Entry Capacity Substitution Workshop 8 – 7 th April 2009.
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Transcript of Entry Capacity Substitution Workshop 8 – 7 th April 2009.
2
Agenda
Feedback from workshop 7
Timeline
Further refinement of options
Mechanical approach
Option model
Two stage auction
Worked examples
Next Steps
3
Feedback
At workshop 7 National Grid sought feedback on proposals presented and what was
required for workshop 8, specifically:
What further information would be required to assess the options at this workshop?;
What examples should be considered?; and
Was the level of detail (in the workshop 7 presentation) adequate?
Responses
Only three responses received. Preference to avoid added cost and/or complexity; hence support for Mechanical Approach,
but advantages of other approaches recognised;
No direct responses to the questions posed.
National Grid has made slight developments to the options based on comments made
in workshop 7. More support for 2-stage auction was expressed.
Worked examples have been developed on each proposal.
4
TCMF – Develop Charging Methodology / Pricing Options
Further development of Charging Methodology
Develop Charging Methodology Changes at TCMF
07/11/09Submit Pricing Changes for
Approval
27/07/09Commence informal
Consultation on Pricing Changes
Approval of
Pricing Changes
Draft Timeline – Development of Methodology
Jan 09 Feb 09 Mar 09 Apr 09 May 09 June 09 July 09 Aug 09 Sept 09 Oct 09 Nov 09 Dec 09
Workshops
5 – Review status – explain risks/rewards process5 – High level options – work through of potential options6 – Industry options – review alternatives6 – Review all options – narrow down for development7/8 – Detailed options/examples9 – Finalised options/examples10 - Update industry following Informal Consultation
07/01/09Workshop 6
07/04/09Workshop 8
07/07/09Workshop 10
12/05/09Workshop 9
10/02/09Workshop 7
Develop stage 1 Licence Direction/Changes 01/04/09
Licence Changes Effective
S23 Notice
Develop stage 2 Licence Changes
07/09/09Submit ECS for Approval
07/12/09Approval of
ECS
27/07/09
Impact Assessment as necessary
28D 14DConsult Report
21D 28DConsult Finalise
Start consultationsInformal Formal
08/06/09 24/08/09Close formal consultation
Consult and Report (non-urgent)
Develop UNC Mod Proposals
07/12/09Approval of UNC
Mods
19/11/09Mod Panel Decision
17/09/09Mods to Panel
02/07/09Tx Workstream: present mods
IT Systemsdevelopment
31/03/09Progress
report
6
Mechanical Approach
Each substitution opportunity progresses subject to satisfying: Limits set on availability of capacity at potential donor ASEP (referred
to in this presentation as “protected” capacity). Use TBE peak forecast for beach terminals.
Need to consider treatment of Interconnectors, Rough.
Use maximum deliverability for storage sites and LNG. Source of data to be considered. Suitable alternative proposals could be considered. Most LNG and storage ASEPs fall outside the scope for substitution
because they have “incremental” capacity. When this capacity moves
to “baseline” it may be made available for substitution. Effectively limits substitution to specific beach terminals
An exchange rate cap: Suggest 5:1
An economic assessment: Suggest no economic assessment in the mechanical approach.
7
Mechanical Approach Capacity available for substitution
All ASEPs not included in the table have zero capacity available for substitution
A. Figures obtained from the LicenceB. Figures obtained from http://www.nationalgrid.com/uk/Gas/Data/CMR/C. Includes sold incremental capacity, but excludes non-obligated capacity releasedD. Protected capacity determined as 100% TBE forecast (except Avonmouth - deliverability)D. As 10% baseline is withheld from QSEC, 90% TBE could be used as an alternative for Protected CapacityE. Figures obtained from Table A2.3A from 10 Year Statement (except Avonmouth - obtained from Platts)F. Avonmouth is the only storage/LNG ASEP with 90% baseline greater than deliverability
ASEP Peak soldAll units in GWh/day (note C)
Smallest ASEPs and most with zero baseline excluded.
Avonmouth 179 161 0 22 159 2Bacton 1783 1,605 0 895 1,488 117
Burton Point 74 66 0 13 11 53Barrow 309 278 0 278 90 0
Easington (inc Rough) 1062 956 345 1,301 1,310 0St Fergus 1671 1,504 0 472 1,272 232Teesside 476 428 0 162 337 91
Theddlethorpe 611 550 0 20 90 460
Baseline (note A)
Release Obligation (see note B)Previous
Incremental90%
Baseline
Available for substitution
(90%baseline - max of [protected,sold])
Protected capacity
(see notes D & E)
8
Mechanical Approach
Storage sites to be based on Max Deliverability. From external source. References to capacity above TBE mean above sold level if higher.Exchange rate cap to be proposed at 5:1
Publish QSEC auction invitation -
including entry zones, ASEP distance order and TBE Maximum Flow Forecast
Figure per ASEP from 42 months
Hold QSEC auction
Determine whether any requests pass
the NPV test?
No
Finish
Yes
Identify recipient ASEP with lowest
revenue driver auction
Do any ASEPs within zone have unsold capacity above protected
level?
Yes
Consider all within zone donor ASEPs with
unsold capacity above protected
level together
Undertake Network Analysis.
Can all reinforcement be avoided and is the
aggregate XR below 5:1?
Accept substitutions and
update ASEP obligated levels
Are there any other recipient ASEPs?
Yes
Finish
No
Consider non-zonal substitutions
Yes
Do any remaining ASEPs have
unsold capacity above protected
level?
No
Consider next nearest out of zone ASEP with unsold
capacity above protected level
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Consider nearest within zone donor ASEP with unsold
capacity above protected level
Undertake Network Analysis
Can all reinforcement be avoided and is the
specific XR below 5:1?
Yes
No
Undertake Network AnalysisCan all
reinforcement be avoided and is the specific XR below
5:1?
Reject all partial substitutions
No, but retain partial valid substitutions
No, but retain partial valid substitutions
Do any ASEPs within zone have unsold capacity above protected
level?
10
Option Model
Capacity at an ASEP would be prevented from being substituted in response to an incremental signal elsewhere. This would be subject to an “option”.
The option
does not give rights to the Shipper to use the capacity covered by the option;
does not give the Shipper first option to buy the capacity; but
it would reserve capacity at the relevant ASEP for any Shipper to obtain at a later auction.
11
Option Model – What is the Option?
Which “option” for the Option should be considered?
Proposal - Simple option with no further rules e.g. no economic test:
the option excludes the capacity from substitution processes thereby protecting capacity for the duration of the option;
the option nominally applies in respect of Q3 Y+4, i.e. from the 42 month lead-time (or later if relevant incremental capacity is triggered from a later date).
simple to apply, understandable, provides certainty
Option is placed ahead of QSEC and applies for 12 months,
i.e. only covers (normally) one QSEC and any ad-hoc QSECs before next option
window.
Option does not prevent other Shippers (or that Shipper) buying capacity at that ASEP.
Options permitted only up to the quantity available in QSEC (usually 90% baseline – sold).
Fixed option price: options pro-rated if available capacity is exceeded.
Exchange Rate Cap
An exchange rate of 4:1 is proposed.
12
How much should the Option cost?
Needs to be high enough to discourage speculative options, but not too high that it encourages discontinuous single quarter bookings.
Propose that Option Price = Q x 0.0001p/unit x 32 quarters and is the same for all ASEPs regardless of specific reserve prices.
ExampleFor an option over 10 mcmd at any specified ASEP:
Option Cost =
10 * 10.8 * 10^6 (convert to kWh/day) * 0.0001 * 365 * 8 / 100 (convert p to £) = £315,360
This value seems appropriate as it is of the same order as a PWA required to progress works for a year for delivery of incremental capacity.
Refunds Given if the capacity covered by the option is sold for any quarter (at 42 months or more from QSEC), in the year covered by the option, to any Shipper.Given if the capacity covered by the option is bought by the User in any QSEC or AMSEC. Recurring option fees (multi-years) would all be refunded.
Option Model – How Much?
These criteria are National Grid’s initial Proposal and will be subject to consultation
13
Option Model - Option & Single Quarter Costs
Option Price = £315,360 for 10 mcmd (may be subject to refund)
ASEPReserve Price
p/kWh/DCost for 10 mcmd for single quarter
St Fergus 0.0378 £3,725,190
Teesside 0.0083 £817,965
Bacton 0.0084 £827,820
Isle of Grain 0.0006 £59,130
Burton Pt 0.0001 £9,855
Barrow 0.0070 £689,850
Theddlethorpe 0.0082 £808,110
Hatfield Moor 0.0028 £275,940
Avonmouth 0.0001 £9,855
14
Option Model.
Publish QSEC auction invitation -
including entry zones, ASEP distance order
Hold QSEC auction
Are there any requests from the QSEC auction that pass the NPV test?
NoFinish Yes Identify recipient ASEP with lowest
revenue driver auction
Open options window
Publish Options resultsASEPs & aggregate quantity
Process as for Mechanical Approach except that the protected level refers to that which is sold or covered by an option and the exchange rate cap is
set at 4:1.
16
Two Stage Auction
This option needs to be considered as a means to prevent capacity being substituted from a particular ASEP by allowing Shippers an opportunity to respond to perceived vulnerability of certain ASEPs when incremental capacity has been requested elsewhere.
Baseline/obligated and incremental capacity can be obtained in the first stage.
Only baseline/obligated capacity can be obtained in the second stage.
Stage 2 will only be run where an incremental signal has been received in stage 1.
Stage 2 run using AMSEC functionality: so Pay as bid.
Release to Y+15
Stage 2 available capacity
As stage 1 minus any sold in stage 1 or previous stage 2 rounds. No pro-rating across stages / rounds.
Three discrete rounds. No next-day withdrawal / revision of bids.
17
STAGE 2: 3 roundsObligated only
Two Stage Auction – March 2010 timeline
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
STAGE 1: Five roundsObligated & incremental
Stage 1closed
Allocations madeon Gemini
Stage 1 QSECopened
Pre-auction activities include invitation letter / notice of prices / IECRInvitation letter – essentially unchanged, but will include substitution information, e.g. entry zones and distances.
Incrementalcapacityidentified
NPVtest
Info published for each ASEP:
Total sold & quantity passing NPV test
15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29
Stage 2 AMSEC opened
Stage 2 closed
Shippers review position
18
Two Stage Auction – Issues
Exchange rate cap set at 2:1 The two stage option does not protect donor ASEP capacity to the extent of
the Mechanical Approach. If capacity is to be protected full financial commitment from the Shipper is required. Hence a lower cap seems appropriate.
How will the process be applied to ad-hoc auctions? Run baseline auction (stage 2 with AMSEC functionality).
Major UNC modification. Re-design of auction processes.
Systems impact. Can use existing functionality but systems changes may be needed if single
quarter bookings need to be prevented.
Possible licence change. Needs review, but may include alteration to IECR annual review dates.
Single Quarter Issue. Potential solution would be to allow “continuous”, but not discontinuous,
bookings; e.g. must have one quarter same level in each of previous two years.
19
Two stage auction
Publish QSEC auction invitation -
including entry zones, ASEP distance order
Hold "shortened"
QSEC auction - 5
rounds
Are there any requests from the QSEC auction that pass the NPV test?
NoFinish
Yes
Identify recipient ASEP with lowest
revenue driver auction
Publish incremental signals received
that would pass the NPV test
Hold 3 round pay as bid quarterly auction for obligated capacity for the QSEC auction
transaction period
Process as for Mechanical Approach except that all unsold
capacity may be used for substitution and exchange rate
cap is set at 2:1.
21
Substitution Example: Scenarios
Consider the scenarios
Incremental signal at Barrow
Likely donor ASEPs: Teesside / St Fergus
New ASEP in South East (e.g. Feeder 5 at Farningham offtake)
Likely donor ASEP: Bacton
Examples
Focus on processes, impacted ASEPs
Do not involve Network Analysis of exchange rates and precise impact on donor ASEP quantities.
22
Substitution Example: Data Provision
Pre-QSEC National Grid will issue the invitation letter. This will contain:
Donor ASEP merit order and zones Capacity is first substituted from all within zone ASEPs together (subject to satisfying
exchange rate cap) then out of zone ASEPs in pipeline distance order (nearest first).
For Mechanical Approach the protected quantity will be identified Only capacity in excess of this level will be considered for substitution.
Recipient ASEP Barrow South East
Donor ASEPs in order Teesside* Isle of Grain*
*ASEPs within zone
Some sold-out ASEPs or with zero
baseline ignored
Glenmavis* Bacton*
St Fergus* Theddlethorpe
Fleetwood Hatfield Moor
Partington Garton
Burton Point Partington
Theddlethorpe Avonmouth
Burton Point
23
Substitution Example: Capacity Available for Substitution (Barrow)
ASEP Baseline GWh/Day
A
Protected CapacityGWh/Day
B
Sold GWh/Day(2008 QSEC data
used)
C
Capacity available for substitution.
Mechanical Approach
D
2-stage auction and Option
ModelE
Barrow 309 90 278 188** 0
Teesside* 476 337 162 91 266
Glenmavis* 99 103 0 0 89
St Fergus* 1671 1272 472 232 1032
Fleetwood 0 No data 650 0 0
Partington 215 224 22 0 172
Burton Point 74 11 13 55** 53
Theddlethorpe 611 90 20 460 530
* Within zone ASEPs** The lower value based on sold quantity would be used for Burton Point (and Barrow if a donor ASEP) under all options.
A, B & C taken from slide 7.D = 90%A – BE = 90%A – C
24
Substitution Example: Capacity Available for Substitution (South East)
ASEP Baseline GWh/Day
A
Protected CapacityGWh/Day
B
Sold GWh/Day(2008 QSEC data
used)
C
Capacity available for substitution.
Mechanical Approach
D
2-stage auction and Option
ModelE
South East 0 0 0 0 0
Isle of Grain* 218 342 666 0 0
Bacton* 1783 1488 895 117 710
Theddlethorpe 611 90 20 460 530
Hatfield Moor 25 26 22 0 0
Garton 0 No data 420 0 0
Partington 215 224 22 0 172
Avonmouth 179 159 22 2 139
Burton Point 74 11 13 55** 53
* Within zone ASEPs** The lower value based on sold quantity will be used for Burton Point under all options.
A, B & C taken from slide 7.D = 90%A – BE = 90%A – C
25
Substitution Example: QSEC Results
Assume incremental signals received at
Barrow for 215 GWh/D
South East for 175 GWh/D
Both pass NPV test.
No additional allocations of obligated capacity at other ASEPs
Consider Recipient ASEP with lowest revenue driver first.
Barrow then South East.
In practice the order should be irrelevant as the two Recipient ASEPs are at different extremes of the NTS.
26
Substitution Example: Mechanical Approach Results
Barrow as Recipient ASEP for 215 GWh/d.
Note: Actual exchanges rate will be determined by network analysis. These will not vary according to the substitution methodology employed (i.e. same for mechanical, option and 2-stage approaches, but different values have been used in this example for illustration.
Within zone substitutions calculated by pro-rating the available capacity at donor ASEPs.
1:1 exchange rate
Quantity required for substitution = 215
5:1 exchange rate
Quantity required for substitution = 1075
Donor ASEPCapacity
substituted
Teesside - 61 Teesside - 91
St Fergus - 154 St Fergus - 232
Quantity obtained by pro-rating on available capacity (D in slide 23)
Burton Point - 53
Theddlethorpe - 460
Bacton - 117
Total substituted = 215 GWh/d from within zone.Requirements satisfied so 215 GWh/d incremental signal met by substitution.
Max available to substitute = 953 GWh/dThis equates to only 191 GWh/d at Barrow. Under current proposals partial substitutions would not be permitted. All 215 GWh/d would be funded.
27
Teesside Pricing Example: Based on Mechanical Approach with 5:1 Exchange Rate
Impact on Teesside ASEP.
Original conditions After substitution
Baseline 476 385
P0 0.0083 0.0076
Assume in previous example that the substituted capacity satisfies the incremental demand at Barrow.
Action required to recover Teesside baseline Incremental signal needed 91GWh/d50% of project cost £14mStep price = P10 0.0087p/GWh/d
Cost to recover baseline at Teesside ASEP.
Assume current sold levels i.e. cost includes
buying up to revised baseline capacity
Assume all capacity up
to 385 GWh/d is sold
Total cost £m 64 18
Cost per unit p/kWh/d 0.0076 0.0077
For the 1:1 exchange rate example the baseline will fall to 415 GWh/d. To recover original baseline will require a smaller increment with a lower project cost; but the unit cost price will be broadly similar to the above example.
28
Substitution Example: Mechanical Approach Results
South East as Recipient ASEP for 175 GWh/d.
1:1 exchange rate
Quantity required for substitution = 175
5:1 exchange rate
Quantity required for substitution = 875
Donor ASEPCapacity
substituted
Bacton - 117 Bacton - 117
Theddlethorpe - 58 Theddlethorpe - 460
Burton Point – 53
Teesside – 91
St Fergus - 154
Total substituted = 175 GWh/d.Requirements satisfied so 175 GWh/d incremental signal met by substitution.
Total substituted = 875 GWh/d.Requirements satisfied so 175 GWh/d incremental signal met by substitution.
29
Substitution Example: Option Approach
Assume that Teesside and St Fergus Shippers are aware of potential bids at Barrow and Bacton Shippers of potential South East bids. Shippers at other ASEPs are not aware or choose not to take out option.
Barrow for 215 GWh/d
South East for 175 GWh/D
Options taken out are such that protected quantities will be available in long term auctions; i.e. 10% baseline quantity withheld is not considered available.
ASEP Scenario A Scenario B
Do nothing Option quantity
(B-C from slides 23/24)
Option
Cost
Quantity of capacity that can be
obtained at reserve price for one
quarter for the option cost.
Teesside No option taken 175 GWh/d £511,000 67 GWh/d
St Fergus No option taken 800 GWh/d £2,336,000 68 GWh/d
Bacton No option taken 593 GWh/d £1,731,560 226 GWh/d
30
Substitution Example: Option Approach Results
Barrow as Recipient ASEP – 215 GWh/d incremental
Donor ASEPCapacity
substituted
Scenario A:No option
Scenario B:Option to TBE at Teesside / St Fergus
1:1 4:1 1:1 4:1
Teesside 41 164 47 91
Glenmavis 14 56 46 89
St Fergus 160 640 122 232
Partington Nil Nil Nil 172
Burton Point Nil Nil Nil 53
Theddlethorpe Nil Nil Nil 223
Total 215 860 215 860 To protect Teesside capacity no more than 91 GWh/d can be substituted away To protect St Fergus capacity no more than 232 GWh/d can be substituted away Under all examples sufficient capacity is available to allow substitution. Note: Increase at Teesside in scenario B is due to effect of pro-rating a lower within zone aggregate available capacity with
a greater proportion protected at St Fergus.
31
Substitution Example: Option Approach Results
South East Recipient ASEP – 175 GWh/d incremental
Donor ASEPCapacity
substituted)
Scenario A:No option
Scenario B:Option to TBE at Bacton
1:1 4:1 1:1 4:1
Bacton 175 700 117 117
Theddlethorpe Nil Nil 58 530
Partington Nil Nil Nil 53
Total 175 700 175 700
To protect Bacton capacity no more than 117 GWh/d can be substituted away Under all examples sufficient capacity is available to allow substitution. This shows that under all scenarios considered an option is beneficial because Bacton is
the only donor ASEP in the SE zone meaning that there are no other ASEPs to share the burden.
32
Substitution Example: 2-Stage Auction
Assume that Shippers see the incremental bids at Barrow and South East in stage 1
Barrow for 215 GWh/d South East for 175 GWh/D
and respond in stage 2 with capacity bids at Teesside, St Fergus, Bacton and Theddlethorpe. Shippers at other ASEPs choose not to take any further action.
Stage 2 bids for obligated capacity (GWh/d) Scenario Bcost for one
quarterF*Res Price*90
Scenario BAdditional cost to
ensure single quarter is
“continuous”
ASEP Scenario A –
no further bids
Scenario B
F (=B-C from slides
23/24)
Teesside Nil 175 - bid up to TBE £1,325,406 £1,726,815
St Fergus Nil 800 - bid up to TBE £27,594,000 £41,873,895
Bacton Nil 593 - bid up to TBE £4,545,345 £9,849,525
Theddlethorpe Nil 160 – bid up to TBE plus Saltfleetby
£1,197,200 £2,050,205
“Continuous” requires at least one quarter in each of the previous two years to be at the scenario B level
33
Substitution Example: 2-Stage Auction Results
Barrow as Recipient ASEP – 215 GWh/d incremental
Donor ASEPCapacity
substituted
Scenario A:No further bids
Scenario B:Bids to TBE at Teesside/St Fergus
1:1 2:1 1:1 2:1
Teesside 41 82 47 91
Glenmavis 14 28 47 89
St Fergus 160 320 121 232
Partington Nil Nil Nil 18
Total 215 430 215 430
Under all examples sufficient capacity is available to allow substitution.
34
Substitution Example: 2-Stage Auction Results
South East Recipient ASEP – 175 GWh/d incremental
Donor ASEPCapacity
substituted
Scenario A:No further bids
Scenario B:Bids to TBE at Bacton
1:1 2:1 1:1 2:1
Bacton 175 350 117 117
Theddlethorpe Nil Nil 58 233
Total 175 350 175 350
Under all examples sufficient capacity is available to allow substitution.
35
Substitution Example: Cost to Recover Baselines
Barrow as Recipient ASEP – 215 GWh/d incremental South East Recipient ASEP – 175 GWh/d incremental
Basis – Shippers take no positive action / exchange rate 1:1
Donor ASEP Mechanical Approach Option Approach & 2 Stage Auction Scenario A
Incremental capacity required
Project cost £m from charging
model
Incremental capacity required
Project cost* £m from charging
model
Teesside 61 27 41 13
St Fergus 154 204 160 254
Glenmavis 0 N/A 14 10
Bacton 117 38 175 61
Theddlethorpe 58 17 0 N/A
* Project costs are taken for the relevant incremental step so would not deliver the exact incremental capacity required.
36
Conclusions
General
Pro-rating within zones has a deleterious effect on St Fergus. If pipeline distance is used within zone then St Fergus would normally be the last ASEP to be affected.
The number of ASEPs within a zone is important as to the extent that a donor ASEP may be affected.
Mechanical Approach
Limiting substitution at storage/LNG sites to protect “deliverability” significantly limits number of potential donor ASEPs.
But is this a bad thing?
Setting constraints on TBE forecast levels limits total available capacity for substitution. Again, is this a bad effect?
Two moderately sized incremental capacity requests could remove all available capacity from the system (if actual exchange rates are 5:1 and the methodology cap is 5:1).
Subject to exchange rates (actual and cap) an incremental signal on one extreme of the network could have an impact at other extremities
Potential issues with “commercialising” TBE process and obtaining independent, reliable, source for Deliverability.
37
Conclusions
Options Approach
A greater number of donor ASEPs can be affected The extent to which they are affected can be limited by Shippers.
Options allow Shippers to identify and protect their needs.
Shippers need to have some awareness of market developments.
Post-auction analysis may show that options were not required and were taken out unnecessarily. Potential for refunds may make this less significant an issue.
There is a knock-on effect where ASEPs without options get affected more. This is more pronounced with higher exchange rates.
Need to agree option fee and scope / extent of refunds
Single quarter booking may be more economical for ASEPs with low reserve price.
38
Conclusions
Two Stage Auction
A greater number of donor ASEPs can be affected The extent to which they are affected can be limited by Shippers.
Two stages allow Shippers to identify vulnerabilities and to protect their needs.
Shippers need to respond to post-stage 1 auction results.
Post-auction analysis may show that stage 2 bids were not required and were made unnecessarily.
There is a knock-on effect where ASEPs without stage 2 bids may be affected due to bids at other potential donor ASEPs.
Full commitment required by Shippers
Most likely option to encourage single quarter bookings
39
Summary
The cost of protecting capacity from substitution up to the TBE forecast levels for the ASEPs considered in the example would be:
The project cost (used in the NPV test) to recover, up to the protected level, capacity substituted away would be:
ASEPMechanical
Approach
Option
Approach
(may be
refunded)
Two-stage Auction Project value*
One quarterOne “continuous”
quarter
Based on 1:1
exchange rate
Teesside Nil £511,000 £1,325,406 £3,052,221 £nil**
St Fergus Nil £2,336,000 £27,594,000 £69,467,895 £nil**
Bacton Nil £1,731,560 £4,545,345 £14,394,870 £24m
* Applies to Option Approach and 2-Stage Auction. For Mechanical Approach value is nil for all scenarios.** Substitution does not take capacity below TBE level.
40
Summary
The Mechanical Approach protects capacity at all ASEPs to a pre-determined level without Shipper involvement (no User commitment).
It is very restrictive and may prevent genuine opportunities for substitution being taken.
Possible problems with base data (TBE needs to be benchmarked, deliverability defined).
Should less stringent rules be applied? E.g. Protect to 90% TBE/deliverability.
The Option Model protects capacity, but only to the extent that it is genuinely needed as demonstrated by Shippers taking out options.
A commitment is required from Shippers but this may be much lower than buying the capacity. But it will still be higher than for a single quarter booking for some ASEPs.
National Grid is proposing that option fees are refundable if the capacity is ultimately bought by that Shipper thereby making the fee relevant only to speculative options.
The Two Stage Auction protects capacity, but only to the extent that it is genuinely needed as demonstrated by Shippers making capacity commitments.
The commitment may be much greater than the option fee. Would Shippers be encouraged to buy a discontinuous single quarter?
It makes Shippers commit earlier than they want to.
It provides certainty that capacity is available; it is a definitive allocation.
41
Next Steps
Next workshop Tuesday 12th May 2009
10am to 1pm
At Elexon
Is it needed?
• What further information is required?
Informal consultation due to commence 8th June 2009
National Grid still expects to consult on three potential proposals.
Development of associated UNC modification proposals throughout May / June.