Environmental Compliance andEnforcement in Sri Lanka:

Rapid Assessment

November 2006

CONTENTSACRONYMS

1.0 INTRODUCTION 1

1.1Background 1

1.2ObjectiveandMethodologyofRapidAssessment 1

2.0 BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT 2

2.1EnvironmentalChallenges 2

2.2Constitution 3

2.3LegalFramework 3

2.4KeyInstitutions 4

3.0 RAPID ASSESSMENT RESULTS 7

3.1LegalEnforcementAuthority 7

3.2InstitutionalArrangementsandCapacityBuilding 8

3.3ComplianceMonitoring:Permitting,InspectionsandSelf-Monitoring 10

3.4EnforcementResponse 12

3.5ComplianceAssistanceandDataManagement 13

3.6EconomicandotherIncentive-BasedInstruments 13

3.7PerformanceIndicators 14

3.8PublicParticipation 14

4.0 RECOMMENDATIONS 16

4.1Short-TermRecommendations 16

4.2Medium-TermRecommendations 17

ACRONYMSADB AsianDevelopmentBank

AECEN AsianEnvironmentalComplianceandEnforcementNetwork

AirMAC AirResourcesManagementCenter

DEO Divisional Environmental Officer

IIE InitialEnvironmentalAssessment

EIA EnvironmentalImpactAssessment

EPC EnvironmentalPollutionControl(Division)

EPL EnvironmentalProtectionLicense

CEA CentralEnvironmentalAuthority

LLF Load-basedLicensingFee

MoE MinistryofEnvironment

NEA NationalEnvironmentalAct

SEO Senior Environmental Officer

SME SmallandMedium-SizedEnterprise

USAID UnitedStatesAgencyforInternationalDevelopment

ThisstudyisarapidassessmentofSriLanka’senvironmentalcomplianceandenforcementprogramconductedbytheSec-retariatoftheAsianEnvironmentalComplianceandEnforce-mentNetwork(AECEN)withfundingfromtheAsianDevel-opmentBank(ADB)underTA6234andtheUnitedStatesAgencyforInternationalDevelopment(USAID).TheAECENSecretariatcarriedouttheassessmentincollaborationwiththeSriLankaCentralEnvironmentalAuthority(CEA),whichisanAECENmember.

1.1 BACKGROUND

StrengtheningenforcementandcomplianceprogramsisatoppriorityofAsiangovernments,whicharefocusedondesigningpoliciesthatcanstimulatesustainabledevelop-mentandeconomicgrowth.Thereisastrongneedforgovernmentstogainanimprovedunderstandingoftheincentives facing firms, and to adopt new approaches that canoptimizetheirenvironmentalcomplianceassuranceexpenditures.

Asian Environmental Compliance and EnforcementNetwork.Establishedin2005,AECENworkstopro-moteimprovedcompliancewithenvironmentallegalrequirementsinAsiathroughregionalexchangeofinnova-tivepoliciesandpractices.Composedofenvironmentalagencies,AECENobjectivesareto:

• Promotethedevelopmentandimplementationof improvedenvironmentalpolicies,laws,regulationsand institutionalarrangements;• Strengthenpractitionercapacitythroughspecialized trainingandskillsdevelopment;and• Facilitateregionalsharingofbestpracticesand informationoncomplianceandenforcement.

OneprincipalactivityofAECENistopilotinnovativepoliciesandpracticesatthecountrylevelandfacilitatefurtheradoptionanddisseminationthroughregionalco-operation(www.aecen.org).

1.0 INTRODUCTION1.2 OBJECTIVE AND METHODOLOGY OF RAPID ASSESSMENT

TheobjectiveofthisrapidassessmentistohelpSri Lanka to define priorities to address its key challengesinenvironmentalcomplianceandenforcementandlaythegroundworkforpoten-tialpilotactivitiesthatcouldbecarriedoutintheaegisofAECEN.TherapidassessmentfollowedtheAECENmethodologywhichwasalsousedtopreparesimilarassessmentsfortheIndia,Philip-pines,ThailandandVietnam.Inpreparingtheas-sessment, a consultant worked with CEA officials toassembletheinformationviaasurveyques-tionnaireandfollow-upinterviews.

Thequestionnairewasdesignedtoidentifypro-gramstrengthsandweaknesses,priorityreformareasandopportunitiesforstrategicinterventionsineightprincipalareas:

• Legalenforcementauthority;• Institutionalarrangementsandcapacity building;• Compliancemonitoring;• Enforcementresponse;• Complianceassistanceanddatamanagement;• Economicandotherincentive-based instruments;• Indicatorstoevaluateprogramsuccess;and• Publicparticipation.

OnNovember6,2006,CEAandAECENco-organizedastakeholderconsultationmeetinginColombo to discuss a draft summary of findings.

1 INTRODUCTION

SriLankaisanislandnationof65,610squarekilometers,andanestimatedpopulationof19.6million,withadensityof280personspersquarekilometer,whichisoneofthehighestintheworld.SriLanka’seconomyhasindicatedagrowthof6percentin2005,comparedto5.4percentin2004. This growth momentum has continued to the first quarterof2006,whentheeconomyrecordedagrowthof8.1percent.In2005,theindustrialsectorledbyfac-toryoutputandconstructionactivities,showedagrowthof8.3percent.GDP(2005)was23.5billionUS$;ofwhichtheindustrialsectoroccupied26.1percentandtheagriculturalsector16.8percent.

TheEighthScheduletotheConstitutionoftheDemo-craticSocialistRepublicofSriLanka(1978)establishednineprovincesforthecountryassemiautonomousregions.Ofthese,theconcentrationofindustryisgreatestintheWesternProvincewiththedistrictsofColomboandGampahahosting80percentoftheindustries.Highpollutingindustriesincludetextiles,foodprocessing, leather tanning, metal finishing, agricultural and mineralproducts.

TheStatecontrols,ifnotowns,morethan80percentofthelandinSriLankaandthusdictatesthedirectionofdevelopmentoftheselands.TheStaterestrictiononthepossession,occupationandtheuseofthisStatelandestateaggravatethepressureonland.ItisexpectedthatwhilethepopulationinSriLankawillstabilizeat23millionby2025,theurbanpopulationwillrapidlyincreasefrom30percentto60percent.

2.1 ENVIRONMENTAL CHALLENGES

Agrochemicals,fertilizers,industrialpollutionandurbanpollution,includingdomesticwasteandsewage,areamongstthemainsourcesofwaterpollution.Manyin-dustriesdonothaveproperwastetreatmentfacilities.ApilotstudyintheKelaniRiverBasinindicatesthatoutofaselectsampleof57industries,lessthanhalfhadpartialorcompletewatertreatmentfacilities.SincetheKelaniRiverisanenvironmentallysensitivesite,com-pliancedataisnottypical,andelsewherethislevelofcompliancecannotbeexpected.Thesurfacedrainageofpollutantsfromurbanenvironmentsanddirectdischargehashadanadverseimpactonriversandonanumberoflakesinurbanareas,includingBeiraLakeinColombo,KandyLakeinKandyandthelakeprovidingdrinkingwatertoKurunegala.

2.0 BACKGROUND AND CONTEXTAs a result of urban congestion, there are difficul-tiesinimplementingpitlatrineregulations,whichhasanimpactontheurbangroundwatersourcesinthecountry.Duetotheabsenceofgully-emp-tierfacilities,localauthoritiesareunabletocontrolsurface latrine over-flow. Other specialized problemsincludethesalinizationofgroundwaterinpartsofthecountryduetorapidgroundwaterextractionandproblemsposedbygemmining.

BothmobileandstationarysourcesgenerateairpollutioninSriLanka,particularlyinurbanareas.AirqualitymonitoringdataparticularlyinColomboindicatesthatairpollutionisincreasing,especiallyfrommobilesources.Toaddressthis,SriLankahaspromulgatedambientairqualityregula-tionsandvehicularexhaustemissionstandards,andhasintroducedlead-freegasoline.

AccordingtothemostrecentStateoftheEnvi-ronmentReport,2,500tonsofsolidwasteiscol-lecteddaily,ofwhich57percentisintheWesternProvince.Thissolidwasteisun-segregatedandincludeshazardousandnon-hazardouswastema-terialandmedicalwaste.Theabsenceofaproperdisposalsystemforsolidwasteisacontinuingconcernislandwide.Thepresentmethodofdis-posalconsistslargelyofopendumpinginlowlyingareas,thusimpactingwaterbodies.PublicprotesthashinderedGovernmentattemptstositewastedisposalfacilities.Thereare,how-ever,someeffortstopilotrecyclingandreuseandalternativedisposalmethods.MatEx,amaterialexchange data-base, seeks to find a solution to themanagementofsolidwastebycreatingaplat-formthatbringsthewasteproducerandpotentialbuyertogether.

Sri Lanka is considered one of the twenty-five bio-diversityhotspotsoftheworld.TheStateoftheEnvironmentReportindicatesthatdeforesta-tionandunsustainablelandusepracticesresultinthelossofanestimated5-10mmoftopsoileveryyeartosoilerosion,whichismostacuteinthehillcountry,wherethecriticalwatershedsarelocated.Astodischargeofpollutiontotheland,existingregulationsfocusalmostexclusivelyonwaterbod-ies,andnotsoil.

BACKGROUNDANDCONTEXT2

2.2 CONSTITUTION

TheConstitutionoftheDemocraticSocialistRepub-licofSriLankamakestheprotection,preservationandimprovement of the environment for the benefit of the communityadirectiveprincipleofStatepolicy.Similarly,theConstitutiondeclarestheprotectionofnatureandconservingitsrichesafundamentaldutyofeverypersoninSriLanka.

In1987,the13thAmendmenttotheConstitutionofSriLankadevolvedpowertonineProvincialCouncilsandrecognizedtheroleoftheProvincialCouncilsintheprotectionoftheenvironment.WhilecertainProvincialCouncilshavetakensomeinitiativeonenvironmentalprotection,therehasbeenlittleconcertedeffortondevolutioninthisregard.Anotherimportantoutcomeofthe13thAmendmentisthatthelocalauthorities,whichpreviouslywereunderthecentralgovernmentasasec-ondtierofgovernance,werebroughtundertherespec-tiveProvincialCouncilsadministration.Asaresult,whilethecentralgovernmentlawdeterminestheformandstructureoflocalauthorities,undertheConstitutiontheProvincialCouncilsmayconferadditionalpowersonlocalauthorities,butmaynotreduceanypowers.

2.3 LEGAL FRAMEWORK

InSriLankathereareover70lawsthatpertaintodif-ferentaspectsofprotectingandconservingthenaturalenvironmentandhumanhealth.Priorto1980,therewasnooverarchinglegislationthatcouldregulatepollutionfromallsources,andvariousagenciesaddressedissuespertaining to their sectors per sector-specific laws. In particular,theFactoriesOrdinanceaddressedindustrialoperations,includingthesafetyandwelfareofworkers,while the Nuisances Ordinance regulated certain defined nuisances.Localauthoritieswereentrustedbylawwiththeregulation,controlandadministrationofallmattersrelatingtopublichealth,publicutilityservicesandpublicthoroughfareswithintheirgeographicalareas.

National Environmental Act.In1980,theNationalEnvironmentalAct(NEA)wasenactedwiththeobjectiveofprotectingandmanagingtheenvironmentasawhole.TheinitialprovisionsoftheActfocusedon‘environmen-talmanagement’;withverylittleenforcementpowervestedintheimplementationagency.In1988,theActwasamendedtoexpandimplementationauthorityto:(1)‘environmentalprotection’,(2)‘environmentalquality’and(3)‘approvalofprojects’.

Whilein1988theprovisionsonenvironmentalprotectionappliedtoallactivitiesthatdischarge,emitordepositwasteintotheenvironmentandcausepollution,asubsequentamendmentin2000limitedtheseprovisionstolisted‘prescribedactivi-ties’.Whilethisamendmentlimitedthejurisdic-tionoftheAct,thepurposewastofocusresourc-esonprioritychallenges.Anamendmentin2005enhanced the fines specified under the Act.

TheenvironmentalqualityprovisionsoftheNEAprovideforthepreventionofpollutionofinlandwaters,theatmosphere,soilorthesurfaceofanylandandthecontrolofexcessivenoise.Unliketheprovisionsonenvironmentalprotection,whichare restricted to a defined list of prescribed activi-ties,theseprovisionsapplytoallpollutingactivities.Theenvironmentalqualityprovisions,however,aremorecomplicatedtoenforceandrequire‘proofofpollution’.Further,thesubsidiarylegislationrequiredtobringtheseprovisionsintoeffectareincomplete.Ingeneral,thegovernmentreliesontheseprovisionsatthetimeoflitigation,wherechargesarebroughtundertheseprovisionsalongwithprovisionsonenvironmentalprotection.

CEAimplementstheenvironmentalassessmentwiththesupportofothergovernmentagenciesthatprovideprojectapproval.Thelevelofdetailfortheassessmentdependsonwhetherthedeveloperisrequiredtocarryoutaninitialenvi-ronmentalassessment(IEE),oranenvironmentalimpactassessment(EIA).FortheEIA,theprojectmustcompleteapubliccommentperiod,whiletheIEEdoesnot.Fordevelopmentactivitieswithinthecoastalzone,theCoastConservationDepartmentimplementstheenvironmentalas-sessmentprocessaspertheCoastConservationAct.CEAissuessiteclearancethroughanadmin-istrativeprocessthathasbeenacknowledgedbytheSupremeCourtandtheCourtofAppeal.

Theenvironmentalmanagementprovisionspro-videtheprimarytoolsforpolicyformulationandoverallcoordination,throughtheformulationofalandusescheme,basicpolicyonthemanage-mentandconservationofnaturalresources,andexploitation and conservations systems for fisher-ies,wildlifeandforestresources.AttheNationallevel,however,theseprovisionshavenotbeenac-tivatedbytheCEA,andtheresourcesdesignatedforthispurposearelimited.

3 BACKGROUNDANDCONTEXT

Since1996,theNEAhasprescribedregulationsforthemanagementofhazardouswaste,andin1999theCEApreparedGuidelinesfortheImplementationofHazardousWasteManagementRegulations.Todate,theCEAhasnotissuedlicenses,andtheregulationshavenotbeenimplementedduetothelackoftreatmentanddisposalfacilities.Since2004,theCEAhasbeenimplementinganenvironmentalclearanceprocessforhazardouswaste,allowingcertaintypesofhazardouswastetobeco-processedatacementplant.Otheralternativeinterimmeasuresarealsoinplace.

North Western Province Environmental Statute.WiththeenactmentofthisProvincialStatutein1990,theNorthWesternProvinceEnvironmentalAuthorityas-sumedjurisdictionwithintheprovince.Asaresult,theNEAisnolongeranationalact.

Waste Management Statute of the Western Provincial Council.ThisProvincialStatuteprovidesfortheestablish-mentoftheWasteManagementAuthorityoftheWesternProvincewithpowerstointroducewastemanagementregulationsandwastemanagementguidelineswithintheWesternProvince.Theseregulationsandguidelinescover‘solidwaste’,‘hazardouswaste’and‘clinicalorinfectiouswaste’thusallowingapossibleduplicationoftheCEA’spowersandfunctions.

2.4 KEY INSTITUTIONS

ThegovernancestructureinSriLankaisthreetiered.Parliamentatthecenter,ProvincialCouncilsatthepro-vinciallevelandLocalAuthoritiesconsistingofMunicipalCouncils,UrbanCouncilsandPradeshiyaSabhasatthelocallevel.

ThesovereigntyofSriLankaisvestedinthepeople,whiletheParliamentexercisesthelegislativepowerofthepeople,andthePresidentexercisestheexecutivepower.OtherthanintheeventofParliamentaryprivileges,thejudicialpowerlieswithcourts,tribunalsandinstitutionscreatedandestablishedbylawortheConstitution.LawsformulatedbyParliamentenjoyimmunityfromchallengeuponpassing,andaCourtortribunalmaynotquestionthevalidityofanysuchlawmadebyParliament.

Ministry of Environment.Establishedin1990,theMin-istryofEnvironmentisresponsibleforproviding“leader-shiptomanagetheenvironmentandnaturalresourcesinordertoensurenationalcommitmentforsustainabledevelopment for the benefit of the present and future generations”andthevisionof“ahealthyandpleasantenvironment,sustainingnatureforthewellbeingofthe

peopleandtheeconomy”.Thefollowingagen-ciesareundertheMinistryofEnvironment:DepartmentofForest,StateTimberCooperation,CentralEnvironmentalAuthority,WildLifeTrust,DepartmentofWildlifeConservation,GeologicalSurvey&MinesBureau,andtheMarinePollutionPreventionAuthority.

TheMinistryformulatedtheNationalEnviron-mentPolicy(NEP)in2003,andtheCaringfortheEnvironment(CFE)2003–2007PathtoSustain-ableDevelopmentasanactionplantowardstheimplementationoftheNEP.TheMinistryhasalsoformulatednationalpoliciesincludingtherecentNationalPolicyonWatershedManagementandtheBiodiversityConservationActionPlan(BCAP).

Central Environmental Authority. EstablishedbytheNEA,theCentralEnvironmentalAuthority(CEA)istheadministeringagencyfortheNEAandisundertheMinistryofEnvironment.Es-tablishedinaccordancewiththeNEA,theCEABoardconsistsoftheChairmanandtwoothermembersappointedbythePresidentinconsulta-tionwiththeMinister.Twomembersarerequiredto have adequate expertise and qualifications inthesubjectofenvironment,whilethethirdisrequiredtohavesuitableadministrativeskillandexperienceinenvironmentalmanagement.TheAuthorityisabodycorporatewithperpetualsuccessionthatmaysueandbesuedinitsname.WhiletheCEAisempoweredtoestablishitsownfund,intermsofArticle154oftheConstitu-tionandtheprovisionsoftheAct,itissubjecttotheAuditorGeneral’sscrutinyandthuscomesunderParliamentarysupervision.A30-memberEnvironmentalCouncilappointedbytheMinisteradvisestheCEA.TheCEAestablishedDistrictEnvironmentalAgenciesforeachadministrativedistrictundertheChairmanshipoftheGovern-mentAgentoftheDistrict.

TheCEAisresponsibleforthecoordinationofallregulatoryactivitiesrelatingtothedischargeofwastesandpollutantsintotheenvironmentandtheprotectionandimprovementofthequal-ityoftheenvironment.Inordertocarryoutitsobjectives,theAuthorityisempoweredtosurveyandtoinvestigatethecauses,nature,extentandpreventionofpollution,andtoconduct,pro-moteandcoordinateresearchonenvironmentaldegradationanditsprevention.CEAcangive

BACKGROUNDANDCONTEXT4

directivestolocalauthoritiestocomplywithanyCEArecommendations.TheCEAmayalsoprovideinforma-tionandeducationtothepublicregardingtheprotectionandimprovementoftheenvironment.

The CEA has five divisions: Environment Pollution Control, EnvironmentManagementandAssessment,EnvironmentEducationandAwareness,HumanResources,andOp-erationalPlanningandMonitoring.Indecentralizingitsfunctions,theCEAhasestablishedfourregionalandfoursub-regional offices throughout the country.

ExceptfortheWesternProvince,CEAoperatesprovincialregional and sub-regional offices that handle most compli-anceandenforcementfunctions.IntheWesternProvince,where the CEA head office is located, the Environment PollutionControlDivisionhasbeencarryingoutroutinecomplianceandenforcementfunctions,detractingfromitsnationalresponsibilities,thoughthissituationwillchange.The CEA recently established a regional Provincial Office fortheWesternProvince,andisintheprocessoftrans-ferringthefunctionsoftheEnvironmentPollutionControlDivision to this regional office.

Inimplementingthehazardouswasteregulations,theCEAhasalsoestablishedaHazardousWasteManagementUnit,whichhasbeenfullystaffedsince2003.Despiteitsmandate,however,theUnitfocusesmuchofitsattentiononthemanagementofsolidwastemanagement,andnotonthemanagementofhazardouswaste.

AirMAC.MoEandCEAestablishedtheAirResourcesManagementCenter(AirMAC)inpartnershipwithotherstakeholderstoprovideleadership,guidanceandfacilita-tioninairqualitymanagement.Itsobjectivesincludethedevelopmentofaneffectivecoordinationmechanismandtheintegrationofallairpollutionabatementprograms.In1996,AirMACinitiatedaprogramforthecontinuousmonitoringofambientairqualityintheColomboCity.

TheCEAproducesweeklyreportswhicharedisseminatedtothemediaandprominentlydis-playedonabulletinboardintheCity.AirMACisalsoengagedinthedevelopmentofpublicprivatepartnershipsparticularlyintestingandissuingVehicle Emission Certificates.

Provincial & Local Government.BelowtheParliament,thenextlevelofgovernanceisrepre-sentedbythenineProvincialCouncilsestablishedbythe13thAmendmenttotheConstitution.ProvincialCouncilsconsistofanelectedlegislativebodyandaGovernorappointedbythePresident,whoperformsthefunctionsoftheexecutive.TheProvincialCouncilsmaymakestatutesapplicablewithintheprovinceinrespectofsubjectareasspecified under the Constitution. Since the Pro-vincialCouncilsaresubsidiarylawmakingbodies,theirstatutesdonotenjoyimmunityfromchal-lenge,andcourtsmayatanytimestrikedownaprovincialstatuteonconstitutionalgrounds.

LocalauthoritiesconsistingofMunicipalCouncils,UrbanCouncilsandPradeshiyaSabhasconstitutethethirdlevelofgovernance.Localauthoritiesarebodiescorporateandhavethepowertofor-mulate subsidiary legislation on subjects specified intherespectivelawsandthusformulateby-lawsfortheirareas.Thispower,whichisanexceptiontotherulethatParliamentmaynotabdicateitslawmakingpower,issubjecttochallengeintermsofwhetherornotithasbeenexercisedwithinthelimitsprescribedbylaw.Thus,Courtsmayscrutinizeandsetasideby-lawsatanytimeonthegroundsoftheirbeingultra vires.Since1987,localauthoritieshavebeenplacedunderthePro-vincialCouncils.Provincialandlocaladministrationis further complicated in the conflict areas.

5 BACKGROUNDANDCONTEXT

RespondingtotheMinisterialpolicyonCaringfortheEnvironment2003–2007,in2004CEAconductedaninternalassessmentanddevelopedanactionplantoidentifystrategiesforenhancingachievementofitsmission.EntitledRoadMapforCaringfortheEnvironment2004–2007,someexpectedoutcomesincludedafocusonimprovingenforcementandcompliance:

• 100percentindustrialcompliancewithenvironmental regulations;• Strengthenedlawenforcementcapacity;and• Establishedcentersforenvironmentalinformation, educationandpromotionofskillsandcommitmentfor environmentalprotection.

TheRoadMapalsooutlinestheactivitiesneededtoachievetheseobjectsbutdoesnotsetinterimtargetstomeasureprogress.SincecomponentsoftheRoadMapareatvariousstagesofimplementation,thisrapidassessmentanditsrecom-mendationscansupportCEAefforts.

3.1 LEGAL ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITY

PertheNEA,theCEAhasoverallregulatoryauthoritypertainingtoenvironmentalpollution,includingpolicymaking,standardsetting,investigation,coordinationandresearch.TosupporttheCEAfunctions,theMinistermayformulateregulationsasrequiredbytheAct.AsdetailedinTable1,CEApossessesarangeofregulatorypowers,thoughwithkeylimitationsthatreducesitseffectivenessastheprincipalcomplianceandenforcementagency.

Table1:SummaryofEnforcementAuthority

3.0 RAPID ASSESSMENT RESULTSSincethe2000amendmentofNEA,CEAhashadtheauthoritytolicenseonly“prescribedactivities”listedunderPartIV-AoftheNEA,whicharethe80mainlyhighlypollutingindustries,eventhoughCEAhadjurisdictionoverallotheractivitiesunderitsbroadermandatetoregulate“environmentalquality”underPartIV-B.ThenarrowscopeofthepermitsystemtocoveronlyactivitiesunderPartIV-A,coupledwiththelackofregulatorypow-ersoverlocalauthorities(seeSection3.2),limitsCEA’sabilitytoregulatepollutingactivities.

AsdetailedinSection3.3,CEAhasthepowersofinspectionandmonitoring,includingtheauthoritytorequireself-monitoringandreport-ing.UndertheNEA,theDirector-Generaloranofficer authorized by him in writing may enter any landorpremisestoexamineandinspect,takesamples,reviewbooks,recordsordocu-ments,takephotographsetc.Whenthereisreasonablecausetosuspectanyseriousobstruc-tionsintheexecutionofduties,theinspectormay enter accompanied by a police officer. The preventionorobstructionoftheinspectorinthecourseofsuchinspectionisanoffence.Theseprovisions are very specific on what the inspec-tormaydoafterenteringpremises,anddonotextendtoinvestigativepowers.

WhileCEAhasthepowertosuspendorcancelalicense,theAuthoritymaynotorderacorrectiveactionperacompliancescheduleorclosureof

CEA Powers and Responsibilities

Conduct policy and rule-making

Establish standards/guidelines

Coordinate of regulatory activities

Approve industrial siting applications

Issue, cancel and suspend licenses

Access to records and equipment

Enter and inspect facilities

Require self-monitoring/reporting

Close facility; require corrective action

Impose civil judicial sanctions

Impose civil administrative sanctions

Impose criminal fines/penalties

Issue cease and desist/closure orders

NoYes Remarks

Responsibility shared with the Ministry of Environment

Promulgation of regulations

Oversight over local authority regulatory activities

For non-prescribed projects – administrative process

Only on prescribed activities

Director-General or authorized officer to require by notice

Director-General or authorized officer

Per license (EPL) requirements

No provision

No provision

No provision

Through courts

Through courts

RAPIDASSESMENTRESULTS6

afacility.Thispowerremainswiththecourts,whichcanonlycloseafacilityfollowingcriminalconviction.Infact,allsanctions (fines and imprisonment) must be pursued as criminalviolations,andCEAdoesnothaveciviljudicialoradministrativeauthority.Notsurprisingly,criminalcasesbrought by CEA are difficult to prosecute, and consume preciousgovernmentresourcesandtime.

Enforcement and Local Authorities.UndertheNEA,theCEAhastheauthoritytoissuedirectivestolocalauthori-tiesonanumberofsubjectareas,particularlyinrelationtotheunauthorizeddischargeofsolidwaste.WheretheCEAhasissuedadirectivetoalocalauthority,thelawdoesnotprovidemeansofensuringcompliance,norsanctionsfornon-compliance.Asaresult,thereislittleincentiveforthelocalauthoritiestocomplywithsuchdirectives,whichlimitstheeffectivenessofCEA.

Therearealsoambiguitiesrelatedtodelegatedauthoritytolocalgovernments.Itisunclear,forexample,whetherornottheCEAcanpursueanenforcementactionincourtagainstaviolatorforactivitieslistedinPartB.Itisalsounclearwhetherornotalocalauthoritycouldobtainaclosureorderbasedondelegatedauthority.NeithersituationhasbeentestedinCourt.

Key Challenges

Limited scope of CEA regulatory powers duetothestrictinterpretationoftheinapplicabilityofthecomplianceandenforcementfunctiontoonly“pre scribedactivities”perPartIV-AofNEAcompromisesoveralleffectivenessofCEA.

Weak enforcement powersduetoinabilitytoconductinvestigations,closefacilities,requirecorrectiveactionpercompliance schedule, or impose administrative fines or penaltiesisamajorchallengefacingCEA.TheCEAalsohas incomplete or undefined enforcement powers over non-complyinglocalauthorities.

3.2 INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS AND CAPACITY BUILDING

Delegation of authority.TheActprovidestheCEAwithwidepowersofdelegation.WiththeconcurrenceoftherelevantMinister,theCEAmaydelegateanyofitspowers,dutiesandfunctionsundertheActtoanyGovernmentdepartment,corporation,statutoryboard,localauthor-

ity or any public officer. Notwithstanding such delegation,CEAretainstheprimaryobligationtoprotecttheenvironmentandtoadministertheAct.Basedontheseprovisions,CEAhasdel-egatedthepowertolicensecertaincategoriesofindustriestolocalauthorities.

Asmentionedearlier,the13thAmendmentestablishedProvincialCouncilsandsetsoutasaProvincialCouncilresponsibilitythe“protec-tionofenvironmentwithintheProvincetotheextentpermittedbyorunderanylawmadebyParliament”,whiletheConcurrentListsetsout“protectionoftheenvironment”asaConcurrentresponsibility. Thus, the Constitution affirms that theProvincialCouncilshavearoletoplayintheprotectionoftheenvironment,thoughtheprovi-sionsindicatethatParliamentintendstoexerciseasupervisoryfunctionoversuchProvincialactivity.TheGovernment,however,hasnotclearlydelin-eatedtheroleofProvincialCouncilsinenviron-mentalprotection.

Asaconsequence,boththeNorthWesternProvinceandtheWesternProvincehaveenactedprovincialstatutespertainingtotheprotectionoftheenvironment.Inparticular,theEnvironmentalStatuteNo.12of1990oftheNorthWesternProvinceduplicatesmanyoftheprovisionsoftheNEA.Asaresult,theNEAisconsideredinoperativewithintheNorthWesternProvince.IfotherProvincesweretoenactprovincialstatutesontheirownandrendertheNEAinoperative,this would significantly limit CEA’s activities. It is, therefore,importanttorationalizethefunctionsatthenationalandprovinciallevels.

Afurthercomplicationtodelegationliesinthefactthatthe13thAmendmentveststhesubjectoflocalauthoritiesasaprovincialsubject.Sofar,thedelegationprocessesoftheNEAby-passestheprovincialcouncils.Thiscancausefutureproblemsinimplementation,particularlyinthesupervisionoflocalauthorityfunctions.

Human Resources.Atpresent,CEAhasatotalstaffof749persons.SeniorEnvironmentalOfficers (SEOs) carry out inspections for Part A activities. Each of the four regional offices has

7 RAPIDASSESSMENTRESULTS

four SEOs and each of the four sub-regional offices has twoSEOs,thusmakingatotalof26SEOs.TheLegalDivi-sion of the CEA consists of five lawyers.

ForPartBinspectionsandrelatedactivities,thereare368 Divisional Environmental Officers (DEOs) presently placedinDivisionalSecretariesandDistrictSecretariesoffices throughout the country. (As a result of restruc-turing these regional and sub-regional offices will all be called provincial offices.) The Government recruited approximately300oftheDEOsduringasinglerecruit-menteffort,andplacedunderDivisionalSecretariesandlocalauthorities.TheCEAispresentlystreamliningthismassivepersonnelrecruitment.TheservicesoftheDEOsareavailabletothelocalauthoritiesonapre-arrangedrotation.Atpresent,theDEOserviceisnotlinkedtotheSEOservice,thoughplansareunderwaytodosowiththe establishment of proposed district level offices.

Budgetary Support.TheActprovidesfortheestablish-mentofaseparatefundfortheCEA.WhiletheinitialcapitalfortheCEAcamefromtheConsolidatedFund,theCEAmaythereafterestablishandmaintainaseparatefund,thoughasyetnosuchFundhasbeenestablished.MainincomesourcesfortheCEAareapplicationfees,rent,licensefees,inspectionfees,saleofpublicationsandlaboratoryservices.

Eachyear,theCEApreparesabudgetbasedontheactualexpenditures for the previous year adjusted for inflation. Anynewactivitiesneedtobefactoredinatthetimeofbudgeting.Sincetheactualtransferoffundsfromthetreasurytakesintoaccountthepredictedincomeforthepreviousyear,attheendoftheyear,theCEAisleftwithazerobalance.Theactualdisbursementoffundsisdonemonthlyonaproratabasis,andanysurplusisalsofactoredintothemonthlydisbursement.Asaresult,thereis little financial flexibility for CEA’s activities. The total budgetfor2005was166millionrupees,whilethebudgetfor2006is194million.

AlthoughthereareseveraldivisionswithintheCEA,theirfundingispartofthemainbudget.Staffsalaries,travelexpenses,etc.ofalldivisionsarelumpedunderonemainbudget,andarenotdividedupaccordingtothevariousdivisions. Only funding allocated for some specific activity isdirectlyhandledbytheconcerneddivision.

Local Government Capacity.Thecapacityoflocalauthoritiesisuneven.Somelocalauthorities,suchastheColomboMunicipalCouncil,havetheirownlaboratory,whilemostdonotevenhavethenecessarypersonnelfortheimplementationoftheenvironmentalpermittingand

monitoringfunctions.Todate,therehasnotbeenanassessmentofthecurrentcapacityofthelocalauthoritiestoimplementbasiccomplianceandenforcementfunctions.

TheCommissionReportonLocalAuthoritiesmadeseveralrecommendationstoenhancetheenvironmentalmanagementcapacityoflo-calauthorities.Theseinclude:establishmentofenvironmentalcommittees,establishmentofanenvironmentaldepartment/divisionateachlocalauthority, financial resources streams linked to the environmentandappointmentofenvironmentalofficers for every local authority.

Training.AccordingtotheRoadMap,themosturgentcapacityneedissupportforthe‘functionsatthesub-nationallevel’–i.e.theDEOs,whoseservicesareprovidedtothelocalauthorities,andwhoarealsoexpectedtocarryoutasupervisoryroleoverthelocalauthorities.TheCEAispres-entlyengagedinstreamliningandenhancingthecapacityoftheDEOservice.

ThedelegatedfunctionsinrelationtoEPLarecarriedoutbytherelevantlocalauthorities,ofwhichonlyafewofthe309arefullycompetentandequipped.TheCEAprovidestechnicalandlegaladvicetolocalauthoritiesontheEPLfunc-tions,whiletheMinistryofLocalGovernmentandProvincialCouncilsprovidesadministrativeand financial support. In 2006, the CEA prepared andpublishedaTrainingManualforEnvironmen-talInspectors,whichcoverslicensingprocedures,inspectionplanning,samplingprocedureandevi-dence,andsetsthetemplateforinspectionwork.

Key Challenges

Overlapping legal authority between CEA and Provinceshasledtoadualprogramthatduplicateseffortsandcompromisesnational regulatoryuniformity.

Absence of a separate CEA fundasauthorizedby NEA limits CEA’s ability to finance compliance andenforcementactivitiesandinitiatives,includingimplementingneweconomic-incentivesprograms.

Limited human, institutional and financial capac-ityofCEAandlocalauthoritiestocarryoutlegalmandatesoncomplianceandenforcementisanobviouslong-termchallenge.

RAPIDASSESMENTRESULTS8

3.3 COMPLIANCE MONITORING: PERMITTING, INSPECTIONS AND SELF-MONITORING

Permitting.Theprincipalpermittingprogramunder‘environmentalprotection’istheEnvironmentalProtectionLicense(EPL)scheme,whichappliestoanypersonwhodischarges,depositsoremitswasteintotheenvironmentandcausespollution;theEPLprovisionsapplyonlyto‘pre-scribedactivities’perPartIVAoftheAct.TheEnviron-mentalPollutionControlDivision(EPCDivision)oftheCEAadministerstheEPLprogramthroughthePollutionControlUnit,HazardousWasteManagementUnitandtheLaboratoryServicesUnit.

CEA has issued a range of effluent discharge standards, includingdischargeintoinlandsurfacewaters,industrialeffluent discharge on land for irrigation, industrial and domestic effluent discharge into marine coastal areas, and separate effluent standards for rubber, textile and tanning industriesdischargingintoinlandsurfacewaters.

PertheCEAAnnualReports,CEAhasissuedandre-newedalargenumberoflicenses.In2004,forexample,thenumberofapplicationsforlicensesshoweda27percentannualincrease;in2005,214newlicenseswereissued(seeTable2).

Table2:EnvironmentalProtectionLicensesin2005

(sourceCEAAnnualReport-2005)

ImplementationauthorityfortheEPLschemeisdividedbetweentheCEAandthelocalauthorities.Thelistof“prescribedactivities”containstwolists–PartAandPartB.TheCEAregulatesactivitiesinPartA,whicharethe80mainlyhighlypollutingindustries(petrochemicals,ce-ment,textiles,rubber,foodprocessing)andissuestheEPL.

AsdelegatedbyCEA,relevantlocalauthoritiesregulate activities defined in Part B, which include lesspollutingandsmall-scaleindustries(e.g.,brickkilns,grindingmills,smallhotels),andissuetheEPL.

Thelawprovidesthat,notwithstandingthedelega-tion,itistheresponsibilityoftheCEAtoprotecttheenvironmentandtoadministertheprovisionsof the NEA. Thus, with final responsibility still restswiththeCEA,whichisrequiredtoexerciseastrongsupervisoryroleoverlocalauthorities.Thisarrangementiscomplicated,however,bythefactthattheCEAisundertheMoE,whilethelocalauthoritiesareundertheMinistryofLocalGovernmentandProvincialCouncils.

TheNEAprovidesanadministrativeappealsprocedureonEPLforanyapplicantforalicense“aggrievedbytherefusaloftheAuthoritytograntthelicense”,ortoanyholderofalicense“ag-grievedbythesuspensionorcancellationofsame,orrefusaltorenewthelicense”.ThisrightofappealisnotavailabletothepublicaggrievedbythedecisionoftheCEAinfavorofthelicensee.(Thesameappliesforapprovalsgrantedundertheenvironmentalassessmentprocess.)

Inspections.EightRegionalandSub-regionalof-fices of CEA carry out inspections and monitoring activitiesthroughoutthecountry.Giveninad-equatemanpowerandequipment,however,theseoffices are unable to carry out regular monitoring ofactivities,andusuallytheydonotprepareanannualmonitoringandinspectionplan.AlthoughCEAcarriesoutsomeunannouncedspotinspec-tionsatirregularintervals,generallyinspectionsarecomplaintdriven,orcarriedoutwhenpro-cessinglicenseapplicationsorrenewals.Inaddi-tion,bynoticeinwriting,CEAmayrequiretheoc-cupant to furnish the Authority within a specified periodinformationonmanufacturing,industrial,ortradeprocesses,oronwastesdischargedorlikelytobedischarged.

In2005,theCEApreparedamonitoringprogramfortheWesternProvince,whichestablishedamonitoringdateforeachindustrythatcorre-spondedtothedeadlineforlicenserenewal,andensuredthateachlicensedindustrywasmoni-toredatleasttwiceayear.DuetotherecenttransferofsomeEPCDivisionfunctionstotheProvincial Office, this monitoring program is not yetinfulloperation.

9 RAPIDASSESSMENTRESULTS

Province/District

Western

Kandy

Kegalle

Galle

Trincomalee

Anuradhapura

Ampara

Weeravila

Jaffna

Badulla

Total

EPL Issued

114

14

17

34

06

06

09

09

--

05

214

EPL Renewed

160

13

05

15

01

03

01

14

--

--

212

Self monitoring and Self-reporting. TheNationalEnvi-ronmental(ProtectionandQuality)Regulations,No.01of1990providethegeneraltermsandconditionsforanEPL,andrequirelicenseestomeasure,calculate,andregisterofsamplestodetermineactuallevelofpollutionandriskofexposure;andrecorddataandreporttotheAuthority.Asaresult,self-monitoringandself-reportingisoftenintroducedasalicenserequirementintheEPL.Themonitoringandreportingfrequencyvariesdependingontheactivity,andistypicallyonquarterlyorbi-annualbasis.Also,therearenosanctionsforselfmonitoringviolations.Inaddition,licensesgrantedundertheenvironmentalassessmentprocessmayalsoincludeself-monitoringandreportingrequirements.

Key Challenges

Lack of comprehensive permitting, monitoring and inspection proceduressignificantly limits the abilityofCEAorlocalauthoritiestoestablishasolidfoun dationforcomplianceassurance.

Limited application of self monitoring requirementsplacesanexcessiveburdenonanalreadyoverstretchedCEAinconductingroutinecompliancemonitoringtasks.

Absence of laboratory accreditation measuresreducestheeffectivenessoftheexistingprogramandfutureeffortstodevelopself-monitoringorpollutionchargeprograms.

3.4 ENFORCEMENT RESPONSE

CEAdetectsviolationsthroughitsownmonitoringactivi-ties,complaintsandselfmonitoringreports.Upondetect-ingaviolation,therelevantCEARegionalorSub-regionalOffice issues one or more warning letters to the violator, settingforthatimelimitforthefacilitytocomeintocom-pliance.Iftheviolatorfailstocomeintocompliance,therelevant Regional or Sub-regional office refers the matter totheLegalDivisionoftheCEA.Priortoproceedingwithanenforcementaction,theLegalDivisionsendsashow-causeletter,andiftheresponseisunsatisfactory,theLegalDepartmentproceedswiththeenforcementactionthroughcriminallitigation.

Inthecaseofaviolation,CEAmaysuspendorcancelthelicense,thoughthissuspensiondoesnotresultinimme-diateclosureofafacility,oreventheestablishmentofacomplianceschedule.Onlycourtscanorderacompli-ancescheduleorclosureafterconviction.Asaresult,non-complyingfacilitiesmaycontinuetooperateduringthelitigation,whichcanbequitelengthy.

ViolationsareprosecutedintheMagistrate’sCourt, and penalties include fines and imprison-ment.Courtsare,however,generallyunwillingtoimprisonthoseconvictedforenvironmentaloffencesunlessthereareextremereasonstodoso.CEAdoesnothaveciviljudicialoradministra-tiveauthority.

IntheabsenceofprovisionsunderPartIVAoftheNEAtoobtainimmediateclosureorders,theCEAhasresortedtotheprovisiononthepowertoissuedirectivesandtoobtaintemporaryclosureorders,toobtainanimmediateclosureofapollutingindustry.Courtshavegenerallybeenwillingtoissuesuchorders,thoughnotinallcases.

Legal Consultation. Litigation can raise difficult legalissuesthatrequireopinionsandassistanceoutsidetheCEA’spresentcapacity.Asaresult,theCEAcanconsultwiththeAttorney-General’sDepartmentforlitigationadviceonfee-for-ser-vicebasis.Inaddition,theCEAcanonlyobtainoutsidelegalassistancewithpriorapprovaloftheAttorney-General.

There are significant capacity limitations at CEA, whichlacksthefundingtopayfortheAttorney-General’sDepartmentforlitigationsupport.Atpresent,thereareover80casespending,approxi-mately35ofwhichrelatetoviolationsofEPLconditions,orfailuretoobtainalicense.SevencasesrelatetofailuretoabidebydirectivesissuedbytheCEA.

Key Challenge

Weak, inflexible agency enforcement tools pre-ventCEAfromexercisingaresponsive,effective,proportionateresponsetonon-compliancethatwouldpunishpolluters,redressharmandcreateanatmosphereofdeterrence.

3.5 COMPLIANCE ASSISTANCE AND DATA MANAGEMENT

TheCEAEnvironmentalEducationandAware-nessDivisioncarriesouttargetedandgeneralawarenessactivities,includingoutreachandprovi-sionofinformationtotheregulatedcommunity.TheCEAhas,infact,preparedseveralguidelinestopromotecompliance,includingtheGuidelinesfortheImplementationofHazardousWasteMan-agement(1999)andtheTechnicalGuidelineson

RAPIDASSESMENTRESULTS10

SolidWasteManagementinSriLanka.TheCEAmaintainsawebsite(www.cea.lk),whichcontainssomeinformationtargetingtheregulatedcommunity,includingalistofsug-gested“Specialists/ConsultantsforTechnologicalGuidanceonPollutionControl”andalistoflaboratories.

OnerecommendedoutputputforwardintheRoadMapwasthedevelopmentofeducationalmaterialandprovi-sionoftrainingonsustainableconsumption,sustainableproduction,ISOstandardsandcleanerproductionfortheregulatedcommunity.UndertheMinistryofIndustry,SriLankaalsooperatestheNationalCleanerProductionCenter,whichcarriesoutindustryauditsandprovidesrecommendationsoncleanerproductionapproachestoindustry.

CEAhasalsonotestablishedanenvironmentalinfor-mationmanagementsystem,andmostcomplianceandenforcementdataisstoredinpaperarchives.

Key Challenges

Limited provision of compliance assistance to the regulated community preventsCEAfromaneffective means for targeting specific pollutingindustries,especiallySMEs,bydirectlyleveraging availableinformation,technologiesandbestpractices.

Absence of a comprehensive computerized data management system preventsthedevelopment,use andsharingofcoreprograminformation

3.6 ECONOMIC AND OTHER INCENTIVE-BASED INSTRUMENTS

Atpresent,SriLankaimplementsatraditionalcommandandcontrolcomplianceandenforcementprogram.Todate,theonlyincentivesprovidedbythegovernmentareseveralsoftloanschemesincollaborationwithbankstoimplementpollutionreductionstrategiesandactions.Presently,asoftloanschemetitledE-FriendsIIisinimple-mentation.

Since2000,however,CEAhasbeenexploringoptionsforestablishingawastewaterpollutionchargeprogram,orload-basedlicensingfee(LLF)scheme.HavingselectedtheKelaniRiverasapilotlocationforthescheme,CEAhascompletedsomeanalysisandtestingfortheschemeanddrawnsomeconclusions.

Inparticular,theschemewouldbebasedonchemicaloxygendemand,andoperateonatwo-tierbasiswhere

industriesthatmeetenvironmentalstandardswouldpayalowernominalrate,whilethosefailingtomeetthestandardswouldpayapenalrate.TheschemewouldinitiallyapplytohighlypollutingindustriesandwouldreturnrevenuestoarevolvingfundestablishedundertheNEA,orsomeotherlegalarrangement.Implementedonaphasedbased,theschemewouldalsoofferincentivestoindustry,includingtheprovisionforsoftloanstoindustriesthatdonothaveaccesstoacommontreatmentsystem.

While much work remains in defining the scheme, including clarifying fiscal and regulatory elements, andimplementationandcapacityrequirements,theCabinethasinprincipleapproveditsestab-lishmentbasedonapolicypaperpreparedbythe CEA, which reflects the results of the previ-ousanalysisthoughleavesunresolvedremainingimplementationrequirements.

Key Challenge

Absence of economic or incentive-based instru-mentsdoesnotallowCEAtoleveragemarketand community forces and access additional finan-cialresourcestocomplementarelativelyweakcommand-and-controlcomplianceandenforce-mentsystem.

3.7 PERFORMANCE INDICATORS

Todate,CEAhasnotdevelopedindicatorstoevaluateitcomplianceandenforcementprogram,thoughitmaintainsawiderangeofrelevantinfor-mationthatcouldsupportperformancemanage-ment.TheCEAAnnualReportincludesinforma-tionon:numberofnewlicensesissued,numberof licenses renewed, number of complaints filed, numberofresponsestocomplaints,numberofsiterecommendationsissuedandnumberre-jected,numberofreportssubmittedtocourt,numberof‘prescribedprojects’approved,numberof cases filed and number of cases concluded. Overall,baselineinformationoncomplianceandenforcementisunevenornon-existent;CEAalsomanagesthisinformationviaapaperarchivalsystem.TheRoadMaprecognizestheneedtodevelop environmentally significant indicators and topublishelectronicallytherelevantevaluationdataonaquarterlybasis.

11 RAPIDASSESSMENTRESULTS

Key Challenge

Lack of performance indicators and targets to assesseffectiveness of enforcement program is a significantconstrainttoeffectiveprioritysettingandprogrammanagement.

3.8 PUBLIC PARTICIPATION

Backedbyastrongcivilsociety,therearealargenum-berofenvironmentalnon-governmentalorganizations(NGOs)operatinginSriLanka.TheCEAconsultsdirectlywithNGOsonarangeofissues,andmaintainsareg-istereddatabaseofoveronehundredenvironmentalNGOs and has provided an office at the CEA headquar-tersforNGOs.Infact,theRoadMaprecognizedtheneedtoestablish‘focalunits’atCEAheadquartersandregional offices for coordination with civil society, as well as a facility at the headquarters and regional offices to respondtopubliccomplaints.

Access to Information.SriLankadoesnothaveanac-cesstoinformationlaw,althoughtheLawCommissionhasrecommendedtheneedforone,andjudicialdecisionsfavorrecognizingtherighttohaveaccesstoinformationinanenvironmentalcontext.TheEvidenceOrdinancealsoprovidesthatwherearighttoinspectapublicdocu-mentexists,thepersonentitledtoexamineisalsoentitledto obtain a certified copy. In the absence of a right to informationact,theusualapproachisthatinformationisconfidential unless declared not to be so. The AirMAC ini-tiative,whichreleasesregularambientairqualitymonitor-ingreports,setsanimportantprecedentindisseminationofpublicenvironmentalinformation.

Citizen Complaints.CEArespondstocitizencomplaintseitherinwritingorbyacomplainthotlinethatislocatedat the Western Province Provincial Office (see Table 3). Forthehotline,thereisnosupportunitordedicatedstafftofollowuponcomplaints,andCEAmerelydirectscomplaintstotherelevantdivisionforinvestigation.Theconcerneddivisiondealswithsubsequentinquiresfromthecomplainants,whichtakesaconsiderableamountofstafftime.

Citizen Enforcement.TherearenodirectenforcementprovisionsintheNEAavailabletocitizens.Citizenenforcementiseitherbywayofanuisanceactionifitcanbeproved,orbychal-lengingtheCEAusuallybywritactionssuchasCertiorariandMandamusseekingaCourtordercompellingtheCEAtoimplementthelaw.Ifsuccessful,thecitizenhastoawaitanotherlengthyprocess for the CEA to file action and compel compliance.AlthoughthepowertoissuetheseprerogativewritswasvestedonlyintheCourtofAppeal,whichsitsinColombo,subsequenttothe13thAmendment,thesewritswithrespecttomatterswithintheProvincecouldnowbeissuedbytheProvincialHighCourts.

Ingeneral,thejudiciaryinSriLankahasbeenpositiveinitsresponsetopublicinterestlitigation.During the last two decades, several high profile environmentalcaseshaveestablishedimportantprecedentswithrespecttothesharedresponsi-bilitiesbetweentheStateandsociety,transpar-encyindecisionmaking,establishingmonitoringcommitteeswithrepresentationfromtheaffectedcommunitytomonitorindividualindustries,etc.Publicnuisancelitigation–theinvocationofthepowersofprerogativewritsandtheexerciseoffundamentalrightsjurisdiction–continuestoplay a significant role in environmental litigation. Actionsakinto‘classactions’canbebroughtintermsoftheCivilProcedureCodethoughtheseprovisions have not been explored sufficiently in relationtoenvironmentalissues.

Key Challenges

Public access to information is not recognizedinlaw,whichlimitspublicparticipationindecision-makingrelatedtocomplianceandenforcement.

Ineffective citizen complaints process and limited public awareness of programreducesopportunitiesforCEAtoleveragepublic involvementincomplianceandenforcementprocess..

Table3:CitizenComplaintsReceivedbyCEAin2005

RAPIDASSESMENTRESULTS12

Type of Complaint

Hotline

Written complaints

Total Complaints

Other Provinces

37

615

652

Total

323

1965

2288

Western Province

286

1350

1636

Thefollowingproposedrecommendationsarebasedontherapid assessment questionnaire, interviews with officials and astakeholderconsultationmeetingheldontheNovember6,2006attheCEAheadquartersinColombo.Theshorttermrecommendationscanbeimplementedimmediatelyandmayrequireonlyneworrevisedregulations.Long-termrecommendationsrequiremoresubstantivechanges,includingamendingtheNEAorotherlaws,ormoreintensiveplanningorresourcerequirements.

4.1 SHORT-TERM RECOMMENDATIONS

Strengthen cooperation mechanism betweenagencies MoE, CEA, Local Authorities and other concerned agencies.

TheGovernmentshouldestablishformalmechanismsforimprovedcoordinationbetweenenvironmentalagencies,suchasMoE,CEAandlocalauthorities.TheGovernmentshouldputforwardamandateforresolvingissuesatthepolicylevel,includingthroughinter-ministerialorcabinet-levelcoordination,andregularstaff-levelmeetings.

Establish integrated permitting, monitoring and inspection policies, procedures and practices for use by CEA and local authorities

GiventheinstitutionalcomplexitiesinSriLanka,itisimportanttodevelopandimplementuniformpoliciesandproceduresforpermitting,monitoringandinspec-tionforusebyCEAandlocalauthorities.BuildingontheexperienceandcapabilitiesoftheCEAwithintheWest-ernProvince,CEAcoulddevisepoliciesandproceduresthataddressEPLissuance,monitoringandinspectionstoensuremoretransparentandeffectivecomplianceassur-anceprograms.CEAcouldbuildonitsrecentinspectortrainingprogramindevelopingthesenewpoliciesandpractices,andworktosupportlaboratoryaccreditationasacorecapacity.

Move forward on pilot testing and implementingthe waste water discharge fee scheme

BasedontheinitialanalysisofthewastewaterLLFscheme,andCabinetapprovalforthispolicy,CEAshouldmoveforwardaggressivelyinsupportingnecessaryreforminitiatives,includingworkingwithpolicymakersandtheregulatedcommunitytopilottesttheproposedscheme.OneapproachwouldbetoaddresswastewaterdischargeforpriorityPartAindustries,addressingalltechnical,insti-tutional, legal and financial factors.

13 RECOMMENDATIONS

Explore strategies for adopting voluntary incentives-based instruments, includingpublic disclosure and fiscal incentives programs

InadditiontolaunchingtheLLFscheme,CEAshouldexplorethepossibilityofputtinginplaceincentives-basedinstrumentsincludingpublicdisclosureprograms,whichhaveprovensuccessfulin other Asian countries, and fiscal incentives that promotecleanerproduction.

Operationalize a separate CEA Fund

Basedonexistinglegalauthority,inconsultationwiththeFinanceCommission,TreasuryDepart-mentandAuditor-General’sDepartment,theCEA should work to establish a separate financial mechanismorfundtopromoteoverallprogramsustainabilityandeffectiveness,anddevelopingeconomicincentiveinitiatives.

Upgrade and expand citizen monitoring tools and capacity, including the existing hotline

CEAshouldupgradeandexpandthecitizencomplaintmechanismsforreceivingcomplaints,monitoringresponseandprovidingfeedbacktothecomplainants.Buildingontheexistinghotlinecapability,themechanismshouldbeavailablenotonly at the head office but at provincial offices withelectroniclinkagestotheEPCDivision.

Develop comprehensive complianceassistance program to assist regulated community

WhileCEAhasdevelopedsomepromisingoutreachandcomplianceassistanceinitiatives,theAuthorityshouldbuildontheseeffortsbyestablishingamorecomprehensiveprogramthatenliststhesupportofchambersofcommenceandindustry,andbuildsontheexistingNationalCleanerProductionCenter.Indevelopingthiseffort,CEAcouldfocusinitiallyonestablishingamorecomprehensiveinformationclearinghousemechanism.

4.0 RECOMMENDATIONS

Develop performance management system and national indicators

CEAshouldestablishaperformancemanagementsystemforprioritysetting,planningandperformanceevaluationofcomplianceandenforcementprograms,includinges-tablishingasetofnationalperformanceindicators.Linkedtoanenhancedinformationmanagementcapacity,CEAshoulddevelopamixofprogram(input),activity(output)andresults(outcome)indicatorsthatwouldenhanceCEA’saccountability,andassistCEAindesigningproactivecomplianceandenforcementstrategies.

Upgrade and expand capabilities and capacity in information management

CEAshouldworktoestablishauniformsystemofcollec-tion,managementandsharingofcomplianceandenforce-mentinformationatthenationalandlocallevels.TheGovernmentshouldalsoprovideextensivestafftrainingoninformationmanagement.Thenewsystemwouldsaveadministrativecosts,improvedataquality,andincreasetransparencyofCEAactivitiesbyenablingpublicaccesstotheinformation.

4.2 MEDIUM-TERM RECOMMENDATIONS

Reformulate delegated and devolved authority to create a more effective and efficient institutional framework

TheGovernmentshouldleadaconsultativeprocesstodefine more clearly the relative responsibilities of national agencies,provincialcouncilsandlocalauthoritiesincom-plianceandenforcement.InkeepingwiththeConstitu-tionandactualcapacitiesontheground,theGovernmentshouldrevisetheNEAtoaddressestheinherentloop-holesandweaknessesindelegationofprescribed-activitiestolocalauthorities,andobviousduplicationsinresponsi-bilitiesbetweennationalagenciesandprovincialcouncils.Ataminimum,CEAshouldretainpowerstosanctionlocalauthoritiesfornon-compliance.

Amend the NEA to enable CEA to deploy more flexible, effective enforcement tools

TheGovernmentshouldamendtheNEAtoexpandenforcementauthoritytoenabletheCEAtodeternon-complianceandredressharmviaarangeofenforcementresponsetoolsandmechanisms.CEAandlocalauthori-ties should have access to a flexible array of sanctions, includingciviladministrativepenalties,issuanceofcompli-anceschedules,facilityclosure,andremedialactions.

RECOMMENDATIONS14

Enhance human, institutional and financial capacity for implementing complianceassurance activities

Todevelopaneffectivecomplianceandenforce-mentprogram,theGovernmentwillneedtoaddress urgent human, institutional and financial capacitylimitationsatthenational,provincialand local levels. As a first step, the Government shouldcarefullyevaluatethecapacityofCEAinregulatingthehighlypollutingindustries,andoflocalauthoritiesinregulatingsmallandmediumindustries.CEAshouldsetinplaceaprogramofactionwithtargetsforstrengtheningcapacity.

Strengthen self-monitoring and self-reporting requirements for EPL for all regulated industries

GiventheexistingauthorityundertheEPLregula-tions,CEAshouldstrengthenitsself-monitoringrequirementsasappliedtoEPLtosetoutformalproceduresonmonitoring,record-keepingandreportingforbothPartAandPartBindustries.CEAshouldsupportamendmentsoftheNEAtoprovidesanctionsfornon-compliance.Theuseofself-monitoringdataasevidenceofnon-compli-ancewouldputadditionalpressureonindustrytocomply,andcouldbelinkedtoapublicdisclosureorotherincentives-basedprogram.

Sharpen agency focus towards higher risk hazardous waste management activities

Duetothelimitedeffectivenessoflocalauthori-tiesinaddressingsolidwaste,therehasbeenastrongpublicexpectationthatCEAshouldtakeaction,andasaresultadisproportionateamountofCEA–particularlyoftheHazardousWasteManagementUnit–isspentonsolidwastemanagement.Inlinewithitsmandate,theAuthorityshouldrefocusprioritiesonhazard-ouswaste,whichposesahigherrisktotheenvironmentandpublichealth.