 22kE2∗E =
⋂∞k=12
kE
Fact. An event F is called evident provided F ⊆ 2F . w ∈ 2∗Eprovided there is an evident event F such that w ∈ F ⊆ 2E .
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Game Models
Let G = (G1, . . . ,Gn) be a restriction of a game H.
A knowledge/belief model of G is a tuple〈W ,R1, . . . ,Rn, σ1, . . . , σn〉 where 〈W ,R1, . . . ,Rn〉 is aknowledge/belief model and σi : W → Gi .
Given a model 〈W ,R1, . . . ,Rn, σ1, . . . σn〉 for a restriction G and asequence E = {E1, . . . ,En} where Ei ⊆W ,
GE = (σ1(E1), . . . , σn(En))
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Game Models
Let G = (G1, . . . ,Gn) be a restriction of a game H.
A knowledge/belief model of G is a tuple〈W ,R1, . . . ,Rn, σ1, . . . , σn〉 where 〈W ,R1, . . . ,Rn〉 is aknowledge/belief model and σi : W → Gi .
Given a model 〈W ,R1, . . . ,Rn, σ1, . . . σn〉 for a restriction G and asequence E = {E1, . . . ,En} where Ei ⊆W ,
GE = (σ1(E1), . . . , σn(En))
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Some Lattice Theory
I (D,⊆) is a lattice with largest element >. T : D → D anoperator.
I T is monotonic if for all G ,G ′, G ⊆ G ′ implies T (G ) ⊆ T (G ′)
I G is a fixed-point if T (G ) = G
I νT is the largest fixed point of T
I T∞ is the “outcome of T : T 0 = >, Tα+1 = T (Tα),T β =
⋂α<β T
α, The outcome of iterating T is the least α
such that Tα+1 = Tα, denoted T∞
I Tarski’s Fixed-Point Theorem: Every monotonic operatorT has a (least and largest) fixed pointT∞ = νT =
⋃{G | G ⊆ T (G )}.
I T is contracting if T (G ) ⊆ G . Every contracting operator hasan outcome (T∞ is well-defined)
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Some Lattice Theory
I (D,⊆) is a lattice with largest element >. T : D → D anoperator.
I T is monotonic if for all G ,G ′, G ⊆ G ′ implies T (G ) ⊆ T (G ′)
I G is a fixed-point if T (G ) = G
I νT is the largest fixed point of T
I T∞ is the “outcome of T : T 0 = >, Tα+1 = T (Tα),T β =
⋂α<β T
α, The outcome of iterating T is the least α
such that Tα+1 = Tα, denoted T∞
I Tarski’s Fixed-Point Theorem: Every monotonic operatorT has a (least and largest) fixed pointT∞ = νT =
⋃{G | G ⊆ T (G )}.
I T is contracting if T (G ) ⊆ G . Every contracting operator hasan outcome (T∞ is well-defined)
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Some Lattice Theory
I (D,⊆) is a lattice with largest element >. T : D → D anoperator.
I T is monotonic if for all G ,G ′, G ⊆ G ′ implies T (G ) ⊆ T (G ′)
I G is a fixed-point if T (G ) = G
I νT is the largest fixed point of T
I T∞ is the “outcome of T : T 0 = >, Tα+1 = T (Tα),T β =
⋂α<β T
α, The outcome of iterating T is the least α
such that Tα+1 = Tα, denoted T∞
I Tarski’s Fixed-Point Theorem: Every monotonic operatorT has a (least and largest) fixed pointT∞ = νT =
⋃{G | G ⊆ T (G )}.
I T is contracting if T (G ) ⊆ G . Every contracting operator hasan outcome (T∞ is well-defined)
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Some Lattice Theory
I (D,⊆) is a lattice with largest element >. T : D → D anoperator.
I T is monotonic if for all G ,G ′, G ⊆ G ′ implies T (G ) ⊆ T (G ′)
I G is a fixed-point if T (G ) = G
I νT is the largest fixed point of T
I T∞ is the “outcome of T : T 0 = >, Tα+1 = T (Tα),T β =
⋂α<β T
α, The outcome of iterating T is the least α
such that Tα+1 = Tα, denoted T∞
I Tarski’s Fixed-Point Theorem: Every monotonic operatorT has a (least and largest) fixed pointT∞ = νT =
⋃{G | G ⊆ T (G )}.
I T is contracting if T (G ) ⊆ G . Every contracting operator hasan outcome (T∞ is well-defined)
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Some Lattice Theory
I (D,⊆) is a lattice with largest element >. T : D → D anoperator.
I T is monotonic if for all G ,G ′, G ⊆ G ′ implies T (G ) ⊆ T (G ′)
I G is a fixed-point if T (G ) = G
I νT is the largest fixed point of T
I T∞ is the “outcome of T : T 0 = >, Tα+1 = T (Tα),T β =
⋂α<β T
α, The outcome of iterating T is the least α
such that Tα+1 = Tα, denoted T∞
I Tarski’s Fixed-Point Theorem: Every monotonic operatorT has a (least and largest) fixed pointT∞ = νT =
⋃{G | G ⊆ T (G )}.
I T is contracting if T (G ) ⊆ G . Every contracting operator hasan outcome (T∞ is well-defined)
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Some Lattice Theory
I (D,⊆) is a lattice with largest element >. T : D → D anoperator.
I T is monotonic if for all G ,G ′, G ⊆ G ′ implies T (G ) ⊆ T (G ′)
I G is a fixed-point if T (G ) = G
I νT is the largest fixed point of T
I T∞ is the “outcome of T : T 0 = >, Tα+1 = T (Tα),T β =
⋂α<β T
α, The outcome of iterating T is the least α
such that Tα+1 = Tα, denoted T∞
I Tarski’s Fixed-Point Theorem: Every monotonic operatorT has a (least and largest) fixed pointT∞ = νT =
⋃{G | G ⊆ T (G )}.
I T is contracting if T (G ) ⊆ G . Every contracting operator hasan outcome (T∞ is well-defined)
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Some Lattice Theory
I (D,⊆) is a lattice with largest element >. T : D → D anoperator.
I T is monotonic if for all G ,G ′, G ⊆ G ′ implies T (G ) ⊆ T (G ′)
I G is a fixed-point if T (G ) = G
I νT is the largest fixed point of T
I T∞ is the “outcome of T : T 0 = >, Tα+1 = T (Tα),T β =
⋂α<β T
α, The outcome of iterating T is the least α
such that Tα+1 = Tα, denoted T∞
I Tarski’s Fixed-Point Theorem: Every monotonic operatorT has a (least and largest) fixed pointT∞ = νT =
⋃{G | G ⊆ T (G )}.
I T is contracting if T (G ) ⊆ G . Every contracting operator hasan outcome (T∞ is well-defined)
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Rationality Properties
ϕ(si ,Gi ,G−i ) holds between a strategy si ∈ Hi , a set of strategiesGi for player i and strategies G−i of the opponents. Intuitively si isϕ-optimal strategy for player i in the restricted game〈Gi ,G−i , u1, . . . , un〉 (where the payoffs are suitably restricted).
ϕi is monotonic if for all G−i , G′−i ⊆ H−i and si ∈ Hi
G−i ⊆ G ′−i and ϕ(si ,Hi ,G−i ) implies ϕ(si ,Hi ,G′−i )
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Rationality Properties
ϕ(si ,Gi ,G−i ) holds between a strategy si ∈ Hi , a set of strategiesGi for player i and strategies G−i of the opponents. Intuitively si isϕ-optimal strategy for player i in the restricted game〈Gi ,G−i , u1, . . . , un〉 (where the payoffs are suitably restricted).
ϕi is monotonic if for all G−i , G′−i ⊆ H−i and si ∈ Hi
G−i ⊆ G ′−i and ϕ(si ,Hi ,G−i ) implies ϕ(si ,Hi ,G′−i )
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Removing Strategies
If ϕ = (ϕ1, . . . , ϕn), then define Tϕ(G ) = G ′ where
I G = (G1, . . . ,Gn), G ′ = (G ′1, . . . ,G′n),
I for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, G ′i = {si ∈ Gi | ϕi (si ,Hi ,G−i )}
Tϕ is contracting, so it has an outcome T∞ϕ
If each ϕi is monotonic, then νTϕ exists and equals T∞ϕ .
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Removing Strategies
If ϕ = (ϕ1, . . . , ϕn), then define Tϕ(G ) = G ′ where
I G = (G1, . . . ,Gn), G ′ = (G ′1, . . . ,G′n),
I for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, G ′i = {si ∈ Gi | ϕi (si ,Hi ,G−i )}
Tϕ is contracting, so it has an outcome T∞ϕ
If each ϕi is monotonic, then νTϕ exists and equals T∞ϕ .
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Removing Strategies
If ϕ = (ϕ1, . . . , ϕn), then define Tϕ(G ) = G ′ where
I G = (G1, . . . ,Gn), G ′ = (G ′1, . . . ,G′n),
I for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, G ′i = {si ∈ Gi | ϕi (si ,Hi ,G−i )}
Tϕ is contracting, so it has an outcome T∞ϕ
If each ϕi is monotonic, then νTϕ exists and equals T∞ϕ .
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Rational Play
Let H = 〈H1, . . . ,Hn, u1, . . . , un〉 a strategic game and〈W ,R1, . . . ,Rn, σ1, . . . , σn〉 a model for H.
σi (w) is the strategy player is using in state w .
GRi (w) is a restriction of H giving i ’s view of the game.
Player i is ϕi -rational in the state w if ϕi (σi (w),Hi , (GRi (w))−i )holds.
Rat(ϕ) = {w ∈W | each player is ϕi -rational in w}
2Rat(ϕ)2∗Rat(ϕ)
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Rational Play
Let H = 〈H1, . . . ,Hn, u1, . . . , un〉 a strategic game and〈W ,R1, . . . ,Rn, σ1, . . . , σn〉 a model for H.
σi (w) is the strategy player is using in state w .
GRi (w) is a restriction of H giving i ’s view of the game.
Player i is ϕi -rational in the state w if ϕi (σi (w),Hi , (GRi (w))−i )holds.
Rat(ϕ) = {w ∈W | each player is ϕi -rational in w}
2Rat(ϕ)2∗Rat(ϕ)
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Rational Play
Let H = 〈H1, . . . ,Hn, u1, . . . , un〉 a strategic game and〈W ,R1, . . . ,Rn, σ1, . . . , σn〉 a model for H.
σi (w) is the strategy player is using in state w .
GRi (w) is a restriction of H giving i ’s view of the game.
Player i is ϕi -rational in the state w if ϕi (σi (w),Hi , (GRi (w))−i )holds.
Rat(ϕ) = {w ∈W | each player is ϕi -rational in w}
2Rat(ϕ)2∗Rat(ϕ)
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Theorem (Apt and Zvesper).
I Suppose that each ϕi is monotonic. Then for all belief modelsfor H,
GRat(ϕ)∩B∗(Rat(ϕ)) ⊆ T∞ϕ
I Suppose that each ϕi is monotonic. Then for all knowledgemodels for H,
GK∗(Rat(ϕ)) ⊆ T∞ϕ
I For some standard knowledge model for H,
T∞ϕ ⊆ GK∗(Rat(ϕ))
K. Apt and J. Zvesper. The Role of Monotonicity in the Epistemic Analysis ofGames. Games, 1(4), pgs. 381-394, 2010.
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Claim If each ϕi is monotonic, then GRat(ϕ)∩2∗Rat(ϕ) ⊆ T∞ϕ .
Let si be an element of the ith component of GRat(ϕ)∩2∗Rat(ϕ):si = σi (w) for some w ∈ Rat(ϕ) ∩2∗Rat(ϕ)
there is an F such that F ⊆ 2F and
w ∈ F ⊆ 2Rat(ϕ) = {v ∈W | ∀i Ri (v) ⊆ Rat(ϕ)}
Claim. GF∩Rat(ϕ) is post-fixed point of Tϕ(GF∩Rat(ϕ) ⊆ Tϕ(GF∩Rat(ϕ))).
Since each ϕi is monotonic, Tϕ is monotonic and by Tarski’sfixed-point theorem, GF∩Rat(ϕ) ⊆ T∞ϕ . But si = σi (w) andw ∈ F ∩ Rat(ϕ), so si is the ith component in T∞ϕ .
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Claim If each ϕi is monotonic, then GRat(ϕ)∩2∗Rat(ϕ) ⊆ T∞ϕ .
Let si be an element of the ith component of GRat(ϕ)∩2∗Rat(ϕ):si = σi (w) for some w ∈ Rat(ϕ) ∩2∗Rat(ϕ)
there is an F such that F ⊆ 2F and
w ∈ F ⊆ 2Rat(ϕ) = {v ∈W | ∀i Ri (v) ⊆ Rat(ϕ)}
Claim. GF∩Rat(ϕ) is post-fixed point of Tϕ(GF∩Rat(ϕ) ⊆ Tϕ(GF∩Rat(ϕ))).
Since each ϕi is monotonic, Tϕ is monotonic and by Tarski’sfixed-point theorem, GF∩Rat(ϕ) ⊆ T∞ϕ . But si = σi (w) andw ∈ F ∩ Rat(ϕ), so si is the ith component in T∞ϕ .
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Claim If each ϕi is monotonic, then GRat(ϕ)∩2∗Rat(ϕ) ⊆ T∞ϕ .
Let si be an element of the ith component of GRat(ϕ)∩2∗Rat(ϕ):si = σi (w) for some w ∈ Rat(ϕ) ∩2∗Rat(ϕ)
there is an F such that F ⊆ 2F and
w ∈ F ⊆ 2Rat(ϕ) = {v ∈W | ∀i Ri (v) ⊆ Rat(ϕ)}
Claim. GF∩Rat(ϕ) is post-fixed point of Tϕ(GF∩Rat(ϕ) ⊆ Tϕ(GF∩Rat(ϕ))).
Since each ϕi is monotonic, Tϕ is monotonic and by Tarski’sfixed-point theorem, GF∩Rat(ϕ) ⊆ T∞ϕ . But si = σi (w) andw ∈ F ∩ Rat(ϕ), so si is the ith component in T∞ϕ .
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Claim If each ϕi is monotonic, then GRat(ϕ)∩2∗Rat(ϕ) ⊆ T∞ϕ .
Let si be an element of the ith component of GRat(ϕ)∩2∗Rat(ϕ):si = σi (w) for some w ∈ Rat(ϕ) ∩2∗Rat(ϕ)
there is an F such that F ⊆ 2F and
w ∈ F ⊆ 2Rat(ϕ) = {v ∈W | ∀i Ri (v) ⊆ Rat(ϕ)}
Claim. GF∩Rat(ϕ) is post-fixed point of Tϕ(GF∩Rat(ϕ) ⊆ Tϕ(GF∩Rat(ϕ))).
Since each ϕi is monotonic, Tϕ is monotonic and by Tarski’sfixed-point theorem, GF∩Rat(ϕ) ⊆ T∞ϕ . But si = σi (w) andw ∈ F ∩ Rat(ϕ), so si is the ith component in T∞ϕ .
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Claim If each ϕi is monotonic, then GRat(ϕ)∩2∗Rat(ϕ) ⊆ T∞ϕ .
Let si be an element of the ith component of GRat(ϕ)∩2∗Rat(ϕ):si = σi (w) for some w ∈ Rat(ϕ) ∩2∗Rat(ϕ)
there is an F such that F ⊆ 2F and
w ∈ F ⊆ 2Rat(ϕ) = {v ∈W | ∀i Ri (v) ⊆ Rat(ϕ)}
Claim. GF∩Rat(ϕ) is post-fixed point of Tϕ(GF∩Rat(ϕ) ⊆ Tϕ(GF∩Rat(ϕ))).
Since each ϕi is monotonic, Tϕ is monotonic and by Tarski’sfixed-point theorem, GF∩Rat(ϕ) ⊆ T∞ϕ . But si = σi (w) andw ∈ F ∩ Rat(ϕ), so si is the ith component in T∞ϕ .
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F ⊆ 2F and w ∈ F ⊆ 2Rat(ϕ) = {v ∈W | ∀i Ri (v) ⊆ Rat(ϕ)}
Claim. GF∩Rat(ϕ) is post-fixed point of Tϕ(GF∩Rat(ϕ) ⊆ Tϕ(GF∩Rat(ϕ))).
Let w ′ ∈ F ∩ Rat(ϕ) and let i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
Since w ′ ∈ Rat(ϕ), ϕi (σi (w′),Hi , (GRi (w))−i ) holds.
F is evident, so Ri (w′) ⊆ F . We also have Ri (w
′) ⊆ Rat(ϕ).
Hence, Ri (w′) ⊆ F ∩ Rat(ϕ).
This implies (GRi (w ′)) ⊆ (GF∩Rat(ϕ))−i , and so by monotonicity ofϕi , ϕi (si ,Hi , (GF∩Rat(ϕ))−i ) holds.
This means GF∩Rat(ϕ) ⊆ Tϕ(GF∩Rat(ϕ))
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F ⊆ 2F and w ∈ F ⊆ 2Rat(ϕ) = {v ∈W | ∀i Ri (v) ⊆ Rat(ϕ)}
Claim. GF∩Rat(ϕ) is post-fixed point of Tϕ(GF∩Rat(ϕ) ⊆ Tϕ(GF∩Rat(ϕ))).
Let w ′ ∈ F ∩ Rat(ϕ) and let i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
Since w ′ ∈ Rat(ϕ), ϕi (σi (w′),Hi , (GRi (w))−i ) holds.
F is evident, so Ri (w′) ⊆ F . We also have Ri (w
′) ⊆ Rat(ϕ).
Hence, Ri (w′) ⊆ F ∩ Rat(ϕ).
This implies (GRi (w ′)) ⊆ (GF∩Rat(ϕ))−i , and so by monotonicity ofϕi , ϕi (si ,Hi , (GF∩Rat(ϕ))−i ) holds.
This means GF∩Rat(ϕ) ⊆ Tϕ(GF∩Rat(ϕ))
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F ⊆ 2F and w ∈ F ⊆ 2Rat(ϕ) = {v ∈W | ∀i Ri (v) ⊆ Rat(ϕ)}
Claim. GF∩Rat(ϕ) is post-fixed point of Tϕ(GF∩Rat(ϕ) ⊆ Tϕ(GF∩Rat(ϕ))).
Let w ′ ∈ F ∩ Rat(ϕ) and let i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
Since w ′ ∈ Rat(ϕ), ϕi (σi (w′),Hi , (GRi (w))−i ) holds.
F is evident, so Ri (w′) ⊆ F . We also have Ri (w
′) ⊆ Rat(ϕ).
Hence, Ri (w′) ⊆ F ∩ Rat(ϕ).
This implies (GRi (w ′)) ⊆ (GF∩Rat(ϕ))−i , and so by monotonicity ofϕi , ϕi (si ,Hi , (GF∩Rat(ϕ))−i ) holds.
This means GF∩Rat(ϕ) ⊆ Tϕ(GF∩Rat(ϕ))
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F ⊆ 2F and w ∈ F ⊆ 2Rat(ϕ) = {v ∈W | ∀i Ri (v) ⊆ Rat(ϕ)}
Claim. GF∩Rat(ϕ) is post-fixed point of Tϕ(GF∩Rat(ϕ) ⊆ Tϕ(GF∩Rat(ϕ))).
Let w ′ ∈ F ∩ Rat(ϕ) and let i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
Since w ′ ∈ Rat(ϕ), ϕi (σi (w′),Hi , (GRi (w))−i ) holds.
F is evident, so Ri (w′) ⊆ F . We also have Ri (w
′) ⊆ Rat(ϕ).
Hence, Ri (w′) ⊆ F ∩ Rat(ϕ).
This implies (GRi (w ′)) ⊆ (GF∩Rat(ϕ))−i , and so by monotonicity ofϕi , ϕi (si ,Hi , (GF∩Rat(ϕ))−i ) holds.
This means GF∩Rat(ϕ) ⊆ Tϕ(GF∩Rat(ϕ))
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F ⊆ 2F and w ∈ F ⊆ 2Rat(ϕ) = {v ∈W | ∀i Ri (v) ⊆ Rat(ϕ)}
Claim. GF∩Rat(ϕ) is post-fixed point of Tϕ(GF∩Rat(ϕ) ⊆ Tϕ(GF∩Rat(ϕ))).
Let w ′ ∈ F ∩ Rat(ϕ) and let i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
Since w ′ ∈ Rat(ϕ), ϕi (σi (w′),Hi , (GRi (w))−i ) holds.
F is evident, so Ri (w′) ⊆ F . We also have Ri (w
′) ⊆ Rat(ϕ).
Hence, Ri (w′) ⊆ F ∩ Rat(ϕ).
This implies (GRi (w ′)) ⊆ (GF∩Rat(ϕ))−i , and so by monotonicity ofϕi , ϕi (si ,Hi , (GF∩Rat(ϕ))−i ) holds.
This means GF∩Rat(ϕ) ⊆ Tϕ(GF∩Rat(ϕ))
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F ⊆ 2F and w ∈ F ⊆ 2Rat(ϕ) = {v ∈W | ∀i Ri (v) ⊆ Rat(ϕ)}
Claim. GF∩Rat(ϕ) is post-fixed point of Tϕ(GF∩Rat(ϕ) ⊆ Tϕ(GF∩Rat(ϕ))).
Let w ′ ∈ F ∩ Rat(ϕ) and let i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
Since w ′ ∈ Rat(ϕ), ϕi (σi (w′),Hi , (GRi (w))−i ) holds.
F is evident, so Ri (w′) ⊆ F . We also have Ri (w
′) ⊆ Rat(ϕ).
Hence, Ri (w′) ⊆ F ∩ Rat(ϕ).
This implies (GRi (w ′)) ⊆ (GF∩Rat(ϕ))−i , and so by monotonicity ofϕi , ϕi (si ,Hi , (GF∩Rat(ϕ))−i ) holds.
This means GF∩Rat(ϕ) ⊆ Tϕ(GF∩Rat(ϕ))
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F ⊆ 2F and w ∈ F ⊆ 2Rat(ϕ) = {v ∈W | ∀i Ri (v) ⊆ Rat(ϕ)}
Claim. GF∩Rat(ϕ) is post-fixed point of Tϕ(GF∩Rat(ϕ) ⊆ Tϕ(GF∩Rat(ϕ))).
Let w ′ ∈ F ∩ Rat(ϕ) and let i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
Since w ′ ∈ Rat(ϕ), ϕi (σi (w′),Hi , (GRi (w))−i ) holds.
F is evident, so Ri (w′) ⊆ F . We also have Ri (w
′) ⊆ Rat(ϕ).
Hence, Ri (w′) ⊆ F ∩ Rat(ϕ).
This implies (GRi (w ′)) ⊆ (GF∩Rat(ϕ))−i , and so by monotonicity ofϕi , ϕi (si ,Hi , (GF∩Rat(ϕ))−i ) holds.
This means GF∩Rat(ϕ) ⊆ Tϕ(GF∩Rat(ϕ))
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sdi (si ,Gi ,G−i ) is ¬∃s ′i ∈ Gi , ∀s−i ∈ G−iui (s′i , s−i ) > ui (si , s−i )
bri (si ,Gi ,G−i ) is ∃µi ∈ Bi (G−i )∀s ′i ∈ Gi ,Ui (si , µi ) ≥ Ui (s′i , µi ).
Uϕ(G ) = G ′ where G ′i = {si ∈ Gi | ϕi (si ,Gi ,G−i )}.
Note: Uϕ is not monotonic.
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sdi (si ,Gi ,G−i ) is ¬∃s ′i ∈ Gi , ∀s−i ∈ G−iui (s′i , s−i ) > ui (si , s−i )
bri (si ,Gi ,G−i ) is ∃µi ∈ Bi (G−i )∀s ′i ∈ Gi ,Ui (si , µi ) ≥ Ui (s′i , µi ).
Uϕ(G ) = G ′ where G ′i = {si ∈ Gi | ϕi (si ,Gi ,G−i )}.
Note: Uϕ is not monotonic.
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sdi (si ,Gi ,G−i ) is ¬∃s ′i ∈ Gi , ∀s−i ∈ G−iui (s′i , s−i ) > ui (si , s−i )
bri (si ,Gi ,G−i ) is ∃µi ∈ Bi (G−i )∀s ′i ∈ Gi ,Ui (si , µi ) ≥ Ui (s′i , µi ).
Uϕ(G ) = G ′ where G ′i = {si ∈ Gi | ϕi (si ,Gi ,G−i )}.
Note: Uϕ is not monotonic.
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sdi (si ,Gi ,G−i ) is ¬∃s ′i ∈ Gi , ∀s−i ∈ G−iui (s′i , s−i ) > ui (si , s−i )
bri (si ,Gi ,G−i ) is ∃µi ∈ Bi (G−i )∀s ′i ∈ Gi ,Ui (si , µi ) ≥ Ui (s′i , µi ).
Uϕ(G ) = G ′ where G ′i = {si ∈ Gi | ϕi (si ,Gi ,G−i )}.
Note: Uϕ is not monotonic.
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Corollary. For all belief models, GRat(br)∩2∗Rat(br) ⊆ U∞sd . For allG , we have
Tbr (G ) ⊆ Tsd(G )
Tsd(G ) ⊆ Usd(G )
Then, T∞sd ⊆ U∞sd .
Fact. Consider two operators T1,T2 on (D,⊆) such that,
I for all G , T1(G ) ⊆ T2(G )
I T1 is monotonic
I T2 is contracting
Then, T∞1 ⊆ T∞2 .
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Corollary. For all belief models, GRat(br)∩2∗Rat(br) ⊆ U∞sd . For allG , we have
Tbr (G ) ⊆ Tsd(G )
Tsd(G ) ⊆ Usd(G )
Then, T∞sd ⊆ U∞sd .
Fact. Consider two operators T1,T2 on (D,⊆) such that,
I for all G , T1(G ) ⊆ T2(G )
I T1 is monotonic
I T2 is contracting
Then, T∞1 ⊆ T∞2 .
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This analysis does not work for weak dominance...
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Common knowledge of rationality (CKR) in the tree.
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RCK in the tree
Backwards Induction
Invented by Zermelo, Backwards Induction is an iterative algorithmfor “solving” and extensive game.
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RCK in the tree
(1, 0) (2, 3) (1, 5) A
(3, 1) (4, 4)
B B
A
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RCK in the tree
(1, 0) (2, 3) (1, 5) A
(3, 1) (4, 4)
B B
A
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RCK in the tree
(1, 0) (2, 3) (1, 5) (4, 4)
(3, 1) (4, 4)
B B
A
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RCK in the tree
(1, 0) (2, 3) (1, 5) (4, 4)
(3, 1) (4, 4)
B B
A
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RCK in the tree
(1, 0) (2, 3) (1, 5) (4, 4)
(3, 1) (4, 4)
(2, 3) B
A
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RCK in the tree
(1, 0) (2, 3) (1, 5) (4, 4)
(3, 1) (4, 4)
(2, 3) B
A
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RCK in the tree
(1, 0) (2, 3) (1, 5) (4, 4)
(3, 1) (4, 4)
(2, 3) (1, 5)
A
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RCK in the tree
(1, 0) (2, 3) (1, 5) (4, 4)
(3, 1) (4, 4)
(2, 3) (1, 5)
A
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RCK in the tree
(1, 0) (2, 3) (1, 5) (4, 4)
(3, 1) (4, 4)
(2, 3) (1, 5)
(2, 3)
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RCK in the tree
BI Puzzle
A B A
(2,1) (1,6) (7,5)
(6,6)R1 r R2
D1 d D2
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RCK in the tree
BI Puzzle
A B A
(2,1) (1,6) (7,5)
(6,6)R1 r R2
D1 d D2
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RCK in the tree
BI Puzzle
A B (7,5)
(2,1) (1,6) (7,5)
(6,6)R1 r
D1 d
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RCK in the tree
BI Puzzle
A B (7,5)
(2,1) (1,6) (7,5)
(6,6)R1 r
D1 d
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RCK in the tree
BI Puzzle
A (1,6) (7,5)
(2,1) (1,6) (7,5)
(6,6)R1
D1
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RCK in the tree
BI Puzzle
A (1,6) (7,5)
(2,1) (1,6) (7,5)
(6,6)R1
D1
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RCK in the tree
BI Puzzle
A (1,6) (7,5)
(2,1) (1,6) (7,5)
(6,6)
D1
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RCK in the tree
BI Puzzle
A B A
(2,1) (1,6) (7,5)
(6,6)R1 r R2
D1 d D2
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RCK in the tree
But what if Bob has to move?
A B A
(2,1) (1,6) (7,5)
(6,6)R1 r R2
D1 d D2
What should Bob thinks of Ann?I Either she doesn’t believe that he is rational and that he
believes that she would choose R2.I Or Ann made a “mistake” (= irrational move) at the first
turn.
Either way, rationality is not “common knowledge”.
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RCK in the tree
But what if Bob has to move?
A B A
(2,1) (1,6) (7,5)
(6,6)R1 r R2
D1 d D2
What should Bob thinks of Ann?I Either she doesn’t believe that he is rational and that he
believes that she would choose R2.I Or Ann made a “mistake” (= irrational move) at the first
turn.
Either way, rationality is not “common knowledge”.
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RCK in the tree
R. Aumann. Backwards induction and common knowledge of rationality. Gamesand Economic Behavior, 8, pgs. 6 - 19, 1995.
R. Stalnaker. Knowledge, belief and counterfactual reasoning in games. Eco-nomics and Philosophy, 12, pgs. 133 - 163, 1996.
J. Halpern. Substantive Rationality and Backward Induction. Games and Eco-nomic Behavior, 37, pp. 425-435, 1998.
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RCK in the tree
Models of Extensive Games
Let Γ be a non-degenerate extensive game with perfectinformation. Let Γi be the set of nodes controlled by player i .
A strategy profile σ describes the choice for each player i at allvertices where i can choose.
Given a vertex v in Γ and strategy profile σ, σ specifies a uniquepath from v to an end-node.
M(Γ) = 〈W ,∼i , σ〉 where σ : W → Strat(Γ) and ∼i⊆W ×W isan equivalence relation.
If σ(w) = σ, then σi (w) = σi and σ−i (w) = σ−i
(A1) If w ∼i w′ then σi (w) = σi (w
′).
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RCK in the tree
Models of Extensive Games
Let Γ be a non-degenerate extensive game with perfectinformation. Let Γi be the set of nodes controlled by player i .
A strategy profile σ describes the choice for each player i at allvertices where i can choose.
Given a vertex v in Γ and strategy profile σ, σ specifies a uniquepath from v to an end-node.
M(Γ) = 〈W ,∼i , σ〉 where σ : W → Strat(Γ) and ∼i⊆W ×W isan equivalence relation.
If σ(w) = σ, then σi (w) = σi and σ−i (w) = σ−i
(A1) If w ∼i w′ then σi (w) = σi (w
′).
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RCK in the tree
Models of Extensive Games
Let Γ be a non-degenerate extensive game with perfectinformation. Let Γi be the set of nodes controlled by player i .
A strategy profile σ describes the choice for each player i at allvertices where i can choose.
Given a vertex v in Γ and strategy profile σ, σ specifies a uniquepath from v to an end-node.
M(Γ) = 〈W ,∼i , σ〉 where σ : W → Strat(Γ) and ∼i⊆W ×W isan equivalence relation.
If σ(w) = σ, then σi (w) = σi and σ−i (w) = σ−i
(A1) If w ∼i w′ then σi (w) = σi (w
′).
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RCK in the tree
Models of Extensive Games
Let Γ be a non-degenerate extensive game with perfectinformation. Let Γi be the set of nodes controlled by player i .
A strategy profile σ describes the choice for each player i at allvertices where i can choose.
Given a vertex v in Γ and strategy profile σ, σ specifies a uniquepath from v to an end-node.
M(Γ) = 〈W ,∼i , σ〉 where σ : W → Strat(Γ) and ∼i⊆W ×W isan equivalence relation.
If σ(w) = σ, then σi (w) = σi and σ−i (w) = σ−i
(A1) If w ∼i w′ then σi (w) = σi (w
′).
Eric Pacuit and Olivier Roy 53
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RCK in the tree
Models of Extensive Games
Let Γ be a non-degenerate extensive game with perfectinformation. Let Γi be the set of nodes controlled by player i .
A strategy profile σ describes the choice for each player i at allvertices where i can choose.
Given a vertex v in Γ and strategy profile σ, σ specifies a uniquepath from v to an end-node.
M(Γ) = 〈W ,∼i , σ〉 where σ : W → Strat(Γ) and ∼i⊆W ×W isan equivalence relation.
If σ(w) = σ, then σi (w) = σi and σ−i (w) = σ−i
(A1) If w ∼i w′ then σi (w) = σi (w
′).
Eric Pacuit and Olivier Roy 53
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RCK in the tree
Models of Extensive Games
Let Γ be a non-degenerate extensive game with perfectinformation. Let Γi be the set of nodes controlled by player i .
A strategy profile σ describes the choice for each player i at allvertices where i can choose.
Given a vertex v in Γ and strategy profile σ, σ specifies a uniquepath from v to an end-node.
M(Γ) = 〈W ,∼i , σ〉 where σ : W → Strat(Γ) and ∼i⊆W ×W isan equivalence relation.
If σ(w) = σ, then σi (w) = σi and σ−i (w) = σ−i
(A1) If w ∼i w′ then σi (w) = σi (w
′).
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RCK in the tree
Rationality
hvi (σ) denote “i ’s payoff if σ is followed from node v”
i is rational at v in w provided for all strategies si 6= σi (w),hvi (σ(w ′)) ≥ hvi ((σ−i (w
′), si )) for some w ′ ∈ [w ]i .
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RCK in the tree
Rationality
hvi (σ) denote “i ’s payoff if σ is followed from node v”
i is rational at v in w provided for all strategies si 6= σi (w),hvi (σ(w ′)) ≥ hvi ((σ−i (w
′), si )) for some w ′ ∈ [w ]i .
Eric Pacuit and Olivier Roy 54
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Substantive Rationality
i is substantively rational in state w if i is rational at a vertex vin w of every vertex in v ∈ Γi
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Stalnaker Rationality
For every vertex v ∈ Γi , if i were to actually reach v , then what hewould do in that case would be rational.
f : W × Γi →W , f (w , v) = w ′, then w ′ is the “closest state to wwhere the vertex v is reached.
(F1) v is reached in f (w , v) (i.e., v is on the path determined byσ(f (w , v)))
(F2) If v is reached in w , then f (w , v) = w
(F3) σ(f (w , v)) and σ(w) agree on the subtree of Γ below v
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RCK in the tree
Stalnaker Rationality
For every vertex v ∈ Γi , if i were to actually reach v , then what hewould do in that case would be rational.
f : W × Γi →W , f (w , v) = w ′, then w ′ is the “closest state to wwhere the vertex v is reached.
(F1) v is reached in f (w , v) (i.e., v is on the path determined byσ(f (w , v)))
(F2) If v is reached in w , then f (w , v) = w
(F3) σ(f (w , v)) and σ(w) agree on the subtree of Γ below v
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RCK in the tree
Stalnaker Rationality
For every vertex v ∈ Γi , if i were to actually reach v , then what hewould do in that case would be rational.
f : W × Γi →W , f (w , v) = w ′, then w ′ is the “closest state to wwhere the vertex v is reached.
(F1) v is reached in f (w , v) (i.e., v is on the path determined byσ(f (w , v)))
(F2) If v is reached in w , then f (w , v) = w
(F3) σ(f (w , v)) and σ(w) agree on the subtree of Γ below v
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A B A(3, 3)
(2, 2) (1, 1) (0, 0)
a a a
d d d s1 = (da, d), s2 = (aa, d),s3 = (ad , d), s4 = (aa, a),s5 = (ad , a)
W = {w1,w2,w3,w4,w5} with σ(wi ) = s i
[wi ]A = {wi} for i = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5
[wi ]B = {wi} for i = 1, 4, 5 and [w2]B = [w3]B = {w2,w3}
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A B A(3, 3)
(2, 2) (1, 1) (0, 0)
a a a
d d d s1 = (da, d), s2 = (aa, d),s3 = (ad , d), s4 = (aa, a),s5 = (ad , a)
W = {w1,w2,w3,w4,w5} with σ(wi ) = s i
[wi ]A = {wi} for i = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5
[wi ]B = {wi} for i = 1, 4, 5 and [w2]B = [w3]B = {w2,w3}
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A B A(3, 3)
(2, 2) (1, 1) (0, 0)
a a a
d d d s1 = (da, d), s2 = (aa, d),s3 = (ad , d), s4 = (aa, a),s5 = (ad , a)
I W = {w1,w2,w3,w4,w5} with σ(wi ) = s i
I [wi ]A = {wi} for i = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5
I [wi ]B = {wi} for i = 1, 4, 5 and [w2]B = [w3]B = {w2,w3}
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A B A(3, 3)
(2, 2) (1, 1) (0, 0)
a a a
d d d s1 = (da, d), s2 = (aa, d),s3 = (ad , d), s4 = (aa, a),s5 = (ad , a)
w1 w2 w3
w4 w5
It is common knowledge at w1 that if vertex v2 were reached,Bob would play down.
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A B
v2
A(3, 3)
(2, 2) (1, 1) (0, 0)
a a a
d d d s1 = (da, d), s2 = (aa, d),s3 = (ad , d), s4 = (aa, a),s5 = (ad , a)
w1 w2 w3
w4 w5
It is common knowledge at w1 that if vertex v2 were reached,Bob would play down.
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A B
v2
A(3, 3)
(2, 2) (1, 1) (0, 0)
a a a
d d d s1 = (da, d), s2 = (aa, d),s3 = (ad , d), s4 = (aa, a),s5 = (ad , a)
w1 w2 w3
w4 w5
Bob is not rational at v2 in w1 add asdf a def add fa sdf asdfa addsasdf asdf add fa sdf asdf adds f asfd
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A B
v2
A(3, 3)
(2, 2) (1, 1) (0, 0)
a a a
d d d s1 = (da, d), s2 = (aa, d),s3 = (ad , d), s4 = (aa, a),s5 = (ad , a)
w1 w2 w3
w4 w5
Bob is rational at v2 in w2 add asdf a def add fa sdf asdfa addsasdf asdf add fa sdf asdf adds f asfd
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A B
v2
A
v3(3, 3)
(2, 2) (1, 1) (0, 0)
a a a
d d d s1 = (da, d), s2 = (aa, d),s3 = (ad , d), s4 = (aa, a),s5 = (ad , a)
w1 w2 w3
w4 w5
Note that f (w1, v2) = w2 and f (w1, v3) = w4, so there is commonknowledge of S-rationality at w1.
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Aumann’s Theorem: If Γ is a non-degenerate game of perfectinformation, then in all models of Γ, we have C (A− Rat) ⊆ BI
Stalnaker’s Theorem: There exists a non-degenerate game Γ ofperfect information and an extended model of Γ in which theselection function satisfies F1-F3 such that C (S − Rat) 6⊆ BI .
Revising beliefs during play:
“Although it is common knowledge that Ann would play across ifv3 were reached, if Ann were to play across at v1, Bob wouldconsider it possible that Ann would play down at v3”
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Aumann’s Theorem: If Γ is a non-degenerate game of perfectinformation, then in all models of Γ, we have C (A− Rat) ⊆ BI
Stalnaker’s Theorem: There exists a non-degenerate game Γ ofperfect information and an extended model of Γ in which theselection function satisfies F1-F3 such that C (S − Rat) 6⊆ BI .
Revising beliefs during play:
“Although it is common knowledge that Ann would play across ifv3 were reached, if Ann were to play across at v1, Bob wouldconsider it possible that Ann would play down at v3”
Eric Pacuit and Olivier Roy 58
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F4. For all players i and vertices v , if w ′ ∈ [f (w , v)]i then thereexists a state w ′′ ∈ [w ]i such that σ(w ′) and σ(w ′′) agree on thesubtree of Γ below v .
Theorem (Halpern). If Γ is a non-degenerate game of perfectinformation, then for every extended model of Γ in which theselection function satisfies F1-F4, we have C (S − Rat) ⊆ BI .Moreover, there is an extend model of Γ in which the selectionfunction satisfies F1-F4.
J. Halpern. Substantive Rationality and Backward Induction. Games and Eco-nomic Behavior, 37, pp. 425-435, 1998.
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Proof of Halpern’s Theorem
(1, 0) (2, 3) (1, 5) A
(3, 1) (4, 4)
B B
A
I Suppose w ∈ C (S − Rat). We show by induction on k thatfor all w ′ reachable from w by a finite path along the union ofthe relations ∼i , if v is at most k moves away from a leaf,then σi (w) is i ’s backward induction move at w ′.
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RCK in the tree
Proof of Halpern’s Theorem
(1, 0) (2, 3) (1, 5) A
(3, 1) (4, 4)
B B
A
I Base case: we are at most 1 move away from a leaf. Supposew ∈ C (S − Rat). Take any w ′ reachable from w .
Sincew ∈ C (S − Rat), we know that w ′ ∈ C (S − Rat). So i mustplay her BI move at f (w ′, v). But then by F3 this must alsobe the case at (w ′, v).
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RCK in the tree
Proof of Halpern’s Theorem
(1, 0) (2, 3) (1, 5) A
(3, 1) (4, 4)
B B
A
I Base case: we are at most 1 move away from a leaf. Supposew ∈ C (S − Rat). Take any w ′ reachable from w . Sincew ∈ C (S − Rat), we know that w ′ ∈ C (S − Rat).
So i mustplay her BI move at f (w ′, v). But then by F3 this must alsobe the case at (w ′, v).
Eric Pacuit and Olivier Roy 61
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RCK in the tree
Proof of Halpern’s Theorem
(1, 0) (2, 3) (1, 5) A
(3, 1) (4, 4)
B B
A
I Base case: we are at most 1 move away from a leaf. Supposew ∈ C (S − Rat). Take any w ′ reachable from w . Sincew ∈ C (S − Rat), we know that w ′ ∈ C (S − Rat). So i mustplay her BI move at f (w ′, v).
But then by F3 this must alsobe the case at (w ′, v).
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RCK in the tree
Proof of Halpern’s Theorem
(1, 0) (2, 3) (1, 5) A
(3, 1) (4, 4)
B B
A
I Base case: we are at most 1 move away from a leaf. Supposew ∈ C (S − Rat). Take any w ′ reachable from w . Sincew ∈ C (S − Rat), we know that w ′ ∈ C (S − Rat). So i mustplay her BI move at f (w ′, v). But then by F3 this must alsobe the case at (w ′, v).
Eric Pacuit and Olivier Roy 61
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RCK in the tree
Proof of Halpern’s Theorem
(1, 0) (2, 3) (1, 5) A
(3, 1) (4, 4)
B B
A
I Base case: we are at most 1 move away from a leaf. Supposew ∈ C (S − Rat). Take any w ′ reachable from w . Sincew ∈ C (S − Rat), we know that w ′ ∈ C (S − Rat). So i mustplay her BI move at f (w ′, v). But then by F3 this must alsobe the case at (w ′, v).
Eric Pacuit and Olivier Roy 62
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Proof of Halpern’s Theorem
(1, 0) (2, 3) (1, 5) A
(3, 1) (4, 4)
B B
A
w ’ w ′
w ′′
∗
I Suppose w ∈ C (S − Rat). Take any w ′ reachable from w .Assume, towards contradiction, that σ(w)i (v) = a is not theBI move for player i . By the same argument as before, i mustbe rational at w ′′ = f (w ′, v). Furthermore, by F3 all playersplay according to the BI solution after v at (w ′, v).Furthermore, by IH, at all vertices below v the players mustplay their BI moves.
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RCK in the tree
Proof of Halpern’s Theorem
(1, 0) (2, 3) (1, 5) A
(3, 1) (4, 4)
B B
A
w ’ w ′
w ′′
w3
∗
f
I Induction step. Suppose w ∈ C (S − Rat). Take any w ′
reachable from w . Assume, towards contradiction, thatσ(w)i (v) = a is not the BI move for player i . Since w is alsoin C (S − Rat), we know by definition i must be rational atw ′′ = f (w ′, v). But then, by F3 and our IH, all players playaccording to the BI solution after v at w ′′.
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Proof of Halpern’s Theorem
(1, 0) (2, 3) (1, 5) A
(3, 1) (4, 4)
B B
A
w ’ w ′
w ′′
w3
∗
f
i
I i ’s rationality at w ′′ means, in particular, that there is aw3 ∈ [w ′′]i such that
hvi (σi (w′′), σ−i (w3)) ≥ hvi ((bii , σ−i (w3)))
for bii i ’s backward induction strategy.
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Proof of Halpern’s Theorem
(1, 0) (2, 3) (1, 5) A
(3, 1) (4, 4)
B B
A
w ’ w ′
w ′′
w3
w4
∗
f
i
i
I But then by F4 there must exists w4 ∈ [w ]i such that σ(w4)σ(w3) at the same in the sub-tree starting at v .
Since w4 isreachable from w , in that state all players play according tothe backward induction after v , and so this is also true of w3.But then since the game is non-degenerate, playing somethingelse than bii must make i strictly worst off at that state, acontradiction.
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RCK in the tree
Proof of Halpern’s Theorem
(1, 0) (2, 3) (1, 5) A
(3, 1) (4, 4)
B B
A
w ’ w ′
w ′′
w3
w4
∗
f
i
i
I But then by F4 there must exists w4 ∈ [w ]i such that σ(w4)σ(w3) at the same in the sub-tree starting at v . Since w4 isreachable from w , in that state all players play according tothe backward induction after v , and so this is also true of w3.
But then since the game is non-degenerate, playing somethingelse than bii must make i strictly worst off at that state, acontradiction.
Eric Pacuit and Olivier Roy 66
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Proof of Halpern’s Theorem
(1, 0) (2, 3) (1, 5) A
(3, 1) (4, 4)
B B
A
w ’ w ′
w ′′
w3
w4
∗
f
i
i
I But then by F4 there must exists w4 ∈ [w ]i such that σ(w4)σ(w3) at the same in the sub-tree starting at v . Since w4 isreachable from w , in that state all players play according tothe backward induction after v , and so this is also true of w3.But then since the game is non-degenerate, playing somethingelse than bii must make i strictly worst off at that state, acontradiction.
Eric Pacuit and Olivier Roy 66