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Page 1: Epidemics in Networks Part I Introductiontjhladish.github.io › sismid › SISMID_Lecture1.pdfEpidemics in Networks Part I | Introduction Joel C. Miller & Tom Hladish 18{20 July 2018

Epidemics in NetworksPart I — Introduction

Joel C. Miller & Tom Hladish

18–20 July 2018

1 / 52

Page 2: Epidemics in Networks Part I Introductiontjhladish.github.io › sismid › SISMID_Lecture1.pdfEpidemics in Networks Part I | Introduction Joel C. Miller & Tom Hladish 18{20 July 2018

Introduction

Disease spread

Key Questions

Modeling approaches

Networks

Brief glance at SIR in networks

Random network models

Real world networks

Review

References

2 / 52

Page 3: Epidemics in Networks Part I Introductiontjhladish.github.io › sismid › SISMID_Lecture1.pdfEpidemics in Networks Part I | Introduction Joel C. Miller & Tom Hladish 18{20 July 2018

Who are we?

I Joel C. Miller:I Former math and biology faculty at Penn State and later

Monash University (Melbourne).I Now senior research scientist at Institute for Disease ModelingI Co-author of “Mathematics of Epidemics on Networks”:

http://bit.ly/EpidemicSonnetWorksI Developer of python package EoN: http:

//epidemicsonnetworks.readthedocs.io/en/latest/I 8th year teaching this course.

I Thomas J. HladishI Biology and Emerging Pathogens Institute faculty at the

University of FloridaI Developer of C++ EpiFire, AbcSmc packages:

https://github.com/tjhladish/I 10th year teaching this course

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Page 4: Epidemics in Networks Part I Introductiontjhladish.github.io › sismid › SISMID_Lecture1.pdfEpidemics in Networks Part I | Introduction Joel C. Miller & Tom Hladish 18{20 July 2018

Layout of course

The course will consist of a mixture of theory and computer labs.

I TheoryI Properties of diseases and networksI Analytic predictions of disease behavior

I Computer LabI Python and EpiFire-based stochastic simulation of epidemics

on networks.

I Notes are available at http://sismid.hladish.com

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Page 5: Epidemics in Networks Part I Introductiontjhladish.github.io › sismid › SISMID_Lecture1.pdfEpidemics in Networks Part I | Introduction Joel C. Miller & Tom Hladish 18{20 July 2018

Introduction

Disease spread

Key Questions

Modeling approaches

Networks

Brief glance at SIR in networks

Random network models

Real world networks

Review

References

5 / 52

Page 6: Epidemics in Networks Part I Introductiontjhladish.github.io › sismid › SISMID_Lecture1.pdfEpidemics in Networks Part I | Introduction Joel C. Miller & Tom Hladish 18{20 July 2018

Disease spread

Two features primarily determine population-scale disease spread:

I Population structure.

I Immune response / natural history.

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Page 7: Epidemics in Networks Part I Introductiontjhladish.github.io › sismid › SISMID_Lecture1.pdfEpidemics in Networks Part I | Introduction Joel C. Miller & Tom Hladish 18{20 July 2018

Disease spread

Two features primarily determine population-scale disease spread:

I Population structure.

I Immune response / natural history.

6 / 52

Page 8: Epidemics in Networks Part I Introductiontjhladish.github.io › sismid › SISMID_Lecture1.pdfEpidemics in Networks Part I | Introduction Joel C. Miller & Tom Hladish 18{20 July 2018

Disease spread

Two features primarily determine population-scale disease spread:

I Population structure.

I Immune response / natural history.

6 / 52

Page 9: Epidemics in Networks Part I Introductiontjhladish.github.io › sismid › SISMID_Lecture1.pdfEpidemics in Networks Part I | Introduction Joel C. Miller & Tom Hladish 18{20 July 2018

Immune responseImmune response determines result of individual’s exposure andwhether onwards transmission occurs.

Possible outcomes:

I Remains infected forever: SI

I Gains permanent immunity: SIR

I Recovers but can be reinfected: SIS

I Recovers with temporary immunity: SIRS

7 / 52

Page 10: Epidemics in Networks Part I Introductiontjhladish.github.io › sismid › SISMID_Lecture1.pdfEpidemics in Networks Part I | Introduction Joel C. Miller & Tom Hladish 18{20 July 2018

Immune responseImmune response determines result of individual’s exposure andwhether onwards transmission occurs.

Possible outcomes:

I Remains infected forever: SI

I Gains permanent immunity: SIR

I Recovers but can be reinfected: SIS

I Recovers with temporary immunity: SIRS

S I

HIV, Tuberculosis (without treatment), Hepatitis (sometimes),

7 / 52

Page 11: Epidemics in Networks Part I Introductiontjhladish.github.io › sismid › SISMID_Lecture1.pdfEpidemics in Networks Part I | Introduction Joel C. Miller & Tom Hladish 18{20 July 2018

Immune responseImmune response determines result of individual’s exposure andwhether onwards transmission occurs.

Possible outcomes:

I Remains infected forever: SI

I Gains permanent immunity: SIR

I Recovers but can be reinfected: SIS

I Recovers with temporary immunity: SIRS

S I R

Measles, Mumps, Rubella, Pertussis, . . .

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Page 12: Epidemics in Networks Part I Introductiontjhladish.github.io › sismid › SISMID_Lecture1.pdfEpidemics in Networks Part I | Introduction Joel C. Miller & Tom Hladish 18{20 July 2018

Immune responseImmune response determines result of individual’s exposure andwhether onwards transmission occurs.

Possible outcomes:

I Remains infected forever: SI

I Gains permanent immunity: SIR

I Recovers but can be reinfected: SIS

I Recovers with temporary immunity: SIRS

S I

Many parasites (e.g., lice), Many bacteria, Many STDs, . . .

7 / 52

Page 13: Epidemics in Networks Part I Introductiontjhladish.github.io › sismid › SISMID_Lecture1.pdfEpidemics in Networks Part I | Introduction Joel C. Miller & Tom Hladish 18{20 July 2018

Immune responseImmune response determines result of individual’s exposure andwhether onwards transmission occurs.

Possible outcomes:

I Remains infected forever: SI

I Gains permanent immunity: SIR

I Recovers but can be reinfected: SIS

I Recovers with temporary immunity: SIRS

S I R S

Dengue (sort of), Pertussis, Influenza (because of genetic drift ofvirus).

7 / 52

Page 14: Epidemics in Networks Part I Introductiontjhladish.github.io › sismid › SISMID_Lecture1.pdfEpidemics in Networks Part I | Introduction Joel C. Miller & Tom Hladish 18{20 July 2018

Immune responseImmune response determines result of individual’s exposure andwhether onwards transmission occurs.

Possible outcomes:

I Remains infected forever: SI

I Gains permanent immunity: SIR

I Recovers but can be reinfected: SIS

I Recovers with temporary immunity: SIRS

7 / 52

Page 15: Epidemics in Networks Part I Introductiontjhladish.github.io › sismid › SISMID_Lecture1.pdfEpidemics in Networks Part I | Introduction Joel C. Miller & Tom Hladish 18{20 July 2018

Introduction

Disease spread

Key Questions

Modeling approaches

Networks

Brief glance at SIR in networks

Random network models

Real world networks

Review

References

8 / 52

Page 16: Epidemics in Networks Part I Introductiontjhladish.github.io › sismid › SISMID_Lecture1.pdfEpidemics in Networks Part I | Introduction Joel C. Miller & Tom Hladish 18{20 July 2018

Lots of things to think about

For SIR, we are typically interested in

I P, the probability of an epidemic.

I A, the “attack rate”: the fraction infected (better named theattack ratio)

I R0, the average number of infections caused by those infectedearly in the epidemic.

I I (t), the time course of the epidemic.

For SIS, we are typically interested in

I PI I (∞), the equilibrium level of infection

I R0

I I (t)

9 / 52

Page 17: Epidemics in Networks Part I Introductiontjhladish.github.io › sismid › SISMID_Lecture1.pdfEpidemics in Networks Part I | Introduction Joel C. Miller & Tom Hladish 18{20 July 2018

Lots of things to think about

For SIR, we are typically interested in

I P, the probability of an epidemic.

I A, the “attack rate”: the fraction infected (better named theattack ratio)

I R0, the average number of infections caused by those infectedearly in the epidemic.

I I (t), the time course of the epidemic.

For SIS, we are typically interested in

I PI I (∞), the equilibrium level of infection

I R0

I I (t)

9 / 52

Page 18: Epidemics in Networks Part I Introductiontjhladish.github.io › sismid › SISMID_Lecture1.pdfEpidemics in Networks Part I | Introduction Joel C. Miller & Tom Hladish 18{20 July 2018

Introduction

Disease spread

Key Questions

Modeling approaches

Networks

Brief glance at SIR in networks

Random network models

Real world networks

Review

References

10 / 52

Page 19: Epidemics in Networks Part I Introductiontjhladish.github.io › sismid › SISMID_Lecture1.pdfEpidemics in Networks Part I | Introduction Joel C. Miller & Tom Hladish 18{20 July 2018

Modeling options

Com

ple

xity

Realism

I

II

III

increasinginsight

I :Compartmentalmodels

I : Network models

I : Agent-based

models

11 / 52

Page 20: Epidemics in Networks Part I Introductiontjhladish.github.io › sismid › SISMID_Lecture1.pdfEpidemics in Networks Part I | Introduction Joel C. Miller & Tom Hladish 18{20 July 2018

Modeling options

Com

ple

xity

Realism

I

II

III

increasinginsight

I :Compartmentalmodels

I : Network models

I : Agent-based

models

11 / 52

Page 21: Epidemics in Networks Part I Introductiontjhladish.github.io › sismid › SISMID_Lecture1.pdfEpidemics in Networks Part I | Introduction Joel C. Miller & Tom Hladish 18{20 July 2018

Modeling options

Com

ple

xity

Realism

I

II

III

increasinginsight

I :Compartmentalmodels

I : Network models

I : Agent-based

models

11 / 52

Page 22: Epidemics in Networks Part I Introductiontjhladish.github.io › sismid › SISMID_Lecture1.pdfEpidemics in Networks Part I | Introduction Joel C. Miller & Tom Hladish 18{20 July 2018

Modeling options

Com

ple

xity

Realism

I

II

III

increasinginsight

I :Compartmentalmodels

I : Network models

I : Agent-based

models

11 / 52

Page 23: Epidemics in Networks Part I Introductiontjhladish.github.io › sismid › SISMID_Lecture1.pdfEpidemics in Networks Part I | Introduction Joel C. Miller & Tom Hladish 18{20 July 2018

Simple Compartmental Models

I Continuous time or Discrete time

I Usually SIR or SIS

The major assumptions:

I Every individual is average.

I Every interaction of u is with a randomly chosen otherindividual.

I The probability an interaction is with a susceptible [infected]individual is S/N [I/N]

We will analyze compartmental models in detail later to providecontext for network models.

12 / 52

Page 24: Epidemics in Networks Part I Introductiontjhladish.github.io › sismid › SISMID_Lecture1.pdfEpidemics in Networks Part I | Introduction Joel C. Miller & Tom Hladish 18{20 July 2018

Simple Compartmental Models

I Continuous time or Discrete time

I Usually SIR or SIS

The major assumptions:

I Every individual is average.

I Every interaction of u is with a randomly chosen otherindividual.

I The probability an interaction is with a susceptible [infected]individual is S/N [I/N]

We will analyze compartmental models in detail later to providecontext for network models.

12 / 52

Page 25: Epidemics in Networks Part I Introductiontjhladish.github.io › sismid › SISMID_Lecture1.pdfEpidemics in Networks Part I | Introduction Joel C. Miller & Tom Hladish 18{20 July 2018

Simple Compartmental Models

I Continuous time or Discrete time

I Usually SIR or SIS

The major assumptions:

I Every individual is average.

I Every interaction of u is with a randomly chosen otherindividual.

I The probability an interaction is with a susceptible [infected]individual is S/N [I/N]

We will analyze compartmental models in detail later to providecontext for network models.

12 / 52

Page 26: Epidemics in Networks Part I Introductiontjhladish.github.io › sismid › SISMID_Lecture1.pdfEpidemics in Networks Part I | Introduction Joel C. Miller & Tom Hladish 18{20 July 2018

Introduction

Disease spread

Key Questions

Modeling approaches

Networks

Brief glance at SIR in networks

Random network models

Real world networks

Review

References

13 / 52

Page 27: Epidemics in Networks Part I Introductiontjhladish.github.io › sismid › SISMID_Lecture1.pdfEpidemics in Networks Part I | Introduction Joel C. Miller & Tom Hladish 18{20 July 2018

What is a contact network?

A network is a collection of individuals joined together based oninteractions that may spread the disease in question.These connections (edges) may be:

I Transient (sex workers or random encounter in crowdedmarket)

I Weighted (sharing an office versus brief daily conversation)

I Clustered

(. . . Cause your friends are my friends and myfriends are your friends, . . . )

I Heterogeneously distributed

I Directed

I . . .

14 / 52

Page 28: Epidemics in Networks Part I Introductiontjhladish.github.io › sismid › SISMID_Lecture1.pdfEpidemics in Networks Part I | Introduction Joel C. Miller & Tom Hladish 18{20 July 2018

What is a contact network?

A network is a collection of individuals joined together based oninteractions that may spread the disease in question.These connections (edges) may be:

I Transient (sex workers or random encounter in crowdedmarket)

I Weighted (sharing an office versus brief daily conversation)

I Clustered

(. . . Cause your friends are my friends and myfriends are your friends, . . . )

I Heterogeneously distributed

I Directed

I . . .

14 / 52

Page 29: Epidemics in Networks Part I Introductiontjhladish.github.io › sismid › SISMID_Lecture1.pdfEpidemics in Networks Part I | Introduction Joel C. Miller & Tom Hladish 18{20 July 2018

What is a contact network?

A network is a collection of individuals joined together based oninteractions that may spread the disease in question.These connections (edges) may be:

I Transient (sex workers or random encounter in crowdedmarket)

I Weighted (sharing an office versus brief daily conversation)

I Clustered

(. . . Cause your friends are my friends and myfriends are your friends, . . . )

I Heterogeneously distributed

I Directed

I . . .

14 / 52

Page 30: Epidemics in Networks Part I Introductiontjhladish.github.io › sismid › SISMID_Lecture1.pdfEpidemics in Networks Part I | Introduction Joel C. Miller & Tom Hladish 18{20 July 2018

What is a contact network?

A network is a collection of individuals joined together based oninteractions that may spread the disease in question.These connections (edges) may be:

I Transient (sex workers or random encounter in crowdedmarket)

I Weighted (sharing an office versus brief daily conversation)

I Clustered

(. . . Cause your friends are my friends and myfriends are your friends, . . . )

I Heterogeneously distributed

I Directed

I . . .

14 / 52

Page 31: Epidemics in Networks Part I Introductiontjhladish.github.io › sismid › SISMID_Lecture1.pdfEpidemics in Networks Part I | Introduction Joel C. Miller & Tom Hladish 18{20 July 2018

What is a contact network?

A network is a collection of individuals joined together based oninteractions that may spread the disease in question.These connections (edges) may be:

I Transient (sex workers or random encounter in crowdedmarket)

I Weighted (sharing an office versus brief daily conversation)

I Clustered (. . . Cause your friends are my friends and myfriends are your friends, . . . )

I Heterogeneously distributed

I Directed

I . . .

14 / 52

Page 32: Epidemics in Networks Part I Introductiontjhladish.github.io › sismid › SISMID_Lecture1.pdfEpidemics in Networks Part I | Introduction Joel C. Miller & Tom Hladish 18{20 July 2018

What is a contact network?

A network is a collection of individuals joined together based oninteractions that may spread the disease in question.These connections (edges) may be:

I Transient (sex workers or random encounter in crowdedmarket)

I Weighted (sharing an office versus brief daily conversation)

I Clustered (. . . Cause your friends are my friends and myfriends are your friends, . . . )

I Heterogeneously distributed

I Directed

I . . .

14 / 52

Page 33: Epidemics in Networks Part I Introductiontjhladish.github.io › sismid › SISMID_Lecture1.pdfEpidemics in Networks Part I | Introduction Joel C. Miller & Tom Hladish 18{20 July 2018

What is a contact network?

A network is a collection of individuals joined together based oninteractions that may spread the disease in question.These connections (edges) may be:

I Transient (sex workers or random encounter in crowdedmarket)

I Weighted (sharing an office versus brief daily conversation)

I Clustered (. . . Cause your friends are my friends and myfriends are your friends, . . . )

I Heterogeneously distributed

I Directed

I . . .

14 / 52

Page 34: Epidemics in Networks Part I Introductiontjhladish.github.io › sismid › SISMID_Lecture1.pdfEpidemics in Networks Part I | Introduction Joel C. Miller & Tom Hladish 18{20 July 2018

What is a contact network?

A network is a collection of individuals joined together based oninteractions that may spread the disease in question.These connections (edges) may be:

I Transient (sex workers or random encounter in crowdedmarket)

I Weighted (sharing an office versus brief daily conversation)

I Clustered (. . . Cause your friends are my friends and myfriends are your friends, . . . )

I Heterogeneously distributed

I Directed

I . . .

14 / 52

Page 35: Epidemics in Networks Part I Introductiontjhladish.github.io › sismid › SISMID_Lecture1.pdfEpidemics in Networks Part I | Introduction Joel C. Miller & Tom Hladish 18{20 July 2018

Other important types of networks

The nodes don’t have to be individuals. They can be communities.

I Airline network

I Connected communities

I Livestock movement

I . . .

15 / 52

Page 36: Epidemics in Networks Part I Introductiontjhladish.github.io › sismid › SISMID_Lecture1.pdfEpidemics in Networks Part I | Introduction Joel C. Miller & Tom Hladish 18{20 July 2018

Network definition

I A network is a collection of nodes which are joined into pairsby edges.

I Two nodes that are joined together are called neighbors. Thenumber of neighbors a given node has is its degree, k .

I There is no real difference between the definitions of“network” and “graph”.

I I will tend to use the terminology “partner” for neighbor and“partnership” for “edge” [the term “contact” is alsocommonly used but can be ambiguous].

16 / 52

Page 37: Epidemics in Networks Part I Introductiontjhladish.github.io › sismid › SISMID_Lecture1.pdfEpidemics in Networks Part I | Introduction Joel C. Miller & Tom Hladish 18{20 July 2018

Network PropertiesThere are a number of things we can measure:

I Degree distribution: P(k), the proportion of nodes withdegree k.

I Clustering: frequency of short cycles [not common in sexualnetworks].

I Partnership duration: Network may be dynamics, withpartnerships changing in time. Individuals may enter/leave thepopulation.

High degree nodes tend to be infected early and in turn infectmore nodes. So the early growth is more affected by the presenceof high-degree nodes than by the average degree.

17 / 52

Page 38: Epidemics in Networks Part I Introductiontjhladish.github.io › sismid › SISMID_Lecture1.pdfEpidemics in Networks Part I | Introduction Joel C. Miller & Tom Hladish 18{20 July 2018

Network PropertiesThere are a number of things we can measure:

I Degree distribution: P(k), the proportion of nodes withdegree k.

I Clustering: frequency of short cycles [not common in sexualnetworks].

I Partnership duration: Network may be dynamics, withpartnerships changing in time. Individuals may enter/leave thepopulation.

Clustering tends to slow the spread of a disease, but often does notsignificantly affect whether a disease occurs or how large it gets.Its role is reduced as typical degrees increase.

17 / 52

Page 39: Epidemics in Networks Part I Introductiontjhladish.github.io › sismid › SISMID_Lecture1.pdfEpidemics in Networks Part I | Introduction Joel C. Miller & Tom Hladish 18{20 July 2018

Network PropertiesThere are a number of things we can measure:

I Degree distribution: P(k), the proportion of nodes withdegree k.

I Clustering: frequency of short cycles [not common in sexualnetworks].

I Partnership duration: Network may be dynamics, withpartnerships changing in time. Individuals may enter/leave thepopulation.

Changing partnerships reduces the effect of local “susceptibledepletion”

17 / 52

Page 40: Epidemics in Networks Part I Introductiontjhladish.github.io › sismid › SISMID_Lecture1.pdfEpidemics in Networks Part I | Introduction Joel C. Miller & Tom Hladish 18{20 July 2018

More Network PropertiesThere are a number of things we can measure:

I Edge weights: some edges may have higher transmissionprobabilities than others.

I Assortativity: Individuals may actively select similar partners.In particular, partners with similar degree.

I Modularity: some parts of the network may be more denselyconnected than others.

Edge weights and many other effects are generally less significant(but what if weights inversely correlated with degree?)

18 / 52

Page 41: Epidemics in Networks Part I Introductiontjhladish.github.io › sismid › SISMID_Lecture1.pdfEpidemics in Networks Part I | Introduction Joel C. Miller & Tom Hladish 18{20 July 2018

More Network PropertiesThere are a number of things we can measure:

I Edge weights: some edges may have higher transmissionprobabilities than others.

I Assortativity: Individuals may actively select similar partners.In particular, partners with similar degree.

I Modularity: some parts of the network may be more denselyconnected than others.

Assortative mixing by degree tends to make it easier for a diseaseto get established because the core of high-degree nodes provides agood place to spread. However, it often reduces the total size ofthe epidemic because the low degree nodes tend to connect only tolow degree nodes.

18 / 52

Page 42: Epidemics in Networks Part I Introductiontjhladish.github.io › sismid › SISMID_Lecture1.pdfEpidemics in Networks Part I | Introduction Joel C. Miller & Tom Hladish 18{20 July 2018

More Network PropertiesThere are a number of things we can measure:

I Edge weights: some edges may have higher transmissionprobabilities than others.

I Assortativity: Individuals may actively select similar partners.In particular, partners with similar degree.

I Modularity: some parts of the network may be more denselyconnected than others.

The existence of subcommunities may influence how a diseasespreads (and when it is detected).

18 / 52

Page 43: Epidemics in Networks Part I Introductiontjhladish.github.io › sismid › SISMID_Lecture1.pdfEpidemics in Networks Part I | Introduction Joel C. Miller & Tom Hladish 18{20 July 2018

Introduction

Disease spread

Key Questions

Modeling approaches

Networks

Brief glance at SIR in networks

Random network models

Real world networks

Review

References

19 / 52

Page 44: Epidemics in Networks Part I Introductiontjhladish.github.io › sismid › SISMID_Lecture1.pdfEpidemics in Networks Part I | Introduction Joel C. Miller & Tom Hladish 18{20 July 2018

A preliminary glance at SIR disease in networks

I To give context to our first computer simulations, we take apreliminary look at SIR disease in a simple network.

I We take a very simple network: 4 nodes in a line.

I We take a very simple SIR disease: in a time step nodestransmit to neighbors with probability p and then recover withimmunity.

20 / 52

Page 45: Epidemics in Networks Part I Introductiontjhladish.github.io › sismid › SISMID_Lecture1.pdfEpidemics in Networks Part I | Introduction Joel C. Miller & Tom Hladish 18{20 July 2018

A preliminary glance at SIR disease in networks

I To give context to our first computer simulations, we take apreliminary look at SIR disease in a simple network.

I We take a very simple network: 4 nodes in a line.

I We take a very simple SIR disease: in a time step nodestransmit to neighbors with probability p and then recover withimmunity.

20 / 52

Page 46: Epidemics in Networks Part I Introductiontjhladish.github.io › sismid › SISMID_Lecture1.pdfEpidemics in Networks Part I | Introduction Joel C. Miller & Tom Hladish 18{20 July 2018

A preliminary glance at SIR disease in networks

I To give context to our first computer simulations, we take apreliminary look at SIR disease in a simple network.

I We take a very simple network: 4 nodes in a line.

I We take a very simple SIR disease: in a time step nodestransmit to neighbors with probability p and then recover withimmunity.

20 / 52

Page 47: Epidemics in Networks Part I Introductiontjhladish.github.io › sismid › SISMID_Lecture1.pdfEpidemics in Networks Part I | Introduction Joel C. Miller & Tom Hladish 18{20 July 2018

Modeling Disease Spread in a network

(1− p)2

p 2

p(1−

p)p(

1−p)(1−

p)2

p2(1− p)

p

(1−p

)

p(1− p)

1

p(1− p)2

(1−p

)p

p3

1

p2(1− p)

1

21 / 52

Page 48: Epidemics in Networks Part I Introductiontjhladish.github.io › sismid › SISMID_Lecture1.pdfEpidemics in Networks Part I | Introduction Joel C. Miller & Tom Hladish 18{20 July 2018

Modeling Disease Spread in a network

(1− p)2

p 2

p(1−

p)p(

1−p)(1−

p)2

p2(1− p)

p

(1−p

)

p(1− p)

1

p(1− p)2

(1−p

)p

p3

1

p2(1− p)

1

21 / 52

Page 49: Epidemics in Networks Part I Introductiontjhladish.github.io › sismid › SISMID_Lecture1.pdfEpidemics in Networks Part I | Introduction Joel C. Miller & Tom Hladish 18{20 July 2018

Modeling Disease Spread in a network

(1− p)2

p 2

p(1−

p)p(

1−p)(1−

p)2

p2(1− p)

p

(1−p

)

p(1− p)

1

p(1− p)2

(1−p

)p

p3

1

p2(1− p)

1

21 / 52

Page 50: Epidemics in Networks Part I Introductiontjhladish.github.io › sismid › SISMID_Lecture1.pdfEpidemics in Networks Part I | Introduction Joel C. Miller & Tom Hladish 18{20 July 2018

Modeling Disease Spread in a network

(1− p)2

p 2

p(1−

p)p(

1−p)(1−

p)2

p2(1− p)

p

(1−p

)

p(1− p)1

p(1− p)2

(1−p

)p

p3

1

p2(1− p)

1

21 / 52

Page 51: Epidemics in Networks Part I Introductiontjhladish.github.io › sismid › SISMID_Lecture1.pdfEpidemics in Networks Part I | Introduction Joel C. Miller & Tom Hladish 18{20 July 2018

Modeling Disease Spread in a network

(1− p)2

p 2

p(1−

p)p(

1−p)(1−

p)2

p2(1− p)

p

(1−p

)

p(1− p)1

p(1− p)2

(1−p

)p

p3

1

p2(1− p)

1

21 / 52

Page 52: Epidemics in Networks Part I Introductiontjhladish.github.io › sismid › SISMID_Lecture1.pdfEpidemics in Networks Part I | Introduction Joel C. Miller & Tom Hladish 18{20 July 2018

Modeling Disease Spread in a network

(1− p)2

p 2

p(1−

p)p(

1−p)(1−

p)2

p2(1− p)

p

(1−p

)

p(1− p)1

p(1− p)2

(1−p

)p

p3

1

p2(1− p)

1

21 / 52

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Modeling Disease Spread in a network

(1− p)2

p 2

p(1−

p)p(

1−p)(1−

p)2

p2(1− p)

p

(1−p

)

p(1− p)1

p(1− p)2

(1−p

)p

p3

1

p2(1− p)

1

21 / 52

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Alternative perspective

I

(1− p)2

p 2

p(1−

p)p(

1−p)(1−

p)2

p2(1− p)

p

(1−p

)

p(1− p)

1

p(1− p)2

(1−p

)p

p3

1

p2(1− p)

1

At each step, if thereis an edge to cross, itis crossed with probabil-ity p. No edge is evercrossed twice.

I It is equivalent to decide in advance whether the edges will becrossed if encountered.

I

22 / 52

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Alternative perspective

I

(1− p)2

p 2

p(1−

p)p(

1−p)(1−

p)2

p2(1− p)

p

(1−p

)

p(1− p)

1

p(1− p)2

(1−p

)p

p3

1

p2(1− p)

1

At each step, if thereis an edge to cross, itis crossed with probabil-ity p. No edge is evercrossed twice.

I It is equivalent to decide in advance whether the edges will becrossed if encountered.

I

22 / 52

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Alternative perspective

I

(1− p)2

p 2

p(1−

p)p(

1−p)(1−

p)2

p2(1− p)

p

(1−p

)

p(1− p)

1

p(1− p)2

(1−p

)p

p3

1

p2(1− p)

1

At each step, if thereis an edge to cross, itis crossed with probabil-ity p. No edge is evercrossed twice.

I It is equivalent to decide in advance whether the edges will becrossed if encountered.

I

(1− p)3

p(1− p)2

p2(1− p)

p(1− p)2

p2(1− p)

p(1− p)2

p2(1− p)

p3

22 / 52

Page 57: Epidemics in Networks Part I Introductiontjhladish.github.io › sismid › SISMID_Lecture1.pdfEpidemics in Networks Part I | Introduction Joel C. Miller & Tom Hladish 18{20 July 2018

Alternative perspective

I

(1− p)2

p 2

p(1−

p)p(

1−p)(1−

p)2

p2(1− p)

p

(1−p

)

p(1− p)

1

p(1− p)2

(1−p

)p

p3

1

p2(1− p)

1

At each step, if thereis an edge to cross, itis crossed with probabil-ity p. No edge is evercrossed twice.

I It is equivalent to decide in advance whether the edges will becrossed if encountered.

I

(1− p)3

p(1− p)2

p2(1− p)

p(1− p)2

p2(1− p)

p(1− p)2

p2(1− p)

p3

22 / 52

Page 58: Epidemics in Networks Part I Introductiontjhladish.github.io › sismid › SISMID_Lecture1.pdfEpidemics in Networks Part I | Introduction Joel C. Miller & Tom Hladish 18{20 July 2018

Introduction

Disease spread

Key Questions

Modeling approaches

Networks

Brief glance at SIR in networks

Random network models

Real world networks

Review

References

23 / 52

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Random networks

We rarely have exact data about a population’s contact structure.Instead we have measurements of a few important features.

I We want to generate a random network that captures theseproperties.

I If these properties are the relevant properties, then diseasespread in the simulated network will accurately reproducedynamics in the real population.

I Ideally we can analytically predict the dynamics in the modelnetwork.

I An interesting challenge [outside our scope] is finding ways togenerate random networks with specified properties which areanalytically tractible.

24 / 52

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Common random network models

I Small World networks

I Barabasi-Albert

I Configuration Model

⇐ Analytically Tractible

I Exponential Random Graph Model [ERGM]

25 / 52

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Common random network models

I Small World networks

I Barabasi-Albert

I Configuration Model ⇐ Analytically Tractible

I Exponential Random Graph Model [ERGM]

25 / 52

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Small-world networks

I Start with nodes in a ring and connect nearby pairs.I Rewire a fraction p of the edges.I The resulting network has short typical path lengths and high

“clustering”.

10−6 10−5 10−4 10−3 10−2 10−1 1p

0

200

400

600

800

1000

1200

1400

Ave

rage

pat

hle

ngt

h

0.0

0.1

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5

Clu

ster

ing

26 / 52

Page 63: Epidemics in Networks Part I Introductiontjhladish.github.io › sismid › SISMID_Lecture1.pdfEpidemics in Networks Part I | Introduction Joel C. Miller & Tom Hladish 18{20 July 2018

Small-world networks

I Start with nodes in a ring and connect nearby pairs.I Rewire a fraction p of the edges.I The resulting network has short typical path lengths and high

“clustering”.

10−6 10−5 10−4 10−3 10−2 10−1 1p

0

200

400

600

800

1000

1200

1400

Ave

rage

pat

hle

ngt

h

0.0

0.1

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5

Clu

ster

ing

26 / 52

Page 64: Epidemics in Networks Part I Introductiontjhladish.github.io › sismid › SISMID_Lecture1.pdfEpidemics in Networks Part I | Introduction Joel C. Miller & Tom Hladish 18{20 July 2018

Small-world networks

I Start with nodes in a ring and connect nearby pairs.I Rewire a fraction p of the edges.I The resulting network has short typical path lengths and high

“clustering”.

10−6 10−5 10−4 10−3 10−2 10−1 1p

0

200

400

600

800

1000

1200

1400

Ave

rage

pat

hle

ngt

h

0.0

0.1

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5

Clu

ster

ing

26 / 52

Page 65: Epidemics in Networks Part I Introductiontjhladish.github.io › sismid › SISMID_Lecture1.pdfEpidemics in Networks Part I | Introduction Joel C. Miller & Tom Hladish 18{20 July 2018

Epidemics in Small-world networks: theory vs simulation

(theory to come later)SIR:

−10 0 10 20 30 40t

0

500

1000

1500

2000

2500

3000

I

−5 0 5 10 15 20t

0

500

1000

1500

2000

2500

3000

I

−5 0 5 10 15 20t

0

500

1000

1500

2000

2500

3000

I

−5 0 5 10 15 20t

0

500

1000

1500

2000

2500

3000

I

27 / 52

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Epidemics in Small-world networks: theory vs simulation

(theory to come later)SIS:

−5 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35t

0

1000

2000

3000

4000

5000

I

−5 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35t

0

1000

2000

3000

4000

5000

I

−5 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35t

0

1000

2000

3000

4000

5000

I

−5 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35t

0

1000

2000

3000

4000

5000

I

27 / 52

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Barabasi–Albert networks

I Start with m + 1 nodes all connected to each other.

I Add a node, connect it to m previously existing nodes

I Repeat, each time selecting the previously existing nodes withprobability proportional to their degree.

100 101 102 103 104

k

10−6

10−5

10−4

10−3

10−2

10−1

100

Pro

bab

ility

deg

ree≥k

28 / 52

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Epidemics in BA networks: theory vs simulation

(theory to come later)SIR:

−5 0 5 10 15 20 25 30t

0

5000

10000

15000

20000

I

−5 0 5 10 15 20t

0

20000

40000

60000

80000

100000

I

−2 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14t

0

50000

100000

150000

200000

250000

I

0 2 4 6 8 10t

050000

100000150000200000250000300000350000400000

I

29 / 52

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Epidemics in BA networks: theory vs simulation

(theory to come later)SIS:

−5 0 5 10 15 20t

0

200

400

600

800

1000

I

−5 0 5 10 15 20t

0

500

1000

1500

2000

2500

3000

I

−5 0 5 10 15 20t

0

1000

2000

3000

4000

5000

I

−5 0 5 10 15 20t

010002000300040005000600070008000

I

29 / 52

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Configuration Model

Probably the simplest model capturing a heterogeneous degreedistribution:

7→ 7→ 7→

7→ 7→ 7→ · · · 7→

30 / 52

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Configuration Model

Probably the simplest model capturing a heterogeneous degreedistribution:

7→

7→ 7→

7→ 7→ 7→ · · · 7→

30 / 52

Page 72: Epidemics in Networks Part I Introductiontjhladish.github.io › sismid › SISMID_Lecture1.pdfEpidemics in Networks Part I | Introduction Joel C. Miller & Tom Hladish 18{20 July 2018

Configuration Model

Probably the simplest model capturing a heterogeneous degreedistribution:

7→ 7→

7→

7→ 7→ 7→ · · · 7→

30 / 52

Page 73: Epidemics in Networks Part I Introductiontjhladish.github.io › sismid › SISMID_Lecture1.pdfEpidemics in Networks Part I | Introduction Joel C. Miller & Tom Hladish 18{20 July 2018

Configuration Model

Probably the simplest model capturing a heterogeneous degreedistribution:

7→ 7→ 7→

7→ 7→ 7→ · · · 7→

30 / 52

Page 74: Epidemics in Networks Part I Introductiontjhladish.github.io › sismid › SISMID_Lecture1.pdfEpidemics in Networks Part I | Introduction Joel C. Miller & Tom Hladish 18{20 July 2018

Configuration Model

Probably the simplest model capturing a heterogeneous degreedistribution:

7→ 7→ 7→

7→

7→ 7→ · · · 7→

30 / 52

Page 75: Epidemics in Networks Part I Introductiontjhladish.github.io › sismid › SISMID_Lecture1.pdfEpidemics in Networks Part I | Introduction Joel C. Miller & Tom Hladish 18{20 July 2018

Configuration Model

Probably the simplest model capturing a heterogeneous degreedistribution:

7→ 7→ 7→

7→ 7→

7→ · · · 7→

30 / 52

Page 76: Epidemics in Networks Part I Introductiontjhladish.github.io › sismid › SISMID_Lecture1.pdfEpidemics in Networks Part I | Introduction Joel C. Miller & Tom Hladish 18{20 July 2018

Configuration Model

Probably the simplest model capturing a heterogeneous degreedistribution:

7→ 7→ 7→

7→ 7→ 7→ · · ·

7→

30 / 52

Page 77: Epidemics in Networks Part I Introductiontjhladish.github.io › sismid › SISMID_Lecture1.pdfEpidemics in Networks Part I | Introduction Joel C. Miller & Tom Hladish 18{20 July 2018

Configuration Model

Probably the simplest model capturing a heterogeneous degreedistribution:

7→ 7→ 7→

7→ 7→ 7→ · · · 7→

30 / 52

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Implementation of Configuration Model networks

I Given N nodes and a degree distribution.

I Assign each node u a degree ku. If sum is odd, start over.

I Create a list L and place each node u into L ku times.

I Randomly shuffle L.

I For each consecutive pair of nodes in L, place an edge.

What can go wrong?Create the graph at the last step:L = [7, 6, 5, 6, 2, 2, 4, 7, 1, 3, 6, 5, 4, 5]

31 / 52

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Implementation of Configuration Model networks

I Given N nodes and a degree distribution.

I Assign each node u a degree ku. If sum is odd, start over.

I Create a list L and place each node u into L ku times.

I Randomly shuffle L.

I For each consecutive pair of nodes in L, place an edge.

What can go wrong?Create the graph at the last step:L = [7, 6, 5, 6, 2, 2, 4, 7, 1, 3, 6, 5, 4, 5]

31 / 52

Page 80: Epidemics in Networks Part I Introductiontjhladish.github.io › sismid › SISMID_Lecture1.pdfEpidemics in Networks Part I | Introduction Joel C. Miller & Tom Hladish 18{20 July 2018

Implementation of Configuration Model networks

I Given N nodes and a degree distribution.

I Assign each node u a degree ku. If sum is odd, start over.

I Create a list L and place each node u into L ku times.

I Randomly shuffle L.

I For each consecutive pair of nodes in L, place an edge.

What can go wrong?Create the graph at the last step:L = [7, 6, 5, 6, 2, 2, 4, 7, 1, 3, 6, 5, 4, 5]

31 / 52

Page 81: Epidemics in Networks Part I Introductiontjhladish.github.io › sismid › SISMID_Lecture1.pdfEpidemics in Networks Part I | Introduction Joel C. Miller & Tom Hladish 18{20 July 2018

Implementation of Configuration Model networks

I Given N nodes and a degree distribution.

I Assign each node u a degree ku. If sum is odd, start over.

I Create a list L and place each node u into L ku times.

I Randomly shuffle L.

I For each consecutive pair of nodes in L, place an edge.

What can go wrong?Create the graph at the last step:L = [7, 6, 5, 6, 2, 2, 4, 7, 1, 3, 6, 5, 4, 5]

31 / 52

Page 82: Epidemics in Networks Part I Introductiontjhladish.github.io › sismid › SISMID_Lecture1.pdfEpidemics in Networks Part I | Introduction Joel C. Miller & Tom Hladish 18{20 July 2018

Implementation of Configuration Model networks

I Given N nodes and a degree distribution.

I Assign each node u a degree ku. If sum is odd, start over.

I Create a list L and place each node u into L ku times.

I Randomly shuffle L.

I For each consecutive pair of nodes in L, place an edge.

What can go wrong?Create the graph at the last step:L = [7, 6, 5, 6, 2, 2, 4, 7, 1, 3, 6, 5, 4, 5]

31 / 52

Page 83: Epidemics in Networks Part I Introductiontjhladish.github.io › sismid › SISMID_Lecture1.pdfEpidemics in Networks Part I | Introduction Joel C. Miller & Tom Hladish 18{20 July 2018

Implementation of Configuration Model networks

I Given N nodes and a degree distribution.

I Assign each node u a degree ku. If sum is odd, start over.

I Create a list L and place each node u into L ku times.

I Randomly shuffle L.

I For each consecutive pair of nodes in L, place an edge.

What can go wrong?

Create the graph at the last step:L = [7, 6, 5, 6, 2, 2, 4, 7, 1, 3, 6, 5, 4, 5]

31 / 52

Page 84: Epidemics in Networks Part I Introductiontjhladish.github.io › sismid › SISMID_Lecture1.pdfEpidemics in Networks Part I | Introduction Joel C. Miller & Tom Hladish 18{20 July 2018

Implementation of Configuration Model networks

I Given N nodes and a degree distribution.

I Assign each node u a degree ku. If sum is odd, start over.

I Create a list L and place each node u into L ku times.

I Randomly shuffle L.

I For each consecutive pair of nodes in L, place an edge.

What can go wrong?Create the graph at the last step:L = [7, 6, 5, 6, 2, 2, 4, 7, 1, 3, 6, 5, 4, 5]

31 / 52

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Density of “short” cycles is small for large N

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Number of self loops

0.00

0.05

0.10

0.15

0.20

0.25

0.30

0.35

0.40

Pro

babili

ty in a

giv

en r

ealiz

ati

on N=100

N=1000N=10000N=100000

Configuration model networks, all degrees equal 4.

32 / 52

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Density of “short” cycles is small for large N

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

Number of repeated edges

0.00

0.05

0.10

0.15

0.20

0.25

0.30

Pro

babili

ty in a

giv

en r

ealiz

ati

on N=100

N=1000N=10000N=100000

Configuration model networks, all degrees equal 4.

32 / 52

Page 87: Epidemics in Networks Part I Introductiontjhladish.github.io › sismid › SISMID_Lecture1.pdfEpidemics in Networks Part I | Introduction Joel C. Miller & Tom Hladish 18{20 July 2018

Density of “short” cycles is small for large N

0 2 4 6 8 10 12

Number of triangles

0.00

0.05

0.10

0.15

0.20

0.25

Pro

babili

ty in a

giv

en r

ealiz

ati

on N=100

N=1000N=10000N=100000

Configuration model networks, all degrees equal 4.

32 / 52

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“Annealed” Configuration Model

7→

I The annealed network version assumes that at every momentthe network looks like a Configuration model network.

I However, at every moment, an individual changes all of itspartners.

I In practice this is appropriate if partnerships are so short ordisease transmission so rare that an individual is unlikely toever transmit to the same individual twice or transmit back toits infector.

I People who use the term “annealed network” call the staticversion a “quenched network”.

33 / 52

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Exponential Random Graph Model (ERGM)

I Given some vector of parameters θ and statisticalmeasurements s on a graph G , choose G with probabilityproportional to

exp[θ · s]

I Generally a network is chosen through MCMC.

I Computational power significantly constrains the network size

34 / 52

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Do your friends have more friends than you do (onaverage)?

Given a configuration model network G with a heterogeneousdegree distribution:

If we choose a random individual in a configuration model network,is its expected degree

1. higher

2. lower

3. the same

4. depends on the degree distribution

than the expected degree of a random partner?

35 / 52

Page 91: Epidemics in Networks Part I Introductiontjhladish.github.io › sismid › SISMID_Lecture1.pdfEpidemics in Networks Part I | Introduction Joel C. Miller & Tom Hladish 18{20 July 2018

Do your friends have more friends than you do (onaverage)?

Given a configuration model network G with a heterogeneousdegree distribution:

If we choose a random individual in a configuration model network,is its expected degree

1. higher

2. lower

3. the same

4. depends on the degree distribution

than the expected degree of a random partner?

35 / 52

Page 92: Epidemics in Networks Part I Introductiontjhladish.github.io › sismid › SISMID_Lecture1.pdfEpidemics in Networks Part I | Introduction Joel C. Miller & Tom Hladish 18{20 July 2018

Size Bias

36 / 52

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Size Bias

The probability a partner has degree k is Pn(k) = kP(k)/ 〈K 〉.

36 / 52

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Size Bias

The probability a partner has degree k is Pn(k) = kP(k)/ 〈K 〉.

36 / 52

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Size Bias

The probability a partner has degree k is Pn(k) = kP(k)/ 〈K 〉.

36 / 52

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Size Bias

The probability a partner has degree k is Pn(k) = kP(k)/ 〈K 〉.

36 / 52

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Size Bias

I A random individual has degree k with probability P(k)

I What about a random partner? What is Pn(k), theprobability a partner has degree k?

I Because of how partners are selected, a random partner islikely to have higher degree than a random individual [1, 2].

I Consider a node and choose one of its stubs.

I it will join to one of the other N 〈K 〉 (approximately) stubs.I The number of stubs belonging to degree k individuals is

NkP(k).I So Pn(k) =NkP(k)/N 〈K 〉 = kP(k)/ 〈K 〉 where 〈K 〉 is the

average degree.

I A partner’s partner also has degree k with probability Pn(k).

37 / 52

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Size Bias

I A random individual has degree k with probability P(k)

I What about a random partner? What is Pn(k), theprobability a partner has degree k?

I Because of how partners are selected, a random partner islikely to have higher degree than a random individual [1, 2].

I Consider a node and choose one of its stubs.

I it will join to one of the other N 〈K 〉 (approximately) stubs.I The number of stubs belonging to degree k individuals is

NkP(k).I So Pn(k) =NkP(k)/N 〈K 〉 = kP(k)/ 〈K 〉 where 〈K 〉 is the

average degree.

I A partner’s partner also has degree k with probability Pn(k).

37 / 52

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Size Bias

I A random individual has degree k with probability P(k)

I What about a random partner? What is Pn(k), theprobability a partner has degree k?

I Because of how partners are selected, a random partner islikely to have higher degree than a random individual [1, 2].

I Consider a node and choose one of its stubs.

I it will join to one of the other N 〈K 〉 (approximately) stubs.I The number of stubs belonging to degree k individuals is

NkP(k).I So Pn(k) =NkP(k)/N 〈K 〉 = kP(k)/ 〈K 〉 where 〈K 〉 is the

average degree.

I A partner’s partner also has degree k with probability Pn(k).

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Size Bias

I A random individual has degree k with probability P(k)

I What about a random partner? What is Pn(k), theprobability a partner has degree k?

I Because of how partners are selected, a random partner islikely to have higher degree than a random individual [1, 2].

I Consider a node and choose one of its stubs.I it will join to one of the other N 〈K 〉 (approximately) stubs.I The number of stubs belonging to degree k individuals is

NkP(k).

I So Pn(k) =NkP(k)/N 〈K 〉 = kP(k)/ 〈K 〉 where 〈K 〉 is theaverage degree.

I A partner’s partner also has degree k with probability Pn(k).

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Size Bias

I A random individual has degree k with probability P(k)

I What about a random partner? What is Pn(k), theprobability a partner has degree k?

I Because of how partners are selected, a random partner islikely to have higher degree than a random individual [1, 2].

I Consider a node and choose one of its stubs.I it will join to one of the other N 〈K 〉 (approximately) stubs.I The number of stubs belonging to degree k individuals is

NkP(k).I So Pn(k) =NkP(k)/N 〈K 〉 = kP(k)/ 〈K 〉 where 〈K 〉 is the

average degree.

I A partner’s partner also has degree k with probability Pn(k).

37 / 52

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Size Bias

I A random individual has degree k with probability P(k)

I What about a random partner? What is Pn(k), theprobability a partner has degree k?

I Because of how partners are selected, a random partner islikely to have higher degree than a random individual [1, 2].

I Consider a node and choose one of its stubs.I it will join to one of the other N 〈K 〉 (approximately) stubs.I The number of stubs belonging to degree k individuals is

NkP(k).I So Pn(k) =NkP(k)/N 〈K 〉 = kP(k)/ 〈K 〉 where 〈K 〉 is the

average degree.

I A partner’s partner also has degree k with probability Pn(k).

37 / 52

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Size Bias

I cannot stress enough that if P(k) is the probability a randomindividual has k partners, then

Pn(k) = kP(k)/ 〈K 〉

is the probability a random partner has k partners.

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Introduction

Disease spread

Key Questions

Modeling approaches

Networks

Brief glance at SIR in networks

Random network models

Real world networks

Review

References

39 / 52

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Social networks

I facebook

I linkedin

I twitter

I . . .

These may be more appropriate for spread of ideas or opinions.

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Contact networks

I The network of physical interactions.

I Often highly clustered.

I Appropriate for respiratory diseases.

I Sometimes measured by giving people devices that measurephysical proximity.

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Sexual networks

I Appropriate for sexually transmitted diseases.

I Often low clustering.

I Often highly heterogeneous.

I Transient partnerships may play a large role.

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Location–Location networks

I Cities connected by travel of people between them [spread ofH1N1, Ebola].

I Farms connected by movement of animals [foot and mouth].

I Habitats connected by bird migrations [West Nile].

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Empirical networksA number of attempts have been made to measure networks in“the wild”. Each case has its own peculiarities. This list is a littledated.

I Polymod [3]: 7290 participants across 8 European countriesrecorded information about their contacts during a day.

I Hospital interactions [4]: Employees, patients, and visitors ata pediatric hospital in Rome wore proximity detectors over aweek-long period.

I School interactions [5]: Students and employees at a highschool wore proximity detectors.

I Tasmanian Devils [6, 7]: Contacts between Tasmanian Devilswere measured through collars with proximity detectors.

I Lion interactions [8]: observations of within pride, betweenpride, and nomadic lion interactions.

I Other wildlife [9].

I Romantic networks [10]

44 / 52

Page 110: Epidemics in Networks Part I Introductiontjhladish.github.io › sismid › SISMID_Lecture1.pdfEpidemics in Networks Part I | Introduction Joel C. Miller & Tom Hladish 18{20 July 2018

Empirical networksA number of attempts have been made to measure networks in“the wild”. Each case has its own peculiarities. This list is a littledated.

I Polymod [3]: 7290 participants across 8 European countriesrecorded information about their contacts during a day.

I Hospital interactions [4]: Employees, patients, and visitors ata pediatric hospital in Rome wore proximity detectors over aweek-long period.

I School interactions [5]: Students and employees at a highschool wore proximity detectors.

I Tasmanian Devils [6, 7]: Contacts between Tasmanian Devilswere measured through collars with proximity detectors.

I Lion interactions [8]: observations of within pride, betweenpride, and nomadic lion interactions.

I Other wildlife [9].

I Romantic networks [10]

44 / 52

Page 111: Epidemics in Networks Part I Introductiontjhladish.github.io › sismid › SISMID_Lecture1.pdfEpidemics in Networks Part I | Introduction Joel C. Miller & Tom Hladish 18{20 July 2018

Empirical networksA number of attempts have been made to measure networks in“the wild”. Each case has its own peculiarities. This list is a littledated.

I Polymod [3]: 7290 participants across 8 European countriesrecorded information about their contacts during a day.

I Hospital interactions [4]: Employees, patients, and visitors ata pediatric hospital in Rome wore proximity detectors over aweek-long period.

I School interactions [5]: Students and employees at a highschool wore proximity detectors.

I Tasmanian Devils [6, 7]: Contacts between Tasmanian Devilswere measured through collars with proximity detectors.

I Lion interactions [8]: observations of within pride, betweenpride, and nomadic lion interactions.

I Other wildlife [9].

I Romantic networks [10]

44 / 52

Page 112: Epidemics in Networks Part I Introductiontjhladish.github.io › sismid › SISMID_Lecture1.pdfEpidemics in Networks Part I | Introduction Joel C. Miller & Tom Hladish 18{20 July 2018

Empirical networksA number of attempts have been made to measure networks in“the wild”. Each case has its own peculiarities. This list is a littledated.

I Polymod [3]: 7290 participants across 8 European countriesrecorded information about their contacts during a day.

I Hospital interactions [4]: Employees, patients, and visitors ata pediatric hospital in Rome wore proximity detectors over aweek-long period.

I School interactions [5]: Students and employees at a highschool wore proximity detectors.

I Tasmanian Devils [6, 7]: Contacts between Tasmanian Devilswere measured through collars with proximity detectors.

I Lion interactions [8]: observations of within pride, betweenpride, and nomadic lion interactions.

I Other wildlife [9].

I Romantic networks [10]

44 / 52

Page 113: Epidemics in Networks Part I Introductiontjhladish.github.io › sismid › SISMID_Lecture1.pdfEpidemics in Networks Part I | Introduction Joel C. Miller & Tom Hladish 18{20 July 2018

Empirical networksA number of attempts have been made to measure networks in“the wild”. Each case has its own peculiarities. This list is a littledated.

I Polymod [3]: 7290 participants across 8 European countriesrecorded information about their contacts during a day.

I Hospital interactions [4]: Employees, patients, and visitors ata pediatric hospital in Rome wore proximity detectors over aweek-long period.

I School interactions [5]: Students and employees at a highschool wore proximity detectors.

I Tasmanian Devils [6, 7]: Contacts between Tasmanian Devilswere measured through collars with proximity detectors.

I Lion interactions [8]: observations of within pride, betweenpride, and nomadic lion interactions.

I Other wildlife [9].

I Romantic networks [10]

44 / 52

Page 114: Epidemics in Networks Part I Introductiontjhladish.github.io › sismid › SISMID_Lecture1.pdfEpidemics in Networks Part I | Introduction Joel C. Miller & Tom Hladish 18{20 July 2018

Empirical networksA number of attempts have been made to measure networks in“the wild”. Each case has its own peculiarities. This list is a littledated.

I Polymod [3]: 7290 participants across 8 European countriesrecorded information about their contacts during a day.

I Hospital interactions [4]: Employees, patients, and visitors ata pediatric hospital in Rome wore proximity detectors over aweek-long period.

I School interactions [5]: Students and employees at a highschool wore proximity detectors.

I Tasmanian Devils [6, 7]: Contacts between Tasmanian Devilswere measured through collars with proximity detectors.

I Lion interactions [8]: observations of within pride, betweenpride, and nomadic lion interactions.

I Other wildlife [9].

I Romantic networks [10]

44 / 52

Page 115: Epidemics in Networks Part I Introductiontjhladish.github.io › sismid › SISMID_Lecture1.pdfEpidemics in Networks Part I | Introduction Joel C. Miller & Tom Hladish 18{20 July 2018

Empirical networksA number of attempts have been made to measure networks in“the wild”. Each case has its own peculiarities. This list is a littledated.

I Polymod [3]: 7290 participants across 8 European countriesrecorded information about their contacts during a day.

I Hospital interactions [4]: Employees, patients, and visitors ata pediatric hospital in Rome wore proximity detectors over aweek-long period.

I School interactions [5]: Students and employees at a highschool wore proximity detectors.

I Tasmanian Devils [6, 7]: Contacts between Tasmanian Devilswere measured through collars with proximity detectors.

I Lion interactions [8]: observations of within pride, betweenpride, and nomadic lion interactions.

I Other wildlife [9].

I Romantic networks [10]

44 / 52

Page 116: Epidemics in Networks Part I Introductiontjhladish.github.io › sismid › SISMID_Lecture1.pdfEpidemics in Networks Part I | Introduction Joel C. Miller & Tom Hladish 18{20 July 2018

Empirical networksA number of attempts have been made to measure networks in“the wild”. Each case has its own peculiarities. This list is a littledated.

I Polymod [3]: 7290 participants across 8 European countriesrecorded information about their contacts during a day.

I Hospital interactions [4]: Employees, patients, and visitors ata pediatric hospital in Rome wore proximity detectors over aweek-long period.

I School interactions [5]: Students and employees at a highschool wore proximity detectors.

I Tasmanian Devils [6, 7]: Contacts between Tasmanian Devilswere measured through collars with proximity detectors.

I Lion interactions [8]: observations of within pride, betweenpride, and nomadic lion interactions.

I Other wildlife [9].

I Romantic networks [10]

44 / 52

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Sample location–location networks

I Livestock movement between farms [11] (and many ongoingstudies).

I Patient movement between hospitals: movement of patientsin Orange County [12], movement of patients in TheNetherlands [13].

I Individual movement between wards within a hospital [14](and others that I recall seeing, but can’t find).

I Travel through airline networks [15] (and many other papersby Colizza and Vespignani).

I Seasonal population movements [16]: study of seasonalpopulation movements for malaria control (phone data,census, satellite imagery).

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Page 118: Epidemics in Networks Part I Introductiontjhladish.github.io › sismid › SISMID_Lecture1.pdfEpidemics in Networks Part I | Introduction Joel C. Miller & Tom Hladish 18{20 July 2018

Sample location–location networks

I Livestock movement between farms [11] (and many ongoingstudies).

I Patient movement between hospitals: movement of patientsin Orange County [12], movement of patients in TheNetherlands [13].

I Individual movement between wards within a hospital [14](and others that I recall seeing, but can’t find).

I Travel through airline networks [15] (and many other papersby Colizza and Vespignani).

I Seasonal population movements [16]: study of seasonalpopulation movements for malaria control (phone data,census, satellite imagery).

45 / 52

Page 119: Epidemics in Networks Part I Introductiontjhladish.github.io › sismid › SISMID_Lecture1.pdfEpidemics in Networks Part I | Introduction Joel C. Miller & Tom Hladish 18{20 July 2018

Sample location–location networks

I Livestock movement between farms [11] (and many ongoingstudies).

I Patient movement between hospitals: movement of patientsin Orange County [12], movement of patients in TheNetherlands [13].

I Individual movement between wards within a hospital [14](and others that I recall seeing, but can’t find).

I Travel through airline networks [15] (and many other papersby Colizza and Vespignani).

I Seasonal population movements [16]: study of seasonalpopulation movements for malaria control (phone data,census, satellite imagery).

45 / 52

Page 120: Epidemics in Networks Part I Introductiontjhladish.github.io › sismid › SISMID_Lecture1.pdfEpidemics in Networks Part I | Introduction Joel C. Miller & Tom Hladish 18{20 July 2018

Sample location–location networks

I Livestock movement between farms [11] (and many ongoingstudies).

I Patient movement between hospitals: movement of patientsin Orange County [12], movement of patients in TheNetherlands [13].

I Individual movement between wards within a hospital [14](and others that I recall seeing, but can’t find).

I Travel through airline networks [15] (and many other papersby Colizza and Vespignani).

I Seasonal population movements [16]: study of seasonalpopulation movements for malaria control (phone data,census, satellite imagery).

45 / 52

Page 121: Epidemics in Networks Part I Introductiontjhladish.github.io › sismid › SISMID_Lecture1.pdfEpidemics in Networks Part I | Introduction Joel C. Miller & Tom Hladish 18{20 July 2018

Sample location–location networks

I Livestock movement between farms [11] (and many ongoingstudies).

I Patient movement between hospitals: movement of patientsin Orange County [12], movement of patients in TheNetherlands [13].

I Individual movement between wards within a hospital [14](and others that I recall seeing, but can’t find).

I Travel through airline networks [15] (and many other papersby Colizza and Vespignani).

I Seasonal population movements [16]: study of seasonalpopulation movements for malaria control (phone data,census, satellite imagery).

45 / 52

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Agent-based modelsA number of groups have done large-scale simulations ofpopulations

I Institute for Disease Modeling [DTK].

I Vancouver [17]: Simulations of individual contacts within thecity of Vancouver (N)

I EpiSims [18]: Simulation of all individual movements throughPortland, OR (1.6 million people). Later extended to a largenumber of other cities/regions (≈ 17 million).

I Epicast (based on “Scalable Parallel Short-range Moleculardynamics”: SPASM) [19]: Simulation of individual movementthroughout the US (≈ 300 million).

I Thailand [20]: Simulated individual interactions in Thailandwith the goal of identifying strategy to control pandemicinfluenza (500000 people).

I South Africa: Simulation by George Seage’s group at HSPHfor HIV transmission (≈ 6 million?)

46 / 52

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Agent-based modelsA number of groups have done large-scale simulations ofpopulations

I Institute for Disease Modeling [DTK].

I Vancouver [17]: Simulations of individual contacts within thecity of Vancouver (N)

I EpiSims [18]: Simulation of all individual movements throughPortland, OR (1.6 million people). Later extended to a largenumber of other cities/regions (≈ 17 million).

I Epicast (based on “Scalable Parallel Short-range Moleculardynamics”: SPASM) [19]: Simulation of individual movementthroughout the US (≈ 300 million).

I Thailand [20]: Simulated individual interactions in Thailandwith the goal of identifying strategy to control pandemicinfluenza (500000 people).

I South Africa: Simulation by George Seage’s group at HSPHfor HIV transmission (≈ 6 million?)

46 / 52

Page 124: Epidemics in Networks Part I Introductiontjhladish.github.io › sismid › SISMID_Lecture1.pdfEpidemics in Networks Part I | Introduction Joel C. Miller & Tom Hladish 18{20 July 2018

Agent-based modelsA number of groups have done large-scale simulations ofpopulations

I Institute for Disease Modeling [DTK].

I Vancouver [17]: Simulations of individual contacts within thecity of Vancouver (N)

I EpiSims [18]: Simulation of all individual movements throughPortland, OR (1.6 million people). Later extended to a largenumber of other cities/regions (≈ 17 million).

I Epicast (based on “Scalable Parallel Short-range Moleculardynamics”: SPASM) [19]: Simulation of individual movementthroughout the US (≈ 300 million).

I Thailand [20]: Simulated individual interactions in Thailandwith the goal of identifying strategy to control pandemicinfluenza (500000 people).

I South Africa: Simulation by George Seage’s group at HSPHfor HIV transmission (≈ 6 million?)

46 / 52

Page 125: Epidemics in Networks Part I Introductiontjhladish.github.io › sismid › SISMID_Lecture1.pdfEpidemics in Networks Part I | Introduction Joel C. Miller & Tom Hladish 18{20 July 2018

Agent-based modelsA number of groups have done large-scale simulations ofpopulations

I Institute for Disease Modeling [DTK].

I Vancouver [17]: Simulations of individual contacts within thecity of Vancouver (N)

I EpiSims [18]: Simulation of all individual movements throughPortland, OR (1.6 million people). Later extended to a largenumber of other cities/regions (≈ 17 million).

I Epicast (based on “Scalable Parallel Short-range Moleculardynamics”: SPASM) [19]: Simulation of individual movementthroughout the US (≈ 300 million).

I Thailand [20]: Simulated individual interactions in Thailandwith the goal of identifying strategy to control pandemicinfluenza (500000 people).

I South Africa: Simulation by George Seage’s group at HSPHfor HIV transmission (≈ 6 million?)

46 / 52

Page 126: Epidemics in Networks Part I Introductiontjhladish.github.io › sismid › SISMID_Lecture1.pdfEpidemics in Networks Part I | Introduction Joel C. Miller & Tom Hladish 18{20 July 2018

Agent-based modelsA number of groups have done large-scale simulations ofpopulations

I Institute for Disease Modeling [DTK].

I Vancouver [17]: Simulations of individual contacts within thecity of Vancouver (N)

I EpiSims [18]: Simulation of all individual movements throughPortland, OR (1.6 million people). Later extended to a largenumber of other cities/regions (≈ 17 million).

I Epicast (based on “Scalable Parallel Short-range Moleculardynamics”: SPASM) [19]: Simulation of individual movementthroughout the US (≈ 300 million).

I Thailand [20]: Simulated individual interactions in Thailandwith the goal of identifying strategy to control pandemicinfluenza (500000 people).

I South Africa: Simulation by George Seage’s group at HSPHfor HIV transmission (≈ 6 million?)

46 / 52

Page 127: Epidemics in Networks Part I Introductiontjhladish.github.io › sismid › SISMID_Lecture1.pdfEpidemics in Networks Part I | Introduction Joel C. Miller & Tom Hladish 18{20 July 2018

Agent-based modelsA number of groups have done large-scale simulations ofpopulations

I Institute for Disease Modeling [DTK].

I Vancouver [17]: Simulations of individual contacts within thecity of Vancouver (N)

I EpiSims [18]: Simulation of all individual movements throughPortland, OR (1.6 million people). Later extended to a largenumber of other cities/regions (≈ 17 million).

I Epicast (based on “Scalable Parallel Short-range Moleculardynamics”: SPASM) [19]: Simulation of individual movementthroughout the US (≈ 300 million).

I Thailand [20]: Simulated individual interactions in Thailandwith the goal of identifying strategy to control pandemicinfluenza (500000 people).

I South Africa: Simulation by George Seage’s group at HSPHfor HIV transmission (≈ 6 million?)

46 / 52

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Introduction

Disease spread

Key Questions

Modeling approaches

Networks

Brief glance at SIR in networks

Random network models

Real world networks

Review

References

47 / 52

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Review

I Disease dynamics depend on immune response and populationstructure

I Simple SIR disease can be modeled through percolation.

I We will focus on “Configuration model” populations and hopethat they are close enough to real populations.

I There is a size-biasing effect by which higher degree nodes aremore likely to be infected early on and then transmit to morenodes.

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Introduction

Disease spread

Key Questions

Modeling approaches

Networks

Brief glance at SIR in networks

Random network models

Real world networks

Review

References

49 / 52

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References I

[1] Scott L. Feld.Why your friends have more friends than you do.American Journal of Sociology, 96(6):1464–1477, 1991.

[2] N.A. Christakis and J.H. Fowler.Social network sensors for early detection of contagious outbreaks.PLoS ONE, 5(9):e12948, 2010.

[3] Joel Mossong, Niel Hens, Mark Jit, Philippe Beutels, Kari Auranen, Rafael Mikolajczyk, Marco Massari,Stefania Salmaso, Gianpaolo Scalia Tomba, Jacco Wallinga, Janneke Heijne, Malgorzata Sadkowska-Todys,Magdalena Rosinska, and W. John Edmunds.Social contacts and mixing patterns relevant to the spread of infectious diseases.PLoS Medicine, 5(3):381–391, 2008.

[4] Anna Machens, Francesco Gesualdo, Caterina Rizzo, Alberto E Tozzi, Alain Barrat, and Ciro Cattuto.An infectious disease model on empirical networks of human contact: bridging the gap between dynamicnetwork data and contact matrices.BMC infectious diseases, 13(1):185, 2013.

[5] Marcel Salathe, Maria Kazandjiev, Jung Woo Lee, Philip Levis, Marcus W. Feldman, and James H. Jones.A high-resolution human contact network for infectious disease transmission.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 107(51):22020–22025, 2010.

[6] Rodrigo K Hamede, Jim Bashford, Hamish McCallum, and Menna Jones.Contact networks in a wild tasmanian devil (Sarcophilus harrisii) population: using social network analysis toreveal seasonal variability in social behaviour and its implications for transmission of devil facial tumourdisease.Ecology Letters, 12(11):1147–1157, 2009.

[7] Rodrigo Hamede, Jim Bashford, Menna Jones, and Hamish McCallum.Simulating devil facial tumour disease outbreaks across empirically derived contact networks.Journal of Applied Ecology, 49(2):447–456, 2012.

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References II

[8] Meggan E Craft, Erik Volz, Craig Packer, and Lauren Ancel Meyers.Disease transmission in territorial populations: the small-world network of serengeti lions.Journal of the Royal Society Interface, 8(59):776–786, 2011.

[9] Meggan E Craft and Damien Caillaud.Network models: an underutilized tool in wildlife epidemiology?Interdisciplinary perspectives on infectious diseases, 2011, 2011.

[10] Peter S. Bearman, James Moody, and Katherine Stovel.Chains of affection: The structure of adolescent romantic and sexual networks.The American Journal of Sociology, 110(1):44–91, 2004.

[11] I.Z. Kiss, D.M. Green, and R.R. Kao.The network of sheep movements within great britain: network properties and their implications for infectiousdisease spread.Journal of the Royal Society Interface, 3(10):669, 2006.

[12] Susan S Huang, Taliser R Avery, Yeohan Song, Kristen R Elkins, Christopher C Nguyen, Sandra K Nutter,Alaka S Nafday, Curtis J Condon, Michael T Chang, David Chrest, et al.Quantifying interhospital patient sharing as a mechanism for infectious disease spread.Infection control and hospital epidemiology: the official journal of the Society of Hospital Epidemiologists ofAmerica, 31(11):1160, 2010.

[13] Tjibbe Donker, Jacco Wallinga, and Hajo Grundmann.Patient referral patterns and the spread of hospital-acquired infections through national health care networks.PLoS Computational Biology, 6(3):e1000715, 2010.

[14] A Sarah Walker, David W Eyre, David H Wyllie, Kate E Dingle, Rosalind M Harding, Lily O’Connor, DavidGriffiths, Ali Vaughan, John Finney, Mark H Wilcox, et al.Characterisation of clostridium difficile hospital ward–based transmission using extensive epidemiological dataand molecular typing.PLoS medicine, 9(2):e1001172, 2012.

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References III

[15] Duygu Balcan, Vittoria Colizza, Bruno Goncalves, Hao Hu, Jose J Ramasco, and Alessandro Vespignani.Multiscale mobility networks and the spatial spreading of infectious diseases.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 106(51):21484–21489, 2009.

[16] Amy Wesolowski, Nathan Eagle, Andrew J Tatem, David L Smith, Abdisalan M Noor, Robert W Snow, andCaroline O Buckee.Quantifying the impact of human mobility on malaria.Science, 338(6104):267–270, 2012.

[17] Lauren Ancel Meyers, Babak Pourbohloul, Mark E. J. Newman, Danuta M. Skowronski, and Robert C.Brunham.Network theory and SARS: predicting outbreak diversity.Journal of Theoretical Biology, 232(1):71–81, January 2005.

[18] C. L. Barrett, S. G. Eubank, and J. P. Smith.If smallpox strikes Portland. . . .Scientific American, 292(3):42–49, 2005.

[19] Timothy C. Germann, Kai Kadau, Ira M. Longini Jr., and Catherine A. Macken.Mitigation strategies for pandemic influenza in the United States.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 103(15):5935–5940, 2006.

[20] Ira M Longini, Azhar Nizam, Shufu Xu, Kumnuan Ungchusak, Wanna Hanshaoworakul, Derek ATCummings, and M Elizabeth Halloran.Containing pandemic influenza at the source.Science, 309(5737):1083–1087, 2005.

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