Entrepreneurial ecosystem governance: a principal ...Entrepreneurial ecosystem governance: a...

Entrepreneurial ecosystem governance: a principalinvestigator-centered governance framework

James A. Cunningham & Matthias Menter &

Katharine Wirsching

Accepted: 31 July 2017 /Published online: 27 November 2017# The Author(s) 2017. This article is an open access publication

Abstract Research on entrepreneurial ecosystems haslargely taken a macro-perspective to better conceptual-ize and map the determinants and evolution of entrepre-neurial ecosystems, yet has neglected the micro-levelinteractions of various entrepreneurial ecosystem actors.Recent criticisms of entrepreneurial ecosystems havecentered on the lack of explicit case and effect relation-ships, attribution, units of analysis, the different use ofnetwork definitions as well as the static nature ofexisting frameworks. The purpose of our paper is topresent a micro level principal investigator (PI)-centeredgovernance framework that addresses these posited crit-icisms and in doing so identifies the value creationindicators (benefits), PI capabilities, the problem cate-gories (costs), and solving mechanisms that PIs can useto govern effectively and efficiently large-scale publiclyfunded research programs. In leading such researchprograms, PIs interact with different actors within entre-preneurial ecosystems and manage governance issues,

conflicts, and tensions effectively at the micro level todeliver the anticipated benefits and costs for each actor.Our framework provides the basis for future empiricalresearch on entrepreneurial ecosystem as we have attrib-uted cause and effect at an individual actor level andconceptualized the governance challenges at a microrather than at the macro level that overcomes the staticnature of previous frameworks.

Keywords Entrepreneurial ecosystems . Principalinvestigators . Governance dilemmas . Governancemechanisms . Principal-agent theory. Problemcategories . Capabilities

JEL classification L26 . O31 . O32

1 Introduction

The literature on entrepreneurial ecosystems has identi-fied a range of actors and supporting institutions thatencourage and support formally and informally entrepre-neurial activities and their diffusion (Acs et al. 2014;Colombo et al. 2015). Research on entrepreneurial eco-systems to date has largely taken a macro perspectiveand has focused on such issues as attributes (Spigel2015), environmental factors (Suresh and Ramraj2012), evolutionary trajectories (Mack and Mayer2016), global innovation networks (Malecki 2011), highgrowth firms (Mason and Brown 2014), environmentalsustainability (Cohen 2006), clusters, co-creation, andappropriability (Pitelis 2012). Acs et al. (2014: 479)

Small Bus Econ (2019) 52:545–562https://doi.org/10.1007/s11187-017-9959-2

J. A. Cunningham (*)Newcastle Business School, Northumbria University, Newcastleupon Tyne, UKe-mail: [email protected]

M. Menter :K. WirschingFaculty of Business and Economics, University of Augsburg,Augsburg, Germany

M. Mentere-mail: [email protected]

K. Wirschinge-mail: [email protected]

http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1007/s11187-017-9959-2&domain=pdf

define entrepreneurial ecosystems as the Bdynamic, in-stitutionally embedded interaction between entrepre-neurial attitudes, ability, and aspirations, by individuals,which drives the allocation of resources through thecreation and operation of new ventures^. Such interac-tions between various institutions and actors within en-trepreneurial ecosystems give rise to governance chal-lenges including resource distribution and dealing withconflicts related to the allocation of costs and benefits.There is a dearth of research focusing on these issues at amicro level, which is the focus of this paper.

Spigel (2015) argues that research on entrepreneurialecosystems is under-theorized and -developed. To date,scholars have conceptualized different ways of howentrepreneurial ecosystems evolve and develop (seeMason and Brown 2014; Mack and Mayer 2016;Spigel 2015, Stam 2015; Pitelis 2012). Such researchhas taken a macro perspective to better conceptualizeand map the determinants and evolution of entrepre-neurial ecosystems. Taking account of previous researchand criticisms, we adopt a different approach in concep-tualizing entrepreneurial ecosystems by developing amicro level conceptual framework centered around theprincipal investigator (PI). The PI is an influential en-trepreneurial ecosystem actor, whose actions and behav-iors shape and influence the management of governancewithin the entrepreneurial ecosystem that supports thecreation of new ventures with disruptive knowledge andprovides resources and capabilities for existing firms tocompete more effectively. Publicly funded PIs have todeliver on their scientific research programs and allocateresources efficiently and effectively as well as deal withmultiple governance systems, actors, and relationshipsbased on incomplete contracts. The nature of their rolemeans they interact, engage, and boundary span withother entrepreneurial ecosystem actors (see Boardmanand Ponomariov 2014; Casati and Genet 2014, Kidwell2013, 2014; Menter 2016; O’Kane et al. 2015). Increas-ingly PIs are being mandated by publicly funded re-search programs to participate in technology transferand entrepreneurial activities in collaboration with otherentrepreneurial ecosystem actors such as funding agen-cies, venture capitalists, banks, entrepreneurs, highgrowth SMEs, MNCs, etc. Some of these non-scientific outcomes are uncertain and concerning pub-licly funded research, outcomes are contractually basedon incomplete contracts adding further complexity totheir governance.

To manage and deal with all the governance issuesassociated with large-scale publicly funded researchwithin entrepreneurial ecosystems (Hagendijk andIrwin 2006), PIs need to possess certain capabilities tonavigate, arbitrate, and shape the governance mecha-nisms of different actors and supporting institutions aswell as fulfilling their PI roles and responsibilities suc-cessfully (see Mangematin et al. 2014). To contribute tothe overall value creation within an entrepreneurial eco-system, PIs need to have the capabilities to allocateresources, costs, and benefits among entrepreneurialecosystem actors on the basis of incomplete contracts.PIs have an influential role in the governance of large-scale publicly funded research through their boundaryspanning activities with entrepreneurial ecosystem ac-tors, thus influence appropriate and effective gover-nance mechanisms within entrepreneurial ecosystemsaimed at creating new and disruptive knowledge fornew ventures and existing firms.

To date, research on entrepreneurial ecosystems andcorresponding governance issues has mainly been driv-en by studies of entrepreneurship and new venture cre-ation in the private sector (see Acs et al. 2017). Existingecosystem frameworks have taken macro perspectivesand have neglected the dynamic role of specific ecosys-tem actors. Our paper adds to the under-developedentrepreneurial ecosystem literature as argued by Spigel(2015) by focusing on the micro level principal investi-gator governance issues of entrepreneurial ecosystemthat contribute to Bproductive entrepreneurship^ (seeStam 2015: 1764). The contribution of this paper istwofold. First, while previous entrepreneurial ecosys-tems frameworks focused on the macro level, our frame-work is at the micro level and attempts to address theneed for a more operational level understanding ofentrepreneurial ecosystem as highlighted by Stam andBosma (2015). Our micro level PI-centered governanceframework specifically identifies the value creation(benefits), PI capabilities, the problem categories(costs), and solving mechanisms that PIs can use togovern effectively and efficiently large-scale publiclyfunded research programs based on imperfect contracts.Second, through our framework, we directly addresscriticisms of entrepreneurial ecosystem attribution ofcause and effect, unit of analysis, use of different net-work definition, and the static nature of entrepreneurialecosystem frameworks (see Alvedalen and Boschma2017; Stam and Spigel 2016). By taking a micro levelperspective, our framework outlines the principal-agent

546 J. A. Cunningham et al.

relationships that PIs have with other ecosystem actorsas well as identifies the potential types of problemcategories that can emerge as they seek to contributeeconomic and non-economic value to entrepreneurialecosystems. We outline and discuss the primary capa-bilities that PIs need in order to participate and contrib-ute to productive entrepreneurship in entrepreneurialecosystems for ecosystem actors as well as the alloca-tion of costs and benefits. Based on our micro levelconceptual framework, we suggest future avenues ofresearch on how PIs deal effectively with conflictinggovernance mechanisms that constrain their actions,value creation activities, and the allocation of costs andbenefits to relevant entrepreneurial ecosystem actors.

The remainder of the paper is structured as follows:Section 2 presents entrepreneurial ecosystems, the PIrole, burdens, and challenges for PIs in leading large-scale publicly funded research projects as well as respon-sibilities of PIs as entrepreneurial actors. Section 3 con-siders some primary capabilities of PIs that enable themto navigate, arbitrate, and shape different governancemechanisms, tackle potential governance dilemmas, andcontribute to the performance of entrepreneurial ecosys-tems. Section 4 discusses the governance of entrepreneur-ial ecosystems and specifically boundaries of entrepre-neurial ecosystems, incomplete contracts and resultinggovernance problems, multiple principal agent relation-ships, and the costs and benefits of governance. Section 5outlines our PI-centered entrepreneurial ecosystem gov-ernance framework. A final section provides some con-cluding remarks and discusses future research avenues.

2 Entrepreneurial ecosystems and the roleof principal investigators

2.1 Entrepreneurial ecosystems

Entrepreneurship theory has highlighted exploitation ac-tivities of entrepreneurs, yet has neglected the actualenvironment of entrepreneurs opening up entrepreneur-ial opportunities (Szerb et al. 2015). As the adequateentrepreneurial context constitutes the basis for any en-trepreneurial activity, i.e., due to the high context-dependency of entrepreneurial actions, scholars intro-duced the concept of entrepreneurial ecosystems as asynonym for relevant factors and resources necessaryto create economic knowledge through entrepreneurialengagement (Acs et al. 2014). The perspectives of

industrial districts (Krugman 1991; Markusen 1996),clusters (Porter 1998), and innovation systems(Freeman 1987; Lundvall 2010) have taken firms as thefocal point. However, Stam (2015: 1761) emphasizesthat Bthe entrepreneur, rather than the enterprise, is thefocal point [of entrepreneurial ecosystems]. The entre-preneurial ecosystem approach thus begins with the en-trepreneurial individual instead of the company, but alsoemphasizes the role of the entrepreneurship context^.

For entrepreneurs, access to knowledge is critical andshared through social networks (formal and informal).These entrepreneurs are essential for maintaining andgrowing the entrepreneurial system with governmentsupport (Stam and Spigel 2016). Creating and enablingsuch entrepreneurial ecosystems requires strategies asusing policy to favor incumbents, engaging with entre-preneurs, creating an ecosystem map for further policystrategies, and build on early successes (see Auerswald2015). Within European cities, Audretsch and Belitski(2016) find that culture, infrastructure, formal institu-tions, and internet access are important factors in en-hancing entrepreneurial ecosystems and activities.

Entrepreneurial ecosystems are evolutionary withculture, history, and institutional settings shaping themover time (Mack and Mayer 2016). There are differentpathways to creating entrepreneurial ecosystems andcertain actor roles are more prominent depending onthe context (Kshetri 2014). Mason and Brown (2014:13) argue that entrepreneurial ecosystems emerge inBplaces that already have an established and highlyregarded knowledge base which employs significantnumbers of scientists and engineers^ and that there istechnology disruption that creates new opportunities.

Within these ecosystems, the entrepreneur interactswith universities, which produce and disseminate newand potentially disruptive knowledge, and new venturesand incumbent firms, which transform and apply thatknowledge, hence constitute the nexus between scienceand business. Beyond firms and research organizations,capital providers as well as governments and publicbodies play a crucial role within entrepreneurial ecosys-tems as they influence and shape the manner in whichentrepreneurs direct their abilities (Sölvell 2015). Vi-brant ecosystems enable the efficient flow of knowledgeand ideas between various entities, thus form the basisfor economic and non-economic value creation thatenables Bproductive entrepreneurship.^ The outcomesof entrepreneurial systems can thereby vary amongstakeholders (Stangler and Bell-Masterson 2015).

Entrepreneurial ecosystem governance: a principal investigator-centered governance framework 547

Within the literature, different frameworks andmodels have emerged of entrepreneurial ecosystems.Isenberg (2011) posits six domains and twelve compo-nents of entrepreneurial ecosystems. Whereas Spigel(2015), using Canadian case studies, identifies ten cul-tural, social, and material attributes of entrepreneurialecosystems that support entrepreneurs. Such modelstake a macro perspective, hence do not address theattribution of outcomes, costs, and benefits which isone of the main criticisms of entrepreneurial ecosystems(Stam 2015; Stam and Bosma 2015).

There have been critical perspectives emerging aboutentrepreneurial ecosystems such as its tautological na-ture, the missing clarity about cause and effects in rela-tion to specific factors, units of analysis and attribution ofcontributory factors for economic outcomes (Stam andSpigel 2016). Alvedalen and Boschma (2017) note sev-eral deficits of existing frameworks including a lack ofexplicit cause and effect relationships, the use of differentnetwork definitions, the place-/ cluster-based nature ofempirical studies to date as well as the static nature ofexisting frameworks that do not account for the evolutionover time. Furthermore, Stam and Bosma (2015) empha-size that the operational level of entrepreneurial ecosys-tems has yet to be addressed adequately in the literature.Given the challenges of attributing costs and benefits toentrepreneurial ecosystems, Stangler andBell-Masterson(2015) suggest density, fluidity, connectivity, and diver-sity as vibrancy indicators.

Existing entrepreneurial ecosystem models haveidentified the importance of skilled labor and the roleof university and publicly funded research. Our focus isat the individual level and extends the entrepreneurfocus of Stam (2015). Within publicly funded large-scale research projects, the PI takes over the describedentrepreneurial role with their funded project formingthe nucleus around an imperfect contract. Kuratko andMenter (2017: 45) consequently characterize PIs asentrepreneurial ecosystem actors who Bcreate conduciveenvironment themselves as well as with the help ofpolitical programs and consequently build the breedingground for further entrepreneurial action^. The PI en-gages in bothmanaging different stakeholders for publicscience, but also in designing, resourcing, and deliver-ing large-scale publicly funded projects, arbitrating andattempting to distribute the costs and returns for relevantentrepreneurial ecosystem actors. The emerging litera-ture on PIs describes them as scientific entrepreneurswho shape new paradigms, reshape the boundaries of

organizations, and span boundaries between the publicand private sector (Casati and Genet 2014; Mangematinet al. 2014), thus strive for mutual beneficial outcomesthat can enhance economic and non-economic valuearound disruptive knowledge (McAdam et al. 2012).

In an ideal entrepreneurial ecosystem, public researchoutputs would complement industry inputs and result inefficient processes and satisfactory outcomes that under-pin productive entrepreneurship. The reality looks differ-ent, as basic research, e.g., from universities, does notdirectly diffuse in marketable product or process innova-tions, as suggested by the linear model of innovation(Leyden andMenter 2017). Academia and industry oftenpursue divergent or even conflicting targets and are si-multaneously affected by their regional endowment andcorresponding governance mechanisms imposed by gov-ernment (Lehmann and Menter 2016): whereas universi-ties and research institutions might be interested in thedisclosure of new knowledge through publications, in-dustry might target the protection and commercializationof intellectual property. PIs have to align those opposingobjectives, outweigh financial and scientific interests, andstrive for efficient processes despite contrary objectives ofthe individual actors (Nambisan and Baron 2013). Indealing with such conflicts and constraints, this thencreates an array of managerial challenges for PIs particu-larly at the project level (see Cunningham et al. 2015a).

2.2 The PI role and activities in complexmulti-stakeholder public research projects

Scientists in the principal investigator role are part of theentrepreneurial ecosystem. As the changing nature of in-dividual academic roles (Slaughter and Leslie 1997) andthe evolution of entrepreneurial university (Etzkowitz1983, Guerrero et al. 2015) are blurring the boundariesbetween science and business; the role-identity of scientistsis being modified (Jain et al. 2009; Lam 2010). Thisparadigm shift results in the emergence of a new identityin the scientific community. Scientists are awarded re-search funding for the detailed interpretations and projectplans that are disruptive and original in nature that cancontribute to productive entrepreneurship for ecosystemactors. In the PI role, scientists take on management rolesin the governance, implementation, and realization oflarge-scale publicly funded research programs. Thus, informulating and delivering on public research programs,PIs are becoming influential agents of economic and socialchange.Mangematin et al. (2014: 2) summarize the PI role


and relevance as follows: BThey play a specific role in thenew governance of research as they are the ones whodesign research projects and manage their implementation.[…] These new roles also involve coordinating with mul-tiple organizations, including industry partners, and gener-ally making the job of the principal investigator moreimportant and policy relevant^.

There are growing empirical studies of scientists in thePI role. For a scientist, becoming a PI is a career enhanc-ing and offers a real opportunity to shape activities withrespect to science and markets as well as research produc-tivity (Feeney and Welch 2014). The PI role providesscientists with status within the academic communityand an additional allocation of resources that has thepotential to contribute to economic and non-economicvalue of entrepreneurial ecosystems (see O’Kane et al.2015). It provides opportunities for scientists to work andengage with other scientists in academic, public research,and industrial organizational settings and to build theirown research teams and networks. Taking on the PI rolefor a scientist means that they are taking on additionalresponsibilities and roles that are necessary to provide thebasis of disruptive knowledge that contributes toproductive entrepreneurship. It also requires PIs toremove constraints that prevent entrepreneurship andinnovation. In achieving this, Cunningham et al. (2016)identified ten types of responsibilities and roles of PIs whosimultaneously act as scientists, research strategists, pro-ject managers, team leaders, knowledge brokers, admin-istrators, stakeholder managers, project promoters, re-source managers, supervisors, and mentors, indicatingthe complexity of PIs’ tasks. In essence, the PI, asBoehm and Hogan (2014) argue, is akin to an entrepre-neur and needs to be a Bjack of all trades^ to managecomplex multi-stakeholder relationships. Moreover, theysuggest that PIs are even better placed to manage the gapbetween industry and academic environments. PIs areknowledge brokers who create value by bridging structur-al holes and building trust between the lab and industrythrough four distinct activities: extrapolation, seeking,aligning, and anticipating (Kidwell 2013).

PIs are highly strategic in choosing their institutionsin order to progress their research agenda and theyactively seek environments that support and value theirresearch activities and ambitions (Kidwell 2014). Theyseek out suitable entrepreneurial contexts or places thathave vibrant entrepreneurial ecosystems (Auerswald2015). PIs being a Bjack of all trades^ means they cancreate knowledge and novelty that new ventures can use

and exploit, manage governance issues and relation-ships effectively, contribute to productive entrepreneur-ship, arbitrate the costs and benefits to each shareholder,and contribute to the economic and non-economic valuecreation of entrepreneurial ecosystems. PIs challengesystems and processes (Kidwell 2014) and are non-conformists (O’Kane et al. 2015) who can subvert gov-ernance systems and rules.

Micro institutional conditions and supports do influ-ence the PIs’ academic entrepreneurship decision-making and high levels of trust between all stakeholdersare critical and essential (Organ and Cunningham 2014).PIs can also make the deliberate decision to leave auniversity setting to set up their own firm so that theycan enhance their sphere of influence and use it as amechanism to shape their research agenda and the mar-ket opportunity (Baglieri and Lorenzoni 2014). Based ona study of five PIs, Baglieri and Lorenzoni (2014) showhow PIs positioned themselves closer to the market thatenabled them to provide roadmaps and identify customerneeds as well as actively participate in the value creationprocess. Moreover, Casati and Genet (2014) argue thatPIs are scientific entrepreneurs that engage inenvisioning, value creation, and resourcing actions. Theyfurther argue that PIs shape their environment and havethe entrepreneurial characteristic to engage in scienceand the external environment. Furthermore, PIs withproactive postures challenge existing technology trajec-tories and shape new ones (O’Kane et al. 2015). Theactions and approaches of scientists in the PI role forpublicly funded research thereby contribute to the vi-brancy and development of entrepreneurial ecosystems.

2.3 Challenges and burdens for PIs of publicly fundedlarge-scale research projects

For scientists, becoming a PI places additional respon-sibilities with respect to governance, leadership, andmanagement of large-scale public science projects onthem. With respect to the governance of publicly fundedscientific programs, PIs are responsible for all scientificand financial aspects of their projects (see Cunninghamet al. 2016). Their day-to-day responsibilities includeresearch leadership and management of the project,dealing with internal and external stakeholders (TTOs,entrepreneurs, funders etc.) as well as supervising andmentoring researchers to ensure that the overall projectdeliverables are met. Given the additional responsibili-ties concerning leadership and management,


Cunningham et al. (2016: 71) note that Ball of this is tobe achieved within as many as three layers of controlmechanisms, including their own institution, the publicfunding agency and the project-specific controls^.

The managerial activities and burdens that scientistsin the PI role face can be extensive. Cunningham et al.(2015a) found that PIs experienced three main catego-ries of managerial challenges—project management,project adaptability, and project network manage-ment—and they used a variety of approaches to dealwith these challenges. They found that PIs are moredeeply involved in project operational managementand intensively involved in science brokering activitiesand that the managerial role has a low status among PIs.In their study of a sample of US research centers,Boardman and Ponomariov (2014) find that PI manage-ment know-how is not equal and this raises interestingquestions about the impact on research productivity.Furthermore, Boehm and Hogan (2014) argue the needfor PIs to have a broader commercial understanding andawareness that supports boundary spanning activities,particularly inter-organizational ones. In their study onentrepreneurial performance of PIs and companyculture, Del Giudice et al. (2016) emphasize that nation-al culture can influence PIs’ orientation towardentrepreneurship.

In discharging their project responsibilities PIs expe-rience barriers or what Cunningham et al. (2014) de-scribe as inhibiting factors that can hinder the realizationof their scientific vision and ambition as well as out-comes for other ecosystem actors. They identified threelevels of inhibitors: political and environmental, institu-tional, and project inhibitors. In particular, the institu-tional inhibitors centered on dedicated technology trans-fer support, tailored support for the PI role, and humancapital support. These impeded the operational manage-ment for PIs and highlighted core tensions of the rolebetween research management and leadership.

2.4 Responsibilities of PIs as entrepreneurial actors

To survive in a shifting public research environment thatincreasingly rewards academic entrepreneurship,knowledge translation, and economic impact, PIs areadopting the role of scientific entrepreneurs. Consistentwith this view, many of the tasks now undertaken by PIshave expanded beyond scientific avenues and resemblethose of traditional entrepreneurs. For example, there isincreasing acknowledgement that PIs contribute to

industry growth (Audretsch and Stephan 1996; Zuckeret al. 2002), acquire capital and resources (Forti et al.2013; Kidwell 2013), and act as inventors and marketshapers (Baglieri and Lorenzoni 2014; Casati and Genet2014; Murray 2004) as well as boundary spanningagents who connect scientific inquiry, innovation, andindustry (Boehm and Hogan 2014; Gittelman andKogut 2003). Added to this, a number of scholars haveemphasized the research management duties associatedwith the PI role (Adler et al. 2009; Boardman andPonomariov 2014), while Etzkowitz (2003) refers toresearch groups that are led by PIs as Bquasi-firms.^Moreover, the PI role involves significant coordinationamong entrepreneurial ecosystem actors. The expansionof the role and activities beyond traditional scientificleadership has created a new tension for scientists, par-ticularly around governance asMangematin et al. (2014:2) describe: BIn the new governance of science anduniversities, principal investigators have increased re-sponsibility as scientific fiduciaries. The legal and theinformal responsibilities entailed in the financial man-agement of research pose new administrative challengesfor the principal investigator, requiring them to measurecarefully the balance of research management and re-search leadership in their approach to their principalinvestigator mission. Can they, simultaneously, be en-trepreneurs and administrators?^

In summary, publicly funded PIs are entrepreneurialactors within entrepreneurial ecosystems and in the cre-ation of disruptive knowledge and productive entrepre-neurship. PIs can contribute to economic and non-economic value through fulfilling their PI role and theassociated responsibilities. Hence, PIs are involved inengaging and interacting with a wide range of entrepre-neurial ecosystem actors and they have to deal withcomplex governance issues based on an imperfect con-tract. The PI role, while it gives scientists a status withintheir academic community, also imposes an entrepre-neurial mandate as well as a governance mandate that isrequired to contribute to productive entrepreneurship.

3 Primary capabilities of PIs in contributingeffectively to governance of entrepreneurialecosystems

To contribute effectively to the economic growth ofentrepreneurial ecosystems and productive entrepre-neurship, PIs need to possess capabilities that bridge


the expectations of different actors. Sölvell (2015: 89f.)describes potential conflicts within entrepreneurial eco-systems as follows: BSmall firms who believe they havesomething new exciting to offer have a hard time meet-ing with the right people at a large firm. Large firmssearching for a new supplier are more likely to look foran established international supplier than go searchingamong innovative SMEs located right under their nose.Policymakers often have only vague ideas about whatbusiness really needs. Researchers are more interested inacademic publishing than commercializing their newfindings. […] Entrepreneurs find it difficult to persuadebanks to invest in new innovative businesses^. PIs needto be a Bjack of all trades^ (see Boehm and Hogan2014), having primary capabilities that enable them toaddress the specific needs of different actors and con-tribute to the actors’ value creation processes througheconomic and non-economic ends. To attain this, PIsproactively drive innovation, primarily through knowl-edge and create value by simultaneously interactingwith a multitude of actors (O’Kane 2016). It is the PIs’competency and experience that contributes to the effi-cient and effective value creation processes. Taking thegrowing body of empirical studies of PIs, we identifysome of the primary capabilities that PIs need to possessin order to effectively shape governance relationshipsthat ultimately enhance the overall value of an entrepre-neurial ecosystem.

3.1 Researcher and scientific excellence

Being an excellent researcher is a central capability thatfunded PIs need to have in order to be successful inleading large-scale publicly funded projects that involveacademic and industry partnerships (Cunningham et al.2015b). This is evaluated through peer review process-es, where the project ideas as well as the scientific trackrecord of the PI and associated research teams andpartners are evaluated and assessed as well as the po-tential impacts beyond scientific ones. In their study ofFrench PIs, Casati and Genet (2014: 16) term the dem-onstration of scientific excellence as Bproducingscience^ meaning that BPIs ‘produce’ science, technol-ogies and innovation and the outputs of their activity aremeasurable^. Some PIs seek public funding to pursueexisting scientific trajectories and build on the scientificexcellence that they have created while others open newscientific trajectories (see O’Kane et al. 2015). PIs’scientific work is focused around problem-based

activities, providing some solutions and answers forpolicymakers (Mangematin et al. 2014).

3.2 Research leadership

Becoming a PI places additional research leadership andmanagerial responsibilities on scientists. PIs need tohave a capability in both to ensure that they complywith different governance and control mechanisms ofvarious entrepreneurial ecosystem actors such asfunding agencies, their own institution and any industryor enterprise partners. Research leadership capabilitiesrelate to ensuring that the funded project delivers thedesired scientific outcomes, whereby the PIs’ capabili-ties are leading and coordinating scientific outcomestypically across a number of academic and now increas-ingly industry partners (see Cunningham et al. 2015a),based on imperfect contracts. The role of the PI is toprovide academic leadership. The foundation of thisresearch leadership is achieved through their scientificexcellence and track record.

3.3 Managerial responsiveness

Cunningham et al. (2015a, 2015b) posit that the PI rolehas become managerial in nature in terms of the corefunctions of management (planning, leading, organiz-ing, and controlling). PIs not alone become academicleaders but are viewed as institution leaders. PIs need tohave research managerial capabilities to deal effectivelywith a variety of activities related to finance, humanresources, legal, intellectual property (IP), etc. to suc-cessfully deliver publicly funded research projects. Partof their managerial responsibility is to ensure that allmembers of the funded project are compliant with re-search ethics and professional body requirements. Themanagerial tasks and challenges for PIs focus on projectmanagement, project adaptability, and network chal-lenges (see Cunningham et al. 2015a). Based on theirstudy of Irish PIs, Cunningham et al. (2014) found thatthe balance for PIs is more on research management andless on research leadership. PIs are in essence CEOs oftemporary organizations within their own institution(see Mangematin et al. 2014). Managerial responsive-ness thus means that PIs have to deal with core mana-gerial tensions and changing conditions and objectives:entrepreneurial versus scientific outputs; balancingexisting workloads versus applying for new fundingopportunities; IP protection versus IP exploitation;


project sustainability versus continual loss of talents andexperiences; researchmanagement versus research lead-ership; managing power of collaboration partners. Withrespect to entrepreneurial ecosystems, this capabilityensures that allocated resources—as well as associatedcosts—are deployed, managed, and utilized in a mannerthat can maximize economic and non-economic valuecreation that meets the demands and anticipated benefitsof different actors within governance systems.

3.4 Resource acquisition

One of the core capabilities of a PI is to secure both hardand soft resources to realize their scientific missions oras Kidwell (2014: 34) describes Bthey must steer theircareers in ways that position them to accomplish theirresearch agenda with appropriate resources^. The hardresources typically center on equipment and lab space toconduct their research. Soft resource support is usuallyfocused on institutional support for the PI role andassociated activities. This means in effect that PIs havesupport from various functions within their institutionsto effectively and efficiently deliver the publicly fundedprograms and to be able to simultaneously engage withdifferent actors within an entrepreneurial ecosystem.Being an effective resource acquirer means that the PIhas the necessary threshold resources (hard and soft) inorder to deliver against stated objectives for publiclyfunded projects. This capability also supports the PI torealize more autonomy and research space to conducttheir research and related activities. It also means thatthe PI has the necessary resources that can have thepotential to contribute to value creation for other entre-preneurial ecosystem actors.

3.5 Boundary spanning and relationship building

Empirical studies to date on PIs have consistentlyhighlighted the need for PIs to be capable with respectto building relationships internally and externally totheir own institutions with multiple partners and havethe ability to boundary span. Specifically, Boehm andHogan (2014) highlight the need for PIs to build sus-tainable and effective inter-organizational relationshipsand to develop good personal relationships betweenresearch and industry partners. Casati and Genet(2014) found that PIs were involved in brokering sci-ence where they were transferring knowledge and ex-pertise across domains and organizational settings as

well as forming new networks. PIs need to have bridg-ing capabilities between science and industry. As part oftheir boundary spanning activities and capabilities, PIsare open to collaborating with a wide variety of partnersthat help them to realize their scientific mission (Kidwell2014; O’Kane et al. 2015). Such boundary spanningactivities can enhance existing value creation or createnew streams of economic and non-economic value forindividual entrepreneurial ecosystem actors. This capa-bility also contributes to good governance and relation-ships that are necessary for the functioning of entrepre-neurial ecosystems.

3.6 Envisioning, strategizing, and value creation

Envisioning, strategizing, and value creation constitutethree complementary capabilities that PIs need to pos-sess. First, PIs are visionaries as they have a capability tohave a clear vision of their scientific mission over thelong term. Being visionary means that they appropriateresources and engage with different stakeholders inorder to realize this scientific mission (Kidwell 2014).Casati and Genet (2014: 16) describe this envisioning asa dimension that Brepresents PIs’ medium and longterms scientific vision and perspectives, and includeshow they frame their overall scientific ambition as seriesof projects which match the requirements of publicauthorities^. Strategizing is about how to realize theirscientific vision and mission. O’Kane et al. (2015) findthat PIs strategize constantly with some PIs being morestrategic and selective in relation to competing for pub-lic funding. This requires PIs to balance short-term goalsand operational demands against realizing the longer-term scientific vision and mission. Moreover, in theirstrategizing, PIs are creating alignment and synergiesbetween their research, its application and the marketplace (see Cunningham et al. 2016). Value creation andcapture is finally realized by PIs being able to link andexploit synergies between academic and user domains.

4 The governance of entrepreneurial ecosystems

Due to the inherent structure of entrepreneurial ecosys-tems and the fact that ecosystems are not formalizedinstitutions or organizations but rather an informal plexusof relations between individuals, institutions, and organi-zations, often based on regional proximity, it seems to beimpossible to develop a theory-based holistic framework


for the governance of entrepreneurial ecosystems. Similarto clusters, entrepreneurial ecosystems are characterizedby relational governance mechanisms and a lack of hier-archical structures as well as clear expressions of expec-tances, responsibilities, and objectives (Spigel 2015).Stam (2015) argues that entrepreneurial ecosystems arenot comparable to classical market (failure) situations andconsequently the classical Bgovernance modes,^ namelythe both extremes Bmarket^ and Bhierarchy,^ are notsufficient in a discussion of mechanisms minimizingcosts. Rather, the opportunity of creating a higher overallvalue justifies the important role that entrepreneurial eco-systems play in the welfare of regions and countries (Acset al. 2014). Measuring the value created by an entrepre-neurial ecosystem is only possible if firstly the boundariesof the ecosystem are defined and subsequently costs andbenefits within the ecosystem but also arising conflictsbetween actors inside and spatially proximate, indirectlyaffected actors outside the ecosystem are identified andtaken into account. The subsequent discussion of prob-lems and solving mechanisms and multiple principal-agent relationships demonstrates whether and in whatmanner PIs can add value by managing the governanceof entrepreneurial ecosystems.

4.1 The boundaries of the entrepreneurial ecosystemas a nexus of incomplete contracts and resultinggovernance problems

In order to be able to explain and quantify the addedvalue created by the entrepreneurial ecosystem, thedefinition of the boundaries of the ecosystem is anessential requirement. Stam and Spigel (2016) defineentrepreneurial ecosystems Bas a set of interdependentactors and factors coordinated in such a way that theyenable productive entrepreneurship within a particularterritory .̂ Even though entrepreneurial ecosystems arenot clearly delimited organizational constructs, theyshow the same properties, underlying conditions andproblems like other organizations. As markets are im-perfect, especially not frictionless and characterized bymissing market transparency as well as irrational behav-ior of the participants, the extent of transaction costsdominates the composition of relationships between thedifferent market players. Depending on the specificationof transactions and products, contracts that can be one-time or repeating are concluded. Consequently, transac-tion costs, especially search and information as well asbargaining and enforcement costs, determine the

boundaries of organizations. These universal implica-tions from transaction cost theory (for a broaderdiscussion see Coase 1937; Williamson 1985, 1989)hold for entrepreneurial ecosystems that can conse-quently be considered as a nexus of contracts (Jensenand Meckling 1976). Due to the fact that these contractscannot specify every imaginable situation and resultingdecision or action alternative, they can be described asincomplete by nature. Consequently, implicit and ex-plicit, but still incomplete, multiple contracts exist be-tween distinct entrepreneurial ecosystem actors.

As entrepreneurial ecosystems generate complex andmultifarious outputs and with reference to the assump-tion that knowledge spillovers arise from these ecosys-tems (Acs et al. 2009), externalities can lead to unde-sired behaviors like free-riding. In the case that propertyrights are not enforceable or other interested parties arenot automatically excluded from benefits, the incentivesof involved actors can be influenced and consequentlythe overall output can be reduced for the whole commu-nity (Alchian and Demsetz 1973). Due to the fact thatthe allocation of resources within the entrepreneurialecosystem directly affects the evaluation of related costsand benefits, renegotiations and underinvestment canjeopardize the inherent value of and productive capitalin the ecosystem. Consequently, the organizational arti-fact Bentrepreneurial ecosystem^ is comprehensible un-der the following two conditions. Firstly, a functioningand efficient governance system should ensure that allstakeholders contributing to value creation within theecosystem receive a return on the collaboratively createdvalue they expected. Secondly, contributing to the eco-system is only reasonable if the created value within theecosystem is higher than the sum of all values potential-ly created by actors without their involvement in theecosystem, i.e., overall benefits exceed the overall costswithin the ecosystem. Conflicting interests and prob-lems arising from incomplete contracts and self-interests lead to imbalances and can destroy the expect-ed value. How PIs can contribute to solve these prob-lems is discussed in the following section.

4.2 Multiple-principal agent relationships and the costsand benefits of governance mechanisms within anentrepreneurial ecosystem

Generally, the incomplete contract approach focuses onsingle relationships and single tasks; nevertheless, it alsofits to describe corporate governance dilemmas in


entrepreneurial ecosystems by construing them as a nexusof incomplete contracts (see Zingales 1998). The sur-rounding of entrepreneurial ecosystems is challengingbecause of incomplete information about the risks ofprojects on the one hand and the high requirementsconcerning the definition and formulation of project goalson the other hand. As publicly funded research projectsare naturally complex and multifaceted, the mentionedchallenges can potentially endanger the success of thewhole project. Additionally, the abovementioned stake-holders have a self-interest and try to influence or controlthe project. To overcome these problems, PIs can serve asproject managers and enforcers of all legitimate interestsby reason of their capabilities.

Taking the perspective of the principal-agent theoryhelps to analyze asymmetric information and conse-quences in (contractual) relationships between individ-uals (Jensen and Meckling 1976). From a principal-agent perspective, PIs are acting as an agent for all actorswithin the entrepreneurial ecosystem, what leads tomultiple agency roles. This circumstance requires theconsideration of multiple governance roles of the PI inthe entrepreneurial ecosystem and consequently the ex-istence of different sets of agency costs (Filatotchevet al. 2011). PIs are agents in response of the overallproject, assigned and contracted to balance interests andcompeting claims within the ecosystem. Within theirrole as an agent, PIs bridge the expectations, thus meetthe primary objectives of various actors and constantlysignal progress and results to entrepreneurial ecosystemactors, to ultimately contribute to economic and non-economic value creation processes within entrepreneur-ial ecosystems.

With regard to information asymmetries, the gover-nance literature distinguishes two different problem cat-egories depending on the status of the contract: Badverseselection^—problems as the result of Bhiddencharacteristics^ before the parties reach an arrangement(ex ante), and Bmoral hazard’—problems which describeBhidden actions^ and Bhidden information^ aftercontracting (ex post) (Arrow 1984). Both, the principaland the agent, are interested in a reduction of informationasymmetries. The agent uses Bsignaling^ to persuade theprincipal that he/she has the best intentions and his/herstatement about his/her characteristics is true, whereas theprincipal uses Bmonitoring^ to control the agent’s ac-tions. Holmström (1979) and others showed that anyadditional information improves the welfare of the prin-cipal and the agent (see Stiglitz 1975; Williamson 1975).

Especially in an entrepreneurial environment where pro-ject outcomes are often exposed to high risks, informa-tion asymmetries between the principal and the agentundermine the creation of economic and non-economicvalue within entrepreneurial ecosystems.

To overcome or at least minimize informationasymmetries, thus increasing the efficiency of valuecreation processes, the principal has to evaluate andassess the signals which are sent out by the agent to thendecide on whether to enter into bilateral (contractual)relationships or not. In an entrepreneurial ecosystem, forexample, the PI acts as an agent for public capitalproviders such as public research funding agencies.Before a scientist can take on the PI role and is enabledto act as an agent for a public funding agency, a peerevaluation focuses on scientific merits, capabilities tomanage the funding project proposed and whether theproject has sufficient organization support to be aneffective agent for the funding agency. In general, im-perfect information about individuals’ characteristicscan conclude in unbalanced negotiation power and endsup in an incomplete contract and a dissatisfying rela-tionship for both partners (Zingales 1998). Reducedefforts and a suboptimal allocation of resources finallylead to a project outcome that is under its potentialvalue, resulting in a loss of welfare.

In a complex environment as prevalent in entrepre-neurial ecosystems, monitoring as well as signalingmechanisms are difficult to establish (Freitas et al.2013). Signaling and monitoring activities might there-by take various forms. Entrepreneurs could for exampleuse their personal networks and strong ties to businessangels to signal their good reputation to get funding(Elitzur and Gavious 2003), and funding agencies could,for example, install a simple monitoring system for thePI such as a quarterly reporting system. However, thePI’s task areas are multifaceted. According to Audretschet al. (2009), the classical private entrepreneur has a dualrole: leveraging the existing resources of the business aswell as bringing in human capital to the innovationprocess. Beyond these tasks, the PI as a public sectorentrepreneur has to additionally execute many morefunctions such as supervising and mentoring, managingcultural diversity, or project promotion (Cunninghamet al. 2016). The PI as well as the funding agency wouldagree that managing all involved stakeholders is one ofthe PI’s key responsibilities. But how should the PIcredibly report the importance of a research meeting orthink tank without any physical output? Especially trust


building activities between the PI and the other keyactors in entrepreneurial ecosystems are necessary toensure that the PI can use its capabilities to create value.

Besides the possibility to control the agent, the prin-cipal can install incentive mechanisms like performance-related remuneration. It is a fact that the allocation ofproperty rights and the distribution of tasks, also knownas the separation of ownership and control, is the originof all governance dilemmas, but otherwise can be part ofthe solution. Giving agents ownership shares as part oftheir remuneration is a common method to align theirinterests with the interests of the principal-owner.Demsetz (1967) emphasizes that property rights havean incentive as well as a reward component, which bothcan universally be used in economic settings and arebeneficial in contract theory, too. In large-scale publiclyfunded research projects, property rights matter, butmore in terms of intellectual property rights and specificknowledge than in equity stakes. Stephan and Levin(1996: 177) examine reward structures of university-based scientists and conclude that Bbasic science is fos-tered by a mechanism of reputational rights; technolog-ical advances—and the products and processes theyproduce—are fostered by a mechanism of propertyrights^. Individual incentives to engage in the transferof innovation, i.e., the Bprivatization^ of knowledge, aswell as the opportunities of commercialization are basedon sufficient intellectual property rights.

5 PI-centered entrepreneurial ecosystem governanceframework

PIs have to simultaneously maintain relationships withmany stakeholders within one single project and allstakeholders have self-interest in realizing value. Trustin the capabilities of the PI as well as between thedifferent actors of the entrepreneurial ecosystems canmake controlling and monitoring mechanisms superflu-ous or can at least lead to a reduction of respectivemechanisms. Focusing on strategic tools that keep anoverview on the macro level instead of focusing onsingle actors and relations can help to ensure targetachievement and value creation. Using a modified mod-el of the balanced scorecard (Kaplan and Norton 1995)thereby helps the PI to govern the entrepreneurial eco-system successfully and supports him/her in his/her keyrole constituting the connective link in publicly fundedlarge-scale research programs.

PIs take an active role in the governance system of anentrepreneurial ecosystem. They are part of their insti-tutional monitoring system as their entrepreneurial con-tribution to the project is essential for the overall eco-nomic and non-economic value creation. Therefore, adetailed discussion about the PI and their relation toother stakeholders in research projects against the back-ground of the principal-agent theory sheds light oncommon governance dilemmas. As PIs engage with avariety of actors within entrepreneurial ecosystems, theyhave to navigate different governance mechanisms anddeliver a variety of benefits and outcomes such as dis-ruptive knowledge. From a governance perspective,they have to deal with different problem categoriesresulting from information asymmetries. To be effectiveand to contribute to efficient governance, PIs need topossess a certain set of primary capabilities that enablesthem to bridge and overcome prevalent gaps and obsta-cles between science and business. Drawing this togeth-er, we present a PI-centered entrepreneurial ecosystemgovernance framework that integrates actors that PIsneed to deal with, the primary capabilities they need topossess in order to deliver against the principal’s prima-ry interests, the problem categories associated with re-spective bilateral governance relationships as well asrelated solving mechanisms, to comply with actors’monitoring mechanisms as well as contribute to theeconomic and non-economic value creation and capturefor entrepreneurial ecosystem actors (see Fig. 1).

It is the PI’s research excellence and leadership thatenable PIs to effectively pursue their scientific mission,coordinate various actors within the scientific field, anddeliver publicly funded research programs successfullyand on time. The focus of PIs is on scientific valuecreation and the compliance with respective scientificresearch objectives. Despite potentially diverging objec-tives—universities are interested in research income androyalties whereas PIs primarily strive for personal repu-tation and prestige—it is the PI’s research excellenceand leadership which facilitate the simultaneousachievement of both targets and the satisfactory resolu-tion of potential conflicts. It is obvious that, due to theiterative and dynamic nature of publicly funded large-scale projects, the PI’s role as well as the importance andinvolvement of different entrepreneurial ecosystem ac-tors change over time. In the early stages of projectacquisition, PIs act like a principal and decide whichresearch ideas are pursued, how research should techni-cally be organized and the nature of the disruptive


knowledge. In involving other ecosystem actors, theyallocate costs and benefits, with some of these costsbeing covered by the funding received. The PI becomesa resource allocator. When funding of a project isgranted, the PI is responsible for the design and imple-mentation of an overall project governance system andas the project progresses they have to monitor the allo-cation of costs and benefits for each entrepreneurialecosystem actor. Due to their drive for academic prestigeand enhanced reputation, PIs often choose to apply forand engage in very complex multi-stakeholder projects,which are difficult to coordinate. Their boundary

spanning and relationship building capabilities enablePIs to successfully deliver on the respective principals’objectives and leverage diverse inputs of various stake-holders efficiently.

As entrepreneurial environment actors, research or-ganizations serve as the natural setting of PIs, provideresources, and control the application, incentives, andrewards. Besides financial outcomes such as royaltiesand research income, universities are interested in sci-entific outcomes such as scientific publications as wellas human capital development. Additionally, reputationis important for current and future funding by the


Private Capital Provider

Public Policy

Public Capital ProviderIndustry

Research Organizations

Principal Investigators

(PIs)

Value Crea�on(Indicators/Benefits)

Problem Categories(Costs) Solving Mechanisms

Economic Growth (E)Job Crea�on (E)New Start-ups (E)New Patents (E)Technological Leadership (NE)

Ambiguity in strategicmission (P)Regulatory restric�ons (P)Demand-driven research (A)

Considera�on of regionalknowledgeassets (P)IP protec�on (P)Supply-driven research (A)

PI Capabili�esResearch & Scien�fic ExcellenceResearch LeadershipManagerial Responsiveness

ResourceAcquisi�onBoundary Spanning & Rela�onship BuildingEnvisioning, Strategizing, & ValueCrea�on



Successful and Timely Deliveryof Public Science Programmes(E & NE)

Lack of resources (P)Administra�veburdens (P)Misusageof resources (A)Non-disclosureof research (A)

IP protec�on (P)Efficient controllingmechanisms (P)Repor�ng of financial and scien�fickey figures (A)

PI Capabili�es

Research & Scien�fic ExcellenceResearch Leadership



Financial Returns (E) Lack of resources (P)Administra�ve burdens (P)Misusage of resources (A)Non-disclosure of research (A)

IP protec�on (P)Efficient controlling mechanisms (P)Repor�ng offinancial key figures (A)

PI Capabili�esManagerial Responsiveness

ResourceAcquisi�onEnvisioning, Strategizing, & ValueCrea�on



Publica�ons (NE)Pres�ge/ Reputa�on (E& NE)Human Capital (E& NE)Royal�es (E)

Lack of resources (P)Administra�veburdens (P)Mises�ma�on of value (P)Non-disclosureof research (A)Misusageof resources (A)

Provision of research autonomy (P)Efficient TT mechanisms/ TTOs (P)IP protec�on (P)Signalling reputa�on (A)

PI Capabili�esResearch & Scien�fic Excellence

Research LeadershipBoundary Spanning & Rela�onship Building



New Technologies (E)Patents (E)Financial Returns (E)

Lack of resources (P)Mises�ma�on of value (P)Non-disclosureof research (A)Misusageof resources (A)Supply-driven research (A)

Provision of research autonomy (P)IP protec�on (P)Openness to technological change(P)Demand-driven research (A)Signalling reputa�on (A)

PI Capabili�esManagerial Responsiveness

Resource Acquisi�onEnvisioning, Strategizing, & Value Crea�on

Fig. 1 PI-centered entrepreneurial ecosystem governance framework. Value creation relates to both economic (E) and non-economic (NE)value components | Problem categories and solving mechanisms may be principal- (P) or agent-induced (A)

government and other institutions. Due to the fact thatthe relationship between the PI and the university islong-term orientated, Badverse selection’ problems playa tangential role. Rather, moral hazard problems arisefrom the PI’s hidden actions and hidden intensions.Resources can be wasted or distributed in an inefficientway; therefore, there are less benefits potentially occur-ring to other entrepreneurial ecosystem actors. Further-more, PIs might have an interest in not disclosing newknowledge and technological breakthroughs, i.e., by-pass formal technology transfer systems (Menter2016). In order to prevent respective activities, univer-sities need to provide institutional resources that PIsrequire and reduce the administrative burdens associatedwith the disclosure of innovations. The university mightadditionally establish monitoring mechanisms to controlthe PI over at least three main dimensions: First, finan-cial reporting to ensure an optimal allocation of re-sources. Second, Technology Transfer Offices (TTOs)offer IP protection and efficient technology transfermechanisms to facilitate the commercialization ofknowledge. PIs are required to adhere to formal tech-nology transfer policies and procedures. Third, EthicsCommittees supervise ethical standards and make surethat PIs comply with the norms and values of the uni-versity as well as their professional scientific communi-ties. TTOs only have limited control over the PI, whichin turn can result in suboptimal allocations of resourcesand an overall loss in welfare. Despite institutionalizedmonitoring and control systems, universities need toprovide PIs adequate research autonomy and balancethis against appropriate IP protection systems in order toincrease efficient value creation processes that capturethe benefits for relevant entrepreneurial ecosystem ac-tors. PIs need to invest in building their reputation tosignal their capabilities.

The industry actor in the entrepreneurial ecosystem isbecoming an increasingly important collaborator for PIs,especially SMEs. These entrepreneurial ecosystem ac-tors are one of the main recipients of disruptive knowl-edge that can have direct benefit on their firm. Togetherwith public and private capital providers such as publicresearch funding agencies or venture capitalists, industrymainly contributes financial support to the researchproject. Reversely, the implication is that all financiersfocus on financial controls. Moreover, industry partnerscan contribute other physical factors like equipment,labor, and production or testing space. In return, theyexpect new disruptive knowledge and the access to

expertise or as described by Stam (2015) Bproductiveentrepreneurship.^ SMEs engage in publicly fundedprograms to absorb new knowledge and get access toexpertise, as they do not have the internal resources orcapacity. For all industry actors, the main monitoringmechanism is financial and this may not be of a sufficientscale to engage the interest of PIs. By their resourceacquisition skills and their managerial responsiveness,PIs deal with imposed managerial tensions and thusenable efficient value creation processes within therespective research projects, based on their envisioning,strategizing, and value creation capabilities. Openness totechnology change constitutes a prerequisite forrespective collaborations as economic and non-economic value can only be created by the applicationof new knowledge. The imperfect contract nature ofpublicly funded programs can facilitate this openness.A lack of sufficient resources might result in suboptimalvalue creation processes, some entrepreneurial ecosys-tem actors bearing more of the costs. To ensure theadequate disclosure of new disruptive knowledge, thedistribution of intellectual property rights has to beagreed before the actual project start, i.e., ex ante. Aspublic-private partnerships are primarily based on col-laborative research, firms still have to ensure some re-search autonomy for the PI. In this context, the reputationof PIs serves as a good signal to sustain the autonomythat they require to advance their research efforts and toact as an entrepreneurial actor.

Private capital providers are solely interested in fi-nancial returns, the main benefit, whereas publicfunding agencies focus on scientific reporting as wellas a research governance reported by the PI and thevalue for money. Both types of capital providers haveto avoid two governance dilemmas related to the PI:firstly, Badverse selection^—problems in the early stagecould lead to the funding of suboptimal projects oroptimal projects with suboptimal leadership. Secondly,Bmoral hazard^—behavior by the PI jeopardizes theexpected rewards and benefits. Especially the timelydelivery of publicly funded programs is important forthe funding agency. Thus, capital providers consistentlyrequire updates of reports, providing them insights intothe current project status, completed milestones, upcom-ing activities, and actual and projected benefits. Al-though reports need to be information-dense, they mustnot constitute administrative burdens that add additionalcosts to entrepreneurial ecosystem actors. This can ac-tually constrain the PI to engage in value creating


activities, i.e., conducting research, allocating resources,boundary spanning activities, etc.

The government, thus public policy, expects multiplebenefits and rewards. Policymakers focus on economicimpacts like new start-ups and job creation, economicstimuli sent by licensed new knowledge and technolo-gies as well as the implementation of science and SMEpolicies in general. These targets are abstract at thebeginning of funded projects and therefore; moral haz-ard could dominate the relation between the PI and thepolicymaker. Public policies set the basis for sufficientintellectual property protection mechanisms, thus arecritical drivers in establishing optimal governance sys-tems. As government development agencies are inter-ested in scientific breakthroughs, PIs should be encour-aged to conduct collaborative research, enabling PIs tothink outside the box, i.e., pool different knowledgesources to open up and reach new technological fron-tiers. This potentially expands the boundaries of existingentrepreneurial ecosystems as well as delivering disrup-tive knowledge.

Combining all actors in entrepreneurial ecosystemsand taking their multiple objectives and expected re-wards into account, the PI as a key player can reducecomplexity by navigating through the funded researchproject to deliver the envisaged benefits. As scientists inthe PI role, they bring together different entrepreneurialecosystem actors and are typically the first contact per-son for research organizations, industry, capital pro-viders, and policy. Since the importance of variousactors as well as the significance of respective collabo-rations changes over time, the interaction with PIs isiterative and dynamic, hence not linear (as indicated bythe bold arrow in Fig. 1). Whereas the interaction withe.g. capital providers is rather intense in the projectinitiation phase, the PI subsequently mainly engageswith industry to create economic and non-economicvalue, but still has to report to capital providers also inthe ongoing phases until project completion.

All entrepreneurial ecosystem actors monitor andcontrol the PIs’ activities, but their mechanisms areambiguous: control instruments and reports should beused as a means to an end and not an end in itself tominimize costs. Besides the discussed monitoring op-portunities, PIs use signaling to convince other entre-preneurial ecosystem actors that they have the bestintention to reach all targets, e.g., disclose new technol-ogies and ideas, commercialize knowledge within theagreed framework, etc. Signals are the results of the

agent’s previous actions and are only valuable if theyare visible and verifiable. Successfully completed pro-jects, patent applications, or scientific publications aresuitable signals for certain actors, whereby it should benoted that all these measurable outputs are reducible tothe PI’s capabilities. PIs need to have capabilities thatenable them to operate, engage, and mobilize the nec-essary resources and support to fulfill publicly fundedproject commitments, realize their own scientific ambi-tions, and in doing so, create influence over their ownresearch space while adhering to different governancemechanisms. Information asymmetries have to be re-duced to enable efficient value creation processes. Boththe principal as well as the agent of every bilateralgovernance relationship within entrepreneurial ecosys-tems have to engage in removing obstacles to valuecreation, as respective objectives can only be reachedby jointly addressing prevalent problem categories.

6 Conclusion and future research avenues

The purpose and contribution of our paper is to present amicro level PI-centered governance framework, whichis in contrast to the macro level frameworks posited inthe literature. In presenting our framework, we alsoaddress some of the criticisms of entrepreneurial eco-systems and in doing so identify the value creation(benefits), PI capabilities, the problem categories(costs), and solving mechanisms that PIs can use togovern effectively and efficiently large-scale publiclyfunded research programs. Our paper has highlightedthe influential role that scientists play in the PI role incontributing to the development and growth of entre-preneurial ecosystems and the multitude of actors. Ourframework highlights the governance mechanisms; PIshave to navigate effectively to deliver publicly fundedresearch programs based on imperfect contracts withinentrepreneurial ecosystems that allocate costs and ben-efits to relevant entrepreneurial ecosystem actors. Ourframework addresses some of the criticisms of entrepre-neurial ecosystems research to date and makes the fol-lowing contributions.

First, our micro level approach from a PI perspectiveis a modest attempt to develop an operational levelunderstanding of entrepreneurial ecosystem ashighlighted by Stam and Bosma (2015). We do this byfocusing on the PI capabilities, value creation (benefits),the problem categories (costs), and solving mechanisms


relevant for each entrepreneurial ecosystem actor froman individual perspective—that of the PI. Second, Stamand Spigel (2015) suggest that there is no clarity aboutcause and effect in relation to specific factors and theunits of analysis and attribution of contributory factorsfor economic outcomes. Our micro level PI-centeredgovernance framework attempts to address this by map-ping out the cause and effect by suggesting differentvalue creation indicators for each entrepreneurial eco-system actor relevant to the PI as well as the problemcategories and solving mechanisms that PIs experienceand use in the governance of large-scale publicly fundedresearch. PIs mobilize different entrepreneurial ecosys-tem actors to create new projects, and in doing so,arbitrate and allocate costs and benefits. Future studiesmight thus operationalize our framework. Our thirdcontribution lies around existing studies using differentnetwork definitions, being place-/cluster-based and con-ceptualizing frameworks that are static and do not ac-count for the evolution over time (see Alvedalen andBoschma 2017). Our proposed framework overcomesthe network definitional problem by taking the unit ofanalysis at the individual level and focusing on one ofthe influential actors that generates disruptive knowl-edge—one of the core elements of an entrepreneurialecosystem. Moreover, focusing on the PI means that ourproposed model is not place-/cluster-based, consideringthe time-based, dynamic, and iterative aspects of pub-licly funded large-scale projects.

Future studies can use cross-country programs suchas Horizon 2020, European Research Council PI grantholders as well as national funded PIs as their unit ofanalysis. The focus at the PI and project level can beused to examine the evolution of entrepreneurial eco-system through the prism of large-scale publicly fundedresearch. The very nature of publicly funded programsmeans they are not static but rather dynamic as theyevolve over time. Our conceptual model overcomes thestatic nature of entrepreneurial ecosystem frameworksas our proposed framework allows for time evolutionand the weighting of entrepreneurial ecosystem actors’importance during the different project phases.

For the economic advancement and the contributionto the productive capital of an entrepreneurial ecosys-tem, PIs need to possess capabilities to lead, manage,reconcile, and govern scientific targets with benefitssuch as economic and non-economic value creation.Through their boundary spanning activities and theirability to envision and strategize, PIs leverage actors

and resources to create disruptive knowledge and enableother entrepreneurial ecosystem actors to capture value.The underlying governance dilemma at a micro level ofentrepreneurial ecosystems is that different stake-holders, i.e., principals such as research organizationsor capital providers, are competing if not attempting toassert primary control over the agent, i.e., the PI as thesupplier of disruptive knowledge. PIs consequentlyhave to deal with different forms of control mechanismsand become proficient in navigating, arbitrating, andmanaging these control mechanisms in order to createand generate benefits and value for all relevant entre-preneurial ecosystem actors at a project level. Moreover,PIs have to create their own governance systems at theproject level as well as navigate institutional governancesystems to fulfill their scientific mission and add eco-nomic and non-economic value to relevant entrepre-neurial ecosystems.

How PIs navigate the different governance mecha-nisms matters and can constrain the benefits and valuecreation for entrepreneurial ecosystem actors. More-over, how PIs efficiently and effectively deliver onpublicly funded large-scale multi-stakeholder projectsmatters particularly as they are agents for funding agen-cies and other government agents in supporting anddeveloping SME competitiveness. SMEs have limitedinfluence over universities in comparison to larger firmsso engaging with PIs using public funding is necessaryfor them to access disruptive knowledge, human capital,and expertise.

Finally, this paper emphasized the importance oftaking a PI-centered approach in viewing entrepreneur-ial ecosystems, given the influential role and founda-tional importance of PIs to the vibrancy and sustainabil-ity of entrepreneurial ecosystems. Our PI-centered ap-proach opens up several fruitful avenues of future re-search in at least three distinct research fields: the PIliterature, the entrepreneurial ecosystem literature aswell as the governance literature.

From a PI literature perspective, there is a need toconduct empirical research on how PIs actually arbi-trate, navigate, shape, and circumvent the complex gov-ernance systems they engage in at a micro perspective aspresented in our Fig. 1. Future studies should considerthe potential differences across universities, fundingagencies, and institutional settings and should investi-gate how PIs deploy their capabilities to achieve thedesired benefits for entrepreneurial ecosystem actors.Moreover, research on what signals PIs actually send


as an agent to different actors in a principal position thatafford them more autonomy and at what stage thissignaling becomes effective with multiple principals isneeded. Empirical studies are warranted on how PIsunderstand and deal with moral hazard and adverseselection problem categories and how this varies acrossdisciplines and types of institutional settings. Address-ing these research themes will further advance the en-trepreneurial ecosystem research, particularly from theindividual perspective as identified and advocated byStam (2015).

From an entrepreneurial ecosystem literature per-spective, it is critical to investigate the influence of thecompetitive positing of an entrepreneurial ecosystemactor on the role as a principal. Moreover, the active orpassive role of an ecosystem actor might influence itstendency to shape and control agents such as PIs. Therole of public policy-shaping entrepreneurial behaviorand thus relationships within entrepreneurial ecosys-tems is another very fruitful area of future research.Finally, with the growth influence of virtual ecosystems,principal-agent roles should be analyzed more in depth.

From a governance literature perspective, insightsfrom classical agency research addressing relationshipsbetween managers and owners of firms should be ana-lyzed and transferred toward bilateral governance rela-tionships in entrepreneurial ecosystems. Especially bilat-eral contracts and their mechanisms to avoid Badverseselection^ and overcome Bmoral hazard^ behavior ofagents should be the focus of future research, takingthe important role of PIs into consideration. Incentiveas well as control structures that are established in privatesector organizations have at least potential to be helpfulin the public sector, too. Empirical investigations on howthe actors in entrepreneurial ecosystems actually dealwith the identified problem categories and which mech-anisms are beneficial to increase economic and non-economic value creation would thereby enrich the gov-ernance literature. Efficient signaling and reporting struc-tures could avoid agency costs and the resulting welfareloss and consequently help to create a more valuable andtransparent entrepreneurial ecosystem.

Taking a PI-centered approach to future studies ofentrepreneurial ecosystem is essential as PIs are agentsfor entrepreneurial ecosystem actors and their effective-ness matters to contributing to the functioning, vibrancy,development, and growth of entrepreneurial ecosys-tems. This paper outlines a governance framework thatintegrates distinct research fields associated with

economic and non-economic value creation processesin entrepreneurial ecosystems to improve bilateral gov-ernance relationships that aims at motivating other re-searchers to focus their attention on public sector actorssuch as PIs.


Acknowledgements The authors wish to acknowledge the Spe-cial Issue Editors and reviewers for their constructive feedbackwhich has shaped this paper. James A. Cunningham acknowledgesthe funding support of Science Foundation Ireland (SFI) and co-funding under the European Regional Development Fund underGrant No. 13/RC/2073.

Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of theCreative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestrict-ed use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, providedyou give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source,provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate ifchanges were made.

References

Acs, Z. J., Audretsch, D. B., Lehmann, E. E., & Licht, G. (2017).National systems of innovation. The Journal of TechnologyTransfer, 42, 997–1008.

Acs, Z. J., Autio, E., & Szerb, L. (2014). National systems ofentrepreneurship: measurement issues and policy implica-tions. Research Policy, 43(3), 476–494.

Acs, Z. J., Braunerhjelm, P., Audretsch, D. B., & Carlsson, B.(2009). The knowledge spillover theory of entrepreneurship.Small Business Economics, 32(1), 15–30.

Adler, N., Elmquist, M., & Norrgren, F. (2009). The challenge ofmanaging boundary-spanning research activities: experi-ences from the Swedish context. Research Policy, 38(7),1136–1149.

Alchian, A. A., & Demsetz, H. (1973). The property right para-digm. The Journal of Economic History, 33(1), 16–27.

Alvedalen, J., & Boschma, R. (2017). A critical review of entre-preneurial ecosystems research: towards a future researchagenda. European Planning Studies, 25(6), 887–903.

Arrow, K. J. (1984). The Economics of Agency: DTIC Document.Audretsch, D. B., & Belitski, M. (2016). Entrepreneurial ecosys-

tems in cities: establishing the framework conditions. TheJournal of Technology Transfer, 1–22.

Audretsch, D. B., & Stephan, P. E. (1996). Company-scientistlocational links: the case of biotechnology. The AmericanEconomic Review, 86(3), 641–652.

Audretsch, D. B., Lehmann, E. E., & Plummer, L. A. (2009).Agency and governance in strategic entrepreneurship.Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 33(1), 149–166.

Auerswald, P. E. (2015). Enabling entrepreneurial ecosystems:insights from ecology to inform effective entrepreneurshippolicy.

Baglieri, D., & Lorenzoni, G. (2014). Closing the distance be-tween academia and market: experimentation and user

entrepreneurial processes. The Journal of TechnologyTransfer, 39(1).

Boardman, C., & Ponomariov, B. (2014). Management knowl-edge and the organization of team science in universityresearch centers. The Journal of Technology Transfer, 39(1),75–92.

Boehm, D., & Hogan, T. (2014). ‘A jack of all trades’: the role ofPIs in the establishment and management of collaborativenetworks in scientific knowledge commercialisation. TheJournal of Technology Transfer, 39(1), 134–149.

Casati, A., & Genet, C. (2014). Principal investigators as scientificentrepreneurs. The Journal of Technology Transfer, 39(1),11–32.

Coase, R. H. (1937). The nature of the firm. Economica, 4(16),386–405.

Cohen, B. (2006). Sustainable valley entrepreneurial ecosystems.Business Strategy and the Environment, 15(1), 1–14.

Colombo, M. G., Doganova, L., Piva, E., D’Adda, D., & Mustar,P. (2015). Hybrid alliances and radical innovation: the per-formance implications of integrating exploration and exploi-tation. The Journal of Technology Transfer, 40(4), 696–722.

Cunningham, J., O’Reilly, P., O’Kane, C., & Mangematin, V.(2014). The inhibiting factors that principal investigatorsexperience in leading publicly funded research. The Journalof Technology Transfer, 39(1), 93–110.

Cunningham, J. A., O'Reilly, P., O'Kane, C., & Mangematin, V.(2015a). Managerial challenges of publicly funded principalinvestigators. International Journal of TechnologyManagement, 68(3–4), 176–202.

Cunningham, J. A., Mangematin, V., O’Kane, C., & O’Reilly, P.(2015b). At the frontiers of scientific advancement: the fac-tors that influence scientists to become or choose to becomepublicly funded principal investigators. The Journal ofTechnology Transfer, 1–20.

Cunningham, J. A., O’Reilly, P., O’Kane, C., & Mangematin, V.(2016). Publicly funded principal investigators as transfor-mative agents of public sector entrepreneurship. Essays inPublic Sector Entrepreneurship (pp. 67–94). Springer.

Demsetz, H. (1967). Toward a theory of property rights. AmericanEconomic Review, 57, 347–359.

Del Giudice, M., Nicotra, M., Romano, M., & Schillaci, C. E.(2016). Entrepreneurial performance of principal investiga-tors and company culture: relation and influences. Journal ofTechnology Transfer. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10961-016-9499-y.

Elitzur, R., & Gavious, A. (2003). Contracting, signaling, andmoral hazard: a model of entrepreneurs, ‘angels,’ and venturecapitalists. Journal of Business Venturing, 18(6), 709–725.

Etzkowitz, H. (1983). Entrepreneurial scientists and entrepreneur-ial universities in American academic science. Minerva, 21,198–233.

Etzkowitz, H. (2003). Research groups as ‘quasi-firms’: the in-vention of the entrepreneurial university. Research Policy,32(1), 109–121.

Feeney, M., & Welch, E. (2014). Academic outcomes amongprincipal investigators, co-principal investigators, and non-PI researchers. The Journal of Technology Transfer, 39(1),111–133.

Filatotchev, I., Zhang, X., & Piesse, J. (2011). Multiple agencyperspective, family control, and private information abuse in

an emerging economy. Asia Pacific Journal of Management,28(1), 69–93.

Forti, E., Franzoni, C., & Sobrero, M. (2013). Bridges or isolates?Investigating the social networks of academic inventors.Research Policy, 42(8), 1378–1388.

Freeman, C. (1987). Technical innovation, diffusion, and longcycles of economic development. In The long-wave debate(pp. 295–309). Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer.

Freitas, I. M. B., Geuna, A., & Rossi, F. (2013). Finding the rightpartners: institutional and personal modes of governance ofuniversity–industry interactions. Research Policy, 42(1), 50–62.

Gittelman, M., & Kogut, B. (2003). Does good science lead tovaluable knowledge? Biotechnology firms and the evolution-ary logic of citation patterns. Management Science, 49(4),366–382.

Guerrero,M., Cunningham, J. A., &Urbano, D. (2015). Economicimpact of entrepreneurial universities’ activities: an explor-atory study of the United Kingdom. Research Policy, 44(3),748–764.

Hagendijk, R., & Irwin, A. (2006). Public deliberation and gover-nance: engaging with science and technology in contempo-rary Europe. Minerva, 44(2), 167–184.

Holmström, B. (1979). Moral hazard and observability. The BellJournal of Economics, 10(1), 74–91.

Isenberg, D. (2011). The entrepreneurship ecosystem strategy as anew paradigm for economic policy: principles for cultivatingentrepreneurship. Presentation at the Institute of Internationaland European Affairs.

Jain, S., George, G., & Maltarich, M. (2009). Academics orentrepreneurs? Investigating role identity modification ofuniversity scientists involved in commercialization activity.Research Policy, 38(6), 922–935.

Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of the firm:managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure.Journal of Financial Economics, 3(4), 305–360.

Kaplan, R. S., & Norton, D. P. (1995). Putting the balancedscorecard to work. Performance measurement, management,and appraisal sourcebook, 66, 17511.

Kidwell, D. K. (2013). Principal investigators as knowledge bro-kers: a multiple case study of the creative actions of PIs inentrepreneurial science. Technological Forecasting andSocial Change, 80(2), 212–220.

Kidwell, D. K. (2014). Navigating the role of the principal inves-tigator: a comparison of four cases. The Journal ofTechnology Transfer, 39(1), 33–51.

Krugman, P. R. (1991). Geography and trade. MIT press.Kshetri, N. (2014). Developing successful entrepreneurial ecosys-

tems: lessons from a comparison of an Asian tiger and aBaltic tiger. Baltic Journal of Management, 9(3), 330–356.

Kuratko, D. F., & Menter, M. (2017). The role of public policy infostering technology based nascent entrepreneurship. In J. A.Cunningham&C. O’Kane (Eds.), Technology based nascententrepreneurship: implications for economic policymaking(pp. 19–52). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Lam, A. (2010). From ‘ivory tower traditionalists’ to ‘entrepre-neurial scientists’? Academic scientists in fuzzy universityindustry boundaries. Social Studies of Science, 40, 307–340.

Lehmann, E. E., & Menter, M. (2016). University-industry col-laboration and regional wealth. The Journal of TechnologyTransfer, 41(6), 1284–1307.


https://doi.org/10.1007/s10961-016-9499-y

https://doi.org/10.1007/s10961-016-9499-y

Leyden, D. P., & Menter, M. (2017). The legacy and promise ofVannevar Bush: rethinking the model of innovation andthe role of public policy. Economics of Innovation andNew Technology, 1–18, forthcoming. doi:https://doi.org/10.1080/10438599.2017.1329189.

Lundvall, B. Å. (2010). National systems of innovation: toward atheory of innovation and interactive learning (Vol. 2).Anthem Press.

Mack, E., & Mayer, H. (2016). The evolutionary dynamics ofentrepreneurial ecosystems. Urban Studies, 53(10), 2118–2133.

Malecki, E. J. (2011). Connecting local entrepreneurial ecosys-tems to global innovation networks: open innovation, doublenetworks and knowledge integration. International Journalof Entrepreneurship and InnovationManagement, 14(1), 36–59.

Mangematin, V., O’Reilly, P., & Cunningham, J. (2014). PIs asboundary spanners, science and market shapers. The Journalof Technology Transfer, 39(1), 1–10.

Markusen, A. (1996). Sticky places in slippery space: a typologyof industrial districts. Economic Geography, 72(3), 293–313.

Mason, C., & Brown, R. (2014). Entrepreneurial ecosystems andgrowth oriented entrepreneurship. Final Report to OECD,Paris, 30(1), 77–102.

McAdam, R., Miller, K., McAdam, M., & Teague, S. (2012). Thedevelopment of university technology transfer stakeholderrelationships at a regional level: lessons for the future.Technovation, 32(1), 57–67.

Menter, M. (2016). Principal investigators and the commercializa-tion of knowledge. In D. B. Audretsch, E. E. Lehmann, S.Vismara, & M. Meoli (Eds.), University evolution, entrepre-neurial activity and regional competitiveness (pp. 193–203).Heidelberg: Springer.

Murray, F. (2004). The role of academic inventors in entrepreneur-ial firms: sharing the laboratory life. Research Policy, 33(4),643–659.

Nambisan, S., & Baron, R. A. (2013). Entrepreneurship in innova-tion ecosystems: entrepreneurs’ self-regulatory processes andtheir implications for new venture success. EntrepreneurshipTheory and Practice, 37(5), 1071–1097.

O’Kane, C. (2016). Technology transfer executives' back-wards integration: an examination of interactions be-tween university technology transfer executives andprincipal investigators. Technovation. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.technovation.2016.08.001.

O’Kane, C., Cunningham, J., O’Reilly, P., & Mangematin, V.(2015). Underpinning strategic behaviours and posture ofprincipal investigators in transition/uncertain environments.Long Range Planning, 43(3), 200–214.

Organ, D., & Cunningham, J. (2014). Role frame dynamics andthe proliferation of entrepreneurial propensity in the univer-sity context, paper presented at the Technology TransferSociety Conference, John Hopkins University, Baltimore,23–24 October.

Pitelis, C. (2012). Clusters, entrepreneurial ecosystem co-creation,and appropriability: a conceptual framework. Industrial andCorporate Change, 21(6), 1359–1388.

Porter, M. E. (1998). Clusters and the new economics of compe-tition (Vol. 76, No. 6, pp. 77–90). Boston: Harvard BusinessReview.

Slaughter, S., & Leslie, L. L., (1997). Academic capitalism: pol-itics, policies and the entrepreneurial university. The JohnsHopkins University Press, Baltimore, MA. Transfer SocietyConference, John Hopkins University, Baltimore, 23–24October.

Sölvell, Ö. (2015). Construction of the cluster commons. In D. B.Audretsch, A. Link, &M.Walshok (Eds.), The Oxford hand-book of local competitiveness (pp. 84–101). New York:Oxford University Press.

Spigel, B. (2015). The relational organization of entrepreneurialecosystems. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice.https://doi.org/10.1111/etap.12167.

Stam, E. (2015). Entrepreneurial ecosystems and regional policy: asympathetic critique. European Planning Studies, 23(9),1759–1769.

Stam, E., & Bosma, N. (2015). Local policies for high-growthfirms.Oxford Handbook of Local Competitiveness, 286–305.

Stam, E., & Spigel, B. (2016). Entrepreneurial ecosystems andregional policy. In R. Blackburn, D. De Clercq, J. Heinonen,& Z. Wang (Eds.), Sage handbook for entrepreneurship andsmall business. London: SAGE.

Stangler, D., & Bell-Masterson, J. (2015). Measuring an entrepre-neurial ecosystem.Kauffman Foundation Research Series onCity, Metro, and Regional Entrepreneurship, pp. 1–16.

Stephan, P. E., & Levin, S. G. (1996). Property rights and entre-preneurship in science. Small Business Economics, 8(3),177–188.

Stiglitz, J. E. (1975). Incentives, risk, and information: notestowards a theory of hierarchy. The Bell Journal ofEconomics, 6(2), 552–579.

Suresh, J., & Ramraj, R. (2012). Entrepreneurial ecosystem: casestudy on the influence of environmental factors on entrepre-neurial success. European Journal of Business andManagement, 4(16), 95–102.

Szerb, L., Acs, Z. J., Ortega-Argilés, R., & Komlosi, E. (2015).The entrepreneurial ecosystem: the regional entrepreneurshipand development index. Available at SSRN 2642514.

Williamson, O. E. (1975). Markets and hierarchies, analysis andantitrust implications. New York: Simon & Schuster.

Williamson, O. E. (1985). The economic intstitutions of capital-ism. Simon and Schuster.

Williamson, O. E. (1989). Transaction cost economics. Handbookof industrial organization, 1, 135–182.

Zingales, L. (1998). Corporate governance. In The New PalgraveDictionary of Economics (pp. 1–20). Basingstoke: PalgraveMacmillan.

Zucker, L. G., Darby, M. R., & Armstrong, J. S. (2002).Commercializing knowledge: University science, knowledgecapture, and firm performance in biotechnology.Management Science, 48(1), 138–153.


https://doi.org/10.1080/10438599.2017.1329189

https://doi.org/10.1080/10438599.2017.1329189

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.technovation.2016.08.001

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.technovation.2016.08.001

https://doi.org/10.1111/etap.12167

Entrepreneurial ecosystem governance: a principal ...Entrepreneurial ecosystem governance: a...

Documents

Transcript of Entrepreneurial ecosystem governance: a principal ...Entrepreneurial ecosystem governance: a...