ANTONIO BENGSON III, petitioner, vs. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and TEODORO C. CRUZ, respondents.

Facts:

Respondent Teodoro Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in San Clemente, Tarlac, on April 27, 1960, of Filipino parents. The fundamental law then applicable was the 1935 Constitution. On November 5, 1985, however, respondent Cruz enlisted in the

United States Marine Corps and without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the United States. As a Consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for under Commonwealth Act No. 63, section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by, among other, "rendering service to or accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign country.” He was naturalized in US in 1990. On March 17, 1994, respondent Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation under Republic Act No. 2630. He ran for and was elected as the Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998 elections. He won over petitioner Antonio Bengson III, who was then running for reelection.

Issue: Whether or Not respondent Cruz is a natural born citizen of the Philippines in view of the constitutional requirement that "no person shall be a Member of the House of Representative unless he is a natural-born citizen.”

Held:

Yes. There are two ways of acquiring citizenship: (1) by birth, and (2) by naturalization. These ways of acquiring citizenship correspond to the two kinds of citizens: the natural-born citizen, and the naturalized citizen. A person who at the time of his birth is a citizen of a particular country, is a natural-born citizen thereof.

As defined in the same Constitution, natural-born citizens "are those citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship."On the other hand, naturalized citizens are those who have become Filipino citizens through naturalization, generally under Commonwealth Act No. 473, otherwise known as the Revised Naturalization Law, which repealed the former Naturalization Law (Act No. 2927), and by Republic Act No. 530. To be naturalized, an applicant has to prove that he possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided by law to become a Filipino citizen. The decision granting Philippine citizenship becomes executory only after two

(2) years from its promulgation when the court is satisfied that during the intervening period, the applicant has (1)not left the Philippines; (2) has dedicated himself to a lawful calling or profession; (3) has not been convicted of any offense or violation of Government promulgated rules; or (4) committed any act prejudicial to the interest of the nation or contrary to any Government announced policies.

Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in the manner provided by law. Commonwealth Act. No. 63 (C.A. No. 63), enumerates the three modes by which Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen: (1) by naturalization, (2)by repatriation, and (3) by direct act of Congress. Naturalization is a mode for both acquisition and reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. As a mode of initially acquiring Philippine citizenship, naturalization is governed by CommonwealthAct No. 473, as amended. On the other hand, naturalization as a mode for reacquiring Philippine citizenship is governed by Commonwealth Act No. 63. Under this law, a former Filipino citizen who wishes to reacquire Philippine citizenship must possess certain qualifications and none of the disqualifications mentioned in Section 4 of C.A. 473.

Repatriation, on the other hand, may be had under various statutes by those who lost their citizenship due to: (1) desertion of the armed forces; (2) service in the armed forces of the allied forces in World War II; (3) service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any other time; (4) marriage of a Filipino woman to analien; and (5) political and economic necessity. As distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization, repatriation simply consists of the taking of an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registering said oath inthe Local Civil Registry of the place where the person concerned resides or last resided. As a rule, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that a

naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino. The rule applies to Cruz’s case. Being a natural-born citizen, Cruz reacquired this status upon his repatriation.

G.R. No. 120295. June 28, 1996]

JUAN G. FRIVALDO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and RAUL R. LEE, respondents.

[G.R. No. 123755. June 28, 1996]

RAUL R. LEE, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JUAN G. FRIVALDO, respondents.

On March 20, 1995, private respondent Juan G. Frivaldo filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the office of Governor of Sorsogon in the May 8, 1995 elections. On March 23, 1995, petitioner Raul R. Lee, another candidate, filed a petition with the Comelec praying that Frivaldo "be disqualified from seeking or holding any public office or position by reason of not yet being a citizen of the Philippines," and that his Certificate of Candidacy be cancelled. On May 1, 1995, the Second Division of the Comelec promulgated a Resolution granting the petition.

The Motion for Reconsideration filed by Frivaldo remained unacted upon until after the May 8, 1995 elections. So, his candidacy continued and he was voted for during the elections held on said date. On May 11, 1995, the Comelec en banc affirmed the aforementioned Resolution of the Second Division.

The Provincial Board of Canvassers completed the canvass of the election returns and a Certificate of Votes was issued showing the following votes obtained by the candidates for the position of Governor of Sorsogon:

Antonio H. Escudero, Jr. 51,060

Juan G. Frivaldo 73,440

RaulR.Lee 53,304

Isagani P. Ocampo 1,925

On June 9, 1995, Lee filed a (supplemental) petition praying for his proclamation as the duly-elected Governor of Sorsogon.

In an order dated June 21, 1995, but promulgated according to the petition "only on June 29, 1995," the Comelec en bane directed "the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Sorsogon to reconvene for the purpose of proclaiming candidate Raul Lee as the winning gubernatorial candidate in the province of Sorsogon on June 29,1995 x x x." Accordingly, at 8:30 in the evening of June 30,1995, Lee was proclaimed governor of Sorsogon.

Frivaldo filed with the Comelec a new petition praying for the annulment of the June 30, 1995 proclamation of Lee and for his own proclamation. He alleged that on June 30, 1995, at 2:00

in the afternoon, he took his oath of allegiance as a citizen of the Philippines after "his petition for repatriation under P.D. 725 which he filed with the Special Committee on Naturalization in September 1994 had been granted." As such, when "the said order (dated June 21, 1995) (of the Comelec) x x x was released and received by Frivaldo on June 30, 1995 at 5:30 o'clock in the evening, there was no more legal impediment to the proclamation (of Frivaldo) as governor x x x." In the alternative, he averred that pursuant to the two cases of Labo vs. Comelec, the Vice-Governor— not Lee — should occupy said position of governor.

On December 19, 1995, the Comelec First Division promulgated the herein assailed Resolution holding that Lee, "not having garnered the highest number of votes," was not legally entitled to be proclaimed as duly-elected governor; and that Frivaldo, "having garnered the highest number of votes, and having reacquired his Filipino citizenship by repatriation on June 30, 1995 under the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 725 is qualified to hold the office of governor of Sorsogon".

Frivaldo v. Comelec G.R. No. 120295  June 28, 1996

Facts:Frivaldo obtained the highest number of votes in three successive elections but was disqualified by the Court twice due to his alien citizenship. He claims to have re-assumed his lost Philippine citizenship thru repatriation. Respondent Lee was the second placer in the canvass and claimed that the votes cast in favor of petitioner should be considered void; that the electorate should be deemed to have intentionally thrown away their ballots; and that legally, he secured the most number of valid votes; or the incumbent Vice-Governor should take over the said post due to permanent vacancy due to Frivaldo’s ineligibility.Issues:

1) Was the repatriation valid and legal and reasonably cure his lack of citizenship as to qualify him to be proclaimed and to hold the Office?

2) Is disqualification for lack of citizenship a continuing bar to his eligibility to run for or be elected to or hold public office?

3) Did Comelec have jurisdiction over the initiatory petition considering that said petition is not a pre-proclamation case, an election protest or a quo warranto case?

4) Was the proclamation of Lee, a runner-up in the election, valid and legal in light of existing jurisprudence?

Ruling:

1) Yes. According to law, citizenship may be reacquired by 1) direct act of Congress, 2) by naturalization or 3) by repatriation under P.D 725. The law does not specifically state a particular date or time when the candidate must possess citizenship, unlike that for residence (at least 1 year residency immediately preceding the day of election) and age (at least 35 years old on election day). Philippine citizenship is an indispensable requirement for holding an elective public office to ensure that no alien, or person owing allegiance to another nation, shall govern our people and our country or a unit of territory thereof. An official begins to govern or to discharge his functions only upon his proclamation and on the day the law mandates his term of office to begin. Since Frivaldo re-assumed his citizenship on the very day the term of his office began, he was therefore already qualified to be proclaimed, to hold office and to discharge the functions and responsibilities thereof as of said date . The law intended CITIZENSHIP to be a qualification distinct from being a VOTER, even if being a voter presumes being a citizen first. The Local Government Code requires an elective official to be a registered voter. It does not require him to vote actually. In other words, the law's purpose in this second requirement is to ensure that the prospective official is actually registered in the area he seeks to govern — and not anywhere else. In fact, petitioner voted in all the previous elections. The prime issue of citizenship should be reckoned from the date of proclamation, not necessarily the date of election or date of filing of the certificate of candidacy. The repatriation of the petitioner retroacted upon the date of filing of his application.

2) No. Decisions declaring the acquisition or denial of citizenship cannot govern a person's future status with finality. This is because a person may subsequently reacquire, or for that matter, lose his citizenship under any of the modes recognized by law for the purpose.

3) No. The Constitution has given the Comelec ample power to "exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of all elective provincial officials. Such power to annul a proclamation must be done within ten (10) days following the proclamation. Frivaldo's petition was filed only six (6) days after Lee's proclamation, there is no question that the Comelec correctly acquired jurisdiction over the same.

4) No. The fact remains that Lee was not the choice of the sovereign will. Lee is just a second placer. The rule is: the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes does not entitle the eligible candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared elected. A minority or defeated candidate cannot be deemed elected to the office.

The petition was DISMISSED for being moot and academic and has no merit.

G.R. No. 135083. May 26, 1999

ERNESTO S. MERCADO, petitioner,vs.EDUARDO BARRIOS MANZANO and the COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents.

FACTS:

Manzano and Mercado are vice-mayoral candidates Makati City in the May 11, 1998 elections. Manzano got the highest number votes while Mercado bagged the second place. However, Manzano’s proclamation was suspended in view of a pending petition for disqualification on the ground that he is an American citizen. In his answer, Manzano admitted that he is registered as a foreigner with the Bureau of Immigration and alleged that he is a Filipino citizen because he was born in 1955 of a Filipino father and a Filipino mother. He was born in the United States (San Francisco, CA) on Sept. 14, 1955 and is considered an American citizen under US laws (jus soli). But notwithstanding his registration as an American citizen, he did not lose his Filipino citizenship.

The Second Division of the COMELEC granted the petition and cancelled Manzano’s certificate of candidacy on the ground that he is a dual citizen. Under the Local Government Code (sec. 40), dual citizens are disqualified from running for any position .The COMELEC en banc reversed the division’s ruling. In its resolution, it said that Manzano was both a US citizen and a Filipino citizen. It further ruled that although he was registered as an alien with the Philippine Bureau of Immigration and was using an American passport, this did not result in the loss of his Philippine citizenship, as he did not renounce Philippine citizenship and did not take an oath of allegiance to the US. Moreover, the COMELEC found that when respondent attained the age of majority, he registered himself as a Philippine voter and voted as such, which effectively renounced his US citizenship under American law. Under Philippine law, he no longer had US citizenship. Hence, this petition for certiorari.

ISSUES:

Whether or not Manzano was no longer a US citizen- YES

Whether or not Manzano is qualified to run for and hold elective office

HELD:

DUAL CITIZENSHIP AS A GROUND FOR DISQUALIFICATION

Dual Citizenship vs. Dual Allegiance

To begin with, dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states. For instance, such a situation may arise when a person whose parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Such a person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act on his part, is concurrently considered a citizen of both states. Considering the citizenship clause (Art. IV)of our Constitution, it is possible for the following classes of citizens of the Philippines to possess dual citizenship: Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which follow the principle of jus soli;

Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws of their fathers’ country such children are citizens of that country; Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latter’s country the former are considered citizens, unless by their act or omission they are deemed to have renounced Philippine citizenship. There may be other situations in which a citizen of the Philippines may, without performing any act, be also a citizen of another state; but the above cases are clearly possible given the constitutional provisions on citizenship. Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by dome positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individual’s volition. LGC prohibits “Dual Allegiance” not “Dual Citizenship”

The phrase “dual citizenship” in the LGC must be understood as referring to “dual allegiance.”

Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. Unlike those with dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to strict process with respect to the termination of their status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it would suffice if, upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship considering that their condition is the unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of different states. By Electing Philippine Citizenship, the Candidate forswear Allegiance to the Other Country By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time forswear allegiance to the other country of which they are also citizens and thereby terminate their status as dual citizens. It may be that, from the point of view of the foreign state and of its laws, such an individual has not effectively renounced his foreign citizenship. That is of no moment.

PETITIONER’S ELECTION OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP

The COMELEC en banc’s ruling was that Manzano’s act of registering himself as a voter was an effective renunciation of his American citizenship. This ruling is in line with the US Immigration and Nationality Act wherein it is provided that “a person who is a national of the United States, whether by birth or naturalization, shall lose his nationality by: (e) Voting in a political election in a foreignstate or participating in an election or plebiscite to determine the sovereignty over foreign territory.”

But this provision was declared unconstitutional by the US Supreme Court. Nevertheless, our SC held that by filing a certificate of candidacy when he ran for his present post, private respondent elected Philippine citizenship and in effect renounced his American citizenship. To recapitulate, by declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant of another country; that he will defend and support the Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental reservation, private respondent has, as far as the laws of this country are concerned, effectively repudiated his American citizenship and anything which he may have said before as a dual citizen.

On the other hand, private respondent’s oath of allegiance to the Philippines, when considered with the fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood, received his education, practiced his professionals an artist, and taken part in past elections in this country, leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine citizenship. His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his undertaking made under oath. Should he betray that trust, there are enough sanctions for declaring the loss of his Philippine citizenship through expatriation in appropriate proceedings. In Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, we sustained the denial of entry into the country of petitioner on the ground that, after taking his oath as a naturalized citizen, he applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport and declared in commercial documents executed abroad that he was a Portuguese national. A similar sanction can be taken against anyone who, in electing Philippine citizenship, renounces his foreign nationality, but subsequently does some act constituting renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.

G.R. No. L-52365 January 22, 1980

AMADO F. GADOR, petitioner, vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AS REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIRMAN, HON. LEONARDO PEREZ, respondent.

FERNANDEZ, J.:

WHEREFORE, it is most respectably prayed that the respondent be immediately ordered to include the name of the herein petitioner in the list of candidates for Mayor of the City of Ozamiz which shall be printed and distributed soon to all voting centers in the City of Ozamis.

The petition alleges that the petitioner is a candidate for the Office of Mayor of the City of Ozamiz as Independent this coming January 30, 1980 local election; that he filed his certificate of candidacy with the Election Registrar of Ozamis City on January 7, 1980; that the petitioner filed his certificate of candidacy for Mayor on January 7, 1980 on the basis of a news item in the Bulletin Today, January 6, issue; that on January 8, 1980, the petitioner wired the Chairman of the Commission on Elections informing him of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and at the time requesting him to release the approval of the said certificate; that on January 11, 1980, the petitioner caused the Election Registrar of Ozamiz City to wire the Chairman, Commission on Elections, reiterating the information that the petitioner had filed a certificate of candidacy on January 7; that he was already in the thick of campaigns and was asking about the status of his candidacy; that in view of the President's announcement that the resolution of the respondent, Commission on Elections, for the extension of time for filing certificates of candidacy from January 4 to January 10 had been denied, there is a strong probability that the petitioner's name as candidate for Mayor may not be included in the list of candidates to be voted which is to be printed soon and distributed in Ozamiz City ; and that on grounds of fairness, principles of equity and for the best interest of the people of Ozamiz City, judgment should be rendered commanding the respondent, Commission on Elections, to immediately include the petitioner in the list of candidates for Mayor.

ISSUE: is whether or not the certificate of candidacy of the petitioner which was filed on January 7, 1980 is valid.

Section 7, Batasang Pambansa Bilang 52, provides that "The sworn certificate of candidacy shall be filed in triplicate not later than January 4, 1980." It is a fact admitted by the petitioner that the President had not extended the period within which to file the certificate of candidacy.

This Court is powerless to grant the remedy prayed for in the petition. Having been filed beyond January 4, 1980, the certificate of candidacy of the petitioner is void.

In as much as the election is only eight (8) days away, it is to the interest of all concerned, specially the petitioner himself, that this matter be resolved immediately.

WHEREFORE, the petition for mandamus is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-54718 May 3l, 1983

CRISOLOGO VILLANUEVA Y PAREDES, petitioner, vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, MUNICIPAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF DOLORES QUEZON, AND VIVENCIO G. LIRIO, respondents.

Crisologo P. Villanueva in his own behalf.

The Solicitor General for respondents. Danosos, Lirio, Bautista & Asso. for private respondents.

DE CASTRO, J.:

FACTS:

It appears that on January 4, 1980, which is the last day for the filing of certificates of candidacy in the January 30, 1980 elections, one Narciso Mendoza, Jr. filed with the Election Registrar of Dolores, Quezon, his sworn certificate of candidacy for the office of vice-mayor of said municipality. Subsequently, however, but on the same day, Mendoza filed an unsworn letter withdrawing his said certificate of candidacy.

On January 25, 1980, herein petitioner filed with the Election Registrar of Dolores, Quezon, his sworn "Certificate of Candidacy in Substitution" of the aforementioned Narciso Mendoza, Jr. for the office of vice-mayor of said municipality.

On January 31, 1980, the respondent Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed, on the basis of the results of its canvass, respondent Vivencio Lirio as the duly elected vice-mayor of

Dolores, Quezon. Respondent Board considered all the votes cast in favor of petitioner as stray votes on the ground that his certificate of candidacy was not given due course by the Commission on Elections, Manila, and his name was not included in the certified list of official candidates.

On February 6, 1980, petitioner filed with the COMELEC a petition to annul the proclamation of respondent. He likewise prayed that COMELEC should order the official counting of the votes that may have been cast in his favor and thereafter, to proclaim him as the duly elected vice-mayor of Dolores, Quezon.

WITHDRAWAL NOT MADE UNDER OATH –NOT EFFECTIVE

On February 21, 1980, COMELEC issued the herein questioned resolution denying the said petition, upon the reasoning that petitioner could not have filed his candidacy in substitution of Mendoza's because the withdrawal of the latter had produced no legal effect, the same not having been made under oath as required by Section 27 of the Election Code, and even assuming the efficacy of said withdrawal, the same was made not after the last day for filing of certificates of candidacy as provided under Section 28 of said Code, but on the very same last day. COMELEC reaffirmed its stand upon petitioner's filing of a motion for reconsideration and supplemental motion for reconsideration. Hence, the present recourse.

ISSUE: WON THERES VALID SUBSTITUTION?

HELD:

The law on the matter of withdrawal or cancellation of certificates of candidacy is Section 27 of the 1978 Election Code, which provides:

Sec. 27. Withdrawal or cancellation of certificates of candidacy. - No certification of candidacy duly filed shall be considered withdrawn or cancelled unless the candidate files with the office which received the certificate of candidacy or with the Commission, a sworn statement of withdrawal or cancellation at any time before the day of election. (Emphasis supplied)

There is absolutely no vagueness or ambiguity of the above provision, as to the need of a sworn statement of withdrawal or cancellation of a duly filed certificate of candidacy. That the withdrawal of Mendoza's certificate of candidacy was not made under oath is not disputed. As such, the withdrawal produces no legal effect for failure to comply with the clear and unequivocal mandate of the law. Mendoza, therefore, for all legal intents and purposes,

remained to be a candidate for vice Mayor of Dolores, Quezon, up to January 30, 1980, the date of the elections, as correctly ruled by the COMELEC.

Even assuming that the questioned withdrawal is effective, under a liberal construction of the law as invoked by petitioner, which should not be the case when the terms of the statute are clear and unmistakable, still petitioner may not derive comfort therefrom for Mendoza's withdrawal was made on January 4, 1980, on the very last day for filing certificates of candidacy. Substitution of a candidate by reason of withdrawal is proper only when such withdrawal is made after the last day for filing of certificates of candidacy. This is as, likewise, clearly provided by Section 28 of the 1978 Election Code.

Sec. 28. Candidates in case of death, withdrawal or disqualification of another. — If, after the last day for filing certificates of candidacy, a candidate with a certificate of candidacy duly filed should die, withdraw or be disqualified for any cause, any voter qualified for the office may file his certificate of candidacy for the office for which the deceased, the candidate who has withdrawn, or disqualified person was a candidate in accordance with the preceding sections on or before mid-day of the day of the election, and if the death, withdrawal or disqualification should occur between the day before the election and the mid-day of election day, said certificate may filed with any election committee in the political subdivision where he is a candidate: Provided, however, That if the candidate who died, withdrew or was disqualified is the official candidate of a political party, group or aggrupation, only a person belonging to, and certified by, the same political party, group or aggrupation may file a certificate of candidacy for the same office.

While it may be true as persistently pointed out by the petitioner that a certificate of candidacy duly filed may be withdrawn or cancelled at any time before the day of election, it does not necessarily follow that such withdrawn or cancelled certificate of candidacy may be the subject of substitution by another's certificate of candidacy. For substitution to take place, the withdrawal must be effected after the last day for filing of certificates of candidacy. If the withdrawal was made prior to or on the said last day, as what happened in the instant case, substitution is not allowed. Hence, the person filing a certificate of candidacy is filing said certificate in his own right, not as substitute candidate, and the filing to make the certificate of candidacy valid must not be after the last day for filing ordinary certificates of candidacy, which is January 4, 1980.

By and large, petitioner was, therefore, not a candidate, either in substitution of Mendoza or in his own right, as he filed his certificate of candidacy on January 25, 1980, long after the last day for filing certificates of candidacy. Whatever votes may have been cast in his favor are necessarily considered stray votes. [Section 155 (15), Election Code] There is thus no legal basis for the annulment of respondent Lirio's proclamation as vice-mayor.

Crisologo Villanueva Y Paredes v. COMELECPonente: Teehankee, J. (December 4, 1985)

FACTS:

Narciso Mendoza, Jr. had filed on January 4, 1980, the last day for filing of certificates of candidacy in the January 30, 1980 local elections, his sworn certificate of candidacy as independent for the office of vice-mayor of the municipality of Dolores, Quezon. But later on the very same day , Mendoza filed an unsworn letter in his own handwriting withdrawing his said certificate of candidacy "for personal reasons." Later on January 25, 1980, petitioner Crisologo Villanueva, upon learning of his companion Mendoza's withdrawal, filed his own sworn "Certificate of Candidacy in substitution" of Mendoza's for the said office of vice mayor as a one-man independent ticket. ... The results showed petitioner to be the clear winner over respondent with a margin of 452 votes . But the Municipal Board of Canvassers disregarded all votes cast in favor of petitioner as stray votes on the basis of the Provincial Election Officer's erroneous opinion that since petitioner's name does not appear in the Comelec's certified list of candidates for that municipality, it could be presumed that his candidacy was not duly approved by the Comelec so tha this votes could not be "legally counted. " ... The canvassers accordingly proclaimed respondent Vivencio G. Lirio as the only unopposed candidate and as the duly elected vice mayor of the municipality of Dolores. The COMELEC denied his petition because Mendoza's withdrawal of his certificate is not under oath, as requiredunder Section 27 of the Code; hence it produces no legal effect. For another, said withdrawal was made not after the last day(January 4, 1980) for filing certificates of candidacy, as contemplated underSec. 28 of the Code, but on that very same day.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner was able to file his certificate of candidacy on time and with the forms prescribed by law and thus, making him the winner of the said elections.

RULING:

The fact that Mendoza's withdrawal was not sworn is but a technicality which should not be used to frustrate the people's will in favor of petitioner as the substitute candidate. In Guzman us, Board of Canvassers, 48 Phil. 211,clearly applicable, mutatis mutandis this Court held that "(T)he will of the people cannot be frustrated by a technicality that the certificate of candidacy had not been properly sworn to, This legal provision is mandatory and non-compliance therewith before the election would be fatal to the status of the candidate before the electorate, but after the people have expressed their

will, the result of the election cannot be defeated by the fact that the candidate has not sworn to his certificate or candidacy."

The Comelec's post-election act of denying petitioner's substitute candidacy certainly does not seem to be in consonance with the substance and spirit of the law . Section 28 of the 1978 Election Code provides for such substitute candidates in case of death, withdrawal or disqualification up to mid-day of the very day of the elections. Mendoza's withdrawal was filed on the last hour of the last day for regular filing of candidacies on January 4, 1980, which he had filed earlier that same day. For all intents and purposes, such withdrawal should therefore be considered as having been made substantially and in truth after the last day , even going by the literal reading of the provision by the Comelec.

Miranda v Abaya

G.R. No. 136351 July 28, 1999

Facts

Jose ―Pempe ‖ Miranda then incumbent mayor of Santiago City, Isabela, filed his certificate of candidacy for the same mayoralty post for the synchronized May 11, 1998 elections . Three days after, a complaint to cancel certificate of candidacy was filed against him by Antonio Abaya which was granted. Shortly after the deadline for filing for candidacy, Joel Miranda filed his certificate of candidacy as a substitute for Pempe Miranda. Of course, Abaya filed a disqualification case against Joel Miranda for void substitution . After a motion for reconsideration, COMELEC granted Abaya‘s complaint. Hence, this petition.

Issue

1. Whether the annulment of petitioner‘s substitution and proclamation was issued without jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction; and

2. Whether the order of the Comelec directing the proclamation of the private respondent was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

Held

A disqualified candidate may only be substituted if he had a valid certificate of candidacy in the first place because, if the disqualified candidate did not have a valid and seasonably filed certificate of candidacy, he is and was not a candidate at all. If a person was not a candidate,

he cannot be substituted under Section 77 of the Code. Besides, if we were to allow the so- called ―substitute to file a ―new and ―original certificate of candidacy beyond the period for the filing thereof, it would be a crystalline case of unequal protection f the law, an act abhorred by our Constitution.

G.R. no. 150605, Dec. 10, 2002

EUFROCINO M. CODILLA, SR., petitioner, vs. HON. JOSE DE VENECIA, ROBERTO P. NAZARENO, in their official capacities as Speaker and Secretary-General of the House of Representatives, respectively, and MA. VICTORIA L. LOCSIN, respondents.

If the validity of the proclamation is the core issue of the disqualification case, the proclamation of the candidate cannot divest Comelec en banc of its jurisdiction to review its validity. Ministerial duty of the House to administer oath of office to the winning candidate

FACTS:

Codilla, then sitting as Mayor of Ormoc City, and Locsin, the incumbent Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte, were candidates for the position of Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte. A petition fordisqualification was filed against Codilla for violating Sec. 68(a) of the Omnibus Election Code, alleging that he used the equipment and vehicles owned by the City Government of Ormoc to extract, haul and distribute gravel and sand to the residents of Kananga and Matag-ob, Leyte, for the purpose of inducing, influencing or corrupting them to vote for him.

At the time of the elections on May 14, 2001, the disqualification case was still pending so Codilla’s name remained in the list of candidates and was voted for. In fact, he garnered the highest number of votes. However, his proclamation as winner was suspended by order of the Comelec. After hearing of his disqualification case, he was found guilty and ordered disqualified.

Codilla’s votes being considered stray, Locsin was thus proclaimed as the duly elected Representative and subsequently took her oath of office. Codilla then filed a timely

Motion for Reconsideration with the Comelec and also sought the annulment of Locsin’s proclamation.

ISSUES:

Whether or not Comelec has jurisdiction to annul the proclamation of a Representative

Whether or not it is a ministerial duty of the House to recognize Codilla as the legally electedRepresentative

RULING:

First. The validity of the respondent’s proclamation was a core issue in the Motion for Reconsideration seasonably filed by the petitioner.

xxxSince the petitioner seasonably filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of the Second Division suspending hisproclamation and disqualifying him, the COMELEC en banc was not divested of its jurisdiction to review the validity of the said Order of the Second Division. The said Order of the Second Division was yet unenforceable as it has not attained finality; the timely filing of the motion for reconsideration suspends its execution. It cannot, thus, be used as the basis for the assumption in office of the respondent as the duly elected Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte.

Second. It is the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) which has no jurisdiction in the instant case.

xxx

(a)The issue on the validity of the Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division has not yet been resolved by the COMELEC en banc.

To stress again, at the time of the proclamation of respondent Locsin, the validity of the Resolution of the COMELECSecond Division was seasonably challenged by the petitioner in his Motion for Reconsideration. The issue was still within the exclusive jurisdiction of the COMELEC en banc to resolve. Hence, the HRET cannot assume jurisdiction over the matter.

In Puzon vs. Cua, even the HRET ruled that the “doctrinal ruling that once a proclamation has

been made and a candidate-elect has assumed office, it is this Tribunal that has jurisdiction over an election contest involving members of the House of Representatives, could not have been immediately applicable due to the issue regarding the validity of the very COMELEC pronouncements themselves.” This is because the HRET has no jurisdiction to review resolutions or decisions of the COMELEC, whether issued by a division or en banc.

(b)The instant case does not involve the election and qualification of respondent Locsin.

xxxA petition for quo warranto may be filed only on the grounds of ineligibility and disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines. In the case at bar, neither the eligibility of the respondent Locsin nor her loyalty to the Republic of the Philippines is in question. There is no issue that she was qualified to run, and if she won, to assume office.

A petition for quo warranto in the HRET is directed against one who has been duly elected and proclaimed for having obtained the highest number of votes but whose eligibility is in question at the time of such proclamation. It is evident that respondent Locsin cannot be the subject of quo warranto proceeding in the HRET. She lost the elections to the petitioner by a wide margin. Her proclamation was a patent nullity. Her premature assumption to office as Representativeof the 4th legislative district of Leyte was void from the beginning. It is the height of absurdity for the respondent, as a loser, to tell petitioner Codilla, Sr., the winner, to unseat her via a quo warranto proceeding.

Ministerial duty of the House to administer the oath of office of a winning but nevertheless unproclaimed candidate

Under Rule 65, section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, any person may file a verified petition for mandamus “when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.” For a petition for mandamus to prosper, it must be shown that the subject of the petition for mandamus is a ministerial act or duty, and not purely discretionary on the part of the board, officer or person, and that the petitioner has a well-defined, clear and certain right to warrant the grant thereof.

The distinction between a ministerial and discretionary act is well delineated. A purely ministerial act or duty is one which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a

prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. If the law imposes a duty upon a public officer and gives him the right to decide how or when the duty shall be performed, such duty is discretionary and not ministerial. The duty is ministerial only when the discharge of the same requires neither the exercise of official discretion or judgment.

In the case at bar, the administration of oath and the registration of the petitioner in the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives representing the 4th legislative district of Leyte is no longer a matter of discretion on the part of the public respondents. The facts are settled and beyond dispute: petitioner garnered 71,350 votes as against respondent Locsin who only got 53, 447 votes in the May 14, 2001 elections. The COMELEC Second Division initially ordered theproclamation of respondent Locsin; on Motion for Reconsideration the COMELEC en banc set aside the order of itsSecond Division and ordered the proclamation of the petitioner. The Decision of the COMELEC en banc has not been challenged before this Court by respondent Locsin and said Decision has become final and executory.

In sum, the issue of who is the rightful Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte has been finally settled by the COMELEC en banc, the constitutional body with jurisdiction on the matter. The rule of law demands that its Decision be obeyed by all officials of the land. There is no alternative to the rule of law except the reign of chaos and confusion.

Aquino v COMELEC (1995)

Aquino vs. ComelecAgapito A. Aquino, petitioner vs. Commission on Election, Move Makati, Mateo Bedon, and Juanito Icaro, respondentsSept, 18, 1995Special Civil Action in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.

Relevant Provisions:Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 ConstitutionNo person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least twenty-five years of age, able to read and write, and, except the party-list representatives, a registered voter in the

district in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the election.

Facts: On 20 March 1995, Agapito A. Aquino, the petitioner, filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative for the new (remember: newly created) Second Legislative District of Makati City. In his certificate of candidacy, Aquino stated that he was a resident of the aforementioned district (284 Amapola Cor. Adalla Sts., Palm Village, Makati) for 10 months. Move Makati, a registered political party, and Mateo Bedon, Chairman of LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP of Barangay Cembo, Makati City, filed a petition to disqualify Aquino on the ground that the latter lacked the residence qualification as a candidate for congressman which under Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, should be for a period not less than one year preceding the (May 8, 1995) day of the election. Faced with a petition for disqualification, Aquino amended the entry on his residency in his certificate of candidacy to 1 year and 13 days. The Commission on Elections passed a resolution that dismissed the petition on May 6 and allowed Aquino to run in the election of 8 May. Aquino, with 38,547 votes, won against Augusto Syjuco with 35,910 votes. Move Makati filed a motion of reconsideration with the Comelec, to which, on May 15, the latter acted with an order suspending the proclamation of Aquino until the Commission resolved the issue. On 2 June, the Commission on Elections found Aquino ineligible and disqualified for the elective office for lack of constitutional qualification of residence. Aquino then filed a Petition of Certiorari assailing the May 15 and June 2 orders.

Issue: 1. Whether “residency” in the certificate of candidacy actually connotes “domicile” to warrant the disqualification of Aquino from the position in the electoral district.2. WON it is proven that Aquino has established domicile of choice and not just residence (not in the sense of the COC)in the district he was running in.

Held:1. Yes, The term “residence” has always been understood as synonymous with “domicile” not only under the previous constitutions but also under the 1987 Constitution. The Court cited the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission wherein this principle was applied.Mr. Nolledo:I remember that in the 1971 Constitutional Convention, there was an attempt to require residence in the place not less than one year immediately preceding the day of elections. …What is the Committee’s concept of residence for the legislature? Is it actual residence or is it

the concept of domicile or constructive residence?Mr. Davide:This is in the district, for a period of not less than one year preceding the day of election. This was in effect lifted from the 1973 constituition, the interpretation given to it was domicile.Mrs. Braid:On section 7, page2, Noledo has raised the same point that resident has been interpreted at times as a matter of intention rather than actual residence.…Mr. De los ReyesSo we have to stick to the original concept that it should be by domicile and not physical and actual residence. Therefore, the framers intended the word “residence” to have the same meaning of domicile.The place “where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home,” where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain, i.e., his domicile, is that to which the Constitution refers when it speaks of residence for the purposes of election law.The purpose is to exclude strangers or newcomers unfamiliar with the conditions and needs of the community from taking advantage of favorable circumstances existing in that community for electoral gain.While there is nothing wrong with the purpose of establishing residence in a given area for meeting election law requirements, this defeats the essence of representation, which is to place through assent of voters those most cognizant and sensitive to the needs of a particular district, if a candidate falls short of the period of residency mandated by law for him to qualify. Which brings us to the second issue.

2. No, Aquino has not established domicile of choice in the district he was running in. The SC agreed with the Comelec’s contention that Aquino should prove that he established a domicile of choice and not just residence. The Constitution requires a person running for a post in the HR one year of residency prior to the elections in the district in which he seeks election to .Aquino’s certificate of candidacy in a previous (May 11, 1992) election indicates that he was a resident and a registered voter of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac for more than 52 years prior to that election. His birth certificate indicated that Conception as his birthplace and his COC also showed him to be a registered voter of the same district. Thus his domicile of origin (obviously, choice as well) up to the filing of his COC was in Conception, Tarlac. Aquino’s connection to the new Second District of Makati City is an alleged lease agreement of a condominium unit in the area. The intention not to establish a permanent home in Makati City is evident in his leasing a condominium unit instead of buying one. The short length of time

he claims to be a resident of Makati (and the fact of his stated domicile in Tarlac and his claims of other residences in Metro Manila) indicate that his sole purpose in transferring his physical residence is not to acquire a new, residence or domicile but only to qualify as a candidate for Representative of the Second District of Makati City.Aquino’s assertion that he has transferred his domicile from Tarlac to Makati is a bare assertion which is hardly supported by the facts in the case at bench. To successfully effect a change of domicile, petitioner must prove an actual removal or an actual change of domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one and definite acts which correspond with the purpose. Aquino was thus rightfully disqualified by the Commission on Elections due to his lack of one year residence in the district.DecisionInstant petition dismissed. Order restraining respondent Comelec from proclaiming the candidate garnering the next highest number of votes in the congressional elections of Second district of Makati City made permanent. Dicta:I. Aquino’s petition of certiorari contents were:A. The Comelec’s lack of jurisdiction to determine the disqualification issue involving congressional candidates after the May 8, 1995 elections, such determination reserved with the house of representatives electional tribunalB. Even if the Comelec has jurisdiction, the jurisdiction ceased in the instant case after the elections and the remedy to the adverse parties lies in another forum which is the HR Electoral Tribunal consistent with Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. C. The COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it proceeded to promulagate its questioned decision despite its own recognition that a threshold issue of jurisdiction has to be judiciously reviewed again, assuming arguendo that the Comelec has jurisdiction D. The Comelec’s finding of non-compliance with the residency requirement of one year against the petitioner is contrary to evidence and to applicable laws and jurisprudence.E. The Comelec erred in failing to appreciate the legal impossibility of enforcing the one year residency requirement of Congressional candidates in newly created political districts which were only existing for less than a year at the time of the election and barely four months in the case of petitioner’s district in Makati.F. The Comelec committed serious error amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it ordered the board of canvassers to determine and proclaim the winner out of the remaining qualified candidates after the erroneous disqualification of the petitioner in disregard of the doctrine that a second place candidate or a person who was repudiated by the electorate is a loser and cannot be proclaimed as substitute winner. II. Modern day carpetbaggers can’t be allowed to take advantage of the creation of new

political districts by suddenly transplanting themselves in such new districts, prejudicing their genuine residents in the process of taking advantage of existing conditions in these areas. III. according to COMELEC: The lease agreement was executed mainly to support the one year residence requirement as a qualification for a candidate of the HR, by establishing a commencement date of his residence. If a oerfectly valid lease agreement cannot, by itself establish a domicile of choice, this particular lease agreement cannot be better.

Bagatsing v. COMELEC

There is a difference between a disqualification case filed before and after an election. Why there is a difference between a petition for disqualification filed before and after the election proceeds from the fact that before the election, the question of disqualification is raised as an issue before the electorate and those who vote for the candidate assume the risk that should said candidate be disqualified after the election, their votes would be declared stray or invalid votes. Such would not be true in the case of one filed after the electorate has already voted. The mere filing of a petition for disqualification is not a ground to suspend the proclamation of the winning candidate. In the absence of an order suspending the proclamation, the winning candidat