G.R. No. 20189, Jocson v. Soriano, 45 Phil. 375Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaEN BANCOctober 31, 1923G.R. No. 20189VALENTINA JOCSON,plaintiff-appellant,vs.ANTERO SORIANO, administrator of the estate of Silvestre Estacion, deceased,defendant-appellee.Salinas and Salinas for appellant.Fidel Ibaez and Eusebio C. Encarnacion for appellee.JOHNSON,J.:The only question presented by this appeal is: When the purchaser from the Government of lots or parcels of land formerly belonging to the Friar State dies before complete payment is made, leaving a widow surviving him, do such lots or parcels belong to the estate of the deceased to be administered by his administrator, or may the wife have the inchoate title in such lots or parcels transferred to her and thus be eliminated or excluded from the state of her deceased husband?The facts in the present case may be stated as follows:(a) that some time prior to November 1, 1918, the said Silvestre Estacion purchased from the Government the following lots or parcels of land Nos. 1018, 723, 1007, 687, 270, 742, and 386; (b) that said lots had therefore been purchased by the Government as part of theHacienda de los Frailes en el Municipio de Santa Cruz de Malabon; (c) that Silvestre Estacion and his predecessors had been in possession, as tenants, of said parcels of land since before the American occupation of the Philippine Islands; (d) that he was the occupant, as tenant, of said parcels of land at the time the saidhaciendawas purchased; (e) that after he had purchased said lots he continued to make the partial payments under his contract, up to the time of his death;(f)that he left a widow surviving him, who in the present plaintiff; (g) that after the death of Silvestre Estacion, and on the 12th day of September, 1919, the said Valentina Jocson, as the surviving widow of Silvestre Estacion, taking advantage of the provisions of section 16 ofAct No. 1120, had said lots transferred to her (see Exhibits A, B, C, D, E, F, and G); (h) that notwithstanding the fact that the widow, Valentina Jocson, of Silvestre Estacion had said lots transferred to her in accordance with said section 16 after the death of her husband, the administrator of the estate of Silvestre Estacion took possession of the same, included them in the inventory of the estate and continued to administer the same as a part of the estate of the deceased.Valentina Jocson, under the foregoing facts, prayed that said seven lots be excluded from the inventory of the administrator of the estate of Silvestre Estacion, and that the same be returned to her immediately. The lower court denied her petition and decided that said lots were a part of the estate of Silvestre Estacion and that, as such, Antero Soriano, as administrator, had a right to include them in his inventory and to administer them. From that judgment the plaintiff appealed.The appellant now contends that the inchoate title to said lots belongs to her and that she has the sole and exclusive right to occupy and administer them. Her contention is based upon the provisions ofAct No. 1120, with special reference to section 16 of the same.Act No. 1120provides, among other things, that the actual occupant of any portion of the Friar Lands at the time of the purchase by the Government should be given a preference in the right to purchase the land or lot occupied. Silvestre Estacion was the actual occupant, as tenant, of the said seven parcels of land at the time of the purchase by the Government and at the time of his purchase from the Government, and he continued to be in possession of the same until his death. Said Act further provides that the purchaser had a right to make a partial payments until the full payment purchase price was paid. The Act further provides that the title to each and every parcel land sold should remain in the Governmentuntil the full payment of all installments of purchase money and interest by the purchaser has been made, and that any incumbrance created by the purchaser against said parcels or lots shall be invalid as against the Government Section 16 provides that "in the event of the death of a holder of a certificate (of purchase of any portion of said land), the issuance of which is provided for in section 12 hereof,prior to the execution of a deed by the Government of any purchaser, his widow shall be entitled to receive a deed of the landstated in the certificate upon showing that she has complied with the requirements of law for the purchase of the same. . . ."At the time of the death of Silvestre Estacion, he had nothing but an inchoate right in the parcels of land. The title was still in the Government. The Government being the owner, until full payment was made, had a perfect right to prescribe how such property should be disposed of in case of the death of the husband. The character of the right of Silvestre Estacion was very analogous to that of a homesteader. At No. 926, which provides for the granting of homesteads, in its section 3 contains a very similar provision to that of section 16 ofAct No. 1120, for the disposition of the homestead in case the applicant dies before title in him is perfected, leaving surviving him a wife. Said section 3 provides that "in the event of the death of an applicant (for a homestead) prior to the issuance of a patent (title),his widowshall be entitled to have a patent for the land applied for issue to her" upon a proper showing, and until a final title or patent is issued for the land to the applicant the Government remains the owner.Acts Nos. 1120 and 926 were patterned after the laws granting homestead rights and special privileges under the laws of United States and the various states of the Union. The statutes of the United States as well as of the various states of the Union contain provisions for the granting and protection of homesteads. Their object is to provide a home for each citizen of the Government, where his family may shelter and live beyond the reach of financial misfortune, and to inculcate in individuals those feelings of independence which are essential to the maintenance of three institutions. Furthermore, the state itself is concerned that the citizens shall not be divested of a means of support, and reduced to pauperism. (Cook and Burgwallvs.McChristian, 4 Cal., 24; Franklinvs.Coffee, 70 Am. Dec., 292; Richardson,vs.Woodward, 104 Fed. Rep., 873; 21 Cyc., 459.)The conservation of a family home is the purpose of homestead laws. The policy of the state is to foster families as the factors of society, and thus promote general welfare. The sentiment of patriotism and independence, the spirit of free citizenship, the feeling of interest in public affairs, are cultivated and fostered more readily when the citizen lives permanently in his own home, with a sense of its protection and durability. (Waples on Homestead and Exemptions, p. 3.)Under the statutory and constitutional provisions of the various states of the Union it has been held that "homestead privilege does not determine on the husband's death but is transmitted to his widow and children." (21 Cyc., 562.)In the case of the Estate of Fath (132 Cal., 609) the Supreme Court of California held that "a homestead selected by the husband in his lifetime . . . vests absolutely in his surviving wife . . . The descent of the homestead to the surviving widow was governed by the law in force at the death of her husband." (Dickeyvs.Gibson, 54 Am. St. Rep., 321.)Neither does a widow lose her right in the homestead estate of her first husband by a second marriage. (Sandersvs.Rusell, 21 Am. St. Rep., 29; Milesvs.Miles, 88 Am. Dec., 208.)Upon the death of the husband, the wife may continue to occupy the whole of the homestead. (Nicholasvs.Purczell, 89 Am. Dec., 572.)The doctrine announced with reference to the right of the widow in the homestead upon the death of her husband, does no injustice to the creditors of the deceased, since they have it always in their power to protect themselves either by refusing credit or by demanding such security as will protect the from loss. (Keyesvs.Cyrus, 38 Am. St. Rep., 296.)Said section 16 (Act No. 1120) provides that in the event of the death of a holder of a certificate prior to the execution of a deed by the Government, his widow shall be entitled to receive a deed of the land upon a showing that she has complied with the requirements of the law for the purchase of the same. In the present case the widow took the steps necessary under the law to protect her right, and had the necessary certificates of transfer made to her (Exhibits A to H). From that date the inchoate right which her husband possessed passed to her, and to her alone, and she had a right to continue making the partial payments required, and when completed, to secure an absolute conveyance from the Government. The law conceded to her the right held by her husband, without diminution of control, subject only to her completing the contract with the Government. That being true, we are fully persuaded that the administrator of the estate of Silvestre Estacion had no interest nor any control whatever in the administration of said lots or parcels of land. Under the law they did not belong to the estate of Silvestre Estacion. Whatever interest he had, passed immediately upon his death to his widow. The said lots constituted no part of the estate of Silvestre Estacion.Therefore, it is hereby ordered and decreed that the judgment of the lower court be revoked; that the defendant, as administrator of the estate of Silvestre Estacion, exclude the said seven parcels of land immediately from the inventory of said estate, return the possession thereof to the plaintiff, and that he render to the Court of First Instance of the Province of Cavite, within a period of thirty days, a full and correct account of his administration of said parcels of land, and that he pay over to Valentina Jocson whatever sum or sums may be due her. And, without any finding as to costs, it is so ordered.Malcolm, Avancea, Villamor, Johns and Romualdez, JJ., concur.Street, J., took no part.

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. L-54106. February 16, 1982.]

LUCRECIO PATRICIO, SEGUNDO DALIGDIG, FRANCISCO DALIGDIG, FLORENCIO ARELLANO and EPIFANIO DALIGDIG,Petitioners, v. ISABELO BAYOG, CONRADA, PEDRO, EMILIO, ALFONSO, DIONISIO and ARSENIO, all surnamed MENDEZ, and COURT OF APPEALS,Respondents.

Ruben A. Puertollano for petitioners. Voltaire I. Rivera forRespondents.

SYNOPSISAs a result of the sale by the Mendez spouses of the 23-hectare homestead to the Lamberangs in 1956, the following actions were filed: an action to annul the sale filed by Mendez and his children; an ejectment suit filed by Lamberangs and an action for the reconveyance of the homestead filed by the Mendezes. On January 3, 1977, the Court of Appeals ordered the reconveyance of the homestead to the Mendezes "free of all liens and encumbrances" upon their payment to Lamberang of the redemption price. Judgment having become final, and of possession was issued placing Isabelo Bayog, the representative of the Mendez family, in possession of the homestead after ejecting the tenants of the Lamberangs, the petitioner herein who subsequently filed before the Court of Agrarian Relations at Iligan City an action for damages against the heirs of the Mendez spouses, the now private respondents. The Agrarian court ordered their reinstatement citing Section 10 of the Code of Agrarian Reform giving tenants security of tenure and Section 36 of the same Code which provides that personal cultivation by the landowner is no longer a ground for terminating tenancy. The Mendezes appealed to the Court of Appeals which thereafter reversed the agrarian courts decision and declared them "entitled to the homestead without the gravemen of plaintiffs tenancies. Petitioner-tenants appealed to the Supreme Court contending that share tenancy may be constituted in a homestead after five years from the grant of the patent and that they cannot be ejected because they were not parties in any of the cases involving the Mendezes and Lamberang.

The Supreme Court affirmed the appealed judgment ruling that of the two competing interests, the more paramount and superior policy consideration is to uphold the right of the homesteader and his heirs to own and cultivate personally the land acquired from the State without being encumbered by tenancy relations.

Judgment affirmed.

SYLLABUS

1. PUBLIC LAND LAW; HOMESTEAD ACT; RIGHT OF THE HOMESTEADER AND HEIRS TO OWN AND CULTIVATE PERSONALLY THE LAND ACQUIRED WITHOUT BEING ENCUMBERED BY TENANCY RELATIONS; CASE AT BAR. Where two competing interests have to be weighed against each other: the tenants right to security of tenure as against the right of the homesteader or his heirs to own a piece of land for their residence and livelihood, the Court holds that the more paramount and superior policy consideration is to uphold the right of the homesteader and his heirs to own and cultivate personally the land acquired from the State without being encumbered by tenancy relations. This holding is consistent with the intention of the Code of Agrarian Reform to abolish agricultural share tenancy, "to establish owner cultivator ship and the economic family-size farm as the basis of Philippine agriculture" and "to achieve a dignified existence for the small farmers free from pernicious institutional restraints and practices (Sec. 2 of Homestead Act.)

D E C I S I O N

AQUINO,J.:

The legal issue in this case is whether the tenants hired by the purchaser of a homestead planted to coconuts and bananas may be ejected by the homesteaders heirs who were allowed by the Court of Appeals to repurchase the homestead and who desire to personally possess and till the land.

As factual background, it should be stated that in 1934 Policarpio Mendez obtained a patent and Torrens title for a homestead with an area of about twenty-three hectares located at Sitio Badiangon, Barrio Dalipuga, Iligan City. He and his wife, Petra Macaliag, and their nine children lived on the land, cleared it and planted coconuts thereon.

In 1956, Mendez sold the homestead to the spouses Eugenio Lamberang and Ester Fuentes. In 1958, Mendez and his children filed an action to annul the sale. Lamberang countered with an ejectment suit. On March 20, 1961, Mendez and his children filed an action against the Lamberang spouses for the reconveyance of the homestead.

The three cases reached the Court of Appeals which in a decision dated January 3, 1977 ordered Lamberang to reconvey the homestead to the Mendezes "free of all liens and encumbrances" upon their payment to Lamberang of P19,411.28 as redemption price. That judgment became final and executory.

The Court of Appeals also held that upon the execution of the deed of reconveyance and the delivery of the redemption price to the Lamberang spouses, the Mendezes would be "entitled to the possession and occupancy" of the homestead. (Mendez v. Lamberang, Lamberang v. Bayog, and Mendez v. Fuentes-Lamberang, CA-G.R. Nos. 50879-81-R.).

The Mendezes paid the redemption price and the Lamberang spouses reconveyed the homestead. Pursuant to a writ of possession, a deputy sheriff placed Isabelo Bayog, the representative of the Mendez family, in possession of the homestead after ejecting the tenants of the Lamberang spouses named Lucrecio Patricio, Florencio Arellano, Epifanio Daligdig, Francisco Daligdig and Segundo Daligdig, now the petitioners herein.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red

However, the tenants reentered the homestead allegedly upon instruction of Bernardino O. Nuez, a trial attorney of the Bureau of Agrarian Legal Assistance. Hence, the Mendezes filed a motion to declare them and Nuez in contempt of court.

Before that contempt incident could be resolved, or on April 10, 1979, the tenants, represented by Nuez, filed in the Court of Agrarian Relations at Iligan City a complaint for damages against the heirs of Policarpio Mendez named Isabelo Bayog and Conrada, Pedro, Emilio, Alfonso, Dionisio and Arsenio, all surnamed Mendez (CAR Case No. 92), now private respondents.

By reason of an agreement between the parties at the hearing on October 22, 1979, the said tenants vacated the land. They are now not in possession of the land (p. 5, Rollo).

The Agrarian Court in its decision of December 12, 1979 held that the plaintiffs were "tenants of the landholding in question" and ordered their reinstatement therein. The lower court directed the Mendezes to pay them their "unrealized shares" in the coconuts.

The Agrarian Court concluded that the plaintiffs became the tenants of the Mendezes because the Lamberangs, with whom they established a tenancy relationship, were not illegal possessors of the land, having acquired it through a sale. The court said that under Section 10 of the Code of Agrarian Reform tenants are entitled to security of tenure and that under Section 36 of that Code, personal cultivation by the landowner is no longer a ground for terminating tenancy. The Agrarian Court noted that Presidential Decree No. 152 dated March 13, 1973, which prohibits the employment or use of share tenants in complying with the requirements regarding entry, occupation and cultivation of public lands, is not applicable to the case.

The Mendezes appealed to the Court of Appeals which on May 8, 1980 reversed the decision of the Agrarian Court and declared that the Mendezes are "entitled to the homestead without the gravamen of plaintiffs tenancies" because the purpose of granting homesteads is "to distribute disposable agricultural lots of the State to land-destitute citizens for their home and cultivation" (Pascua v. Talens, 80 Phil. 792, 793). That policy would be defeated "if the buyer can install permanent tenants in the homestead who would even have the right of preemption" (Patricio v. Bayog, CA-G.R. No. 10611-CAR).chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

The tenants appealed to this Court. They contend (a) that under Section 118 of the Public Land Law, share tenancy may be constituted in a homestead after five years from the grant of the patent because Section 119 of the same law does not prohibit any encumbrance on the homestead after that period and (b) that they cannot be ejected because they were not parties in any of the cases involving the Mendezes and Lamberang.

This is a case where two competing interests have to be weighed against each other: the tenants right to security of tenure as against the right of the homesteader or his heirs to own a piece of land for their residence and livelihood.

We hold that the more paramount and superior policy consideration is to uphold the right of the homesteader and his heirs to own and cultivate personally the land acquired from the State without being encumbered by tenancy relations. *

This holding is consistent with the intention of the Code of Agrarian Reform to abolish agricultural share tenancy, "to establish owner cultivatorship and the economic family-size farm as the basis of the Philippine agriculture" and "to achieve a dignified existence for the small farmers free from pernicious institutional restraints and practices" (Sec. 2).

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Barredo (Chairman), Concepcion, Jr., Abad Santos, De Castro and Ericta,JJ., concur.

Escolin,J., took no part.Endnotes:

* "The Homestead Act has been enacted for the welfare and protection of the poor. The law gives a needy citizen a piece of land where he may build a modest house for himself and family and plant what is necessary for subsistence and for the satisfaction of lifes other needs. The right of the citizens to their homes and to the things necessary for their subsistence is as vital as the right to life itself. They have a right to live with a certain degree of comfort as become human beings, and the State which looks after the welfare of the peoples happiness is under a duty to safeguard the satisfaction of this vital right.

"Moreover, a man with a home and a means of subsistence is a lover of peace and order and will profess affection for his country, whereas one without a home and in penury is not only a social parasite but also a dangerous element in the social order. The Homestead Act at once aims at the promotion of wholesome and happy citizenship and the wiping out of the germs of social discontent found everywhere.

"Considering the social and economic ends of the Homestead Act, the courts should exercise supreme care and strict vigilance towards faithful compliance with all its benign provisions and against the defeat directly or indirectly, of its highly commendable purposes. And it is my firm conviction that where,. . . a rich and clever man attempts to wrest a homestead granted to a poor and ignorant woman, the slightest tokens of illegality should be enough to move the courts to apply the strong arm of the law." (Dissent, Moran,J., Kasilag v. Rodriguez, 69 Phil. 217, 254, 263-264.)

"The object and purpose of the homestead law is to encourage residence upon and the cultivation and improvement of the public domain. This paramount public purpose should certainly not be nullified by the tactics of the courts." (Aquino v. Director of Lands, 39 Phil. 850, 861.).

"The statutes of the United States as well as the various states of the Union contain provisions for the granting and protection of homesteads. Their object is to provide a home for each citizen of the government, where his family may shelter and live beyond the reach of financial misfortune, and to inculcate in individuals those feelings of independence which are essential to the maintenance of free institutions. Furthermore, the state itself is concerned that the citizens shall not be divested of a means of support, and reduced to pauperism.

"The conservation of a family home is the purpose of homestead laws. The policy of the state is to foster families as the factors of society and thus promote general welfare. The sentiment of patriotism and independence the spirit of free citizenship, the feeling of interest in public affairs, are cultivated and fostered more readily when the citizen lives permanently in his own home, with a sense of its protection and durability." (Jocson v. Soriano, 45 Phil. 375, 379)

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaEN BANCG.R. No. L-19242 February 29, 1964SIGBE LASUD, LUMAGUS MAMADUD and PRIMITIVA MAMADUD,plaintiffs-appellants,vs.SANTAY LASUD and GUINANTANA CIA,defendants-appellees, LUMAGUS MAMADUD and PRIMITIVA MAMADUD,plaintiffs-appellants,vs.SANTAY LASUD and GUINANTANA CIA,defendants-appellees.Ernesto Q. Organo for plaintiffs-appellants.Antonio M. Ceniza and Fausto Imbing for defendants appellees.LABRADOR,J.:According to the Stipulation of Facts entered into and between the parties, the parcel of land subject of the action was originally a homestead of the deceased father of plaintiff Sigbe Lasud and defendant Santay Lasud. Original Certificate of Title No. 1232 was issued pursuant to Homestead Patent No. 26114 in the name of their father on February 1, 1934. Because of the death of their father plaintiff Sigbe Lasud and defendant Santay Lasud inherited the land and became co-owners thereof.On July 14, 1955 plaintiff Sigbe Lasud sold her interest, right and participation in said parcel of land including her improvements thereon in favor of her brother defendant Santay Lasud and his wife Guinantana Cia for the sum of P550.00. Upon registration of this sale, the original certificate of title was cancelled and a transfer certificate of title issued in the name of Santay Lasud.On August 10, 1959, Sigbe brought this action against her brother Santay Lasud to compel him to reconvey back to plaintiff the one-half share that plaintiff had sold to him in July, 1955. Defendant moved to dismiss the action on the ground that it is barred under Article 1391 of the new Civil Code (if the suit is for the annulment of the sale), and it is also barred under Article 1606 of the same code (if the suit is to exercise a right to repurchase). The court sustained these objections and dismissed the action.1wph1.tThereafter, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint alleging that the land sought to be purchased was originally acquired as a homestead under the Public Land Acts; that plaintiff has offered to repurchase her one-half share that she had sold to defendant but that defendant refused to admit the repurchase.With the amended complaint as a basis plaintiff's attorney prayed for a reconsideration of the court dismissing the complaint. The court in an order dated December 21, 1959 reconsidered its order of dismissal and ordered defendant to file his answer to the amended complaint. Thereafter, on February 16, 1961, the court entered the order subject of the present appeal, holding that the right to redeem can apply only to sales outside the family circle, unlike the sale in the case at bar. The court held:... Considering that Sec. 119 of the Public Land Law aims to preserve in the family of the homesteader that portion of the public domain which the State had gratuitously given to him, it is apparent that the conveyance mentioned therein refers to an alienation made to a third person outside the family circle. And certainly the defendant Santay Lasud can not be considered a third party in relation to the original homesteader, his father, because there is a privity of interest between him and his father, the defendant Santay Lasud being the continuity of the legal personality of the former. So much so, that the sale made by the plaintiff, Sigbe Lasud, to her brother, the defendant Santay Lasud, can not be a "proper" case to be brought under the operations of Sec. 119 of the Public Land Law, because such a sale does not take the land out of the family circle of the homesteader their father that is, the sale is not in contravention of an avowed fundamental policy, which is, to preserve and keep the family of the homesteader, the land granted to him by the State.The case would have been different if the plaintiff, as one of the heirs, conveys his share to a third party, in which case he or his co-heir, the defendant herein, may in consonance with the aim and purpose of the homestead law, as interpreted in the light of the above cited authorities, redeem the property to preserve and keep the same within the family of the original homesteader.Considering the nature and circumstances of this case, the Court holds that the provisions of Sec. 119 of Com. Act 141 can not be made in the instant case; and pursuant to its inherent power to suspend and correct its orders and processes.The Court resolves to set aside, as it hereby set aside its order dated December 21, 1959, and the order dated November 13, 1959, dismissing this case is hereby reinstated.The above order is the subject of the present appeal.It must be remembered that the appellee Santay Lasud against whom the right to repurchase or reconveyance is asserted is a son of the original homesteader himself and is an immediate member of the family of the homesteader and his direct descendant and heir to the property. In point of proximity to the homesteader, the appellee is close to the original homesteader as the appellant who tries to redeem the property. They are brother and sister, son and daughter of the homesteader. Under the circumstances We agree with the court below that the sale of the homestead or part thereof does not fall within the purpose, spirit and meaning of the provision of the Public Land Act (Com. Act No. 141, See. 119) authorizing redemption of the homestead from any vendee thereof.WHEREFORE, We affirm the order appealed from, with costs against appellants. So ordered.Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes Dizon, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.Padilla, J., took no part.