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SEABROOK UPDATED FSAR
APPENDIX 31
REPORT ON ANALYSIS OF HIGH ENERGY LINE BREAKS OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT
The information contained in this appendix was not revised, but has beenextracted from the original FSAR and is provided for historical information.
SB 1 & 2
Amendment 56FSAR
November 1985
APPENDIX 31
REPORT ON
ANALYSES OF HIGH ENERGY LINE BREAKS
OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT
Prepared for
PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF NEW HAMSPHIRE
SEABROOK STATION
Prepared by
United EngineersIt ConstructorsA Raytheon Company
Report No. 9763-006-S-N-2
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Amendment 56FSAR
November 1985
TABLE OF CONTENTS
SECTION TITLE
LIST OF TABLES
LIST OF FIGURES
SUMMARY
1.0
INTRODUCTION
2.0
METHOD OF ANALYSIS
2.1 Mass and Energy Releases2.2 Pressure/Temperature/Humidity Transients
3.0 HELB ANALYSES AND RESULTS
3.1 Primary Auxiliary Building
3.2 Containment Enclosure Area
3.3 Main Steam/Feedwater Pipe Chase
3.4 Tank Farm Area
3.5 Waste Processing Building/Primary AuxiliaryBuilding Chase
4.0
4.14.24.34.44.5
5.0
6.0
HWHLB ANALYSES AND RESULTS
Primary Auxiliary BuildingContainment Enclosure AreaFuel Storage BuildingEmergency Feedwater PumphouseService Water Pumphouse
CONCLUSIONS
REFERENCES
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LIST OF TABLES
TABLE NO. TITLE
2.1-1 Determination of Mass/Energy Release
2.2-1 Design Basis Information
3.1-1 Primary Auxiliary Building - High Energy LineBreak Locations
3.1-2 Primary Auxiliary Building - Summary of Results
3.2-1 Containment Enclosure Area - High Energy LineBreak Locations
3.2-2 Containment Enclosure Area - Summary of Results
3.3-1 Main Steam/Feedwater Pipe Chase - High EnergyLine Break Locations
3.3-2 Main Steam/Feedwater Pipe Chase - Summary ofResults
3.4-1
Tank Farm Area - High Energy Line Break Locations
3.4-2
Tank Farm Area - Summary of Results
3.5-1
Waste Processing Building/Primary AuxiliaryBuilding Chase - High Energy Line Break Locations
3.5-2 Waste Processing Building/Primary AuxiliaryBuilding Chase - Summary of Results
4.0-1 Hot Water Heating Line Break Locations
4.0-2 Hot Water Heating Line Breaks - Summary ofResults
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LIST OF FIGURES
FIGURE NO. TITLE
2.1-1 Primary Auxiliary Building Showing Locations ofHELB Temperature Detection Thermocouples
2.1-2 Containment Enclosure Area Showing Locations ofHELB Temperature Detection Thermocouples
2.1-3 Containment Enclosure Area Showing Locations ofHELB Temperature Detection Thermocouples
3.1-1 Zone Designations of Primary Auxiliary Buildingat Various Elevations
3.1-2A Nodal Arrangement of Primary Auxiliary Buildingat Various Elevations for Steam Generator Blow-down Line Break Analysis
3.1-2B
3.1-2C
3.1-2D
3.1-3A
3.1-3B
3.1-3C
3.1-3D
3.1-4A
3.1-4B
3.1-4C
3.1-4D
Nodal Parameters of PAB for Steam Generator Blow-down Line Break Analysis
Temperature Responses in PAB Following a Ruptureof 3" Steam Generator Blowdown Line
Pressure Responses in PAB Following a Rupture of3" Steam Generator Blowdown Line
Nodal Arrangement of Primary Auxiliary Buildingat Various Elevations for Auxiliary Steam LineAS-2302-2-8" Break Analysis
Nodal Parameters of PAB for Auxiliary Steam LineAS-2302-2-8" Break Analysis
Temperature Responses in PAB Following a Ruptureof 8" Auxiliary Steam Line
Pressure Responses in PAB Following a Rupture of8" Auxiliary Steam Line
Nodal Arrangement of Primary Auxiliary Buildingat Various Elevations for Auxiliary Steam LineAS-2303-1-6" Break Analysis
Nodal Parameters of PAB for Auxiliary Steam LineAS-2303-1-6" Break Analysis
Temperature Responses in PAB Following a Ruptureof 6" Auxiliary Steam Line
Pressure Responses in PAB Following a Ruptureof 6" Auxiliary Steam Line
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November 1985
LIST OF FIGURES(Continued)
FIGURE NO. TITLE
3.1-5A Nodal Arrangement of Primary Auxiliary Buildingat Various Elevations for Auxiliary Steam Conden-sate Line ASC-2404-2-3" Break Analysis
3.1-5B Nodal Parameters of PAR for Auxiliary SteamLine ASC-2404-2-3" Break Analysis
3.1-5C Temperature Responses in PAB Following a Ruptureof 3" Auxiliary Steam Condensate Line
3.1-5D Pressure Responses in PAR Following a Ruptureof 3" Auxiliary Steam Condensate Line
3.1-6A Nodal Arrangement of Primary Auxiliary Buildingat Various Elevations for Auxiliary Steam Conden-sate Line ASC-2406-1-4" Break Analysis
3.1-6B Nodal Parameters of PAR for Auxiliary Steam Con-densate Line ASC-2406-1-4" Break Analysis
3.1-6C Temperature Responses in PAR Following a Ruptureof 4" Auxiliary Steam Condensate Line
3.1-6D Pressure Responses in PAR Following a Rupture of4" Auxiliary Steam Condensate Line
3.1-7A Nodal Arrangement of Primary Auxiliary Buildingat Various Elevations for CVCS Letdown Line BreakAnalysis
3.1-7B Nodal Parameters of PAR for CVCS Letdown LineBreak Analysis
3.1-7C Temperature Responses in PAR Following a Ruptureof CVCS Letdown Line
3.1-7D Pressure Responses in PAB Following a Rupture ofCVCS Letdown Line
3.2-1A Containment Enclosure Area Showing Nodal Arrange-(Sheets 1 & 2) ment for CVCS Letdown Line Break Analysis
3.2-1B Nodal Parameters of Containment Enclosure Areafor CVCS Letdown Line Break Analysis
3.2-1C Temperature Responses in Containment EnclosureArea Following a Rupture of 3" CVCS Letdown Line
3.2-1D Pressure Responses in Containment Enclosure AreaFollowing a Rupture of 3" CVCS Letdown Line
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LIST OF FIGURES(Continued)
FIGURE NO. TITLE
3.2-1E Maximized Pressure Responses in ContainmentEnclosure Area Following a Rupture of 3" CVCSletdown Line
3.3-1A
3.3-1B
3.3-1C
3.4-1A
3.4-1B
3.4-1C
3.5-1A
Nodal Arrangement of Main Steam/Feedwater PipeChase
Nodal Parameters of Main Steam/Feedwater PipeChase for Main Steam Line Break Analysis
Temperature Response of MS/FW Pipe Chase Follow-ing a Small (0.10 Sq. Ft.) Rupture of Main SteamLine
Nodal Parameters of Tank Farm Area for AuxiliarySteam Line AS-2302-32-8" Break Analysis
Temperature Response of Tank Farm Area Follow-ing a Rupture of 8" Auxiliary Steam Line
Pressure Response of Tank Farm Area Followinga Rupture of 8" Auxiliary Steam Line
Nodal Parameters of Waste Processing Building/Primary Auxiliary Building Chase for AuxiliarySteam Line AS-2339-1-1 1/2" Break Analysis
3.5-1B Temperature Response of WPB/PAB Chase Followinga Rupture of 1 1/2" Auxiliary Steam Line
3.5-1C Pressure Response of WPB/PAB Chase Followinga Rupture of 1 1/2" Auxiliary Steam Line
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November 1985
SUMMARY
The environmental envelopes that the safety related Class lE equipment will exper-
ience following postulated high energy line breaks outside containment have been
determined. Systems containing high energy lines for which breaks have been
evaluated include the Main Steam, Feedwater, Auxiliary Steam and Condensate,
Chemical and Volume Control, Steam Generator Blowdown, and Hot Water Heating.
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
It is necessary to demonstrate that equipment used to perform a required
safety function for Seabrook Nuclear Station - Units 1 & 2 are capable of
functioning properly in the normal, abnormal, or accident environmental
conditions to which they could be exposed. As stated in NUREG-0588( 1 ), among
these environmental conditions are the elevated temperature, humidity,
and/or pressure which could result from the postulated rupture of high
energy lines which may be in the vicinity of this equipment. The purpose
of this study is to evaluate the consequences of high energy line breaks
outside containment and develop the environmental envelopes for Class 1E
equipment.
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2.0 METHOD OF ANALYSIS
Each of the high energy lines and all of the Class lE equipment outside
containment were identified and located. Based on this information, the
various plant buildings were nodalized and the high energy line break (HELB)
locations chosen in such a way as to provide an accurate representation
of the environmental conditions that would result in the vicinity of the
Class lE equipment following a postulated HELB.
2.1 Mass and Energy Releases
Each high energy line was evaluated on the basis of the methods of
Standard Review Plans 3.6.1 and 3.6.2( 2 ) to determine the types,
areas, and locations of postulated ruptures that would result in the
most severe environmental conditions at each of the Class lE equip-
ment. The break releases were calculated using the Moody critical
flow model( 3 ) and accounting for physical restrictions within the
system (e.g. flow and pressure control valves) and the frictional
effects of the piping system.
These release rates were taken to be constant, i.e. no decay of the
reservoir pressure was assumed, until isolation of the ruptured line
was initiated or, as in the case of the closed Hot Water Heating
Systems, until the piping inventory was depleted.
The methods and assumptions employed in calculating the mass and
energy release rates for each high energy line are outlined in Table
2.1-1. As noted in this table, isolation of many of these lines will
be accomplished by the use of redundant temperature detectors in
various plant areas that, in the event of elevated temperatures, will
send closure signals to redundant isolation valves present in the
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high energy lines. The locations of these temperature detectors are
provided in Figures 2.1-1, 2.1-2, and 2.1-3.
The mass and energy release rates used in evaluating the pressure,
temperature, and humidity responses throughout the various plant areas
are calculated and defined in References 6, 7, and 8.
2.2 Pressure/Temperature/Humidity Transients
The environmental conditions that result due to postulated high
energy line ruptures were determined for the following areas:
1. Primary Auxiliary Building (PAB)
2. Containment Enclosure Area (CEA)
3. Fuel Storage Building (FSB)
4. Main Steam/Feedwater Pipe Chase
5. Tank Farm Area (TFA)
6. Waste Processing Building/Primary Auxiliary Building (WPB/PAB) Chase
For HELB other than Hot Water heating Line Breaks (HWELB), the envir-
onmental Responses of the PAB, CEA, TFA, WPB/PAB Chase, and MS/FW
Pipe Chase were calculated using the COMPRESS (4) computer program.
Using the break mass and energy releases and the building nodaliza-
tions discussed previously, COMPRESS calculates the transient pres-
sures, temperatures, and humidities that would occur throughout the
plant building following these ruptures. The methods and assumptions
used in these pressure/ temperature calculations agree with those of
NUREG-0588 (1) .
Table 2.2-1 lists the ambient conditions, building initial conditions,
and other pertinent design basis information used in analyzing these
environmental transients. The ambient and initial conditions were
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chosen so as to maximize the temperature response that would result
from these postulated HELB. In addition, the Uchida condensing steam
heat transfer correlation is used during the condensing mode while
a convective heat transfer coefficient of 2.0 Btu/hr-ft 2- °F is used
otherwise.
The environmental response of the PAB, CEA, and FSB to postulated
HWHIB was calculated using a reasonable, yet still conservative, hand
calculation method which accounted for mass and heat transfer between
the hot water and the room air. Since the HWH subsystems are closed
systems which will not be isolated and these plant areas are supplied
with ventilation air by non-Class 1E systems, the maximum temperatures
and humidities that result from HWHLB are calculated by releasing the
total HWH subsystem fluid mass into the initial room air mass.
The building initial conditions were determined based on the histor-
ical distribution of ambient conditions which occur during the time
of the year when the HWH system is in operation (September through
May). These conditions are defined in Table 2.2-1.
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3.0 HELB ANALYSES AND RESULTS
The environmental response of the plant buildings to postulated high energy
line ruptures were calculated using the methods outlined in Section 2.0.
The results of these HELB analyses (other than HWHLB) are presented in the
following sections.
3.1 Primary Auxiliary Building
From an evaluation of each of the high energy lines in the PAR and
their operating conditions, it was concluded that the break locations
listed in Table 3.1-1 would provide environmental envelopes for the
Class lE equipment.
Figure 3.1-1 shows the layout of the PAR and the zone designations
which were useful in defining the environmental parameters throughout
the PAB. Zone 32A, which is not shown, represents the PAR below the
the (-)6' elevation and includes the piping tunnels, Zone 32E repre-
sents the 2' and (-)6' elevations, and Zones 32 and 33C, 32 and 33D,
and 32 and 33E represent the 7', 25', and 53' elevations, respective-
ly. Zones 47 and 48 represent the Chemical and Volume Control System
(CVCS) equipment vaults and contain no Class lE equipment.
Table 3.1-2 summarizes the peak and enveloping temperatures and pres-
sures that would occur in each of these zones for each postulated
high energy line rupture. All areas can be taken to experience 100%
relative humidity, condensing environments, however, air displacement
and thus essentially pure steam environments would be expected to
occur only in the general vicinity of the postulated breaks.
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November 1985
For each of the ruptures considered in these tables there follows a
series of four figures, lettered A though D. The A series of these
figures (e.g. Figure 3.1-2A, 3.1-3A) physically defines the nodal
arrangement which was chosen to analyze the rupture's effect on the
PAB environment. The B series provides the flow diagrams and physical
parameters (volumes, heat sink areas, flow areas) for this nodal
arrangement. Figures C and D provide the calculated temperature and
pressure transients for each of the nodes defined in the A and B
series figures.
3.2 Containment Enclosure Area
The Containment Enclosure Area contains several high energy (CVCS)
lines, however, only the letdown line operates at an elevated tem-
perature. Therefore, only a rupture of this line has been considered
as stated in Table 3.2-1.
The layout of the Containment Encosure Area, which includes the
Mechanical Penetration Area, the Charging Pump Cubicles, and the
Residual Heat Removal (RHR), Safety Injection (SI), and Containment
Spray (CBS) Vaults, is shown in Figure 3.2-1A, Sheets 1 and 2. These
figures also show the nodal arrangement used, while Figure 3.2-1B
provides the corresponding flow diagram and physical parameters.
Table 3.2-2 summarizes the pressures and temperatures experienced in
the various areas of the enclosure volume following a postulated CVCS
letdown line break. Figures 3.2-1C and 3.2-1D show the transient
temperatures and pressures in the CEA. By a variation of the assumed
initial conditions (10% vs. 95% relative humidity), an additional
investigation was made which determined the maximum pressure response
of the CEA. This result is shown in Figure 3.2-1E. For the HELB
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November 1985
temperature detection system is use, the peak pressures correspond to
approximately 95 seconds after the break. These peak pressures are
listed in Table 3.2-2. The relative humidity throughout all CEA
compartments would reach 100%.
3.3 Main Steam/Feedwater Pipe Chase
The breaks evaluated for the Main Steam/Feedwater Pipe Chase are
listed in Table 3.3-1. It was concluded that the MS line breaks will
result in more severe environmental conditions than the FW line
breaks.
Figures 3.3-1A and 3.3-1B define the MS/FW Pipe Chase arrangement and
nodalization. The MS/FW Pipe Chase reaches a maximum of 325 ° F for a
spectrum of MS line break sizes from 0.10 ft 2 to 1.0 ft 2 . The tem-
perature transient resulting from a 0.10 ft 2 break is provided in
Figure 3.3-1C and the results are summarized in Table 3.3-2.
3.4 Tank Farm Area
The break evaluated for the Tank Farm Area is listed in Table 3.4-1.
Since no HELB temperature detectors are located in the Tank Farm
Area, the Auxiliary Steam line break releases will continue until the
operator detects the break and isolates the line.
Figure 3.4-1A defines the nodal parameters used for the Tank Farm
Area HELB analysis. The resulting temperature and pressure transients
are provided in Figures 3.4-1B and 3.4-1C, respectively, and the peak
values summarized in Table 3.4-2.
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November 1985
3.5 Waste Processing Building/Primary Auxiliary Building Chase
The WPB/PAB Chase, which is located between the WPB and Column Line A
of the PAB, contains both Class lE equipment and several Auxiliary
Steam and Condensate lines. The line ruptures which have been eval-
uated are listed in Table 3.5-1.
Figure 3.5-1A defines the nodal parameters used for evaluation of the
WPB/PAB Chase response to postulated HELB. Figures 3.5-1B and 3.5-1C
provide the temperature and pressure transients that result for the
enveloping HELB. The peak values for pressure and temperature are
summarized in Table 3.5-2.
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Amendment 56FEAR
November 1985
4.0 HWHLB ANALYSES AND RESULTS
The environmental response following postulated HWHLB has been calculated
for those plant buildings with Hot Water Heating (HWH) systems which operate
in the high energy region, i.e. pressure greater than 275 psig or temper-
ature greater than 200 °F. The HWBLB postulated are listed in Table 4.0-1.
The results of these HWHLB analyses are presented individually in the follow-
ing sections and are summarized in Table 4.0-2.
4.1 Primary Auxiliary Building
The peak environmental conditions at the 53' elevation of the PAB due
to postulated HWHLB were found to be 110 °F with a relative humidity
of 100%. These conditions are enveloped by the consequences resulting
from other HELB postulated to occur in the PAR.
4.2 Containment Enclosure Area
The HWH system piping which serves the PAR and FSB passes through the
CEA. A postulated rupture of one of these lines results in tempera-
tures and relative humidities throughout the CEA of approximately
106 °F and 100%, respectively. Due to the location of this piping,
very localized conditions may be slightly more severe although the
large recirculation air flows will tend to mitigate these effects to
a certain extent. With the exception of these localized effects the
environmental conditions that result from a CVCS letdown line break
will envelope those resulting from a HWHLB.
4.3 Fuel Storage Building
Since the hot water heating piping are the only high energy lines
present in the FSB, the environmental conditions that result from a
postulated HWHLB will define the enveloping conditions for high
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November 1985
energy line ruptures. The resulting environmental conditions are
100 °F with a 100% relative humidity.
4.4 Emergency Feedwater Pumphouse
Since the hot water heating piping are the only high energy lines
present in the EFWPH, the environmental conditions that result from
a postulated HWHLB will define the enveloping conditions for high
energy line ruptures. The resulting environmental conditions are
88 ° F with a 100% relative humidity.
4.5 Service Water Pumphouse
Since the hot water heating piping are the only high energy lines
present in the SWP11, the environmental conditions that result from a
postulated HWHLB will define the enveloping conditions for high
energy line ruptures. The maximum temperature that would be expected
to result in the SWPH is 90 °F. Due to the relatively large room
volume and small volume of hot water heating piping for the SWPH,
the maximum relative humidity that is expected to result following a
RWELB is 90%
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November 1985
5.0 CONCLUSIONS
The analysis of high energy line ruptures outside containment has yielded a
realistic evaluation of the elevated temperatures, pressures, and humidities
that can result in the various buildings of Units 1 and 2. These results
provide the HELB environmental envelopes for evaluation of the Class lE
equipment. These envelopes should be evaluated along with the conditions
that result following postulated moderate energy line breaks, loss of
ventilation air flow, and any other events which may cause adverse envir-
onmental conditions to develop.
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6.0 REFERENCES
1. NUREG-0588, "Interim Staff Position on Environmental Qualification ofSafety-Related Electrical Equipment", August, 1979.
2. NUREG-0800, U.S. NRC Standard Review Plans 3.6.1 and 3.6.2, July, 1981.
3. Moody, F. J., "Maximum Two-Phase Vessel Blowdown from Pipes", Journalof Heat Transfer, August 1966.
4. UEC-TR-004-1, "COMPRESS- A Code for Calculating Subcompartment PressureResponses", July, 1976.
5. Appendix E attached to ANSI Standard N176, "Design Basis for Protectionof Nuclear Power Plants Against Effects of Postulated Pipe Rupture".
6. Calculation Set No. 4.3.35-F03
7. Calculation Set No. MSVCS-FAG-07
8. Calculation Set No. 4.3.35-F01
TABLE 2.1-1
DETERMINATION OF MASS/ENERGY RELEASE
Line CVCS Letdown Line Steam Generator BlowdownAuxiliary Steam andCondensate Lines Main Steam Line Feedwater Line Hot Water Heating Line
PlantCondition
Heatup Phase Hot Standby Full Power Full Power Full Power Full Power
LineConditions
P = 435 psiaT = 380 ° F
P = 1100 psiaT = 550 ° F
P = 165 psiaT = 358 ° F
P = 1000 psiaT = 545 ° F
P = 1100 psiaT = 440 ° F
P - 157 pslair = 250 ° F
BreakFlow
Limited by CVCSLetdown Line Con-trol Valves
Moody critical flow withpiping system frictionaleffects included (Method-ology of App. E attachedto ANSI Std. N176( 5))
Limited by upstreampressure controlvalves
Releases calculatedusing Westinghouseinformation packagemethodology
Releases calculatedusing Westinghouseinformation packagemethodology
Moody Critical FlowModel
IsolationMechanism
Dependent on Loc-ation: HELB Temp-ature DetectionSystem or OperatorAction at 30 min.
HELB Temperature Detec-tion System
Dependent on Loca-tion: HELB Tempera-ture Detection Sys-tern or operator ac-tion at 30 minutes.
Reactor ProtectionSystem and EmergencyFeedwater Discon-tinued at 30 min.
Reactor ProtectionSystem
No Isolation Occurs
IsolationValve ClosureTime
10 Seconds 5 Seconds 15 SecondsIsolation Valve inFaulted Loop Fails.
Isolation Valve inFaulted Loop Fails
No Isolation Occurs
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November 1985
TABLE 2.2-1
Design Basis Information
A. Ambient Conditions
1. HELB, other than HWHLB: 14.7 psia/88 ° F/100% RH
2. HWHLB: 14.7 psia/70 ° F/95% RH
B. Building Initial Conditions
1. HELB, other than HWHLB: 14.7 psia/104 ° F/952 RH
2. HWHLB: 14.7 psia/86 °F/56% RH
C. HELB Temperature Detection System
1. Temperature at Isolation Signal Initiation: 130°F(Intended to cover setpoint plus instrumenterror margins of up to 10 ° F)
2. System Response Time-time delay: 8.1 Secondsuntil signal at isolation valves
D. Ventilation System Operation
1. No credits are taken for energy removal orair exchange by non-Class 1E ventilationsystems.
2. Credits are taken for Class 1E ventilationsystems according to their performancecharacteristics following postulated HELB.
E. Unit Trip
1. A concurrent loss of offsite power or unittrip has not been assumed.
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November 1985
TABLE 3.1-1
Primary Auxiliary BuildingHigh Energy Line Break Locations
1. Steam Generator Blowdown Line (Lines No. SG-1301-5-3", SG1304-5-3",SG-1307-5-3", or SG-1310-5-3")
a. At 53' elevation of PAR in vicinity of blowdown flash tank.
2. Auxiliary Steam and Condensate Lines
4. Line No. 2302-2-8" -between Columns A & B.
At 53' elevation of PAR along Column Line 5
b. Line No. 2303-1-6" - At 7' elevation of PAR between Column Lines5 & 6.
c. Line No. 2404-2-3" - At (-) 6' elevation of PAR along Column LineC.
d. Line No. 2406-1-4" - At (-) 6' elevation of PAR along Column Line2.
3. Chemical and Volume Control System Letdown Line (Line No. CS-360-9-3")
a. At 7' elevation of PAR in the CVCS equipment vault area.
ZONEDESIGNATION
SG-1310-5-3"Break @
Zone 32E
AS-23O2-2-8Break @
Zone 33E
AS-2303-1-6"Break @
Zone 33C
AS-2404-2-3"Break @
Zone 32B
AS-2406-1-4"Break @
Zone 32B
CS-360-9-3"Break @Zone 47
EnvelopingConditions
Temp. Press. Temp. Press. Temp. Press. Temp. Press. Temp. Press. Temp. Press. Temp. Press.° F psig ° F psig psig ° F psig ° F psig ° F psig ° F psig
32A 108. 0.4 104 .04 104. 0.1 220 0.4 190. 0.3 114 .05 220. 0.4
32B 108. 0.4 104. .04 104. 0.1 220 0.4 190. 0.3 114. .05 220. 0.4
32C 108. 0.4 104. .04 104. 0.1 132 0.1 136. 0.1 112. .05 136. 0.4
33C 108. 0.4 104. .04 163. 0.1 105 0.1 104. 0.1 107. .05 163. 0.4
32D 111. 0.4 105. .04 113. 0.1 105 0.1 104. 0.1 108. .05 113. 0.4
33D 111. 0.4 105. .04 113. 0.1 105 0.1 104. 0.1 108. .05 113. 0.4
32E 165. 0.5 112. .04 104. 0.1 105 0.1 104. 0.1 107. .05 165. 0.5
33E 131. 0.5 158. .06 104. 0.1 105 0.1 104. 0.1 107. .05 158. 0.5
47 108. 0.4 104. .04 134. 0.1 105 0.1 120. 0.1 185. .15 185. 0.4
48 108. 0.4 104. .04 134. 0.1 105 0.1 120. 0.1 185. .15 185. 0.4
TABLE 3.1-2
Primary Auxiliary BuildingSummary of Results
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November 1985
TABLE 3.2- 1
Containment Enclosure AreaHigh Energy Line Break Locations
1. Chemical and Volume Control System Letdown Line(Line No. CS-360-9-3")
a. In Mechanical Penetration Area (MPA) at (-) 34'-6" elevation nearcontainment wall penetration.
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November 1985
TABLE 3.2-2
Containment Enclosure AreaSummary of Results
Compartment
MechanicalPenetrationArea
Remainder ofEnclosure Volume(Including ChargingPump Cubicles &Ventilation EquipmentArea)
CVCS Letdown Line Rupture (CS-360-9-3") Peak Temperature ( °F) Peak Pressure (psig)
0.35
0.35
134
108
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TABLE 3.3-1
Main Steam/Feedwater Pipe ChaseHigh Energy Line Break Locations
1. Main Steam Line
a. At 21' elevation of MS/FW Pipe Chase
2. Feedwater Line
a. At 3' elevation of MS/FW Pipe Chase
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November 1985
TABLE 3.3-2
Main Steam/Feedwater Pipe ChaseSummary of Results
Main Steam Line Rupture Peak Temperature ( ° F) Peak Pressure (psig)
325
Pressure Varies dependentupon location with respectto break location and hasbeen studied in detail ina separate analysis.Maximum Pressure:
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TABLE 3.4-1
Tank Farm AreaHigh Energy Line Break Locations
1. Auxiliary Steam and Condensate Lines
a. Line No. AS-2302-32-8"
Auxiliar Steam Line Ru turePeak Tem erature ( F) Peak Pressure
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TABLE 3.4-2
Tank Farm AreaSummary of Results
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November 1985
TABLE 3.5-1
Waste Processing Building/Primary Auxiliary Building ChaseHigh Energy Line Break Locations
1. Auxiliary Steam and Condensate Lines
a. Line No. 2339-1-1 1/2" - At 53' elevation of WPB/PAB Chase
B. Line No. 2341-1-1 1/2" - At 25' elevation of WPB/PAB Chase
SB 1 & 2
Amendment 56FSAR
November 1985
TABLE 3.5-2
Waste processing Building/Primary Auxiliary Building ChaseSummary of Results
CompartmentAS-2339-1-1 1/2" Break
@ 53' elevationAS-2341-1 -1 1/2" Break
@ 25' elevation
WPB/PAB Chase53' elevation
Temp. ( °F) Pressure (psig) Temp. ( °F) Pressure (psig)
175 0.05 168 0.05
WPB/PAB Chase25' elevationand 15' 5" elevation
168 0.05 175 0.05
NOTE: Due to the general arrangement of the WPB/PAB Chase area, the results obtainedfor a break of Line No. AS-2339-1-1 1/2" have been extrapolated to be repre-sentative of the environmental conditions that would result from a break ofLine No. AS-2341-1-1 1/2".
SB 1 & 2FSAR
TABLE 4.0-1
Hot Water Heating Line Break Locations
1. Primary Auxiliary Building
a. At 53' elevation of PAB
2. Containment Enclosure Area
a. At 21'-6" elevation of CEA
3. Fuel Storage Building
a'. At 21'-6" elevation of FSB
4. Emergency Feedwater Pumphouse
a. At 27' elevation of EFWPH
5. Service Water Pumphouse
a. At 21' elevation of SWPH
Amendment 56November 1985
SB 1 & 2
Amendment 56FSAR
November 1985
TABLE 4.0-2
Hot Water Heating Line BreaksSummary of Results
1. Primary Auxiliary Building: 110 ° F/100% Rh(53' elevation)
2. Containment Enclosure Area: 106 °F/100% RE
3. Fuel Storage Building: 100 °F/100% RH
4. Emergency Feedwater Pumphouse: 88 °F/100% RH
5. Service Water Pumphouse: 90 °F/90% RH
A F A ci
C
LI
El
'furlI I I
A F A B
a. ?CC; rx's F. Inlet Heaters k. .tir Lock q. boric Acid Tanks v.b. Blel3own Flash Tank g. Inlet Filters n. Storage Ares r. CVCS Vaults w.c. PAS ithrust tan Roos b. RAACT Pipe Chase n. Electrics1 Chase s. Charging Pump Vaults s.8. Ale lock N. Valve Aisle la. 480 V. Loma C t. Letdown ilegssitier y.e. PAR inlet B Containment I. CPCS Tank p. PCCW Pumps U. tan-RAACT Pipe Chase z.
—
II DenotesThermocoupleLocation
)
HVAC OpeningBoron Injection TankChiller Surge TankAns. Steam Condensate TankPipe Trench
PSNli SEABROOY STATION FRINARY AUXILIARY BUI1DINC
Elevation 53 11 Elevation 25 FT Elevation 7 FT Elevation 2 FT 6 -6 FT
Figure 2.1-1: Primary Auxiliary Building Showing Locations of HELB TemperatureDetection Thermocouples
c. Charging Pumps
d. Containment Enclosure Cooling Units
containment
No Temperature Detectors Locatedin These Areas
CHARG/NC rums AREA CONTAINMENT VENTILATION ENCLOSURE AREAZONE 32 33 C ZONE 41 BEl. 7 . -0" to 23 . - 0"
El. 21 . .6" to 49'-0"
Figure 2.1-2: Containment Enclosure Area Showing Locationsof HELB Temperature Detection Thermocouples
MECHANICAL PENETRATibN AREA
ZONE 29 AEl. (-)8'-0" to (4)I'-0"
MECHANICAL PENETRATION AREA
ZONE 28 A 11. 8
El. (-) 96 . -6" to (4) 1 . -0"
Containment Building Spray Pumpb. ReLsiclual Heat Removal Pump
Thermocouple Location
RHR SI VAnTS2014E 30 A, 13„ C, A 0
. El. (-)6I'-0 to (4)23'-6"
Figure. 2.1-3: Containment Enclosure Area Showing Locations ofHELB Temperature Detection Thermocouples
0.0 b
5 —
p- -I MO IMO
13L-ir-Z
- 41111.1
Elevation 55 FT Elevation 25 FT Elev.tion 7 FT Elevation 2 6 -6 FT
A
II F A
A
A
I I I
A
•
ir A
A
B
A
S . PCCW Neat Exchangers P . Inlet Nesters k. Air Lock q. Boric Acid Tanks V. NVIC Opening
I,. Slowdown Flash lank B. Inlet Filters 6. Storage Area r. CVCS Vaults V. Boron Injection Tank
C. PAD Exhaust Fan Room I,- RAACT Pipe Chose n. Electrical Chase s. Charging Pump Vaults x . Chiller Surge Tank
d. Air Lock i. Valve Aisle 0. 6110 v. Load Centers t. Letdown Degessiller Y. Aux. Steam Condensate Tank
U. PAB Inlet A Containment J. CVCS Tank P. PCCW Pumps U. Non-RAACT Pipe Chase C. Pipe Trench
Purge Fans
Figure 3.1-1: Zone Designations of Primary Auxiliary Buildingat Various Elevations
Elevation 2 -6 FTElevation 7 FT
col
3
— 4
— 5
—
• A
Boric Acid Tanks v. to/AC Openieg
CVCS Vaults is. Boron Injection Tank
Charging Pump Vaults x. Chiller Surge Tank
Letdown Degessifier p. Aux. Steam Condensate Tank
Non-RAACT Pipe Chase Ir. Pipe Trench 04 '0'M M0 0W MM 0N M
a. PCCW Nest Exchengets F. Inlet Nesters k.
b. Slowdown Flash Tank S. Inlet Filters A.
C . PAB Exhaust Fen Room h. RAACT Pipe Chose n.
d.e.
Air LockFAB Inlet 1. Containment
1.J.
Valve AisleCVCS Tank
o,p.
Purge Fans
Air LockStorage AreaElectrical Chase480 v. Load CentersPCCW Pumps
A A
Elevation 53 FT
A
VIM
3 —
Line No. SB-1310-5-3''Sta. Can. hoedown
Elevation 25 FT
c Ø
LP" •6
5
I I I
A
CO LALi., cm
Figure 3.1-2A: Nodal Arrangement of Primary Auxiliary Building at VariousElevations for Steam Generator Blowdown Line Break Analysis
3
MJE
2
4
5
6
VOLUME BEAT SINKNODE (ft3) AREA(ft2)
1 95,490 18,0002 23,520 5603 53,930 8,0004 243,400 42,6705 108,070 18,5006 38,235 15,9007 ATMOSPHERE
FLOW PATH' CHARACTERISTICS
LOSS FACTOR
MI NNE AREA(ft2) INERTIA(ft) Kc exp Kfr1c Ktotal
1 2 15.0 .05 .78 1.0 .01 1.791 3 128.7 .45 .42 .85 .17 1.441 4 9.40 .88 .78 1.0 .20 1.982 4 31.5 .09 .78 1.0 .01 1.792 7 20.0 5.00 .78 1.0 3.50 5.283 4 10.6 5.40 .78 1.0 2.22 4.004 '5 44.8 .80 .78 1.0 .30 2.084 7 20.0 .50 .78 1.0 1.60 3.385 6 5.9 8.50 .78 1.0 3.2 4.98
Figure 3.1-2B: Nodal Parameters of Primary Auxiliary Building forSteam Generator Blowdown Line Break Analysis
COMPHRTMF N1ETJ
2YA3
Li •56 u
_c
CI CDa:
-JCr
CIC)
0-
1 I 1T T 1 3
2 3 4 5 6 789'10—1 T T T FT i i I 2
1 0° 2 3 4 5 6 789j0 '2 3 4 5 6 789 10
TIME r SEC JFigure 3.1-2C: Temperature Responses in Primary Auxiliary Building Following
A Rupture of 3" Steam Generator Blowdown Line
COMPARIMEN11 1712Y3 /\4
II
3
e;
a _- 7- -1 -T T T10 2 3 4 5 6 8 9 1
1 T-T—TT1Tr2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0
TIME (SEC)
-T T-T -1-1 32 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0
Figure 3.1-2D: Pressure Responses in Primary Auxiliary Building Following aRupture of 3" Steam Generator Blowdown Line
1
—2
— 3
— 5
EI
0
Elevation 52 FT
Elevation 25 FT
Elevation 7 FT Elevation 2 6 -6 FT
A A A F A
I I I
I I
A C
I I IF A A 11 C D A 8 C 0
a. PCCW Heat Exchongets R. Inlet Hester, k, Air Lock 4- Boric Acid Tanks v. HVAC Opening
b.C.
Slowdown Flash TankPAS Exhaust Fen Room
g.h.
Inlet Filters 6. Storage Ares r. CVCS VaultsRAACT Pipe Chase n. Electrical Chase a. Charging Pump Vaults
v.x.
Boron injection TankChiller Surge Tank 0
4t
d. Air Lock I. Valve Aisle o 480 v. Load Centers t. Letdown Degaseifier y. Aux. Steen Condensate Tank 1D fDe. PAR Inlet Containment J. CVCS Tank p. PCCW Pumps u. Hon-RAACT Pipe Chase s. Pipe Trench =
Purge Fans Ce
M
r?%JD
Figure 3.1-3A: Nodal Arrangement of Primary Auxiliary Building at COLn
lncr
Various Elevations for Auxiliary Steam LineAS-2302-2-8" Break Analysis
M/E NODEVOLUME(ft 3)
HEAT SINKAREA(ft2 )
1 3
6
5
123456
53,930
8,000
95,490
18,000
23,520
560
243,400
42,670
146,300
34,400ATMOSPHERE
1 2 128.71 4 10.62 3 15.02 4 9.43 4 31.53 6 20.04 5 44.84 6 20.0
.45 .42 .85 .17 1.44
5.40 .78 1.0 2.22 4.00
.05 .78 1.0 .01 1.79
.88 .78 1.0 .20 1.98
.09 .78 1.0 101 1.79
5.00 .78 1.0 3.50 5.28
.80 .78 1.0 .30 2.08
.50 .78 1.0 1.60 3.38
FLOW PATHS CHARACTERISTICS
LOBS FACTOR
AREA(ft2 ) INERTIA (1t-1) Kc Kexp Kfrit total
FROM TONODE NODE
Figure 3.1.-38: Nodal Parameters of Primary Auxiliary Building forAuxiliary Steam Line AS-2302-2-8" Break Analysis
CI
24 6 1111 -17 02
TIME ( SEC )Figure 3.1-3C: Temperature Responses in Primary Auxiliary Building Following
a Rupture of 8" Auxiliary Steam Line
T—T3 4 5678910
I 3 4 5678910
3
COMPARTMENT1 El2 03 A
4 X5 <>6 1'
CD
COMPARTMENT1 [II2 03 A4 X
<>56+
fl-
"IMAWMI Ti '111,h 4,
, . 1' • . ;!flf,f— 0.11011114/01,11.4.1M)#11111TIPP"Irrill■11.1!.1
I *IR"'
r
1 o°I I 1 11114 5 6 78910"
I 3 14— ',!.)— 6 3 TI i 0' 1 T 1 1 1 iTly 2 (
3I,
2 2 3 4 5 6 789'10 e.
TIME 1 SEC JFigure 3.1-3D: Pressure Responses in Primary Auxiliary Building Following
a Rupture of 8" Auxiliary Steam Line
A A
I I I
Elevation 25 FTElevatIOn 53 FT
1
3 —
5
I I I 1ir A A
k.ALM.o.P .
Air LockStorage AresElectrical Chase480 v. Load CentersPCCW Pumps
q.r.s.t.U.
Boric Acid TanksCPCS VaultsCharging Pump VeultsLetdown DegasstfierHon-RAACT Pipe Chase
Tank
HVAC OpeningBoron Injection TankChiller Surge TankAux. Steam Cond Pipe Trench
EleVatIon 7 FT Elevation 2 & -6 FT
A A
1
2
— 3
1
Auxiliary Steamline No. 2303 -1-6'' --trtr
— &
—5
—
7-1
PCCW Heat ExchengetsBlowdown rush 'ConkPAB Exhaust Fan RoomAir LockPAP Inlet & ContainmentPurge Fans
Figure 3.1-4A: Nodal Arrangement of Primary Auxiliary Building atVarious Elevations for Auxiliary Steam Line AS-2303-1-6"Break Analysis
6 —- -I
V. Inlet Heaters1. Inlet Filtersh. RAACT Pipe Chase1. Valve Aislej. CPC! Tank
o 1 - -1775.1
- - -f- 1
II
NODEVOLUME(ft 3)
HEAT SINKAREA(ft?)
1 38,200 8,5002 49,700 10,0003 243,400 42,6704 172,940 26,5605 38,235 15,9006 ATMOSPHERE
3
01
FLOW PATHS CHARACTERISTICS
LOSS FACTOR
rarpf_PISME
TOHOPE
AREA(ftl) INERTIA (ft-1)-Kc Kexp Kfric Ktotal
1 3 60.0 .04 .78 1.0 .02 1.802 3 44.8 .80 .78 1.0 .30 2.082 5 5.9 8.50 .78 1.0 3.20 4.983 4 51.5 1.33 .78 1.0 .33 2.113 6 20.0 .50 .78 1.0 1.60 3.384 6 20.0 5.00 .78 1.0 3.50 5.28
0<
tm MEl 0
0.M 9
M
6
Figure 3.1-4B: Nodal Parameters of Primary Auxiliary Building for AuxiliarySteam Line AS-2303-1-6" Break Analysis
0rt
uis.CO cnos
C)
IC3
COMPARTMENT[fl
2D3 L
4 X56+
CDa_
CD
o°iti------6 111 CD (1)
Cf t<0 =cr Ia.
I -7 t 1 IIIII .1 -I— T-- --1— T- I till 2 I I me1(D2 3 4 5 6 78910 2 3 4 5 6 78910 2 3
---r-I 1 i i 1 35 6 78910
. . - • gVD00 VI,...n 4:ts
Figure 3.1-4C: Temperature Responses in Primary Auxiliary BuildingFollowing a Rupture of 6" Auxiliary Steam Line
TIME ' SEC)
CT1
C
OMPARTMENT1 FA2 03 A
r1i 111 1 I I I 1 1 1 11 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 111 3
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 0 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 '1 0 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 0
TIME I SEC)Figure 3.1-4D: Pressure Responses in Primary Auxiliary Building
Following a Rupture of 6" Auxiliary Steam Line
I IF A A 3 A
2
Auxiliary SteamLine No. 2404-2-3"
—5
— 6
r
P. Inlet Nesters k. Air Lock q. Boric Acid Tanks v. NVAC Openings. Inlet Filters fi. Storage Area r. CFCS Vaults V. Boron Injection Tankh. NAACP Pipe Chase a. Electrical Chase m. Charging Pump Vaults x. Chiller Surge Tankt. Valve Aisle 0. 480 v. Load Centers t. Letdown Degassifier 7 - Aux. Steam Condensate Tank
J. CVCS Tank P- PCCW Pumps U. Non-RAACT Pipe Chose C. Pipe Trench
pccw Neat ExchangetaBlowdown Flesh TankPAB Exhaust Fan RoomAir LockPAB Inlet ContainmentPurge Fans
0.0 h111...1
Elevation 53 FT
A Elevation 25 FT- Elevation 7 FT Elevation 2 6 -6 FT
A A A
I I I
Figure 3.1-5A: Nodal Arragement of Primary Auxiliary Building at Various Elevationsfor Auxiliary Steam Condensate Line ASC-2404-2-3" Break Analysis
6
7
5
2
VOLUME HEAT SINKNODE (ft3) AREA(ft2)
I 8,645 4,1802 29,700 11,7003 49,700 10,0004 38,200 8,5005 243,400 42,6706 172,940 26,5607 ATMOSPHERE
FLOW PATHS CHARACTERISTICS
LOSS FACTOR
AREA(ft2 ) INERTIA (ft-1) Ec exp Kfric Ktotal
1 2 2.1 15.0 .78 1.0 1.5 3.281 3 3.0 10.3 .78 1.0 1.4 3.182 3 5.9 '8.5 .78 1.0 3.20 4.983 5 44.8 .80 .78 1.0 .30 2.084 5 6.3 .32 .78 1.0 .10 1.885 6 51.5 1.33 .78 1.0 .33 2.115 7 20.0 .50 .78 1.0 1.60 3.386 7 20.0 5.00 .78 1.0 3.50 5.28
"mom 1MNODE MME
Figure 3.1-5B: Nodal Parameters of Primary Auxiliary Building forAuxiliary Steam Condensate Line ASC-2404-2-3" Break Analysis
IIIII124 5 6 789 10
t 3 4 5 6 789103 4 5 6 78910 3
Mr
COMPARTMENT1 [Ti
.t 2 0wCl 3 AA
C-) 1Xco 5 <>
6+7 Z
C)
CO
C
4."1
C)
TIME f SLCJFigure 3.1-5C: Temperature Responses in Primary Auxiliary Building
Following a Rupture of 3" Auxiliary Steam Condensate Line
(-r
o°—r
5 6 7 10'lI I I I I I I T—T- T---T I I 1 1 2 ,I
I,
3 4 5 5 7 9 9 .1 0 1 3 4 5 6 7 9 9 El 0 L
TIME 1 SEC )Figure 3.1-5D: Pressure Responses in Primary Auxiliary Building
Following a Rupture of 3" Auxiliary Steam Condensate Line
COMPARTMENT1 [1]2D3 A
X
M0... Cr)._-.
LLI:3c3
CL
Elevation 7 FT Elevation 2 -6 FT
A A
Elevation 53 FT Elevation 25 FT
A
I I I
.1 IF A
3 —
4 —
5
6
Ento
3
—4
—5
— 6
DA
Irt•-••■...■■■■■•■••••■■•■■••....1•16J6111J
P.3.
Inlet HeatersInlet Filters
k.
I.Air Lock
Storage Are.4-r.
Boric Acid TanksCVCS Vaults
V.
V.
HVAC OpeningBoron Injection Tank
(DIDEg
0.h. RAACT Pipe Chase n. Electrical Chase a . Charging Pump Vaults a . Chiller Surge Tank EifI. Valve Aisle o. 480 v. Load Centers t . Letdown Degaselfier Y. Aux. Steam Condensete Tank (I)j. CVCS Tank p. PCCU Pumpe U. Bon-RAACT Pipe Chose C. Pipe Trench 0
rt
a. PCCW Rest Exchangesb. Blowdown Flash Tanke. PAB Exhaust Fen Roomd. Al, Locke. PAB Inlet Containment
Purge Fans
Figure 3.1.-6A: Nodal Arrangement of Primary Auxiliary Building at VariousElevations for Auxiliary Steam Condensate Line ASC-2406-1-4" Break Analysis
HEAT SINEAREA(ft 2 )
4,18011,70010,0008,500
42,67026,560
VOLUME(ft 3)
8,64529,70049,70038,200
243,400172,940ATMOSPHERE
FLOW PATHS CHARACTERISTICS
,FROMNODE
.TONODE
AREA(ft2) INERTIA (ft-1) 'Cc
LOSS FACTOR
rtotalKexr Kfric
1 2 2.1 15.0 .78 1.0 1.5 3.281 3 3.0 10.3 .78 1.0 1.4 3.182 3 5.9 1.5 .78 1.0 3.20 4.983 5 44.8 .80 .78 1.0 .30 2.084 5 6.3 .32 .78 1.0 .10 1.885 6 51.5 1.33 .78 1.0 .33 2,115 7 20.0 .50 .78 1.0 1.60 3.386 7 20.0 5.00 .78 1.0 3.50 5.28
6
7
5
NODE
23
567
Figure 3.1-68: Nodal Parameters of Primary Auxiliary Building for AuxiliarySteam Condensate Line ASC-2406-1-4" Break Analysis
COMPARTMENT111]2 C1)3 A
4 ><5 KT>6+7Z
CD
CDLU C.)
I2 3 4 5 6789 1 ,3
O �.<M MSCr fa,
m• M
P■—• rt
CO LnVI ON
1 I -T-1 –T I -7" I I lilt3 4 5 6 1 8 9 1 0 2 3 4 5 6789 1 O
TIME ( SEC )Figure 3.1-6C: Temperature Responses in Primary Auxiliary Building
Following a Rupture of 4" Auxiliary Steam Condensate Line
—4
1
L.17'
COMPHRTMF_NT1 El2 CD3 L
4X
I t FT i 1,, —- 1- 77-7
r c --7 2 t 1 ilin 3
G - JO/ 89 1 1 !s_ -I )7 E3 11 02 3 4 5 6 7 8 q 1 0TIME ( SET.r. l
Figure 3.1.-6D: Pressure Responses in Primary Auxiliary BuildingFollowing a Rupture of 4" Auxiliary Steam Condensate Line
100
Elevation 7 FT Elevation 2 .6 FT
4
9 —
2 —
6 —
I —
A
A
a.
b.c.d.C.
PCCW Heat ExchangersSlowdown Flash TankPAS Exhaust Fan RoomAir LockPAS Inlet ContainmentPurge Fans
Elevation 51 FT Elevation 25 FT
Figure 3.1-7A: Nodal Arrangement of Primary Auxiliary Building atVarious Elevations for CVCS Letdown Line Break Analysis
ii P A
P .
B.Ii.1.
J.
I I
Inlet HeatersInlet FiltersRAACT Pipe ChaseValve AisleCVCS Tank
A
Air LockStorage AreaElectrical Chase480 v. Load CentersPCCW Pumps
A C II A
4. Boric Acid Tanks V. HVAC Openingr. CVCS Vaults V. Boron Injection TeakO. Charging Pump Vaults x. Chiller Surge Tankt Letdown Degassifier Y- Aux. Steam Condensate Tanku. lion-RAACT Pipe Chase e. Pipe Trench
—
—5
—2
En
cr,
4 NI
D F AA
••••■■•••■11.11,1••••■••••1
cut__
6
5
3
HEAT SINKAREA(ft2 )
23,00015,90010,0008,50042,67026,560
valmr(ft )
47,10038,23549,70038,200243,400172,940ATMOSPHERE
FLOW PATHS CHARACTERISTICS
leCOLEALIDE
TO AREA (ft2 ) INERTIA (ft-1) Ke Kexp Kfric KtotalNODE
1 2 .80 45.0 .11 .11 .22 .441 7 1.4 37.5 .34 .20 .67 1.212 3 2.3 47.0 .78 1.0 1.80 3.583 5 44.8 .80 .78 1.0 .30 2.084 5 6.3 -32 .78 1.0 .10 1.885 6 51.5 1.33 .78 1.0 .33 2.115 7 20.0 .50 .78 1.0 1.6 3.386 7 20.0 5.00 .78 1.0 3.5 5.28
ROBI
WE
Figure 3.1-7B: Nodal Parameters of Primary Auxiliary Buildingfor CVCS Letdown Line Break Analysis
NODE
1234567
f--z
.4 X t.) + NCC CV Cr) -a- L.0 coa_
—(s1
1:nape.4
SB 1 & 2 Amendment 56FSAR November 1985
000E O'OSZ 0'00Z O'OST 0'00T O'OS
]o)=C9C2(=CSO=DSC2I=090 Wb41=lid N1b31JI1UNC 1haNdInC3 C:N1: H N 1 d
COMPARTMENT1I2 03 L
4X5647
II-6
UDIa_
),
A VAPice A A A411,02 1 A A ri 6i661103TIME ( SEC )
Figure 3.1-7D: Pressure Responses in Primary Auxiliary BuildingFollowing a Rupture of CVCS Letdown Line
MECHANICAL PENETRATION AREAZONE 29 AEl. (-)8'-0" to (+)1'-0"
MECHANICAL PENETRATION AREAZONE 28 A & 8El. (-) 34'-6" to (+) 1 . -0"
I. Containment Building Spray Pumpb. Residual Heat Removal Pump
CVCS LetdownLine No.
RHR & SI VAULTSZONE 30 A, B, C, & DEl. (-)61'-0 to (+)23' -6"
Figure 3.2-1A: Containment Enclosure Area Showing Nodal Arrangement(Sheet 1 of 2) for CVCS Letdown Line Break Analysis
..1=■■■•••••■■■■•—■••■ammi
P---n-L
C. Charging &impsd. Containment Enclosure Cooling Units
containment
CHARGING PUMPS AREA CONTAINMENT VENTILATION ENCLOSURE AREA
ZONE 32 33 C
ZONE 41 BEl. P-0" to 23'- 0"
El. 21'-6" to 49'-0"
Figure 3.2-1A : Containment Enclosure Area Showing Nodal(Sheet 2 of 2) Arrangement for CVCS Letdown Line Break Analysis
5
4
2
3
21,400
4,050
61,170
15,000
145,000
1 66,355
2 12,000
3 144,000
4 92,570
5 524,350
VOLUME HEAT SINK(ft 3 ) AREA(1t2)
FLOW PATHS CHARACTERISTICS
LOSS FACTORS
FROM TO AREA (/C 2) INERTIA (ft-1) R-c Kexp Kfric total_HODE NODE
1 5 20.0 .20 .78 1.0 .02 1.802 4 8.0 5.50 .78 1.0 .74 2.523 4 18.9 4.07 .78 1.0 7.1 8.884 5 28.0 .18 .78 1.0 .10 1.88
Figure 3.2-18: Nodal Parameters of Containment EnclosureArea for CVCS Letdown Line Break Analysis
NODE
1O'OSI O'OVT 00E1 O'OZT 0'011 0001
.1°.°4
(A C]0) 3111.62dk121
SB 1 & 2
Amendment 56FSAR
November 1985
=C9C1t=t90=C903(=Mall WUUOCN4 m1 ,11:411vne IN3Wene3 31 SWO H N S
COMPARTMENT1!J2034X5 e>
--4
In-
360101 4 6 6 360102 6- 6 360103 10° 4TIME ( SEC )
Figure 3.2-1D: Pressure Responses in Containment Enclosure AreaFollowing a Rupture of 3" CVCS Letdown Line
COMPARTMENT1[I2 03 AC30
ist r- 4X
el
0 w4
!I 5 <1.',>CI
0 tA,
4-1
0_
L-3
4-4
4
A 1 1 I 1 1 A ?ihil301.02 I 1 1 1 1 1 14 5 4 5 6 769 'l o 4 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 11 03 2
TIME ( SEC )Figure 3.2-1E: Maximized Pressure Responses in Containment Enclosure
Area Following a Rupture of 3" CVCS Letdown Line
A
Main Steam &
Feedvater
PiPi Chase'
Containment
SB 1 E. 2
Amendment 56FSAR
November 1985
ControlBuilding
PrimaryAuxiliaryBuilding
Figure 3.3-1A: Nodal Arrangement of Main Steam/Feedwater Pipe Chase
NODE V0L1ME HEAT SINK
NODE (ft ) Area (ft 2 )
1 69,270 16,930
2 Atmosphere
M/E
FLOW PATH CHARACTERISTICS
LOSS FACTORS
FROM TONODE NODE AREA (ft 2 ) INERTIA (ft-1 ) K
c exp KEric Ktotal
1 2 856 .01 .78 1.0 .10 1.88
Figure 3.3-1B: Nodal Parameters of Main Steam/Feedwater Pipe Chasefor Main Steam Line Break Analysis
CI% 0
COMPARTMFNTI El2 0
tr;
1 A - 1 ro, A U -Lii 11 ce A 1 Iii 6 3/ 601 02TIME (SEC)
Figure 3.3-1C: Temperature Response of - Main Steam/Feedwater Pipe ChaseFollowing a Small (0.10 Square Feet) Rupture of Main Steam Line
A A 1 h Ye 0 2 , 3
NODE
1
2
BEAT SINEAREA(ft 2)
11,000240,000
Atmosphere
Irown(lra_
FLOW FATE - CHARACTERISTICS
LOSS FACTORS
FROM TO AREA (ft2 ) INERTIA (ft -1) FeNODE NODE
1 2 10.00 .006 .78 1.0 0.01 1.79
0$
P:1
NJ
Hit
rexp - Efric Ktotal
Figure 3.4-1A: Nodal Parameters of Tank Farm Area forAuxiliary Steam Line AS-2302-32-8" Break Analysis
COMPARTMENTH
CD(r)
CD
CDCD
I I I tri3 4 5 67891O '
r I rill 2 1 –1-1- 1 I3 r 13 4 5 6 78910 2 3 4 5 6 78910 2 3
TIME (SEC)Figure 3.4-1B: Temperature Response of Tank Farm Area
Following a Rupture of 8" Auxiliary Steam Line
COMPARTMENTl[1]
LID
LID
1 0°TIME (SEC)
Figure 3.4-1C: Pressure Response of Tank Farm Area Followinga Rupture of 8" Auxiliary Steam Line
02 k<m ma 0Cr CI.
I I I I I I Ilf 1 I 1 I I I I III 2 I I I I I I Ilf 3 r 1 ro 2
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 '1 0 2 3 4 5 6 789 '1 0 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 '1 0 2 3 P1 CI)Z
4.....rt■DCO 1/4-nk.fi as
MIMEMME ( f t 1 )
HEAT SINEAREA(f0)
1 19,030 3,890
1 2 17,500 4,760
3 Atmosphere
cn
Dp•C/5OJ
2 3FLOW PATHS CHARACTERISTICS
LOSS FACTORS
FROM To AREA (ft 2 ) INERTIA (ft -1 ) KCKNODE NE exp Kfric K total
1 2 8.40 0.24 .78 1.0 0.01 1.79
2 3 1.75 1.14 .78 1.0 0.06 1.84
05
CO fD
Figure 3.5-1A: Nodal Parameters of Waste Processing Building/Primary Auxiliary Building
Ce fa,M
rT1/410
Chase for Auxiliary Steam Line AS-2339-1-1 1/2" Break Analysis CO lALAO'
M/E
COMPARTMENT11112C0
1. Op 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 4T- -T5 -F-6 T1 -r87-1 0 -T3- -E1)-761 8-91 0 3T 1 T i f _ 1 ---r
T IME I SF CFigure 3.5-1B: Temperature Response of WPB/PAB Chase
Following a Rupture of 1 1/2" Auxiliary Steam Line
COMPHR1 MEN]IPI
(I)
rn
-q`
3 -14 -)6J1861102-• -r I rill
2 3 4 5 678910T r--r T 1 Tr10° 2 3 4 56789'10
TIME ( SEC )Figure 3.5-1C: Pressure Response of WPB/PAB Chase
Following a Rupture of 1 1/2" Auxiliary Steam Line