Epidemic spreading in complex networks with degree correlations
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Epidemic spreading in complex networks with degree correlations
Authors: M. Boguna, R. Pastor-Satorras, and A. Vespignani.
Publish: Lecture Notes in Physics: Statistical Mechanics of Complex Networks, 2003
Presenter: Cliff C. Zou
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Background
Limitation of Internet worm models Extended from simple epidemic model
Homogeneous assumption No topology considered
Suitable for scan-based worms Not suitable for modeling topological
malware Email viruses P2P malware
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Objective
Provide epidemic analytical models for topological networks
Cover both correlated networks and uncorrelated networks We only consider uncorrelated networks
here
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Model Notations
: infection prob. via an edge per unit time
P(k): fraction of nodes with degree k Only consider SI model
ik(t): fraction of infected in k-degree hosts
hki = k k P(k): average degree
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Topological Model I
(t): prob. that any given link points to an infected host Think each edge has two “end points” P(k)ik(t)¢ N: # of k-degree infected P(k)k¢ N: # of end points owned by k-degree
nodes
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Topological Model II
A newly infected at most has k-1 links to infect others It is infected through an edge The edge is useless in infection later
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Problems of Models
Implicit assumptions: Homogenous mixing Assume infected are uniformly distributed
Fact: epidemic spread via topology Infected are connected (clustered) Many infectious edges are wasted
Results: Models overestimate epidemic spreading
speed
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Illustration
16 infectious “end points” Only 10 effective infection links
Model I: 16, overestimate 60% Model II: 12, overestimate 20%
A
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Simulation Results
0 200 400 600 8000
2
4
6
8
10x 10
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Time: t
E[I(t)]
Model (2)Model (3)Simulation
Random network
0 200 400 600 8000
2
4
6
8
10x 10
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Time: t
E[I(t)]
Model (2)Model (3)Simulation
Power law network
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How to Improve Model?
Remove wasted edges in modeling Virtual removal hosts
Hosts with few/no links to vulnerable hosts
How to proceed? I don’t know yet
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Security Research Major Conferences
Tier-1: IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (IEEE S&P) ACM Computer Communication Security (CCS) Usenix Security Symposium Annual International Cryptology Conference (CRYPTO)
Tier-2: NDSS: Network and Distributed System Security ACSAC: Annual Computer Security Applications Conference DSN: dependable system and network ESORICS: European Symposium on Research in Computer
Security RAID: Recent Advances in Intrusion Detection
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Technical News
ACM techology news: http://www.acm.org/technews/articles/2006-8/0130m.html
Information Security Magazine: http://informationsecurity.techtarget.com/