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Report

ENVIRONMENTAL FLASHPOINTS INSUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

Prepared for:Consortium for International Earth

Science Information Network (CIESIN)

Prepared by:Robert Winterbottom

International Resources Group, Ltd.1211 Connecticut Ave., NW, Suite 700

Washington DC • 20036

October 1997

INTERNATIONAL RESOURCES GROUP i

CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

II. OVERVIEW OF THE CONTEXT FOR ENVIRONMENTAL FLASHPOINTS INSUB-SAHARAN AFRICA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1Country Characteristics and Dynamics of Major Sub-regions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1Demographic Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2Food Security and Drought . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4Desertification and Land Use Changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6Changes in Agricultural Production Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6Changes in Access to and Control of Natural Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7Water Shortages and Other Stresses on Water Supply . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8Socio-economic Conditions and Vulnerabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8Institutional and political vulnerabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

III. MAJOR ENVIRONMENTAL STRESSES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11Natural Disasters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11Desertification and Conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12Resource Alienation and Environmental Degradation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13Resource Conflict: Water . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14Resource conflict: Oil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19Development Programs and the Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

IV. OTHER ENVIRONMENTALLY-RELATED STRESSES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26Public Health Issues and the Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26Technological Disasters and the Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

V. MODES OF IMPACT ON U.S. INTERESTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

VI. OPTIONS FOR AVOIDING OR AMELIORATINGENVIRONMENTAL STRESSES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

VII. MONITORING ENVIRONMENTAL STRESSES ANDMITIGATION EFFORTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36Comparison of conditions, risks and contributing factors to environmental flashpoints in Sub-SaharanAfrica . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36Early Warning Systems and Environmental Monitoring . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36Information Needs for Monitoring Environmental Flashpoints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

Annex A: List of Persons Contacted . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43Annex B: List of Principle References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45Annex C: Statistical Annex on Socio-Economic and Environmental Indicators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47

ENVIRONMENTAL FLASHPOINTS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA DRAFT OCTOBER 30, 1997

INTERNATIONAL RESOURCES GROUP ii

1. For the purposesof this paper, the region of Sub-Saharan Africa includes 51 countries, stretching across the lower part of the Saharadesert from Mauritania to Sudan, and from Ethiopiaand the Horn of Africa southward to South Africa, including all the countries of West, Central,East and Southern Africa.WesternSahara, Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, Libya and Egypt are included in the region of North Africa and the MiddleEast.

2. Asbackgroundfor a more detailed reviewof specificenvironmental flashpoints in Sub-Saharan Africa, this section provides an overviewof the development context in the region. It is based on statistics which are presented in a series of additional maps and tables in Annex C.

INTERNATIONAL RESOURCES GROUP 1

ENVIRONMENTAL FLASHPOINTS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

I. INTRODUCTION

This paper provides an overview of economic development conditions and related environmental stressesin Sub-Saharan Africa which have been or could be linked to conflicts over resources, increased1

vulnerability to natural or technological disasters, resource degradation or controversial developmentassistance activities, significant public health problems, or non-compliance with international environmentalagreements. This paper is one of a series of regional studies prepared for the Consortium for InternationalEarth Science Information Network (CIESIN) for a conference on “Environmental Flashpoints.” Thebackground papers and conference organization are being supported by the Environment Center of theDirectorate of Central Intelligence as part of their effort to inform policy makers and US governmentagencies about the influence of environmental stresses on political stability and economic security in today’sworld. This paper benefitted from consultation with a number of individuals and organizations as well asa preliminary review of the extensive literature which is available on this subject (see list of personscontracted and references in Annexes A and B).

This paper does not aim to be a comprehensive analysis of the environmental stresses within each countryin the region; rather, it draws attention to a few particularly important cases which should be noted bydecision-makers. The paper also provides a number of examples which illustrate the linkages betweenenvironmental changes and the potential political, economic and social impacts of these changes. Inaddition, the paper discusses environmental and socio-economic vulnerabilities in the region, responsecapacities, options for avoiding or reducing environmental stresses, and suggestions for monitoringenvironmental stress and mitigation efforts. Above all, this paper is intended to stimulate further discussionand guide more in-depth analysis which is needed not only to inform the U.S. response to emergingconflicts and crises in Africa, but also to improve the management of activities designed to support theachievement of US foreign policy objectives with particular attention to the increased effectiveness ofsustainable development programs.

II. OVERVIEW OF THE CONTEXT FOR ENVIRONMENTAL FLASHPOINTS INSUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

Country Characteristics and Dynamics of Major Sub-regions

Sub-Saharan Africa embraces more than 50 countries with a wide variety of natural resource endowments,environmental and socio-economic conditions, considerable differences in land use systems, great culturaldiversity, and uneven progress towards sustainable development. Despite this variation, there are someshared conditions across the continent and patterns that can be described. A review of available statistics2

provides some insights and an overall sense of environmental and socio-economic conditions which mayinfluence the emergence, severity or capacity to respond to environmental flashpoints. While data on a

Total Population Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa (1989-1996)

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996

Total Population (millions)



Source: African Development Indicators, 1997

particular factor may be unreliable or out of date, or may not fully capture the reality in a given country,when the various data sets are combined and reviewed as a group, a more accurate picture emerges. This“country-level” picture needs to be seen, however, in the broader context of a regional dynamic—thattakes account of cross-border markets and other influences, river basins linkages, as well as sub-nationalconditions which may be obscured in country-level statistics.

Demographic Factors

While demographic factors are clearly not the sole cause of environmental stresses, they often contributeto situations of degradation and conflict and set the stage for heightened social, economic and politicalconsequences from such situations. A quick review of population data reveals that more than half of thepopulation of Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) lives in just seven countries: Nigeria, Ethiopia, Zaire, SouthAfrica, Tanzania, Sudan and Kenya. Population density is particularly high in the Central African countriesof Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda, Malawi, and in the Gambia, Nigeria and several other coastal West Africancountries.

The annual rate of population growth exceeds 3% in more than a dozen countries, including several inWest and Central Africa. Population growth is highest in Djibouti (4.9%) and the Gambia (3.8%). Annualgrowth rates have continued to increase from relatively high rates in 1985-1989 to even higher rates (2.8%or greater) in recent years in a number of countries, including Niger, Gabon, Uganda, Madagascar, Mali,Cameroon, Zambia and Burkina Faso. Family planning programs are weak in most SSA countries, withthe exception of some countries clustered for the most part in East and Southern Africa: Botswana, Kenya,South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe, as well as Ghana and Mauritania. AIDS is currently a significantfactor in a group of countries in central and southern Africa, and could become more important in WestAfrica, particularly in urbanized, coastal countries such as Togo (See tables in Annex C).

Exhibit 1

1965-80 1980-90 1990-952.40%

2.60%

2.80%

3.00%

3.20%

1965-80 1980-90 1990-95

Changing Rate of Population Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa (1965-1995)

Average Annual Rate of Population Grow th (%)



Source: Cleaver and Schreiber, 1994

Despite the frequent incidence of violent conflicts, droughts, and other humanitarian emergencies, the totalpopulation of the region grew by 250 million people during the last 16 years, from 350 million in 1980 to600 million in 1996. While the overall rate of population growth in SSA has decreased slightly in recentyears, given the age structure of Africa’s population, the population is likely to increase by more than onebillion people by the year 2020. Assuming that fertility rates continue to decline, the hypothetical stationarypopulation of Sub-Saharan Africa could exceed 2.5 billion in the year 2055.

Exhibit 2

Africa’s population is still predominantly rural, but urban growth has accelerated in recent years in anumber of countries and has averaged about 5% over the past 20 years for the region as a whole. Forexample, the annual rate of growth of urban populations has been particularly high in the past decade inBurkina Faso (11%) in response to a combination of increased land pressure in rural areas and an increasein urban-based employment opportunities associated with the rapid growth of small and medium-sizedenterprises serving the needs of growing urban centers. Other countries with high rates of growth of urbanpopulations are characterized by recurrent conflicts in outlying areas (Angola, Mozambique, Burundi) andan increasingly important segment of the population that works abroad or in adjacent urban centers (CapeVerde, Swaziland).

In Africa, as in other regions of the developing world, the rapidly expanding cities are now home to a largeshare of the world’s poor. An estimated 1.5 billion people, more than at any other time in history, now livein urban shanty towns, without reliable supplies of clean water, access to sanitation services, and vulnerableto outbreaks of disease and food insecurity. Kenya’s urban population tripled from 1960 to 1990 and nowaccounts for 23% of the total population. One-fifth of Kenya’s urban population is poorly housed and ill-served by overloaded infrastructure for water supply, waste disposal and other urban services. Thesprawling capital of Kinshasa used to provide its inhabitants with potable water, electricity, publictransport. In recent years, in the wake of poor governance and civil turmoil, inflation has eroded thepurchasing power of the employed, unemployment has soared, the formal economy has shrunk by 40%and its infrastructure has crumbled. When cities such as Kinshasa are unable to absorb the growingpopulations, land pressure in rural areas continues to increase and may contribute to overuse and

Arable Land Per Capita1965-90

00.10.20.30.40.50.60.70.80.9

1

1965 1980 1987 1990

Ara

ble

Lan

d(h

ecta

res/

per

son

)



Source: Cleaver and Schreiber, 1994.

degradation of natural resources. Environmental degradation makes it more difficult to break out of thecycle of rural poverty, and the potential for widespread unrest builds.

Food Security and Drought

Food security is a major concern for millions of Africans. Up to one-third of the population in more thana dozen countries were faced with food insecurity in the 1980s. At that time, some 98 million people or28% of the total population for SSA lacked adequate food supplies. Populations in a dry belt extendingfrom the Sahel to the Horn of Africa, and south into East Africa are chronically food insecure (see statisticsfor Chad, Sudan, Somalia, Ethiopia and Zambia in Annex C). In 1986-89, the caloric supply for SSApopulations was only 87% of the minimum requirement established by the UN.

Exhibit 3

Over the past thirty years, arable land per capita has declined from about 0.5 hectares per person to lessthan 0.3 hectares per person. This has occurred despite widespread conversion of forest and wetlands tocropland, and the extension of farming onto marginal upland soils. Agriculture accounts for a relativelylarge share of GDP in many African countries, yet the average annual growth of agriculture’s share of GDPover the past two decades has been negative or very low in more than a dozen countries. Often, thefluctuations are tied to changes in the value of exported agricultural commodities, which have declined inmany instances. Food aid to Sub-saharan Africa amounted to nearly 3 million metric tons in 1994, with thebulk of the food aid going to Ethiopia, Mozambique, Rwanda, Liberia, Sudan, Eritrea, Angola, Malawiand Tanzania. As a result of civil disturbances over the past several years, food aid to Rwanda, Burundi,Tanzania and Liberia has sharply increased. Cereal imports range from 500,000 to over 1 million metrictons in the populous countries of Nigeria, Sudan, Ethiopia, South Africa and Kenya.



Even in areas where production within the region is sufficient to meet the overall needs of the population,a large segment of the population may find it virtually impossible to purchase sufficient quantities of foodto meet their needs. Incomes are low among most farmers, especially relative to cereal prices which arepushed upward by the high costs of transport over poorly maintained road networks, and insufficientcompetition among local traders and grain merchants. Currency devaluations, removal of price controlsand barriers to cross-border trade, the worldwide increase in cereal prices and other measures, which maybe beneficial from a macro-economic standpoint, have in the short term created hardships for many poorfamilies in Africa. For example, average prices for a 100 kg. sack of millet in many areas of the Sahel havedoubled in recent years from 7500 CFA francs to 15,000 CFA, although incomes for many urban and ruralhouseholds have not grown significantly during the same period.

Exhibit 4. Countries with Recurrent Drought (3 or more incidences in the period 1983-1995)

Country 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95Botswana Y Y Y Y Y Y YCape Verde Y Y Y Y YChad Y Y Y YEthiopia Y Y Y Y Y Y YKenya Y Y YLesotho Y Y YMalawi Y Y YNiger Y Y Y Y YSudan Y Y Y Y YSwaziland Y Y YTanzania Y Y YZambia Y Y Y Y YZimbabwe Y Y Y Y Y

To a greater extent than most other developing regions, sub-Saharan Africa is dominated by semi-arid andsub-humid climates, and large areas are subject to highly variable rainfall and periodic drought. Across theSahel zone of West Africa and in an arc extending to the countries of the Greater Horn of Africa andaround to much of Southern Africa, farmers consider themselves fortunate if there are at least a few yearsof good rainfall in a given decade. In more than a dozen countries, drought has recurred three or moretimes in the past ten years. The impact of recurrent drought on food insecurity has been tempered in severalcountries by the high level of remittances from extended family members who are able to migrate elsewherein search of work (sometimes seasonally, as in the Sahel, or for longer periods in the case of Cape Verde).The impact of drought on rural producers also has been buffered by access to other employmentopportunities in the mining sector and their close proximity to a strong, diversified urban economy.



Desertification and Land Use Changes

In times of lower than average rainfall, vegetative cover is reduced, soils are more vulnerable to winderosion, pastures are more easily overgrazed, fuelwood stocks are more rapidly depleted and naturalregeneration is reduced. The combination of erratic rainfall, fluctuating productivity and constantlyincreased demand from growing populations has led to over exploitation of the natural resource base inmany areas and to “desertification.” Woodlands, grazing lands, wetlands and wildlife habitat have beenreduced in area as more and more land is cleared and converted into cropland. In Cote d’Ivoire, Nigeria,Liberia, Tanzania and Benin, the area of forest and woodland decreased by roughly 12-24% from 1981-1983 to 1991-1993. The area of cropland increased by 10-35% during the same period in Mali, BurkinaFaso, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, the Gambia, Cote d’Ivoire, Congo, Uganda, Tanzania, Malawi, Swazilandand Lesotho. While some of these changes in land use reflect a conversion of land to more productive landuses, much of the decrease in woodland and increase in cropland has been the result of non-sustainableharvesting of fuelwood (particularly for urban consumers) and clearing of forest and woodland soils whichare not able to sustain crop production over the long term. Large areas of both woodland and croplandare also being progressively degraded to the point where they are barren and abandoned.

As more households cut and collect fuelwood, graze their livestock, exploit local fisheries and huntwildlife, these natural resources are harvested at unsustainable levels, particularly in years of below-averagerainfall when productivity declines. The sustainable level of production declines further as degradationproceeds at an accelerating rate. Not only croplands, pastures and open access woodlands are affected.The use of forest reserves, parks and protected areas and other areas high in biological diversity are oftennot effectively controlled; in densely settled areas, local populations steadily encroach on these sites to apoint where they are depleted or converted to other uses.

Fallow periods have been shortened or eliminated in many areas as land use pressures increase. Traditionalsystems of manuring fields by agreements between herders and farmers have been disrupted bygovernment-imposed changes in water usage rights, changes in grazing patterns and socio-economic statusor simply rendered insufficient in the face of more intensive cropping. At the same time, the nearlycontinuous cropping of farmland without sufficient measures to restore soil fertility has led to widespread“mining” (depletion) of soil nutrients, impoverishment and abandonment of once productive cropland.

Changes in Agricultural Production Systems

Agricultural production systems in many regions in Africa have developed under conditions of relativelylow population densities, uncontrolled harvesting of woodlands, rainfed agriculture using few externalinputs, extensive cropping practices with long fallows and limited interaction with livestock productionsystems. Farmers are now struggling to adapt to conditions of high population density, growing scarcityof woodlands and reductions in field size. Many now recognize the need for more intensive croppingpractices, increased use of genetically improved seed, fertilizers, irrigation, higher densities of perennial treecrops in farmfields, and the integration of other agroforestry and soil and water conservation practices andlivestock production systems into more sustainable mixed farming systems. However, land and tree tenure,pricing policies, and a lack of access to needed inputs have sometimes discouraged the adoption of moreintensive and sustainable cropping techniques.

After many years of investment in agricultural research and extension in Africa, much progress has beenachieved in the use of improved seed. Modest improvements have also been made in cultivation practices.



The use of animal traction and plows is more common although cultivation in many areas is still primarilydone by hand-held hoes. A variety of reasonably effective soil and water conservation techniques are beingused by farmers in increasing numbers in response to the establishment of more favorable conditions forthe adoption of such practices. These conditions consist primarily of policy reforms and associatedmeasures which provide improved access to technical information, credit and markets, as well as moresecure land use rights and greater authority and capacity to community-based organizations supportingnatural resource management and local development.

Chemical fertilizers have also been used to enhance agricultural production, although not very extensively.The use of chemical fertilizers in Sub-saharan Africa has hovered at only 2 million metric tons since 1980.Most of the fertilizer is used in only four countries: South Africa (832,000 tons), Nigeria (394,000),Zimbabwe (171,000) and Kenya (134,000). Application rates are among the highest in Mauritius (261kg/hectare or arable land), Zimbabwe (60 kg/ha) and Kenya (48 kg/ha). The only other SSA countries withsignificant rates of use of fertilizer are Togo, Malawi, Tanzania, Lesotho, Nigeria, Congo and Coted’Ivoire — generally coastal countries or with a concentration of high-input farming for export markets.On average, farmers in Africa use less than 10 kg/ha of fertilizer, and many do not have either access tofertilizer stocks or cash/credit to purchase fertilizers. Irrigation, another strategy to increase production,faces similar constraints. Only Madagascar, Zimbabwe and Burundi are able to irrigate more than 2% oftheir cropland area. Many costly schemes to expand the area of irrigated agriculture in Africa have notproved to be sustainable; more success has been achieved in recent years with the development of small-scale irrigated perimeters.

Changes in Access to and Control of Natural Resources

Traditional rules and measures to control access to the remaining wildlands or uncultivated areas havefrequently been undermined by attempts at extending control and management by centralized agencies ofthe State and by an erosion of the authority of local leadership. Given the deficient manpower and otherresources of the State agencies, non-farmed “commons” are often exploited under conditions of de factoopen access and unregulated use. Despite the presence of a legal framework to control industrial logging,non sustainable timber harvesting is a serious problem in Central Africa; much of the closed tropical forestin West Africa has already been logged over and is in various stages of conversion to perennial tree crops,farmland or degraded wasteland.

In many areas, there is growing competition over access and use of water, pasture and farmland. Theseconflicts have been aggravated not only by population growth and increasing pressure on the resources,but also by development activities that have alienated land and other resources from customary use, anddisrupted traditional land use systems and local authority for conflict resolution. Pastoralists have beenparticularly hard hit as the construction of publicly financed wells has set the stage for a free-for-allscramble for water resources, and as the push for increased production of both subsistence and cash cropsand the resulting expansion of cropland has steadily reduced the area of remaining rangelands.

River valleys and other seasonally flooded bottomlands (with clay soils and a higher capacity for retainingsoil moisture) have historically been important sources of dry season grazing, which were used by nomadicherders when upland pastures dried out and lost their nutritional value. River blindness, other diseases andheavy soils which were difficult to till reduced the scale of agricultural development, until a series of large-scale disease control and “new lands” development programs spurred conversion of these areas tocropland. In general, development activities have favored agricultural production and rural development



activities among sedentarized villages; it has been more difficult (and politically less appealing) to reachnomadic populations that move across national borders with their herds in pursuit of patchy, seasonalrainfall and greener pastures.

Government authorities have often failed to maintain corridors for the passage of livestock, pasturereserves, rights to seasonal settlements and other measures which could help to avert potential conflictsbetween herders and farmers. As differences in ethnic groups are often associated with differentlivelihoods, the conflicts between herders and farmers have frequently been cast as a clash between ethnicgroups, when in fact the basis for the conflict is often linked to competing demands on natural resources(water, pasture, cropland). Such conflicts are liable to arise when herders attempt to regain access toresources that have been taken over by farmers and alienated them from their traditional use and control.This is a common situation in West and East Africa, and a significant source of instability in the region.

Water Shortages and Other Stresses on Water Supply

Water availability is critically stressed during much of the year for many populations across West and EastAfrica. Water scarcity is already present in the Nile basin and in much of Southern Africa. By the year2025, most major basins in West, East and Southern Africa will be faced with increasing and even acutewater scarcity (see maps). Per capita water availability is particularly low in the well-watered but denselysettled areas of Kenya, Burundi, Rwanda and in the lower rainfall regions of Djibouti, Cape Verde andSomalia. Even countries with a relatively abundance of water (as measured by per capita water availabilityin 1990) are expected to be faced with sharply reduced water availability by the year 2025; this situationis found in Cote d’Ivoire, Niger (which has extensive groundwater resources), Benin, Sudan and Senegal(See Map).

Pollution from industries and human settlements has been relatively localized, but is increasinglywidespread in and around urban centers, and in association with an expansion of oil fields, mines andindustrial development. Sewage systems, refuse collection and waste disposal facilities are generallylacking, poorly maintained or inadequate to deal with the growing volume of wastes.

Socio-economic Conditions and Vulnerabilities

Not surprisingly, in view of the foregoing, socio-economic conditions and standards of living for manypeople in the region are relatively low. GNP per capita in Sub-saharan Africa has averaged around $493over the past ten years, down slightly from a level of $536 in 1975-1984. The countries with higher GNPper capita include several small island economies with a well developed tourism and small manufacturingindustries (Seychelles, Mauritius) and those with small populations and substantial petroleum and mineralexports (Gabon, Namibia). The countries with lower GNP per capita (less than $300) are for the most partthe more densely settled countries and agrarian-based economies of the Sahel, the Horn of Africa andCentral Africa. This group also includes several countries severely affected by internal conflicts (SierraLeone, Eritrea, Somalia, Rwanda).

Exhibit 5

Average GNP Per Capita for Sub-Saharan Africa (1980-1995)

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

1980 1986 1988 1990 1992 1993 1994 1995

GNP per capita, US dollars



Source: African Development Indicators, World Bank, 1997

The UN Development Programme tabulates a human development index (HDI) based on severalindicators: life expectancy at birth, adult literacy rate, school enrollment ratios, real GDP per capita, andchanges in the HDI ranking and GDP. Of the 175 countries which are ranked, only one Sub-Saharan Africacountry (Mauritius) is included in the top half of the rankings. 8 Sub-Saharan Africa countries are includedin the top three/quarters of the rankings, although this group includes Cape Verde (with incomes increasedby remittances from extended family members working in the US), Congo and Gabon (with income anddevelopment activities funded by non-sustainable timber and mineral extraction), and a cluster of countrieswith a well-developed mining sector and/or linked to the more developed economy of South Africa(Botswana, Namibia, Swaziland, Zimbabwe). 35 out of the 43 lowest ranked countries, or 81% of thosein the bottom quarter of HDI rankings, are countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. As we improve ourunderstanding of the dynamics of environmental flashpoints, we may conclude that the potential risks andimpacts associated with environmentally related insecurity and conflict are likely to be higher in SubSaharan Africa than in most other regions of the developing world.

One can also review national data on such factors as population growth rates, cropland available percapita, per capita caloric supply, food insecurity, recurrence of drought, annual growth in agriculture GDP,access to safe water, child mortality rates and other indicators of survival prospects. Taken together, thesedata provide a sense of the overall development status and capacity to deal with environmental stressesamong the different countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (See tables in Annex C) In combination with other,more qualitative assessments, these data provide a useful backdrop for a review of environmentalflashpoints in Africa.

One can, in turn, categorize countries with respect to their risk of environmentally-related conflict,insecurity or instability, based on an aggregate assessment of the situation with respect to a range of



factors, including not only environmental, but also the inter-related demographic, socio-economic, politicaland institutional factors (See Table). Given the complexity of this mix of factors and the difficulties inherentin “predictions,” this analysis simply underscores the need for continuous tracking of the full range ofvariables at the country and sub-national level in order to improve our ability to anticipate crises and tointervene in a timely way to minimize potentially negative socio-economic and environmentalconsequences.

Institutional and political vulnerabilities

The link between environmental stresses and governance issues is particularly important in Sub-SaharanAfrica. Because of a shortage of trained professionals and the limited stage of development of nationalinstitutions at independence, African countries have been severely constrained by weaknesses in humanand institutional capacities. In an effort to centralize power and consolidate control on potentially lucrativesources of wealth, state agencies frequently attempted to extend their mandates far beyond their capacities.The gap between the expanding mandate and reduced capacity of public agencies and the overall lowproductivity of government services have also been aggravated by inadequate support for public educationand public service. Political leadership and policies have not provided sufficient resources for education;quality control has been lacking, together with public recognition and support for academic achievement.Careers of civil servants rarely advance on the basis of merit, competence and experience. Institutionalinstability, frequent restructuring, and politically-motivated shifts in personnel are common and act togetherto undermine the effectiveness of government agencies.

In recent years, the inefficiency and ineffectiveness of central governments have resulted in a call forreforms and a shift in authority to other institutions. The power of the State has been challenged bydecentralization, the increasing role of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), a loss in confidence bythe international donor community, imposed conditionalities for privatization, downsizing and otherstructural adjustments and macroeconomic policy reforms, and the emergence of many more influentialactors in a more pluralistic, “civil society.” Autocratic regimes have been the rule rather than the exception,but they are increasingly being challenged by a liberalized press and opposition parties within the recentlyestablished multi-party political systems. Overall, there has been slow but encouraging progress in the“democratization” of many institutions, particularly among grass-roots, community-based organizationswhich support local development (such as rural credit unions, marketing cooperatives, village developmentcommittees, community-based land management and NRM groups).

Despite these changes, the power of many African governments is still closely linked to the military, whichcan and are called upon to intervene and to suppress human and democratic rights in order to thwartchallenges to the status quo. Those in power are often not held accountable for their actions. Many remainoriented to short term, personal profit, or are unable to control corruption within the ranks of governmentcivil servants. Political elites are still prone to use their power to manipulate the policy and legal frameworkto favor their own short term economic interests. Often, they are very skillful in utilizing developmentassistance to benefit themselves. Their continued inattention to a more equitable distribution of benefitsand recognition of local rights so as to serve the interests of rural producers and other poor segments ofthe population often becomes a destabilizing force. A lack of good governance, in combination with avariety of pressures and hardships associated with environmental stresses, often combine to trigger unrest,violent conflict and even greater hardship for Africa’s people.



III. MAJOR ENVIRONMENTAL STRESSES

Natural Disasters

Sub-Saharan Africa is especially prone to natural disasters and related humanitarian emergencies. Thereasons are complex, but often involve many of the same factors that increase the vulnerability of Africato a broader array of environmental stresses, including overuse and degradation of natural resources,conflicts over natural resources, and poorly designed or managed development programs. As in the caseof many other environmental stresses, the vulnerability to and impact of natural disasters is accentuatedby the weak institutional capacity to avoid or mitigate such disasters.

U.S. Government bilateral assistance in the wake of natural disasters, political crises and relatedemergencies amounted to one billion dollars in FY 1995. Major assistance was provided to a number ofcountries in Sub-Saharan Africa, including Angola ($32 million), Rwanda ($26 million), Sudan ($24million) and Liberia ($8 million). Only Bosnia received a higher level of disaster assistance. An estimated3.6 million people were affected by the disaster situation in Angola. All together, the Office of U.S. ForeignDisaster Assistance was called upon to intervene to varying degrees in more than 20 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa in 1995 (see map).

In recent years, disaster assistance in Sub-Saharan Africa has been provided in response to drought-inducedcrop failures and water shortages, flooding, outbreaks of insect pests such as locusts, and diseaseepidemics. Many countries in Southern Africa are particularly susceptible to the effects of El Niño, anddisaster assistance has been mobilized frequently in this region as a result of recurrent drought.Increasingly, however, these “disasters” are not simply the result of a single, discrete event or naturalcatastrophe. Africa is more frequently faced with “complex emergencies” which last longer (usually severalyears), are more violent and entail a greater loss of human life from associated armed conflicts. As we haveseen in the cases of Rwanda, Somalia, Liberia and elsewhere, these situations can be extremely destructive,and fundamentally disrupt the economy and socio-political systems.

Previously, the prevailing view was that complex humanitarian emergencies wereaberrations, and most large disasters occurred due to natural phenomena. Over the pastseveralyears,however, it has become apparent that complex disasters have emerged as thedominantnew form of humanitariancrisis.

The role of environmental factors in such complex emergencies varies and is sometimes difficult todistinguish from other contributing factors. Often, conflicts and disputes are linked to environmentaldegradation and the resulting tensions caused by increased human suffering and competition overremaining resources. Rwanda would be one example. In other cases, such as the Congo, the emergenciesmay be related to a scramble for wealth tied to the control over the exploitation of natural resources.Changing relationships between people and the environment may help to explain the growing magnitudeof some “natural” disasters such as drought and flooding. When farmers take advantage of wetter-than-average rainfall years to clear and plant new fields in areas which are marginal for crop production, theyare faced with crop failures in drier-than-average years. Similarly, when floodplains are developed in yearsof below-average rainfall, a “disaster” results in years of exceptional rainfall, particularly when the upperreaches of the watershed have been logged, overgrazed or cleared for crop production. In most cases, theenvironment is both a contributing factor, and heavily impacted by the disaster. The dislocation andconcentration of people as a result of disasters often strains local supplies of water, fuelwood, food,housing materials, and waste disposal systems. Refugee movements can extend the impacts intoneighboring countries.



Frequently, the costs of disaster assistance and other economic costs of coping with the emergencysituation greatly exceed the resources which had previously been committed in the form of developmentassistance. Despite the tremendous expenditures by bilateral and multilateral agencies and private relieforganizations, much human suffering cannot be avoided and the earlier progress and results of developmentassistance programs are often nullified.

Desertification and Conflict

Desertification affects some 370 million people living in relatively fragile environments with a highpotential for drought, famine, environmental degradation and conflicts over resources. According to theSwiss Peace Foundation and the Center for Security Studies and Conflict Research, Africa and Asia arethe two continents most severely affected by desertification. Their research indicates that these regions alsohave the greatest number of current and potential wars, and the highest number of conflicts withenvironmental dimensions. In Africa, the transformation of once-productive soil and land degradationassociated with desertification is caused by overgrazing, exhaustion of cropland and deforestation. Anumber of countries in Sub-Saharan Africa are especially vulnerable to “desertification conflicts.” Thesecountries include the more densely populated areas of the semi-arid sudano-sahelian belt which extendsfrom Senegal to Sudan and includes Mauritania, Mali, Niger and Chad. Several other countries in theGreater Horn of Africa are also included: Somalia, Ethiopia and Kenya. What might begin as small andrelatively insignificant conflicts in these countries can escalate into major conflicts.

The majority of these countries rank very low in the UNDP “human development index.” Althoughpoverty was pervasive through the Third World, it is now more concentrated in South Asia (whichaccounts for 50% of the poorest of the poor in the world) and Africa (20% of the world’s poorest). Inmany instances, the poorest populations are living on less productive, marginal land. Moreover, theirpoverty is frequently associated with a high degree of environmental degradation. The degradation processis often, in turn, aggravated by a loss of land rights and a reduction in the traditional authority or controlby local communities over their land and other natural resources. The centralization of governmentauthority that followed in the wake of independence by many African countries undermined traditionalcontrol on access and sanctions which had been imposed to reduce overuse of woodlands, pastures, waterand other resources. Government restrictions on the movements of pastoralists and others across nationalboundaries (despite the adaptive value of such seasonal movements with respect to more sustainablepatterns of land use) as well as poorly conceived efforts at sedentarization of nomads have also contributedto resource degradation.

While the environment is not the sole cause of conflict, there are often environmental dimensions toconflicts, particularly in Africa. In the course of a systematic review of conflicts occurring over the pastthirty years, researchers at ENCOP examined the role of environmental transformation and desertificationas a contributing factor. They concluded that 22 out of 51 wars surveyed, or 43% of the conflictsworldwide do have an environmental dimension or are partly environmentally induced. The percentage iseven higher in Sub-Saharan Africa, where 17 out of 21 conflicts (80%) are environmentally related. Onlymajor conflicts in Angola, South Africa, Djibouti and Liberia were judged to be essentially political or notrelated to environmental factors.



Resource Alienation and Environmental Degradation

In many regions of Africa, government actions or inactions have acted to undermine the traditionalauthority of local communities and worked against the long-term sustainable use of some naturalresources. For example, in the case of the Oku mountain range in the Northwest Province of Cameroon,the central government imposed a system of centrally issued permits for the exploitation of the bark of thePygeum tree. During a period when the prices of coffee and cacao were declining, the bark of this treebecame increasingly valuable and was exported to Europe to meet the demand of pharmaceuticalcompanies. By centralizing the issuance of permits, the government set in motion a series of actions whichresulted in widespread deforestation and soil erosion.

The Oku montane forest ecosystem is characterized by high rainfall, steep slopes and a rich flora and fauna.The forests are important catchment areas for rivers that flow into densely settled agricultural areas inNigeria and Cameroon. Given their non-suitability for sustainable crop production, forest land use had beenmaintained by local chieftains under a system of communal property ownership. They recognized andprotected sacred forests and enforced a land use system based on local knowledge of soil capabilitiesthrough rituals, taboos and locally enforced sanctions.

In 1976, the increased commercial value of Pygeum bark attracted the interest of Cameroon’s centralgovernment, which developed a permit system for those wanting to exploit the tree bark. While therationale for instituting such a system was to avoid the overexploitation of the resource, in fact, theintervention of the government services served mainly to destroy the system of local taboos andenforcement of sanctions against over-exploitation or misuse of local resources. Government agents wereable to join in, however, on the lucrative business opportunity. By 1984-85, the tree bark trade peaked andcrashed, as whole trees were peeled, girdled and killed over large areas in a rush to exploit the resource.As the forests were degraded and cleared, a boom in the cultivation of cash crops such as potatoes, beansand maize followed.

As attention was drawn to the resulting erosion and land degradation, the government made a plea formore agents, resources and authority to establish protected areas to conserve what was left of the Okumontane forests.

The “Kaya” coastal mangrove forests on Kenya have also been degraded as a result of alienation fromlocal communities, land speculation and development for Kenya’s tourism industry. Despite localopposition, the State Government and County Councils proceeded with the development of these forestsand coastal resources in a manner which has not protected the interests and livelihoods of artisanalfishermen and other local communities. Kenya’s land laws clearly favor government officials and well-placed business interests and leave little recourse for local citizens. Government officers are protected fromany liability even if they fail to respect local rights and customary uses of a resource. Legal decisions onchanges in land use and land rights have eroded the traditional rights of the communities and local systemswhich have been the past custodians and managers of the resource.

The case of the Maasai and the Loita forest in Kenya is also illustrative. This area of some 30,000 hectaresof moist tropical forest has traditionally been used by the Maasai pastoralists for dry season grazing, as wellas ritual ceremonies. The biologically rich and culturally important area was policed by local communitiesso as to limit encroachment and conversion to other uses. In 1993, the Narok County Council unveiledtheir plans to convert the Loita forest into a game reserve. The Council argued that this measure wasneeded to reduce congestion in the 150,000 hectare Maasai Mara park, increase revenues for the Counciland expand employment opportunities in the region. Having failed to benefit to a significant degree from


3. Postel, Sandra, Dividing the Waters: Food Security, Ecosystem Health, and the New Politics of Scarcity, Worldwatch Paper 132,Worldwatch Institute, Washington, D.C., September 1996, p. 6.

4. Postel, Sandra, Dividing the Waters: Food Security, Ecosystem Health, and the New Politics of Scarcity, Worldwatch Paper 132,Worldwatch Institute, Washington, D.C., September 1996, p. 38.

5. Renner, Michael, Fighting for Survival: Environmental Decline, Social Conflict and the New Age of Insecurity, W.W. Norton &Company, New York, 1996, p. 60.


the development of the Maasai Mara park, and keenly aware of the potential loss of an important resource,the local community was opposed to the Council’s plans. The Maasai community identified a number ofother measures to reduce congestion and increase revenues, but the Council maintained its desire todevelop the forest as a game reserve. As a result the Maasai took legal action to organize themselves asthe Loita Conservation Trust, but this action was later contested on the basis of a law that bars individualsor local groups from suing on behalf of the public.

Resource Conflict: Water

A growingscarcityof freshwater is nowa major impedimentto food production,ecosystemhealth, socialstability, and peace among nations.3

Dwindling availability of water has led to more competition and heightened tensions. Contributing to thisscarcity are: increased demand, arising from population growth and urbanization; reduced supplies, causedby both depletion and degradation; and inequitable allocations. In some cases, water conflicts, like theresource itself, cross political boundaries. Examples of this can be found in the Nile, Senegal and Okavangoriver basins (see table ). In other cases, the friction may be internal, centered around the distribution of theresource, as in the case of urban areas in South Africa and in West African cities.

Research has shown that tension is most likely to occur when (a) the river system is shared by at least twocountries; (b) there is insufficient water to meet projected demands; and (c) no recognized treaty oragreement to govern water allocation exists. About 40 percent of the world’s population rely on shared4

river systems for their drinking water, irrigation or hydropower needs. Table 1 indicates African countries5

who depend on water sources that originate outside their borders.


6. See Gleick,Peter, “Water and Conflict,” in Occasional paper No. 1, Project on Environmental Change and Acute Conflict, AmericanAcademy of Arts and Sciences and University of Toronto, September 1992.

7. Renner, Michael, Fighting for Survival: Environmental Decline, Social Conflict and the New Age of Insecurity, W.W. Norton &Company, New York, 1996, p. 62.

8. Marcus, AmyDockser, “Water Fight: Egypt Faces Problem it has Long Dreaded: Less Control of Nile,” Wall Street Journal, August22, 1997, p. A1.


Table 1: Dependence on Imported Surface WaterSelected Countries in Africa

Share of TotalFlow Originating

Country Outside Border(percent)

Egypt 97Mauritania 95Botswana 90Gambia 86Sudan 77Niger 68Senegal 34

Source: Postel, Sandra, Dividing the Waters: Food Security, EcosystemHealth, and the New Politics ofScarcity, Worldwatch Paper 132, Worldwatch Institute, Washington, D.C., September 1996, p. 39.

Not all water disputes will lead to violent conflict. To the contrary, most will lead to negotiations,discussions and non-violent solutions. However, “outright conflict has the greatest potential to emerge6

when the downstream (most vulnerable) nation is militarily stronger than the upstream (water controlling)nation and feels its interests are threatened.” If a country has few alternative water resources apart fromupstream sources, it may feel especially vulnerable and threatened by proposals that impact water useupstream. “Violent conflict over water resources is not highly likely in cases where the downstreamcountry has less power than the upstream country, even though the former may suffer substantial socialand economic insecurity.”7

This section looks at existing and potential tensions over transboundary water resources. In particular, itexamines the Nile, Senegal and Okavango river basins. Another case in point regarding conflictingdemands over water resources (Epupa Falls Hydroelectric Power Project) is included in the section ondevelopment programs and the environment.

Nile River Basin. As the region’s political landscape has changed, so too has the potential for conflict overNile waters. The Nile river basin touches 10 countries: Egypt, Sudan, Central African Republic,Democratic Republic of the Congo (formerly Zaire), Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, Tanzania, Kenya andEthiopia. The Blue Nile, which supplies around 85 percent of the Nile’s waters, originates in Ethiopia’shighlands. The White Nile flows from Burundi’s hills through Sudan, where it joins the Blue Nile.

While the Nile is important to all the riparian countries, it is particularly important in Egypt, where it is thesole water source. It also is the home to 95 percent of the country’s 61 million people. However, “Egypt8


9. Bennett, Olivia (Ed.), Greenwar: Environment and Conflict, The Panos Institute, London, 1991, p. 96.

10. Marcus, AmyDockser, “WaterFight:Egypt Faces Problem it has Long Dreaded: Less Control of Nile,” Wall Street Journal, August22, 1997, p. A1.

11. The treaty contains a provision which states that Egypt and Sudan will reduce their allocations equally in the event of increased useby upstream countries.


13. US Department of State, East Africa Regional Environmental Hub Action Plan, August 1997, p. 2.

14. Whittington,Dale, presentationat RegionalEnvironmental Hub Briefing, US State Department, Washington, D.C., August 27, 1997.

15. Marcus, AmyDockser, “WaterFight:Egypt Faces Problem it has Long Dreaded: Less Control of Nile,” Wall Street Journal, August22, 1997, p. A1 and Dale Whittington, presentation at Regional Environmental Hub Briefing, US State Department, Washington, D.C., August27, 1997.


is at the end of the line, vulnerable to the actions of the upstream states.” Until recently, Egypt did not9

have to compete over the river’s resources. Civil conflict in the upstream riparian states preventeddevelopment. However, this has changed. Egypt now “faces the prospect of having to share the river withits upstream neighbors far more extensively than before.” Peace in Ethiopia, along with that country’s10

rapid population growth, has prompted the government to consider plans for developing this valuableresource.

Historically, the Nile has provided Egypt and Sudan with a secure water supply. Since the completion ofthe Aswan Dam in 1970, Egypt and Sudan have maintained control over the allocation of Nile water. A1959 agreement between the two countries laid out quotas that were contingent on no upstreamwithdrawals. While this treaty allows for renegotiation as other upstream riparian countries come into theprocess, allocations tend to be treated as a “given.” The potential for conflict is clear. For example,11

Egypt’s Executive Director of the Aswan dam and head supervisor of the New Valley project states “Abreach of the 1959 treaty is like a breach of our border.” Similarly, the US State Department warns,12

The status quo is not likely to be tenable for much longer. Ethiopia and other ripariansincluding Eritrea and Tanzania with rapidly expanding populations are facing the possibilityof acute water shortages. Efforts to date to develop a regional water allocation mechanismhave been stifled by the unwillingness of the countries to cooperate politically as well as bylegal disputes over water rights. As demand for Nile water grows, and countries actunilaterally to develop water resources, political and economic stability in the region could beincreasingly linked to a resolution of water allocation issues.13

There is little doubt that water will play a central role as new governments, particularly in Ethiopia, try toprovide for their populations. The main question is how? Options include both large- and small-scale waterdevelopment.

In Ethiopia’s Blue Nile Valley, hundreds of micro-dams, mainly for irrigation, have already been built.University of North Carolina Researcher Dale Whittington notes that, because these small dams areindigenous efforts, using local funds and materials, their numbers are difficult to control. While the central14

government could push the effort, they would be hard pressed to stop it. Eventually, thousands of thesemicro-dams could draw enough water so as to reduce the flow of water to Egypt. In addition, both15


16. Oral communication with Robert (Gus) Tillman, Senior Environmentalist, World Bank, Washington, D.C., September 9, 1997.



19. Organisation de Mise en Valeur du fleuve Senegal (OMVS)


Ethiopia and Uganda are exploring options for large scale water schemes and are developing master waterplans.16

Adding to this pressure are Egypt’s plans for massive new water development to irrigate the westerndesert, called the “New Valley Project.” It proposes to use 6.5 billion cubic yards for land reclamation,industrial and tourism development and for the creation of new cities in the desert. Egypt contends it willkeep within its current water allocation, with the volume for this new scheme coming from enhanced waterconservation.

Egyptian President Mubarak has put his personal prestige behind the project, saying that he wants to createanother “Egyptian Delta” and relocate millions to the region, perhaps solving some of the country’spopulation problems. An Egyptian government spokesman explains the country has no other option.

For 7,000 years, Egyptians have lived on a narrow strip of land around the Nile. It waspossible at three million, 18 million, even 45 million. With 61 million people and estimates thatwe will reach 85 million within 20 years, there is now an urgent need to get out of the NileValley. There is no more room.17

Others speculate that Egypt may be “jockeying for a better bargaining position in any future Nile-waternegotiations by establishing ‘facts on the ground’ that require larger allocations.”18

In sum, a changing political landscape has heightened the potential for conflict over access to Nile waters.New-found stability in Ethiopia has allowed the government to think about the broader issue ofdevelopment. Its concerns over food security and population growth have prompted plans to expandgreatly the diversion of Nile water for irrigation and hydropower purposes. This may bring Ethiopia intodirect conflict with Egypt, for whom the Nile is a lifeline. This situation may be exacerbated further as thepolitical landscape, and consequent potential for diversion, changes in other upstream riparian states (e.g.,end to civil conflict in Sudan).

Senegal River Basin. The Senegal River serves as the border between Senegal and Mauritania. Itsfloodplains support over 1 million people, who act as farmers, herders and fishers. Population growth inboth countries is high. Drought and chronic food shortages prompted the two governments to constructtwo dams—the Manantali Dam on the Bafing river tributary in Mali and the Diama dam near the mouthof the Senegal river between Senegal and Mauritania. These dam projects, completed by the late 1980s,promised to provide a continuous supply of water for irrigation.

Land degradation, droughts, and anticipation of better land from the two dams prompted significantmigration into the area. Mauritanian author Boubakar Ba explains

The dams gave rise to great hopes of an end to the years of want, and competition for landthere became fierce. ... The competition for land in the Senegal River valley, exacerbated bydrought and the OMVS development, has injected a hostility into relations between ethnic19


20. Ba, Boubakar, “Uneven Development in Mauritania,” in Greenwar: Environment and Conflict, Olivia Bennett, Ed., The PanosInstitute, London, 1991, pp. 87 and 89.

21. Homer-Dixon, Thomas and Valerie Percival, Environmental Scarcity and Violent Conflict: Briefing Book, The Project onEnvironment,Populationand Security, American Association for the Advancement of Science and the University of Toronto, Washington, D.C.,1996, pp. 35-38 and Thomas Homer-Dixon, Jeffrey Boutwell and George Rathjens, “Environmental Change and Violent Conflict,” ScientificAmerican February 1993, pp. 41-2.

22. Seccombe, Allan, “Nam Use of Okavango ‘Inevitable’,” The Namibian, May 22, 1997.


groups. The local population in the upper and middle reaches of the Senegal River valley aregenerally black Africans, whereas the people coming down from the north are mainly Arabs.20

Drought and land degradation disrupted traditional nomadic lifestyles, prompting migration of thousandsof light-skinned Mauritanian Moors to the valley. The Mauritanian government facilitated this “resourcecapture” by the Arab Moors, a powerful political and ethnic group. It did so by withdrawing recognitionof customary titles to land and revising its land tenure system. Over a period of several years, the Moorsexpropriated lands from smallholders, including both Senegalese and Mauritanians. This struggle overcontrol of irrigable land intensified in the 1980s and prompted numerous protests.

In April 1989, two Senegalese villagers were killed in a dispute over grazing rights. Other incidentsfollowed. In Senegal, Mauritanian shops were looted, while Senegalese living in Mauritania sufferedretaliatory attacks. The violence escalated on both sides, resulting in about 250 deaths on both sides andmigration of hundreds of thousands from one side to another. In the aftermath, the two countries severeddiplomatic relations. While they were was restored in April 1992, neither country has allowed the expelledpopulation to return or provided compensation for losses suffered.21

Okavango River Basin. Namibia’s plans to draw 20 million cubic meters of water each year from theOkavango River to supply its capital, Windhoek, have sparked sharp protests from the Botswanagovernment and environmentalists worldwide. At the heart of the matter is Namibia’s desperate need forwater, sparked by rapid population growth, economic growth and drought. At stake is the OkavangoDelta, the world’s largest inland wetland and a prized natural paradise, located in northern Botswana. Anever-changing mosaic of perennial and seasonal swamps and grasslands, it acts as a magnet for many kindsof wildlife and, consequently, is critical for Botswana’s tourist industry. It has been proposed as a worldheritage site, and several international organizations are interested in preserving its unique ecosystem. Inaddition, it provides important sustenance and income for local residents, who harvest its fish andvegetation for nourishment, crafts, construction and medicinal purposes and, after waters recede, use thepreviously-flooded land for agriculture.

The Okavango Delta is one of only two perennial surface sources in Botswana’s dry, desert climate. Itswaters originate in Angola and cross Namibia’s Caprivi strip before entering Botswana. Namibia faceschronic water shortages. While water conservation is extensively practiced, population growth,urbanization and drought have all canceled these gains. The Government sees construction of a 250 kmpipeline from the Okavango River to central Namibia as a potential solution. Initially, this project wastreated as an “emergency” project, and was not subject to environmental impact assessments. Protests andgood rains led to a slower approach and the ability to take more in-depth assessments. Namibia believes“it will be inevitable that we will have to go to the Okavango because there is no other way to meet thedemand for water.” Experts believe alternatives exist, including enhanced exploitation of Namibia’s22


23. Jenvey, Adrian, “Water Wars: Part 2,” New African, April 1997, p. 17.

24. Jenvey, Adrian, “Water Wars: Part 2,” New African, April 1997, pp. 16-17.

25. Jenvey, Adrian, “Water Wars: Part 2,” New African, April 1997, p. 17.

26. Oral communication with Robert (Gus) Tillman, Senior Environmentalist, World Bank, Washington, D.C., September 9, 1997.

27. Renner, Michael, Fighting for Survival: Environmental Decline, Social Conflict, and the New Age of Insecurity, WorldwatchInstitute, Washington, D.C., 1996, p. 54.


available groundwater. The Chinese government wants to provide funding and US-based Owens Corning23

has offered to supply the $50 million worth of pipes for the project.24

Although Botswana is interested in using the Delta itself, as evidenced by its own proposed waterdevelopment schemes, it stands to lose both an important resource and tourism revenue.

Yet how likely is conflict? “In some quarters belief is growing that if Namibia continues to declinemeaningful negotiation on the Okavango water rights issue, at some point a military response will becomethe only option still open.” While doubtful, there have already been military clashes over Sedudu/Kaliki25

island, located in the Chobe river on the border of the two countries.

A tri-national body, OKACOM, has been established as a mechanism through which Angola, Namibia andBotswana can mutually agree on their water rights. Thus far, it has not been able to assert itself as alegitimate player in this process. In part, Namibia’s decision to proceed unilaterally has helped makeOKACOM ineffective.

National and international efforts to strengthen OKACOM may provide the impetus needed to avertpotential problems. The Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) may be able to play a role.In addition, South Africa’s concerns about its own water supply has prompted it to start developing aregional water strategy. Its economic muscle may help facilitate agreement by all the other parties.26

Finally, the democratic nature of political systems in the region may help ensure equitable benefit sharingand, consequently, alleviate the potential for violence.

Resource conflict: Oil

Oil Development in Nigeria. Conflict arising from environmental degradation due to oil development insoutheastern Nigeria illustrates how the contribution of environmental factors to conflict depends on thebroader social, economic and political context. As Michael Renner points out:

On the whole, the countries least able to withstand any additional stress are those that alreadysuffer from the classical signs of underdevelopment (such as poverty, unequal landdistribution, rapid population growth or a huge foreign debt), that manifest deep ethnictensions or social and other cleavages within their populations, and that have non-representative governance structures.27

This case depicts another common theme of this paper—that conflict is more likely when one groupdisproportionately suffers negative consequences without receiving commensurate benefits. Finally, itillustrates how environmental complaints may provide an entree into calls for broader political reform.


28. It encompasses the states of Rivers, Edo Delta, Aria, Imo, Cross River, Ondo and Akwa-Ibom.

29. Lewis, Paul, “Nigeria’s Deadly Oil War: Shell Defends its Record,” New York Times, February 13, 1996, p. A10.

30. Op. cit., Renner, p. 57.

31. Renner, p. 57.


33. Shell stopped operating in Ogoniland in 1993. It remains a major oil producer in the country.



Nigeria’s Delta states are the heart of the country’s oil industry. About 12 million people, representing28

over 20 different ethnic groups, live in this region. The area supplies about 90 percent of the country’s oil,which accounts for 80-90 percent of Nigeria’s foreign exchange. Oil provides a steady stream of revenuesfor the national government. The multinational company Royal Dutch/Shell produces roughly half of thecountry’s oil. Its Nigerian operations are lucrative, providing estimated profits of $170-190 million a year,about 10 percent of its total exploration and production profits.29

From the standpoint of local communities, relatively little of these benefits from oil production have flowedinto the region. In contrast, the environmental impacts have been severe. In Ogoniland, for instance,

frequent oil spills from antiquated pipelines, the flaring of natural gas, leaks from unlined toxicwaste pits, and generally poor practices have exacted a heavy toll on soil, water, air, andhuman health. Formerly lush agricultural land is now covered by oil slicks, and muchvegetation and wildlife has been destroyed. Many Ogoni suffer from respiratory diseases andcancer, and birth defects are frequent. ... Today, the area remains impoverished. It has noelectricity or plumbing, and the few roads are sited primarily to provide access for the oilindustry. Schools are more often closed than open, and the sole hospital in the region remainsunfinished.30

While the damage affects numerous groups, the Ogoni (numbering about 500,000 people) have been themost vocal and adept at publicizing these problems. In order to demand restitution and a share of31

revenues, traditional Ogoni leaders formed the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP)in 1990 and appointed Ken Saro-Wiwa, a popular writer, its spokesperson. MOSOP persuaded thegovernment to create a commission to channel money into these regions. Initially, the regions were to get3 percent of Nigeria’s $10 billion annual oil income, which was later raised to 13 percent. MOSOP’sleadership disputed tactics, with Mr. Saro-Wiwa favoring a more confrontational approach. In December32

1992, under Saro-Wiwa’s urging, the movement demanded that Shell and the government provide $10billion in oil royalties as well as compensation for environmental damage. However, this federal aid nevermaterialized. As a result, MOSOP focused on the issue of pervasive poverty in Ogoniland.

Attacks on Shell’s oil installations began in 1993. In response, the company asked Nigeria’s military33

government for protection. The military government conducted a violent campaign to intimidate theprotesters. “To crush the unrest ... Nigeria sent its notoriously brutal ‘mobile police’ and mounted acampaign of repression that included laying waste to whole villages.” Estimates suggest that the ensuing34

violence destroyed at least 27 villages, killed about 2,000 people, and uprooted another 80,000.



36. “Nigeria: The General in his not-so-solitude,” The Economist, April 6, 1996, pp. 43-44.

37. State Dept Cable, March 25, 1997.

38. State Dept Cable, November 12, 1996.


40. Renner, pp. 52-3.


Leaders of MOSOP were detained or forced to go into hiding. In May 1994, Ken Saro-Wiwa wasimprisoned and held on murder charges. In November 1995, after a mock trial, Nigeria’s militarydictatorship executed him and 8 other Ogoni activists, despite worldwide protests.

The Ogoni movement threatened important economic interests, from which government leaders directlybenefited. In addition, as an intellectual, Saro-Wiwa represented a political threat to the regime. MOSOPargued for ecological protection, partly because of its appeal in the West, but its main objective was to gainmore control over the region and a share of its oil revenues.35

The debate over imposing economic sanctions, in response to the hangings, illustrates the conflict’simportance to the United States and the international community. Official credits were blocked, visas formembers of the regime were banned, and Nigeria was suspended from membership in the Commonwealth.However, the most effective mechanisms, sanctions on either oil or equipment, were not imposed. Therewas no appetite for it. Nearly half of Nigeria’s oil exports go to the United States. Further, companies likeMobil and Chevron produce 2 million barrels per day, with more seeking to get into the market.36

Because of its economic importance and ability to get the ear of government, the oil industry is often atarget of community unrest. For example, in March 1997, protesters, angered by the transfer of localgovernment offices from one community to another, took at least 127 hostages at a Shell facility. Whiletheir grievances were not aimed at the industry, per se, the protesters targeted it because of its ability tocapture the attention of the federal and state governments to their concerns.37

MOSOP, as well as international NGOs such as Amnesty International, believe multinational companieswith significant investments in Nigeria, particularly those in the oil sector, should use their influence withthe Nigerian government to end human rights abuses and hasten the return of democracy. In May 1996,38,39

Shell recommenced its dialogue with Ogoni leaders. MOSOP demands Shell use its influence to pressurethe Nigerian government to release Ogoni prisoners and to withdraw security forces from Ogoniland.

In sum, the unequal distribution of oil revenues helped prop up Nigeria’s military regime, with few benefitsgoing to those whose lands were devastated.

These contending interests are typically bound up with issues of ethnicity and economicdevelopment, of subsistence versus commercial operations. Governance structures are oftenincapable of adjudicating conflicting interests, favoring instead one group over another. ... Itmay be the social, economic and political repercussions of environmental change—rather thanthe change itself—that are the most important determinants of conflict over the environment.40

As this paper illustrates, this formula—one group suffering the negative consequences of resourceextraction without receiving a commensurate share of the benefits—is repeated and often serves as atrigger in other violent conflicts.


41. Horta, Korinna, Questions Concerning The World Bank and Chad/Cameroon Oil and Pipeline Project: Makings of a NewOgoniland? Corporate Welfare Disguised as Aid to the Poor? Environmental Defense Fund. March 1997, p. 1.


43. Horta, Korinna, “Pipeline Disaster in the Making,” Journal of Commerce, March 12, 1997.


Proposed Chad-Cameroon Oil Pipeline. A consortium of multinational oil companies—Exxon, Shell andElf—have proposed the development of oil-fields in southern Chad’s Doba region and construction of an1,100 km (600 mile) pipeline system to transport the oil. The pipeline would traverse Cameroon, endingat the Atlantic port of Kribi, from where the oil would be exported. The project is dependent upon theinvolvement of international development agencies, mainly the World Bank—not for financing but forpolitical risk mitigation. As Korinna Horta of the Environmental Defense Fund notes:

the consortium looks to World Bank participation as the center piece of its risk reductionstrategy in a politically volatile part of Africa and as necessary to attract funding fromexport-credit agencies and commercial banks. The international standing of governments ofpoor countries depends on their relationship with the World Bank. When this relationship turnssour, foreign aid and commercial lending are likely to be cut-off. The resulting politicalleverage of the World Bank reduces the risk of other public and private investment with whichit is associated.41

There are many critical issues surrounding the project. Environmental issues, including involuntaryresettlement, particularly in the Doba area of Chad; improvement of roads and other infrastructure(particularly in Cameroon) and its impact on forests, transition zones and the bush meat trade; siting of thepipeline; construction impacts; oil spills and leakages; and related health issues (i.e., increased incidenceof AIDS and STDs), are of significant concern. Most of these will be explored and addressed in a fullenvironmental impact assessment (EIA), which will be publicly available in late 1997.

But perhaps the most important issue is the distribution of revenues. This project has the potential to igniteexisting political tensions in both countries and cause civil unrest. In Chad, the 30-year civil war betweenthe Muslim north and Christian and animist south may be refueled by the new oil wealth. Development ofthe oil fields near Doba, the center of the southern rebellion, may intensify resentment over northern controlof resources and increase demands for autonomy. Recent reports indicate “the feeling by many in thecapital that the country will soon enter a golden age of oil wealth is tempered by the views of local humanrights workers, journalists and others who fear becoming the next Ogonis.”42

In Cameroon, there is concern both about the use of oil revenues and the pipeline’s environmental impact.Because it may pass through ecologically fragile rainforest areas, it could lead to deforestation, wildlifepoaching and the loss of local livelihoods. There is also concern about groundwater contamination andpollution of nearby water systems. An EIA is being carried out. However, as one NGO representative hasnoted, “the best environmental reports are of little help when the governments involved are incapable ofcarrying out their recommendations.”43

The World Bank’s Public Information Document notes “the project is expected to dramatically increaseChad’s government revenues and thereby generate increased expenditures on poverty alleviation


44. World Bank, “Chad-Petroleum Development and Pipeline...Project,” Public Information Document, April 4, 1995, p. 2.

45. Djomo,Louis,AfricanForestActionNetwork,Yaounde, Cameroon, letter to Mr. James Wolfensohn, President, World Bank, August11, 1997.

46. Horta, Korinna, “FuelingStrife in Chad and Cameroon: The Exxon-Shell-ELF-World Bank Plans for Central Africa,” MultinationalMonitor, May 1997, p. 13.

47. Economist Intelligence Unit, “Chad,” EIU Country Report, 2nd quarter 1997, p. 40.


49. Office of Environment, US Agency for International Development, List of Upcoming Multilateral Development Bank (MDB)Projects with Possible Environmental Concerns, US Agency for International Development, April 1997, p. 20.

50. Horta, Korinna, “Pipeline Disaster in the Making,” Journal of Commerce, March 12, 1997.


activities.” Local environmental organizations, in a letter to the World Bank’s President, expressed their44

concern “the proposed project will only exacerbate existing problems and not contribute to alleviatingpoverty and promoting sustainable development. ” The head of a Cameroonian NGO explains, “What we45

need are small-scale programs that respond to local aspirations. Real change involves decentralization,devolving power to the people at the base.”46

This argument—that the trickledown effects from oil and pipeline investments are not the best option toreduce poverty—appear well-founded. Neither government has shown concern for poverty alleviation inthe past. For instance, a 1995 World Bank report on Cameroon found the government’s will to address47

poverty very weak and complained of financial mismanagement and lack of transparency. For Chad, the48

World Bank’s concern over allocation of oil revenues has prompted it to explore transparent oil revenuebudgeting mechanisms, where revenues would be channeled through the governments’ national budgets,which would help ensure accountability.49

Serious questions remain about how successful these efforts can be. As in Nigeria, “the people of Chadand Cameroon may receive little or no benefit from oil development, and may instead turn on both the oilcompanies that take over their environment and the governments that enable the development.”50

Development Programs and the Environment

Development programs contribute to a complex spectrum of impacts—some intended and someunintended. Their potential for stimulating political instability is hard to predict and depends on a varietyof factors, including distribution of benefits and costs and the level of disruption imposed on localcommunities.

The history of oil development in Nigeria clearly demonstrates how uneven distribution of developmentproject benefits and environmental costs can lead to social disruption. A series of oil spills resulting fromoil development has significantly polluted land and water in the southeastern part of the country, adverselyaffecting public health and agricultural productivity. However, the people living in the region have receivedvirtually none of the revenue from sale of the oil recovered. As a result, the Ogoni people and others in theregion have staged numerous protests against Shell Oil and the Nigerian government. The government hasfelt threatened enough by this opposition to execute leaders of this movement. This, in turn, has led tointernational protests. Proposed oil development in Chad and a proposed construction of an oil pipeline



from Chad to the Cameroon coast has the potential to create many of the same kinds of environmentalproblems and social tension.

Structural adjustment policies, which can also shift the distribution of economic winners and losers,frequently contribute to political unrest. In many African countries, such as Zambia, the removal ofsubsidies on primary foodstuffs led to protests and civil action. In others, such as Cameroon, areorientation toward exports may alter land use by encouraging extraction of natural resources, such astimber. Recently, the World Bank launched a Structural Adjustment Participatory Review Initiative(SAPRI). This effort, which includes 4 African countries, will examine the societal effect of these programson various sectors of society.

In addition, development projects that may involve involuntary resettlement, such as hydroelectric dams,also have the potential to contribute to political tension. As described in more detail in the followingsection, the proposed Epupa Falls hydroelectric project along the Angola-Namibia border illustrates thisconcept. Under this proposed project, the traditional grazing lands of the Himba people would be flooded.Some villages and homes would also be flooded. This could cause significant disruption to social fabricof this minority tribe.

The Manantali and Diama dams have created a somewhat different problem. By making water availablefor irrigation in some areas, they have increased the value of some land. This prompted the politicallypowerful Mauritania Moors to evict poorer black farmers from the land. This, in turn, created significanttension between Mauritania and Senegal, where black tribes dominated.

Development programs also have the potential to reduce political tensions. Urban infrastructure or waterand sanitation projects throughout the continent, by providing a needed service, may forestall discontent.Programs like Gestion des Terroirs, which emphasize community-based natural resource management, alsohave the potential to help build coping mechanisms.

Namibia: Proposed Epupa Falls Hydroelectric Power Project. The Namibian government and itsparastatal electric utility company, Nampower, has proposed building a hydroelectric dam on the Kuneneriver, one of the country’s three perennial rivers. The project proposal involves construction of a dam 40kilometers downstream from Epupa Falls. This site was selected because it was found to have lowerenvironmental impacts and would displace fewer indigenous people than other proposed locations alongthe Kunene. However, it would still have significant adverse environmental and social consequences. Theproposed dam would be 203 meters high, making it the highest dam in Africa. Its projected large size isbased on the need to ensure power even with 2-3 years of drought. A feasibility study, currently underway,will likely be completed in 1997.

Opposition to the dam is keen. Local residents, particularly the semi-nomadic tribe of pastoralists knownas the Himba, have expressed their vehement opposition to the dam. The proposed dam will flood theirtraditional grazing areas and ancestral graves, as well as force resettlement of about 100 families.Traditional migration patterns will be broken, and remaining areas will probably be overgrazed. As notedby the Himba (and expressed in a preliminary impact assessment of the project), the dam will cause thebreakdown of the Himba’s economical foundation, their culture and social organization.

In addition, the government has disregarded questions regarding the economic viability of the project. Forinstance, a 1993 study by the World Bank stated that the costs of the dam were underestimated and the


51. WorldBank, EnergySectorManagementAssistanceProgram (ESMAP), Namibia: Issues and Options in the Energy Sector, ReportNo. 11320-NAM, Washington, DC, March 1993, pp. v, 18, 34-35.

52. The pre-feasibilitystudy for Epupa dam supposes that the mining industry, which represents about 50% of Namibia’s current energyconsumption, will have a steady need for energy in the future, even though activity in this sector has been decreasing.

53. Earthlife Africa, Namibia Branch and Urgewald, Electric Power from Kudu Gas: An Alternative to Epupa, March 1996, p. 2.

54. Inambao, Chrispin, “Government given 72 Hours to Respond in Himba Case,” The Namibian, July 31, 1997.

55. “Building of Hydro-electric Dam in Namibia Viable: Nujoma,” SAPA (South African Press Association), August 19, 1997.


prognosis for Namibia’s energy needs exaggerated. The government projects the country’s energy51

consumption will double over the next 10 years due to population growth, urbanization, and increasedincome levels demand. However, the World Bank estimates much slower increases.52

Alternatives have also not been seriously considered. Potential alternatives to power from Epupa include:rehabilitation of the existing Ruacana and Gové hydropower plants, which are upstream on the Kunene;development of the off-shore Kudu gas field and an oil field; small local power alternatives such as sun,wind and wave power; and energy efficiency measures. The only one of these alternatives that has beenanalyzed in any detail is development of the Kudu gas field. A March 1996 study by Earthlife Africa’sNamibia Branch and Urgewald concluded that Kudu gas could provide electric power at a cost ofUS$0.019 - 0.028 per KWh, while Epupa would cost two to three times as much. This study was53

conducted because Earthlife and Urgewald were able to get assistance from experts in this area. Althoughthis analysis has been successful in raising questions about the desirability of building the dam, thegovernment has thus far been able to deflect suggestions that Kudu gas be used as alternative to Epupahydropower partly on the grounds that significant South African commitments to purchase of gas, whichhave not been forthcoming, would be necessary to make development of the field economic (the amountof gas used in Namibia alone would be insufficient to justify its development).

It appears that maximizing employment opportunities, especially in Namibia’s depressed north (which isalso home to the majority Owambo ethnic group, from which the ruling SWAPO party draws much of itssupport), is a key factor in the government’s position on this project. However, no assessment has beenmade as to whether Epupa would be the best and most sustainable way to generate jobs.

No financing for the project has yet been arranged. The environmental, social and economic questionssurrounding the project have begun to make some in the international community skeptical about theproject. The World Bank has expressed doubts about funding it, while the European Union and severalEuropean countries have stated they will not provide financing. Other possible sources include severalAsian governments.

More recently, tensions regarding this projects have heightened. In late July 1997, armed security agentsand policy disrupted a meeting of the Himba leader, Chief Kapika, the community and lawyers from theLegal Assistance Center to discuss the Epupa dam scheme. The Chief has appealed to the High Court fora ruling on the banning of public meetings. Chief Kapika noted his community was not properly informedabout government policy on the dam and that “the Government rarely meets with us to discuss issues ofconcern to us.” Chief Kapika has also said that if the dam was built, “we will all gather there and they54

have to build the dam on top of us.” President Sam Nujoma was quoted in the Namibian newspaper as55

saying “The government will not be deterred by the misguided activities of those who want to impede the


56. “Building of Hydro-electric Dam in Namibia Viable: Nujoma,” SAPA (South African Press Association), August 19, 1997

57. Platt, Anne E., Infecting Ourselves: How Environmental and Social Disruptions Trigger Disease, Worldwatch Paper 129,Worldwatch Institute, Washington, D.C. April 1996, p. 42.


59. Kaplan, Robert D., “The Coming Anarchy,” Atlantic Monthly, February 1994, p. 5 of 23.

60. Kaplan, Robert D., “The Coming Anarchy,” Atlantic Monthly, February 1994, p. 14 of 23.



economic development and the upliftment of the standards of our people, including particularly the welfareof the residents in the Kunene region.”56

In sum, President Nujoma’s interest in providing employment to an important constituency, who providea basis for his political survival, is facing a direct challenge by the Himba people. The process by whichthese challenges are addressed may provide important insights into environmental conflict in a democracy.

IV. OTHER ENVIRONMENTALLY-RELATEDSTRESSES

Public Health Issues and the Environment

Ecological disruption can have a significant impact on public health and the spread of disease.Development projects, such as new roads and infrastructure through wilderness areas, and land usechanges resulting from logging, agriculture, migration, and urbanization, along with increased trade andmovement of goods and people, can lead to increased exposure to disease. Loss of biological diversity mayalso reduce or eliminate control species that keep microbes in check.

Unsafe water, which spreads about 80 percent of all disease in developing countries, is the leading cause57

of public health concerns in sub-Saharan Africa. Lack of access to clean water supplies can spark a wholerange of diarrheal diseases—including typhoid fever, hepatitis A, and cholera.

This tragedy has its roots in two very basic common social problems: lack of clean drinkingwater, and lack of sanitation. Of course, these problems are closely related: in communitieswithout adequate sanitation, pathogen-laden human and animal wastes, food, and garbage pileup near homes or drain into waterways to infect drinking supplies.58

Robert Kaplan argues that the cycle between poverty and disease is increasing in urban areas, particularlyin West Africa, where the countryside is “draining into dense slums by the coast.” He notes that “whereas59

rural poverty is age-old and almost a “normal” part of the social fabric, urban poverty is sociallydestabilizing.” Lack of social services and related social unrest in South African townships may provide60

an example of this destabilizing effect.

Drawing definitive conclusions regarding the connection between environmental disruption and diseaseis often difficult because “reliable data linking land use changes to disease outbreaks are rare. Whatevidence exists tends to be anecdotal and by no means comprehensive.” However, in specific cases, such61

as water projects which create new habitat for waterborne diseases and road building, clear linkages tochanges in disease incidence are available. For example, the Manantali and Diama dams, built along the


62. Platt, Anne E., Infecting Ourselves: How Environmental and Social Disruptions Trigger Disease, Worldwatch Paper 129,Worldwatch Institute, Washington, D.C. April 1996, p. 38-9.





Senegal River, created the perfect conditions for epidemic schistosomiasis. The number of people infectedin the Diama region went from 0 before the dam to more than 90 percent of the population.

Global warming may exacerbate these changes in environmental conditions. It may contribute to increasednumbers and more severe floods, storms and droughts, as well as lead to changes in rainfall. These types62

of changing weather patterns can produce the right conditions for disease. For example, a researcher inRwanda found a more than 337 percent increase in the incidence of malaria from 1984-87, while at thesame time measuring a one degree centigrade increase in average temperature. After heavy rains in 1987,Rwanda’s high, mountainous regions, where there previously had been virtually no malaria, reported a 500percent increase (compared with a 300 percent increase in lower regions). Scientists estimate that a global63

mean temperature rise of 3 C could create ecological conditions conducive to malaria in 60 percent of theo

world’s land area, compared to the current 45 percent. Similar outcomes, resulting from changes in64

temperature and rainfall, will also occur for other diseases, such as schistosomiasis.

Disease induced by environmental degradation will likely have adverse impacts on both the social structureand economic productivity of communities. Although it is difficult to quantify these adverse effects, theimpact of HIV/AIDs on human productive capacity and economic growth in Africa may provide someindication of how this dynamic might work.

Because of this enormous human toll, AIDS is more than simply a health issue: it is adevelopment issue, an economic issue, and a human rights issue. Most victims are afflicted inthe prime of their working years, and unable to support their families or to work productively.In Zimbabwe, one out of four adults is now infected with HIV.65

The solutions to environmentally-induced disease are complex. In some instances, technological fixes, suchas water supply and sanitation projects, could help alleviate the situation. There are also many examplesof low-technology interventions, such as oral rehydration therapy, which could help. A focus on povertyis also appropriate, as the poor tend to be more vulnerable to disease, in part due to their inability to affordfood, shelter or medical care.

Technological Disasters and the Environment

Technological disasters, such as oil spills, pesticide use, land degradation from mining, are most likely toinvolve US companies. They can be a sudden event or a more gradual phenomenon. The response takento the problem is critical. If it is perceived as inappropriate, the event and related problems could serve asa trigger for severe reactions. The case of oil development in Nigeria (already described in the resourceconflicts section) provides a good example of this possibility. The proposed oil pipeline between Chad andCameroon has a similar potential. But, again, a critical factor is the adequacy of the response. A report by


66. Control Risks Group, No Hiding Out, July 1997, p. 38.

67. Sachs, Aaron, Eco-Justice: Linking Human Rights and the Environment, Worldwatch Paper 127, Washington, D.C., December1995, p. 36.


the Control Risks Group notes the Nigeria cases “reinforces the message that—whatever standard practicemay have been in the past—international companies must now conform to the highest standardseverywhere.”66

The improper disposal or handling of hazardous wastes is another kind of technological disaster that hasthe potential to ignite political tension. Illegal dumping of toxic substances may be one source of problems.From 1990-1994, there were 239 documented instances of dumping in Africa. Waste shipments may alsospark controversy. In the late 1980s, hazardous waste disposal cost $275 per metric ton in the UnitedStates, compared to as low as $2.75 in Africa, where environmental regulations and appropriatetechnologies were lacking. If seen as taking advantage of lax environmental regulation, US companies67

could suffer a significant backlash.

Another potential technologically-based cause of political tension is agrochemical companies targetingAfrican markets, that is, trying to sell pesticides banned in the home country. In many instances, there areno restrictions in the consuming countries. This dual standard is readily apparent. For instance, thedeveloping world accounts for only 19 percent of total pesticide consumption, but 50 percent of allpesticide poisonings and 80 percent of all pesticide related deaths.

Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES). The Convention on InternationalTrade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), in effect since 1975, provides protectionto threatened species of plants and animals through controls on their international trade. The idea behindCITES is to remove the economic incentives for poaching by regulating trade and making traffickingexpensive. It requires government-issued permits or certificates for trade of endangered species andproducts or, in the case of species threatened with extinction, it prohibits all commercial trade.

Three appendices are at the heart of CITES: Appendix I protects threatened species from all internationalcommercial trade, Appendix II regulates trade in species not threatened with extinction but which maybecome threatened if trade is unregulated, and Appendix III governs species that are not endangered butare managed or protected within the listing nation. Virtually all African countries are party to CITES.(There are 6 exceptions: Angola, Cape Verde, Lesotho, Libya, Mauritania, and Sao Tome & Principe.)Members to CITES meet every two years to update and approve lists of protected species.

One of the most controversial elements of CITES is the concept of sustainable utilization. As Dr. MostafaTolba, then executive director of the United Nations Environment Programme, explained in his openingaddress to the 8th CITES Convention of Parties in March 1992, “There are complaints from a number ofdeveloping countries, that the rich are more interested in making the Third World into a natural historymuseum than they are in filling the bellies of its people.” This conflict can perhaps best be illustrated by thedebate surrounding proposals from three southern African nations (Botswana, Namibia, and Zimbabwe)to transfer their elephant populations from Appendix I to Appendix II, the first possible step in reopeningivory trade. These proposals were officially offered at the most recent meeting of CITES, held in June 1997in Zimbabwe. Although the proposals were accepted, ivory trade cannot resume until tough conditions are


68. Asa result of this decision, the three countries will be allowed to sell 60 tons of ivory from existing stockpiles provided that stringentconditions relating to trade controls and population monitoring are met. Ivory trade cannot occur before March 1999 in order to ensure adequatetime for safeguards against poaching are put in place. Initially, trade will involve only legally-held government stockpiles and not elephants killedfor trade. Japan is the sole country allowed to import the ivory, with no re-exports permitted.

69. Duke, Lynne, “Can Elephants and Humans Coexist in Africa?” The Washington Post, June 19, 1997, p. A1.

70. Telecky,Teresa M, Directorof the WildlifeTrade Program, the Humane Society of the United States, Testimony before the US Houseof RepresentativesSubcommittee on Fisheries Conservation, Wildlife & Oceans on H.R. 39, the African Elephant Conservation ReauthorizationAct of 1997, March 13, 1997.

71. Lee, Kyu Young, “Groups Clash over Wildlife Habitat Expansion Program: US Humane Society Seeks to Cut Off Funds for aZimbabwe Program that Uses Revenue from Hunting to Expand Wildlife Habitat,” ENN Online, Earth Times, 1997,http://www.enn.com/planetenn/050597/feature1.htm.

72. Lee, Kyu Young, “Groups Clash over Wildlife Habitat Expansion Program: US Humane Society Seeks to Cut Off Funds for aZimbabwe Program that Uses Revenue from Hunting to Expand Wildlife Habitat,” ENN Online, Earth Times, 1997,http://www.enn.com/planetenn/050597/feature1.htm.


met. The three countries plan to sell off ivory stockpiles that are the accumulation of tusks seized from68

illegal shipments or from elephant deaths. They will be imported by Japan, where cubes of ivory are usedto make stamped imprints on correspondence. Revenues from the sales will go toward conservation and69

wildlife management programs.

International conservationists and animal rights activists fear this downgrading could send the incorrectmessage that the species is safe and lead to increased poaching. The Humane Society of the United Statesprotested the move, saying “down-listing elephants for any reason is the proverbial nose under the tent thatwill send poachers into the brush for elephants. Ivory from poached elephants will be stockpiled as aninvestment by dealers who will await the day when CITES will open the trade.” While the collective70

elephant population of Namibia, Botswana and Zimbabwe is stable, elephants in eastern and central Africaremain vulnerable.

The debate spurred a campaign by animal rights activists against CAMPFIRE (Communal AreasManagement Programme for Indigenous Resources), a US-funded program in Zimbabwe that shiftsauthority for wildlife management to local districts and communities, especially those near parks and onmarginal agricultural lands. The US Humane Society, for instance, contended that the US governmentshould not underwrite trophy hunting.

Over 90 percent of CAMPFIRE revenues come from safari hunting—through the sale of carefullyregulated licenses to hunt elephants, lions and other wildlife. Rights to hunt elephant, for instance, can earnabout $12,000 per animal. Revenue generated by the program goes to the local communities, who decide71

how it is used (e.g., for a school, medical clinic, protection of the animals or their habitat, cash forvillagers). The premise of the program is that if local communities are permitted to manage and realizesubstantial, tangible benefits from wildlife resources in their area, they will gain a strong incentive toprevent poaching and ensure the resource is managed in a environmentally sustainable manner. In 1995,24 districts in Zimbabwe earned about $3.5 million from CAMPFIRE. Of that amount, about 50 percentwent directly to the communities, 35 percent ended up in wildlife management and local employment, andthe rest was retained by district councils to build community infrastructures.72

The controversy over CAMPFIRE illustrates the broader “North-South” debate over sustainableutilization. The nations hardest hit by restrictions on trade and utilization are those in the South, thatgreatly need the revenue. In some cases, an important source of income comes from tourism and legalizedhunting. If this resource is illegally hunted or destroyed, a major income source is lost and the country is



likely to become even more destitute. However, restrictions on wildlife utilization can deprive the countryof important income.

The recent controversy over downlisting of the African elephant illustrates polarization on severalissues—between preservation and sustainable use and over the locus of control of the resource—Southvs. North or government vs. communities.

One key to enhancing political and economic stability, in the context of environmental threats, is devolvingsome control over resource decision-making to local communities so that they receive the right economicincentives, have the potential to realize benefits from addressing environmental problems and no longercan complain that the central government, large corporations or other “outside” forces are ignoring theirconcerns and needs. The all-or-nothing debate over down-listing of elephants, with some organizationsarguing for maximum centralization of control over resource decision-making, illustrates how treaties suchas CITES can potentially pose obstacles to the devolution of power and create resentment between Africannations and the North and northern-based international NGOs. If pushed too far, some countries couldeven decide to opt out of such treaties, which could have the perverse effect of leading to greaterenvironmental problems and eliminating important institutional mechanisms for addressing them.

V. MODES OF IMPACT ON U.S. INTERESTS

Throughout this paper, we have attempted to go beyond a review of current or potential environmentalstresses or changes, and illustrate the linkages to political, economic and social changes which are likelyto have an impact on U.S. foreign policy objectives and related interests. For the purposes of this paper,“U.S. interests” are considered to be success in the promotion of democratic institutions and free trade,as well as progress in achieving the principal sustainable development program objectives in Africa suchas economic growth, improved health care and family planning, improved environmental conservation andnatural resources management (see graphic for the Strategic Plan for Africa Bureau and USAID fourpillars).

Why should the U.S. be concerned about environmental stresses in Africa? Left unattended, theseenvironmental stresses are likely to build up and work against efforts to stimulate economic growth.National economies which are still largely dependent on the agricultural sector and agro-sylvo-pastoralproduction systems cannot grow and prosper in the face of continued degradation and depletion offarmland, pastures and woodlands. Rural populations cannot aspire to improved socio-economic well-being if they are denied access to or control over critically important land and water resources, or have noincentive to invest in their sustainable use and improved management. If urban economies are underminedand rural communities remain poverty-stricken, potential markets for U.S. goods and services do notmaterialize, and trade fails to expand.

As we have seen in the case of Nigeria, environmental stresses such as those associated with oil extractioncan also lead to localized hardships, followed by political unrest, violence, repression, suppression ofhuman rights and a reinforcement of autocratic rule instead of democracy. In these cases, the U.S. andother industrialized countries may be forced to choose between continued progress towards theestablishment of democratic institutions and a respect of human rights, or continued support for theexisting power structure and allied multinational business interests.

As we have witnessed on countless occasions, environmental stresses can interact with other prevailingconditions in developing countries to increase the vulnerability of local communities to drought, flooding


73. Pers. comm., Peter Veit, WRI.


and other natural disasters, leading to an increased need for famine relief and humanitarian assistance. Asbecame clear in Rwanda, resource scarcity and related conflicts can contribute to violence on such a scalethat years of investment in development efforts to build infrastructure, train human resources and increasethe productivity of arable land and other natural resources are undone and destroyed within a matter ofmonths. And as conservationists have been forced to recognize in Madagascar and in many other Africancountries, the most dedicated efforts to protect wildlife and conserve biodiversity cannot succeed in thelong run if a country fails to utilize its natural resource base to alleviate poverty and to support equitableeconomic development.

Increasingly, the U.S. must look beyond its apparent interests in the short term to consider its medium andlong term interests. All too often, U.S. decision-makers have only tracked flows of trade and investmentwhich are presumed to contribute to economic development, without much regard to who actually benefitsand who bears the burdens or local costs associated with expanded trade and investments. For example,in areas such as southern Ghana, it may seem like good business for U.S. investors to promote thecultivation of pineapples or other cash crops on land near export outlets. However, if government agenciestake over control of the land from local communities or agree to concentrate the benefits of these newventures in the hands of a privileged few, in time, the investments may be jeopardized by the poor andmarginalized who eventually realize how little they have left to lose — and how much they too might gainby challenging the schemes of government and foreign business interests.73

U.S. investors in mineral exploitation and other resource-based business enterprises would do well to lookbeyond the presumed costs of doing business in a world of transparent, stable governments, andestablished legal procedures and standards norms for environmental protection. While it may appearattractive at the outset to be free from meaningful or enforceable environmental regulations, in the mediumand longer term, unpredictable governments, resentful local communities and a failure to respect customaryproperty rights may impose substantial unforeseen costs. Investments may be lost amid the chaos of civildisorders and government collapse (as in Rwanda, Somalia, Liberia), or private armies may have to berecruited to guard access and maintain control over the resource, as in case of the rutile mines in SierraLeone (which contribute 50% of the country’s GNP).

Net Official Development Assistance (ODA) to Sub-Saharan Africa (1980-1995)

02468

1012141618

1980 1986 1988 1990 1992 1993 1994 1995

Net ODA from all donors (constant 1987 prices, $ billion)




Exhibit 6

Although the U.S. contribution to Official Development Assistance (ODA) as a percentage of total GNPis below that of many other industrialized countries, U.S. funding for bilateral and multilateral developmentassistance programs is still substantial. Over the past ten years, net ODA from all donors to Sub-SaharanAfrica has grown from $11.3 billion to $15.5 billion (in constant 1987 prices), including ____ from theU.S. . The U.S. clearly has a strong interest in effective use of this assistance. Despite the considerable timeand resources dedicated to the design of development assistance programs, all too often, they do not havethe intended results or fail to generate a sustainable level of benefits. In many instances, such as the ten-yeareffort to promote land tenure reforms in Niger, the primary beneficiaries have been the political elites thatcontrol the development process. Greater attention needs to be devoted to supporting local, grass rootsinitiatives, to respecting local knowledge and reinforcing community control and authority in the face ofwealthy, vested interests and government bureaucrats.

VI. OPTIONSFORAVOIDINGORAMELIORATINGENVIRONMENTALSTRESSES

Options for Avoiding or Mitigating Environmental Stresses and Related Conflicts

Discussion of the opportunities for environmental rehabilitation, improved environmental management,and progress in sustainable development. Linkages to progress in community empowerment,democratization, expanded trade, reduced vulnerability to disaster, improved capacity for conflictmanagement and increased food security. Examples of gestion de terroir and participatory natural forestmanagement efforts in West Africa. Role of CVGT and marches ruraux, and of a favorable policyenvironmental for the emergence and development of these local, more democratically-managed,community-based institutions.

Over the past several decades, many “lessons learned” from a series of development assistance activitiesaimed at reversing or slowing environmental degradation have served to improve the effectiveness of theseprograms. In the process, the partners engaged in their efforts have gained a better appreciation of the



enabling conditions or program elements which are most often required in order to increase theproductivity of natural resources and reduce environmental degradation while improving human well-beingand socio-economic conditions. A new generation of participatory, community-based local developmentactivities tied to improved land use planning and natural resource management are underway across theSahel from Cape Verde to Niger, and in many countries of Eastern and Southern Africa. Several examplesillustrate what can be and is being done to avoid or minimize environmental stresses and related conflicts.

In Cape Verde, rural producers are challenged by low and variable rainfall, a heavily degraded and sparsecover of remaining natural vegetation, steep slopes, with potentially high rates of field erosion anddownstream sedimentation. Farmers have broken the cycle of worsening environmental degradation anddeepening poverty by organizing community-based associations with the capacity to mobilize local laborfor infrastructure construction, erosion control and soil and water conservation structures, reforestationand agroforestry, and diversification of agricultural production. These associations provide access to credit,technical information and other extension services, and in a manner which assists women and othervulnerable groups. A 1988 law has encouraged the creation of these associations, and a number of PVOshave launched “apprenticeship” programs to help develop human capacities for a variety of skills (bothtechnical and managerial) among the association members. Local NGOs have developed to provide asustainable source of support to the community associations. Various contractual mechanisms haveemerged to insure that quality control standards are met for activities supported by “food for work,” andto provide for the policing and maintenance of infrastructure and other investments. (See box on NRMactivities supported by food aid program in Cape Verde).



Table 2: Comparison of Conditions, Risks and Contributing Factors toEnvironmental Flashpoints in Sub-saharan Africa

Country Environmental Demographic Economic Governance Index Ranking Category

Conditionsand Factors

1 2 3 4HumanDev. Flashpoint

Burkina Faso semi-arid, moderate $220 GNP per High stability; #172 lowmedium population capita; 19,000 multi-partypotential; 72% pressure: MT food aid in systempasture and 1994 dominated bywoodland President’s10.5 million; 38

persons/km2;2.8% rate ofgrowth; 0.4 haarable land percapita

party;decentralized,participatorydev. activities;mod. highethnic diversity

Cape Verde arid, low high population $1090 GNP per medium #123 lowpotential; very pressure: capita; 65,000 stability;little remaining 400,000 pop.; MT food aid in numerous localforest or __ 1994 associations;pasture; mod persons/km2; commonwater avail 2.1% rate of language; low

growth; 0.10 ha ethnic diversityarable land percapita

Ghana sub-humid, mod. high pop. $360 GNP per medium #132 moderatemoderate pressure: 17.5 capita; 101,000 stability;potential; 57% million; 77 MT food aid in moderatepasture and persons/km2; 1994 ethnic diversitywoodland; mod. 2.8% rate ofwater growth; 0.18 haavailability arable land per

capita


Country Environmental Demographic Economic Governance Index Ranking Category

Conditionsand Factors

1 2 3 4HumanDev. Flashpoint


Liberia humid, high mod. high pop. est. $500 GNP low stability; not ranked highpotential; 76% pressure: 2.8 per capita; mod. ethnicpasture and million; 31 177,000 MT diversitywoodland; mod. persons/km2; food aid in 1994water avail 2.4% rate of

growth; 0.14 haarable land percapita

Rwanda humid, high High pop. $190 GNP per low stability; #174 highpotential; 41% pressure: 6.7 capita; 269,000 commonpasture and million; 322 MT food aid in language; twowoodland; low persons/km2; 1994 major ethnicper cap water 3% rate of groupsavail. growth (85-89);

0.16 ha arableland per capita

Somalia arid, low Mod. pop. est. $100 per low stability not ranked highpotential; 93% pressure: 9.8 capita; 30,000pasture and million; 15 MT food aid inwoodland; low persons/km2 1994per cap water 2.2% rate ofavail. growth; 0.14 ha

arable land percapita

1. Land use data for 1991-93 from World Resources Report, 1996; per capita water availability from World Bank, 1996.2. Population size in 1996 and growth rate for the period 1990-1996 from World Bank, 1997; population density in 1995 from World Resources Report, 1996;arable land per capita for 1990, from Cleaver and Schreiber, 1994.3. GNP and food aid data from World Bank, 1997.4. Indicator classification based on assessment of political and social stability, from World Bank, African Water Resources, 1996.



VII. MONITORING ENVIRONMENTAL STRESSES AND MITIGATION EFFORTS

Comparison of conditions, risks and contributing factors to environmental flashpointsin Sub-Saharan Africa

Sub-Saharan Africa is a region marked by significant environmental transformation and degradation,uneven progress in economic development, a growing gap between rich and poor, political instability,conflict and recurrent humanitarian emergencies. The relationships between these interrelated factors arecomplex, and it is often difficult to distinguish between cause and effect. It is perhaps instructive tocompare the conditions and factors which could play a role in triggering environmental flashpoints amongseveral countries.

While one might argue that environmental stresses are greater in semi-arid conditions, or when arable landper capita falls below a certain minimum required for food security, this does not explain why Burkina andCape Verde may have a lower risk than Liberia or Rwanda.

(See Attached Graphs of Selected Indicators )

Demographic or economic factors by themselves do not seem to determine the relative risk ofenvironmental flashpoints. Governance, however, does seem to be an extremely critical variable. While thepresence of a multi-party system and a popularly-elected government may seem to be an essential aspectof more democratic governance, the most critical element with respect to environmental flashpoints maybe the degree of support for decentralized, participatory local development activities. This is frequentlyreflected in the diversity, growth and degree of empowerment of community-based organizations. Theseorganizations can often play a vitally important role in avoiding or resolving conflicts at the local level,before they become intractable. It is also important to assess the level of accountability of government :are people held accountable for an infringement on the rights of others (including rights to naturalresources, as well as other more basic human rights)?

While economic data and most often commonly available development indicators generally do not capturethe full extent of “grass roots democratization” and “environmental governance,” one can combine aqualitative assessment of governance issues, with an assessment of environmental, demographic, foodsecurity and other socio-economic conditions. The result suggests a rough categorization of countries withrelatively high, medium or lower risks of conflict or instability which could be triggered in part byenvironmental stresses.

Early Warning Systems and Environmental Monitoring

In the wake of well-publicized effects from the Sahel droughts in the 1970’s, a number of aid agencies havesupported the development of “early warning systems” and funded disaster preparedness and mitigationprograms. In recent years, the scope of assistance from private voluntary organizations (PVOs) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) has steadily expanded beyond emergency relief in areas affected bynatural disasters to encompass more broadly based disaster mitigation and development programs, reachingeven into the most remote areas. Droughts still occur in Africa, but the incidence of famine has beenreduced by a combination of mitigation, early warning and coordinated response by relief and development



agencies. The USAID-funded Famine Early Warning System (FEWS) has been particularly effective inproviding host country and U.S. decision-makers with timely and reliable information to help them assessfamine threats and plan required assistance in advance so as to reduce the actual incidence of famine. Thisprogram has regularly tracked and disseminated information from rainfall reports, crop growth and otheragroclimatic and meteorological data, market prices of foodstuffs, food stocks, import and export flows,use of food aid, changes in health and nutrition, demographic movements, pasture conditions and otherrelevant data. Much of this data is available from a combination of remote sensing by U.S. institutions suchas USGS, NASA and NOAA, by national early warning offices in the affected countries, and field surveys.Coverage of the program now includes the Sahel, the Greater Horn of Africa, and Southern Africa. FEWSrepresentatives are currently located in 16 sub-Saharan countries.



Matrix for Categorization of Risk Factors Related to Environmental Flashpointsin Sub-saharan Africa

Categoryof risk Illustrative Environmental Population Food Security Socioeconomic Governanceandfactors for Countries Trends pressure conditions Capacity forenvironmental Conflictflashpoints Resolution

I. Relatively high risk Somalia, Kenya, Various forms of High Low to medium Low to medium Autocratic regimes;of conflict, Cameroon, environmental human human rightsinstability, Gambia, Nigeria, degradation are development index suppressedinsecurity, triggered Sudan, Chad, prevalentin part by Sierra Leone,environmental Liberia, Rwanda,stresses and Burundi, Congo-spreading to a Brazza, Congo-significant extent Kinshasa

II. Some risk of Ethiopia, Senegal, Some continued Medium Medium Low to medium Numerousconflict, instability, Burkina Faso, degradation, but human indicators ofinsecurity; likely to Niger, Mali, Ghana, many local development index emergence of morebe localized, Togo, Benin, initiatives to democratictemporary Gabon, Tanzania, rehabilitate and institutions;

Zambia, restore progressiveMadagascar, environmental empowerment ofAngola, Namibia, quality/ land local community-Botswana, South productivity basedAfrica organizations

III. Relatively low Cote d’Ivoire, Low to moderate Low to medium Medium to high Medium to high Moderate progressrisk of significant Uganda, Mauritius, scale of human towardsconflict and Swaziland, degradation development index democratizationinstability Zimbabweassociated withenvironmentalstresses



However, monitoring and other information collection and analysis activities need to be linked to responsecapabilities and decision-making. Sahelians in Mauritania, Niger and Chad suffered hardships in the 1997“hungry season” despite earlier tracking of the gravity of the situation when decision-makers failed torespond and act decisively when the information which was made available to them. The potentialusefulness of early warning monitoring can be undermined by bureaucratic inertia or politicalconsiderations. For example, decisive action in Niger was stalled by a reluctance to deal with a governmentwhich had recently taken power by the force of arms. But, without accurate information, timely assessmentof vulnerability and efficient famine response is difficult at best.

While much of the data examined in the context of famine early warning systems is useful for monitoringother environmental stresses, the FEWS data concentrates on short and medium term changes related toagricultural production. Monitoring and analysis of longer term environmental and economic changes andtrends is also necessary. And this information needs to be assessed in combination with data on political,institutional and social dynamics. Most analytic models cannot be used to make predictions about the fullrange of situations prevailing in Africa, but monitoring and tracking trends can help analysts to “flag”potential problems areas. In order to assess the relative importance of environmental flashpoints, there islimited utility in tracking only a few “selected” indicators; situations are complex and highly variable, andthe interaction of multiple factors is of paramount importance. As we have illustrated in this paper, theextent to which not environmental stresses contribute to significant political, economic or social changesdepends on a variety of other conditions. These conditions need to be monitored in conjunction with theactual environmental stresses. This cursory analysis also points to the potential usefulness of organizingand maintaining a “tableau de bord” to monitor environmental flashpoints in Africa. Data from differentsectors (environment, economy, health and population, food security and agricultural production,infrastructure development, etc.) could be pulled together and tracked to discern trends. The system couldalso be set up to flash “warning lights” when indicator data moves outside of the “normal” range—eithertoo low, too high, or an exceptionally rapid rate of change.

Information Needs for Monitoring Environmental Flashpoints

The following are suggested as potentially important types of information which should be monitored:

Environmental and Natural Resource Indicators: (in addition to data monitored by FEWS):

# Changes in land use; extent of fallow and unexploited arable land

# Trends in the management and renewal of soil fertility; extent of degraded farmland

# Extent and severity of wind and water erosion

# Extent and severity of deforestation, overgrazing and degradation of forests, woodlands,pastures and other non-cultivated lands

# Ratio of fuelwood supply/demand

# Ratio of deforestation/reforestation

# Ratio of land abandonment / land reclamation (for agriculture, primarily)

# Changes in arable land/ per capita

# Changes in consumption of fertilizers



# Changes in area of irrigated land

# Changes in area of protected parks, reserves, natural areas

# Changes in biodiversity index; critical habitats and species

Environmentaland resource accountingindicators:

# Value of environmental services

# Air and water pollution damages

# Value of other environmental damages

# Depreciation of natural resources

# Environmentally-related adjustments in GDP

Indicators of Progress in Socio-economic and Institutional Development:

# GNP per capita; GNP per capita growth rate

# Changes in index of per capita food production

# Percent of population facing food insecurity

# Average daily supply of calories per capita

# Access to potable water; water use per capita

# Energy use per capita

# Changes in literacy

# Extent of infrastructure development and quality of maintenance

# Changes in percent of GDP from agriculture and average annual growth in agricultural GDP

# Trends in employment, particularly in the secondary and tertiary sectors of the economy

# Changes in the degree of access and range of alternative livelihoods available to rural producersand the urban poor

# changes in the distribution of income and benefit sharing

# Development of new markets, and changing access to markets and purchasing power by themajority of households

# Evolution of cross-border trade and in urban-rural linkages; changes in the nature and qualityof markets served by local communities

# Emergence of private sector; enabling conditions for the establishment and operation of NGOs

# Evolution of labor movements and associations

# Relative security of access and use rights by rural producers;

# Extent of compensation to existing users when land rights are taken over

Human Resource and Demographic Indicators:



# Life expectancy

# School enrollment

# Adult illiteracy

# Population growth rate (total, urban, rural)

# Migration patterns (emigration, immigration, movements of refugees)

# Changes in population density and pressure (person / land unit, including persons/arable land andpersons/forested land)

# Changes in total fertility rate

# Changes in birth rates, death rates, child mortality and morbidity rates

Indicators of an Open and Just Society:

# Progress in the rule of law; respect of due process by the State, especially with respect toalienation of private property and natural resource-related rights.

# Accountability of the military, senior government officials and other decision-makers in the faceof violence and injustice.

# Respect of human rights; reaction to human rights abuses.

# Existence and functionality of taxation systems, revenue sharing and other fiscal policies whichdistribute real benefits in an equitable manner to local communities.

# Respect of human rights.

# Relative freedom of the press.

Indicators of Effective Governance, Development Priorities and Policy Frameworks:

# Attitudes and reactions to corruption, particularly in high places.

# Transparency and fairness of procedures to allocate forest concessions, mining permits and othergrants related to the exploitation of publicly managed natural resources; adequacy of methodsto determine the value of these resources.

# Ratio between public expenditures for the military and socio-economic needs (health care,education, investment in infrastructure, agricultural production, environmental protection).

# Attention given to environmental protection legislation and enforcement.

# Respect of constitutionally-defined checks and balances; functionality of separate butcomplementary mandates of public powers.

# Climate for reforms of legal framework: provision for participatory process, motivation forchanges, political support for enforcement of new standards and implementation of newprocedures.

# Political support and trends vis a vis meaningful, effective devolution of decision-makingauthority and power to decentralized, democratic institutions.



In the past, there has been a tendency to measure progress in “democracy and governance” by changes inthe number of political parties, or the extent to which various parties are represented in governments. Moremeaningful progress can be tracked at the grass roots by monitoring changes in the number, activities andauthority of community-based organizations (CBOs) such as democratically managed rural savings andcredit associations, producer cooperatives, local land management committees, and natural resource-basedrural enterprises such as wood markets in Niger.

Similarly, there has been a tendency of environmental organizations to track “environmental” indicators,and development institution to tract “economic development” indicators. Increasingly, in Africa,development practitioners are recognizing the importance of a cross-sectoral analysis of the “nexus” ofpopulation, agriculture, economic development and environment. More recently, a number of NGOs andother observers are stressing the relevance of human rights and governance issues as well. While the StateDepartment, USAID, World Bank, UNDP, FAO and other organizations do monitor a range of valuableindicators, more attention needs to be paid to sub-national statistics and trends at the grass-roots, and tothe complex interactions of environmental, demographic, economic and governance issues.

VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Environmental stresses in Sub-Saharan Africa are not simply a result of rapid population growth andincreasing pressure on natural resources, although these can be important factors, especially in the mediumand longer term. And one cannot deny the importance of politics and ethnic differences as importantfactors in the recent series of conflicts and humanitarian emergencies that we have witnessed in Africa.However, environmental stresses have frequently been a contributing factor as well. The steady depletionof soil nutrients in permanently cropped land, the failure to fully develop and rationally utilize thecontinent’s water resources, uncontrolled commercial logging of remaining tropical forests, exploitationof oil and minerals with insufficient respect of local rights, inadequate protection of environmental qualityand inequitable distribution of economic benefits are all important sources of environmental stress in Africa.The result has been to heighten the region’s vulnerability to periodic drought and other natural disasters.Food security and health conditions have also been negatively impacted, and the prospects for sustainableeconomic growth have been undermined.

Without a doubt, Africa is highly vulnerable to environmental stresses and the influence of other factorswhich can undermine development programs, destabilize governments, provoke conflicts, and lead tohuman suffering. The large expanse of relatively dry or semi-arid environments, the high degree ofdependence on rainfall agriculture, the scarcity or uneven distribution of water resources and otherenvironmental factors in combination with a relatively low level of economic development and weakgoverning institutions have increased the vulnerability of Africa to environmental stresses and associatedconflicts and instability.

There are, however, many encouraging signs of change. The future of many African communities need notbe bleak, but can instead include a greater degree of food security, improved economic and social well-being, and more rational, sustainable use of natural resources. This future can be realized if governments,aid agencies and other partners continue to address the macro-level policy and institutional changes thatare necessary for continued progress with sustainable development programs in Africa. This would entailsupport for the establishment of incentives and other conditions which empower local communities andfavor the improved management of natural resources by rural producers. It will also require a higher degreeof accountability by government so as to discourage corruption and encourage a greater respect of human



rights and traditional, community-based controls over the use and conservation of natural resources.Improved environmental governance must be supported by a reformed policy and legal framework, andmore enlightened political leadership which is truly committed to serving the public interest.

The tremendous loss of human life, suffering and environmental degradation which resulted from thepolitical conflicts and civil war in Rwanda did not have to happen, despite continued population growthand growing pressures on farmland, pasture, woodlands, water supplies and other environmental resources.Family planning programs could have been strengthened further; agricultural intensification could havebeen accelerated; and urbanization could have been promoted and accommodated through thedevelopment of alternative livelihoods for displaced farmers and herders. Most importantly, thedevelopment of more democratic and representative institutions could have been supported at the local andnational levels in a manner which would have insured greater accountability for abuses of human rights,and improved governance by the State authorities. The demographic and environmental stresses, bythemselves, did not precipitate the conflict. But they generated pressures which the political leadership usedin their efforts to maintain power.

Similar pressures are building in many countries in Africa—a result of not only population growth, but alsoof poorly managed and ineffective development programs, and a common tendency on the part ofgoverning elites to look after their own interests at the expense of local communities and the commongood. In order to head off such situations before they lead to instability and conflict, a wide range ofindicators needs to be closely monitored. These indicators should include not only the traditional measuresof socio-economic development, but also a range of indicators of environmental conditions and naturalresource management, as well as institutional capacity and improved governance.

Average AnnualPopulation Growth Rate (%)

(1990 - most recently available)

0 1 2 3 4 5

Mauritius

Sudan

Ethiopia

Somalia

South Africa

Sierra Leone

Liberia

Zimbabw e

Mozambique

Chad

Botsw ana

Kenya

Burundi

Senegal

Malaw i

Ghana

Burkina Faso

Nigeria

Benin

Rw anda*

Mali

Congo

Cameroon

Togo

Tanzania

Cote d'Ivoire

Angola

Uganda

Madagascar

Zaire

Gambia

Population Density 1995(persons per 1000 hectares)

0 2000 4000 6000

Botsw ana

Chad

Congo

Mali

Angola

Sudan

Somalia

Zaire

Mozambique

Madagascar

Cameroon

Zimbabw e

Liberia

Tanzania

South Africa

Burkina Faso

Senegal

Cote d'Ivoire

Benin

Kenya

Ethiopia

Sierra Leone

Togo

Ghana

Uganda

Gambia

Malaw i

Nigeria

Burundi

Rw anda

Mauritius

Selected Flashpoint Indicators—Sub-Saharan Africa

Source: African Development Indicators, 1997 Source: World Resources Report, 1996* For the period 1985-89

Arable Land Per Capita, 1990(hectares)

0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2

South Africa*

Mauritius

Kenya

Somalia

Liberia

Rw anda

Ghana

Tanzania

Zaire

Mozambique

Gambia

Mali

Burundi

Madagascar

Congo

Malaw i

Ethiopia

Zimbabw e

Nigeria

Cote d'Ivoire

Uganda

Angola

Togo

Burkina Faso

Benin

Sierra Leone

Sudan

Chad

Cameroon

Senegal

Botsw ana

Selected Flashpoint Indicators—Sub-Saharan Africa

* Data not availableSource: Cleaver and Schreiber, 1994

1965-80 1980-90 1990-952.40%

2.60%

2.80%

3.00%

3.20%

1965-80 1980-90 1990-95

Changing Rate of Population Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa (1965-1995)

Average Annual Rate of Population Grow th (%)

Source: Clearver and Schreiber, 1994

Total Population Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa (1989-1996)

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996

Total Population (millions)

Source: African Development Indicators, 1997

Net Official Development Assistance (ODA) to Sub-Saharan Africa (1980-1995)

02468

1012141618

1980 1986 1988 1990 1992 1993 1994 1995

Net ODA from all donors (constant 1987 prices, $ billion)


Arable Land Per Capita1965-90

00.10.20.30.40.50.60.70.80.9

1

1965 1980 1987 1990

Ara

ble

Lan

d(h

ecta

res/

per

son

)

Source: Cleaver and Schreiber, 1994.

Average GNP Per Capita for Sub-Saharan Africa (1980-1995)

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

1980 1986 1988 1990 1992 1993 1994 1995

GNP per capita, US dollars


Water Available Per Capita

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80

Zimbabw e

Zaire

Uganda

Togo

Tanzania

Sudan

South Africa

Somalia

Sierra Leone

Senegal

Rw anda

Nigeria

Mozambique

Mauritius

Mali

Malaw i

Madagascar

Liberia

Kenya

Ghana

Gambia

Ethiopia

Cote d'Ivoire

Congo

Chad

Cameroon

Burundi

Burkina Faso

Botsw ana

Benin

Angola

ENVIRONMENTAL FLASHPOINTS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA · 2009-10-21 · ENVIRONMENTAL FLASHPOINTS IN...

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